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Authors:
Heino Nyyssönen (D. Soc. Sc.)
University Lecturer in International Relations, University of Tampere, Finland
Jussi Metsälä (M. Soc. Sc.)
Ph.D. Candidate in International Relations, University of Tampere, Finland
Abstract:
The legislation concerning multiple citizenship and voting varies greatly among the European
states. These issues touch upon the complex interconnectedness of (inter)national politics, ethnic
majorities and minorities, identity and loyalty. This paper focuses on the processes of extending
voting rights to the Hungarian dual citizens. This extension of legal rights beyond the territorial
borders of a state can be seen as a manifestation of transnationalism – as the end of the Westphalian
state system. However, the development can also be seen as an outside interference in the domestic
politics, imposing potential territorial claims and even as a violation of state sovereignty. In East
Central Europe both perspectives are often present simultaneously; a state offers citizenship for a
minority group in neighbouring states, but opposes similar actions towards its own internal
minorities. The focus of this paper is in the Hungarian case, but similar situations are conceivable
globally – rare is an ethnically homogenous state.
Word count:
9 047 words
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STATE, DUAL CITIZENSHIP AND VOTING RIGHTS: DOMESTIC
PRACTICES AND INTERSTATE TENSIONS
Introduction
The phenomenon in question – an “ethnic” minority beyond present borders – is quite a classic one
in International Relations and used as a casus belli many a time. The protection of countrymen has
been a common argument, from the appeasement in Munich 1938 to an invasion in Grenada 1983.
In general, power political solutions have varied from border revisions and occupations to mass
deportations and ethnic cleansing, recurrently under the concepts of state and nation building.
Recent events in Crimea and Ukraine have shed new light on the question of potential
political use of citizenship and dual citizenship1. The current situation between Russia and Ukraine
is no doubt an extreme one but there are other potential cases, as well. For example, in April, 2014
ethnic Hungarian dual citizens2 residing outside of Hungary cast their votes in Hungarian
Parliamentary elections for the first time. Essentially this is just a domestic practice, as it is well
within the sole authority of the state to decide on the possibilities to naturalise and to whom it
grants (dual) citizenship. Then again, there is also a relevant international dimension, as this policy
can cause interstate tensions, and there are numerous actors involved in these matters as well, like
the kin-state, host-state and the minorities themselves. Nevertheless, the discipline of IR has paid
surprisingly little attention to these questions, although citizenship – particularly in Central and
Eastern Europe – deals very deeply with state borders, territories, and thus intensifies questions of
identity, belonging and loyalty.
Primarily this is a study of situations, in which the line between domestic and foreign
policies becomes blurred. We claim that by granting voting rights to external citizens living abroad,
the nation is now going regional and global. Elections are not anymore a matter of only one
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country. But, in a more concrete form, the focus of this paper is about contextualising Hungarian
foreign policy lines on the ethnic minorities beyond state borders in the 2000s. Although the
Hungarian diaspora has existed at least since the First World War, we concentrate here mainly on
the period following the EU enlargement: it seems that the entrance to the Union has not ousted the
question from the agenda – instead dual citizenship can be a potential problem even inside the
Union.
There are two particularly significant Hungarian cases. Firstly, in December 2004 the
citizens had to decide in a referendum, as to whether the Parliament should accept dual (multiple)
citizenship – without right to vote. Secondly, there is the debate that has been taking place since
spring 2010, when the Parliament unilaterally guaranteed Hungarian citizenship for outer-
Hungarians. Yet, before these cases can be studied in depth, certain theoretical perspectives
concerning such concepts as state, territory and citizenship have to be clarified. On one hand the
possibility of multiple citizenships has been seen, perhaps in a somewhat touting way, as a long
overdue passing of the old Westphalian state system, but as examples in Europe and elsewhere
show, other perspectives are also possible, some of them clearly questions of power politics.
Therefore, this study focuses especially on the interstate question posed by Szabolcs Pogonyi,
Maria Kovács and Zsolt Körtvélyesi in their most valuable article, i.e. if multiple citizenship ‘can
easily appear in the toolbox of those envisaging a nationalist or imperialist project of expanding the
size of their nation across its present borders’. (Pogonyi, Kovács & Körtvélyesi 2010: 10; see also
Collyer 2014.)
According to Pogonyi, Kovács and Körtvélyesi (2010: 4) the process of establishing
legislation allowing external citizenship for kin-minorities has been, in a sense, unilateral, as many
states would like to endorse their kin-minorities living in other states, but at the same time are very
critical about the policies of other states related to their own minorities. For example, the hundreds
of thousands of ethnic Croats residing outside of Croatian borders have been given the option of
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Croatian citizenship, but at the same time Croatia has been very disapproving of the similar policies
of Italy (Ragazzi & Štiks, 2009: 352–353). Overall, East Central Europe is packed with complex
demographic circumstances, which do not often coincide with the political and territorial divisions
(see also Bauböck, 2009: 476).
Although there are a lot of studies depicting minorities and polices towards minorities in a
particular country, practical forms and policies dealing with “kin-states” and their relations to “kin-
minorities” are less studied. Extensive analysis of the Hungarian Status Law can be found in
English in The Hungarian Status Law Syndrome: A Nation Building and/or Minority Protection
(Kántor et al. 2004). Moreover, Maria Kovács (2005) has studied the 2004 referendum, Nyyssönen
and Korhonen (2010) focused on Hungary, particularly observing how these policies affect
geopolitics and borders. Citizenship laws in the new EU member states were analysed in
Citizenship policies in the New Europe (Bauböck, Perchinig & Sievers 2009), whilst Myra
Waterbury (2010) has studied Hungarian diaspora politics and kin-state nationalism.
