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1 The Danger 1 A Bremen Lecture (1949) by Martin Heidegger (Translated by Simon F. Oliai) En-framing "sets up" that which stands before it and can thus be disposed of. Similarly, en-framing bars access to all proximity as such. In en-framing, where, above all, the indifference underpinned by the lack of distance and contrast is "set up", the lack of proximity gives an insight into the very essence of en-framing as such. That is to say, it probably pertains to the very essence of en-framing (as that in which the lack of proximity is dispensed) for proximity to be barred so long as the logic of en-framing prevails. What be-speaks and announces itself when proximity is barred? How does the essence of en-framing deploy itself therein? Proximity brings closer and thus brings the world closer. 2 The world, on the other hand, is the mirror-play of the fourfold composed of the sky, the earth, the mortals and the gods. Bringing the world closer, that is, bringing it into our proximity is, so to speak, the coming into their thingliness ("Dingen des Dinges") of things. Were the bringing close that characterizes all proximity barred, the thing as the thing would become inaccessible. The universal "setting up" of en-framing leaves all self-presencing no option other that of presenting itself as 1 GA 79, pp.46-67, Vittorio Klostermann, Frankfurt am Main, 1994. 2 Distance and Proximity

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The Danger 1

A Bremen Lecture (1949) by Martin Heidegger

(Translated by Simon F. Oliai)

En-framing "sets up" that which stands before it and can thus be disposed of.

Similarly, en-framing bars access to all proximity as such. In en-framing, where,

above all, the indifference underpinned by the lack of distance and contrast is

"set up", the lack of proximity gives an insight into the very essence of en-framing as

such. That is to say, it probably pertains to the very essence of en-framing (as that in

which the lack of proximity is dispensed) for proximity to be barred so long as the

logic of en-framing prevails. What be-speaks and announces itself when proximity is

barred? How does the essence of en-framing deploy itself therein? Proximity brings

closer and thus brings the world closer.2

The world, on the other hand, is the mirror-play of the fourfold composed of the

sky, the earth, the mortals and the gods. Bringing the world closer, that is, bringing

it into our proximity is, so to speak, the coming into their thingliness ("Dingen des

Dinges") of things. Were the bringing close that characterizes all proximity barred,

the thing as the thing would become inaccessible. The universal "setting up"

of en-framing leaves all self-presencing no option other that of presenting itself as

1 GA 79, pp.46-67, Vittorio Klostermann, Frankfurt am Main, 1994.

2 Distance and Proximity

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a parcel-stock in the disposition of the disposable. As disposable, neither the object

(once more, that is) and even less the thing as the thing would be permissible.

In the deployment of en-framing, the thing as the thing is not preserved. In the

essence of en-framing the thing as the thing is left unprotected. In the context of its

en-framing, the thing is thus left without "the true". In our language, the word

“the true” meant “attentive care”. In our Swabian dialect, the word "the true"

signifies that children have been given to their mother's attentive care. In the

context of its "setting up" ("Stellen") as en-framing, the thing is left without the

attentive caring for, that is to say, without "the true" of its thingly essence3.

En-framing does not protect or care for the thing as the thing. The deployment

of en-framing is indeed tantamount to the loss of the thing's "truth". Whilst en-

framing has, for long and in a concealed manner, prevailed and (through its

"setting up") decisively shortshrifted all presence within the limits of a standing

reserve, the thing as the thing has long been "truthless" because of the essential

hegemony of en-framing. In its drive to pile up, en-framing secures only the

disposableness of a standing reserve. That is to say, it maintains an ontological state

in which, originally and essentially, the unattended thing is left behind to sink

further in the loss of its “truth”.

In the essence of en-framing is dispensed the thing's ”neglect" as the thing.

3 Only this (!) Does it not dispense itself in the dispensed exclusion of the essence of truth?

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The term "neglect" here is taken literally and be-speaks that which has been

thought beforehand. For what is well thought is also well said and vice versa.

"Neglect" does not here denote mere slipping into the state of that which is left

uncared for. Nor does it simply denote falling into disorder. Employed thus, this

term is no mere pejorative one and its use does not entail any value judgment. The

"neglect" of the thing names that which, within the essence of en-framing, manifests

the essence of technology and, as such, springs therefrom. What dispenses itself in

the"neglect" of the thing? What has already occurred when the thing can not,

as it were, "thing" as the thing, that is to say, assume its "thingly" essence as such?

Thinging, so to speak, brings the thing-world close whilst estranging itself from the

world.

When the thing, deprived of its "truth", can not “thing” (given its diminished

character), then access to the world as the world is denied. In the "neglect" of

the thing, the denial of access to the world is thus dispensed. The world is the

concealed mirror-play of the fourfold composed of the sky, the earth, the mortals

and the gods. The world “worlds”, that is to say, it assembles and ordains. Yet, the

“worlding” of the world can not be authentically experienced and correspondingly

thought so long as we remain unskilled in thinking such a “worlding” from out of its

own ground and in conformity with the measure that it provides4. There we need

help. For the “worlding” of the world brings itself to us freely. It is constrained only

where, instead of being thought in terms of the mode of thinking it promises, it is

represented according to other criteria.

