High-Level Review Panel on the SSA - AllAfrica...bodies, oversight institutions and internal disciplinary bodies to investigate all Report of the High-Level Review Panel on the SSA

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PrefaceTheHigh-LevelReviewPanelontheSSAandRelatedMatters ispleasedtosubmit itsfinalreport tohisExcellency,PresidentMatamelaCyrilRamaphosa.Wehope that the findingsandrecommendationscontainedinthisreportrespondadequatelytotheconcernsthatledthe President to establish this Panel, and that those of our recommendations that areaccepted and implemented play a decisive role in achieving ‘a professional nationalintelligencecapabilityforSouthAfricathatwillrespectandupholdtheConstitution,andtherelevantlegislativeprescripts’asrequiredbyourTermsofReference.Wethink itprudenttohighlightherethatourkeyfinding isthattherehasbeenaseriouspoliticisation and factionalisation of the intelligence community over the past decade ormore,basedon factions in the rulingparty, resulting inanalmost completedisregard fortheConstitution,policy,legislationandotherprescripts,andturningourcivilianintelligencecommunityintoaprivateresourcetoservethepoliticalandpersonalinterestsofparticularindividuals. In addition, we identified a doctrinal shift towards a narrow state securityorientation in the intelligence community from 2009 in contradiction to the doctrinesoutlined in the Constitution, White Paper on Intelligence and other prescripts. We areconcernedthatthecumulativeeffectoftheaboveledtothedeliberatere-purposingoftheSSA.ThePanelhasmademanydetailedfindingsandrecommendations,butmostimportantlyitis recommending an overarching overhaul of the intelligence and security architecture ofthe country, the implementation ofwhichwill require extensive consultation and a gooddoseofdetermination.The Panel has done its best tomeet the requirements of the task given to it,within theparametersofcertainconstraints.Theseincludethescopeandrangeof issuesreferredtothePanel,thetighttimelinesgiventoit,andthefactthatmostofthepanellistswerealsoinfull-time employ elsewhere. One of the challenges the Panel faced was having to keepremindingitselfthatitwasnotaninvestigativecommissionortaskteam.ThereweremanyissuesbroughtbeforethePanelthatitwouldhavelikedtodelveintoinmoredetailbutre-assured itself by the understanding that ‘high-level’ in its title refers to the depth of thereviewratherthanthesocialstandingofthepanellists.WewouldliketoexpressourgratitudetothePresidentforentrustinguswiththistask,totheMinisterandherstafffortheirsupport,totheActingDirector-Generalforhissupport,and to the Secretariat for their efficiency, constant availability and hardwork above andbeyond the call of duty. Lastly, we thank all those who submitted inputs and appearedbeforethePanelfortheirinvaluablecontributiontoitswork.High-LevelReviewPanelontheSSA

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Contents

Preface................................................................................Error!Bookmarknotdefined.

Contents.......................................................................................................................iiii

Abbreviations..............................................................................................................ivii

1.ExecutiveSummary....................................................................................................1

2.Recommendations…………………………………………………………………………………………………..3

3.Introduction.............................................................................................................11

4.PoliciesandPrescripts..............................................................................................15

5.AmalgamationofSASSandNIA................................................................................28

6.Structure………………………………………………………………………………………………………………34

7.MandateandCapacity………………………………………………………………………………………….40

8.Controls ……………………………………………………………………………………………………………….47

9.TheExecutive...........................................................................................................60

10.IllegalOrders.........................................................................................................71

11.TrainingandDevelopment.....................................................................................79

12.Coordination..........................................................................................................84

13.Oversight................................................................................................................89

14.Conclusion(WhatWentWrong?)...........................................................................98

AppendixA-PanellistBiographies.............................................................................100

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AbbreviationsAG–Auditor-GeneralAGSA–Auditor-GeneralofSouthAfricaANC–AfricanNationalCongressBMA–BorderManagementAgencyCASAC–CouncilfortheAdvancementoftheSouthAfricanConstitutionCD–ChiefDirector/ChiefDirectorateCFO–ChiefFinancialOfficerCOMSEC–CommunicationsSecurityCompanyCR17–CyrilRamaphosa2017CampaignCV–CurriculumVitaeDB–DomesticBranchDCAF–GenevaCentrefortheDemocraticControloftheArmedForcesDDG–DeputyDirector-GeneralDG–Director-GeneralDHA–DepartmentofHomeAffairsDIRCO–DepartmentofInternationalRelationsandCooperationFB–ForeignBranchFIC–FinancialIntelligenceCentreFIS–ForeignIntelligenceService/sGILAA–GeneralIntelligenceLawsAmendmentActof2013GP–GautengProvinceHUMINT–HumanIntelligenceIA–IntelligenceAcademyIG–Inspector-GeneralIGI–Inspector-GeneralofIntelligenceJSCI–JointStandingCommitteeonIntelligenceKZN–KwaZuluNatalProvinceLRA–LabourRelationsActMI6–UKSecretIntelligenceServiceMK–UmkhontoweSizwe(ANC’sarmedwing)MoU–MemorandumofUnderstandingMPD–MinisterialPaymentDirectiveMTEC–MediumTermExpenditureCommitteeNAC–NationalAssessmentsCentreNC–NationalCommunicationsNCC–NationalCommunicationsCentreNGO–Non-GovernmentalOrganisationNIA–NationalIntelligenceAgencyNICOC–NationalIntelligenceCoordinatingCommitteeNIE–NationalIntelligenceEstimateNIPS–NationalIntelligencePrioritiesNIS–NationalIntelligenceServiceNPA–NationalProsecutingAuthorityNSC–NationalSecurityCouncil

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NSS–NationalSecurityStrategyOIC–OfficeforInterceptionCentresOIGI–OfficeoftheInspector-GeneralofIntelligenceOoS–OrgansofStatePAN–PrincipleAgentNetworkPFMA–PublicFinanceManagementActPOCA–PreventionofOrganisedCrimeActPOSIB–ProtectionofStateInformationBillPRECCA–PreventionandCombattingofCorruptionActPSA–PublicServiceActRICA – Regulation of Interception of Communications and Provision of Communication-RelatedInformationActSABC–SouthAfricanBroadcastingCorporationSAHRC–SouthAfricanHumanRightsCouncilSANAI–SouthAfricanNationalAcademyforIntelligenceSANDF–SouthAfricanNationalDefenceForceSAPS–SouthAfricanPoliceServiceSARB–SouthAfricanReserveBankSARS–SouthAfricanRevenueServiceSASS–SouthAfricanSecretServiceSAVESA–SaveSouthAfricaSDP–StrategicDevelopmentPlanSIGINT–SignalsIntelligenceSO–SpecialOperationsSOE–State-OwnedEnterpriseSSA–StateSecurityAgencyTA–TemporaryAdvanceUK–UnitedKingdomUS–UnitedStatesVAG–VerligteAksieGroep

ReportoftheHigh-LevelReviewPanelontheSSA 1

1. ExecutiveSummary

TheHigh-LevelReviewPanelintotheStateSecurityAgency(SSAorAgency)wasestablishedbyPresidentCyrilRamaphosa in June2018,began itswork in July2018andwasgivensixmonths to submit its report. The key objective for the establishment of the Panelwas toenable the reconstructionofaprofessionalnational intelligence capability for SouthAfricathatwillrespectandupholdtheConstitution,andtherelevantlegislativeprescripts.The Panelwas chaired by Dr SydneyMufamadi and included nine othermemberswith awide range of senior level experience and expertise in law, security studies, civil society,academia, the intelligence and security community and other arms of government. ThePanelwassupportedbyaSecretariatprovidedbytheAgency.ThePanelhadaccess to anextensivenumber ofdocuments, includingpresentationsandsubmissions fromSSAunits,othersectorsof the intelligencecommunity,pastandcurrentindividual members of the community and other relevant arms of government; policies,legislation, regulations and directives; previous review reports and discussion documents;investigationreportsandmanyothers.ThePanelheldinterviewswithawiderangeofpeople,including,interalia,thecurrentandformer ministers of intelligence/state security; former and current directors-general andsenior leadership of the SSA and its predecessor services; the Inspector-General forIntelligence, the Coordinator for Intelligence, the National Security Advisor, the Auditor-General;theheadsofotherarmsofthebroaderintelligencecommunityaswellasindividualmembersandformermembersofthecommunityandmanyothers.ThePanel’sTermsofReferenceprovided12focusareasforthePanel’swork:• Thehigh-levelpoliciesandstrategies,legislation,regulationsanddirectivesgoverning,

orimpactingonthemandate,structure,operationsandefficacyoftheSSA.• Theimpactontheworkofthecivilianintelligenceagenciesoftheamalgamationofthe

previousservicesintooneagencyandtheappropriatenessofthischange.• Theappropriatenessofthecurrentstructureoftheagencytoitscoremandatesandto

effectivecommand,controlandaccountability.• ThemandateandcapacityoftheSSAandtoexaminethecompatibilityofitsstructure

inrelationtothismandate.• Theeffectivenessofcontrolstoensureaccountability.• Theinstitutionalculture,morale,systemsandcapacitytodeliveronthemandate.• Theinvolvementofmembersofthenationalexecutivein intelligenceoperationsand

measurestopreventthis.• The policy framework (including legislation) that governs operational activities

conductedbymembersofthenationalexecutive.• Thedevelopmentofguidelinesthatwillenablememberstoreportamanifestlyillegal

orderasenvisagedinsection199(6)oftheConstitution.• TheeffectivenessofTrainingandDevelopmentProgrammesincapacitatingmembers


oftheAgency.• The effectiveness of intelligence and counter-intelligence coordination within the

AgencyandbetweentheagencyandotherSouthAfricanintelligenceentitiesandthecapacityandroleoftheNationalIntelligenceCoordinatingCommittee(NICOC)inthisregard.

• The effectiveness and appropriateness of the existing oversight mechanisms inensuringaccountabilityandtransparency.

Apart from its specific findingsand recommendations, thePanelasked itself thequestion:‘Whatwentwrong?’Inansweringthisquestion,itmustbesaidthatthefindingsofthePaneldonotimpugneverymemberoftheSSAanditsmanagement,butfocusonthethingsthatwentwrong.Itidentifiedfivehigh-levelanswerstothisquestion:

• Politicisation: The growing contagion of the civilian intelligence community by thefactionalism in the African National Congress (ANC) progressively worsened from2009.

• Doctrinal Shift: From about 2009, there was a marked doctrinal shift in theintelligence community away from the prescripts of the Constitution, the WhitePaperonIntelligence,andthehumansecurityphilosophytowardsamuchnarrower,statesecurityorientation.

• Amalgamation: The amalgamationofNational IntelligenceAgency (NIA) and SouthAfrican Secret Service (SASS) into the SSA did not achieve its purported objectivesandwascontrarytoexistingpolicy.

• Secrecy:ThereisadisproportionateapplicationofsecrecyintheSSAstiflingeffectiveaccountability.

• ResourceAbuse:TheSSAhadbecomea‘cashcow’formanyinsideandoutsidetheAgency.


2 Recommendations

Forconvenienceofreference,wepresentbelowthefulllistofrecommendationscontainedin the individual chapters of the report. We would first, though, like to highlight someoverarchingrecommendationsonwhichmanyoftheothersdepend,aswellasmakesomegeneralrecommendations.

2.1 NationalSecurityStrategy

ThePanelrecommendstheurgentdevelopmentofaNSSasanoverridingbasis forredefining and refining the concepts, values, policies, practices and architectureinvolved in South Africa’s approach to security. Such a strategy should be widelyconsultedwiththepublicandParliamentbeforeformalapproval.

2.2 ArchitecturalReview

ThePanelrecommendsthat,onthebasisoftheaboveNationalSecurityStrategyandother considerations, there is a comprehensive review of the architecture of theSouthAfricansecuritycommunitywhichconsiders,interalia:

a) TheseparationoftheSSAintotwoservices-adomesticandaforeignservice–withmaximumor,preferably,totalseparation.

b) Locating theCoordinator for Intelligenceand theNICOCanalysis arm in theOfficeofthePresidency.

c) Formallyre-establishingtheNationalSecurityCouncil.d) Refining the mandates of the intelligence departments, including defence

intelligence and crime intelligence, to ensure minimum duplication andmaximumcoordination.

2.3 ImplementationTaskTeam

ThePanelrecommendsthatthePresidentappointsaTaskTeam,preferablyonafull-timecontractualbasis,tounpacktheaboveandotherrecommendationsofthePanelinto a concrete plan of action; initiate, undertake and coordinate the above-recommendedreviewsandoverseetheimplementationoftheiroutcomes.

2.4 InvestigationsandConsequences

ThePanelrecommendsthatthePresidentinstructstheappropriatelawenforcementbodies, oversight institutions and internal disciplinary bodies to investigate all


manifest breaches of the law, regulations and other prescripts in the SSA ashighlighted by this report with a view to instituting, where appropriate, criminaland/ordisciplinaryprosecutions.In particular, the Panel recommends the establishment of a multidisciplinaryinvestigation team to deal with the criminal investigations, and that a privateadvocateisappointedtoconductinternaldisciplinaryhearings.

2.5 Panelrecords

The Panel recommends that the records of the work of this Panel be sealed andstored – including this report, documents submitted, panellists' and secretariat’snotes,recordingsofinterviewsetc–andmadeavailableasnecessaryfortheworkoftheabove-recommendedtaskteamsandinvestigationcapacities.

2.6 PublicationofReportThe Panel has temporarily classified this report as Secret in order to protect itscontents from unauthorised disclosure until the President has had a chance toconsideritanddecideonfurtheraction.The Panel recommends that the President considers declassifying this report andreleasing it to thepublicora redactedversion thereofwhere someof its contentsmightbeconsideredsensitive.

2.7 DetailedRecommendations

2.7.1 OnPolicyandPrescriptsa) Urgentlydraft aNSS, guidedby the recommendationsof thisPanel, for

consultation inParliamentandwiththepublicasabasis for the furtherdevelopmentofpolicyandprescriptfortheintelligencecommunity.

b) OnthebasisoftherevisedNSS,bringthecurrentWhitePaperuptodate,retainingthebasicvision,valuesandprinciplesofthecurrentPaper.

c) On the basis of the approved recommendations of this Review Reportand a revisedNSS andWhite Paper, establish a high-level task team toreviewallrelevantlegislation,regulationanddirectives.Theteamshouldincludelegalexpertsfromoutsidetheintelligencecommunity,theStateLaw Advisors, functional and legal experts from within the intelligencecommunityaswellasexperiencedpractitioners.

d) OnPOSIB,thePresidentshouldconsiderwhethertheoptionofsendingitback to Parliament for further consideration of the concerns about itsconstitutionality has been exhausted and, if so, to submit it to the


ConstitutionalCourt.e) Urgentlyinitiateaprocesstolookintotheimplicationsofrescindingthe

Secret Services Act and, in the interim, ensure that the CouncilestablishedbytheActisestablishedandfunctioning.

f) Establish a process to investigate breaches of the Regulations andinstitutethenecessarydisciplinaryprocesses.

2.7.2 OntheAmalgamationofSASSandNIAintoSSAa) Serious consideration be given to oncemore separating the SSA into a

foreign service and a domestic service but this time with maximumindependence of each, with the minimum of shared services betweenthemifatall.

b) TheNCC, as a capacity that is supposed to focus exclusively on foreignsignalsintelligence,shouldbelocatedinsidetheforeignserviceatleastasaninterimmeasure.

c) ThePresidentshouldestablishataskteam,comprisedofexpertisewithinand outside the SSA, to explore in detail the practical and otherimplications of the re-separation of the services and other possiblearchitecturalchanges.

d) Any process ofmajor changes to the SSA be thoroughly consulted andchange-managedwithAgencystaffatalllevels.

e) Thetitles‘StateSecurityAgency’and‘Minister/MinistryofStateSecurity’bechangedtoreflectthedeterminationtoreturntheroleandphilosophyof our democratic intelligence capacity back to their Constitutionalorigins.

2.7.3 OnStructure

a) Thepre-SDP structure shouldbe immediately formally re-institutedand

thatnecessaryappointmentsbemadetoinjectstabilityandpurposeintotheAgencyandthat,asfaraspossible,suchappointmentsshouldnotbeinactingcapacities.

b) No further restructuring of the Agency should take place until therestructuringtaskteamrecommendedabovehascompleteditswork.

c) Managementandstaffdisplacedby theSDPprocessshouldbeurgentlyreinstated or otherwise gainfully deployed and, where necessary,providedwithre-training.

d) Theoneormoreintelligenceservicesarisingfromthepossibleoutcomesof this review should go back to the ‘leanness’ and ‘meanness’ of theearlierdaysofcivilianintelligence.


2.7.4 OnMandateandCapacity

a) As part of the community-wide architectural and legislative review

recommended above, serious attention be given to clearer and morefocuseddefinitionsofthemandate/sofanyresultingservice/saswellasothersectionsofthebroaderintelligencecommunity.

b) As a matter of urgency, the leadership of the SSA take measures toaddress the capacity gaps in terms of people, financial and otherresourcesinitsprovincialandforeignoffices.

c) TheSSA instituteclearprocessesof interactionbetween itsanalysisandcollectingarmsandensuretheseareeffectivelyimplemented.

d) Conduct an intensive evaluation of the quality of the SSA’s intelligenceproducts through assessment of the products themselves and thesurveyingofasampleoftheAgency’sclients.

e) An urgent policy review of the Agency’s security vetting mandate beundertaken to consider the scope and reach of that mandate and toclearlyidentifythedivisionbetweenthenormalprobitychecksofexistingand prospective state employees to be undertaken by the employingdepartments and the more focused security competency vetting to beundertakenbytheSSA.

f) The SSA should, as a matter of extreme urgency, resource and givepriority to the further development and upgrading of the electronicvettingsystemtoitsfullintendedfunctionality.

2.7.5 OnControls

a) Urgently institute forensic and other investigations by the competent

authoritiesintothebreachesoffinancialandothercontrolsidentifiedbysomeofthe informationavailabletothePanelandother investigations,especiallywithregardtothePANprojectandSO, leadingtodisciplinaryand/orcriminalprosecutions.

b) Thetaskteamrecommendedearlier toreview legislationandprescriptsrelating to intelligence should include in theirworka reviewof existinglegislative and other controls governing the conduct of intrusiveoperations,includingbenchmarkingwithotherappropriatejurisdictions.

c) In the meantime, the ministries of State Security and Justice shouldurgently attend to the strengthening of the capacity of the judicialauthorityestablishedintermsofRICAandtheexpeditingofthereviewoftheRICAlegislation.

d) TheMinistryand theSSAshouldurgently conduct research to look intoalternative payment methods to cash that provide the necessary


protection of sensitive information, including benchmarking against thepracticeofforeignintelligenceservicestodeterminehowtominimisetheuseofcashandtoidentifysecuremethodsofnon-cashmethodsforthemovementofcashandmakingofpayments.

e) The Agency should immediately ensure that the rules governing thetemporary advance system are tightened up and consistentlyimplemented,includingintroducingauditablemethodsforaccountingfortheexpenditureof suchadvances, and shouldensure there are routineandvisibleconsequencesforbreachesofsuchrulesandprocesses.

f) The Agency should institute disciplinary proceedings against all thosefound to have abused the temporary advances system and, whereapplicable,torecovermoniesresultingfromsuchabuses.

g) Asamatterofurgency, theMinistryand theAgency should review theSSA’s annualplanningprocess and its relation to thebudgetingprocessthat ensures clear accountability and manageability of budgeting,expenditureandperformanceagainstplanningprioritiesandtargetsthatareshareablewiththeAG,theJSCIandotherrelevantoversightbodies.

h) TheMinistryandAgencyshouldurgentlyfindwiththeAGanacceptablemethod for the unfettered auditing of the Agency’s finances includingcovertfinancesthatleadstotheabsenceofthestandardqualificationintheAgency’sannualaudits.

i) TheAgency should institutemeasures to ensure a seamless interactionbetween the administrative (Finance, Procurement, Human Resources)and the operational arms of the Agency as concerns the accountabilityandcomplianceoftheoperationalarms,ensuring,inparticular,thattheAgency’sCFOhasthesameaccesstoinformationasthedirector-generalandInspector-General.

j) TheMinistryshouldestablishataskteamcomprisedofrepresentativesoftheAgency,retiredpractitioners,thelegalprofessionandcivilsocietytodevelopapolicydocumentonachievinganappropriatebalancebetweensecrecy and transparency for the intelligence services, drawing oninternational comparisons, that leads practically to the development ofappropriate prescripts and practices. Such a process should draw onpreviousreviewsandcommissions.

k) The Ministry should initiate a process together with the ministries ofFinance,DefenceandPolicetoexploretheoptionsandconsequencesforrepealing the Security Services Special Account ActNo. 81 of 1969 andtheSecretServicesAct,No.56of1978anddesignaprocesstowardsthatend. In the interim, as recommended in Chapter 2, the Councilestablishedbythislegislationisactivatedandfunctioning.


