Hegel's Primary Approach to the Dialectical Methodology

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HEGEL'S PRIMARY APPROACH TO THE DIALECTICALMETHODOLOGYA REAPPRAISALFRANCIS BAUMLIPhilosophical Forum, Vol 7, 1975-6

IBoth the casual and the discerning reader, when poring through the pagesof Hegel's Logic, are likely to be enamored by the systematic unity andelegance of the triadic dialectical scheme. But more than one commentator has found it difficult to explain the subtleties of that scheme. Thenegativity that characterizes dialectical reason, as well as the necessity ofresolving initially incompatible opposites through the positive work ofspeculative reason, has stymied many a student of Hegel's, and perhapshas required a good deal of patience from the more critical reader. Butregardless of whether one endorses or rejects the dialectical format of theLogic, it at least is apparent that in this work the progressive movement ofdialectic has for its task the resolution or the suspension of contradictoryideas in a unified synthesis which cancels the opposition. This willingnessto cancel opposites and thereby limit the law of contradiction has longbeen a tendency of Eastern philosophy. But, perhaps because of theemphasis on formal logic that has prevailed since Aristotle, the Westernthinker has usually been more skeptical about such reasoning. Hence, it isnot surprising that some of Hegel's readers cast such a skeptical eye onthe methodology of his Logic. Given this uneasiness about the methodology of the Logic, and given that it is so often assumed that themethodologies of both the Logic and the Phenomenology of Mind arealike, it is easy to see why many a reader approaches the Phenomenologywith the same qualms. But, while it has long been customary for philosophers to understand the Phenomenology'by applying the clear scheme ofdialectic that is so explicitly set forth in the Logic, this may be a m istake.After all, the Phenomenology was published several years earlier than theLogic, and the direction or unfolding of thought is very different in the

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two works. It is my opinion that if the blinders that we so quickly assumewhen reading the Logic are rem oved, we will find tha t the earlier dialecticmust be approached differently. This different approach will, I believe,facilitate an understan ding of Hege l's very difficult w ork , and pe rhaps willalso evade some of the prejudices that the more radical dialectic of theLogic causes. The purpose of this paper is then two-fold: to give astatem ent about some of the m ore general methodological assum ptions ofthe Phenomenology of Mind, and to outlipe a specific approach to thedialectical scheme of the work. The further problem of reconciling themethodology of the Phenomenology with that of the Logic is a temptingone, but is far beyond the scope of this paper.

IIHegel's process philosophy, unlike the dualism of Whitehead'smetaphysic, entails a unity of both the process, or generative principle,and the content, or logical stages, of change and growth. One mayabstract the logical description of process and call it dialectic, and onemay, from a slightly different perspective, refer to absolute spirit as theultimate and abiding determinateness of that process; but any suchabstraction must defer to the basic unity. The dialectical process ofmovement occurs within the absolute, but the absolute is the processinsofar as it defines itself; i.e., attains consciousness of itself, by that verymovement. The mo vemen t, or attainm ent of consc iousness, is embodiedin individual persons and cultures which are finite elements of absolutespirit moving toward fuller consciousness; but this is an immanentmo vem ent and may only be described as spirit moving itself. Finite levelsof consciousness may for a time halt their movement and endure a longperiod of stasis, but such periods of stasis, no m atter how long they mightpersist in time, and no matter how great the fear and anxiety may beregarding change, yet will loosen their temporal ties and will follow ahigher logic: "Should that anxious fearfulness wish to remain always inunthinking indolence, thought will agitate the thoughtlessness, its restlessness will disturb that indolence." 1 I.e. it is the nature of consciousness to speculate, no matter how limited this speculation may be. Hence,the temporal span of stasis itself is a finite thing which reflects the finitudeof the static consciousness. It follows from this that Hegel does notemphasize the temporal order of cultural development. Rather, his emphasis is on the logical, or dialectical order which describes the realmof appearances without referring to their logical continuity. Yet,226