4 The „Appropriation’ of Being‟s Dispensation (“Ereignis”)

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These other criteria may in themselves not even be totally foreign to the essence

of the world. It may indeed happen that we take these other criteria (from which we

attempt to understand the “worlding” of the world) as corresponding to that of

the essence of the world whereas, in truth, the “worldling” of the world is precisely

its concealed essence. That is to say, that which we seek to describe through our

characterisation of the “worlding” of the world. Thus, we run the risk of knowingly

going down an unavoidably mistaken path. Yet, if we go down such a path

knowingly, we could in a certain amount of time backtrack. The world is the

fourfold composed of the earth, the sky, the mortals and the gods. The mirror-play

of fourfolding “renders true” all that comes to its thingly essence and, therein,

deploys and dis-assembles itself in the unified whole of its presencing. Since

Antiquity, the presencing of the present is called ηδ εδν or its beingness whilst ηδ

ειναι stands for Being, namely, thε εδνηα of entities, the esse entium. The world

dispenses, clears and thus “guards” the “thinging” of the things, that is to say, their

coming into their thingly essence. The world “guards” the essence of presencing as

such. The world “guards” and thus “renders true”(in its “worlding”) the essence of

Being which deploys and dispenses the beingness of entities.

We now set the world on what we have known thus far as the Being of entities.

Presented as such, the world is “guarded ”and “rendered true” by Being in its

essence. As its “guarding ”, the world is the “rendering true ”of the essence of Being.

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Instead of saying “rendering true”, we shall simply say the “truth” and thereby try to

think this fundamental concept more originally on the basis of the “worldling”

of the world, that is to say, the assembling-ordaining brought about by the world.

The hitherto concealed mirror-play in the fourfold of the earth, the sky as well as

the gods and the mortals “worlds” as the world. The world is the “truth” of the

essence of Being. Thus far, we have characterised the world with regards to Being.

The world, thus represented, is subordinated to Being whereas, in “truth”, the

essence of Being is deployed and dispensed from the concealed “worldling” of the

world5. The world is not a manner of Being and a subordinate one at that.

Being appropriates its essence from the “worldling” of the world. What this means

is that the “worlding” of the world is that which dispenses Being in a hitherto

unfamiliar and unexperienced sense of this term. When the world first dispenses in

its own fashion, Being as well as “Nothing” disappear with it in its “worlding”.

Only when “Nothing ”(which, in its essence, springs forth from the “truth” of Being)

has disappeared into the “truth” of Being, shall nihilism be overcome. Yet, the

world as the world estranges and divests itself in its own concealment. Remaining

concealed in Greek is referred to as λαυθαυειν 6. Ληθη is concealment. The world,

in the self-estrangement that its own “worlding” begets, remains concealed as the

essence-origin of Being. However, the world remains concealed (Ληθη) in such a

manner that its concealment procures and guards an unconcealment:Αληθεια.

5 ibid

6 Being hidden and sheltered (“Entbergung”)

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Such an unconcealment is the cleared “saving” (« Βergen”) of the presencing of that

which comes to presence in unconcealment. An entity (in its being) deploys itself as

that which presents itself from out of Aληθεια. In the unconcealment of all that

comes into presence as such, that is to say, in Αληθεια the entire realm of the essence

of the history of the Being of entities is dispensed and reposes. Αληθεια dispenses

itself in the cleared “saving”(“lichtende Bergen”) of presencing. It does so in such a

way that an entity unfolds itself in the historicity of its presencing. Aληθεια is the

history of Being and, as such, engulfs and outlines the entire breadth of the history

of Being in its various epochs.

A-ληθεια, that is to say, the unconcealment of entities as coming into presence

as such, deploys itself only when and so long as Ληθη dispenses itself as

concealment. As such, Aληθεια does not preclude Ληθη, that is to say,

unconcealment does not exhaust concealment. Rather unconcealment requires

concealment and confirms it as the essential origin of all Aληθεια. The latter

is contained in and contains itself in Ληθη. Yet, this rapport was decided in

such a manner as to make Aληθεια as such7 retreat into concealment, that is to say,

in favour of the presence of entities as such. Thus, the presence of entities arrogated

to itself the ontological priority of that against backdrop of which it had been

deployed in a singular manner.

7 Guards, “renders true” and remains behind -- therefrom first δρθδης

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The coming into presence of entities can dispense its protective “rendering true”

(in the clearing coextensive with the opening of a world) only in as far as

unconcealment dispenses itself and allows the former to be experienced and

represented or not. Indeed, Aλήθεια does not guard its own truth in its own essence.

It recoils into concealment, Ληθη. Thus, forgetting suits Aληθεια. One must note

that the forgetting of Aληθεια does in no way persist since a human representation

has somehow not retained something in its memorising. Rather, forgetting, that is

to say, the retreating into concealment, dispenses itself togetherwith Aληθεια and in

favour of all presence which, fundamentally, is rooted in and springs forth from

unconcealment. Ληθη is the forgetting of the “rendering true” of the essence of

Being. As such, Ληθη is precisely the essential root and the origin of the institution

of any mode of Being. The shortshrifted and easily misunderstood expression,

“forgetting of Being” says that the essence of Being, that is to say, presencing

harvests its origin from out of Aληθεια as the dispensation of the latter. An origin

which, together with Aληθεια, retreat into concealment8. In thus retreating into

concealment, Aληθεια as well as all coming into presence divest themselves of their

ontological primacy. In so far as they divests themselves in such a way, they remain9

inaccessible to all human understanding and representation. For this very reason,

human thinking can not think the essence of unconcealment and presencing in

themselves. Thus, in retrospect, one can not possibly say that human thinking must

8 Remains therein

9 Unmediated, that is.

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have hitherto forgotten the essence of Being. Human thinking “forgets” the essence

the Being in such a way only in as far as Being’s own essence retreats into

concealment as forgetting10

. This dispensation lies in the estrangement of the world

as the “guarding-guardian” (“Wahrnis”) of the essence of Being. One can find signs

that such an estrangement, which dispenses itself therein, is concealed in the

history of Being. A history which dispenses and submits itself to various epochs of

the “forgetting of Being”. These epochs are ontologically conditioned by the same

“guarding concealment” (“Entbergung”) of entities (in their Being) in the context of

Western European history which has, by now, come to engulf the totality of the

planet. The concentration on the modern struggle for the mastery of the earth,

which characterises the respective positions of both of today’s world “powers”,

also presupposes the said concealment.