2.7.6 OntheExecutivea) Thecurrent legislativeprovisionsshouldbereviewedwithregardtothe

Minister’spowersastheyrelatetotheadministrationoftheservice/s.b) Whiletheprerogativetoappointaheadofservice/sshouldremainwith

the President, such appointment should follow a similar process ascurrentlybeingundertakenfortheappointmentoftheNationalDirectorofPublicProsecutionsorasrecommendedinChapter13oftheNationalDevelopmentPlan.

c) The findingsof thePanelandof thecurrent investigationof the IG intothe SO and related matters should form the basis for seriousconsequences for those involved in illegal activity, including, whereappropriate,disciplinaryand/orcriminalprosecution.

d) TheformerheadofSOshouldbewithdrawnfromhiscurrentpositionasaseniorrepresentativewithingovernment.

2.7.7 OnIllegalOrders

a) Arising out of investigations following from this review and current or

future investigations by the IGI, there should be firm consequences forthosewhoissuedmanifestlyillegalordersandthosewhowittinglycarriedthemout.

b) Anurgentprocessshouldbeinitiated,drawingonlegal, intelligenceandacademic expertise, to develop a clear definition of manifestly illegalordersasapplicabletothe intelligenceenvironmentandtorecommendprocedures and processes for handling these. Such processes andproceduresto includetheconsiderationthatallordersshouldbe issuedin writing and protection for those refusing to obey or reporting amanifestlyillegalorder.

c) Onthebasisoftheoutcomeofrecommendationb)above,aswellasthebroader review of relevant legislation and prescript arising from thisreport, there should be relevant amendments made to legislation,regulationsanddirectivesdealingexplicitlywithmanifestly illegalordersand the processes for dealing with them, including providing for thecriminalisation of the issuing of, or carrying out of, a manifestly illegalorder.

d) Inlinewiththerecommendationscontainedinthechapterofthisreportdealing with Training and Development, the education, training anddevelopmentof intelligenceofficersshouldensureextensiveknowledgeandunderstandingof the constitutional, legislativeandotherprescriptsrelating to intelligence as well as the definition of, and procedures for


dealingwith,manifestlyillegalorders.e) In addition to d) above, there should be a compulsory induction

programme for any member of the executive assigned with politicalresponsibility for the intelligenceservices, includingheadsofMinisterialServices and advisors, aswell as any newly-appointed senior leaders ofsuch services, that educates them on the relevant prescripts asmentionedaboveandonthenatureofmanifestly illegalordersandtheconsequencesthereof.

f) Further,onthebasisoftheoutcomeoftheprocessrecommendedinb)above, there should be an urgent, all-encompassing civic educationcampaignforallmembersoftheservice/sonthemeaningofamanifestlyillegalorderandtheprocessesfordealingwiththem.

2.7.8 OnTrainingandDevelopmenta) TheestablishmentofanAdvisoryPanel,consistingofretiredpractitioners

with training expertise, academics with expertise in security, a humanresources specialist, an ICT expert, risk management expert andeconomist,toattendto,andensureoperationalisationof,thefollowing:• Review the vision and mission, scope and structure of a national

intelligence training and education capacity for the intelligencecommunity

• Confirm the intelligence doctrine, oriented towards theConstitution,andbasedontherevisedWhitePaper,NSSandotherrelevantpoliciesandprescripts.

• Develop appropriate curricula, including general, executive andspecialised, continuous trainingandeducation, taking intoaccountthedifferencesofoperatingintheforeignanddomesticterrains.

• Guidetheestablishmentofaprofessionalandappropriatelytrainedandeducatedfaculty(teachingandtrainingstaff)andmanagementcadre.

• Developanappropriatecareeradvancementprotocoltoguidestaffrecruitment,development,deploymentandpromotion.

• Develop and confirm guiding values for intelligence training andeducation.

• Guideordevelopexitoptionsforexistingstaffandrecognitionandaccommodation of former intelligence officers and officials if andwhereneeded.

• Determine collaborations and partnerships with accreditedacademic institutions, select NGOs, specialist organisations andagencies,andrelevantgovernmenttraininginstitutions.

• ReviewtheappropriatenessoftheMahikengcampus.


2.7.9 OnCoordinationa) NICOC should be relocated to the Presidency to give it the necessary

authoritytoensurecompliancebytheintelligencedepartmentswiththeprescriptsonintelligencecoordination.

b) The task team recommended above to look at the overall architectureandlegislationoftheintelligenceandsecuritycommunityshouldfactorinthe recommendationsof thisPanel insofaras they relate to intelligencecoordinationandNICOC.

c) In the meantime, urgent measures should be put in place to ensurecompliance by the intelligence services with the White Paper andlegislativeprescriptson intelligencecoordinationwithconsequences fornon-compliance.

2.7.10 OnOversight

a) Urgently process and promulgate the regulations governing the

functioningoftheIGI.b) Urgently institutea formal investigation into the issues surrounding the

withdrawaloftheIGI’ssecurityclearance.c) Establisha task team to reviewandoversee the implementationof the

recommendationsof the2006and2008 reviews insofaras they relatedtotheIGI.

d) ProposeareviewofthefunctioningoftheJSCI.e) Given the demands of intelligence oversight, the idea of a dedicated

capacityfortheJSCIneedstobeexploredfurther.


3 Introduction

3.1 EstablishmentofthePanel

The High-Level Review Panel on the State Security Agency was established byPresidentCyrilRamaphosaon15thJune2018withthemainobjective‘toenablethereconstruction of a professional national intelligence capability for South Africathat will respect and uphold the Constitution, and the relevant legislativeprescripts.’ 1 The panel commencedwork on 1st July 2018 andwas initially giventhreemonthstocompleteitstask,laterextendedtosixmonths.

3.2 TermsofReferenceThe Terms of Reference note the establishment of the SSA in 2009 through theamalgamationofpreviouslyseparateinstitutions–theSouthAfricanSecretService,the National Intelligence Agency, the National Communications Centre, the SouthAfricanNationalAcademyforIntelligence(SANAI)andCOMSEC(thecommunicationssecuritycompany).The Terms of Reference further note allegations that the SSA has faced seriouschallengesandviolationsofthelawinrecentyears.TheReviewwastofocusontheSSAandtheOfficeforInterceptionCentresandanyrelatedstructures.ThePanelwas,inparticular,tofocusonthefollowingissues:

• The high-level policies and strategies, legislation, regulations and directives

governing,or impactingonthemandate,structure,operationsandefficacyoftheSSA.

• The impact on the work of the civilian intelligence agencies of theamalgamation of the previous services into one agency and theappropriatenessofthischange.

• Theappropriatenessofthecurrentstructureoftheagencytoitscoremandatesandtoeffectivecommand,controlandaccountability.

• Themandateandcapacityof theSSAand toexamine the compatibilityof itsstructureinrelationtothismandate,

• Theeffectivenessofcontrolstoensureaccountabilityon,interalia:o OperationalDirectives;o FinancialAccounting;o Professionalism;o Non-partisanship;

1High-LevelAdvisoryPanel:TermsofReference


o CodeofConduct;ando ServiceLevelAgreements

• The institutional culture, morale, systems and capacity to deliver on themandate.

• The involvement of members of the national executive in intelligenceoperationsandmeasurestopreventthis.

• Thepolicyframework(includinglegislation)thatgovernsoperationalactivitiesconductedbymembersofthenationalexecutive.

• Thedevelopmentofguidelinesthatwillenablememberstoreportamanifestlyillegalorderasenvisagedinsection199(6)oftheConstitution.

• The effectiveness of Training and Development Programmes in capacitatingmembersoftheAgency.

• The effectiveness of intelligence and counter-intelligence coordinationwithinthe Agency and between the agency and other South African intelligenceentities and the capacity and role of the National Intelligence CoordinatingCommittee(NICOC)inthisregard.

• Theeffectivenessandappropriatenessoftheexistingoversightmechanismsinensuringaccountabilityandtransparency.

The Panel was given full independence but had no power to subpoena or cross-examinewitnesses.

3.3 PanelMembers2

ThePresidentappointedthefollowingtenmemberstothePanel:• DrSydneyMufamadi(Chairperson)• ProfessorJaneDuncan• MrBarryGilder• DrSiphokaziMagadla• MrMurrayMichell• MsBasetsanaMolebatsi• Rtd.LtGeneralAndrePruis• MrSilumkoSokupa• ProfessorAnthoniVanNieuwkerk• ProfessorSibusisoVil-Nkomo

AsrequiredbytheTermsofReference,theSSAprovidedlogisticalandadministrativesupporttothePanel.

2SeeAppendixAforbriefbiographiesofthePanelmembers.


3.4 Methodology

3.4.1 BriefingsandInterviews

ThePanelreceivedbriefingsfromtheActingDirector-General(DG)andmembersofthetopmanagementoftheSSAdealingmainlywiththemandate,structures,functionsandchallengesofthevariousbranchesandunitsoftheAgency.ItalsometwithalltheprovincialheadsoftheAgencyaswellassomeheadsofforeignstations.ThePanelhadsessionswith thecurrentanda former IGI, the JSCI, the formerChairperson of the JSCI, as well as with the (AGSA) and DG of the NationalTreasury.It also interacted with the current and former ministers of Intelligence/StateSecurityplus the currentNational SecurityAdvisor aswell as formerdirectors-general of the SSA and of its predecessor entities and former heads of theDomesticandForeignbranchesofSSA.

ThePanelalsoengagedthecurrentandformerheadsoftheNICOC,theheadsoftheCrimeIntelligenceDivisionoftheSouthAfricanPoliceService(SAPS)andofthe IntelligenceDivision of the South AfricanNational Defence Force (SANDF),theheadoftheFinancialIntelligenceCentre(FIC),andformerdirectors-generalofthedepartmentsofhomeaffairs(DHA)andforeignaffairs.It also had the benefit of the institutionalmemory and insights of someof itsmemberswhohadpreviouslyservedinseniorleadershippositionsinNIA,SASS,NICOC,DHA,SAPSandFIC.

3.4.2 Documents

ThePanelperusedalargenumberofdocuments,includingpresentationsonthestructureandfunctioningofSSA,legislationandpolicydocuments,IGIandotherinvestigationreports,submissionsbyvariousSSAunits,SSAstaff,externalbodiesandindividuals.

KeyamongthesetothePanel’sbriefwere:

• TheWhitePaperonIntelligence• The2013NSS• The2007DraftNSS• The1996Reportof theMinisterialReviewCommissionofEnquiry into the

TransformationoftheCivilianIntelligenceServices(thePikoliCommission)


• The 2006 Final Report of the Task Team on the Review of Intelligence-RelatedLegislation,RegulationandPolicy

• The2008ReportoftheMinisterialReviewCommissiononIntelligence(theMatthewsCommission)andthe2008AdvisoryReportforMinisterKasrilsonthisreport

3.5 StructureoftheReport

ThebodyofthereportisstructuredaccordingtoClause5oftheTermsofReferenceasoutlinedin2.2above,assigningachaptertoeachpointoffocus.

Eachchapterhasthefollowingstructure:• BriefSummaryoftheIssue• SummaryofInputsReceived• Discussion• Findings• Recommendations

The report ends with a Conclusion (that summarises the Panel’s answer to thequestion:Whatwentwrong?).


4 Polic ies and Prescripts

Focus Area: The high-level policies and strategies, legislation, regulations and directivesgoverning,orimpactingon,themandate,structure,operationsandefficacyoftheSSA.

4.1 TheIssue

SouthAfrica’sintelligencecommunityhasfacedmanychallenges,legalandstructuralvacillations in theyears since thebirthofdemocracy. Inmore recent times– since2005 to be precise – the civilian intelligence community has been the target of anumberofscandals,startingwiththehoaxemailsagaof2005thatledtothefiringofthenNIADG,throughtomorerecentallegationsagainstthesuccessorSSArelatingtoitsPANprogrammeandotherallegedabuses.

The question is: to what extent are these apparent abuses of the intelligencemandate and operations, as well as some of the legacy issues, the result ofweaknessesinpolicy,legislationandprescripts?

4.2 SummaryofInputs

ThePanelhadaccesstoalltherelevantpolicyandlegislativedocumentsaswellastopreviouscommissionandtaskteamreportsonthesematters.Theseincluded, interalia:

• TheWhitePaperonIntelligence(1994)• NationalStrategicIntelligenceAct39of1994• IntelligenceServicesOversightAct40of1994• IntelligenceServicesAct65of2002• Regulationof InterceptionofCommunicationandProvisionofCommunication-

RelatedInformation,Act70of2002• GeneralIntelligenceLawsAmendmentAct11of2013(GILAA)• NSS(asapprovedbyCabinetinDecember2013)• DraftNSSofJune2007• Report of the Task Team on the Review of Intelligence-Related Legislation,

RegulationandPolicies,April2006• TheMatthewsCommissionReportof2008• TheIntelligenceServicesRegulationsof2014• OperationalDirectives

We also received a comprehensive briefing, presentation and documents from theSSALegalDivisiononcurrentprocessestoreviewlegislationandotherprescripts.Inaddition,weengagedmanyoftheinstitutionsandindividualswemetontheirviewsonthisfocusarea.


4.3 Discussion

It was not part of the Panel’smandate to conduct a detailed review of all policy,legislationandotherprescripts.ThePanel’s focuswas largelyonassessing these inrelationtothequestion‘Whatwentwrong?’The Panel noted the many initiatives since the early days of the democraticintelligencedispensationtoreviewandamendpolicyand legislationandthatmanyof the recommendations of earlier reviews were never implemented or fell awaywhen a new administration came into office. Thus, many of the observations andfindingsofthePanelarenotnew.Thisisofseriousconcernand,inthePanel’sview,speaks toa significantextent to thedysfunctionalityof the intelligence communityoverthepastdecadeorso.

4.3.1 Constitution

TheConstitutionistheoverarchinglegislationthatgovernsthesecurityservices.Chapter11oftheConstitutionsetsouttheprinciplesgoverningnationalsecurityand provides for the establishment, structuring and conduct of the SecurityServicescomprisingIntelligence,DefenceandPolice.Section 198prescribes that the followingprinciples governnational security intheRepublic:

(a)NationalsecuritymustreflecttheresolveofSouthAfricans,as individualsand as a nation, to live as equals, to live in peace and harmony, to be freefromfearandwantandtoseekabetterlife.(b) The resolve to live in peace and harmony precludes any South Africancitizen from participating in armed conflict, nationally or internationally,exceptasprovidedforintermsoftheConstitutionornationallegislation.(c) National securitymust be pursued in compliancewith the law, includinginternationallaw;and(d)NationalsecurityissubjecttotheauthorityofParliamentandthenationalexecutive.

Section199providesfortheestablishment,structuringandconductofsecurityservicesandstatesthat:

(1) The security services of the Republic consist of a single defence force, asinglepolice serviceandany intelligence servicesestablished in termsof theConstitution.(3)Other than the security servicesestablished in termsof theConstitution,armedorganisationsorservicesmaybeestablishedonly intermsofnationallegislation.(4) The security services must be structured and regulated by national


legislation;and(5) act, teach and require their members to act, in accordance with theConstitution and the law, including customary international law andinternationalagreementsbindingontheRepublic.(6)Nomemberofanysecurityservicemayobeyamanifestlyillegalorder.(7) Neither the security services, nor any of their members, may, in theperformanceoftheirfunctions—(a) prejudice a political party interest that is legitimate in terms of theConstitution;or(b)further,inapartisanmanner,anyinterestofapoliticalparty.

(8 To give effect to the principles of transparency and accountability,multi-partyparliamentarycommitteesmusthaveoversightofallsecurityservicesina manner determined by national legislation or the rules and orders ofParliament.[Ouremphases]

Section209governstheestablishmentofthecivilianintelligenceservicesbythePresident intermsofnational legislationandsection210requiresthatnationallegislationmust regulate theobjects, powers, and functionsof the intelligenceservices.

Intermsofsection209:

(1)anyintelligenceservice,otherthananyintelligencedivisionofthedefenceforceorpolice service,maybeestablishedonlyby thePresident,asheadofthenationalexecutive,andonlyintermsofnationallegislation;and(2)thePresidentasheadofthenationalexecutivemustappointawomanoramanasheadofeachintelligenceserviceestablishedintermsofsubsection(1),andmusteitherassumepoliticalresponsibilityforthecontrolanddirectionofanyof thoseservices,ordesignateamemberof theCabinet toassume thatresponsibility.[Ouremphases]

Section 210 sets out the powers, functions andmonitoring of the intelligenceservicesandprovidesthat:

…national legislationmust regulate theobjects,powersand functionsof theintelligenceservices,includinganyintelligencedivisionofthedefenceforceorpoliceservice,andmustprovide for—(a) theco-ordinationofall intelligenceservices; and (b) civilianmonitoring of the activities of those services by aninspectorappointedby thePresident,asheadof thenationalexecutive,andapprovedbyaresolutionadoptedbytheNationalAssemblywithasupportingvoteofatleasttwothirdsofitsmembers.[Ouremphases]

TheprovisionsoftheConstitutionregardingintelligencereflecttheresolveofitsdrafters that our intelligence and security services should never return to thewantondisrespect forpoliticalandhumanrights thatprecededthedemocraticdispensation.


4.3.2 WhitePaper

TheWhite Paper on Intelligence of 1994 provides a policy framework for theestablishment, principles and functioning of the intelligence services in ademocratic SouthAfrica. TheWhite Paperwas adopted by Parliament in 1995and has not been reviewed to date, although there have been a number ofrecommendations by past reviews and commissions that this should be done,andtherehasbeenafurtherprocesstodothissince2016.Importantly, theWhite Paper reflects the vision and values of the founders ofourconstitutionaldemocracyasfarasdemocraticintelligenceisconcerned.TheWhite Paper sets out the legislativemandate of the new civilian services(domestic and foreign) and aims to address the creation of an effective,integratedandresponsiveintelligencemachinerythatcanservetheConstitutionand the government of the day, through the timeous provision of relevant,credible,andreliableintelligence.The White Paper describes modern intelligence as organised policy-relatedinformation, including secret information ‘that may be gathered by covert orovertmeans,fromarangeofsources,humanandnon-human,openorsecret’.In addition, it recognises various forms of intelligence including politicalintelligence, economic intelligence, technological and scientific intelligence,military,criminalandcounterintelligence.