State, Territory and Citizenship
The idea of the nation state is practically universal in the present-day world. Nonetheless, all states
and nations have certain, even if flexible, outer limits, in the sense that everyone and everywhere
cannot belong to the same nation or state. And this idea of territoriality – an apparently ‘natural’
attempt to exercise control of our surrounding by setting spatial limits and borders – can be seen as
a ‘fundamental ordering principle of the modern state system’. (Anderson 2006: 7, 137–138;
Goemans 2006: 25; Newman 2006: 88; cf. also Kahler 2006: 3.) Therefore, sharing territory can, in
a conflict situation, be very problematic. After all, physical area, if understood as integral or even
sacred part of the national homeland, cannot simultaneously be part of the homeland of someone
else (Newman 2006: 95–98; cf. also Goemans 2006: 28). Yet, the conventional concept, that state
sovereignty is the absolute dominance of a certain territory and those living inside of it, has been
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challenged; the territorial and political authority of any state is not anymore, if it ever was,
unlimited. Other actors, states or not, have set limitations and challenges on political behaviour of
states all through history. (Raustiala 2006: 219; Agnew 2005: 438, 441–442; cf. also Spiro 2011:
699–700.)
Globalisation and the erosion of state power has been a continuing theme in IR for decades
and it is rather clear that political entities are not any more seen as exclusive, but overlapping in
many ways (Blatter 2011: 791). Or, as Miles Kahler (2006: 1, 18) notes, the meanings of territorial
borders might have changed – especially after the end of the Cold War – but they have most
certainly not gone extinct. The reality of borders separating “Us” from “Them” is still very much
alive, globalisation processes have also resulted in the reaffirmation of certain forms of borders, old
or new (Newman 2006: 101–103; Paasi 2003: 475; see also Spiro 2011: 736–738).
Interestingly, most of the new international borders emerging – between 1900 and 2002 –
through state partition or secession are situated on old existing administrative boundaries and not
for example along ethnic or cultural divisions3 (Goemans 2006: 28, 52; cf. also Pogonyi 2014: 130).
Besides, foreign relations are not independent from domestic politics, either – on the contrary, there
are signs of “domestication” of foreign relations and questions have been raised, whether ethnic
minorities, “We” beyond borders, belong to foreign policy at all (see Magyar Nemzet, 6 November,
2010). In fact, it should be noted, that some states have been extending their sovereignty well
beyond their borders for a long time, for example by proclaiming the validity of domestic laws
outside the geographical borders, for their own citizens at least (Raustiala 2006: 219, 222–223).
Concepts of citizenship and nationality, as citizen and national, are often used as synonyms.
However, both concepts have a different etymology. Citizens have rights to participate in the
political life of the state, while nationals need not to have these rights, though normally they do.4
For further use it might be useful to distinguish nationality from citizenship as in several non-
English speaking countries nationality could be understood as a synonym of ethnicity. For example,
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the identity cards of the former Soviet Union separated nationality (Armenian, Estonian, Jew etc.)
from the citizenship of the Soviet Union. However, here we are content with the term citizenship,
when we refer to Hungarian állampolgarság (citizenship) and kettős állampolgarság (dual
citizenship).
While customarily the state has been rather free to decide to whom it grants the citizenship –
and states have been quite successful in incorporating the legal status as a member of the society
with the idea of national identity – the topic has implications in IR and in relations between states,
too (Spiro, 2011: 694, 697, 715–716). Partly due to the fact that only 10 per cent of countries of the
world are inhabited by a single ethnic group, as Anthony D. Smith (1991: 15) mentioned in his
classic study National Identity. In this sense, the grand declarations of right to self-determination,
with the possibility of border changes, in President Woodrow Wilson’s fourteen points were already
dead at birth (cf. Goemans 2006: 41–42). Therefore, it is quite important to recognize that
citizenship and territorial nation state are not synonymous – a misconception created by
‘methodological nationalism’ in political science – anymore, if they ever were. Argument, that the
longstanding nationalistic “one nation for one country” -thinking has, for the most part, run its
course, could very well be accurate. (Bauböck 2009: 475–476; Goemans, 2006: 40–41.)
There are also further international aspects in this matter, namely a regional political
membership derived from a citizenship on the state level. In EU context all citizens of the member
states are also citizens of the Union. Therefore, new citizenship rights can be problematic, as the
citizenship of a member state opens the whole area of the EU through people’s freedom of
movement (Bauböck 2009: 484). Additionally, populations outside the political territory of the EU
– e.g. Hungarians in Serbia and Ukraine – are/would be entitled to the same rights and under the
same obligations as those inside the EU5. Bearing in mind the tensions in Ukraine and prospects of
perhaps a serious internal, or international, conflict, the European Union might be forced to act in
order to protect its citizens in case of an acute crisis (cf. Pogonyi 2014: 691, 695). Consequently, a
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very national and domestic political decision can have rather far-reaching consequences on the
international arena.
An often used – originally by Hannah Arendt – characterization of citizenship is as ‘the right
to have rights’ (e.g. Blatter 2011: 771; Spiro 2011: 719, note 167; Bauböck 2009: 478) and, in
relation to Spiro, there just might be developing an international normative stand towards
citizenship legislation on the basis of international human rights. Hereby citizenship would become,
for individuals, ‘the right to have the right to have rights’. What the long-term effects of this sort of
development are going to be remains to be seen, but it is well within reason to believe, that all of the
consequences might not be positive. (Spiro 2011: 719–720, 745.)