The estrangment of the world dispenses itself as the “neglect” of things11

.

The estrangement of the world and the “neglect” of things are part and parcel

of a unique attitude. As such, they are the “same” but they are not equal.

In what manner does the estrangement of the world dispense itself as

the “neglect” of things? One in which en-framing is deployed and prevails.

For en-framing “sets up” all entities as the disposable stock of a standing reserve.

“Setting them” up as the disposable stock of a standing reserve, en-framing “sets up”

entities in its own characteristic lack of distance and contrast (“das Abstandlose”).

10

The forgetting of the difference, the neglect of the thing-estrangement from the world. 11

Of presencing

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This is how en-framing relates to all presencing as such. Yet, in its essence, en-

framing is the essence of Being, that is to say, the most visible and, probably,

complete expression of its history. En-framing is the essence of modern technology.

The essence of en-framing is the Being of entities (neither above or beyond them)

which is now entirely forgot there. That is to say, eclipsed in the dispensation

that characterises the epoch in which Being as en-framing is fully deployed.

An epoch that is one of the complete “neglect” of things through en-framing.

The world, that is to say, the dispensation of the “worlding” of things as things,

remains concealed. Even though it is this very concealment that underpins the

unconcealment of entities and, in such a way, guards the presencing of the

Being of entities. The world is the truth of the essence of Being that guards the

determination as well as the dispensation of the latter in its history.

En-framing is Being itself, that is to say, presencing (as an entity) as such in the

prevalent manner of the “neglect” of the thing. The world and en-framing are

the “same”. On the other hand, the “same” is never the equal. Even less would the

“same” be the indifferent togetherness of the identical. The “same” is rather the

rapport of the different. “Sameness” is “savedness”, that is to say, that which is

necessarily dispensed and “guarded” in such a self-enowning rapport and, in the

narrower sense of the term, retained therein. The “world ” and en-framing are the

“same” and thus, even up to the outermost expressions of their respectives essences,

remain opposed to each other.

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Yet, the opposition between the world and en-framing is no mere representable

opposition of two present objects, that is to say, an opposition that would be

“present-at-hand”. Such an opposition dispenses itself as the expression of the

very deployed essence of Being. In so far as en-framing “sets up” all entities as

disposables in a standing reserve, it also “sets up” the presencing of entities from

its essential origin, that is to say, from Aληθεια. En-framing lets, through the

“setting up” that underpins all disposing of a standing reserve as such, the lack of

distance and contrast prevail. Thus, everything seems of an equally disposable

value. Yet, such an equalisation does not accord much importance to the if and the

how of its own deployment as the unconcealed against the backdrop of a concealed

other. Through the “setting up” that underpins the disposing of a standing reserve,

en-framing lets unconcealment and its essence fall into complete oblivion.

En-framing, as the essence of Being, “sets up” Being outside the truth of its essence

and therefore pits Being against its own very essence. As long as en-framing

prevails, Being is pitted against the truth of its own essence without however being

able to sever itself from it in the context of this very self-opposition and self-

abjuration. The world, that is to say, the “guarding” and the “rendering true” of the

essence of Being, sets itself upon the path charted by the hegemony of en-framing

whilst the world is estranged through the “neglect” of things. In the essence and the

institution of en-framing, the occurence of the “worlding” of the world is thus

stalled.

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The dispensation of the said stalling underpins the concealed distance that

separates from the “worlding” of the world12

. In en-framing, as the most complete

dispensation of the forgetting of the essence of Being, shines forth, nevertheless, a

ray that reflects the distant origin of the world. In so far as the world estranges itself

from its own “worlding”, one can not say that nothing comes from the world.

Rather, such an estrangement reflects the greatest proximity of that which is most

distant from the world.

The world and en-framing are the same. They are the different facets of the essence

of Being. The world is the “rendering true” of the essence of Being. En-framing is the

most complete forgetting of the truth of Being. The “same” in question here (which

is the differentiated essence of Being) finds itself in an opposition (from within itself)

and, indeed, in such a way that the world is pitted against itself in a concealed

manner in the context of en-framing. En-framing, on the other hand, not only severs

itself from the concealed “worlding” of the world but it also “sets up” all entities as

disposables in a standing reserve, that is to say, it imposes an ontological state

whose imposition presupposes the completion of the forgetting of all “worldling”.

In such a manner, en-framing persecutes and “up-sets” the truth of the

essence of Being13

. This “up-setting” is the authentic “setting up” that is

12

Only possible in so far as en-framing is the appropriation of the dispensation of Being ( “Ereignis”) 13

That is one-sidedly severed from the “world”

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dispensed in the essence of en-framing. In this “up-setting”14

lies, first and

foremost, the “setting up” that is charactertistic of all en-framing and which

(through the “set up”of all entities as disposables in a standing reserve)

sets them upon the path of their “neglect ”. The innermost essence of all

“setting up”, which dispenses and deploys itself as en-framing, is thus the most

characteristically distinctive manner of persecuting, that is to say, “up-setting”.