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consciousness continually clamors for direction and logical purposive-ness. Consciousness, then, confronts time becauseTime therefore appears as spirit's destiny and necessity, where spirit is not yetcomplete within itself; it is the necessity compelling spirit to enrich the share self-consciousness has in consciousness, to put into motion the immediacy of the inherentnature (which is the form in which the substance is present in consciousness); or,conversely, to realize and make manifest what is inherent, regarded as inward andimmanent, to make manifest that which is atfirstwithini.e. to vindicate it for spirit'scertainty of self.2

Which is to say that "It is only spirit in its entirety that is in time, and theshapes assumed, which are specific embodiments of the whole of spirit assuch, present themselves in a sequence one after the other/' 3 In otherwords, no logical order can ever be had in the temporal domain. Thegestation of spirit at its temporal levels, may only be rationally u nderstoodfrom the ultimate perspective, and will only be completed therein. Thisultimate understanding is identical to the ultimate completion, andthereby involves both the epistcmic and ontological fulfillment of spirit.This fulfillment does not imply that the diversity of knowledge qua spiritcollapses into *\ . . the night in which, as we say , all cows arc black. . . " . 4Rather, absolute spirit is fulfilled because its completed self-consciousness contains the plurality of all logical moments while yet involving atransformation of perspectivea transformation from the limited perspective of finite appearances to the singular and unified perspective oflogical continuity.Since finite consciousness is defined as the initial and continuingmovement of attention, it would be a mistake to say that consciousness isinactive. But nevertheless, there are varying intensities of commitment togrowth in different individual persons. Many persons are more or lesssatisfied with the caprice of feeling, or empty intuition. They affirm theirstate of consciousness by a mere claim to consciousness, withoutaffirming any content for that consciousness. Hence, they do not immersethemselves in the mainstream and rigor of philosophical inquiry. This laxattitude is apparent at the various levels of cultural and individual stasis,and can only be overcome by the intangible and perhaps indefinableupsurge of interest or desire. But this upsurge, which injects a vitalisticfervor into one's approach to knowledge, serves to demolish the distancebetween consciousness and its potential dimensions by moving it towardthe transcenden tal horizon of speculative re ason. In this wa y, consciousness moves toward an embodiment with philosophy, vigorously conjoining its own intellectual existence with the rational system of spirit.5

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This vitalizing tendency is immediately efficacious because the person is not distanced, or removed, from the epistemic and ontologicalprocess of speculative reason. No means is utilized for gaining knowledge, because any supposed means itself is a part of knowledge; i.e. thetools of speculative reason are actually identical to that reason, just asone's body is the participant, and not the incidental probe, in any am orousencounter. Furthermore, no medium need be pierced or dispersed ingaining knowledge. The supposedly intermediate styles whicty appear asan incidental veil to be lifted away, are themselves ontpfogic^l ejernents ofthe very process of reason. They are not a medium precisely becauseconsciousness must embrace and absorb these elements rather than pretend to pierce through them to more elusive stages which, actually, canonly be successfully encountered in their turn.6Although there is no medium or means which are barriers forspeculative reason, there nevertheless are various conscious attitudeswhich might slow the movement of dialectic. Hegel gives a preliminarywarning about these dangers for the sake of aiding the individualconsc iousness. In thefirstof these he points out that, since cqnsciosnessis traversing the various logical stages of the dialectic and is therebycontinually redefining itself as it embodies new levels of awareness, $person's self-identity is always being redefined, and any satisfaction?which one might experience is subject to consequent frustration;44Because of that," Hegel states, "the road can be looked on as the pathof doubt, or more properly a highway of despair/*7 The only w ay tq avoidthis frustration is to cultivate an attitude rather like Augustine's doctrine,of faith seeking reason. Consciousness must realize that the terminus of 4finite satisfaction is for the sake of a more complete satisfaction. Andalthough subsequent satisfactions themselves are temporary andtherefore deceptive, they are so only for the person who gives too muchattention to the various determinate stages of rational progression, anddoes not keep in mind a general commitment to change and transcendence, which can admit a flexible and expansive satisfaction. A seconddanger to be avoided is unproductive doubt, or the feeling that dissatisfaction with a given level of consciousness casts suspicion on the value ofconsciousness itself. To avoid this attitude one must look at past levels ofconsciousness, and therein perceive both the logical continuity and thetendency of prior stages of doubt to discover new levels of consciousnessthrough speculative reason. And a third danger is that a person mightavoid new levels of consciousness, not because he doubts the value of,increased consciousness, but because his satisfaction with his presentlevel of understanding is so habitual that it causes him to fear apy fur-228