The important issues of citizenship itself are – paraphrasing Jussi Ronkainen – what is the
range of citizenship (who and where belongs and who and where doesn’t), what are the implications
of citizenship (the privileges and obligations associated with the status) and what is the penetration
of the citizenship (what is the individual’s level of attachment to the political system and society
and vice versa). (Ronkainen 2011: 248.) Accordingly, a citizen is, or should be, someone having a
stake in the future of that particular political entity (Bauböck 2009: 478–479, 481). Consequently,
granting citizenship and voting rights to a population utterly detached from “national” framework of
a state is most likely to produce rather little, as the connections between the population and political
processes are not strong enough to generate an affirmative reaction. It can be argued, that actual ties
are essential to the participation in political life, in one or several countries (Ronkainen 2011: 258–
259).
Concepts of Dual Citizenship
The earlier international disinclination towards dual citizenship, exemplified by the 1930 League of
Nations convention stating, that everyone should have only one nationality, has been forcefully
transformed by the pressures of globalisation. We have outpaced the idea that both territory and
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those living inside of it are a part of the sovereign state and part of that state only. (Blatter 2011:
771; Kahler 2006: 15, 17; Spiro 2010: 111–130.) Dual citizenship has become an issue particularly
for modern multicultural societies, characterised by growing migrant populations (Bron 2002: 34–
41; Grace 2007; cf. Dahlin & Hironaka 2008: 55–56, 68).
In the present day Europe countries like, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Portugal,
Sweden, Switzerland and UK accept the principle of dual citizenship. Yet, there are also prominent
countries, like Austria, the Baltic States, Czech Republic, Denmark, Germany, Holland, Ireland,
Norway, Poland, Spain and Ukraine6, which do not accept multi citizenship at all. Moreover, the
interpretations of the concept vary: Germany7, for example, obligates individuals to decide the
citizenship at the age of 23, whilst Finland does not demand it. The rights of a state to use its
discretion in this matter may only be restricted by obligations, which it has undertaken to other
states and contained chiefly in treaties (Donner 1994: 29, 119). Often dual citizenship is based on
good relations and negotiations, as, like in visa practices, the state could accept the principle but
does not implement it to all potential states.
Also important factors in the concept of dual citizenship are the actual, concrete ways of
exercising the rights associated with citizenship(s). That is because having a dual citizenship does
not automatically guarantee participation in political decision making, one of the main features of
the whole concept. A useful portrayal of this is found in Jussi Ronkainen’s study, which examines
dual citizens in Finland and their identification to the different citizenships. Naturally the results are
not directly transferable, but he does present a number of convincing points, which are useful also
outside the Finnish context. (Ronkainen 2011: 258–259; Bauböck 2009: 475.)
Ronkainen’s classification of different types of attitudes towards dual citizenship can be
paraphrased with the use of his terms ‘either–or’, ‘both–and’ and ‘neither–nor’ -citizens. The first
group sees themselves entirely as members of only one political entity, the second as members of
many entities simultaneously and the last group as ‘non-traditional’ form of transnational political
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belonging, as sort of outsiders without a ‘continued tie to any state/society’. (Ronkainen 2011: 254–
257.) Based on this, political rights are an important part of the concept of citizenship, even if
someone happens to live in a foreign state, but the actual political participation and voting
behaviour is largely depended on the level of attraction felt towards the citizenship granting state
(Pogonyi 2014: 125).
External Voting Rights in Europe
Whereas external voting is not a new phenomenon by any means, a somewhat revealing position on
the matter of regulating external enfranchisement can be found in the report titled Code of Good
Practice in Electoral Matters – Guidelines and Explanatory Report8 composed by the Venice
Commission of the Council of Europe in 2002. This report maintained that citizens living abroad
could be given ‘the right to vote and to be elected’, though states could impose restrictions and
qualifications based on residency. Thereby the situation is rather similar with the aforementioned
international regulation, or perhaps more accurately with the lack thereof, of citizenship laws:
namely the state is fairly free to decide to or not to allow voting and to pass constraints when and
where perceived necessary. Consequently, the formalization of international normative rules
regarding the rights of migrants and expatriates to exercise their rights by voting has not been a
particularly successful process, predominantly only large migrant sending states have favoured such
an arrangement, while in general the international community has not been very concerned about
the matter. (Grace 2007: 40–41; Bauböck 2009.) Still, the number of people eligible for external
voting has doubled in the last 40 years (Pogonyi 2014: 122)9. It could be argued that there exist
situations where voting rights, equality and territorially restricted jurisdictions collide.
The scale of voting rights of external citizens, dual or otherwise, can be seen in the fact that
globally states allowing some form of external voting number between 115 and 120 from the total
of 214. In Europe almost all of the current 28 EU member states have provided at least some access
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to voting rights for their citizens residing in other states. Only Cyprus, Greece, Ireland (see e.g.
Honohan 2011), Malta and Slovakia do not have, or have not implemented, provisions for external
voting. Furthermore, there are four states (Croatia, France, Italy and Portugal), which have enacted
legislation to allow their non-resident citizens to have separate legislative representation. (Pogonyi
2014: 123; Collyer 2014, 62; Pogonyi, Kovács and Körtvélyesi 2010: 13; see also Annex A in
Voting from Abroad: The International IDEA Handbook 2007.)