In old High German, persecutory “up-setting” (“nachstellen”) is called “fara”.

The danger is the self-assembling “setting up” as persecutory “up-setting”.

“Up-setting” is indeed the ground of the essence of the danger. In so far as Being

persecutes and “up-sets” itself as en-framing and “sets up” the forgetting of its own

essence, Being (“Seyn”) as Being is, indeed, the danger to its own very essence.

Thought in the context of the estrangement of the world and the “neglect” of things,

Being is the danger15

. Being is, simply, in and out of itself the danger to itself. As the

“up-setting” that persecutes, that is to say, “up-sets” its own essence through its own

forgetting, Being as Being is the danger. This essential dangerousness is the mode in

which, as the “same”, that is to say, as the world and en-framing (different facets

of the essence of Being), Being opposes and destitutes itself. For us the thought

that Being dispenses itself as its own danger may appear strange and easily

misunderstood. Thus, we can only think the above-mentioned thought correctly

when we formulate it in the following manner: Being, which is here thought from

out of its own “up-settingly” persecutory essence, must in no way be thought as

endowed with a “dangerous” character. Rather, the danger lies in Being’s reversal.

14

Here, the term is employed differently than in all theory and reflection as such and yet in a manner

that is not without relation to both. 15

Turned upside down (“umgekhert”)

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This means that the hitherto unfolded conception of Being that was derived from

the metaphyics of idea belongs (in accordance with its concealed essence) to that

which now as the danger prevails on Being. The danger is the self-gathering “up-

setting” which, as en-framing and through the “neglect” of things, persecutes the

self-estranged world with the forgetting of its truth. The essence of technology is en-

framing. The essence of en-framing is the danger. Being, in its very essence, is the

danger to itself. Only when it is understood as a danger in such a manner can the

danger in itself likewise be considered as dangerous by man’s thinking of Being.

The realm of the dangerousness of the danger, one which all thinking must

experience from out of the essence of Being, is what (in another context and at an

earlier times) was referred to as that of error. Yet, one must note that error here is

not understood as some shortcoming or deficiency of knowledge since erring as such

belongs to the very essence of “truth” in the sense of the unconcealment of Being.

The essence of all error lies in the essence of Being as the danger. The greatest

danger lies in the perspective wherein the danger as the danger is concealed and not

recognised as such. “Up-setting” the essence of Being, en-framing thus displays its

essential dangerousness. Therein, it may happen that we may not become aware of

this essence of Being that is a danger to its own very essence. We do not at all

experience the danger as the danger. We do not experience en-framing as the self-

persecutory and “up-setting” disguise of Being’s own essence. We do not experience,

profoundly that is, the essential danger that characterizes Being’s self-relation even

though entities are everywhere beset with all manner of danger and distress.

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Instead of re-orienting us towards the danger that lies in the very essence of Being,

tribulations and distress of varying sorts make us blind to the danger.Indeed,

the latter’s most dangerous quality lies in that it does not show itself as a danger. It

may seem that Being itself is innocuous. Some may even think that it is the emptiest

and the most general concept there is and, thus, what could be less harmless than

that if not an even emptier concept? Another such concept is the Being of the

ultimate “same”, that is to say, the entity that is most endowed with being, namely,

God16

. The danger, as which the essence of en-framing dispenses itself in the

framework of the domination of technology, is greatest when, in the midst of

particular dangers, only that which is not fundamentally dangerous expresses itself

within the overall context of numerous and contingent forms of distress. In the wake

of every danger, a Distress comes to revolve around it. Such a Distress di-stresses.

Its oft reduced to that which perplexes and squeezed as the insoluble. Assuredly,

where the danger conceals itself, there the Di-stress is bound to veil itself. There, the

Di-stress is not experienced as Di-stress. One encounters much distress and suffering

and attempts to eliminate or diminish these in a case by case manner. A manner that

is underpinned by the general disposition which aims at alleviating all suffering as

such. One which, as far as alleviating insignificant cases of suffering is concerned,

leaves no possible means untested and indeed alleviates a great variety of suffering

and soothes many a distress. All the same, in so doing, one still fails to take into

account the Di-stress itself.

16

Granted that God is not Being itself but the most being of beings (“das Seiendste”), who can

now dare say that a God thus represented is the Danger for Being ?

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As far as the Di-stress is concerned, the greatest danger, that is to say,

the seeming lack of Di-stress rules in the midst of external dangers. In truth,

even though it is veiled, the apparent lack of Di-stress is the authentic distress.

Everyone suffers distresses and yet no one really perseveres in the Di-stress. Thus,

the danger does not persistently manifest itself as such. Is there a painting in which

we may remark the Di-stress and the hegemony of its apparent lack? There is

indeed that which is noteworthy and yet we do not take note of.

Hundreds of thousands die on a mass scale. Yet, one can ask, do they die?

