HEIRS OF PEDRO LOPEZ vs. DE CASTRO324 SCRA 591-618, February 3, 2000G.R. No. 112905

THE HEIRS OF PEDRO LOPEZ, EUGENIO LOPEZ DE LEON, PASCUAL LOPEZ DE LEON, ANTONIO GUICO LOPEZ, FORTUNATO GUICO LOPEZ, MIGUEL GUICO LOPEZ, ERLINDA LOCERO LOPEZ, TING LOPEZ DE LEON, RUFINA LAYAO LOPEZ, LUISITA LOPEZ DE LEON, MACARIO LOPEZ DE LEON, FELISA LOPEZ DE LEON, PRINTIS L. DE LEON, FLOVIANA LOPEZ VELASCO, LOURDES LOPEZ DE LEON, LAGRIMAS LOPEZ DE LEON, ROSARIO LOPEZ DE LEON, RESURRECCION LOPEZ DE LEON and RICARDA LOPEZ DE LEON,petitioners,

HONESTO C. DE CASTRO, MARIA SOCORRO DE CASTRO married to ANTONIO PERIGRINA, FRANCISCO DE CASTRO, FAUSTINO DE CASTRO, EPIFANIA C. VDA. DE CASTRO, and their successors-in- interest,respondents.

FACTS:

In this case, two applications for registration of the same parcel of land were filed in different branches of the Court of First Instance. The certificates of title were issued in the name of respondent de Castro, while the other, for the heirs of Pedro Lopez was still pending.

On June 24, 1957, Assistant Fiscal Jose M. Legaspi, representing the Municipality of Silang, Cavite, filed a motion to lift the order of general default and submitted an opposition on behalf of the municipality. The opposition was later amended on September 16, 1966 alleging that a portion of the land applied for which the municipality had leased to private persons had been its patrimonial property since 1930 or earlier. The municipality further alleged that in a registration case entitled "Mariano Lopez de Leon v. Municipality of Silang" (CA-G.R. No. 8161-R), the Court of Appeals found that the applicants had never been in possession of the land sought to be registered.

On June 24, 1957, Assistant Fiscal Legaspi, representing the Municipality of Silang Cavite, submitted an opposition on behalf of the municipality. The opposition was amended alleging that the subject lot had been its patrimonial property since 1930 or earlier.

In their answer, the applicants claimed that a part of the whole tract of land they sought to register was their inheritance. The municipality filed a motion to dismiss.

On February 7, 1969, the lower court issued an order denying the motion to dismiss for lack of merit on the ground that the oppositor municipality had no personality to intervene considering that Lot 1 was outside of its territorial limits.

The municipality filed a motion for reconsideration of the said order. The court denied it in its July 23, 1970 order.

The applicants filed a motion praying that the clerk of court be commissioned to receive evidence for them it appearing that the order of July 23, 1970 had become final and executor by virtue of which the municipality of Silang no longer had any personality. The court granted said motion and directed clerk of court to submit a report.

In his report, dated April 15, 1971, clerk of court Rolando Diaz stated that since time immemorial, the Delos Reyes owned and possessed parcel of land in question. On November 3, 1870, they sold it to Dimaranan. On September 15, 1892, the property was passed to Pedro Lopez de Leon, Sr. And Maxima Trinidad until their death when their children took over ownership and possession thereof. Upon their death, their respective heirs succeeded over the property and on February 25, 1971, they partitioned it.

On April 19, 1971, the court rendered a decision approving the report of the clerk of court and ordering the decree of title be issued in favor of the applicants (Lopez).

In the course of examining the records for the purpose of issuing the decree of registration in favor of Pedro Lopez, et al., the Land Registration Commission discovered that lot 1 had been decreed in favor of private respondent Honesto de Castro, et al.

Further investigation revealed that sometime in 1967, Honesto de castro et al. sought the registration of the same parcel of land in question and succeeded in declaring it in their names.

On August 19, 1981, the CFI of Cavite issued an order declaring the court had lost jurisdiction, without however dismissing the case.

Seven (7) years later, on June 28, 1988, the heirs of Pedro Lopez filed a complaint for execution of judgement and cancellation of land titles of the defendants and their successors-in-interest before the RTC of Cavite.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the titles issued to the defendants be cancelled?

HELD:No.In land registration proceedings, all interested parties are obliged to take care of their interests and to zealously pursue their objective of registration on account of the rule that whoever first acquires title to a piece of land shall prevail. To illustrate, where more than one certificate of title is issued over the land, the person holding a prior certificate is entitled to the land as against a person who relies on a subsequent certificate.36It should be stressed that said rule refers to the date of the certificate of title and not to the date of filing of the application for registration of title. Hence, even though an applicant precedes another, he may not be deemed to have priority of right to register title. As such, while his application is being processed, an applicant is duty-bound to observe vigilance and to take care that his right or interest is duly protected.Petitioners failed to exercise the due diligence required of them as applicants for land registration. In the same way that publication of their application for registration was supposed to have rendered private respondents on constructive notice of such application, the publication of notice in the land registration proceedings initiated by private respondents had the same effect of notice upon petitioners. Petitioners were thus presumed to have been notified of the land registration proceedings filed by private respondents in the Tagaytay City branch of the Cavite CFI thereby providing them with the opportunity to file an opposition thereto.

They let seven years to pass from such discovery before they acted to revive what already was a dormant judgment. In short, they were guilty of laches-negligence/failure to do that which is ought to be done.

Sec. 32. Review of decree of registration (Presidential Decree 1529) The decree of registration shall not be reopened by reason of absence, minority or other disability, subject, however, to the right of any person...deprived of land, to file in the proper Court of CFI a petition for reopening and review not later than ONE YEAR.

Upon the expiration of said period of one year, the decree of registration and the certificate of title issued shall become incontrovertible.

Hence, the heirs of Pedro Lopez lost their property in favor of Honesto de Castro.

THE DIRECTOR OF LAND vs. COURT OF APPEALS276 SCRA 276

THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS,petitionerCOURT OF APPEALS and TEODORO ABISTADO, substituted by MARGARITA, MARISSA, MARIBEL, ARNOLD and MARY ANN, all surnamed ABISTADO,respondents

FACTS:On December 8, 1986, Private Respondent Teodoro Abistado filed a petition for original registration of his title over 648 square meters of land under Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1529.[5]The application was docketed as Land Registration Case (LRC) No. 86 and assigned to Branch 44 of the Regional Trial Court of Mamburao, Occidental Mindoro.[6]However, during the pendency of his petition, applicant died.Hence, his heirs -- Margarita, Marissa, Maribel, Arnold and Mary Ann, all surnamed Abistado -- represented by their aunt Josefa Abistado, who was appointed their guardianad litem, were substituted as applicants.The land registration court in its decision dated June 13, 1989 dismissed the petition for want of jurisdiction.However, it found that the applicants through their predecessors-in-interest had been in open, continuous, exclusive and peaceful possession of the subject land since 1938.However, the Court noted that applicants failed to comply with the provisions of Section 23 (1) of PD 1529, requiring the Applicants to publish the notice of Initial Hearing (Exh. `E') in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines.Exhibit `E' was only published in the Official Gazette (Exhibits `F' and `G').Consequently, the Court is of the well considered view that it has not legally acquired jurisdiction over the instant application for want of compliance with the mandatory provision requiring publication of the notice of initial hearing in a newspaper of general circulation."ISSUE:

Whether or not newspaper publication is mandatory in a land registration case?

HELD:

Yes. The pertinent part of Section 23 of Presidential Decree No. 1529 requiring publication of the notice of initial hearing reads as follows:Sec. 23.Notice of initial hearing, publication, etc.-- The court shall, within five days from filing of the application, issue an order setting the date and hour of the initial hearing which shall not be earlier than forty-five days nor later than ninety days from the date of the order.The public shall be given notice of initial hearing of the application for land registration by means of (1) publication; (2) mailing; and (3) posting.1.By publication.--Upon receipt of the order of the court setting the time for initial hearing, the Commissioner of Land Registration shallcause a notice of initial hearing to be published once in the Official Gazette and once in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines: Provided, however, that the publication in the Official Gazette shall be sufficient to confer jurisdiction upon the court.Said notice shall be addressed to all persons appearing to have an interest in the land involved including the adjoining owners so far as known, and `to all whom it may concern.'Said notice shall also require all persons concerned to appear in court at a certain date and time to show cause why the prayer of said application shall not be granted.Publication in a newspaper of general circulation should be deemed mandatory when the law already requires notice by publication in the Official Gazette as well as by mailing and posting, all of which have already been complied with in the case at hand.The reason is due process and the reality that the Official Gazette is not as widely read and circulated as newspapers and is oftentimes delayed in its circulation, such that the notices published therein may not reach the interested parties on time, if at all.Additionally, such parties may not be owners of neighboring properties, and may in fact not own any other real estate.In sum, the all-encompassingin remnature of land registration cases, the consequences of default orders issued against the whole world and the objective of disseminating the notice in as wide a manner as possible demand a mandatory construction of the requirements for publication, mailing and posting.Admittedly, there was failure to comply with the explicit publication requirement of the law.Private respondents did not proffer any excuse; even if they had, it would not have mattered because the statute itself allows no excuses.Ineludibly, this Court has no authority to dispense with such mandatory requirement.The law is unambiguous and its rationale clear.Time and again, this Court has declared that where the law speaks in clear and categorical language, there is no room for interpretation, vacillation or equivocation; there is room only for applicationThere is no alternative. Thus, the application for land registration filed by private respondents must be dismissed without prejudice to reapplication in the future, after all the legal requisites shall have been duly complied with.WHEREFORE, the petition isGRANTEDand the assailed Decision and Resolution areREVERSEDandSET ASIDE.The application of private respondent for land registration isDISMISSEDwithout prejudice.No costs.SO ORDERED.