Nonetheless, pressure from other European states and the fear of disproportional importance
of external voters – a significant portion of the total number of voters (circa 10 per cent in the 2007
Parliamentary elections) – has compelled Croatia to reform its electoral system. After 2000, the
fixed number of seats elected by external votes was changed and a system of a maximum of 14
seats, depended on the overall national voting figures was installed. Under this arrangement the
problematic situations of representatives of external citizens outnumbering the representatives of
Croatia’s internal minorities and the possibility of exceeding the absolute number of Members of
Parliament set in the constitution (160 seats) were conceivable. Therefore, constitutional
amendments made in 2010 removed this system and currently the number of representatives is 151,
140 of whom are elected in ten territorial constituencies. The eleventh constituency is reserved for
the external citizens electing 3 representatives and the twelfth constituency is for the national
minorities with 8 seats. (Sajfert 2013: 3–4; Pogonyi, Kovács and Körtvélyesi 2010: 14.)
In Portugal there are eighteen constituencies on the mainland, two for the autonomous
regions, Azores and Madeira, one for Portuguese living in Europe and one for those living in the
rest of the world. In Italy (see e.g. Lafleur 2013) the traditional form of (not) allowing emigrants to
vote was formulated in the requirement of travelling back to Italy to vote. Since 2001 – after
constitutional reforms consistent with neo-fascists ideas of the 1950s, according to Pogonyi –
Italian election legislation has set aside 12 Parliamentary seats for the ethnic Italians residing out of
the country (Pogonyi 2014: 135–136). These constituencies divide the globe into four districts
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(Europe, South America, North and Central America and the rest). In France the globe is divided
into eleven constituencies for French residents overseas since 2010.
Guaranteeing voting rights for external citizens does not necessary lead to strengthening of a
particular government, but to speculations of its political advantages and disadvantages. Indeed,
there are numerous examples showing the impressive potential of influence and power the voting
rights of external citizens might produce in ‘cases of large-scale enfranchisement of transborder
ethnic kin-groups’ (Pogonyi, Kovács and Körtvélyesi 2010: 15). For instance, there is some
evidence that Croatian external votes helped the nationalist president Franjo Tudjman in 1995 and
2000 (Lyons 2006: 112). Even the later reforms aimed to reduce the influence of external votes
have not been entirely successful, as can be seen from the still significant role of the Croatian dual
citizens during the 2007 Parliamentary elections. (Ragazzi & Štiks 2009: 353.)
Therefore, the notion, made by the former Hungarian Minister of Health István Mikola in
2006, of a possibility to remain in power for decades with the help of the votes of the outer-
Hungarians, might have revealed, that ultimately the case is not about subsidizing brothers and
sisters, but about political power (e.g. Pogonyi 2011: 697).10 By granting external voting rights
Hungary has increased its ‘potential citizenry’ considerably, and the absolute number of the external
voters – potential or actual – is in an entirely different category when compared for example with
many migrant diasporas with the same rights (Pogonyi 2014: 133).
The possibility, that extending citizenship with voting rights actually creates more national,
international and regional disunion between different population groups and might in fact
strengthen some boundaries rather than reduce them, is something that should be considered very
carefully (Blatter 2011: 792–793). There are predictable possibilities of internal tensions if and
when politicians try to persuade the external voters to their side by making concession. Moreover,
the interest of the political elite in a kin-state and the external kin-population do not necessarily
always match. This has already taken place at least in France and Italy. Based on the 2007
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Presidential elections, Le Monde speculated – erroneously – that the forthcoming reform would
favour the current centre-right government, but in 2012 the left triumphed with the help of overseas
constituencies (Le Monde, 26 September, 2009). In Italy, confidence in their electoral reform
proved to be misplaced for the Berlusconi government and the elections resulted in a centre-left
majority (Pogonyi 2014: 136). So, after the right to vote has been given, what indeed are the
prospects of cancelling that right if the voting behaviour of the kin-population does not suit the
needs of the establishment (Pogonyi 2014: 126, 134–135; Blatter 2011: 789). All in all, these
instances point toward the fact, that national elections and campaigning are going more and more
regional and global.
Hungarian Attempts
What makes Hungary particularly interesting is its large ethnic kin-minorities just beyond the
borders. Whilst post-Trianon Hungary itself is ethnically quite homogenous, ‘Hungarians are
neighbours of Hungarians’, as all neighbouring states have a Hungarian minority. And it has to be
remembered, for the purpose of this paper, the question is not merely of groups of migrants, but of
people, who – mostly at least – have lived in their countries of residency for whole of their lives,
even for generations. They have been, therefore, firstly citizens of e.g. Romania, Slovakia, Serbia or
Ukraine. The new Hungarian citizenship is an additional, a second one, to these already existing
citizenships.
According to official censuses11 between 2001 and 2011 there were 1 227 600 Hungarians in
Romania (Romanian National Institute of Statistics), 458 467 in Slovakia (Statistical Office of the
Slovak Republic), 253 899 in Serbia (Statistical Office of the Republic of Serbia) and 156 000 in
Ukraine (State Statistics Committee of Ukraine). In Croatia (Croatian Central Bureau of Statistics)
the number was 14 048, in Slovenia (Statistical Office of the Republic of Slovenia) 6243 and in
Austria (Statistik Austria) the number of members of the acknowledged Hungarian (language)
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minority is about 25 000. Subsequently, there are over two million people just outside of the
existing borders – in the Hungarian state there are circa 9 960 000 inhabitants (cf. Kovács and Tóth
2007; Népszabadság, 10 March, 2012).
In Hungary both political “camps” have shared an agenda of a responsibility of Hungarians
outside borders, but there has been a lack of consensus of legislative actions based on this
responsibility (Batory 2010: 31–48). In Bauböck’s words the Hungarian case can be seen as
example of an ethno-national understanding of belonging to a community, i.e. those with shared
past or linguistic contiguity are to be included in to the “national body” (Bauböck 2009: 480, 481,
493).