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ther consciousness. Of course, the active consideration of furtherconsciousness entails some dissatisfaction with the present level; but ifone combines the present dissatisfaction with a fear of any remedy, then arather unhappy state of alienation is the result. This is a difficult problemto overcome but its best remedy is to introduce consciousness to newlevels of being by a preliminary and vicarious acculturation. This isaccomplished through the contemplation of highly abstract philosophicalconcepts; i.e., turning one's attention to the more general facets of thedialectic in order to overcome one's fear through a gradual familiarization. This familiarization will eventually approach a forthright immersionin the process which will manifest itself as love of knowledge.8But despite these tendencies which might frustrate the activity ofconsciousness, there are several facets of the dialectical process w hich , inaddition to the fact that there is no means nor medium betweenconsciousness and its activity, serve to quicken and encourage growth.The first of these is that as consciousness moves forward in acquiringfurther consciousness, it is never encumbered by the possibility of error.Error, or falsehood, has no meaning within the perspective of absolutespirit since spirit, by containing all its finite moments, unifies and reconciles them. And falsehood has no meaning with regard to the speculativeprogress of consciousness, no matter how finite it may be, since in thedialectical movement, antithetical stages of knowledge are also reconciled. If the idea of falsehood makes any sense within Hegel's system, itonly refers to those times when consciousness might cast a backwardglance at its prior and more limited states. Prior states, since they do notsuffice to describe the present state of consciousness, do not fulfill itsnature and therefore, in a sense, are false to it. But this idea of falsehoodactually describes neither the epistemic nor ontological orientation ofconsciousness. It only refers to a rather incidental posterior, or rearguard, action whereby consc iousness, by its progressing activity, acts inaccord with the process of absolute spirit and thereby resists any regressive tendencies. Any concern with falsehood, as will be emphasizedfurther, is only a limited perspective which is immersed in doubt. Oncethe doubt is rem oved, any idea of falsehood also drops out of the picture.9A second characteristic of the dialectical process which encouragesthe transcending activity of consciousness is the realization of purposive-ness. As consciousness negotiates the various levels of the dialectic, it isencumbered by the continual frustration of satisfaction. But this frustration is transformed into an aid when consciousness realizes that, could itonly attain a level of complete fulfillment, its satisfaction would becomplete and consciousness would not have to transcend itself further.

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This desire for complete satisfaction and the resulting intensity of dialectical movement serves to focus attention toward the absolute, enamoringthe notion with hopes for uniting with its object.10Third, knowledge which is acquired at a certain level of consciousness is not lost as the person moves to a higher plane of awareness.Hence, the person need not experience a sense of loss or abandonmentwhen consciousness expands its boundaries. Each movement is a meansfor supplying further intelligibility to prior understanding, as well asinjecting novel awareness. Dy providing this further intelligibility, consciousness retains prior experiences in a single embodiment, just as theabsolute, at the final stage, contains all prior levels of consciousness. AsHegel says,These stages are not merely differentiated; they supplant one another as beingincompatible with one another. But the ceaseless activity of their own inherent naturemakes them at the same time moments of an organic unity, where they not merely donot contradict one another, but where one is as necessary as the other; and this equalnecessity of all moments constitutes alone and thereby the life of the whole. 11

It is the logical past which makes up the logical presentxwhich, in its turn,points the way to the logical end . Without this on-going inter-contingncy,the Absolute would be lifeless, lacking both its completed unity and itsfinite levels which provide the moving process toward that completion.This retentive aspect of consciousness means that the person embodiesthe assimilated, synthesized knowledge of all his prior experiences, holding the "wealth of the bygone life" present in *'recollection.**12 Thisrecollection is not an intricate, difficult process wherein the attention ofconsciousness intermittently returns to various moments of its prior life;rather, recollection here means that the logical past is lived or expressedin the present. The past is not external because it is embodied; hence;retention of prior consciousness is tacit and manifest by virtue of thisembodiment.13Although the transcending task of consciousness is aided by thisretentive quality, it nevertheless might appear that consciousness wouldinitially be discouraged by the long and difficult path it must traversebefore attaining absolute consciousness, or spirit. But the task is not sodifficult as it first appears. Although the particular person is an embodiedconstruct of knowledge who stands at a certain locus on the logical road tospirit, he travels a road that has already been negotiated, either by othermembers in his own culture, or by other cultures.14 And the knowledgewhich these previous individuals have already assimilated may be trans-230