It definesmodern intelligence and juxtaposes the purpose of intelligence in ademocraticandconstitutionaldispensationvis-à-vis thepurposeof intelligenceduringtheColdWar.AccordingtotheWhitePaper, inorder for intelligencetoremainrelevantinthemodern,post-ColdWarworld,intelligencemustservethefollowingpurposes:

• Provide policy-makers, timeous, critical and unique information to warn

themofpotentialrisksanddangers.Thisallowsthepolicymakerstofacetheunknownandbest reducetheiruncertaintywhencriticaldecisionshavetobemade;

• Toassistgoodgovernance,throughprovidinghonestcriticalintelligencethathighlightstheweaknessesanderrorsofgovernment.Asguardiansofpeace,democracy and the Constitution, intelligence services should tellgovernmentwhattheyoughttoknowandnotwhattheywanttoknow.

• IntheSouthAfricancontext,themissionoftheintelligencecommunityistoprovideevaluatedinformationwiththefollowingresponsibilities:o tosafeguardtheConstitution;o toupholdtheindividualrightsenunciatedintheBillofRights;o the achievement of national prosperity whilst making an active

contributiontoglobalpeaceandothergloballydefinedprioritiesforthe


well-beingofhumankind;ando the promotion of South Africa’s ability to face foreign threats and to

enhanceitscompetitivenessinadynamicworld.

TheWhite Paper underlines the following principles underpinning intelligenceorganisation:

• PrincipleofNationalIntelligenceOrganisation

o Toupholdtheprinciplesofintegrity,objectivityandcredibility;o Berelevanttothemaintenance,promotionandprotectionofnational

security;andbeloyaltotheStateandtheConstitution.• PrincipleofDepartmentalIntelligenceCapabilities

o Recognises thenecessity for departmental intelligence capabilities tosupport line function responsibilities and departmental decision-making,aslongassuchstructuresobservethelegalobligations,style,characterandcultureofthedepartmentstheyserveandobservethesame fundamental approach to their tasks that are applicable to thenationalintelligenceservices.

• PrincipleofPoliticalNeutralityo A national intelligence organisation is a national asset, and shall

thereforebepoliticallynon-partisan;o NoIntelligenceorSecurityserviceororganisationshallbeallowedto

carryoutanyoperationsthatareintendedtoundermine,promoteorinfluence any South African political party or organisation at theexpenseofanotherbymeansofanyacts,includingactivemeasuresorcovertactionorbymeansofdisinformation.[Ouremphasis]

• PrincipleofLegislativeSanction,accountabilityandParliamentaryControlo Mission, function and activities shall be regulated by relevant

legislation,theBillofRights,theConstitutionandanappropriateCodeofConduct;

o Intelligenceworkshallderiveitsauthorityfromalegalframeworkandshallbesubordinatetomeasuresofaccountabilityandparliamentarycontrol.

• PrincipleofthebalancebetweenTransparencyandSecrecyo Effective Intelligence, whilst requiring among others the essential

component of secrecy, needs to be sensitive to the interests andvaluesofademocraticsociety;

o Thedevelopmentofamoreopenintelligencecommunitywillgoalongway towards demystifying and building trust in the nationalintelligence communities. Where legal limits of secrecy, includingcriteria and time frames for classification are clearly understood andacceptedbysociety,thedangersofthe intelligencesystembecomingself-servingareaverted.[Ouremphasis]


• Principle of effective management and organisation and soundadministration;

• AnethicalcodeofconductforIntelligenceWork.• Coordination of Intelligence and liaison with departmental intelligence

structureso Anationalsecuritysystemshouldincludestructuresandopportunities

to facilitate an input by those domestic departmentalintelligence/informationstructuresasauthorisedbylaw.

o Awell-functioning intelligencecoordinatingmechanismisessentialtocoordinatetheflowofinformation,priorities,duplicationofresources,the audi alteram partem principle with regard to interpretation andothermatters pertaining to the other functions of intelligence. [Ouremphasis]

Whileelementsof theWhitePaper refer to the specificitiesof the time itwasdrafted and are thus somewhat anachronistic, the fundamental vision, valuesandprinciplesofthePaperremainvalidandrelevanttotoday.

4.3.3 NationalSecurityStrategyThePanelwasmadeawareofeffortsintheintelligenceandsecuritycommunitytodevelopaNSSthatwouldserveasanoverarchingpolicytoguidethecountry’sunderstandingofandapproachtonationalsecurity.ThePanelhadsightoftwoversionsofsuchastrategy,bothpreparedbyNICOC:

• DraftNSSforSouthAfrica–2007• NSS–2013

The first went as far as the then National Security Council (NSC) Directors-GeneralinJune2007where,apparently,itstalled.ThesecondwasapprovedbyCabinetonthe4thDecember2013.The 2007 draft NSS involved an extensive process of governmental and publicconsultationinthedraftingprocessandrecommendsanopenprocessofpublicand parliamentary consultation on the Strategy. It includes a proposal for theestablishmentofaNationalSecurityAdvisoryCouncil thatwould includepublicsector,privatesectorandcivilsocietyrepresentatives.The2013NSSisclassifiedTopSecretand,althoughitmentionsthepossibilityofwiderconsultation,thePanelisnotawareofanysuchconsultationtakingplace.Furthermore, the Strategy is not in a form that could be effectively consultedoutsideofgovernmentandthesecuritysectorinparticular.

4.3.4 Legislation

ThereisawiderangeoflegislationthatgovernstheSSAanditsrelatedentities.


Theseinclude:

• NationalStrategicIntelligenceAct,1994(Act39of1994);• IntelligenceServicesAct(ISA),2002(Act65of2002);• ProtectionofInformationAct,1982(Act84of1982);• NationalKeyPointsAct,1980(Act102of1980);• IntelligenceServicesOversightAct,1994(Act40of1994);• Regulation of the Interception of Communications and Provision of

Communication-Related Information Act, 2002 (Act 70 of 2002)(“RICA”);

• FinancialIntelligenceCentreAct,2001(Act38of2001)(‘FICA”);• ProtectionofConstitutionalDemocracyAgainstTerroristandRelated

ActivitiesAct,2004(Act33of2004)• SecretServicesAct,1978(Act56of1978);

ThePanelwasmadeawareofanumberofprocessesover theyears to reviewand amend the legislative prescripts. Many of the more high-levelrecommendationsof thesepreviousprocessesare identicalor similarbuthavenever been finalised or implemented, and the Panel has come to similarconclusions,asshallbereflectedlaterinthisreport.

ThePanelalsoconsideredPOSIBandtheSecretServicesActof1978.POSIB was introduced to Parliament in 2008. It was an attempt by the thencivilian intelligence community to replace the apartheid Protection ofInformationAct tobring the legislation in linewith theConstitution andotherinformation-related legislation. It provided for the crime of espionage which,strangely, South Africa had never had before, and it created processes forcompulsorydeclassificationofinformationanditcriminalisedtheclassificationofinformationtohidecorruptionandothermalfeasance.However, theBill raisedhigh levelsofpublicconcernand,despitenumerousattempts toaddress theseconcerns through amendments and the Bill’s having been approved byParliament,itremainsunsignedtenyearslater.

TheSecretServicesAct isanapartheid-erapieceof legislationthatenabledthesetting up of a special account for funds used for ‘secret services’. The mainbenefit to theStateSecurityAgencyof thisAct is that itallows it tocarryoverunspentfundsintothenewfinancialyear,unlikeotherdepartmentswhohavetoreturnunspentfundstothefiscusorapplyforarollover.However,theActalsoprovidesforacommitteethathastoapproveany ‘secretservice’tobefundedfrom this account. The Panel is not aware that any such committee has beenfunctioning.


4.3.5 Regulations

The Intelligence Services Regulations came into effect on 29 January 2014, intermsofsection37oftheIntelligenceServicesAct,andtheGILAAandrepealedtheIntelligenceServicesRegulationsof2003.Chapter I of the Regulations deals with ‘General Provisions’. It provides, interalia,that:• theMinistermaynot requireor permit theDirector-General (DG)or any

othermembertoengageinanactivityortakeadecisioninbreachoftheseregulations.

• the DG upholds the provisions of the Regulations and other statutoryobligations, ensures that other members do the same and dealsimmediatelyandeffectivelywithanybreachthereof.[Ouremphasis]

• thattheAgencymustprovideevaluated informationtoensure, interalia,the safeguarding of the Constitution and the upholding of the individualrightscontainedintheBillofRights.

• that the Agency must be loyal to the State and the constitutionalobligations.

• thattheattributesandqualitiesofasuccessfulintelligenceofficerinclude:o FaithfulnesstotheRepublicofSouthAfricaandtheConstitutiono ObediencetothelawsoftheRepublicofSouthAfricao Disregardforamanifestlyillegalorder[Ouremphasis]

ChapterIIoftheRegulationsdealswith‘OrganisationandStructures’.ItprovidesfortheestablishmentoftheorganisationalstructureoftheAgency,thecreationand grading of posts for the fixed establishment of the Agency; the filling ofposts;additionalemploymentandjobdescriptions,jobtitlesandaremunerationmanagementsystem.OfparticularinteresttotheworkofthePanelaretheprovisionsthatallocatethepowersofappointment:

• ThePresidentappointstheDG.• The Minister, in consultation with the President, appoints deputy

directors-general(DDGs).• The Minister appoints general managers (chief directors), managers

(directors)andequivalentlevels.• TheMinisterappointsheadsofforeignstations.Thedirector-generalcan

appointdeployeestoforeignstationsbelowheadofstationlevel,butinconsultationwiththeMinister.

• The DG can make appointments up to the level of Divisional Head(DeputyDirector).


Chapter V of the Regulations specifies the requirements and processes forrecruitment, selection, appointment and termination of service in the Agencyandconditionsofservice.Ofparticularinterestaretheprovisionsthat:

• allpositionsintheAgencymustbefilledonthebasisofcompetitionandadvertisedopenly;

• theDGisaccountableandtheauthorityforrecruitmentandselectionisvestedwithhimorher;

• recruitment and selection processes in the Agency must be open,transparentandsubjecttointernalscrutinyandaudit;

• thatamember inapost,one level lowerthanthevacantpostoronanequivalent level to thevacantpostorona levelhigher than thevacantpost,maybeappointedbytheMinisterortheDG,asthecasemaybe,toactinamanagementpostforaperiodnotexceedingtwelve(12)months.

Chapter XVI, titled ‘Consultations’, provides for an internal mechanism tocompensateforthelimitationofamember’sconstitutionalrighttobelongtoatradeunion,onthebasisofthefollowingprinciples:

• TopromotesoundemployeeandemployerrelationsintheAgency.• Toprovideforeffectiveconsultation,ingoodfaith,onmattersofinterest.• Tostrivetoreachconsensuswiththeparticipants.

ChapterXVIII–DisciplinaryProcedure–provides,inanappendix,foralistofactsregardedasmisconduct,including,amongmany:

• abusinghisorherpositioninsideoroutsidethescopeofhisorherofficialduties topromoteorprejudicepersonal interestsor thoseofanyparty,group,politicalorganisationorotherindividual;

• failingtoobeyalawfulorderorinstructionintentionallyornegligently3;• beingabsentfromworkwithoutleaveorwithoutavalidreason;• wilfullyspreadingafalseallegationormakingafalsestatementtoanyone

aboutanothermember;• sexuallyharassinganothermember;• as a supervisor failing to take appropriate corrective action upon

becomingawareofsexualharassmentandunfairdiscrimination;• attempting to secure or abandon any personal advantage, service

benefitoractivitieswithintheAgencybymeansoforinaidofapoliticaloranyotherorganisation/institutionoutsidetheAgency;

• wilfully contraveningor failing to complywith anyprovisionof theAct,regulations,directions,directivesandpoliciesissuedintermsoftheAct,whethersuchanactconstitutesanoffenceornot;

• failingtoreportonorinvestigateanyoftheabove-mentioned.[Ouremphases]

3Seeminglynoprovisionismadeforissuingorobeyingamanifestlyillegalorder.SeeChapter9


TheRegulationprovidesforthefollowingsentences:

• Correctivecounselling;• Awrittenwarningwhichmust be valid for a period not exceeding one

year;• Afinenotexceedingthemember’smonthlybasicsalary;• Areductionofthemember’ssalary,rankorjoblevelorallthree;• Arequestforthemembertoresign,anduponrefusal,heorshemustbe

discharged;• Discharge.

Chapter XXVI of the Regulations, dealing with Vetting, provides that a vettinginvestigationmayonlybeusedto:

• protecttheAgencyfromforeignandhostileintelligenceoperations;• safeguardtheAgencyfromtheunauthoriseddisseminationordisclosure

ofclassifiedinformationandmaterial;and• determine the person’s ormember's integrity, reliability and loyalty to

theAgency insafeguarding the interestsof theRepublicofSouthAfricaanditsConstitution.

4.3.6 OperationalDirectives

The Operational Policy and Operational Directives (OD)were approved by theMinister on23 January 2015. They are consistentwithGILAAand the ISA thatserveasthelegislativegenesisofthePolicyandDirectives.

4.4 Findings

4.4.1 General

ThePanelfindsthat:a) whiletheremaybechangestobemadetopolicyandprescriptimpacting

on the intelligence community, and that many of the Panel’srecommendationstofollowmayrequirelegislativereview,initsviewthechallengesthatledtotheappointmentofthePanelaredueinthemaintoanalmostcompletedisregard forpolicyandprescript– in short, seriousbreachesoftheConstitution,policy,law,regulationsanddirectives.


4.4.2 Constitution

ThePanelfindsthat:

b) NochangesarerequiredtotheConstitutiontopreventmalfeasanceintheintelligencecommunity.Whatisclear,aslatersectionsofthisreportshallshow, is that members of the SSA in particular, as well as seniorpoliticians,havebeeninbreachoftheConstitutionalprovisionsregardingobeying amanifestly illegal order and the injunction not to further theinterestsofanypoliticalpartyinapartisanmanner.

4.4.3 WhitePaper

ThePanelfindsthat:

c) The White Paper broadly and correctly reflects the vision, values andprinciples that underpinned the creation of our democratic intelligencedispensation and that these remain relevant and, in recent times, havebeenmorehonouredinthebreach.

d) AlthoughtheWhitePaperspecificallyprescribestheestablishmentoftwo

separate civilian intelligence services–external anddomestic –NIAandSASSwereamalgamated into theSSAwithoutprioramendments to thishigh-levelpolicydocumentandtheparliamentaryandpublicconsultationthiswouldhaverequired.Wedealwiththisinmoredetaillater.

e) Although still apropos in general terms, there are sections of theWhite

PaperthatareanachronisticandrelatetothetimeinwhichitwasdraftedandapprovedbyParliament.

4.4.4 NationalSecurityStrategy

ThePanelfindsthat:

f) AcredibleNSSisacrucialpolicytoolthatsetsthebroadcontextinwhich

thesecuritysectorfunctionsonbehalfofthenation.Itisadocumentonwhich the white papers and other policy documents of the securitydepartmentsandotherrelevantorgansofstateshouldbebased.

g) The2013NSS is a crossbetweena strategy, intelligenceestimateanda


business plan. It is also too time-bound to the period in which it waswritten.Further,itisverynon-committalandunambitiousinitsproposalsonthenationalsecurityarchitecture.

h) The 2007 Draft NSS provides a high-level, less time-tied outline of the

possible threats the country may face, proposes a sound system ofcounteringthreatsandathorough,thoughradical,newarchitectureandsetofbusinessprocessesforthesecuritycommunity.Further,itprovidesfortheinvolvementofthebroadersocietyinthenationalsecuritysystem.

4.4.5 LegislationThePanelfindsthat:i) Therearemanyconcernsandproposalsthatmayimpactonlegislationas

willbeshownlater inthereportbut,asstatedabove, itsmainfinding isthatoverthepastdecadeorsotherehasbeenamarkedand increasingdisregardofthelegislation.

j) FailuretofinalisethePOSIBhascausedaserioushiatusintakingforward

this issue and leaves the country reliant on an apartheid-era piece ofinformationprotectionlegislation.

k) TheSecretServicesActisanapartheidanachronismandaseriouscauseof

financialmalfeasanceintheAgency.

4.4.6 Regulations

ThePanelfindsthat:

l) TheRegulationsappear tobecomprehensiveanddetailedandbasedonsoundprinciples.

m) There have been numerous cases of breaches of the Regulations andfailurestoapplytheveryconsequencemanagementmeasurescontainedintheRegulations.

4.4.7 OperationalDirectives

n) There is clearevidence that theODswerebreachedby theSOUnit, the


PANandotherdeepcoveroperations.

4.5 Recommendations

ThePanelrecommendsasfollows:

4.5.1 NationalSecurityStrategya) Urgently draft a NSS guided by the recommendations of this Panel, for

consultation inParliamentandwith thepublic as abasis for the furtherdevelopmentofpolicyandprescriptfortheintelligencecommunity.

4.5.2 WhitePaper

b) BringthecurrentWhitePaperuptodate,retainingthebasicvision,values

andprinciplesofthecurrentPaper.

4.5.3 Legislation,RegulationsandDirectives

c) On the basis of the approved recommendations of this Review Report,

establish a high-level task team to review all relevant legislation,regulation and directives. The team should include legal experts fromoutside the intelligence community, the State Law Advisors, functionaland legal experts from within the intelligence community as well asexperiencedpractitioners.

d) On the POSIB, the President should consider whether the option of

sending it back to Parliament for further consideration of the concernsabout its constitutionalityhasbeenexhaustedand, if so, to submit it totheConstitutionalCourt.

e) Urgently initiateaprocessto look intothe implicationsofrescindingthe

SecretServicesActand,intheinterim,ensurethattheCouncilestablishedbytheActisestablishedandfunctioning.

f) EstablishaprocesstoinvestigatebreachesoftheRegulationsandinstitute

thenecessarydisciplinaryprocesses.


5 Amalgamation of SASS and NIA

FocusArea:Theimpactontheworkofthecivilianintelligenceagenciesoftheamalgamationofthepreviousservicesintooneagencyandtheappropriatenessofthischange.

5.1 TheIssueIn1994,policyandlegislationcreatedtwocivilianintelligenceservices–adomesticservice (NIA) and a foreign service (SASS). During the early 2000s a number ofelementsoftheNIAwerehivedoffasseparateentities–SANAI,theNCC,COMSECandtheOIC.The administration that came in 2009, by proclamation and later legislativeamendments,amalgamatedalltheseentitiesintoonedepartment–theSSA.

5.2 SummaryofInputsThetopicoftheamalgamationofNIAandSASSintotheSSAwasfrequentlydiscussedwith many of the current and past members of the SSA and its predecessorinstitutionsandrelatedentitieswhoappearedbeforethePanel. ItalsoformedpartofsomeofthesubmissionsmadetothePanel.The relevant policy documents and legislation referred to in the previous chapterformedpartoftheinputsonthisissue,aswellas:

• Progress Report: Restructuring Project of the State Security Agency(September2009to06June2014)

• PikoliCommissionReport• SubmissionbyformerheadofCOMSECandministeriallegaladvisor• SubmissionbyaformermemberoftheSSATopManagement

5.3 DiscussionDuringtheTransitionalExecutiveCouncilintelligencenegotiationsinthefirsthalfofthe90s,therewasintensedebateaboutwhetherthenewintelligencedispensationshouldhaveasinglecivilianintelligenceserviceortwoseparateservices.TheformerNational Intelligence Service (NIS) negotiators argued strongly for one servicewiththeANCarguingforseparateinternalandexternalservicesbasedonbenchmarkingwithotherdemocraciesandthenecessaryspecialisedfocus.ThislatterpositionheldswayaswasreflectedintheIntelligenceWhitePaperpassedbyParliamentin1994.In2009,theincomingadministrationtookadecisiontoreversethisandamalgamatethethenNIAandSASSandotherentitiesintotheSSA.