They perish and are dispersed. Do they really die? They become the stock

of a standing reserve set up to fabricate corpses. Do they die? They are liquidated

in death camps in an inconspicuous manner. Besides all of this, millions now sink

in utter misery and end up perishing of hunger in China. Dying means bringing

death unto its essence. Being able to die means that one can indeed assume and bear

the movement of such a bringing-unto. We can only assume and bear this movement

only when our own essence corresponds to the essence of death and makes its

expression possible. Thus, in the midst of untold deaths, the very essence of death

remains disguised. Death is neither pure nothingness nor is it a mere transition from

one entity to another. Death belongs to and springs forth from the essence of men’s

existence dispensed by Being. As such, it shelters the very essence of Being. Death is

the highest mountain range (“höchste Gebirg der Wahrheit des Seyns selbst”) and the

precious hearth of the “truth” of Being.

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That is to say, the hearth wherein the concealment of the essence of Being is

sheltered and the fruits of the sheltering of its essence are harvested and gathered.

Therein, man can only correspond to and render possible the expression of Death

only if Being itself gathers the essence of man from out of the “truth” of its own

essence. Death is the Hearth of Being in the Poem of the World.

Corresponding and making possible the expression of death is called being

able to die. Whoever can die is mortal only in a sense that is derived from and

dependent on the original sense of these words. Mass scale suffering, unspoken

and gruesome instances of disconcerting death abound and yet the essence of

death remains disguised and inaccessible to men. Man is thus no longer mortal.

Immeasurably great suffering creeps and rages over the earth. The flood tide of

sorrow and misery rises. Yet, the essence of suffering conceals itself. Suffering

is the rift (“der Riss”) wherein the very ground of the fourfold of the world

displays itself in all its particularity (“eingezeichnet ist”). From out of this ground,

that which is great receives its greatness, that is to say, that which is great for

men as such. In the rift of suffering, the highly saved saves its saving as such. The

rift of suffering thus traverses the complete stretch from the expression of goodwill

to an uncharted port of grace and compassion. Unspeakable and immense grief

oppresses us everywhere. Yet, we remain deprived of suffering since we are not

enowned and claimed by the essence of suffering. A gruesome impoverishment

spreads itself around. The herd of the poor grows and grows. Yet, the essence of

poverty conceals itself.

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Therein, it is dispensed that the simple wherewithal of the essential be brought,

albeit imperceptibly, to belong to the innermostness where the thing may indeed

inhabit a saved world. Death, the hearth and the rock of Being, Suffering,

the very ground of Being, Poverty, the ownmost freeing of Being unto itself, are

remarkable in as much as, therein, the Danger makes it appears that the Distress

is lacking in the midst of the surrounding distresses and, thus, the Danger is not

the danger. The Danger masks itself in as much as it disguises itself though en-

framing. The latter fully realises itself in that of which it is the essence as such, that

is to say, technology. That is why our attitude towards technology is so odd and

peculiar. In what sense is it odd and peculiar? In that, so long as the essence of

technology is not thought as en-framing and whilst neither the essence of en-framing

is thought as the Danger nor the latter’s essence is illustrated as Being itself, we shall

continue to misinterpret technology. That is to say, precisely we shall misinterpret it

now that everything seems determined through the manifold expressions of

technology and its various realisations. Indeed, we either think too little of

technology or linger too long thereupon.

We may even be tempted to resume the preceding and detailed discussion of

technology, en-framing and the Danger by concluding that technology must be

a danger. Indeed, one hears everywhere such a judgement passed on technology

in a sufficiently loud and forceful manner. Some even go farther in their judgement.

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One even affirms that technology is the doom of all higher culture and shall

violently lower everything down to the level of mere civilisation. Technology is

described is the catastrophe of the modern world. One that shall certainly

decline in the wake of the irresistible sway of technology. Today, such judgements

are passionately pronounced as warnings that can frigthen and discourage us.

In many different ways, they determine dominant, contemporary views of

technology and yet they do not account for the fact that one is simultaneously and

voraciously obliged to follow and perhaps even further pursue the progress of

technology. Here, the latter does not contradict our judgement of or attitude

towards technology. In any case, contradiction as such does not amount to

a valid objection. For what does not contradict itself in our existence and

nevertheless remains real, perhaps even more so than that which is smoothly

coherent? We have now mentioned these known views only because we are

interested in understanding how they represent modern technology. These do

not think technology on the basis of its essence and origin. Rather, they think of

technology within the perspective of its accomplishments and in relationship to the

whole of reality as such. By which one means that which lies outside the domain of

technology’s essence, to wit, culture, politics, ethics or religion. Thus, with these

man reckons how technology, as one among many other so-called “realities”,

concerns and relates to them.

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One berates technology for its provoking (“herausfordern”) of other realities as well

as the manner in which it aggressively enframes them and brings about beneficial

and harmful effects. One therefore thinks of technology technically. Technology is

thus subordinated to the power of technical evaluations. Yet, technical judgements

on technology never attain its essence. Indeed, so little can they make headway in

attaining it that they even forbid access to it.

The mentioned characterisations never think the essence of technology. Moreover,

given that their judgements on technology do not spring forth from the domain of

its essence, they remain no more than superficial prejudices. This is why it is

immaterial whether we detest technology as mankind’s doom or praise it as

mankind’s greatest achievement and the instrument of its redemption. Our

comportment towards technology remains confused and fragmented. By not

venturing upon the path of thinking, our finite human essence risks setting

the essence of technology aside (not just its achievements or mere utility) and may

end up retching itself on it by approaching it in a haphazard manner that is

bedevilled by the ambiguity of technology’s essence.