The first post-1989 attempt to deal with the question of outer-Hungarians concerned basic
treaties to confirm present state borders. In particular, treaties with Ukraine, Slovakia and Romania
raised debate, as some MPs demanded guarantees for minority treatment in neighbouring countries
– then again a socialist Foreign Minister could argue that particularly the acceptance of those
bilateral treaties will end allegations of revisionism (Az Országgyűlés hiteles jegyzőkönyve 1994–
1996: 23390–23391). A second, and still current, topic is the question of regional autonomy, openly
backed by the Hungarian Parliament in the mid-1990s, as a softer alternative compared to
contesting state borders themselves (see e.g. Blatter 2011: 783–784). Thirdly, a particular Status
Law was an attempt to lower the Hungarian state border for ethnic Hungarians on the threshold of
the EU accession. On the basis of an idea of belonging to the same, homogenous “nation”, Hungary
aimed to subsidise and grant benefits for Hungarians in neighbouring states, except the EU member
Austria. The law was modified after domestic political turn and after consultations with
neighbouring countries, like Romania and Slovakia, and the Council of Europe in 2003. At that
time Fidesz, the main opposition party, and two radical minority organisations did not sign the
amendment of the law.
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A formal proposal for dual citizenship emerged outside the state actors, from the diaspora
itself: few months after the modification of the Status Law in 2003 minority organisations in Serbia
and Romania took the initiative, as at that time it seemed plausible, that Hungary’s membership in
the EU would to close the borders from Hungarian minorities. With the help of the Hungarian
World Organisation 474 000 signatures were gathered by July 2004 and a referendum had to be
organised. The result would commit the Parliament to act if at least half of the whole electorate
participated in the referendum.
Domestic party political emphasis was present in the referendum campaigns, as pro and
contra arguments were divided mostly on the basis of government–opposition line, with the former
opposing and the latter favouring dual citizenship. When studying the arguments of the socialist-
liberal government, it can be observed that they opposed dual citizenship, and that economic
arguments and civil nationalism, i.e. Hungarians inside the Hungarian state, prevailed. Also
historical arguments were used, as the then socialist Prime Minister Ferenc Gyurcsány surmised,
that the proposal will empty regions beyond borders and lead to a ‘second Trianon’ (Magyar Hírlap,
3 November, 2004; Népszabadság, 10 November, 2004; Magyar Hírlap, 27 November, 2004).
Statistically, the amount of ethnic (outer) Hungarians has been decreasing since the 1990s, and a
slowly moving ‘Trianon’ was a potential political threat. The worst scenario seemed to include an
axiom that the land exists only as far as people live there, and ethnic minorities beyond borders
were a constant reminder of the existence of the nation (cf. Collyer 2014: 60). Inversely, a territory
matters and is finally lost only if there are no more countrymen there; for example the lack of
Germans in the present day Czech Republic and Poland, or the Finns in Karelia after 1944. So, also
a territorial principle was present in the debate: the former leader of the Alliance of Free Democrats,
SzDSz, philosopher János Kis, condemned PM Gyurcsány’s scenario by arguing that if people
leave their land as a consequence of the law, the question is not about people but land. For him the
law would be harmful as the kin-minority would not be equal in their present home-states in the
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future. Instead of nationalist language and clichés of the extreme right, the government should
condemn the proposal because it would lead to postponing rational solutions for many years
(Magyar Hírlap, 27 November, 2004).
The biggest party in the opposition, Fidesz, took a completely different stance. On the basis
of ethnic nationalism it estimated that dual citizenship would not empty regions, and aimed to
maximize rights for ethnic Hungarians, even at the cost of domestic political confrontation. The
leader of the party, Viktor Orbán, re-bordered Hungarians as a nation of 15 million and argued, that
dual citizenship had already been carried out in many European countries, and ‘only Hungarians are
made to believe that they should be small’ (Magyar Nemzet & Népszabadság, 29 November, 2004).
However, Fidesz’s conception of citizenship was misleading and narrow from the very beginning: it
excluded the right to settle in Hungary and the right to vote or run as a candidate in Parliamentary
elections. Dual citizenship linked the concept to the thematic of nation as it meant “re-uniting of the
nation”: Catholic bishops declared their support for ‘re-unification’ (új nemzetegyesítés), and Fidesz
demanded, that a law of ‘becoming nationally together’ (nemzeti összetartozás törvény) should be
enacted.
Thus, on 5 December 2004 voters decided, as to whether the Parliament had to enact a law
on citizenship of persons, who confess to be Hungarian, but are not citizens, do not live in Hungary,
but could prove their (Hungarian) nationality on the basis of the Certificate of Hungarian
Nationality, or by other means defined by the law. (Magyar Nemzet, 4 December, 2004;
Népszabadság, 6–7 December, 2004.) The referendum was not valid, as only 37.5 per cent of the
whole electorate participated. It was also known at the time, that the current Parliament with a leftist
and liberal majority would not enact such a law. Evidently a domestic controversy was stressed in
the end, and neither side was able to present a coherent interpretation of international norms and
practices supporting their respective positions (Kovács 2005: 72). Also Romania had opposed the
idea in public, claiming that Romanian Hungarians would have to give up their citizenship in the
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case of applying a Hungarian one, and threatened to debate the issue in the Council of Europe, like
in the Status Law case (Népszava, 16 November, 2004; Népszabadság, 17 November, 2004;
Népszabadság, 1–3 December, 2004).