The SSA was established by Presidential Proclamation 59 of 11 September 2009,followed by the centralisation of command and control of civilian intelligence inGovernmentNotices(912,913,914and915)on17September2009andadoptionoftheGILAANo528inJuly2013,whichconfirmedinlawtheestablishmentoftheSSA.GILAAalsodisestablishedtheNIA,SASS,SANAIandCOMSEC.Theimpactoftheamalgamationprocessbecameanimportantconsiderationfortheworkof thePanelbecause current and formermembersargued that therewasanabsenceofaclear legislative frameworkthatguidedtheprocessof integrationandthenarrowingofthephilosophicalorientationandpurposeofcivilianintelligence.The 1994 White Paper, after specifying that there will be two separate civilianintelligenceservices,states:

Thisarrangementwillnotonlyensurethatthenewintelligencedispensationin South Africa corresponds with general international trends, but willpromote greater focusing, effectiveness, professionalism and expertise inthespecialisedfieldsofdomesticandforeignintelligence.

TheWhitePaperalsospecifiesthenamesofthetwoservices–NationalIntelligenceAgencyandSouthAfricanSecretService.However,the2009changesalsoamendedthename fromNational Intelligence Agency toStateSecurity Agencywhich, in theviewofthePanelandmanyofitsinterlocutors,suggestsasignificantconceptualshiftfromsecurityofthenationtosecurityofthestate,ashiftthatappearstohavebeenreflectedinpraxisinthesubsequentyears.Somerepresentationstothe1996PikoliCommissionarguedforthetwoservicestobe amalgamated into one, but the Commission recommended that the situationshould remain as is but should be reviewed in future. No subsequent reviews orcommissionsdealtwith this issueand thePanel isnotawareofanypublicprocessthatprecededthecreationoftheSSA.The main arguments for the creation of SSA centred around the elimination ofduplication, cost savings and better coordination and integration of foreign anddomestic intelligence. In the viewof thePanel andmanywhogaveevidence to it,theseproposedbenefitswerenotrealised.Therewasastrongviewthat,nineyearsintoamalgamationandtheformalconclusionoftheprocessinJune2014,theSSAisstill not de facto fully integrated. Among core concerns about the amalgamationprocess were the distribution and centralisation of power, obscured mandates ofdomesticandforeignintelligence,sharingofsystems,duplicationofroles,leadershipinstabilityandstaffdisplacement,amongothers.The Panel understands that part of the pressure for the amalgamation of thepredecessorservicesintotheSSAcamefromNationalTreasurywhichhadexpressedconcernover the ‘proliferation’of structures in thecivilian intelligencecommunity.However, evidence presented before the Panel showed that the total civilian


intelligencebudgethasalmostdoubledsinceamalgamation.Somequotesofsomeofthekeyconcernsraisedwiththepanelinclude:

TheobjectiveofProclamation59of2009wastostrengthenoperations,trimcorporate services and minimize duplication of services. However, thatobjectivewasnotrealized.Integrationremainsincomplete.InsteadwehaveseenagrowingconcentrationofpowerintheDirectorGeneral(emergenceofa'SuperDG')who,atthesametime,isatthesamelevelastheothertwoDirectors-DomesticandForeign.Integrationisnotreallyastructuralissuebutverymuchaculturalmatter,amindset issue, dependent on the value people place on cooperation asopposed to amere structural arrangement. The individual 'organisationalcultures' of NIA and SASS persisted even after formal integration into theSSA.Nineyearsafteramalgamationand theestablishmentof theSSA thelatterstillhasnotinpracticaltermsevolvedintoacoherentorganisationalculture,characterisedbyasharedvaluesystem.

And:

ThismergerofentitieswasdonethroughaProclamationwithoutrepealingthelaws.ThiswasanirregularexercisewhichgotsubsequentlyregularizedthroughGeneralIntelligenceLawsAmendmentAct(GILAA)whichwasonlypromulgatedin2013……Before collapsing all the structures into SSA, no feasibility study (socioeconomicimpactstudy)wasconductedontheimpactonhuman,technical,financial,collectionmethods,oversight,checksandbalancesinoperationalactivitiesetc.Therewasjustapolicyviewexpressedthatinordertocutcostandcreateefficiencieseverythinghadtobecollapsedintoone.Thiscollapseof the structures into SSA also resulted in the oversight body created toensure fair labour practices in the intelligence services to be underminedthroughdepletionofhumancapacityandoversightfocus.Thisdepletionofcapacityresultedinlowstaffmoralewithintheintelligenceservices,duetonon-adherencetofairlabourpracticesandtheruleoflaw.

Therewasaviewthatpartoftheweaknessoftheamalgamationprocesswasthatitreliedonchangingoldlawsinsteadofcreatingnewonesforthenewstructure.LegalopinionpresentedtotheAgencyin2010speakstotheurgentneedforthepassingofa‘StateSecurityBill’thatwouldoutlinethestructuresanddistributionofpowersoftheSSA.Therewasoverwhelmingagreementthatamalgamationoughttohavebeenprecededbyanextensivepolicyreview‘beforebehavingaccordingtodesiredpolicy’.Of great concern to theReviewPanelwas theobservation thatnoneof the seniorleaders of the Agency (past and present), including formerministers, who led theprocessofamalgamation,wereabletospeakwithconfidenceandclarityaboutthelegal framework that formed the foundation for integration. A former DG of the


Agencyconfessedthattheywere‘notsurewhethertherewasaproblemstatementto change the service to SSA…It was as if we woke up one day and decided toamalgamate.ThereisnolegislationthatoutlinesthenewframeworkforSSA.’Theconstitutionalityoftheamalgamationprocesswasalsobroughtintoquestionbytheleadershipthatwaschosentoleadtherestructuring.Theirconcernsincluded:

• thechangefromnationalintelligencetostatesecurity‘narrowedthefocusofintelligence as a state institution rather than an arm of intelligence forsociety.’

• theabsenceof consultation in theprocessofdeveloping theStateSecurityBill, the confusionbetween thepowers of theDGand theDirectors of theforeign and domestic branches, and the narrowing of the intelligencemandate.

A senior member of the restructuring leadership explained that “We came into asituation thatwas established.We never understood it. Therewas a proclamationbeingmadeandwewerethenbroughtin…”Onceof thekey challenges facedby the civilian intelligence community since1994wasthatthetwoservicesthenestablishedwereforcedbypracticalrealitiestosharecertainservicesandfacilities inheritedfromtheoldNIS.This includedadecisiontoundertake extensive construction at the intelligence campus inherited fromNIS onthe Delmas Road in Pretoria East to accommodate the two departments and theservicestheyshared.Overtheyears,therehadbeenanumberofinitiativestofindanacceptablewaytoshare certain services, as well as initiatives to separate out as stand-alonedepartmentscertainoftheseservices,suchastheIA,theNCC(responsibleforsignalsintelligence on the foreign terrain). All of these shared services were previouslyhoused inNIA, creating someunhappiness fromSASS about their lack of sufficientinvolvementinthemanagementoftheseservices,inspiteoftheestablishmentofaSharedServicesBoardandotherinitiatives.ItappearedtothePanelthattheamalgamationofeverythingintotheSSA,inspiteofthe intention, did not really solve this problem, but rather created dissonancebetween the systems and functions inherited from the two previously separateentities,andthusinsufficientfocusonthespecialneedsofthedomesticandforeignbranches of SSA. Interestingly, a number of former leaders of the SSA and itspredecessors expressed similar views. Andmanymore inside andoutside the SSAthoughtthatNIAandSASSshouldbeseparatedagain.MembersinboththeOIGIandtheJSCIpointedoutthatseparateServiceswouldassisttheoversightprocess.


5.4 FindingsThePanelfindsthatthe:a) AmalgamationofNIAandSASSintotheSSAwasinbreachoftheWhitePaper

onIntelligenceand,atthevery least,shouldhavebeenprecededbyasimilarpolicy process as was involved in the original White Paper, includingconsultationsinParliamentandwiththepublic.

b) Initial establishment of SSA through presidential proclamation was irregulardue to the Constitutional requirement that the President can only establishintelligenceservicesthroughlegislation.

c) Statedintentionofamalgamatingthepreviousserviceswasnotachievedand,infact,creatednewandmoreseriousproblems,including,interalia:• seriousdisruptionof the functions,efficiencyandoperationsof the two

previousservices• excessiveconcentrationofpower• anunwieldlyhierarchy• anexcessivetop-heavinessofmanagement• alackofproperfocusonforeignintelligence• duplicationofcertainfunctionssuchasanalysis• dislocationofpersonnel

d) That the changeof name fromNational IntelligenceAgency to State SecurityAgency was in breach of the human security philosophy of our democraticintelligencedispensationcontainedintheConstitutionandtheWhitePaper.

5.5 RecommendationsThePanelrecommendsthat:

a) TheSSAshouldbeseparatedintoaforeignserviceandadomesticservicebutthistimewithmaximumindependenceofeach,withtheminimumofsharedservicesbetweenthemifatall.

b) The NCC, as a capacity that is supposed to focus exclusively on foreignsignals intelligence, be located inside the foreign service at least as aninterimmeasure.

c) TheOICshouldbegivenindependentorganisationalstatusasoutlinedinChapter 6 of RICA and should be capacitated to receive andmanage itsbudget independently of the SSA. The OIC should revert to its pre-SSAreporting structure and the Director of theOIC should have full controlandaccountabilityovertheresourcesoftheOIC.

d) The President establish a task team, consisting of expertise within andoutsidetheSSA,toexploreindetailthepracticalandotherimplicationsof


there-separationoftheservicesandotherpossiblearchitecturalchanges.e) Any process of major changes to the SSA be thoroughly consulted and

change-managedwithAgencystaffatalllevels.f) Thetitles‘StateSecurityAgency’and‘Minister/MinistryofStateSecurity’

bechangedtoreflectthedeterminationtoreturntheroleandphilosophyofourdemocraticintelligencecapacitybacktotheirConstitutionalorigins.


6 Structure

FocusArea:Theappropriatenessofthecurrentstructureoftheagencytoitscoremandatesandtoeffectivecommand,controlandaccountability

6.1 TheIssueOver the years since 1995, there have been numerous structural changes to thecivilianintelligencecommunity,thelargestbeingtheamalgamationofSASSandNIAintotheSSAdealtwithinthepreviouschapterand,morerecently,theintroductionof the Strategic Development Plan (SDP) in 2017 and its reversal by the currentMinister in 2018. Are these frequent and sometimes drastic structural changesnecessaryandlogical?

6.2 SummaryofInputsIn the early stages of its work, the Panel received extensive briefings from thedifferent arms of the SSA and related entities on their respective structures andfunctions in presentational and documentary form. Of particular relevance andinteresttoitsworkwerethefollowingadditionalsubmissions:

6.2.1.1 StructuralEvolutionoftheCivilianIntelligenceCommunity6.2.1.2 ImplementationoftheStrategicDevelopmentPlan20356.2.1.3 InterviewwithformerSSADG6.2.1.4 InterviewwithStaffCouncil

6.3 Discussion

6.3.1 TheStructuralEvolutionoftheCivilianIntelligenceServices

The general trend in the civilian intelligence community over the years since1994hasbeenanexponential growthand ‘seniorisation’of structures. In fact,thishasbeenatrendinmuchofthepublicserviceinthedemocraticyears.Thefollowingstatisticsareofinterestinthisrespect:

• 1994–NIS4–1DG,1DDGand7ChiefDirectors(CDs)• 1995–NIAandSASS–2DGs,2DDGs,8CDs• 2001–NIAandSASS–2DGs,4DDGs,19CDs• 2008–NIA,SASS,NCC5,SANAI6,OIC7–2DGs,9DDGs,29CDs

4NationalIntelligenceService5NationalCommunicationsCentre


• 2009–SSA–3DGs,12DDGs,38CDs• 2016–SSA–3DGs,7DDGs,30CDs

In addition, the Panel took note that the structural evolution of the civilianintelligencestructuresovertheyearsreflectedagradualandrelativelydramaticexpansionofthespananddepthofmanagementandcontrolovertheyearsand,in the case of the SSA, the huge concentration of power and managementresponsibilityintheDG.ItmaybeinterestingtocomparethemanagementspanoftheoldNIS,asingleservicewithbothaforeignanddomesticmandate,whichwasfacingamajorsecuritythreatfrominsideandoutsidethecountry,withthatofthecurrentSSAwhichfacesnoseriousthreattotheconstitutionalorder.TheDGofNISoversawsevenchiefdirectorateswiththehelpofoneDDG.TheSSADG has overall responsibility for two directors, seven DDGs and 30 chiefdirectorates.

6.3.2 StrategicDevelopmentPlan

Following a change in SSA DG on 26th September 2016, the Agency launchedwhatwascalledthe ‘StrategicDevelopmentProject’on17thOctober2016.Theplanarising from thisprojectwasapprovedby the thenMinisteron9thMarch2017withtheintentionthat itshouldbeimplementedinthe2017/18financialyear.

Theprojectwasanambitiousand far-reachingattempt to foresee the stateofthecountry, thethreats itmight faceandtherequiredSSAcapacitytocounterthese by 2035. The project involved a scenario planning exercise, identifyingvariouspossiblescenarios for thecountryby2035,basedontheoutcomethattheNDPenvisions,andthenspeltoutthevisionforthestructureandfunctioningoftheSSAby2035withvariousmilestonesalongtheway.

The effect of the proposed structure for the SSA by 2035would be to slightlyreduce the high-level management of the SSA to 1 DG, 7 DDGs and 27 chiefdirectors(fromthecurrent3DGs,7DDGsand30CDs).Themaineffectistodoaway with the two posts of Director: Foreign Branch and Director: DomesticBranchbothatdirector-general level. ThenumberofDDGsand chiefdirectorsremainsmoreorlessthesame.OneeffectofremovingthetwoDirectorswouldbe that Section 4 of the National Strategic Intelligence Act would have to beamendedasthesetwopostsarelegislatedasbeingpartoftheNICOCPrincipals.Interestingly, a new programme is introduced – Strategic Risk Analysis andManagement.TheSDPdocumentdescribesthisfunctionasfollows:

Strategic Risk Management is a key function that indicate [sic] thepotential pitfalls in delivery. Analysing and tracking strategic risk

6SouthAfricanNationalAcademyofIntelligence7OfficeofInterceptionCentres


management inOoS 8 isakey indicator topotential threats.Asa riskmanagement capacity of government, SSA will be tracking andanalysing strategic risks in all OoS with the view of projecting theirimpactonnationalsecurity.MonitoringandTrackingofStrategicRiskswillbeundertakenatanational,provincialandlocalgovernmentlevels.In addition this process will also be undertaken for State OwnedCompanies thus the function will be organised into these categoriesallowingforspecialisation.

Theadditionofthisfunctionaddsanimmenseandoverarchingresponsibilitytothe SSA’smandatewhich is not envisaged in the founding philosophy or evencurrent legislation for the civilian intelligence community. Further, the SDPenvisions the SSA housing and having access to all government departments’databases.It is worth quoting one section from the submission to the thenMinister[emphasesareours]:

The SDP projects an SSA in 2035 whose operations are completelycovert.Inadditiontocollectionofintelligence,thecovercapacitiesofSSAwill conduct influencing operations and generate revenues. Theofficial operational SSA capacity will be responsible for operationalcoordination and standard setting. SSA Analysis capacity will beintegratedandreflectiveofallsourcesofinformation.SSAoperationswill be supported by cutting edge technologies. The SSA will becapacitated by the bestminds,whopossess technical competencies,occupationally relevant personality attributes and are multi-lingual.The organisational design will be lean and mean focused onfacilitatingeffectivedelivery.

Afewpointsintheaboveneedfurtherengagement:

• Completely CovertOperations:What thismeans in practice is that all the

operationsoftheSSA,bothdomesticandforeign,willbecarriedoutthroughcover companies or organisations set up by the SSA, rather than throughofficial SSA structures. SSA staffwill beemployedby these companiesandthenecessary assets (fixedandmovable)will bepurchasedandownedbythese coverentities.Given theabuse that thePanelhas found (dealtwithlater in the report) of the bypassing of proper financial and procurementcontrolsinthecomparativelysmallcoverstructuresofthecurrentSSA,themoving of the whole of SSA operations into covert mode opens up thepossibilityofevenmoreabuse.ItalsoraisesthequestionofhowthismyriadofcoverentitieswillbeeffectivelymanagedbytheSSAmanagement,giventheir physical and institutional separation from the central command and

8OrgansofState


controlstructuresoftheAgency.• Influencing:Thenotionofintelligenceservicesplayinganinfluencingroleis

atrickyone.Yes,ontheforeignterrain,intelligenceservicesdoplayaroleintryingtoinfluencethepoliciesandactionsofothergovernments inpursuitoftheirownnationalinterests.Sometimesthisisrelativelybenign,muchthesameastheroleofdiplomats.Butsometimesitinvolvesrecruitingagentsofinfluenceingovernmentstopushtheirinterestsandagenda.Thisistrickieronthedomesticterrain,exceptperhapsinextremecasesoforganisedcrimeor severe anti-constitutional activitieswhere agents of influencemight beinfiltratedintocrimesyndicates,terroristorganisationsetcinordernotjusttogather intelligence,butalso to try topreventormitigate theactionsofsuchentities.

• Revenue Generation: It is concerning that the SSA envisages its coverentities having a revenue-generation role, presumably to ‘top up’ therevenue it gets from the fiscus. This opens up the Agency to many risks,including abuse of such revenue, failure to declare it to the fiscus and, ofcourse,thatsomeorallofthesecoverentitiesmightgivemoreattentiontogenerating profit than to the intelligence functions they are supposed toperform.

• Lean andMean Organisational Design: It is clear from the proposed SSAstructure that itwill beanythingbut leanandmean,andeven less so if itfurtherconsistsofahostofcoverentitiesdomesticallyandinternationally.

One aspect of the SDP that arouses concern is that it appears to completelyignoretheroleofNICOCinprovidingintelligenceestimatesandassessmentstogovernmentbycollatingtheinformationfromalltheintelligenceservicesaswellasothergovernmentdepartmentsandexternalexperts.The implicationof theSDP is that the SSA seems to abrogate this role largely to itself. There is nomentionofNICOCinitsthinking.9The SDP also recommends an interim structure for the Agency to beimplemented in the 2017/18 financial year. This comprises eight programmes(i.e. 8 DDGs) – Research Development and Analysis, Domestic Operations,Foreign Operations, Counter Intelligence, Technical Operations, Strategic RiskAnalysis and Management, Intelligence Academy and Corporate Services. Theonlydifferencewiththeproposed2035structureappearstobethatforeignanddomestic operations remain separated into two branches, while in the 2035structuretheybothfallunderoneOperationsbranch.With the ministerial approval of the SDP in March 2017, this structure wasimplemented, resulting in a number of posts beingmade redundant and theirincumbentsredeployed,putinlowerpositionsorforcedout.AformermemberoftheSSAexecutivedescribesitasfollows:

9SeethelaterchapteroncoordinationforthePanel’sviewontheroleandplaceofNICOC


WhileIwaspursuingtheimplementationofthecorrectivemeasures10,Iwasmaderedundant throughtheStrategicDevelopmentPlanprocessat the end of March 2017. This is the so-called 'Vision 2035' thatpurported to take the SSA to the future. Although I had misgivingsabouttheSDP,inparticularitscompliancewiththeGeneralIntelligenceLawsAmendmentAct I had toput the interest of the serviceand thecountryabovemyown.Afterall, Iwasassured that theMinisterandPresident endorsed the Plan. The SDP, rather than promoting greaterintegration, coordination and effectiveness, actually aggravated thesituation.

ThethenDGadmittedtothePanelthathewasthe‘sponsoroftheSDP’.WhenquestionedaboutthedisplacementsandothernegativeimplicationsoftheSDPthat resulted from the restructuring, he accepted that ‘in retrospect, I can seethedamagethatwasdoneintheimplementationofSDP’.Leaders of the Staff Council expressed to the Panel that at the time of SDPrestructuring ‘therewas serious fighting’between theStaffCouncilon theonehandand theDGandMinisteron theother.Theyexpressed theviewthat theSDPwas‘imposed’onthem,inspiteofthethenDG’sassertionthattheSDPwasaconsultativeprocess.When the current Minister came into office in 2018, she instructed that theAgency go back to the pre-SDP structure. This caused further confusion anddislocationofpersonnelwhohad recentlybeenappointed toposts in the SDPstructure,albeitmanyoftheminactingcapacities.