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ferred to the present individual in a way that lightens his task and shortensits duration. As Hegel says:The particular individual, so far as content is concerned, has also to go throughthe stages through which the general mind has passed , but as shapes once assumed by

mind and now laid aside, as stages of a road which has been worked over and levelledout. Hence it is that, in the case of various kinds of knowledge, we find that what informer days occupied the energies of men of mature mental ability sinks to the level ofinformation, exercises, and even pastimes, for children; and in this educationalprogress we can see the history of the world's culture delineated in faint outline. Thisbygone mode of existence has already become an acquired possession of the generalmind, which constitutes the substance of the individual, and, by thus appearingexternally to him, furnishes his inorganic nature. In this respect culture or development of mind, regarded from the side of the individual, consists in his acquiring whatlies at his hand ready for him, in making its inorganic nature organic to himself, andtaking possession of it for himself.15iIn other words, difficulties which prior individuals have experienced arepresented to the present individual in analogical, rational terms whichmay be assimilated rather spontaneously, without the effort prior individuals have experienced. This is

Because the substance of individual mind, nay, more, because the universal mind atwork in the world, has had the patience to go through these forms in the long stretch oftime's extent, and to take upon itself the prodigious labor of the world's history, whereit bodied forth in each form the entire content of itself, as each is capable of presentingit; and because by nothing less could that all-pervading mind ever manage to becomeconscious of what itself isfor that reason, the individual mind, in the nature of thecase, cannot expect by less toil to grasp what its own substance contains. All the same,its task has meanwhile been made much lighter, because this has historically beenimplicitly accomplished, the content is one where reality is already cancelled forspiritual possibilities, where immediacy has been overcome and brought under thecontrol of reflection, the various forms and shapes have been already reduced to theirintellectual abbreviations, to determinations of thought pure and simple.16

This is to say that when the stumbling-blocks of blind speculation and theagony of doubt are ameliorated by the help of education, the individualembraces the knowledge of his culture by a virtually spontaneous assimilation, and as a result, travels the same steps of the dialectic at a muchfaster rate.Taking this last point into account, and reiterating the first threepoints, these aids to the dialectical process may be summarized as: thedialectical guarantee of truth which relegates apparent error to the statusof finite truth, purposive awareness, the dialectical retention of prior

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knowledge, and the rather spontaneous assimilation of cultural understanding. These four aspects of rational speculation, since they ease thetask of consciousness, give concrete support to Hegel's rather abstractexhortationsthat the person avoid any attitudes which might causealienation, sterile doubt, or despair. With this support, the individual isless likely to think he is encumbered by a means, or medium, whichappears to stand between himself and further consciousness, flence, hiscommitment to self-realization is more active ajid concrete, giving him asense of courage and vitality which reflects the immanent tendencytoward completion which is the very process of absolute spiift.S III

These various guidelines serve as a general methodological basis forHegel's phenomenological ontology. They describe the nature of Hegel,'sdoctrine of absolute spirit, and prescribe both advice and dogma for thesake of easing the toil of finite consciousness. But Hegel's jdi!alecjticalscheme is a more precise attempt to describe how the various movementsof finite consciousness, as it aspires to higher levels of knowledge, arerealized. The immediate purpose of this paper, then, is to describeHegel's dialectic as it occurs in the Phenomenology of Mindi This description is abstracted from an entire reading of the work, and may appearto be rather general; but it would not be very reasonable to exemplify thisproposed interpretation here since a single application would, by itself -,exceed the present length of this paper. Therefore, trusting that the readerwill be generous enough to recall his reading of the Phenomenology forthe sake of tieing this theory in with an example, I wish to propose thefollowing interpretation of Hegel's earlier dialectic:1) At any stage of the dialectic, whether at the first moment ofawareness or a later level, consciousness attains a finite and temporarysatisfaction prior to further dialectical progression. At such points* theperson understands a given construct of knowledge which is the basis ofhis being. At any one point, the person, in his understanding and hisbeing, embodies, in an organized and active way, all the past experienceshe has negotiated in the logical continuity toward complete self-consciousness.2) The temporary satisfaction, attained at any logical ech elon , is onlya partial, or virtual, thing. An element of dissatisfaction always persists.The virtual satisfaction which consciousness has attained tends tobecome boring to the attentive activity of consciousness, and dissatisfac-