CACHO vs. COURT OF APPEALS269 SCRA 159, March 3, 1997

TEOFILO CACHO,petitioner-appellant, COURT OF APPEALS, REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, NATIONAL STEEL CORPORATION and THE CITY OF ILIGAN,respondents-appellees.

FACTS:The late Doa Demetria Cacho applied for the registration of two parcels of land situated in what was then Lanao, Moro Province. Both parcels were within the limits of Military Reservation No. 43, known as "Camp Overton".The petitions were docketed as GLRO Record No. 6908 & 6909 and were jointly tried and decided by Judge Jesse Jorge on December 10, 1912.On June 29, 1978, Teofilo Cacho, herein petitioner, as the son and sole heir of the late Doa Demetria Cacho, filed a petition for reconstitution of two original certificates of title under Republic Act 26.The Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the lower court and dismissed the petition for re-issuance of Decrees No. 10364 and 18969, with prejudice.

ISSUE:

Did the Court of Appeals commit reversible error in its decision?

HELD:

Yes. A land registration proceeding is binding upon and conclusive against all persons including the government and its branches.

A decree of registration that has become final shall be deemed conclusive upon all matters that might be litigated or decided in the land registration proceeding.

The lower court and the court of appeals correctly found that decrees of registration had in fact been issued in the case at bench.

To allow the final decrees to be once again be subject to the conditions set forth in the 1914 case of Cacho vs U.S. would be tantamount to setting aside the decree which cannot be reopened after the lapse of one year from the enrty thereof. Such action would definitely run counter to the very purpose of the Torrens System.Requiring the submission of new plan as a condition for the re-issuance of the decree would render the finality attained by the Cacho vs U.S. case nugatory, thus, violating the fundamental rule regarding res judicata.

In land registration proceedings, the ownership of a parcel of land is sought to be established. After the ownership has been proved and confirmed by judicial declaration, no further proceeding to enforce said ownership is necessary, except when the losing party had been in possession of land and the winning party desires to oust him therefrom.

The issuance of a decree is a ministerial duty both of the judge and of the land registration commission.

A final decision in land registration cases can neither be rendered inefficacious by the statute of limitation nor by laches.

WHEREFORE,the decision of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The decision of Branch I of the Regional Trial Court of the Twelfth Judicial Region stationed at the City of Iligan, in its LRC Case No. CLR (GLRO) Record Nos. 6908 and 6909 dated June 9, 1993, is REINSTATED and AFFIRMED.No special pronouncement is made as to costs.SO ORDERED.

DIRECTOR OF LANDS vs. COURT OF APPEALS308 SCRA 317, June 17, 1999

THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS,petitioner, COURT OF APPEALS, MONICO RIVERA and ESTRELLA NOTA,respondents.FACTS:Lot 10704 is one of the uncontested lots.It is a parcel of land party cocal and corn land situated at Cagmanaba, Oas, Albay containing an area of 68,179 square meters bounded on the North, South and West by Burias Pass and on the East by Lot 10976.Originally the land was owned by Eliseo Rivera who began possessing and occupying the same in the concept of owner openly, continuously, adversely, notoriously and exclusively since 1926.He planted corn in the vacant spaces and some coconut seedlings which later bore fruit.Sometime on January 7, 1928, the Spouses Ignacio Almazar and Gregoria Rivera purchased the land from him.The land now was declared in the name of Gregoria Rivera under Tax Declaration No..There was another re-assessment under Tax Declaration No. 7968 .They continued planting corn.On May 22, 1971, claimant herein and his wife purchased the land from Gregoria Rivera.She caused the land to be declared in her name under Tax Declaration No. 10641.There was another re-assessment under Tax Declaration No. 10403.There was a house which they constructed as their abode.They continued planting corn and harvested about 10 to 15 sacks of ears of corn.They shelled the ears of corn and sold the same to the market for their own livelihood.Meanwhile, on the coconut trees they harvest about 50 to 100 nuts every 45 days for family consumption.The land was surveyed in the name of the herein claimant per certification of the CENRO.The cadastral survey costs in the amount ofP101.70 had been paid under .Likewise, all taxes have been paid up to the current year Finding that the claimant, together with his predecessor-in-interest, has satisfactorily possessed and occupied the land in the concept of owner openly, continuously, adversely, notoriously and exclusively since 1926, very much earlier to June 12, 1945, the court ordered the registration and confirmation of Lot 10704 in the name of the Spouses Monico Rivera and Estrella Nota.The Director of Lands appealed to the Court of Appeals, alleging that the finding of the trial court that claimants-appellees and their predecessor-in-interest have possessed Lot 10704 since 1926 is not sufficiently supported by the evidence.The appellant contended that the earliest tax declaration presented by appellee took effect only in 1949 and that there is no evidence that Gregoria Rivera declared the same in her name for tax purposes during her alleged occupancy.The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment appealed from

ISSUE:Whether or not Spouses Monico Rivero and EStrella Nota have a registrable title to the lot in question? HELD:Yes. Monico Rivera and Estrella Nota were in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of ownership under a bona fide claim of ownership for at least thirty years prior to 1973 is a question of fact which was resolved affirmatively by the trial court and the Court of Appeals.Such factual finding is generally binding upon this court which should limit itself to questions of law in an appeal by petition for review oncertiorariunder Rule 45.There is a question of law where there is a doubt raised concerning the correct application of law and jurisprudence on the matter.

Section 48 (b) of the Public Land Act provides: Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interests have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bonafide claim of acquisition or ownership, for at least 30 years immediately preceding the application for confirmation of the title except when prevented by war or force majeure. They shall be conclusively essential to the government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter.WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error in the decision appealed from, the same is AFFIRMED.SO ORDERED.

REPUBLIC vs. DOLDOL295 SCRA 359, September 10, 1998G.R. No. 132963

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, (represented by Opol National Secondary Technical School),petitioner,NICANOR DOLDOL,respondent

FACTS:Sometime in 1959, respondent Nicanor Doldol occupied a portion of land in Barrio Pontacan, Municipality of Opol, Misamis Oriental. On October 23, 1963, he filed an application for saltwork purposes for the said area with the Bureau of Forest Development. The Director of Forestry, however, rejected the same on April 1, 1968. Meanwhile, the Provincial Board of Misamis Oriental passed a resolution in 1965 reserving Lot 4932, Cad-237, Opol Cadastre as a school site. This reserved lot unfortunately included the area occupied by Doldol.In accordance with said resolution, the Opol High School transferred to the site in 1970. Seventeen years later, on November 2, 1987, then President Corazon Aquino issued Proclamation No. 180 reserving the area, including the portion in dispute, for the Opol High School, now renamed the Opol National Secondary Technical School (hereafter Opol National School). Needing the area occupied by Doldol for its intended projects, the school made several demands for him to vacate said portion, but he refused to move.

In view of Doldol's refusal to vacate, Opol National School filed in 1991 a complaint foraccion possessoriawith the Regional Trial Court of Cagayan de Oro. The trial court ruled in the school's favor and ordered Doldol to vacate the land. On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the courta quo, ruling that Doldol was entitled to the portion he occupied, he having possessed the same for thirty-two years, from 1959 up to the time of the filing of the complaint in 1991.

Sometime in 1970, the Opol High School filed a complaint for accion possessoria with the RTC, the court ruled on schools power.

On appeal, the CA reversed the decision of the court ruling that Doldol was entitled to the portion he occupied, he having possessed the same for 32 years (1959-1991).

ISSUE:Whether or not Doldol has the better right to possess the land in dispute?HELD:No. The Public Land Act requires that the applicant must prove (a) that the land is alienable public land and (b) that his open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the same must either be since time immemorial or for the period prescribed in the Public Land Act. When the conditions set by law are complied with the possessor of the land, by operation of law, acquires a right to grant, a government grant, without the necessity of title/certificate of tile being issued.

The evidence presented shows that the land in dispute is alienable and disposable in accordance with the District Foresters Certification. Doldol thus meets the first requirement.

Consequently, Doldol could not have acquired an imperfect title to the disputed land since his occupation of the same started only in 1955, much later than June 12, 1945. Not having complied with the conditions set forth by law, Doldol cannot be said to have acquired a right to the land or a right to assert a right superior to the school given that then Pres. Aquino had reserved the lot for Opol National School.

The privilege occupying public lands with a view of pre-empting confers no contractual or vested right in the land occupied and the authority of the President to withdraw such lands for sale or acquisition by the public, or to reserve them for public use, prior to divesting by the government of title thereof stands eventhough this may defeat the imperfect right of settler. Lands covered by reservation are not subject to entry, and no lawful settlement on them can be acquired (Solicitor General)

In sum, Opol National Schoolhas the better right of possession over the land in dispute.