6.4 FindingsThePanelfindsthat:a) Asper itsfindingsinthepreviouschapter,theamalgamationofNIAandSASS

into the SSA did not achieve the purported intention of rationalisation andsavingofresources.

b) The structure of SSA is unwieldly, top heavy and has a span and depth ofcommandand control that gives thedirector-general excessivepoweron theonehandandmakeseffectivemanagementdifficultontheother.

c) Thecivilianintelligencecommunityneedsgenuinely‘leanandmean’structureswith focused mandates and priorities as part of an overall re-design of theintelligenceandsecuritycommunity.

d) WhiletherecanbesomeappreciationfortheSSA’sattempttoenvisionalong-termfutureforthecountryandtheAgencyinitsStrategicDevelopmentPlan,the plan itself is out of tunewith the philosophy, and does not complywith

10MeasurestoreininSpecialOperations


policyandlegislationgoverningtheintelligencecommunity,andthat:• TheintentiontomakealloperationsoftheSSAcovertisnotdesirable• The intention tousecover structures for revenuegenerationshouldnot

beallowed• TheintentiontohouseallgovernmentdatabasesintheSSAisimpractical

andundesirable.

6.5 RecommendationsThePanelrecommendsthat:a) The pre-SDP structure should be immediately formally re-instituted and that

necessaryappointmentsbemadeto injectstabilityandpurpose intotheAgencyandthat,asfaraspossible,suchappointmentsshouldnotbeinactingcapacities.

b) No further restructuring of the Agency should take place until the restructuringtaskteamrecommendedinthepreviouschapterhascompleteditswork.

c) ManagementandstaffdisplacedbytheSDPprocessshouldbeurgentlyreinstatedorotherwisegainfullydeployed,and,wherenecessary,providedwithre-training.

d) Theoneormore intelligenceservicesarising fromthepossibleoutcomesof thisreview should go back to the ‘leanness’ and ‘meanness’ of the earlier days ofcivilianintelligence.


7 Mandate and Capacity

FocusArea:Themandateand capacityof theSSAand toexamine the compatibilityof itsstructureinrelationtothismandate

7.1 TheIssueAs outlined in the previous chapter, the SSA has become a large and unwieldlystructureandhasexperiencedarangeofchallengessincetheamalgamationofSASSand NIA and the other entities into it. The mandate of the SSA and its relatedresponsibilitiesaresetdown in legislation.But is theSSAcapacitatedto fulfil theseresponsibilitiesprofessionallyandisitoptimallyorganisedtodoso?

7.2 SummaryofInputsThe mandate of the SSA is drawn from the legislation, in particular, the NationalStrategic IntelligenceActof1994asamended.Further, thePanelreceivedbriefingsandpresentationsfromalloftherelevantstructuresoftheSSA,assessedsomeofitsintelligenceproducts,consideredtheviewsofpreviouscommissionsandtaskteams,andengagedmanyofthemembersandmanagementonthecapacitychallengestheyface.ThePanel also received submissions fromsome individual SSAmembers thatdealtwith capacity and related issues. It should benoted that,while the Panel receivedmanyinputsonthevariouscapacitiesandchallengesoftheAgency, itdidnothavethetimenoropportunitytovisitsomeoftheseforon-siteassessment.Thisappliesparticularlytothetechnologicalcapacities.

7.3 Discussion

7.3.1 Mandate

ThemandateoftheSSAistakenfromtheNationalStrategic IntelligenceActof1994asamended,inparticular,bytheGILAAthatformalisedtheestablishmentoftheSSA.Section2ofthisActsetsoutthefunctionsoftheAgencyasfollows:

(a) to gather, correlate, evaluate and analyse domestic and foreignintelligence(excludingforeignmilitaryintelligence),inorderto—


(i) identifyanythreatorpotentialthreattonationalsecurity;

(ii) supplyintelligenceregardinganysuchthreattoNICOC;

(b) to fulfil the national counter-intelligence responsibilities and for this

purposetoconductandco-ordinatecounter-intelligenceandtogather,correlate, evaluate, analyse and interpret information regardingcounter-intelligenceinorderto–

(i) identify any threat or potential threat to the security of theRepublicoritspeople;

(ii) informthePresidentofanysuchthreat;(iii) supply(wherenecessary)intelligencerelatingtoanysuchthreat

to the South African Police Service for the purposes ofinvestigatinganyoffenceorallegedoffence;

(iv) supplyintelligencerelatingtoanysuchthreattotheDepartmentofHomeAffairsforthepurposeoffulfilmentofanyimmigrationfunction;and

(ivA) supply intelligence relating to any such threat to any otherdepartment of State for the purposes of fulfilment of itsdepartmentalfunctions;and

(v) supply intelligence relating to national strategic intelligence toNicoc;and

(c) to gather departmental intelligence at the request of any interested

department of State, and, without delay to evaluate and transmit suchintelligenceandanyother intelligenceatthedisposalof theAgencyandwhichconstitutesdepartmentalintelligence,tothedepartmentconcernedandtoNICOC.

Further, in terms of section 2(b), in the prescribed manner, and in regard tocommunicationsandcryptography–

(i) to identify, protect and secure critical electronic communications andinfrastructure against unauthorised access or technical, electronic or anyotherrelatedthreats;

(ii) to provide cryptographic and verification services for electroniccommunicationssecuritysystems,productsandservicesusedbyorgansofstate;

(iii) to provide and coordinate research and development with regard toelectroniccommunicationssecuritysystems,productsandservicesandanyotherrelatedservices;

Inaddition,theActsetsouttheAgency’sroleinVetting.


Section2Aprovidesthatavetting investigationbeconducted intheprescribedmanner to determine the security competence of a person if such a person –(a) isemployedbyorisanapplicanttoanorganofstate;or(b) isrenderingaserviceorhasgivennoticeof intentiontorenderaserviceto

anorganofstate,whichservicemay–

(i) givehimorheraccesstoclassifiedinformationandintelligenceinthepossessionoftheorganofstate;or

(ii) givehimorheraccess toareasdesignatednationalkeypoints intermsoftheNationalKeyPointsAct,1980(ActNo.102of1980);

7.3.2 Capacity

ThePanelwasnotinapositiontoassessthecapacitiesoftheAgencyinrelationto its range of responsibilities as outlined in legislation nor to interact in anysignificantwaywithitsclientsexceptthosethatareinternaltothecommunity.However,thePanelidentifiedsixareasofcapacityconcernfromtheinformationavailabletoit.

• ProvincialOffices• ForeignStations• IntelligenceProducts• Vetting• Analysis• Technology

7.3.3 ProvincialOffices

ThePanelmetallnineprovincialheads.Anumberofcommonconcernsarose:• Some provinces experienced either distrust from provincial governments

or attempts by the government or governing party to involve them inpoliticalissues.

• Somemanagementpostswerenotfilled,andmanywerefilledwithactingappointments.

• Thehighcostofrentingofficesasopposedtopurchasing.Thereweresomeprovincialmanagerswhomotivatedforworkingthrough‘virtualoffices’.

• One unanimous complaint was the lack of response from head office totheirintelligenceorotherreports,particularlyalackoffeedbackorfurthertaskingfromtheheadofficeanalysisarms.


7.3.4 ForeignStations

ThePanelwasonly able tomeetone recent SSAHeadof Stationbut engagedwith themanagement of the Foreign Branch and others with insight into thechallenges.Keyamongthesechallengesare:• There are huge weaknesses in the process of selecting members for

placementabroad.• Therearealsocomplaintsoffavouritismintheplacingofmembersabroad.• Concernwasalsoexpressedaboutthe lackofresponsesfromheadoffice

tointelligenceandotherreports.• Thereweremoreor less consistent complaints that theamalgamationof

SASSintotheSSAhadreducedfocusonforeignintelligence.

7.3.5 IntelligenceProducts

The Panel did not have an opportunity to extensively assess intelligenceproducts, except for recent National Intelligence Estimates (NIE), which arecommunity-wide products produced through NICOC, and a few SSA products.However, through the NIEs seen, the few SSA products seen and theobservations of a number of clients, ministers and personnel of the SSA orrelated entities, the Panel was given the impression that the quality of theintelligenceproductsoftheSSAhaddeterioratedinrecentyears.

7.3.6 Vetting

The security vetting of government officials and others by the SSA (andpreviously NIA) has been a problematic area for some time. The followingobservationswerenotedbythePanel:

• Therecontinuestobeahugebacklogofoutstandingvettingrequestsand

routine vetting investigations. This has caused extreme frustration fromgovernmentdepartmentsatnational,provincialandlocallevelsaswellasstate-ownedenterprises(SOEs).

• TheSSAappearstohavegone‘overthetop’intermsoftheentitieswhosemembers it believes should be vetted. One example of this is the SouthAfrican Broadcasting Corporation (SABC). The Panel struggled tounderstand why members of a national broadcaster should be securitycleared outside of the standard integrity checking steps of normalrecruitmentprocesses.WewerealsotoldthattheSSAwasvettingpublichealthdoctors.

• In the early tomid-2000s, the former NIA had instituted an initiative toplace vetting officers in key government departments to manage and


coordinatethevettingofmembersofthosedepartmentsandthusassistinbringing down the backlog. This appears to have been discontinued inSSA’stime.

• In the early 2000s, the thenNIAwas introduced to an electronic vettingsystembyanexternalIntelligenceSecurityServicethatallowedthebulkofvetting processes to be handled electronically and thus automated. Thesystem would allow applicants for security clearance to applyelectronically. The system would then automatically check a range ofrelevantdatabases (inourcase, forexample,HomeAffairs,SAPScriminalrecords, perhaps credit checks etc.) plus intelligence records.At least forclearancestoConfidential level, therewouldbenoneedto interviewtheapplicant(unlesstherewereconcernsthatarosefromelectronicchecking),thus saving many person-hours in the vetting process. In addition, thesystem automated all the information into an in-house database, thusreducingadministrationtimeandpaperwork.ThePanelwasshockedto findthat,about15years later, thesystemhadonly been advanced to the stage of a database for entering vettinginformation, but that the ability for applicants to apply online and foronline access to the relevant databases had still not been implemented,thus requiring the continued effort and person-hours in conducting alllevelsofvetting.TheSSAvettingofficersinterviewedbythePanelblamedthisonlackofresources.

• ThePanelwasinformedthattheformerSASS,whengiventhemandatetoconduct itsown internalvetting,had introducedavettingpanel thathadcollectively assessed the results of a vetting process. It seems that thispracticewasnotcarriedoverintoSSA,leavingdecisionstoindividualsandtheirchainofcommand.

7.3.7 Analysis

ThePanelwasmadeawareofanumberofchallengesrelatingtoResearchandAnalysisintheSSA:

• As mentioned earlier in the report, both provincial and foreign offices

complainedaboutthelackofresponsefromAnalysistotheirreports.Onemanager in Analysis told the Panel that this was an organisation-widesystemicproblem.

• Althoughoneof the intentionsof thecreationof theSSAoutofNIAandSASSwas toachieve integrationof foreignanddomestic intelligence, thedomesticand foreignbranchanalysis functions remainedseparateand, itappears,therewaslittlecross-pollinationbetweenthem.Theintentionofthe SDPwas to change this by putting them under one deputy director-general, although still creating separate chief directorates for ‘Thematic


Analysis’ and ‘Geographic Analysis’. The lack of integration of analysis inthe SSA was a commonly expressed concern to the Panel. Further, theapprovalandimplementationoftheSDPin2017anditssuspensionbythecurrentMinisterin2018,createdmuchconfusion.

• ThePanelwas told that there is a ceilingon theoccupational levels thatanalysts in the provincial offices can reach without being transferred toheadoffice.

7.4 FindingsThePanelfindsasfollows:• OnMandate:

a) Themandate of the SSA as reflected in legislation, aswell as in the SSA’sinterpretationofthismandate,isexcessivelybroadandopen.

b) TheroleenvisagedfortheSSAintheSDPis inbreachoftheconstitutionalandpolicyphilosophiesandvaluesofSouthAfrica’sdemocraticintelligencedispensation and, to the extent that this plan still reflects attitudes in theSSAtoitsmandate,isofseriousconcern.

• OnCapacity:c) TheintelligencecollectingcapacitiesoftheSSAin itsprovincialandforeign

offices are seriously under-resourced in terms of quality and quantity ofpersonnel,aswellasintermsoffinancialandotherresources.

d) The interrelation between the collecting and analysis arms of the SSA isseriouslydysfunctionalintermsoftaskingtooperationalarms,responsestooperations’reportsandotherrespects.

e) The general sense of SSA products is that their quality has declined overtime.

f) ThescopeandpraxisoftheSSA’svettingmandateisoverlybroadandthatno effective measures have been taken for over 15 years to address thelegacychallengesofthebacklogofvettingapplications.

g) TheanalysisfunctionsoftheSSAhavebecomeworryinglydisorganisedovertimeduetofrequentrestructuringandtherehasbeenafailuretoproperlyachievetheanalyticalsynergybetweentheforeignanddomesticbranches.

• OnStructuralCompatibilitywithMandate:h) As noted in the previous chapter, the SSA is an unwieldly structure and

frequent restructuring and leadership changes have made its structureunsuitableforeventhebroadmandateithasgivenitself.


7.5 RecommendationsThePanelrecommendsthat:a) As part of the community-wide architectural and legislative review

recommendedearlier,seriousattentionbegiventoclearerandmorefocuseddefinitionsofthemandate/sofanyresultingservice/s.

b) Asamatterofurgency,theleadershipoftheSSAtakemeasurestoaddressthecapacitygapsintermsofpeople,financialandotherresourcesinitsprovincialandforeignoffices.

c) The SSA institute clear processes of interaction between its analysis andcollectingarmsandensuretheseareeffectivelyimplemented.

d) AnintensiveevaluationofthequalityoftheSSA’sintelligenceproductsthroughassessmentof theproducts themselves and the surveyingof a sampleof theAgency’sclientsbeconducted.

e) An urgent policy review of the Agency’s security vetting mandate beundertaken to consider the scope and reach of that mandate and to clearlyidentify the division between the normal probity checks of existing andprospectivestateemployeestobeundertakenbytheemployingdepartmentsand themore focused security competency vetting to be undertaken by theSSA.

f) TheSSAshould,asamatterofextremeurgency,resourceandgiveprioritytothefurtherdevelopmentandupgradingoftheelectronicvettingsystemto itsfullintendedfunctionality.


8 Controls

FocusArea:Theeffectivenessofcontrolstoensureaccountabilityon,interalia:

• OperationalDirectives;• FinancialAccounting;• Professionalism;• Non-partisanship;• CodeofConduct;and• ServiceLevelAgreements

8.1 TheIssueOneofthemainraisonsd’être fortheappointmentofthisReviewPanel lies inthequestionastowhethertheabusesthattheSSAisaccusedofarearesultofalackofsufficient controls in andon theAgency and/orwhether the controls that doexisthavebeeneffectiveincurbingabusesor,infact,havebeenadequatelyapplied.

8.2 SummaryofInputsAlmostallthedocumentaryandverbalinformationprovidedtothePaneltouched,inonewayoranother,ontheissueofcontrols.Manyaspectsofthisaredealtwithinother chapters of this report. Key among the inputs, inter alia, are the followingdocuments:

• Legislation,RegulationsandDirectives• SSAFinancialStatements• AGReports• ReportsonSO• InternalandIGIinvestigationreportsonthePAN• BenchmarkReportontheAuditoftheSouthAfricanIntelligenceCommunity• MatthewsCommissionReport• 2006ReportoftheLegislativeReviewTaskTeam• SpecialReportof the LegislativeReviewTaskTeamon theSuperintendence

and Oversight of the Conceptualisation, Planning and Execution of PoliticalIntelligence

ThePanelengaged,interalia,withthefollowing:

• AGSA• DGofNationalTreasury


• Former and currentChief FinancialOfficer (CFO)of SSAand its predecessorservices

• ActingSARSCommissioner• IGI• MembersoftheSSAfinanceteam• ThePANinvestigationsteam• ManagementandmembersinvolvedinSO

8.3 Discussion

8.3.1 General

TheissueoftheeffectivenessofcontrolsontheSSAisanall-encompassingoneincluding the highest level of controls such as political and parliamentaryoversight; IGI oversight; constitutional, legislative and prescriptive controls,procedural controls and the various levels of leadership, management andsupervisorycontrol.AnumberoftheseelementsofcontroloftheSSAaredealtwithinotherchaptersofthisreport.11AkeyissueforthePanelwastowhatextentpapercontrols–thatis,thevariousprescripts committed to writing – are, in themselves, the key mechanism forcontrol? Throughout this report, the Panel has found that the major factorleadingtotheabusesidentifiedhas,infact,beentheconsistentfailuretocomplywiththeseprescripts–rightfromtheloftyheightsoftheConstitutionitselfdownintotheSSAdirectivesandevenjustplaincommonsenseandmoralrectitude.Thus,controlisperhapsnotsomuchabouttheprescriptsputinplace,butaboutthepeoplerequiredtocomplywiththem–inotherwords,aboutintegrity.Butisintegrityaqualityoneisbornwithorisitlearnt?Perhapsthetruthissimplythat,if there are no consequences for a lack of integrity, there is no compunction.Self-disciplinethrivesinanatmosphereofdiscipline.

8.3.2 ThePrescripts

Chapter2ofthisreportdealsindetailwithPoliciesandPrescripts.ItmakesthepointthatitwasnotpartofthePanel’smandatetoconductadetailedreviewofallpolicies, legislationandotherprescripts.Themainfinding inthatChapter is,indeed, that the problem was not so much with the prescripts but with theblatantdisregardforthem.InthissectionthePanelwouldliketoflagafewissuesonthecontrolsrelatingtotheauthorisationofoperations,andparticularlythosethatinvadeprivacy.

11SeeChapters2,8,9and12.


In 2005, the then Minister of Intelligence appointed a task team to reviewintelligence legislation and other prescripts. At the time, there was publiccontroversy surrounding thehoaxemails saga, the surveillanceof aprominentbusinessman and a supposedly political intelligence project of the then NIA.ThesewerethesubjectofinvestigationbytheIGIatthetime.Inlightofthis,theMinister at the time instructed the legislative review task team to urgentlyprovidehimwithaseparatereportonthegovernanceofpoliticalintelligencebythe then NIA. Although that report was intended to look at so-called politicalintelligence,itsrecommendationsseemtoremainlargelyapropos:1. That the Minister for Intelligence Services issues a Regulation –

probably under the National Strategic Intelligence Act on theCoordination of Intelligence as an Activity – which achieves thefollowing:a. Regulates the National Intelligence Priority-setting system as

containedinthe2005NIE,namely:i. Thatthesystembandprioritiesaccordingtothelevelofthreat

against national security and interest, and that each banddetermines the extent of resources and the intelligencecollectiontechniquesappliedtoeachofthepriorities.

ii. ThattheServicesareobligedtoapplytheNationalIntelligencePriorities as approved by Cabinet in determining their ownprioritiesandintheiroperationalplanning.

iii. ThatasystemofmonitoringthedeliveryoftheServicesontheNationalIntelligencePrioritiesbeinstituted.

b. Obliges the Services to prepare each year an operational planbased on the National Intelligence Priorities that sets out thetargets and operational techniques to be applied to each targetandsubmitsuchplanforMinisterialapproval.Thiswouldineffectprovide a general Ministerial pre-approval for the conduct ofintrusiveintelligenceoperationsagainstgenerictargets.

c. Requires the Services to consult the Minister where intelligenceoperations or monitoring reveal the need to conduct intrusiveoperationsthatcarryahighriskofpoliticalembarrassmenttotheGovernment.

d. MandatestheHeadsofServicestoissuedirectivesfortheconductofintelligenceoperationsthat:i. Determine specific internal processes for priority-setting and

targetingarisingoutoftheNationalIntelligencePrioritiesii. Specify the criteria to be applied in authorising the use of

intrusiveintelligencetechniquesiii. Outline the levels of authority required to authorise such

intrusive operations, dependent on the levels of risk ofcompromiseinvolved.

iv. Determinethe levelofsupervisionof theconductofhigh-riskintelligenceoperationsandthesystemofsuchsupervision.


v. Specify the procedures to be followed in authorising specificmethodsofintrusiveintelligencecollection.

vi. Determine the requirement and procedure for discardingincidental information collected during intrusive operationsunlesssuchinformationindicatesanewthreat.

vii. Detailsthesystemofrecord-keepingofallprocesses involvedinauthorisingandmanagingintrusiveintelligenceoperations.

viii. Obligates the Services to establish internal mechanisms formonitoringcompliancewiththesedirectivesanddealingwithfailuresofcompliance.

e. Empowers theMinister to institute a community-wide system ofmonitoringofcompliancewiththeRegulation.