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tion tends to eclipse satisfaction. As dissatisfaction becomes more apparent, consciousness, which is no longer willing to rest tranquil with itsbasis of being and Knowledge, begins to feel inadequate to itself. This isthe beginning of an unhappy state which, if not actively resisted, willdegenerate to a state of alienation. This unhappiness is experienced as aninner lacking, which translates into the attitude of desire. This desire ismotivated by the mental pain, or anxiety, that unhappiness causes. Itexpresses itself as a tendency to escape from the center of the self andmove to the periphery, or horizon, of consciousness. As desire reachesbeyond the periphery of present consciousness, it apprehends furtherpossibilities of knowing and being which are not yet specifically grasped.These possibilities serve as encouragement, or as a vague promise thatalternatives exist, even though they may not appear to be viable ones. Ifthe person is at an advanced stage of consciousness, with many experiences behind him, then this tendency toward apprehension may further beencouraged by the sense of continuity, or purposive activity, which theperson has encountered in those previous experiences.3) Consciousness, in this attempt at escape, flees to a very differentlevel of understanding which may loosely be called its opposite, or itscontradiction. This polarity of the new mode of consciousness with theold is established by the very fact that consciousness, in making such aviolent effort to break with its nature, tries to find a way of knowing andbeing; i.e ., living, which is radically different from the old. Consciousnessembraces its new understanding, affirming it as true; but because the newstatus has been embraced as a reaction to the old, the sense of repugnancefor the old way of understanding means that consciousness perceives thetwo levels as utterly incompatiblebelieving that neither can be truewithout the other being false, and that neither can be false without theother being true. Hence, from the perspective of the finite consc iousness,the new level of understanding is thought to be the logical contradiction ofthe old.4) Unfortunately, the new level of understanding, because it wasaccepted hastily, as a mere reaction to the old, offers little in the way ofsatisfaction or ontological familiarity to consciousness. Hence, the personmust actively search, within the context of his present understanding, forsufficient rational grounds to justify his leap of faith and to solidify thenew belief.5) Very quickly, consciousness begins to discover that its desires forfurther knowledge are not satisfied. This is because the persisting sense ofdissatisfaction reflects the prior level of understanding and therefore isseeking relief on foreign territory. In other words, the motivation for

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seeking to make the present level of understanding more concrete has itsroots in a prior level of understanding, even though the rejection of theprior status, and the consequent fixation with the present one, wouldpresuppose that the roots of the persisting doubt were established in thepresent level of understanding at the moment it was conceived.The sense of doubt and dissatisfaction, as well as the activity ofdesire, quickly loses direction. As the person continues his efforts forresolving the difficulties, the painful anxiety becomes more find morepersistent, driving the person to a state of unhappiness that threatens toapproach complete alienation. This is why Hegel calls the road of thedialectic the pathway of despair.6) As dissatisfaction becomes more and more diffuse, one\s.faith inthe new level of awareness is lessen ed, and a sense of doubt is attached tothe new state of knowledge. But this doubt, concomitant with the oldsense of dissatisfaction, also is diffused along the entire spectrum ofbelief, and hence it permeates any sense of satisfaction with the presentgiven as well as the persisting sense of dissatisfaction with the old bplief.As a result, consciousness has no loyalty for either the old or the newgiven. Attention, which desires the tranquility of satisfaction,ivascillatesbetween the new and the old given, and by the very fact that it is nolongerin a state of flight from a given that is repugnant to its desires, he.,because dissatisfaction marks both givens, there is no tendency to see thetwo givens as contradictory. At this point, it is not that both appear to.befalse; rather, concern with truth or falsity drops out of the picture sincethe opposition, no longer externalized as a logical conflict, persists only asan internalized feeling of unhappiness. For this very reason, the peripheryof consciousness is cleansed; it is now ready to solve its problems, not bya flight, but by an attempt to confront dissatisfaction on its own grounds,thereby filling the immediate needs of consciousness with new attentiveawareness without dispensing with its present state of awareness. Unhappiness has chastened consciousness, and brings a new feeling: ofresponsibility about one's entire beingthe embodied unification of one'spast in the present.7) Since the attention of consciousness no longer attempts to fleebeyond its periphery and leave the present state of being behind, the ideaof contradiction, which hinges on the sense of opposition between truthand falsity, is not relevant to the new attempt at knowledge. Both thecancelation of this concern for contradictories, plus the chastisementconsciousness has undergone which encourages a tolerant and evengrateful acceptance of the person's present state of being, are ratherautomatically brought to bear on the secondary level of awareness which234


