he nighttime assault came with little warning.There was no drumroll of artillery to pave the wayfor teams of black-painted sappers, or give alarmto U.S. and South Vietnamese defenders of this

rugged outcrop of mountain in northern I Corps.Specially trained North Vietnamese Army (NVA) infiltrators,

armed only with high-explosive satchel charges, were support-ed by infantry with rocket-propelled grenades, machine gunsand AK-47 assault rifles. At least one Soviet-made flamethrow-er was part of their arsenal. Backing them up were NVA crewsmanning mortars and deadly effective recoilless rifles.

With uncanny stealth, the sappers closed within feet ofthinly spread GI defensive positions before they were detect-ed. Then they struck violently, breaching the perimeter andturning their attention to high-value targets—the tactical op-erations center (TOC), 105mm howitzers and a large amount

of high-explosive ammunition.Fire Base Henderson shuddered to the bark and bite of

bursting satchel charges. Small-arms fire ripped across thehilltop and tracers stabbed the night sky—red for American,green for the North Vietnamese. Then, “a terrible explosion”roared across the mountaintop. Lt. Jim Knight recalled that“it was so deafening it drowned out all the other sounds offighting.” It was past 0500 hours.

The great blast was a massive detonation of artilleryammunition. It lit up the pre-dawn sky with a vivid firestormthat consumed friend and foe alike. When it was over, morethan a score of American soldiers of the 2nd Battalion, 501stInfantry (Geronimo), 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile),lay dead or missing.

Somewhat surprisingly, the story of the action at Hendersonwas shunted to page 17 by The New York Times, where the na-tion’s largest newspaper had only this to report: “Early thismorning [May 6, 1970], Fire Base Henderson, six miles south-west of Cam Lo near the demilitarized zone (DMZ), was at-tacked and 29 Americans were killed, 31 were wounded andtwo were reported missing. This was the largest American lossin a single action in more than a year.” (These casualty figureswere not correct.)

No doubt the events at Henderson were overshadowed bythe tragedy at Kent State, and also by allied operations in theCambodian incursion. Here’s what happened south of QuangTri River.

By early 1970, American troop withdrawals from Vietnambegan affecting unit strength including the 101st, although itwas scheduled to be the last combat division to leaveVietnam. A full-strength airmobile rifle company could boastalmost 140 soldiers, but most were operating at about 65%capacity, with a foxhole strength in the neighborhood of 80-90 infantrymen.

Adding to the challenges facing American commanderswas the policy of “Vietnamization”—turning the conduct ofthe war over to the Army of the Republic of Vietnam

by Charles F. Hawkins

Photos courtesy Ed Schultz

In a 45-minute melee at Firebase Henderson on May 6, 1970,27 men of the 101st Airborne Division lost their lives.

T

HendersonHell Night at

A wounded Sgt. 1st Class Edward J. Carlyle surveys the damage inthe aftermath following the attack on Henderson, May 6, 1970.

28 • VFW • August 2010

August 2010 • WWW.VFW.ORG • 29

(ARVN). This meant two things: first,U.S. troops increasingly assumed de-fensive postures on and around firesupport bases; and second, combinedoperations of ARVN and U.S. forceswere necessary to affect the transition.

Henderson typified the former andwas an example of the latter. Of course,there also was the problem posed by theNVA, no small matter in itself.

Henderson: The BuildupIn April, the 101st senior command andthe 1st ARVN Division decided on acombined operation in the ARVN areaof operations to interdict enemy forcesmoving south across the DMZ. TheARVN would retain tactical control andthe 3rd Brigade of the 101st would re-open FSB Henderson to provide forARVN and U.S. artillery support toARVN ground units.

In addition to this division operation,brigade commander William Bradleysaid,“Third Brigade continued defensivemissions with three fully committed in-fantry battalions 20 miles to the south.”

During the last few days of April, the al-lied buildup at Henderson began.

U.S. defenders, D Co., 1st Bn., 501stInf., commanded by Capt. WilliamWhitaker, arrived by helicopter. Whitakerand his men did not stay on Hendersonvery long, a bit more than a week, but inthat time they noted some critical details.The rocky outcrop of mountain was big,larger than Whitaker’s company coulddefend easily. In addition, “there washigh ground on three sides,”Whitaker re-membered. There were also plenty ofsigns of enemy activity in the area.

Late on May 4, Bradley was orderedto return Whitaker’s company to 2ndBrigade for other operations. Taking itsplace in defense were 84 troopers of ACo., 2nd Bn., 501st Inf., commanded byCapt. Jim Mitchell. The change was to

take effect the following day.Whitaker’s outfit numbered about 120

men for field duty, an above-averagestrength for which he was grateful. Bycontrast, Mitchell’s A Company from the2nd Battalion was 30% less in strength.Whitaker wondered about the additionalcombat strength that Mitchell needed fordefense.

When they departed Henderson, oneof Whitaker’s soldiers motioned to theincoming troopers and said, “Sir, they’reall wearing new boots,” a reference to re-placements that Mitchell’s company hadrecently received.

All told, 162 Americans were on thefirebase. Among them were men of Aand C companies, 2nd Bn., 501st Inf.; BBtry., 2nd Bn., 11th Arty; a squad of BCo., 326th Engineers; a detachment ofthe 501st Signal Battalion; and a mortarplatoon of E Company. The remainderof the 311 allied forces there were ARVN.