2. ThattheMinisterforIntelligenceServicesinitiatesanengagementwith

the Inspector-General for Intelligence Services and the Joint StandingCommitteeonIntelligencetoensuremoreeffectiveroutineandadhocmonitoring of compliance with Ministerial and Service prescriptsgoverningtheconductofintelligenceoperations.

3. That theMinister for IntelligenceServices, togetherwith theHeadsofServices and the SANAI, institute a programme of education in theServices on the need for constitutionality, legality, accountability,integrityandprofessionalismintheconductof intelligenceoperationsaswellasan intensive internal communicationprogramme to informallmembersof the serviceson the regulatory changes recommendedabove,oncetheyareinstituted.

Theaboverecommendations,althoughperhapsslightlydated,gelwithmanyoftheobservationsandfindingsofthePanelbutthePanelunderstandsthatthesehave been unevenly implemented. If they had been fully implemented (andcompliedwith)at the time, theymaywellhaveprevented theabuses that theSSAhasbeensubjectedto.Whileanadaptationoftheserecommendationsmaystillberelevantinpreventingfutureabuses,thesamedocumentalsomakesthepointthatthesuccessofthemeasuresitrecommendsstillultimatelyrestsontheintegrityofthepeopleimplementingandoverseeingthem.The Panel also discussed various other elements of tightening up controls,particularly over the utilisation of intrusivemethods of intelligence collection.TheseincludedtheeffectivenessofthecurrentsystemofobtainingauthorityforinterceptingcommunicationsintermsofRICA,thepossibilityofjudicialauthoritybeingrequiredforsurveillance, infiltrationandotherintrusivemethods,judicialauthorisationfortheconductofsignals intelligenceontheinternationalterrainandothers.These issues are the subject of some controversy and a ‘tug-of-war’ betweenintelligence practitioners and human rights advocates around the world.However, the general trend seems to be in the direction of more stringent


controls(andoversight)overintrusiveintelligencetechniquesthatareotherwisein breach of human rights in general and invasion of privacy in particular. ThePanelhasdonesomeinternationalbenchmarkinginthisrespectbutfeelsmoreworkmayneedtobedoneonthis.Afewexamples:

• In Country A, specially designated judges in the Federal Court approvewarrantstoconductelectronicandotherformsofsurveillance(althoughthisdoesnotcurrentlyextendtosignalsintelligence).

• Country B includes two types of warrants for otherwise unlawfulactivities. Type 1 intelligence warrants authorise illegal activities inrelation to citizensorpermanent residents and requirebothministerialand judicial authorisation by a Chief Commissioner of IntelligenceWarrants (a retired judge), while type 2 intelligencewarrants (‘used incircumstances where a type 1 warrant is not required’ – presumablyagainstforeigners)mustbeapprovedbytheMinisteronly.

• CountryChasrecentlyestablishedanInvestigatoryPowersCommission,consisting of a commissioner and a number of other judicialcommissioners who hold or have held high judicial office. They areappointed for a period of three years by the Prime Minister onrecommendation of the country’s most senior judicial officers and areresponsible for keeping under review (by way of audit, inspection andinvestigation) the exercise by public authorities of various intrusivepowers, including communication interception, metadata access andretention, equipment interference and covert and human intelligencesources.

Whatever intensificationofcontrolsof intrusiveoperationsmaybeconsidered,thereisalsotheargumentofnotdisempoweringintelligenceservicesfromtheirability to collect intelligence on legitimate targets who themselves operate insecret.

8.3.3 FinancialControls

AkeyconcernforthePanelhasbeenthefailuretoimplementfinancialcontrolsin the SSA. In particular, this applies to the failures in the adherence tooperationaldirectivesandespeciallythosewhichapplytospecialoperations.A key element of this is the fact that most of the operational financialtransactionsof theAgencyaredonebymeansof cash. This is tohide the factthattheoriginsofthepaymentsaretheSSA.Thiswould,interalia,applytothepayment of sources, purchases of certain fixed and moveable assets, runningcosts of cover entities etc. This fact is a major vulnerability in the system offinancialcontrolsgiventhat,often,proofofthelegitimatedisbursementofsuchcash payments has to avoid revealing the identity of the recipient or that,indeed,theintendedrecipientreceivedthefunds.


ThissystemofcashdisbursementsishandledthroughwhatarecalledTemporaryAdvances(TA).HowthesystemissupposedtoworkisthatamemberappliesfortheTAonthebasisofanapprovedsubmission.ThatmemberisthenrequiredtoaccountfortheexpenditureofthatTAandreturnanyunusedamount.ThereissupposedtobearulethatsaysthatamembermaynotreceiveasecondTAuntilheorshehasreconciledthepreviousone.Notwithstanding these control measures, it became clear to the Panel that apractice has developed in which members are able to acquire subsequenttemporaryadvances,evenwhenthepreviousoneshavenotbeensettled.Intheoperationalenvironment,someoftheseadvancessometimesrunintomillionsofRand. This has led to a situation inwhich certainmembers have accumulatedseveral advances that they have not accounted for. However, the Panel wasinformed that where steps are taken to recoup the funds through deductionsmade against salaries, the amounts can be too large to be realistically settledovertime.Furthermore,thePanelwasmadeawareofanumberofmemberssoaffectedwhohave left theAgencybefore theywereable to settle thebalanceandarethusowinglargesumsofmoney,whichtheyareunlikelytoeverbeabletopayback.In addition, the temporary advance system does not guarantee that the cashleaving the agency is indeed paid as intended to the ultimate recipient. Ofconcern to the Panel is that the consequence management in many of thesematters has been completely absent or inadequate. Often sanctions involverepaymentofpocketedmoneythroughsalarydeductionswithnoconsequenceforthecriminalactoftheftofstatefunds.ThePanelnotedthatthere isa finelinebetweensuchlossesincurredbeingadministrativeorcriminal.

ThePanelreceivedbriefingsonthetheftofoverR17millionfromasafe insidetheSSAcomplexinDecember2015.Inspiteofvideofootageoftheperpetratorsand the outcome of internal investigations, there appears to have been noconsequencemanagement for this incident.Ofparticular concern is the reportthePanelreceivedthattheHeadoftheDPCI(‘Hawks’)atthetimefailedtotaketheinvestigationoftheburglarytoitslogicalconclusion.

One of the key challenges of the SSA lies in its planning processes and thebudgeting process arising out of them. The Panel was provided withdocumentation and heard evidence from numerous members about strategicandoperationalplanningdeficiencieswithintheSSA.OverthepastdecadeorsotheAgencyhasbeenrivenbyaseriesofseniormanagementchangesandeachtime such changes occur, the strategic and operational plans that had beendevelopedwereeitheradjustedorreplacedbyanewsetofplans.ThishashadadeeplydamagingimpactontheSSA’sabilitytoplanandseethroughthoseplanstofruition.AconsequencehasalsobeenthatbudgetplanningwithintheSSAhassufferedandhasbecomenothingmore thananannual allocationwitha smallpercentage increase.TheAGhasregularly raisedtheconcernthat thereseems


nottohavebeenaseriousattemptintheSSAtodefinestrategicprogrammesoridentify clear,measurable targets and indicators. Neither have the plans beenunderpinnedbyarationalallocationofbudgetaryresources.OneofthekeycontrolweaknessesasfarasfinancialmanagementintheSSAisconcerned lies in the factof aperceived (perhaps falsely) impermeableborderbetweenthe‘covert’SSAandthe‘open’SSA.FromevidenceheardbythePanel,itseemseventheCFOoftheSSAisrestrictedintermsofinformationheorshecan obtain from the covert structures and, in many cases, is not taken intoconfidence. In fact, the Panel heard of incidents where serious tensions andconflict arose between the CFO and operational management when the CFOtriedtoimposebasicfinancialandbudgetarymanagementcontrolsonthem.Itsurprised the Panel that a CFO of an intelligence agency should have anyrestrictionontheinformationsheorheisentitledtoandthecontrolssheorhecaneffectivelyimpose.ItseemsthateventheIGIhas,dejure,moreentitlementtoaccessthantheCFOhasdefacto.RelatedtothisistheissueoftheAG’sinabilitytoeffectivelyauditalloftheSSA’sfinancial, procurement and performance activities. TheAGwas interviewed bythePaneltoprovideitwithaperspectiveontheauditprocessinvolvingtheSSA.The AG conducts an annual audit of the SSA in terms of the Public Audit Act(PAA),No25of2004asisthecasewithallnationaldepartments.TheAGSAnoted,however,thateveryyearheisforcedtoautomaticallyprovideaqualifiedauditoftheSSA.• Firstly,thisisbecauseheisnotprovidedwithaccesstoinformationtoallow

himtoverifythefinancesandassetsoftheSSA.• Secondly, he is not able to determine the extent to which performance

targetshavebeenmet.• ThissituationpertainsnotwithstandingattemptsbytheAGSAandtheSSAto

developmechanismstoenableathoroughauditprocesstobeconducted.In addition, the AG has regularly made findings on the internal controlenvironment.Inhisreportonthe2017/18financialyear,henotedforexample:• Lack of consequence management and not holding staff accountable for

poorqualityoffinancialandperformancereporting;• Inadequate internal review processes bymanagement leading tomaterial

misstatementsasrequiredinsection40(1)(a)and(b)ofthePublicFinanceManagementAct(PFMA);

• Non-compliancewithsupplychainprocessesgoingunnoticed;• Absence of approved standard operating procedures to guide collection

collation verification, storing and reporting of actual performanceinformation;

• Numeroussenioractingpositionshavecreatedinstability,whichresultedindelaysintheauditofperformancemanagement;andthe

• LackofmonitoringandimplementationplansbytheAccountingOfficerandseniormanagementtoaddresskeycontroldeficiencies.


TheAG’sReportalsocomplainedabouttheincompleteassessmentoftheusefullifeofassetswhichhaverecurredyear-after-yearasaresultofinformationbeingwithheld.WhilethisisassumedtobebecausetheSSAisreluctanttodisclosethisinformationbecauseofthecovertnatureoftheassets,itcouldalsobebecausetheAgencyisintentonhidingindicationsofseriousmanagementweaknesses.ThePanel recognised that theAG, as a resultof limitedaccess to information,couldonlyprovideaqualifiedauditandnorcouldhepublishhisannualReport.Thisisamatterofgreatconcern.

8.3.4 PAN

ThePanelwaspresentedwith the resultsof several investigations into the so-called PANwhich the Agency (NIA at the time) had implemented over severalyearsuntil2011,whenitwassuspended.The implementation of a principal agent network is accepted practice inintelligenceagencies.Inessence,itisamethodof‘forcemultiplication’inwhichprincipal agents are recruited outside the Agencywho in turn are trained andcapacitated to recruit and handle sources and agents in or close to targets oflegitimate interest to the Agency. This is primarily a HUMINT (humanintelligence) collection initiative. However, it appeared to the Panel that PANevolved into a methodology designed to avoid or bypass the proceduralrequirementsforrecruitmentofstaff,disbursementoffundsandprocurement.Asanexample,thePanelbecameawarethatonepersonwasrecruitedintothePANtoprovideanalysissupport.Theanalysisfunctiondoesandshouldresideinthe Agency itself and be conducted by full-time employees of the Agency andshouldbethecapacitythatreceivesintelligencefromPANagents.Ananalystisnot aprincipal agent. Therewereplentyofotherexamplesofbreachesof theprincipal agent network concept. Indeed, apart from this, the PAN Project hasgained notoriety for alleged wide-ranging illegality which has led to severalinvestigationsaswellasseepedintothemediainrecenttimes.Several investigationshavebeenconductedintothisprojectbyinternalAgencyinvestigators, aswell as two investigationswhichwere conductedby theOIGI.ThePanelheard theviewsof severalpersons involved in the investigations,aswellasthoseoftheIG.ThePanelnoted that thenatureof theaccusationsand theevidencecollectedduring the various investigations painted a disturbing picture. Allegations ofmalfeasance, procedural transgressions and criminal behaviour were placedbefore thePanel. These ranged fromaccusations that individualmembers hadnotadhered, forexample, toproperprocurementprocesses; signed fraudulent


contractsormadepayments topersonswithout contractshavingbeen signed;the employment of family members and close associates outside of formalprocesses; procurement of assets without adherence to formal procedures;abuseofassets;missingfunds;missingassetsandseveralothermatters.In his interactions with the Panel, a former member of top managementconfirmedtheappointmentofhissonasanemployeeofawarehousethatwasafrontcompanyfortheSSA.HealsoconfirmedinitiatingtheemploymentofthewifeoftheManageroftheCoverSupportUnit(CSU).ItappearedtothePaneltherehadbeeninstancesofseriouscriminalbehaviourwhichhadtakenplaceundertheguiseofconductingcovertworkandthatthisbehaviourmayhaveinvolvedtheft,forgeryanduttering,fraud,corruption,andeven bordered on organised crime and transgressions of the Prevention ofOrganisedCrimeAct(POCA).ThePanelwasconcernedwhetherthereportingrequirementswerefollowedbythe responsible individuals in management when the allegations werediscovered.This includes reportingof fruitlessandwastefulexpenditure to theNational Treasury in terms of the PFMA and to SAPS under section 34 of thePreventionandCombattingofCorruptionAct(PRECCA).

Of particular concern for the Panel was that, apart from suspending theprogramme in 2011, it appears that no formal action or consequencemanagementhastakenplacebytheExecutiveortheAgencymanagement.TheabsenceofconsequencemanagementhasbecomeathemerunningthroughouttheAgencyoverseveralyears.ThePanelreceivedreportsthatmembersoftheAgency’sinternalinvestigationsteamintothePANprojecthadbeensubjecttovariousformsofintimidationandsomehadtheirofficesbrokeninto.

TheProjecthashadotherconsequenceswhichseemnottohavebeenaddressedwith the seriousnesswarranted.One such is the largenumberof claimsmadeagainst the Agency and the Minister by former PAN members involvingallegations of breaches of contract by the Agency. These have amounted tohundredsofmillionsofRands.

8.3.5 SpecialOperations

ThereportdealsinChapter8inmoredetailwiththeSSA’sSOunitintermsofitsserious breaches of the Constitution, legislation and other prescripts, mainlyrelated to the politicisation and factionalisation of intelligence as well asexecutiveoverreach. It justneedstobenotedherethatSObecamealawuntoitself,particularlyintermsoftheutilisationof,andaccountingfor,SSAfundsanditsveryexistenceandfunctioningwasaprimeexampleofthedevastatingimpact


ofalackofcontrolsandthecrudeevasionofexistingcontrols.8.3.6 ToSeeorNottoSee

One of the key challenges for intelligence services, the governments and thepublicsthattheyserve,isagreeingontheappropriatebalanceforthoseservicesbetweensecrecyandtransparency.One of the common ‘wisdoms’ in the thinking about intelligence (amongpractitioners themselves) is that 90per centof intelligence information comesfrom open sources and 10 per cent from secret sources (the figures differslightly, depending on who you are talking to). This ‘wisdom’ is basically aninjunctionnottousecovertandintrusivemethodstocollectinformationthatisopenly available. It is perhaps necessary to define ‘open’ here. Apart from itsusualmeaningofopensourcemediaetc,intheintelligenceworld,theyalsotalkof‘grey’informationsources.Greysourcesarereallythosesourcesthatarenotsecretorcovertbutarenotgenerallypublicinthesamewaythatthemediaare– academic research, subscription databases, government reports anddatabases,interviewswithexpertsetc.One of the challenges for intelligence services is that their client – thegovernment – also has access to open sources and, through its engagementswith its counterparts in the international arena, for instance, often has moreinsights and knowledge than the intelligence services themselves. For thisreason, intelligence services tend to talk about providing ‘unique’ rather thanjust ‘secret’ intelligence. Providing unique intelligence could, in some cases,simplymeanprovidingsecretinformationthatwouldnototherwisebeavailabletoaclient,ororganising,processingandpackagingarangeofsecret,openandgrey sources of information to produce intelligence that again would notnormallybeavailabletotheclient.The reality is, however, that intelligence services are designed and organisedprimarilyforthecollectionofsecretintelligence.Otherwise,wewouldnotneedthem.The restof it– the90percent– is, inessence, theback-officework. Insimple terms, the focus of intelligence work should be on those (legitimatelyauthorised) threats and targets who themselves operate in secret – terroristgroups,crimesyndicates,corruptnetworks,etc.Arisingoutofthisreality isthesimpletruththat,forthesakeofthesuccessofintelligence operations against such targets or threats, for the safety of theservice’s operatives and sources, there needs to be an element of secrecysurroundingtheworkofan intelligenceservice.Thepurposeofsuchsecrecy isnot (or should not be) to keep such information from the public but from the(legitimate) adversariesof the service and, of course, information that goes tothepublicgoestotheadversaries(throughtheirownopensourcecollection).Thepoint isthatthebalancebetweensecrecyandtransparencyshouldrevolve


aroundthequestion:whatisitthatweabsolutelydonotwantouradversariestoknow? Our sources, our methods, our technologies, our information aboutthem?Whatelse?Thosemembers of the Panel who previously served in senior positions in theintelligence services prior to 2009, remarked how, when they visited theircounterparts abroad (often in countries that could be considered as majoradversaries who were conducting espionage against South Africa) the twoservices would get to know each other’s leaders and sometimes more juniorofficers,wouldshareeachother’sorganisationalstructuresand,ofcourse,oftenshare intelligence. Of course, these exchanges were ‘secret’, but the questionremains–ifwearewillingtosharesuchinformationwiththeseadversaries,howmuchofitshouldbekeptfromthepublic?Thedownsideoflegitimatesecrecyshouldbeclearfrommuchofthisreport–itprovides opportunity for bypassing necessary accountability, controls,supervisionandoversight.Thecorollary–themorethetransparency,thelessofsuchopportunity.The South African intelligence community has erred on the side of excessivesecrecy and this can largely explain the various formsofmalfeasance that thisreport(andothersbeforeit)haveidentified.