PALOMO vs. COURT OF APPEALS266 SCRA 392, January 21, 1997

SPOUSES IGNACIO PALOMO and TRINIDAD PASCUAL, and CARMEN PALOMO VDA. DE BUENAVENTURA,petitioners,

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, FAUSTINO J. PERFECTO, RAFFY SANTILLAN, BOY ARIADO, LORENZO BROCALES, SALVADOR DOE, and other DOES,respondents

FACTS:On 13 June 1913, then Governor General of the Philippine Islands issued EO NO. 40, which reserved for provincial park purposes parcels of land situated in Naga,Tiwi, Albay.

Subsequently, the then Court of First Instance in Albay, ordered the registration of 15 parcels of land covered by EO No. 40 in the name of Diego Palomo on 1916-1917. Palomo donated these parcels of land to his heirs, herein petitioners, Ignacio and Carmen Palomo, two years before his death in 1937.

Claiming that the aforesaid OCT were lost during the Japanese occupation, Ignacio Palomo filed a petition for reconstruction. In 1953, the RD issued TCT to said lot.

On July 10,1954, President Magsaysay issued Proclamation No. 47, converting the area embraced by EO No. 40 into Tiwi Hot Spring National Park, under the control, management, protection and administration of Commissions of Parks and Wildlife, now a Division of the Bureau of Forest Development. The area was never released as alienable and disposable portion of public domain and, therefore, is neither susceptible of disposition under Public Land Law nor registrable under Land Registration Act.

The Palomos, however, continued in possession of the property, paid real taxes thereon and introduced improvements by planting rice, bananas, pandan and coconuts. They also mortgaged the parcels of land to guarantee a loan from BPI.In May 7, 1974 petitioner Carmen vda. de Buenaventura and spouses Ignacio Palomo and Trinidad Pascual filed Civil Case No. T-143 before the then Court of First Instance of Albay for Injunction with damages against private respondents Faustino J. Perfecto, Raffy Santillan, Boy Ariado, Lorenzo Brocales, Salvador Doe and other Does who are all employees of the Bureau of Forest Development who entered the land covered by TCT No. 3913 and/or TCT 3914 and cut down bamboos thereat, totally leveling no less than 4 groves worth not less thanP2,000.

On October 11, 1974, the Republic of the Philippines filed Civil Case No. T-176 for annulment and cancellation of Certificates of Title involving the 15 parcels of land registered in the name of the petitioners and subject of Civil Case.

The court dismissed the complaint of the petitioner. On the other hand, the court rule din favor of the RP.

The petitioners appealed to the CA which affirmed the findings of the lower court.

ISSUE:Whether or not petitioner certificate of titles are valid?

HELD:No. Under the Spanish Crown, private ownership of land could only be acquired through royal concessions, which were documented in various forms, such as:1. Royal Grant2. Special Grant3. Title by Purchase4. Possessory Information Title obtained under the Spanish Mortgage Law or under the Royal Decree of January 26, 1889.

Unfortunately, no proof was presented that petitioners predecessors-in-interest derived the title from an old Spanish grant. Petitioners placed much reliance on the decisions of the Court of First Instance which were not signed by the judge but were merely certified copies of notification to Diego Palomo bearing the signature of the Clerk of Court.

There is no question that the lands in the case at bar were not alienable lands of the public domain. As testified by the District Forester, records in the Bureau of Forestry show that the subject lands were never declared as alienable and disposable and subject to private alienation prior to 1913 up to the present.Moreover, as part of the reservation for provincial park purposes, they form part of the forest zone.It is elementary in the law governing natural resources that forest land cannot be owned by private persons. It is not registrable and possession thereof, no matter how lengthy, cannot convert it into private property,unless such lands are reclassified and considered disposable and alienable.Neither do the tax receipts which were presented in evidence prove ownership of the parcels of land inasmuch as the weight of authority is that tax declarations are not conclusive proof of ownership in land registration cases. Having disposed of the issue of ownership, we now come to the matter regarding the forfeiture of improvements introduced on the subject lands. It bears emphasis that Executive Order No. 40 was already in force at the time the lands in question were surveyed for Diego Palomo. Petitioners also apparently knew that the subject lands were covered under the reservation when they filed a petition for reconstitution of the lost original certificates of title inasmuch as the blueprint of Survey Work Order Number 21781 of Plan II-9299 approved by the Chief of the Land Registration Office Enrique Altavas in 1953 as a true and correct copy of the Original Plan No. II-9299 filed in the Bureau of Lands dated September 11, 1948 contains the following note, "in conflict with provincial reservation."In any case, petitioners are presumed to know the law and the failure of the government to oppose the registration of the lands in question is no justification for the petitioners to plead good faith in introducing improvements on the lots.Finally, since 1,976 square meters of the 3,384 square meters covered by TCT 3913 fall within the reservation, TCT 3913 should be annulled only with respect to the aforesaid area. Inasmuch as the bamboo groves leveled in TCT 3913 and subject of Civil Case T-143,were within the perimeter of the national park,no pronouncement as to damages is in order.WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED with the modification that TCT 3913 be annulled with respect to the 1,976 square meter area falling within the reservation zone.SO ORDERED.

JAMES BRACEWELL vs. COURT OF APPEALS & REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES323 SCRA 193, January 25, 2002

JAMES R. BRACEWELL,petitioner, HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,respondents

FACTS:The controversy involves a total of nine thousand six hundred fifty-seven (9,657) square meters of land located in Las Pias, Metro Manila. The facts show that sometime in 1908, Maria Cailles, married to James Bracewell, Sr., acquired the said parcels of land from the Dalandan and Jimenez families of Las Pias; after which corresponding Tax Declarations were issued in the name of Maria Cailles. On January 16, 1961, Maria Cailles sold the said parcels of land to her son, the petitioner, by virtue of a Deed of Sale which was duly annotated and registered with the Registry of Deeds of Pasig, Rizal. Tax Declarations were thereafter issued in the name of petitioner, cancelling the previous Tax Declarations issued to Maria Cailles.

On September 19, 1963, petitioner filed before the then Court of First Instance of Pasig, Rizal an action for confirmation of imperfect title under Section 48 of Commonwealth Act No. 141. On February 21, 1964, the Director of Lands, represented by the Solicitor General, opposed petitioners application on the grounds that neither he nor his predecessors-in-interest possessed sufficient title to the subject land nor have they been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the same for at least thirty (30) years prior to the application, and that the subject land is part of the public domain.

The registration proceedings were meanwhile suspended on account of an action filed by Crescencio Leonardo against Maria Cailles before the then Court of First Instance of Pasig, Rizal. On March 26, 1985, the entire records of the registration case were forwarded to the Makati Regional Trial Court where it was docketed as Land Registration Case No. M-77. The Solicitor General resubmitted his opposition to the application on July 22, 1985, this time alleging the following additional grounds: (1) the failure of petitioner to prosecute his action for an unreasonable length of time; and (2) that the tax declarations attached to the complaint do not constitute acquisition of the lands applied for.On May 3, 1989, the lower court issued an Order granting the application of petitioner. The Solicitor General promptly appealed to respondent Court which, on June 29, 1992, reversed and set aside the lower courts Order

The C.F.I. ruled in favor of petitioner upholding the right of M. Cailles. In 1985, the Solicitor General re-submitted his opposition. The lower court issued an order granting the application of petitioner. The Solicitor General appealed to respondent Court in 1992 which reversed and set aside the lower courts order. It also denied petitioners Motion for Reconsideration.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not petitioner has vested rights over the parcels of land?2. Whether or not Sec. 48 of Court of Appeals No. 141 could be invoked in this particular case?

HELD:No. Sec. 48 of C.A 141 was amended by PD 1073 in January 1977, which now reads (b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership, since June 12, 1945, or earlier, immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title, except when prevented by wars or force majeure.

Petitioner failed to show that the parcels of land subject of his application are alienable or disposable. It was conclusively shown by the government that the same were only classified as alienable on March 27, 1972. Even the petitioner and his predecessors occupied the same since 1908, he still cannot claim title thereto by virtue of possession since the subject parcels of land were not yet alienable land at that time nor capable of private appropriation.

There can be no imperfect title to be confirmed over lands not yet classified or disposable or alienable. In the absence of such classification, the land remains public land until released therefrom and open to disposition.

Petition DENIED for lack of merit.

THE DIRECTOR, LANDS MANAGEMENT BUREAU vs. COURT OF APPEALS & AQUILINO CARINO324 SCRA 757, February 7, 2002

THE DIRECTOR, LANDS MANAGEMENT BUREAU,petitionerCOURT OF APPEALS and AQUILINO L. CARIO,respondents.FACTS:On May 15, 1975, the private respondent, Aquilino Cario, filed with the then Branch I, Court of First Instance of Laguna, a petitionfor registration of Lot No. 6, a sugar land with an area of forty-three thousand six hundred fourteen (43,614) square meters, more or less, forming part of a bigger tract of land surveyed as Psu-108952 and situated in Barrio Sala, Cabuyao, Laguna.Private respondent declared that subject land was originally owned by his mother, Teresa Lauchangco, who died on February 15, 1911,and later administered by him in behalf of his five brothers and sisters, after the death of their father in 1934.In 1949, private respondent and his brother, Severino Cario, became co-owners of Lot No. 6 by virtue of an extra-judicial partition of the land embraced in Plan, among the heirs of Teresa Lauchangco. On July 26, 1963, through another deed of extrajudicial settlement, sole ownership of Lot No. 6 was adjudicated to the private respondent. .