Hard Luck AlphaAlpha Company had been on standdownto rest and refit after turning back anighttime sapper attack against FirebaseGranite barely a week earlier. The fighthad been vicious and Jim Knight’s 1st

Platoon was in the thick of it. So, too, wasLt. Col. Otis Livingston, the battalioncommander. “It was close,” said Knight,“and Livingston was right there in a fox-hole with the rest of us, firing a rifle at theattacking North Vietnamese.”

Now, Alpha was back on another fire-base, but this time it was detached fromthe 2nd Battalion. Nevertheless, sea-soned veterans were prepared for whatmight lay ahead. Again, Knight’s menwould find themselves in the midst ofheavy fighting.

Late on the afternoon of May 5, 17 re-inforcements arrived at Henderson—Lt.Richard Hawley’s battalion Reconnais-sance Platoon had been summoned toman a critical portion of the perimeter.

Bradley had choppered in to Hender-son that afternoon to make his com-

Caught between enemy outside the wire andbursting shells behind, [Lt. Richard] Hawley’sscouts were consumed by the massive firestorm.Foxholes became death traps.

NVA sappers took advantage of the situation at Henderson and left a trail of destruction bytargeting artillery pieces and the ammunition dump in a night attack. U.S. troopers foughtback during the horrific firestorm, however, killing 29 of the enemy.

30 • VFW • August 2010

mand presence felt, and to ensure offi-cers and men on the ground under-stood the importance of their defensivemission. Shortly after Bradley departed,a resupply Chinook hovered overheadto set down a sling-load of 105mmhowitzer ammunition.

With darkness fast approaching, noone bothered to distribute the howitzershells, fuses and powder bags undersecure revetments. It would prove to bea costly and fatal oversight.

As daylight faded, they did what theycould to prepare positions in the sectorof the ARVN artillery battery. To theirleft was Knight’s 1st Platoon, and be-hind them were six 105mm howitzersand a huge stockpile of ammunition.

AftermathAbout 5 a.m. on May 6, members of the33rd NVA Sapper Battalion attackedHenderson from several directions. Oneassault sliced between Knight’s 1st Pla-toon and Hawley’s scouts. One of 1stPlatoon’s forward positions was cut off.Amazingly, two of the three defenderssurvived. Others were not so fortunate.

The sappers went for the howitzersand also the ARVN TOC on the hilltop.Medic Spec. 4 Dennis Hughes of BBtry., 2nd Bn., 11th Arty., was asleepalongside one of the wheels of a 155mmhowitzer when a satchel charge blewhim into the air.

“When I came to my senses, I crawledover to help two guys, one of whom wason fire,” he recalled. Despite his ownwounds, Hughes tended to others as hemoved through a trench system on thehill. His medical bag lost in the initialexplosion, he cut strips from his uni-form for dressings. Several times, hedashed under fire to pull the woundedto safety. His actions saved several lives,earning him a Silver Star.

Many of the big guns were destroyedby satchel charges, some with barrelspeeled back like bananas. Other high-explosive charges (or possibly theflamethrower) set off some of the artil-lery shells—sympathetic detonation didthe rest. This was the “terrible explosion”that Knight reported.

Caught between enemy outside thewire and bursting shells behind, Hawley’s

scouts were consumed by the massivefirestorm. Foxholes became death traps.Hawley and many of his soldiers died attheir posts, or in the wire, preferring totake their chances against the enemy.

Jim Knight, exposed to murderousfire throughout the attack, was lucky. Asthe fighting began to wane, Knightspotted enemy soldiers walking awayfrom the firebase. “They were illumi-nated by flares,” he explained,“and wereat sling arms, uncaring, as if we were alldead.” Well-aimed fire by American ri-flemen dispelled that notion.

Most of the enemy fell back into thesurrounding jungle before daylight, butNVA mortar and recoilless rifle crewskept firing throughout the day. Onemortar round exploded as 3rd Brigade operations officer Maj. Tex Turner, andbrigade Command Sgt. Maj. RaymondLong were heading for the TOC. Theblast instantly killed Long, the last ofthe 27 Americans to die on Henderson.

A Company counted the most fatali-ties with 11, followed by E Companywith six. C Company had four KIA,HHC two KIA and B Company one. BBattery lost three artillerymen.

The dead included two missing men—Sgt. Larry Kier of A Company, and StaffSgt. Refugio Teran, E Company, ReconPlatoon. Both were declared dead inSeptember 1978. At least 40 GIs werewounded. ARVN losses were three killed.The enemy left 29 bodies behind duringthe 45-minute melee.

At Henderson, the enemy took timelyadvantage of an awkward situation, achangeover in defenders, and an unfor-tunate event, the massive explosion ofartillery ammo. Nothing, however, candetract from the defenders’ courage.

When Hard Luck Alpha took to thefield again, there were fewer than 40 sea-soned hands in its ranks. In the long sum-mer ahead, they would continue to provetheir mettle against the NVA. But eachMay, we remember Henderson and thosewho fell there, brave men who broughthonor to themselves and their country.�

CHARLES F. HAWKINS, a VFW member, isa defense and military operations analystworking in northern Virginia. At the timeof the attack on Henderson, the authorwas a rifle platoon leader with C Co., 2ndBn., 506th Inf., around FSB Ripcord.

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