“Reunification of the Nation”
In 2010, as one of its first actions, the new conservative government established dual citizenship,
now with a passport, but without the right to vote (see A magyar állampolgárságról szóló, 2010).
Fidesz followed a policy line presented during the 2004 referendum; failure of which was now
labelled a national treason, as the vice PM Zsolt Semjén concluded in his article Nation Policy
(Nemzetpolitika) (Magyar Nemzet, 18 August, 2010)12. According to Semjén, the question was
about national solidarity and the motivation to repair the injustice of Trianon. The bill divided the
socialists, now in opposition, as a slight majority supported it, whilst most of the rest did not
participate in the final vote at all.
Concurrently the Slovakian Parliament blamed its neighbour of “Greater-Hungarian
revisionism” and modified the State Citizenship Act, an “ultimatum” made public before the final
vote in Hungary. The majority, including a number of opposition Parliamentarians, decided to
withdraw citizenship from those Slovakian citizens, who wished to apply for Hungarian citizenship.
This law is still valid, although the number of cases has not been significant. Yet, in February 2011
the Parliament rejected a proposal, which would have not recognised Hungarian dual citizenship on
Slovakian soil and would have banned joining certain offices, like the military or police, from dual
citizens (Magyar Nemzet & Népszabadság 11 February, 2011). Here Slovakia has not been alone:
after Romania’s membership in the EU, Moldova imposed restrictions concerning public positions
of those having dual citizenship. Similar considerations took place in Lithuania, this time against
those of Polish heritage. (Pogonyi, Kovács and Körtvélyesi 2010: 11.)
17
Thus, Slovakia and Romania, countries, in which the largest Hungarian minorities live, were
the most critical, but as they also partially accepted the principle of dual citizenship, their criticism
lost much of its prominence. The latest dispute dealt with the Székely flag (an autonomous area
during 1952–1968), as Romania restricted the use of the flag, which was then hoisted on the
Parliament in Budapest, as a ‘symbol of national solidarity’. (See e.g. Iordachi 2004a.) However,
these hegemonic attempts have been only partially fulfilled: for example, in the Slovakian elections
of 2010 and 2012 two rival Hungarian parties emerged, but the traditional Party of the Hungarian
Coalition (Magyar Koalíció Pártja), which had drifted towards a close cooperation with Fidesz,
failed to pass the threshold. Instead a new party, the Most-Hid – the name means ‘bridge’ both in
Slovakian and Hungarian – with ethnic Slovakian members gained seats. Fidesz-KDNP has
detested the party, and even the vice premier Semjén has expressed how “ethnicity” instead of
“assimilation” should be the criteria of support.
Beside the dual citizenship Hungarian “nation politicians” made another move. On the 90th
anniversary in 2010 they commemorated Trianon in the Parliament as a Day of National Unity
(Nemzeti Összetartozás Napja). In fact, this was the Fidesz version of a united Europe without strict
borders, interpreted strongly in historical terms, on the one hand absorbing aims of the extreme
right and on the other hand openly challenging the resolution 1335 of the Council of Europe from
2003. The socialists had proposed alterations to the bill, for example the Meineckean Kulturnation,
which was rejected, leading to a socialist boycott of the whole ritual. (Népszabadság, 1 June, 2010;
Magyar Nemzet, 5 June, 2010.)
Moreover, the new Hungarian constitution (2012) begins provocatively: ‘We, the members
of the Hungarian nation’ (Mi a magyar nemzet tagjai) (Magyar Közlöny 43/2011). Thus, the
formulation does not refer to citizens, but to a nation, which in the Hungarian context is not the
same as the (current) state. The basic law was accepted practically on the first anniversary of the
Fidesz-KDNP victory, only after a few weeks debate, and without consensus of all Parliamentary
18
parties, which either opposed or boycotted the whole process. As much as the 1989 constitution –
i.e. the thoroughly revised 1949 version – mentioned that Hungary shall bear a sense of
responsibility for Hungarians living outside the borders, the 2011 paragraph is more detailed. At
first the article D defines the cause: ‘Motivated by the ideal of a unified Hungarian nation, Hungary
shall bear…’. Moreover, it mentions that Hungary shall promote their survival and development
and ‘continue to support their effect to preserve their Hungarian culture and foster their cooperation
with each other and with Hungary’. (Hungarian constitution in English 2011.)
New Electoral Legislation and the Elections of 2014
In 2010 Hungary was the only country in the European Union having a two-thirds supermajority
won by an electoral bloc, 52.73 per cent of the votes – Romania, also with a mixed electoral system,
followed suit in 2012. Now Fidesz was able to introduce an electoral reform without a broader
consensus, and in 2011, despite earlier standpoints, guaranteed voting rights also to outer-
Hungarians. One of the main differences compared to the old electoral system, inspired by the
German model, was that in 2014 a majority of MPs (106 out of 199) are elected by a first past the
post system, and the rest by a proportional vote. According to the Chairman of the Parliament
László Kövér, the new voting right in practice completed the unification of the nation in legal
sense.13
The new electoral act offers voting rights for Hungarian citizens without permanent
residence in the country. The first draft of the bill included pre-registration of all voters, heavily
criticised by the domestic opposition, but finally the constitutional court ruled it unconstitutional.