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consciousness first fled to . But at this point the second level is not eagerlyand prematurely embraced; rather, it is given the attention and consideration that is due any novel mode of knowledge.It is here that a synthesis occurs as understanding moves to anendorsement of the new level of knowledge. Because the two logicallevels are no longer construed to be incompatible, consciousness perceives them both as viable perspectives which, rather than alternatives,are equally relevant to the fulfillment of consciousness. One truth is addedto another, conjoined by a singular act of logical generosity and onticgrowth which-provides the feelings of satisfaction and wonder that areproper to any insight.8) By virture of the synthesis, consciousness attains a new state ofbeing, or knowledge. Again, a virtual satisfaction has been attained,which will persist, as at thefirst evel, until dissatisfaction again upsets theequilibrium.IV

The main aspect of this dialectic is that, unlike the usual interpretation ofthe Logic, there is no tension which persists after the synthetic resolution.There remains no sense of struggle between laws of thought, nor betweena law of thought and a unifying ontic principle. Contradiction is neithervanquished nor resolved; rather, a shift in perspective renders it totallyirrelevant. The perspective of falsity is m erely a finiteand rather alienatedattitude about the self and its desires for satisfaction. Within the dialectical struggle, the old idea of opposition between truth and falsiiy istransformed into the unifying composition of truth becoming an additionto further truth. Truth then is understood as the progressive accruementof ideas. And contradiction, rather than being a struggle between formallaws of thought that is so often thought to characterize the dialectic of theLogic, is understood in the Phenomenology as the doubt whichconsciousness has about its capabilities for attaining further knowledgewithout at the same time rejecting its present level of understanding.When doubt is finally overcom e after a rather trying period of reorientation, the dialectic movesbut not in terms of victory; rather, in the spiritof discovery and creative annexation.

If there are some who believe this description of the dialecticalprocess in the Phenomenology also serves as a proper characterization ofthe dialectic in the Logic, I would not reject such a thesis outright. Butputting further questions about this thesis aside for the present, one point235


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does de serve being ma de. This is that, perhaps because the subject m atterof the Logic is approached in a way that is less phenomenologicallyintimate, it is easier to construe its dialectic as a more austere activity inwhich logically contradictory metaphysical doctrines are resolved only bycontinual recourse to more powerful ontological principles. The purposeof this paper is to suggest that those who understand Hegel's dialectic ofthe Logic this way, make a mistake if they also apply it to thePhenomenology of Mind,Institute of Discourse, Ltd.Maryville, Missouri

NOTES1 G. W. F. Hegel, The Phenomenology of Mind, trans. J, B. Baillie (New York: HarperTorchbooks, 1967), p. 138; & see pp. 92-98, 106. (AH subsequent references are thiswork.)2 p. 800.3 p. 689, & see pp. 689-690, 800-803.4 p. 79, & see pp. 798, 800, 804.5 See pp. 67, 70-77, 82-83. See pp. 131-135.7 p. 135.8 See pp. 70, 80-82, 116-118, 125-127, 137.9 See pp. 84-85, 98-104, 132-133.10 See pp. 83-84, 137-138.11 p. 68, & see p. 69.12 p. 76.13 See pp. 89, 94.14 See p. 89., s pp. 89-90.16 pp. 90-91.

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Hegel's Primary Approach to the Dialectical Methodology