By retching itself up in such a way, one would miss the possibility of accomplishing

of what one fundamentally aspires to, namely, steering technology in a manner

worthy of man through human action. Indeed, how could we do this humanely, in

grand style and in conformity with an historically dispensed sense, so long as the

question of the essence of technology and its essential relationship to man’s essence

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is not seriously seized upon? So long as we do not carefully observe that we must

first open up thinking and reflection on the domain of the essence of technology

(“Wesenbereich der Technik”) and, instead, continue to mull over it in a technical

fashion, we shall not be able to make any appropriate decision concerning

technology.

There are interpretations of technology which assert that it is neither something

evil nor something good. One says that technology is neutral in character and all

depends on how one engages with it and what one makes out of it. All depends on

whether man is in a condition that would enable him to take control of technology

and will its subjection to higher goals. All is decided by whether man can steer

technology in a moral and religious manner. A view such as the foregoing does not

naysay the seriousness of our responsibility in tackling technology and yet, through

such a meditation on technology, one thinks it as little in terms of its own essence as

through its previously mentioned interpretations. For whoever regards technology

as something neutral would indeed represent it as an instrument with which other

instruments could be put to use or installed. Whoever takes technology to be

something neutral shall in turn have to represent it instrumentally, that is to say,

technically. But technology does not exclusively consist of the technical and conceals

its essence therein. The essence of technology itself is not technical.

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Admittedly, some hold technology to be something neutral and evaluate it as such.

The captious appearance of such a view of technology reinforces the impression that

such an interpretation of technology is objective whereas it is not at all value free.

Indeed, its captious appearance is deceptive. Whether one holds technology to

be something diabolical, something divine or something neutral, in all these

representations and valuations the phenomenon of technology is approached in

an exterior and unessential manner.

For, in all of them technology is viewed as an means to an end. By interpreting

technology as a means, one places and situates it in the hands of man and represents

it as a reality among many other realities. Whoever takes technology to be a means,

be it an essential or an inessential one, oft portrays it in the context of its invariably

positive appraisals and wishes to undertake and complete a worthy explication of it.

In truth, however, technology is devalued (in its essence) whenever it is regarded as

a means or a tool. For it is regarded as some being among many others whereas

it is in technology and as technology that Being deploys and dispenses itself.

On the other hand, when one seeks to think the essence of technology within the

prevalent and universal framework of the consolidation of “setting up” as such,

that is to say, experience and think it as en-framing, the implicit claim of such

a thinking is that of appreciating technology in a way that can hardly be surpassed

by contemporary thought.

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Yet, we have not alluded to the usual and contemporary opinions of technology here

in order to contend that they somehow abandon thinking or criticise them for being

inadequate in their relation to the essence of technology and thus refute them as

deficient judgements thereof. Various historically necessary and dominant views of

technology have been solely contemplated on here in order to elucidate how the

dominant essence of technology ordains human representation of it. For the

essential dominance of the essence of technology does not primarily lie in the

workings of high frequency machines but is found where technology presents and

fashions human representation as, first and foremost, technical. Indeed, the very

essence of technology, that is to say, en-framing carries out such a disguise. Such a

self-disguising of enframing can be well revealed as such where one had long

fumbled in the dark and divested technology of its essential attribute by viewing

it as a mere application of a means to an end. Whereas, it is technology that has

inverted the equation by drawing man behind it as its instrument. Quite possibly,

men have also blindly followed this path and, all the while, unwittingly travailed

themselves over how to use technology in a healthy and useful manner.

Be that as it may, technology is not, in the end, a mere instrument since from its

very essential beginning (“von ihrem Wesenanfang”) it has never become a means

in the hands of men. It has been overshadowed within the backdrop of its utilisation

as a means even though the everyday semblance provided by numerous

technological accomplishments may present a different picture. For this very

reason, when one realises, here and there, that, in truth, technology can indeed be

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something other than a mere means, one oft trys- through the use of grandiloquent

and unexamined expressions- to free oneself of the spell which has been cast on

man’s essence by that of technology’s. One says that technology is something

demonic and that the demonic character of technology enmeshes men’s will and

interaction in a tragic manner. In an epoch of distress such as ours, it behooves us

not to make light use of words which originate in the language of an epoch of great

thinking in which the highly thought domain of the manifestation of the Gods, that

is to say, δαζμουες, and of Destiny, ηυχη, once shone and “guarded”.

The perplexing fear of the supposedly demonic character of technology and

its supposedly tragic consequences is, in truth, anguish in face of the thinking which

thinks what is. That is to say, a thinking which soberly seeks its path-beyond the

mere stunting or sharpening of the intellect and sentimentalism- in and through

thinking. In its essence, technology is neither a means to an end nor an end in itself.

It essence institutes beyond the domain of means and ends in a domain which is

determined by all primordial realisation as it were and, as such, can indeed be

delimited as the domain of the real. In its essence, technology is no reality in the

midst of many others. For it is the concealed ground of the reality of all that is now

real. The ground of all reality is presence. Presencing belongs to the very essence of

Being.

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The essence of technology is Being in the essential form of enframing. Yet, the

essence of enframing is the Danger. Let us think clearly: enframing itself is not

the Danger since dangeorus and threatening consequences can supposedly spring

from the essence of technology. The Danger is not enframing as technology but,

rather, as Being. The essence of the Danger is Being itself in so far as it “sets up”,

that is to say, persecutes (“nachstellt”) the “truth” of its own essence through its

forgetting. Since the essence of technology should not be thought as being more

restricted than that of Being’s, it is designated here with the unfamiliar expression,

en-framing.