Currently non-resident (new) citizens need to register to be eligible to vote for party lists, not for
single seat candidates, unless they can prove their permanent address in Hungary. The government
expected a vast majority of new dual citizens – ca. 500 000, including children and another non-
registered voters – to support the government, whilst the opposition expected expats, another
19
relevant group outside Hungary, up to 500 000, to favour the opposition. However, according to the
critics, ‘Some are more Equal than Others’, namely new dual citizens are in a privileged position, as
they could register on the Internet and vote by mail ballot, but ordinary citizens staying abroad
during the elections have to be personally present in the Hungarian Embassy or consulate. (Cf.
Népszabadság 5 January, 2013; Népszabadság, 27 February, 2014; Lane Scheppele 2014; cf. also
criticism towards Lane Scheppele in Magyar Nemzet, 4 March, 2014.)
In April 2014 Fidesz-KDNP won 133 seats out of 199 with 2 198 489 votes. The number of
outer Hungarian votes remained smaller than expected, 128 712, but of those votes Fidesz gained
almost all, 95 per cent. Compared to 2010 and 2.7 million votes the party de facto lost several
hundred thousand voters. Nonetheless, because of the new electoral system, the government could
maintain its huge two-thirds supermajority – this time with 45.23 per cent of the votes. Contrary to
expectations the “ethnic card” was overshadowed by other current foreign political topics, like
Ukraine and nuclear energy. Yet, in Slovakia local nationalists covered Jobbik’s election posters,
which they considered provocations on Slovakian territory. (Nemzeti Választasi Iroda, 2014;
Magyar Nemzet & Népszabadság, 2 April, 2014, 7 April, 2014, 8 April, 2014.)
Soon after the elections Fidesz announced that their national list for EU elections will
contain Hungarian representatives beyond borders, i.e. from neighbouring countries as well. Actual
“campaigning” had reached those states even earlier, as for example in 2012 Kövér visited ethnic
Hungarians, despite the wishes of the Romanian authorities to postpone the visit after the Romanian
Parliamentary elections. Also socialists have, comparatively openly, been present particularly in
Romania, largely in territories belonging to pre-Trianon Hungary. Arguably, domestic politics has
made an influence on political reasoning of ethnic minorities and the Hungarian foreign policy.
While recently state borders were lowered – ‘de-bordered’ in the present-day Europe – the frames
of the nation have become more visible – ‘re-bordered’. (Magyar Hírlap, 11 April, 2014;
Népszabadság, 5 June, 2012; Nyyssönen 2011.)
20
Conclusion
Here we have analysed recent Hungarian politics concerning the politics/policies towards ethnic
minorities abroad. “Nation policy”, completed with an electoral reform, is the newest conceptual
attempt and neologism in the long story of Hungarian nationalism. Leading Hungarian politicians
have rejected the concept of Kulturnation and raised instead the idea of a unified nation, i.e. de
facto beyond borders. Whether or not this strategy aims to some kind of a bridgehead, the Fidesz-
KDNP government has seemingly favoured more radical solutions than its predecessors, as there
have been obvious actions aimed to strengthen influence beyond present state borders.
During the last twenty years we have witnessed a discursive change, from minority
protection to more radical “nation policy” in the Carpathian Basin. Without doubt Hungary is a
special case after Trianon 1920, but it would be wrong to limit this study only to Hungary. Instead
Hungary could be a potential forerunner to other states, like Russia and their minorities abroad after
the collapse of the Soviet Union; the immediate future of Ukraine might very well be a testing
ground on this matter14. For those who think that juxtaposing Russia and an EU member state is
simply banal, we may say that both are indeed successor states, and have, for example, used
historical arguments recently. Hungary’s power projecting capabilities are obviously not
comparable, but it has, gradually, raised its say in the Carpathian Basis. From this viewpoint
Hungary is a permanent reminder of “inner” problems, also inside the EU, when it is promoting its
normative power beyond the union. In this sense dual citizenship is not anymore simply a question
of an individual but also of regional and global issues, which can be easily politicised for nationalist
purposes. In the Hungarian case there are at least promises that by guaranteeing voting rights “the
unification of the nation” has de facto already taken place and no further actions are necessary.
Moreover, it seems plausible that limiting the representation only to party lists dispelled wildest
21
fears of those not living in the country or paying taxes having too much weight in the national
politics.
Nevertheless, we think that an idea of a particular quota, or a special constituency, might
still be a better option – although this time the new Hungarian electoral system made a broader
impact on the victory than the diaspora votes. Still, a particular constituency would be in
congruence with other cases studied here. In addition it would place the expectations and the
influence of the “diaspora card” into its right place – perhaps like the national minorities, who in
2014 were also guaranteed representation, the outer Hungarians definitely are also a minority. Thus,
time will tell if some sort of a quota arrangement might be favourable in the Hungarian case, too.
Likewise, what remains to be seen, are the responses and concrete actions of the very populations so
recently officially nationalized or “Hungarianized”.
Notes
1 Another relatively recent example of the dangers of using citizenship as an excuse for military action is the 2008 war
between Georgia and Russia over Abkhazia and South Ossetia; for example, Szabolcs Pogonyi (2014: 122–140) states,
that in this case Russia ‘misused external citizenship’ to its own ends. For a more nuanced description of the situation
and consequences of Russian policy of ‘passportisation’ in the areas, see Artman (2013: 682–704). Most recently, one
of the justifications given by the Russian government to the (possible) use of armed force in Crimea has been the
protection of its own citizens and fellow populations. What makes this proclamation interesting is the fact, that
Ukrainian legislation does not allow dual citizenship, partly because of the fear of Russian interference precisely
through the policies of protecting its own citizens (Pogonyi 2011: 696; Shevel 2009: 280).