Private respondents statements were confirmed by the report of the Land Investigator of the Bureau of Lands. It further stated that the land was agricultural in nature and improvements thereon were sugarcane, bamboo clumps, etc.; That the land subject for registration was outside any civil or military reservation, etc. and that the same land was free from claim and conflict; That Carino had been in open, continuous and exclusive possession of the land who acquired the same thru inheritance from his deceased mother.

ISSUE:Whether or not the decision of Court of Appeals which affirmed the RTCs decision ordering the registration of Lot No. 6 in the name of Respondent Carino was valid?

HELD: No. The petition for land registration at bar is under the Land Registration Act which requires that he who alleges in his petition or application, ownership in fee simple, must present muniments of title since the Spanish times, such as Titulo Real, or royal grant, a Concession Especial or special grant, a Composicion Con Al Estado or adjustment title, or a titulo de compra, or title through purchase; informacion possessoria or adjustment title, which would become a titulo gratuito or a gratuitous title.

Even if considered as petition for confirmation of imperfect title under the Public land Act (CA No. 141), as amended, private respondents petition would meet the same fate. For insufficiency of evidence, its denial is inevitable. The evidence adduced by the private respondent is not enough to prove his possession of subject lot in concept of owner, in the manner and for the number of years required by law for the confirmation of imperfect title.Section 48 (b) of Commonwealth Act No. 141 as amended by R.A. No. 1942 and R.A. No. 3872, the law prevailing at the time the Petition of private respondent was filed on May 15, 1975, provides:"Sec. 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the public domain or claiming to own any such lands or an interest therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of first Instance of the province where the land is located for confirmation of their claim and the issuance of title therefor, under the Land Registration Act, to wit: x.................x.................x(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership,for at least thirty yearsimmediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title except when prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter."Possession of public lands, however long, never confers title upon the possessor, unless the occupant can prove possession or occupation of the same under claim of ownership for the required period to constitute a grant from the State.

The underlying principle is that all lands that were not acquired from the government, either by purchase or by grant, belong to the state as part of the public domain.

As stressed by the Solicitor General, the contention of private respondent that his mother had been in possession of subject land even prior to 1911 is self-serving, hearsay, and inadmissible in evidence. The phrase "adverse, continuous, open, public, peaceful and in concept of owner", by which characteristics private respondent describes his possession and that of his parents,are mere conclusions of law requiring evidentiary support and substantiation. The burden of proof is on the private respondent, as applicant, to prove by clear, positive and convincing evidence that the alleged possession of his parents was of the nature and duration required by law. His bare allegations without more, do not amount to preponderant evidence that would shift the burden of proof to the oppositor.

The Court cannot apply here thejuris et de jurepresumption that the lot being claimed by the private respondent ceased to be a public land and has become private property.To reiterate, under the Regalian doctrine all lands belong to the State. Unless alienated in accordance with law, it retains its basic rights over the same as dominus. Private respondent having failed to come forward with muniments of title to reinforce his petition for registration under the Land Registration Act (Act 496), and to present convincing and positive proof of his open, continuous, exclusive and notorious occupation of Lot No. 6en concepto de duenofor at least 30 years immediately preceding the filing of his petition,[37]the Court is of the opinion, and so finds, that subject Lot No. 6 surveyed under Psu-108952, forms part of the pubic domain not registrable in the name of private respondent.

WHEREFORE,the Petition is GRANTED; the Decision of the Court of Appeals, dated November 11, 1993, in CA-G.R. No. 29218 affirming the Decision, dated February 5, 1990, of Branch XXIV, Regional Trial Court of Laguna in LRC No. B-467, is SET ASIDE; and Lot No. 6, covered by and more particularly described in Psu-108952, is hereby declared a public land, under the administrative supervision and power of disposition of the Bureau of Lands Management. No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

TURQUESA vs. VALERA322 SCRA 573[G.R. No. 76371. January 20, 2000]

MARIANO TURQUESA, ABRAHAM LALUGAN and LAYAO, MANUEL MAGALA substituted by his Heirs, OTILIO DAMASEN and SEGUNDINA DAMASEN, ANTONIO ESCALANTE, METODIO TULLAS, FLORA LABUGUEN and JUANA LABUGUEN, LOURDES SINDON BAYUBAY, MANUEL MEDRANO and JOSE MEDRANO,petitioners,

ROSARIO VALERA and the HONORABLE COURT of APPEALS,respondents

FACTS:More than half a century ago, private respondent applied for the registration of two parcels of land located in Barrio Pulot, Laguyan, Abra described in Plan PSU-119561 with a total land area of 232,908 square meters. The first lot (hereinafter referred to as Lot 1) has an area of 210,767 square meters whereas the other lot (Lot 2) has an area of 22,141 square meters. In support of her application, private respondent presented documents showing that when she was still single, she bought Lot 1 during the years 1929-1932 from Cristeta Trangued and the heirs of Juan Valera Rufino who were allegedly in possession thereof since the Spanish regime in the concept of owners and who declared it in their name for taxation purposes. From 1929, she continued possession of said land in the concept of owner and continued to pay the tax thereon in her name. Notices of the application for registration were published in the Official Gazette, with copies thereof sent to persons mentioned therein and posted in the proper places.The Director of Lands, together with petitioners and other persons opposed the application of private respondent. In the course of the hearing, the oppositors (except the director of lands) averred that their lands were included in lot 1 which private respondent sought to register in her name. Oppositors moved for an ocular inspection in order to determine the correct boundary limits of the lands they respectively claim, but the same was denied.

On 23 April 1956, the trial court ruled that applicant has a registrable title.Oppositors appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA) insofar only as Lot 1 is concerned, arguing, among others, that the trial court erred in not granting their motion for new trial and their demand for ocular inspection. On March 15, 1966, the Court of Appeals set aside the appealed decision and remanded the case to the lower court for further proceedings, and ordered the conduct of an ocular inspection.

In accordance with the CA directive, three (3) commissioners were appointed by the Trial Court to conduct ocular inspection. The observations and findings were the following:(1) the claims of petitioners as shown in the sketch plan are not shown in the original survey.(2) the claims of other petitioners appeared in the original survey although three of these claims bear different identifying names.(3) the Calle para Collago maintained by the oppositors to be the extent or boundary of the property of the applicant on the south side is existing and still is the existing boundary on the south and on the southeast side as shown in the sketch plan.However, the court just reiterated its former decision ordering the registration of the lot in the name of applicant Rosario Valera.ISSUE:Does Rosario Valera have a rightful claim over the lot in question?HELD:No. She doesnt have a rightful claim over the land.The burden of proof in land registration cases is incumbent on the applicant who must show that he is the real and absolute owner in fee simple of the land applied for.On him also rests the burden to overcome the presumption that the land sought to be registered forms part of the public domain considering that the inclusion in a title of a part of the public domain nullifies the title. Undoubtedly, a land registration proceeding is one which isin remin character, so that the default order issued by the court binds the whole world and all persons whether known or unknown,except those who have appeared and filed their pleadings in the registration case.In the case at bar, those exempted from the order of general default are the petitioners and the other oppositors.Even if petitioner/s (Partolan) was excluded by the order of general default and (Baltar) did not appeal from the trial courts decision of April 23, 1956. The applicant must still prove and establish that she has registrable rights over the land, which must be grounded on incontrovertible evidence and based on positive and absolute proof. The declaration of the applicant that the land applied for has been in the possession of her predecessor-in-interest for a certain period, does not constitute the WELL-NIGH INCONTROVERTIBLE and CONCLUSIVE evidence required in land registration. If an applicant does not have any rightful claim over real property, the Torrens System of registration can confirm or record nothing.It must be borne in mind that what defines a piece of land is not the size or area mentioned in its description, but the boundaries therein laid down, as enclosing the land and indicating its limits.The Damasens were declared to have a rightful claim over the specific portions of Lot. . A reading of the said decision and the foregoing discussions clearly indicates that the land to be registered in private respondents name is limited to a certain area stated in the sketch annexed to the Commissioners report. It categorically excluded those portions pertaining to the oppositors. Since private respondent failed to show that she has a proprietary right over the excluded areas, such as the portions occupied by those against whom the writ of possession was sought for, then the trial court was correct in refusing to grant the writ as the same has no basis

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the decision of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the two orders of the trial court dated September 14, 1981 and November 25, 1981 are REINSTATED.

FELIPE SEVILLE, et. al. vs. NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT COMPANY, et. al./ CALIXTRA YAP351 SCRA 112, February 2, 2001G.R. No. 129401.