8.4 FindingsThePanelfindsasfollows:

a) Whiletherecanbeimprovementstotheprescriptsandotherwrittencontrolmeasures,therealproblemintheperiodunderreviewhasbeenthealmostcomplete disregard for, and non-compliance with, the existing controls, insomecasesconstitutingcriminality.

b) Inrespectoftheabove,therehasbeen,asfarasthePanelcoulddetermine,almostnoconsequencemanagementforthesebreachesofcontrols.

c) Adherence to control measures is primarily about the integrity of thepersonnelrequiredtoapplythem.Integritycanonlythriveinanatmosphereofintegrity.Consequencemanagementisakeytooltoensurethis.

d) There has been unevenness in the application or implementation of therecommendations of earlier review processes regarding improving thecontrols over authorisations of intrusive collection methods, largely due toleadership and management changes, as well as an apparent negativeattitudetowardspreviousexecutiveandmanagementleadership.

e) Thereisaneedtoreviewthelegislativeandothercontrolsandmechanismsfor the authorisation of intrusive methods of collection beyondcommunications interception, raids and searches, basedon an internationalbenchmarkingwithconsiderationforSouthAfricanconditionsandhistory.


f) Therehavebeenpervasiveand seriousbreachesof financial controls in theAgencyinvolving,insomecases,seriouscriminality.

g) The excessive use of cash transactions in the Agency undermines effectivefinancialcontrols.

h) The temporary advance system in the Agency is also a serious vulnerabilityandhasnotbeenstrictlyapplied,resultingincriticalfinanciallosses.

i) ThereisanabsenceofeffectiveplanningandbudgetingintheAgency.j) The inability of the AG to properly audit the Agency’s finances is a major

concernandneedstobeurgentlyaddressed.k) The apparent division between the so-called ‘open’ and ‘covert’ sections of

theAgencyneeds tobeaddressedwithparticularattention to theabilityofthose charged with managing and overseeing financial, procurement andhumanresourceprocessestodosowithouthindrance.

l) While the initial conceptof aPrincipalAgentNetworkwas valid, the realityprovedthatthePANbecameinfactanattempttobypassnormalcontrolandaccountability mechanisms and processes and was an attempt to applyexcessiveutilisationofcoverstructuresandpersonnelbeyondthelegitimateneeds of the Agency, and that this created serious malfeasance includingcriminality.

m) TherewasanalmosttotalbreachingoffinancialandothercontrolsbytheSOunitresultinginexcessiveexpenditureand,insomecases,criminality.

n) There is an overemphasis on secrecy in the Agency that needs to berebalancedagainsttransparencyandaccountability.

o) The Security Services Special Account Act No. 81 of 1969 and the SecretServicesAct,No.56of1978areapartheid-erapiecesoflegislationdesignedatthetimetofacilitatetheregime’ssecretoperationssuchassanctions-busting,assassinations, propaganda etc and have no place in our constitutionaldemocracy and are a key factor in facilitating the avoidance of financialcontrolsandaccountability.

8.5 RecommendationsThePanelrecommendsasfollows:

a) Urgently institute forensic and other investigations by the competentauthorities into the breaches of financial and other controls identified bysome of the information available to the Panel and other investigations,especially with regard to the PAN project and SO, leading to disciplinaryand/orcriminalprosecutions.

b) The task team recommended earlier to review legislation and prescriptsrelating to intelligence should include in their work a review of existinglegislativeandother controlsgoverning theconductof intrusiveoperations,includingbenchmarkingwithotherappropriatejurisdictions.


c) Inthemeantime,theministriesofStateSecurityandJusticeshouldurgentlyattend to the strengthening of the capacity of the judicial authorityestablishedintermsofRICAandexpeditingthereviewoftheRICAlegislation.

d) The Ministry and the SSA should urgently conduct research to look intoalternativepaymentmethodstocashthatprovidethenecessaryprotectionofsensitiveinformation, includingbenchmarkingagainstthepracticeofforeignintelligence services to determine how tominimise the use of cash and toidentifysecurenon-cashmethodsforthemakingofpayments.

e) The Agency should immediately ensure that the rules governing thetemporary advance systemare tightenedup and consistently implemented,includingintroducingauditablemethodsforaccountingfortheexpenditureofsuchadvances,andshouldensurethereareroutineandvisibleconsequencesforbreachesofsuchrulesandprocesses.

f) TheAgencyshouldinstitutedisciplinaryproceedingsagainstallthosefoundtohave abused the temporary advances system and, where applicable, torecovermoniesresultingfromsuchabuses.

g) Asamatterofurgency,theMinistryandtheAgencyshouldreviewtheSSA’sannualplanningprocessanditsrelationtothebudgetingprocessthatensuresclear accountability and manageability of budgeting, expenditure andperformance against planning priorities and targets that are shareablewiththeAG,theJSCIandotherrelevantoversightbodies.

h) The Ministry and Agency should urgently find with the AG an acceptablemethodfortheunfetteredauditingoftheAgency’sfinancesincludingcovertfinances that leads to the absence of the standard qualification in theAgency’sannualaudits.

i) The Agency should institute measures to ensure a seamless interactionbetween the administrative (Finance, Procurement, Human Resources) andthe operational arms of the Agency as concerns the accountability andcomplianceoftheoperationalarms,ensuring,inparticular,thattheAgency’sCFO has the same access to information as the DGandIG.

j) TheMinistryshouldestablishataskteamcomprisedofrepresentativesoftheAgency,retiredpractitioners,thelegalprofessionandcivilsocietytodevelopapolicydocumentonachievinganappropriatebalancebetweensecrecyandtransparency for the intelligence services, drawing on internationalcomparisons, that leads practically to the development of appropriateprescriptsandpractices.Suchaprocessshoulddrawonpreviousreviewsandcommissions.

k) TheMinistryshouldinitiateaprocesstogetherwiththeministriesofFinance,DefenceandPolicetoexploretheoptionsandconsequencesforrepealingtheSecurityServicesSpecialAccountActNo.81of1969andtheSecretServicesAct,No.56of1978anddesignaprocesstowardsthatend.Intheinterim,asrecommended in Chapter 2, the Council established by this legislation isactivatedandfunctioning.


9 The Executive

Focus Area: The involvement of members of the national executive in intelligenceoperationsandmeasurestopreventthis.Thepolicyframework(includinglegislation)thatgovernsoperationalactivitiesconductedbymembersofthenationalexecutive.

9.1 TheIssueIn a democratic dispensation such as our own, there should be a clear separationbetween the role,powersand functionsofan intelligenceserviceand thoseof theresponsible political executive/s. In the Panel’s Terms of Reference, concern wasexpressedthatthisboundaryhadbeenbreachedinnumerousways,particularlywithregardtothepoliticalexecutive’sdirectinvolvementinintelligenceoperations.Furthertothis,varioussubmissionstothePanelcalledintoquestiontheneedforaMinisterofIntelligence/StateSecurity.

9.2 SummaryofInputsThePanelreceivednumerousbriefingsandconductedmanyinterviewsthattouchedon this issue, including from the IG, five former and current ministers ofintelligence/statesecurityaswellasformerSOoperatives, leadersandmembersoftheAgencyandothers.Inaddition, thePanel reviewedrelevant legislativeprescripts, investigationreports,reportsfromSOandotherdocuments.

9.3 Discussion

9.3.1 General

Democraticgovernancerequiresthepublicservice,includingintelligenceservicedepartments,toservethepoliciesandplansofthedulyelectedgoverningpartyas promised by it to the electorate. However, this requirement of intelligencedepartments in a democracy needs a professional and ‘dispassionate’intelligence service able to serve the legitimate intelligence needs of thegovernmentofthedayand,ofcourse,agovernmentofthedaythatunderstandsandrespectsthis,inprincipleandinpractice.Such an approach would allow the relevant political authority to convey thegovernment’s intelligence requirements to the service, appraise the service’s


deliveryontheseandgenerallyoverseetheefficacyandefficiencyoftheserviceand its compliancewithpolicy, legislativeandotherprescripts.Ultimately, it isthesepoliticalauthoritieswhoareaccountabletotheelectoratethatputthemintopower.Thisissueisnotjustrelevanttotheintelligenceservices.Chapter13onBuildingaCapable andDevelopmental State of theNationalDevelopmentPlan (NDP)12makesasimilarpointforthewholeofthepublicservice:

Althoughpublic servantswork for elected leaders, their role is non-partisanandthepotentialtoforgeacollectiveprofessionalidentityaspublicservantsrequiresthatthisdistinctioniskeptclear.

Oneof thebiggestdangers to thisdelicatebalancebetweenpolitical authorityand functional authorityover intelligence services is the impositionbypoliticalauthorityoftheprovisionofintelligencethatservesitsnarrowpoliticalneeds.Inourowncircumstances,there isoftentherequirementfrompoliticiansoftheirintelligenceservicetofindadversarialscapegoatsfortheirownfailures.

9.3.2 LegislativeProvisions

Sections 209 and 210 of the Constitution specify, inter alia, that only thePresident can establish an intelligence service (other than the intelligencedivisionsofthepoliceanddefenceforce)andthatthismustbedoneintermsofnational legislation.Also, that thePresidentmust ‘appointapersonasheadofeach intelligenceserviceandmusteitherassumepolitical responsibility for thecontrol and direction of those services, or designate a member of cabinet toassumethatresponsibility’.[Ouremphasis]TheIntelligenceServicesActandotherrelevantlegislationgiveextensivepowerstothedulydesignatedministeroverthemanagementoftheservice/s,includingpowerstocreatestructuresandpostsintheservice/s,makeappointments,issueregulationsetc.Section12oftheIntelligenceServicesActreads:

12GeneralpowersofMinister(1) The Minister may, subject to this Act, do or cause to be done allthingswhicharenecessaryfortheefficientsuperintendence,controlandfunctioningoftheAgency.…(2)Withoutderogatingfromthegeneralityofhisorherpowersintermsof subsection (1), and notwithstanding anything to the contrarycontainedinanyotherlaw,theMinistermay-

12NationalDevelopmentPlan–OurFuture–MakeitWork


(a) acquire any immovable property, with or without any buildingsthereon which is necessary for the efficient functioning of the Agencyand,subjecttosection70ofthePublicFinanceManagementAct,1999(Act 1 of 1999), supply guarantees, indemnities and securities for thatpurpose;…(aA)erectormaintainbuildingsonthepropertysoacquired;…(b) sell orotherwisedisposeof immovablepropertywhich isno longerrequiredforanypurposecontemplatedinparagraph(a);(c) acquire, hire or utilise any movable property and any otherequipmentwhichmaybenecessary for the efficient functioningof theAgency;…(d)sell,letorotherwisedisposeofanythingcontemplatedinparagraph(c),whichisnolongerrequiredforthesaidpurposes.

[Ouremphasis]

ItistruethattheMinisterhasthepowertodelegatemanyofthesefunctionstotheDGandbelowand,infact,hasdoneso.Ofconcern,however,isthatmanyofthese legislatedpowers seem to cut through thenecessaryboundarybetweenpolitical and administrativemanagement and that their delegation downwardsmaybeatthewhimofaparticularminister.

9.3.3 TheMinisterial–AccountingOfficerInterface

ThecleardelineationoftheboundarybetweenministerialandDGfunctionsandresponsibilities is not a problem unique to the intelligence service in SouthAfrica. This has long been a bone of contention in the post-apartheidadministration in the whole of the public service and has been subject of anumberofreviewsandprocesses, includingthroughtheNationalDevelopmentPlan.The provenance of this challenge goes back to the early days of democraticgovernance when it was required of ministers to drive and ensure policy,demographic and functional transformation of the departments they largelyinherited fromtheapartheiddispensation.Thus,ministersweregiven (throughthe Public Service Act and other prescripts) extensive powers over theadministration of their departments, including extensive powers over humanresourceprocesses.ThePFMA,ontheotherhand,madeaccountingofficersfullyresponsible (and accountable) for the efficient management of theirdepartments.AsnotedintheNDP:

Following the end of apartheid, there was good reason to givepolitical principals wide-ranging influence over the public service to


promoterapidtransformationofapublicservicethathadpreviouslyrepresentedaminorityofthepopulation.

Whilethisisaproblemthroughoutthepublicadministrationandhasoftenledtotherapidturnoverofdirectors-general,itshouldbeofparticularconcernfortheintelligence departments as it opens them up to political interference withadministrativeprocessesandthusdefeatstheidealofaprofessionalservicewithan appropriate remove from day to day politics. This danger also includes thepossibilityofpresidential interference in theadministrationandconductof theintelligenceservices.

9.3.4 PoliticisationofIntelligence

In unpacking itsmandate and Terms of Reference, the key question the Panelagreed it needed to find answers towas: ‘What the hell happened?’ In otherwords,whatwerethekeyfactorsthatledtothesituationthatnecessitatedtheappointment of this Panel? Invariably, the most common answer the Panelreceived when it put this question to many interviewees was the increasingpoliticisationoftheintelligenceandsecuritycommunityingeneral,andtheSSAinparticular,overthepastdecadeormore.Theterm‘politicisation’canbemisleading.Itisusedhereinaspecificcontext.Asstated above, it is a normal democratic governance requirement that anintelligenceserviceshoulddutifullyservethelegitimatepoliciesandplansofthedulyelectedgovernmentoftheday.Butthishastobedistinguishedfromsuchservicesservingthepoliticalinterestsofapoliticalparty,quaparty,oroffactionsofsuchparties,orthepoliticalinterestsandaspirationsofindividualpoliticians,evenwhen(perhaps,especiallywhen)suchpoliticiansoccupypositionsofformalauthorityovertheservice.Anybreachoftheseprinciplesultimatelydestroystheintegrityofanintelligenceservice andundermines the valueof its intelligenceproducts to the legitimateneeds of the government. And, this is precisely what has happened to SouthAfrica’scivilianintelligencecommunity(andalsotoPoliceintelligence)overthepast 10 to 13 years. It has become extensively embroiled in the politics andfactionalismoftherulingparty.Thebeginningofthiswasevidenced,forexample,inthehoaxemailsagaof2005whenthethenNIA,orelementswithinit,providedfalseintelligencepurportingtheexistenceofemailsandchatgroupsthatsoughttoproveaconspiracyagainstthethendeputypresident. Inspiteofan investigation intothisby thethen IGIthatprovedtheemailsetctobefabricated,theveracityoftheIGI’sfindingswerethemselveschallengedbytheJSCIandwithintheANCitself.But, this factionalisationof intelligencehadbecomeparticularlymarked in theperiod since 2009. This viewwas expressed bymany of the interlocutorswho


appearedbeforethePanelandbydocumentaryevidenceavailabletothePanel.In theviewof thePanel thepoliticisationand factionalisationof intelligence isthemainanswertothequestion‘Whatthehellhappened?’In its interviewswith formermembers of the SSA topmanagement, the Panelheard that a report was submitted to the then Minister about the emerginginfluenceofacertainfamilyovergovernmentofficialsandthethenasathreattonational security. In response to growing concerns about the influence of thatfamily,domesticoperationsundertookaninvestigationintothem.Accordingtothe Minister at the time, he was unhappy with how the investigation wasconducted.Asaresultofthisinvestigation,theformerpresidentwasadvisedtoreconsiderhisrelationshipwiththefamilybecauseitmaydamagehisreputation.AccordingtotheformermembersoftheSSAtopmanagement,thisreportwassuppressedandinpartledtoachangeofleadershipwithintheSSA.One of the things that surprised the Panel was that the revised Oath ofAllegiance thatSSAmembersareexpected to take requiresmembers to swearallegiancetotheConstitution,thelawsofthecountryANDthePresident.Italsorequiresthemto‘recognisetheauthorityoftheMinisterofStateSecurity’.Themore recent intensification of the factionalisation of the SSA in particularwasprimarilyevidencedforthePanelinthepresentationsandinterviewsonthefunctioningoftheSOunitoftheSSAfromabout2011onwards.

9.3.5 SpecialOperationsAccordingtoinformationprovidedtothePanel,aSOunitwasfirstsetupinthethenNIAinoraround1997,wassubsequentlyshutdown(datenotknown)andre-openedagaininoraround2002/03and,apparently,carriedoverintotheSSA.ThenotionofaSOunit in intelligence,militaryandpolice services isnotatallunusual.Normallyitentailsunitswhoworkunderdeepercoverthanotherunitsof a service and who work on particularly sensitive operations againstparticularlyserioustargetsorissues,andusuallyatanationallevel.Membersofsuchunitsaresupposedtobehighlytrainedandparticularlycompetent. Inthecase of NIA and SSA, such a unit would be based at head office andwork onnationalprojectsofparticularseriousnessthatcannotbeassignedtoaprovincialorotherstructure.ThePanelprobedrelativelydeeplyandwidelyintotheissueofSO.Towardstheendofitsdeliberations,itreceivedabriefingfromtheOIGIonaninvestigationitis currently conducting into SO that it hopes to conclude by the end of thecurrent financial year. The Panel will make recommendations regarding thisbelow.Forthepurposesofthischapterofourreport,wehighlightkeyelementsofwhatwaspresentedtothePanelonSO,particularly inrelationtothenakedpoliticisationofintelligenceinrecentyears.


ThePanelwasabletoidentifythekeyplayerinthepoliticisationofSOandtheSSAingeneral(thememberiscurrentlyservinggovernmentinaseniorcapacity).According to reports, he was ‘deployed’ to SSA by the then President via theMinister at the time to head up the SO chief directorate. Thiswas in spite ofallegations that he left his previous employ under a cloud of corruptionallegations. According to his CV, themember served in the ANC undergroundstructuresandDepartmentof IntelligenceandSecurity.ThePanelneedstoputon record that thismemberwas themost recalcitrant and evasive ‘witness’ ithadencounteredinallitsinterviews.Heinvokedthe‘needtoknowprinciple’towithhold information – particularly with regard to his interaction with theExecutive–fromthePanel.It iscleartothePanelthattheSSA’sSOunit,especiallyunderthewatchofthemembermentionedabove,wasalawuntoitselfanddirectlyservedthepoliticalinterestsoftheExecutive. Italsoundertook intelligenceoperationswhichwereclearly unconstitutional and illegal. Information made available to the Panelindicatedthattheseoperationsincluded,interalia:

• ThetrainingofundercoveragentsinVIPprotectionandassigningsomeofthese to provide protection to the then President, aswell as to otherswhowerenotentitledtosuchprotection,suchastheformerChairpersonoftheSouthAfricanAirways(SAA)Board;theformerNationalDirectorofPublicProsecutions(NDPP);theANCYouthLeague(ANCYL)PresidentandformerActingHeadof theDepartmentof PriorityCrimes Investigations(DPCI-theHawks).VIPprotectionisamandateoftheSAPSand,althoughthePanelisawareofinitiativessomeyearsagototrytomakethisathenNIAresponsibility,thisdidnothappen.

• Infiltratingandinfluencingthemediainorder,apparently,tocounterbadpublicityforthecountry,thethenpresidentandtheSSA.

• ThePanelalsoheardtestimonyandwasprovidedwithlegalpapersaboutaunionthatwasestablishedwiththesupportoftheSOUnitoftheSSA(theWorkers’AssociationUnion)ostensiblytoneutralisetheinstabilityintheplatinumbelt.ThePanelalsoheardtestimonyfromtheIGIabouttheSSA having put under surveillance unions thatwere critical of the thenPresident.

• Intervention in the #FeesMustFall protests to influence the direction ofthe studentmovementwhichwas justified as supporting ‘young brightminds’tobepatrioticandtobestrategicallydeployedtoinstitutecountermeasuresandensurestabilityandpeaceinuniversities.

These are just some of the SO projects that the Panelwasmade aware of. Inaddition, the Panel was given access to a document which was purportedly areporttothethenDGontheSOunit’s‘achievements’inthe2016/17year:

• During the 2016 ANC January 8 statement in Rustenburg, the unit


‘initiated 3 countering operations to impede the distribution of CR17regalia,impedetransportationsystemofdissidentgroupsfromGP…’

• DuringtheFebruary2016StateoftheNationAddresstheunitwas‘ableto infiltrate and penetrate the leadership structure’ of the movementagainstthethenPresident.Indicationswerethatmorethan5000peoplewouldembarkonparliament,butwithefficientandeffectivecounteringactions, and the dissemination of “disinformation” to supporters, onlyapproximately50anti-presidentsupportersattendedthemarch.’