2 The term dual citizen is used in this paper interchangeably with the term multiple citizenship to emphasize the
possibility of being a citizen of more than one polity at the same time, with full participatory rights. For the use of the
term external citizenship see Bauböck (2009: 475–478). However, a crucial question remains: is citizenship something
“external” referring to benefits and ethnicity or “internal”, which means full participatory rights in a given community.
If the latter is the case, not only citizens, but also questions of territory and political power will matter: there are cases,
when not the people have migrated, but the borders.
22
3 Hungary, according to Goemans (2006), is one of the countries forming the exception on this matter.
4 For Aristotle citizen was the “one who is a partner in the legislative and judicial process”, and thus a member of the
political community, polis. The world nation is derived from Latin and built on the past participle form natus "having
been born" of the verb nasci "to be born". Cicero, for example, referred to all races (omnes nationes), which were able
to bear enslavement, but Rome, our community (nostra civitas) cannot. Nationality is a product of 19th Century. (See
also Ronkainen 2011: 249–250.)
5 Similar occurrence has already taken place in 2013, when Croatia became a member of the EU, with almost half a
million citizens living outside its borders, and also outside the territory of the EU (see e.g. Ragazzi & Štiks 2009: 355).
6 The Ukrainian citizenship legislation has been a product of three different understandings of national identity. As a
result the legislation defines citizenship primarily on territorial grounds; the nation is convergent with the state. On the
other hand, Russian citizenship/compatriot legislation is more complex. After the failure of introducing comprehensive
arrangement allowing dual citizenship in the area of the former Soviet Union, Russia turned towards unilateral policy of
granting citizenship to citizens of foreign states – de facto dual citizenship – and created an inclusive course of action
“toward compatriots abroad”. In fact, the definitions of “compatriots” are, according to Oxana Shevel (2011: 195–199),
kept vague on purpose, in order for the Russian Federation to be able to use the concept as a pragmatic political
instrument on a wide range of issues. However, Igor Zevelev (2008: 52) claims ‘it is clear that the notion of compatriots
applies first and foremost to ethnic Russians, but the Russian authorities refrain from mentioning this directly’. Still, as
Peter Spiro 2010: 121–122) reminds, interference with someone else’s affairs is not directly linked to the citizenship
status – dual or otherwise – of those portrayed as needing protection, and may be used merely as an excuse. (Cf. also
Shevel 2009: 279–283, 283–284; Shevel, 2011: 192–195; Iordachi 2004b: 122–123.)
7 Until 2000 Germany followed the exclusive and constricting practice of ius sanguinis and accepted the citizenship
only on the basis of proved German ethnicity. In 1999 the Parliament changed the law: according to the original
proposal dual citizenship would have been granted generally for all children born in Germany, if their parents had lived
eight years (down from 15) in the country. Because of a fierce opposition of the CDU–CSU, a petition with 5 million
names was collected. In the final bill a person has to choose the citizenship at the age of 23. A concise description of
Germany’s citizenship policy can be found in Howard (2012).
8 Full text of the report is available at http://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/default.aspx?pdffile=CDL-
AD%282002%29023rev-e.
9 According to Michael Collyer (2014:66) only South Africa and Macedonia have implemented new legislation in order
to inhibit external voting.
23
10 The matter of introducing Hungarian dual citizenship with voting rights has drawn intensive condemnation, for
example on the grounds that ‘these groups [outer-Hungarians] lack genuine links to their external “homelands”’, it
obstructs democratic processes (Pogonyi 2014: 136) or that the kin-populations given citizenship should be in a
situation, where the protection of the kin-state is absolutely necessary (Bauböck, 2009: 481, cf. also 493).
11 The paradox here lays in the intimate power relations between census and nation state, namely the “national” aspects
of inclusion and exclusion, or who belongs and to what category. Naturally, the concept of dual citizenship poses
certain challenges to the idea of national census as some individuals and groups will be included in several overlapping
categories in at least two countries. For a historical description, see e.g. Anderson (2006).
12 Instead of minority protection the discourse has shifted more to “nation politics” during the last few years. According
to Fidesz’s foreign policy strategy until 2014 domestic, foreign and nation policies are closely intertwined. Under the
sub-title ‘Nation Policy’ they argue how it is peculiar for the Hungarian foreign policy to have to fulfil two interests at
the same time: Hungarian state and nation. Partly this means securing international tasks for Hungarian citizens and
partly supporting Hungarians beyond borders to ‘strengthen the stability of the area’ (Következetes Külkapcsolatok.
Magyarország külkapcsolati Stratégiája).
13 This is somewhat extraordinary in Europe: in comparison only Lithuania stands next to Hungary, as there a majority,
71 seats, are distributed by first past the post system, and 70 by a proportional. Armenia and Georgia favour mixed
system too, but there a majority of distributed seats come from proportional system. According to the calculations of the
opposition, Fidesz would have won more than 73 per cent of the seats in 2010 had the new electoral law been in place.
(Cf. Népszabadság, 13 October, 2011, 22 November, 2011, 2 September, 2013.)
14 As already mentioned briefly in the beginning of this paper, on 1 March, 2014, the President of Russia, Vladimir
Putin, requested the Russian Parliament to authorize the use of military forces on Ukrainian territory, because of the
“threat to citizens of the Russian Federation, our compatriots” (President of Russia, 1 March, 2014). The Parliament
voted unanimously to allow the use of force. Additionally, on 17 March, after a Crimean referendum, President Putin
issued an executive order recognising the Republic of Crimea as an independent state (President of Russia, 17 March,
2014), and on the next day he issued an executive order on the admission of the Republic of Crimea into the Russian
Federation (President of Russia, 18 March, 2014).
24
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