FELIPE SEVILLE in his capacity as judicial administrator of the estate of JOAQUIN ORTEGA and/or FELIPE SEVILLE, EMILIA ESTRADA, MARIA S. TELLDER, MA. ISABEL SEVILLE, MA. TERESITA LICARDO, FRANCISCO SEVILLE, RAMON O. SEVILLE, JOSE MARIE SEVILLE, GEMMA ALVAREZ-ASAYAS, ANNABELLE ALVAREZ-GONZALES, SYLVIA ALVAREZ-LIOK, ADOLFO O. ALVAREZ JR., DIANA ALVAREZ-DABON, MARIA SALVADOR O. POLANCOS and JOAQUIN ORTEGA II as successors-in-interest of JOAQUIN ORTEGA and his estate,petitioners,

NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT COMPANY, LEYTE SAB-A BASIN DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATED SMELTING AND REFINING CORPORATION, LEPANTO CONSOLIDATED MINING CO., PHILIPPINE PHOSPHATE FERTILIZER CORPORATION, CALIXTRA YAP and REGISTER OF DEEDS OF LEYTE,respondents.

FACTS:On June 14, 1980, Calixtra Yap sold to LSBDA (Leyte Sub-Basin Development Authority) a lot consisting of 464,920 square meters located at Sto. Rosario, Isabel, Leyte. On June 1, 1982, LSBDA filed a Miscellaneous Sales Application with the Bureau of Lands covering said lot. Thereafter, an original Certificate of Title (OCT) was issued in the name of LSBDA. In 1989, LSBDA assigned all rights over the property to the National Development Company (NDC), and as a result, a new TCT was issued. The property was leased to Philippine Associated Smelting & Refining Corporation, Philphos & LEPANTO.

In 1988, the estate of Joaquin Ortega, represented by their administrator Felipe Seville, filed a complaint for recovery of real property, rentals, & damages against the respondents. After trial, the Court declared, among others, the following:

1. The Deed of Sale by Calixtra Yap in favor of LSBDA is NULL & VOID ab initio;2. The intestate estate of Joaquin Ortega is declared owner in fee simple of the 735,333 sq. m. & NDC is ordered to segregate same area & convey the same to the estate of J. Ortega.;3. The Register of Deeds is ordered to issue 8 new titles;4. xxxx5. xxxx6. xxxx7. xxxx8. xxxx

A motion for reconsideration was filed with the Court of Appeals where the latter REVERSED & SET ASIDE the RTCs judgment.Hence, this petition.In their Memorandum, petitioners submitted the following issues for the reconsideration of the Court:

1. Whether or not the sale of Calixtra Yap of the estate of the late Joaquin Ortega in favor of LSBDA was NULL & VOID;2. Whether or not the issuance of a Miscellaneous Patent & an Original Certificate of Title in favor of LSBDA was valid;3. Whether or not petitioners are guilty of laches;4. Whether or not petitioners are entitled to the remedy of reconveyance & the damages awarded by the Trial Court.

HELD:The petition has no merit. There was no showing that the land had been classified as alienable before the title was issued to LSBDA, hence, petitioners could not have become owners thereof through prescription. Petitioners challenge to LSBDA cannot be granted, because it is based on a wrong premise and amounts to a collateral attack, which is not allowed by law.

Certificate not subject to collateral attack A certificate of title shall not be subject to collateral attack. It cannot be altered, modified, or cancelled except in a direct proceeding in accordance with law. It has been held that a certificate of title, once registered, should not thereafter be impugned, altered, modified, enlarged or diminished, except in a direct proceeding permitted by law. Otherwise, the reliance on registered titles would be lost.

LSBDAs title was based on Miscellaneous Sales Patent issued by the Director of the Bureau of Lands. LSBDA acquired the property in a public auction conducted by the Bureau of Lands. Therefore, the same was valid.

Moreover, the title became indefeasible & incontrovertible after the lapse of one year from the time of its registration and issuance. Sec. 32 of PD 1529 provides that upon expiration of said period of 1 year, the decree of registration and the certificate of title shall become incontrovertible.

Petitioners also claim that the disputed property should be reconveyed to them. This cannot be allowed. The proper remedy is an action for reversion, which may be instituted only, pursuant to Sec. 101 of the Public Land Act, which states that, All actions for the reversion to the Government of lands of the public domain or improvements thereon shall be instituted by the Solicitor General or the officer acting in his stead, in the proper courts, in the name of the Republic of the Philippines.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DENIED and the assailed Decision AFFIRMED.Costs against petitioners.

SERNA vs. COURT OF APPEALS308 SCRA 527, June 18, 1999G.R. No. 124605.

ENRIQUITO SERNA and AMPARO RASCA,petitioners,COURT OF APPEALS, SANTIAGO FONTANILLA, and RAFAELA RASING,respondents.FACTS:

Dionisio Fontanilla had four (4) children, namely, Rosa, Antonio, Jose and Lorenza, all surnamed Fontanilla.Rosa married Estanislao Pajaro and their union produced Fructoso and Paciencia.Lorenza married Alberto Rasca and they had a daughter, petitioner Amparo Rasca (married to Enriquito Serna).Jose had a son, respondent Santiago Fontanilla (married to Rafaela Rasing).Hence, the parties involved are first cousins.Dionisio Fontanilla was the original owner and possessor of a parcel of land, containing an area of twelve thousand five hundred eight square meters (12,508 sq. m.), located in Barangay Lucap, Alaminos, Pangasinan. In 1921, the property was declared in his name for taxation purposes.In the same year, Turner Land Surveying Company surveyed the land for Dionisio Fontanilla, with the agreement that the cost of survey would be paid upon approval of the plan by the Bureau of Lands.On March 2, 1923, the Bureau of Lands approved the survey plan.In 1938, for failing to pay the survey costs and to prevent foreclosure, Dionisio Fontanilla sold the land to his daughter, Rosa Fontanilla.In 1939, Rosa began paying the real estate property tax thereon.On August 21, 1955, Rosa sold the land to her nephew, herein Respondent Santiago Fontanilla, thru a notarized Deed of Absolute Sale. The instrument was not registered. Respondent spouses Fontanilla constructed their house on the lot in question.

On December 16, 1957, Rosas heirs, Estanislao Pajaro and his two children, Fructoso & Paciencia, executed another Deed of Absolute Sale over the same land in favor of Respondent Fontanilla.In 1978, respondent spouses Fontanilla went to the United States (U.S.) and stayed there until 1981. While in the U.S., Petitioners Enriqueto & Amparo Serna (Ampara is a grandchild of Dionisio Fontanilla), applied for the land registration of the same land in Pangasinan. In 1979, the registration was approved and the Register of Deeds issued Original Certificate of Title No. 139 to petitioners. Such title was transcribed in the registration book of the Register of Deeds of Pangasinan.On May 7, 1981, Respondent spouses Fontanilla filed with the Court of First Instance (CFI) an action for reconveyance.After trial, the CFI ruled in favor of Respondent spouses Santiago Fontanilla & Rafaela Rasing declaring them absolute and legal owners of the land in question; ordering the defendants to transfer & recover OCT No. 139 to spouses Santiago Fontanilla & Rafaela Rasing.

Both parties appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA).

On August 22, 1995, the CA AFFFIRMED the decision of the RTC. Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but said motion was denied on February 26, 1996.

ISSUES:1. Whether or not the appealed decision was supported by evidence?2. Whether or not the decision was in accordance with law & jurisprudence?HELD: 1. YES. The appealed decision was supported by evidence. Respondent spouses Fontanilla & R. Rasing proved that they were enjoying open, continuous and adverse possession of the property for more than 60 years from 1921. xxxxThough mere tax declaration does not prove ownership of the property of the declarant, tax declarations & receipts can be strong evidence of ownership of land when accompanied by possession for a period sufficient for prescription.2. YES. The decision was in accordance with law and jurisprudence.At the time material hereto, registration of untitled land was pursuant to Act No. 496, as amended. Later, PD 1529, the Property Registration Decree, amended & codified laws relative to registration of property. Adjudication of land in a registration (or cadastral) case does not become final & incontrovertible until the expiration of one year after the entry of the final decree. After the lapse of said period, the decree becomes incontrovertible & no longer subject to reopening or review.

An action based on implied or constructive trust prescribes in 10 years. This means that petitioners should have enforced the trust within 10 years from the time of its creation or upon the alleged fraudulent registration of the property. Discovery of the fraud must be deemed to have taken place from the issuance of the certificate of title because registration of real property is considered a constructive notice to all persons and it shall be counted from the time of such registering, filing or entering.

Respondent spouses Fontanillas action for reconveyance was timely as it was filed within 10 years from the issuance of the Torrens Title over the property.

WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition for review oncertiorarifor lack of merit.We AFFIRM the decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 39922.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. COURT OF APPEALS & ROMEO DIVINAFLOR349 SCRA 451

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitionerCOURT OF APPEALS & ROMEO DIVINAFLOR, respondentsFACTS:Lot 107391, with an area of 10,775 square meters, is a parcel of riceland located at Maramba, Oas, Albay. Originally, the land was owned by Marcial Listana who was in possession & occupation of the same in the concept of an owner, openly, continuously & exclusively in 1939.On May 21, 1973, Romeo Divinaflor acquired ownership of the land by means of an Absolute Deed of Sale. He had it declared in his name thru a tax declaration.Finding that the claimant, together with his predecessor-in-interest, has satisfactorily possessed & occupied this land in the concept of an owner, openly, continuously, adversely, notoriously, & exclusively since 1939, very much earlier to June 12, 1945, the Court ordered the registration & confirmation of lot 10739 in the name of Spouses Romeo Divinaflor & Nenita Radan.The Director of Lands appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA) alleging that the finding of the Trial Court was not sufficiently supported by evidence. The Director contended that the earliest tax declaration presented by claimant took effect only in 1980 & the certificate of real estate tax payment was dated 1990.