Given that we have thought the essence of technology as the Being of beings

in the same train of thought on the matter of our reflection, we could use the same

expression to designate the essence of technology and the word en-framing could

indeed be considered as a shorthand for both. The word “setting up” (“stellen”)

is derived from the Greek term θεζις provided, that is, we think in the Greek

manner. In this case, what does thinking in the Greek manner mean? It means

taking into consideration which clearing of the essence of Being had come to claim

(and was presuspposed) by which manner of existence that pertained to the ancient

Greeks. It means thinking, at the very outset, in which dispensation of Being such an

unconcealment of the Being of the ancient Greeks had indeed stood and how such a

dispensation’s fundamental claim to their existence spoke its own language and,

indeed, spoke every word of this language. Such a taking into consideration of that

which is Greek is singularly more difficult than the practice of classical philology.

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That is why it is more exposed to error than the mentioned science. Thinking in the

Greek manner does not mean merely turning to lessons in classical philology.

Were it to mean only this, we would run the danger of not knowing the mentioned

science’s obvious presuppositions by delivering our thinking and that which it must

think to a determined form of historical representation.

What would the word θεζις mean when we think in the Greek manner? θεζις means

“setting up” and positing. Such a “setting up” springs from Φυαις in such a way that

it is determined by the same Φυαις and within its very domain. What this means is

that within Φυαις a certain θεζις-like character is concealed. In the world of the

Greeks, a crucial difference bespoke through terms such as θυζει and θεζις.

The difference concerned the manner of the presencing of that which is present as

such, i.e., Being. θεζει, θεζς must, therefrom, be thought in relation to Being. Thus,

the rapport between Being and “setting up” announced itself in the first epoch of the

history of Being. Let us note that, in retrospect, it is not strange that in a subsequent

epoch Being should dispense itself in the manner of a “setting up” in the sense of en-

framing. At which point, we must note (this must still be further refined) that en-

framing must be thought of as an outgrowth of the former and, as such, must be

thought as the assembling of all growth. En-framing: the assembling of “setting up”

in the mentioned sense of ordering, “up-setting” and persecuting (“nach-stellen”).

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It is not strange that the essence of Being has forged an essential rapport with

“setting up” and positing. What is strange is that for a hundred years one has never

sought to question and examine this rapport. At the dawn of Being’s history, in

what sense and in what manner does a θεζις-like character deploy itself in Being,

that is, Φυζις ? The latter means the self-illuminating arising, educing and bringing

forth of all presence from out of concealment into unconcealment. Φνζις is the self-

illuminating arising of bringing-forth as such. We do not however use the term

“bringing forth” in its usual and harmless connotation here, one whose explication

may not seem necessary.

Rather, we must rigourously think “bringing-forth” in the unity of the dimension

which is linked to and links all concealment (Ληθη) to unconcealment (Α-ληθεια) in

an essential manner and “guards” them both interchangeably. Thought in the Greek

sense of Φυζις, “bringing forth” means bringing here unto unconcealement from

concealment. This bringing means that one lets something come forth from out of

itself17

. Only when Φυζις disposes, θεαις is possible and necessary. Only when such

a “bringing forth” in the “mounting”(“Hervorbringen An-gebrachtes”)of an entity

deploys (“anwest”) itself, can a given entity (a rock) and, from it and through

human “setting up”, another entity (a stone staircase) be installed among other

already present entities (the rising crag and its base). This latter entity (the

staircase) deploys itself in the manner of that which, through all human “setting up”

in installation, comes to assume a standing and permanent character.

17

Λδγος: Bringing forth into setting forth, let set forth.

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That which is thus made to stand and assume a permanent character through

θεζει deploys itself differently from that which is “brought forth” and installed

through θνζει . Nevertheless, the latter underpins the fact that, in Φνζις, both

that which is brought before and onto, that is to say, entities, are represented as

standing before us in a permanent fashion. Yet, that which is thus brought to stand

before us, that is to say, into concealment has not been “brought forth” through

some human installing18

but, rather, through that which “brings itself forth” before

us. Bringing in the manner of Φνζις is a disposing out of itself, a “setting up” that

is a self-installation through entities into unconcealment . Φυζις, that is to say,

self-installing in unconcealment is letting entities present themselves into

unconcealment19

. Letting entities thus present themselves is the Being of entities.

Therefrom and early on, Φνζις showed itself to be a “self-bringing forth” whose

character is that of a “setting up”. A “setting up” that is not brought about through

some human endeavour but one which brings about all human setting forth and

representation as such . In which, unconcealment is alloted to all human ordering

and directing as such whilst a sheltering within unconcealment is also brought about

and “set up”. Yet, the outline of such a “setting up” (one that is freely let be and

sheltered through “bringing forth” as such) does not pertain to that which, through

the essence of Being and its history, is dispensed as en-framing20

.

18

ποιησις 19

Bringing into Proximity; to guard and save all “pre-sencing” 20

This sounds ambiguous (!)