The CA affirmed the judgment appealed from, ruling that, To our mind, it is not necessary, in cases of this nature, to present tax declarations & tax receipts of the land in question. All that the law mandates is proof of open, continuous, peaceful & adverse possession which appellee has convincingly established xxxxx.

Thereafter, a Motion for Reconsideration of the above-mentioned decision was likewise denied.

ISSUE: Whether or not Respondent Divinaflor has acquired registrable title over the subject property?

HELD: YES. Respondent Divinaflor acquired a registrable title over the subject property.

PD 1073, Sec. 48, provides that, Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, notorious possession & occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership, since June 12, 1945, or earlier, immediately preceing the filing of the application for confirmation of title, except when prevented by wars or force majeure. Those shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant & shall be entitled to a Certificate of Title under the provisions of this Chapter.

DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES (DBP) vs. COURT OF APPEALS331 SCRA 267, April 28, 2000G.R. No. 129471DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES,petitioner,COURT OF APPEALS and CARLOS CAJES,respondents.

FACTS:The land in dispute, consisting of 19.4 hectares located in San Miguel, Province of Bohol, was originally owned by Ulpiano Mumar, whose ownership since 1917 was evidenced by Tax Declaration No. 3840.In 1950, Mumar sold the land to private respondent who was issued Tax Declaration No. R-1475 that same year.The tax declaration was later superseded by Tax Declaration Nos. R-799 issued in 1961and D-2247 issued in 1974. Private respondent occupied and cultivated the said land, planting cassava and camote in certain portions of the land. In 1969, unknown to private respondent, Jose Alvarez succeeded in obtaining the registration of a parcel of land with an area of 1,512,468.00 square meters,in his name for which he was issued OCT No. 546 on June 16, 1969. The parcel of land included the 19.4 hectares occupied by private respondent. Alvarez never occupied nor introduced improvements on said land. In 1972, Alvarez sold the land to the spouses Gaudencio and Rosario Beduya to whom TCT No. 10101 was issued.That same year, the spouses Beduya obtained a loan from petitioner Development Bank of the Philippines for P526,000.00 and, as security, mortgaged the land covered by TCT No. 10101 to the bank.In 1978, the SAAD Investment Corp., and the SAAD Agro-Industries, Inc., represented by Gaudencio Beduya, and the spouses Beduya personally executed another mortgage over the land in favor of petitioner to secure a loan of P1,430,000.00. The spouses Beduya later failed to pay their loans, as a result of which, the mortgage on the property was foreclosed.In the resulting foreclosure sale held on January 31, 1985, petitioner was the highest bidder.As the spouses Beduya failed to redeem the property, petitioner consolidated its ownership. It appears that private respondent had also applied for a loan from petitioner in 1978, offering his 19.4 hectare property under Tax Declaration No. D-2247 as security for the loan. As part of the processing of the application, a representative of petitioner, Patton R. Olano, inspected the land and appraised its value.Private respondent's loan application was later approved by petitioner.However after releasing the amount of the loan to private respondent, petitioner found that the land mortgaged by private respondent was included in the land covered by TCT No. 10101 in the name of the spouses Beduya. Petitioner, therefore, cancelled the loan and demanded immediate payment of the amount.Private respondent paid the loan to petitioner for which the former was issued a Cancellation of Mortgage, dated March 18, 1981, releasing the property in question from encumbrance.It appears that respondent Cajes had also applied for a loan from DBP in 1978, offering his 19.4 has. as security for the loan which was approved. However, after the release of the loan, DBP found out that the land mortgaged by Cajes was included in the land mortgaged by the Sps. Beduya. Petitioner DBP cancelled the loan & demanded payment from Cajes.

Sometime in April of 1986, more than a year after the foreclosure sale, a re-appraisal of the property covered by TCT No. 10101 was conducted by petitioners representatives. It was then discovered that private respondent Cajes was occupying a portion of said land. Private respondent Cajes was informed that petitioner had become the owner of the land he was occupying, & he was asked to vacate the property. As private respondent refused to do so, petitioner filed a complaint for recovery of possession with damages against him, invoking that it was an innocent purchaser for value. The Regional Trial Court-Tagbilaran City rendered a decision declaring petitioner DBP the lawful owner of the entire land on the ground that the decree of registration was binding upon the land.The Court of Appeals reversed the RTC decision. Hence, this petition.

ISSUES: 1. Whether or not petitioner bank is a mortgagee in good faith?2. Whether or not petitioner bank can can be considered an innocent purchaser for value?HELD : No. At the time of the constitution of the mortgagee, the mortgagee-bank failed to conduct an ocular inspection. While an innocent mortgagee is not expected to conduct an exhaustive investigation on the history of the mortgagors title, in the case of banking institutions, a mortgagee must exercise due diligence before entering into said contract. Judicial notice is taken of the standard practice for banks, before approving a loan, to send representatives to the premises of the land offered as collateral & to investigate who are the legal owners thereof. Banks, having been impressed with public interest, are expected to exercise more care & prudence than private individuals in their dealings, even those involving registered lands.

Petitioner was already aware that a person other than the registered owner was in actual possession of the land when it bought the same at the foreclosure sale. A person who deliberately ignores a significant fact which would create a suspicion in an otherwise reasonable man is not an innocent purchaser for value. It is a well-settled rule that a purchaser cannot close his eyes to facts which should put a reasonable man upon his guard, & then claim that he acted in goof faith under the belief that there was no defect in the title of the vendor.

Judgment AFFIRMED in toto.

VDA. DE VILLANUEVA vs. COURT OF APPEALS351 SCRA 12, February 1, 2001G.R. No. 117971.

ESTRELLITA S. J. VDA. DE VILLANUEVA, LAURENCE and JENNIFER, BOTH SURNAMED VILLANUEVA, ROGELIO MILLAMA and ROLLY DE JESUS,petitioners,

HON. COURT OF APPEALS, LINA F. VDA. DE SANTIAGO, EDDIE, ROLANDO, WILLY and MARILOU, ALL SURNAMED SANTIAGO,respondents.

FACTS:On December 20, 1962, the land registration court, in a final decision, awarded the disputed lots, measuring 98,800 sq. m. to Spouses Antonio & Rosario Angeles. They sold the lots to Victorino Santiago in 1967 who converted some parcels into fishponds. In 1977, Santiago sold the lots to Anacleto Santiago, husband of respondent Lina Santiago. At the time of the last sale, no decree of registration had yet been issued for the said lots despite the final judgment in the land registration case.

On February 28, 1978, Victorino Santiago filed an action for forcible entry against Carlos Villanueva & his wife, petitioner Estrelita Villanueva, which was dismissed since Victorino had already sold the property to Spouses Santiago.However, on Sept. 22, 1978, while Adona was in Alaminos, Pangasinan, some people entered the property and destroyed the nipa hut. Adona reported the matter to Anacleto who advised him to stop work until the problem was solved.By then, Adona had completed work on about six (6) hectares of the entire 9.8-hectare property, including the three (3) hectares which were fully developedOn December 12, 1978, the decrees of registration covering the subject lots were issued & OCTs were transcribed in the name of Antonio Angeles on December 27, 1978.On February 22, 1979, Antonio Angeles, as original owner & vendor, executed a Deed of Confirmation Sale, Waiver & Quitclaim over the lots in favour of Anacleto Santiago, the vendee, for which TCTs were subsequenty issued in the name of Anacleto Santiago. The lots were declared for taxation purposes.On February 26, 1979, the Santiagos sued the Villanuevas for forcible entry. On February 14, 1980, a criminal case was also filed against the Villanuevas for violation of the Anti-Squatting Law. During the pendency of these cases, Anacleto discovered that the Ministry of Natural Resources granted to Carlos a Fisheries Lease Agreement over the said lots on February 28, 1980. Anacleto sought the cancellation of the said agreement, but both the Ministry and the Office of the President dismissed Anacletos petition. In the meantime, Carlos Villanueva & Anacleto Santiago both died. Hence, the present case was brought by Anacletos heirs against the heirs of Carlos.In their complaint dated July 30, 1991, Lina Vda. De Santiago & her children maintained that as successors-in-interest of Anacleto, they were unlawfully deprived of the possession, use & enjoyment of the fishponds for the last 12 years by Carlos & now, by the latters widow, Estrelita Vda. De Villanueva, and their children.

The Santiagos asked the court the Viilanuevas to vacate the lots and restore to them possession & ownership of the lots registered in their precedessors name.

In a decision dated December 18, 1992, the Trial Court dismissed the complaint for lack of cause of action and res judicata. The CA reversed the RTC decision. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not respondents certificate of title constitutes valid and indefeasible proof of ownership.

HELD : Yes. The high court ruled that respondents titles constituted indefeasible proof of ownership which entitles them to possession of the properties.

In land cases, the certificate of title serves as evidence of an indefeasible and incontrovertible title to the property in favor of the person whose name appears therein.

A title once registered under the Torrens system cannot be defeated by adverse, open and notorious possession; neither can it be defeated by prescription. It is a notice to the whole world and as such, all persons are bound by it and no one can plead ignorance of the registration.

Petition DENIED, judgment AFFIRMED with modifications.

CERVANTES vs. COURT OF APPEALS354 SCRA 4G.R. NO. 118982. February 19, 2001

LORETA BRAVO CERVANTES, LOIDA CERVANTES, LEAH CERVANTES, CHRISTY CERVANTES, CHARME CERVANTES, SPS. ARMANDO ABAD and ADORACION ORDUNA,petitioners,

HON. COURT OF APPEALS, GUILLERMO (GIL) FRANCISCO, VENANCIO FRANCISCO, APOLONIA FRANCISCO and VIRGINIA FRANCISCO,respondents.

FACTS:On July 8, 1985, Guillermo Francisco, et.al, filed an amended complaint alleging that they were the heirs of the late Antonio G. Francisco who was the registered owner of a parcel of land containing an area of 3,768 located at Bugallon, Pangasinan. Said heirs discovered that Antonio Cervantes & spouses Armando Abad were illegally occupying & had declared in their names certain portions of said property.

Despite demands to vacate the subject property, petitioners refused to do so. Hence, an action for recovery of land was filed by Guillermo Francisco. In his answer, Antonio Cervantes denied the allegations in the complaint & in defense, claimed legal possession over one of the parcels of land in question alleging that he and his siblings inherited the land from their late father Tranquilino Cervantes who purchased the same in 1947 from Juan Abad (deceased), who in turn earlier purchased the property from Guillermo Franciscos predecessors-in-interest. Cervantes prayed for the dismissal of the complaint.On the other hand, spouses Armando Abad alleged that their possession was lawful and in concept of an owner for more than 70 years dating back before 1920. According to them, the land was purchased by their parent, the late Juan Abad, and Marcelino Nievera from Estefania Ignacio Vda. De F. Totanez, who purchased the same from Antonio Fernandez, who in turn purchased the property from Vicente Espino, whose possession & ownership of the property was public, exclusive, notorious, open & continuous long before the alleged registration of the subject property in the name of Antonio Francisco, under Act No. 496, the latter being known as a mere trustee or overseer.Defendants Abad alleged that the imprescriptibility and indefeasibility of the Torrens Title do not apply to the case at bar because registration by the applicant-registrant was done in bad faith and by way of actual fraudulent acts; that Act No. 496 as amended by P.D. No. 1529 was never intended to shield the fraudulent and unlawful acts of the applicant-registrant in order to divest the actual owner and possessor thereof before the registration; and that between the actual owners-possessors before the registration under Act No. 496 and a usurper-trustee who applied and successfully registered the same land in his name, the former should prevail over the latter.On October 28, 1987, the Trial Court rendered judgment in favor of Guillermo Francisco declaring that they were the owners of the parcels of land. The defendants were ordered to vacate immediately the parcel of land and pay actual damages.

On August 25, 1994, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the Trial Court in toto.Petitioners Motion for Reconsideration was denied by the Court of Appeals in a Resolution dated February 13, 1995. ISSUE: Whether or not Petitioners Cervantes & Abad have a right to the parcels of land they were occupying?HELD: No. Petitioners have no right over the land. Taking into consideration the documentary evidence presented by the plaintiffs, particularly that of TCT No. 2200 (Exhibit A.) which the parcel in question is included, among others, that the sale of the parcel in question was made by Juan Abad to Tranquilino Cervantes (father of defendant Antonio Cervantes) on January 22, 1947 took place when the said TCT No. 2200 was already existing in the name of Antonio Francisco, the late father of the herein plaintiffs. Said TCT No. 2200 was issued on November 8, 1924, or more than twenty-two (22.) years before the aforesaid sale between Juan Abad and Tranquilino Cervantes. This clearly shows that what Juan Abad sold to Tranquilino Cervantes on January 22, 1947 was a parcel of land that did not belong to the former. It is because said parcel of land already belonged to Antonio Francisco for having obtained a title over said parcel of land covered by TCT No. 2200. Not being the owner of the parcel in question, Juan Abad did not transmit any right whatsoever with respect to the parcel in question. Well-settled is the rule that one cannot sell what he does not own and this rule has much force when the subject of the sale is a titled land that belongs to another person. Simply put, the sale of the parcel in question made by Juan Abad to Tranquilino Cervantes did not affect the title of Antonio Francisco over said parcel.24Likewise, the trial court correctly held that defendants Abad had no right to the parcel of land they were occupying, thus:The purchases alleged by the defendants-spouses on the questioned parcel of land beginning from their alleged primitive predecessor-in-interest Vicente Espino to Estefania Ignacio Vda. De F. Totaez to Juan Abad and Marcelino Nievera were never proven in court. The documentary evidence they presented before this Court were not sufficient to establish their right over the parcel in question. The Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition of Real and Personal Property with Sale has no probative value because it is self-serving. Besides, it sought to partition the parcel of land which is already covered by TCT No. 2200 issued in the name of Antonio Francisco. Simply stated, there was no property that they could partition among themselves because said property subject of the partition did not belong to their late father Juan Abad but to the late Antonio Francisco, the father of the plaintiffs.The Deed of Absolute Sale (Exhibit 2.) entered between Juan Abad and Tranquilino Cervantes, has no probative value also for being irrelevant. Besides, this is the same deed wherein this Court has already passed upon concerning its efficacy and ruled in the early part of this decision that it has no effect whatsoever to TCT No. 2200 issued in the name of the late Antonio Francisco.1wphi1.ntThe Tax Declaration issued in the name of the defendants-spouses and the corresponding Tax Receipts have no probative value also as against the TCT No. 2200 issued in the name of the late Antonio Francisco. It is because they are not proofs of ownership. TCT No. 2200, on the other hand, serves as evidence of an indefeasible title to the property in favor of the person whose name appears thereinAntonio Francisco. Further, after the expiration of the one year period from the issuance of the decree of registration upon which it is based, it becomes incontrovertible (Pamintuan vs. San Agustin, 43 Phil. 558).25The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial courtin toto,the same being in accordance with law and the evidence. Hence, the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals should be as it is hereby affirmed.

It is a fundamental principle in land registration that the certificate of title serves as evidence of an indefeasible and incontrovertible title to the property in favor of the person whose name appears therein, in this case, Antonio Francisco. A title once registered under the Torrens System cannot be defeated even by adverse, open & notorious possession, neither can it be defeated by prescription. Petitioners cannot prove their ownership of the subject parcels of land through tax declarations & corresponding tax receipts inasmuch as they are not conclusive evidence of ownership.

Petition DENIED.

Sps. ZARAGOZA vs. COURT OF APPEALS341 SCRA 309[G.R. No. 106401.September 29, 2000]

SPOUSES FLORENTINO ZARAGOZA and ERLINDA ENRIQUEZ-ZARAGOZA,petitionersTHE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, ALBERTA ZARAGOZA MORGAN,respondents

FACTS:Flavio Zaragoza Cano was the registered owner of certain parcels of land situated at the Province of Iloilo. He had four children: Gloria, Zacariaz, Florentino and Alberta, all surnamed Zaragoza. He died intestate & was survived by his four children.On December 28, 1981, private respondent Alberta Zaragoza-Morgan filed a complaint against Spouses Florentino & Erlinda, herein petitioners, for delivery of her inheritance share, consisting of Lots 943 & 871, & for payment of damages. She Claimed that she was a natural-born Filipino citizen & the youngest child of Flavio. She further alleged that her father, in his lifetime, partitioned the aforecited properties among his 4 children. The shares of her brothers & sisters were given to them in advance by way of deed of sale but without consideration, while her share was not conveyed by way of deed of sale because she became an American citizen & was prohibited to acquire land in the Philippines except by hereditary succession. For this reason, no formal deed of conveyance was executed in her favor covering these lots during her father's lifetime.Petitioners Florentino & Erlinda, in their answer, admitted their affinity with private respondent & the allegations on the properties of their father. They, however, denied knowledge of an alleged distribution by way of deeds of sale to them by their father. They said that lot 871 was still registered in the name of their father, while lot 943 was sold by him to them for valuable considerations. They denied knowledge of the alleged intention of their father to convey said lots to Alberta & that there was partitioning of the estate of their father during his lifetime.On November 23, 1983, petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss, on the ground that the complaint did not state a cause of action and it failed to implead indispensable parties.The resolution of said Motion was deferred by the lower court until the case was tried on the merits.On October 7, 1986, the Regional Trial Court of Ilo-ilo promulgated its decision, adjudicating lot 871 in then name of Flavio Zaragoza Camo to Plaintiff Alberta Zaragoza-Morgan

ISSUE:Whether or not that question regarding the validity of the Certificate of Title issued in the name of petitioner is allowed in this petition.

HELD:No. The petition is a collateral attack. It is not allowed by Section 48 of the PD 1529, otherwise known as the Property Registration Decree which provides:

Sec. 48. Certificate not subject to collateral attack-A certificate of title shall not be subject to collateral attack. It cannot be altered, modified, or cancelled except in a direct proceeding in accordance with law.

In the case of Halili, the court held that a certificate of title accumulates in one document a precise and correct statement of the exact status of the fee held by its owner. The certificate, in the absence of fraud, is the evidence of title and shows exactly the real interest of the owners. The title, once registered, with very few exceptions, should not thereafter be impugned, altered, changed, modified, enlarged or diminished, except in direct proceeding permitted by law. Otherwise, all security in registered titles would be lost. And inCo, we stated that a Torrens title cannot be collaterally attacked.The issue on the validity of title, i.e., whether or not it was fraudulently issued, can only be raised in an action expressly instituted for that purpose.