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Nevertheless, “setting up” deploys itself in the manner of the “upsetting set up”of

en-framing which, by virtue of a common and concealed origin, seems to be

essentially interchangeable with “setting up” in the sense of Φυζις. The term en-

framing names the essence of technology. Technology deploys itself in the manner

of an “upsetting set up” not because technological procedures are used in

manufacturing and employing machines which to us appears as en-framing in the

sense of the linkage of bars and equipments. The essence of technology bears the

name en-framing since in the “setting up” of all en-framing Being itself is to be

found. That is to say, Being which, since the beginning of its history, has illumined

itself as Φυιζς, as “setting up” that emerges and “brings forth” out of itself. From the

essence of Being, from Φυιζς, Being- which deploys itself as enframing- derives its

name. The geneaology of en-framing as the essence of technology has been situated

in the essential origin of the European-planetary history of Being, one which has

emerged from out of Φνζις. Wherein, unconcealment has come to claim entities

as their fulfilled originary essence. Since the early epoch of Greek thought,

unconcealment’s claim to entities has not been a silent one. Indeed, it was last be-

spoken in Nietzsche’s conception of the Will to Power that deploys itself as the

Eternal Recurrence of the Same. What a thinker says of Being is not his opinion.

That which is said in his thinking (“Das Gesagte”) is the telling echo of the claim

as which Being deploys itself and within which it brings itself onto language.

Being an echo is both rarer and more difficult than having an opinion and

defending standpoints. Being an echo is the suffering of thinking.

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One whose quiet sobriety bespeaks its passion. A thinking that is infinitely more

difficult and fraught with danger than the oft cited and supposedly authoritative

objectivity of scientific research. To be an echo, namely, to bespeak the claim of

Being requires an accuracy of language of which the technico-technological

linguistic style of sciences assuredly knows nothing. The international character of

all scientific language is the strongest proof of its homelessness and rootlessness.

However, this does not at all mean that the rootedness of language is protected

and determined or bestowed thereupon by the merely National (“das bloβ

Nationale im geringsten ”) in the narrowest sense of the term.

The rooted character of a higher language thrives only in the realm of the uncanny

claim made by the intrinsic silence of the essence of Being. The term en-framing

serves, when used to speak of technology to whose thinking it belongs, to determine

an epoch of Being whilst its essence, that is to say, “setting up”, lies in the early

history of Being (Φνζις Θεζις ). That which in the early history of Being in the

essence of Φνζις was concealed in Θεζις, namely, “setting up” comes to language

in the latest epoch of the modern history of Being. Wherein, Kant gives expression

to the ongoing echo of its claim as the Being of entities when he speaks of the essence

of Being as the “absolute position”, as the positedness and the being set of objects or

entities21

.

21

Yet, posited and set by whom? The human subject? With what right?

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En-framing is spoken as the thoughtfully chosen name of technology and

not taken as some familiar expression saddled with the misleading overtone of a

superficially oppositional characterisation. En-framing tells us that technology is

no mere product of culture and no mere reflection of civilisation. In conformity

with its essence, technology is the self-ordaining assemblage of positing in the sense

of “setting up” of all entities in the “set-up”. The grounding backdrop of all setting

in the “set-up” is deployed in the “up-set” (“nach-stellen”) as which Being

“persecutes” its own very essence with its forgetting22

. For Being deploys itself inso

far as it turns away (“wegkehrt”) from its own essence and thus turns this essence

away (“zukehrt”) through its forgetting.

Glossary of Some Key Concepts

German Terms:

das Abstandlose: Lack of distance and contrast

A-letheia (Α-ληθεια): “Truth” as un-concealment

An-gebrachte: Mounted/ Installed into a specific form

Ankunft: Arrival

Anschein: Semblance

Anspruch: Claim to/ Enownment by Being

Anwesen: Presencing

Anwesende: Entity

Austrag: Difference /the differentiating movement

22

Why? How can it be thought on the basis of the appropriation of the dispensation of Being (“Ereignis”)?

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Ausbleiben: Exclusion

Beistellen: Establishment

Βergen: To Shelter

Bergung: Sheltering and Concealing

Bereich: Domain/ Realm

Beseitigen: Exclude/ Set Aside

Bestellen: Set up

Bestand: Standing Reserve

Bestandstück: Parcel of a Standing Reserve

Betreiben: Practice/Occupy oneself with

Beruhen: To Lie in

Entgegensetzung: Opposition

Entziehen: To Divest

Er-eigen: To Dispense/ En-own

Ereignis: The “Event” of the Appropriation of Being’s Dispensation

Das Gebirge: The Rock / The Hearth

Die Gefahr: The Danger

Gehalten: To Keep / To Contain

Gehüten: To Protect and Shelter

Ge-Stell: En-framing

Gestellheit: Being set up and en-framed

Das Geviert: The Fourfold

Gleich-giltigen: Making equally indifferent

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Herbeizerren: To Harm

Herstellen: To Set and Establish in front of

Die Hut: The Care/ The Custody/ The Careful Watch

Lehen: To Derive

Leistung: Accomplishement / Realisation

Nach-stellen: To Up-set / To Persecute

Die Nähe: Proximity

Stellen: To Set up

Stellung: Positing / Setting up

Der Tod: Death

Verweigerung: Neglect

Verwahrlosung: A Thing’s Loss of its “Truth”

Verstellen: To Disguise

Wahrung: Preserving the “Truth”

Wahrnis: Rendering “True”

Wesen: Essence (noun)/ To deploy (verb)

Zug: Train/ Current (of Thought)

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Greek Terms:

Αληθεια Aletheia (“Truth” as Un-concealment)

Ληθη Lethe (Concealedness, Hiddenness)

Λδγος Logos (Discourse, Saying, Pronouncement)

Θεζις Thesis (Positing)

Φνζις Phusis(Nature-Being)

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