ACCORDINGLY, judgment is hereby rendered GRANTING the instant petition for review.The decision of the Court of Appeals dated March 27, 1992 in CA-G.R. CV No. 12587, entitledAlberta Zaragoza-Morgan vs. Spouses Florentino Zaragoza and Erlinda Enriquez-Zaragozais VACATED and SET ASIDE.The complaint for delivery of inheritance share in the Regional Trial Court, for failure to implead indispensable parties, is also DISMISSEDwithout prejudice to the institution of the proper proceedings.No pronouncement as to costs.

TAN vs. PHILIPPINE BANKING CORPORATION353 SCRA 292[G.R. No. 137739.March 26, 2001]

ROBERTO B. TAN,petitionerPHILIPPINE BANKING CORP., HELEN LEONTOVICH VDA. DE AGUINALDO and REGISTRAR OF DEEDS OF MARIKINA,respondents.

FACTS:On 29 December 1925, petitioner bought from respondent Helen Aguinaldo a parcel of land at Valley Golf Subdivision Antipolo, Rizal. The lot was then registered in the name of respondent Aguinaldo. No claims, liens or encumbrances appeared on the said title. After payment of the agreed purchase price, the title was cancelled and a new one in the name of petitioner was issued.On 29 February 1996, two months after he bought the property, petitioner was served a copy of the petition for certiorari filed by respondent bank. Said petition stated that said petitioner was being sued as a nominal party as the new registered owner of the said parcel of land. It was only then that petitioner learned that the lot he bought from respondent was subject between her and respondent bank.It appeared that respondent Aguinaldo and her husband obtained loans from respondent bank. To secure payment of this obligation, they executed a real estate mortgage over three parcels of land in favor of the respondent bank-PBC.

Upon maturity of these loans, respondent bank sent demand letter to respondent Aguinaldo. Despite said demands, the loans remained unpaid. Respondent bank then initiated extrajudicial foreclosure proceeding on the real estate mortgage. In the public sale, the mortgage properties were sold to respondent bank as the highest bidder.On 15 February 1990, before the expiration of the redemption period of one year, respondent Aguinaldo filed a complaint for the nullification of the aforesaid foreclosure proceeding. In said proceedings, the parties (respondent Aguinaldo and respondent bank) entered into a Joint Partial Stipulation of Facts stating, among others, that they agree that the decision to be rendered by this Honorable Court [RTC] shall be final and unappealable, subject only to the filing within the reglementary period of the usual motion for reconsideration.On 15 April 1995, the trial court rendered its decision against the respondent.The respondent bank filed a motion for reconsideration of the said decision had become final and executor. Upon presentation of the courts decision and certification, the register of deeds cancelled respondent banks title and issued a new title in the name of respondent Aguinaldo. She subsequently sold the lot to petitioner. Respondent bank filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision of the trial court but the same was denied. It then brought the case to the CA by way of certiorari and thereafter moved for partial reconsideration praying for the reinstatement of the Transfer Certificates of Title. In its decision the CA reinstate said titles in the name of the respondent PBC.

ISSUE:Whether or not the petitioners title over the said parcel of land is valid?

HELD:Yes. The petitioners title is valid.It must be noted that petitioners title was irregularly issued after the lot covered by the same was sold to him by respondent Aguinaldo. Petitioner relied on the sellers title, which was then free from any claims, liens or encumbrances appearing thereon.As such, petitioners title can only be challenged in a direct attack/proceeding. It is well settled that a certificate of title cannot be subject to collateral attack and can be altered, modified or cancelled only in direct proceeding in accordance with law. Having obtained a valid title over the subject lot, petitioner is entitled t protection against indirect attacks against his title.Having obtained a valid title over the subject lot, petitioner is entitled to protection against indirect attacks against his title. The CAs original ruling on the matter, as stated in its decision, denying respondentbanksprayerforreinstatement of its canceled titles without prejudice to the filing of proper action should thus stand. It is more in keeping with the purpose of the adoption of the Torrens system in our country:The Torrens system was adopted in this country because it was believed to be the most effective measure to guarantee the integrity of land titles and to protect their indefeasibility once the claim of ownership is established and recognized. If a person purchases a piece of land on the assurance that the sellers title thereto is valid, he should not run the risk of being told later that his acquisition was ineffectual after all. This would not only be unfair to him. What is worse is that if this were permitted, public confidence in the system would be eroded and land transactions would have to be attended by complicated and not necessarily conclusive investigations and proof of ownership. The further consequence would be that land conflicts could be even more numerous and complex than they are now and possibly also more abrasive, if not even violent. The Government, recognizing the worthy purposes of the Torrens system, should be the first to accept the validity of the titles issued there under once the conditions laid down by the law are satisfied.

WHEREFORE,premises considered, the Resolutions, dated 28 August 1998 and 23 February 1999, of the Court of Appeals areREVERSEDandSET ASIDE. Its Decision, dated 27 February 1998, is REINSTATEDin toto.

OMANDAM vs. COURT OF APPEALS349 SCRA 483, January 18, 1991G.R. No. 128750

CARQUELO OMANDAM and ROSITO ITOM,petitionersCOURT OF APPEALS, BLAS TRABASAS and AMPARO BONILLA,respondentsFACTS:On January 29, 1974, the Bureau of Lands in Pagadian City issued in favor of Camilo Lasola a Homestead Patent covering one parcel of land. Sometime in 1978, the RD issued an OCT in his name.On April 28, 1983, the same lot was bought by (respondent) Blas Trabasas from Dolores Sayson, who claimed that she was the owner of such land.Sometime in 1984, Trabasas discovered that petitioners Omandam and Itom had occupied the land. In 1987, Omandam protested Lasolas homestead patent before the Bureau and prayed for the cancellation of the OCT. In the same year, Trabasas repurchased the same land from LasolaIn 1989, Trabasas acquired a new certificate of title.On April 16, 1990, Spouses Trabasas filed a complaint against Omandan for recovery of possession and/or ownership of the subject land with the RTC.The RTC issued its decision (1993) declaring that neither respondents (Trabasas) nor their predecessors-in-interest were ever in possession of the land. Trabasas has no equitable right to the possession of the land under litigation.Trabasas appealed to the CA. The CA reversed RTC decision. It ordered (petitioners) Omandam and Itom to vacate the land and surrender it to the respondents (Trabasases) =)

ISSUE:Whether or not the courts have jurisdiction to inquire into the validity of decree or registration issued by the Director of Lands?

HELD:No. Courts have no jurisdiction to inquire into the validity of decree or registration issued by the Director of Lands.Commonwealth Act no 141 (Public Land Act) gives in its sections 3 and 4 to the Director of Lands primarily and to the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources (now the Secretary of DENR) ultimately the authority to dispose and manage public lands. The courts have no jurisdiction to inquire into the validity of the decree of registration issued by the Director of Lands. Only the DENR secretary can review, on appeal, such decree.It will be recalled that the Bureau of Lands approved Lasolas homestead application on May 21, 1968. Nineteen years after, in 1987, Omandam filed the protest with the Bureau of Lands. Thereafter, Trabasas instituted the present action in the Regional Trial Court for recovery of possession and/or ownership. The trial court held that petitioners were entitled to a declaration of equitable possession over the area in question. . Said trial court then ordered the cancellation of respondents title and the issuance of a new one. In effect, the courts order reversed the award made by the Director of Lands in favor of Lasola. This reversal was in error, for the proper administrative agency, the DENR under CA 141, had prior jurisdiction over the patent on the subject matter, which is the contested homestead area.DENRs jurisdiction over public lands does not negate the authority of courts of justice to resolve questions of possession and their decisions stand in the meantime that the DENR has not settled the respective rights of public land claimantsBut once the DENR has decided, particularly with the grant of homestead patent and issuance of an OCT and then TCT later, its decision prevails. By now it appears indubitable that private respondents, spouses Trabasas and Bonilla, have been duly confirmed in their right to possession of Lot No. 8736 as owners thereof.By virtue of the deed of sale executed by OCT holder Camilo Lasola as early as September 24, 1987, in favor of Trabasas, who then secured a transfer certificate of title in his name, private respondents clearly have superior right over the land claimed by petitioners Omandam and Itom.The appellate court did not err in upholding the right of private respondents, and in ordering the petitioners to vacate and surrender the land to said respondents.WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED, and the decision of the Court of Appeals dated October 29, 1996, and its resolution dated February 21, 1997, are AFFIRMED.Costs against petitioners.

DIRECTOR OF LANDS vs. COURT OF APPEALS171 SCRA 71, 1966

FACTS:The land in question was situated in Obando, Bulacan. It adjoined the Kailogan River and private respondent Valeriano had converted it into a fishpond.In their application in 1976, private respondents claimed that they were the co-owners in fee simple of the land partly through inheritance and partly by purchase and that; it was not within any forest or military reservation.The Republic of the Phil., represented by the Dir of the Bureau of Forest Development, opposed the application on the principal ground that the land applied for was WITHIN THE UNCLASSIFIED REGION of Obando, Bulacan and that such a