• During the ANC’s manifesto launch in Port Elizabeth in 2016, the unit‘initiatedamediacampaigntoprovidepositivemediafeedbackthroughtheplacementofyouthsofvariousethnicgroups inphotographicvision[sic] of media personnel, thereby promoting social cohesion.’ [Ouremphasis]

The report ‘boasts’ of various other similar operations, including that ‘Activemonitoringof theSouthAfricaFirst,Right toKnow,SAVESA,CASACandGreenPeacewasdoneduetothepenetrationabilityofthegroup.’It is clear from the above information and other information available to thePanel that SO had largely become a parallel intelligence structure serving afactionoftherulingpartyand,inparticular,thepersonalpoliticalinterestsofthesitting president of the party and country. This is in direct breach of theConstitution, the White Paper, the relevant legislation and plain goodgovernmentintelligencefunctioning.

9.3.6 ExecutiveInvolvementinOperations

Althoughthefocusareaofthischapterisindeedontheinvolvementofmembersof the executive in intelligence operations, we have gone to some length todiscuss the politicisation of the SSA and the activities of its SO arm, as theseissuesrelatedirectlytotheextentofexecutiveoverspillinthelastdecadeorso.There was more than enough information before the Panel that the thenMinister, in particular, involved himself directly in operations. The Panelinterviewed one member of SSA who had previously served in the Minister’sofficeduringhistimeasMinisterofStateSecurity,whoconfirmedtothePanelthathehad,fromtimetotime,beenaskedbyamemberofSOtopassparcelscontainingcashtotheMinister.One concern that was brought to the Panel’s attention by a number of itsinterlocutorswastheextenttowhichmembersoftheExecutivewereabletobemanipulatedbyinformationpeddlers.Informationpeddlershavebeenabaneofthe SouthAfrican intelligence community since thedawnof democracy. Theseare people, often with an apartheid security background, who approachpoliticiansandsecurityserviceswithapparently‘juicy’information.Theyusuallyknowwell what these politicians and serviceswant to believe and thus tailor


theirinformationtotheseneeds.Therehavebeennumerousexamplesofthisinthedemocraticyears–the‘MeiringReport’,the‘VAGReport’,the‘BrowseMoleReport’ and many others. We were informed that the then Minister, inparticular,wassusceptibletosuchpeddlers.OnepersontoldthePanel, infact,thatallormostofSOs’sourceswerepeddlers.AnotherconcernbroughttothePanel’sattentionwasthattheannualNIEhadinrecent years been presented to Cabinet by theMinister of State Security. Theinvolvement ofministers of intelligence/state security and sometimes defenceandpolice inthepreparationoftheNIE isa long-standingproblemdatingbackbefore the period being specifically reviewed by the Panel. In the view of thePanel,this isanotherfactorthatmuddiestheboundarybetweenexecutiveandintelligencedepartmentfunctions.This isparticularlysoiftherelevantministerpresentstheNIEtoCabinethimorherself.The power to appoint a Head of Service lies with the President while theMinister, in consultationwith thePresident,appointsdeputydirectors-general.In the period being reviewed by the Panel, the president and minister haveplayed key parts in deploying ‘their people’ into the SSA. This makes theappointees beholden to the appointers and this is particularly damagingwhentheintelligenceserviceisaspoliticisedastheSSAhasbecome.OnthisissuetheNDPargues:

InSouthAfrica,thecurrentapproachtoappointmentsblursthelinesof accountability. The requirement for Cabinet to approve theappointmentofheadsofdepartmentmakes itunclearwhethertheyare accountable to theirminister, to Cabinet or to the ruling party.Wheretheministermakesappointmentsbelowthe levelofdirector-general, it becomes unclear whether these officials report to thedirectorgeneralortotheminister.Thismakesitdifficultfordirectors-general to carry out their day-to-day responsibilities in running thedepartment.Reformsareneededtoensurethatdirectors-generalareaccountable to their minister, and that departmental staff areaccountabletotheirdirector-general.

TheNDPgoesontomakerecommendationsaboutchangingthewaydirectors-generalareappointed:

Fortopappointments,therecruitmentsystemneedstobecapableofensuring that a political principal has confidence in his/her head ofdepartment,thatheadsofdepartmenthavethenecessaryexperienceandexpertise,andthattheappointmentisseentobefairandbasedonmerit.Toachievethisbalance,theplanproposesahybridmodelsimilar to that used in Belgium. A selection panel convened by thechair of the PSC and the administrative head of the public servicewoulddrawupashortlistofsuitablecandidatesforseniorposts,from


which the political principal would select a candidate. This allowsindependent oversight to ensure that candidates are suitablyqualified, while also ensuring that the final selection is compatiblewiththeprioritiesofthepoliticalprincipal.

Itshouldnotbedifficulttoadaptthisapproachtotheappointmentofaheadofintelligenceservice.Thereisnoreasonfortheappointmentofsuchapersontobesecret.

9.3.7 ToMinisterorNottoMinisterA number of people who appeared before the Panel raised the question ofwhetherSouthAfrica shouldhaveaMinisterof Intelligence/StateSecurity.Wehasten to state that this matter does not arise from the specific problemsidentifiedabove.Ithasbeenadebateatleastsincethesecondhalfofthe1990s.As mentioned above, the Constitution provides for the President to assumepoliticalresponsibilityforthecivilianintelligenceservicesortodelegatethistoamemberofCabinet.TheprovenanceofaministerforintelligenceinSouthAfricagoesbacktotheearlyyearsofdemocracywhenthelateJoeNhlanhla(formerlyhead of the ANC’s Department of Intelligence and Security) was initiallyappointedDeputyMinisterforIntelligenceundertheJusticeMinistryandlaterasfullMinisterforIntelligence.Thereasoningbehindthiswastheneedforapolicymaker to drive and oversee the transformation of civilian intelligence on thebasisoftheconstitutionalprinciples,theWhitePaperandlegislation,aswellasonthepolicyandplanningrequirementsofthenewdemocraticgovernment.Butitwasalsoarealitythatthetwonewintelligenceservices–NIAandSASS–having been forced to develop their capacities on the physical and otherlogistical infrastructureinheritedfromtheNIS,wereinasense‘joinedtogetheratthehip’,makingasingleministrylogical.The question needs to be asked whether the original need for a minister tooversee and drive transformation of the civilian services still remains. But it isalsonecessarytoaskwhetheraministryofintelligenceorstatesecuritydoesnotfurtheraggravatetheissueofover-centralisationofintelligencepowerasraisedearlier in this report, whether over one service such as the SSA or over twoseparatedomesticandforeignservices.HoweveritalsoneedstobekeptinmindthattheroleofsuchaMinisteraddsafurtherelementofoversightandcontrol.This issuewould need to be carefully considered as part of the review of thearchitectureofthewholeofthesecuritycommunityandgovernment.

9.4 FindingsInmakingitsfindinginthischapterinparticular,thePaneloncemorestressesthatit


wasnotaninvestigationtaskteam,althoughitwasoftentemptedtobecomeoneinthelightoftheextremelyconcerninginformationputbeforeitinthetopicscoveredby this chapter. These findings, therefore, are at a high level and further downrecommendationsaremadetotakethesefindingsfurther.ThePanelfindsasfollows:

a) Thecurrent legislativeprovisions regarding the roleof theMinisterof StateSecurityvis-à-visthedepartmentitselfgivetoomuchscopeforaMinistertointerfereintheadministrationandoperationsofthedepartment.

b) Therehasbeenanextremelyseriouspoliticisationandfactionalisationofthecivilian intelligence community, and thishasworsened since the creationoftheSSA.

c) ThemanipulationoftheSSAforfactionalpurposeshasemergedfromthetop– the Presidency – through the Ministry of State Security and into themanagementandstaffoftheSSA.

d) The failure of the Executive to heed the intelligence warning about thethreatsposedby the influenceof a certain familyover governmentofficialsand especially the former president, has cost the country dearly. However,the failure of the SSA to address state capture could not be considered asignificantintelligencefailure,astheMinisteratthetimewasmadeawareofthethreatandfailedtoactontheintelligencethatwasathisdisposal.

e) The activities of the SSA and attempts at social engineering, through its SOarm,andtheinvolvementofthePresidentandMinisterintheseconstituteaserious breach of the Constitution and law for which there must beconsequences.

f) It is of extreme concern to the Panel that South Africa is represented in aseniorgovernmentcapacitybythepersonwhoheadedupSOandisdirectlyresponsibleforthebreachesmentionedine)above.

g) ThethenMinisterdirectlyparticipatedinintelligenceoperationsinbreachofconstitutional and legal prescripts and the desired boundary between theexecutiveandthedepartment.

h) The attempts to influence the trade union movement and civil societyorganisations inSouthAfrica, throughsurveillance, wasan improperuseofpublicresourcesandviolatedtheconstitutionallymandatedroleoftheSSAtoremainpoliticallyimpartial.


a) The current legislative provisions on the role of the Minister should bereviewed with regard to the Minister’s powers as it relates to theadministrationoftheservice/s.


b) Whiletheprerogativetoappointaheadofservice/sshouldremainwiththePresident, such appointment should follow a similar process as currentlybeing undertaken for the appointment of the National Director of PublicProsecutionsorasrecommendedinChapter13oftheNationalDevelopmentPlan.

c) ThefindingsofthePanelandofthecurrentinvestigationoftheIGintotheSOandrelatedmattersshouldformthebasisforseriousconsequencesforthoseinvolved in illegal activity, including, where appropriate disciplinary and/orcriminalprosecution.

d) The formerheadof SO should bewithdrawn fromhis current position as aseniorrepresentativewithingovernment.


10 I l legal Orders

FocusArea:Thedevelopmentofguidelinesthatwillenablememberstoreportamanifestlyillegalorderasenvisagedinsection199(6)oftheConstitution.

10.1 TheIssueThe Constitution makes it illegal for members of the security services to obey amanifestlyillegalorder.Towhatextentisthisconstitutionalrequirementreflectedinintelligencepolicy,legislationandprescripts?Andtowhatextentarethereprocessesandpractices inplaceinthecivilianintelligencecommunitytoreportanddealwithmanifestlyillegalorders?

10.2 SummaryofInputsThePanel referred to theConstitution, policy, legislation andother prescripts, andalsoresearchedrelevantcaselaw.Inparticular, thePanelaskedmanyof thosewhocamebefore itwhether theyhadeverybeengivenamanifestlyillegalorderand,ifso,whathadtheydoneaboutit.

10.3 Discussion


Chapter11oftheConstitutionistitled‘SecurityServices’.Section199,undertheheading ‘Establishment, structuring and conduct of security services’, in sub-section1says:

The security services of the Republic consist of a single defence force, asinglepoliceserviceandanyintelligenceservicesestablishedintermsoftheConstitution.[Ouremphasis]

Section199(6)says:

Nomemberofanysecurityservicemayobeyamanifestlyillegalorder.[Ouremphasis]

ThePanelisnotawareofanywayinwhichthisConstitutionalprovisionhasbeensubstantially cascaded down into intelligence legislation or prescript.Interestingly, in the2013General IntelligenceLawsAmendmentAct, there isaprovision to insert the following clause intoSection5of theNational StrategicIntelligenceActof1994:


CompliancewiththeConstitution5B.WhenperforminganyfunctionprovidedforinthisAct,theConstitution,inparticularsection199(5)and(7),mustbedulycompliedwith.

Section199(5)says:

Thesecurityservicesmustact,andmustteachandrequiretheirmembersto act, in accordance with the Constitution and the law, includingcustomary international lawand internationalagreementsbindingon theRepublic.

Section 199 (7) is the one that deals with prohibiting the prejudicing of alegitimate political party interest or acting in a partisan manner towards anypoliticalparty.Although this amendment to the National Strategic Intelligence Act can beinterpreted to require adherence to all the provisions of the Constitution (asomewhatobviouspoint),itisperhapsinterestingthatthetwosub-sectionsarestressed,whilesub-section5,dealingwiththeinjunctionaboutmanifestlyillegalorders,isleftout.

Section11(1)oftheIntelligenceServicesAct65of2002says:

Amembermust,intheperformanceofhisorherfunctions,obeyalllawfuldirections received from a person having the authority to give suchdirections.

ThisformulationintheActimpliestherighttodisobeyanunlawfuldirectionbutdoes not expressly deal with this. Similarly, Chapter XVIII of the IntelligenceServicesRegulationsthatdealswithdisciplinaryprocedureincludestheoffence:

failuretoobeyalawfulorderorinstructionsintentionallyornegligently

Butagain, there isnoprovision foranoffenceof issuing an illegalorder,noraprocedure for how to refuse such an order or process for reporting it underprotecteddisclosure,exceptundertheProtectedDisclosuresAct.

10.3.2 WhatisaManifestlyIllegalOrder?

The notion of a manifestly illegal order arises mainly in the military domain,dealingwithactsofwarthatareclearlyoutsidethe‘rulesofwar’orareclearlyaseverebreachof human rights, such as civilianmassacres, rape andotherwarcrimes. In this context, a soldier should have the right – in fact, the duty – torefuse to obey an order to commit one of these acts. In modern days, the


conceptarisesinparticularfromtheNurembergTrials,inwhichtheNazisontrialforwar crimes claimed in their defence that theywere just followingorders –Befehl ist Befehl(anorderisanorder).

Article33oftheRomeStatutesays:

1. The fact that a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court has been

committed by a person pursuant to an order of a Government or of asuperior, whether military or civilian, shall not relieve that person ofcriminalresponsibilityunless:

(a) The person was under a legal obligation to obey orders of the

Governmentorthesuperiorinquestion;(b)Thepersondidnotknowthattheorderwasunlawful;and(c)Theorderwasnotmanifestlyunlawful.

2. For the purposes of this article, orders to commit genocide or crimesagainsthumanityaremanifestlyunlawful.

Again,thisformulationisobviouslydesignedforwarcrimesandonecanassumethat the inclusionof the clauseonmanifestly illegal orders in ourConstitutionreflects the intention of its drafters that South Africa should complywith thisinternationalvalue relating to theconductofwar.But,as reflectedabove, thisinjunction inourConstitutionappliestoall theconstitutionally-definedsecurityservices,includingtheintelligenceservices.

AreviewofsomerelevantcaselawbythePanel,revealedthefollowing:

• Manyofthecasesfoundpertainingtounlawfulinstructionsfellwithinthe

employmentsphere.Section5(2)(c)(iv)oftheLabourRelationsAct66of1995(“LRA”)statesthat:‘nopersonmayprejudiceanemployeeforfailureor refusal to do something that an employermay not lawfully permit orrequire an employee to do’13. Section 187(1) of the LRA states thatdismissal for failure to obey an instruction constitutes an automaticallyunfairdismissal.

• InRvSmith14thecourtheldthat‘ifasoldierhonestlybelievesheisdoinghisdutyinobeyingthecommandsofhissuperiorandiftheordersarenotsomanifestly illegalthathemustoroughttohaveknownthattheywereunlawful, the private soldier would be protected by the orders of hissuperiorofficer.’

• In relation to obeying superior orders, the court in R v Van

13Section5(2)(c)(iv)oftheLabourRelationsAct66of1995.14(1900)17SC561


Vuuren15applied a purely objective test. The court stated that anobligationtoobeyanorderfromasuperioronlyarisesinacasewheretheordergivenisalawfulorder,thatis ‘onenotcontrarytotheordinarycivillawandjustifiedbymilitarylaw’.ThecourtinRvVanVuurenrejectedthetestformulatedinRvSmith.

• In thecaseofSvBanda16, thecourtaccepted the test formulated inRvSmith and reformulated it. The court reformulated the test to mean ‘Asoldiermustobeyordersissuedbyalawfulauthorityandisunderadutytoobey all lawful orders, and, in doing so, must do no more harm than isnecessary to execute the order. Where, however, orders are manifestlybeyond the scope of the authority of the officer issuing themand are somanifestlyandpalpablyillegalthatareasonablemaninthecircumstancesofthesoldierwouldknowthemtobemanifestlyandpalpablyillegal,heisjustifiedinrefusingtoobeysuchorders.Thedefenceofobediencetoordersofasuperiorofficerwillnotprotectasoldierforactscommittedpursuanttosuchmanifestlyandpalpablyillegalorders.’

• Thedefenceofobediencetosuperiororderswasfurtherdiscussedinthecase of Johannes HendrikMostert and Others v The State17where thecourtheld:‘thetestthathasbeendevisedbyourcourtsisthatthedefenceofobediencetoorderswillbesuccessful,providedthattheorderswerenotmanifestlyandpalpablyunlawful’.

So,whatconstitutesamanifestlyillegalorderintheintelligencecontext?Insimpleterms,itcouldbeanyorderthatisclearlyinbreachoftheConstitution,legislation,regulationsordirectives.Atthehighestlevel,forinstance,itcouldbean order to conduct an intelligence operation that prejudices the legitimateinterestsof apoliticalparty (Section199 (7)of theConstitution)or, at amore‘tactical’level,anordertointerceptatarget’sphonewithoutfirstacquiringthenecessaryjudicialpermissionintermsoftheRICAAct.Thequestionmay arise: how serious should thebreachbebefore theorder isdeemed manifestly illegal? Obviously, in the intelligence context, we are notusuallydealingwiththe‘magnitude’ofmanifestlyillegalordersasoutlinedintheRome Statute (although, of course, if intelligence services start involvingthemselves in assassinations – as we know has happened with some of theservicesontheglobalstage–theywouldbegettingclosetothatlevel).

There has been a debate for some time locally and internationally about thebalance between legality and operational necessity. The authors of a paperissued by the Intelligence Working Group of the Geneva Centre for theDemocraticControloftheArmedForces(DCAF)in2003argue,forinstance:

151944 OPD 35.16(1990)(3)SA466.17[2006]4AllSA83(N).


Inevitably, intelligence is an activity where there will at times be thetemptation, and perhaps even the need, to transgress the conventionallimitsofmoralorlegalconductinthehopeofachievingsomegreateraim.Thoughthismaybejustifiedonoccasions,itisnaturalthatthereshouldbemisgivings by others who may be unaware of what is at stake.18 [Ouremphasis]

Laterinthesamepapertheauthorsarguethat:

rigidadherence towhatareclaimed tobeconstitutionalprinciples can, ifappliedwithoutperspective–orcommonsense–beasgreatadangertotheconstitutionalorderasprofligatedeparturesfromthoseprinciples.19

Theseappeartoreflecttheviews largelyofapractitionerorpractitionersfromtheWesternintelligenceservicesdealingwithinternationalterrorism.ThePanelisnotnecessarilysupportingtheseviewsinourcontext;certainlynotintermsofjustifying breaches of the Constitution no matter how serious the threat.However,theremaybeaneedtorecognisethatthemoredetailedprescripts(aswith any piece of legislation) cannot anticipate every possible circumstance inwhich they might apply and there may need to be provision for certainpermissionsforauthorisationofinvasiveoperationsinemergencysituations,forexample,tobeobtainedpostfacto,orforotherprocesses,whereurgencyisall-pervasive,forcondoninganotherwiselegitimateactionthatmaybeinbreachofoneorotherprescript.Theaboveargumentispresentedsimplytomakethecriticalpointoftheneedtofindaworkabledelineationbetweenamanifestlyillegalorderandanorderthatisinbreachofsomelesserprescriptforotherwisevalidreasons.Thepurposeofthis,ofcourse,istodealwiththeothersideofthebalancebetweendisobeyingamanifestlyillegalorderanddefyinganotherwiselegitimateinstruction.

10.3.3 HowtoDealwithaManifestlyIllegalOrder

The last sentence above leads us to perhaps the most difficult aspect of thisdiscussion–howdoesanintelligenceofficerknowwithcertaintythatsheorhehasbeenissuedwithamanifestlyillegalorderandhowdoessheorherespondtosuchanorder?

Theanswertothefirstpartoftheabovequestionwouldbethatanintelligenceofficer should have a comprehensive knowledge and understanding of all theprescripts (from the Constitution downwards) that apply to the conduct ofintelligenceand,obviously,acommitment tocomplyingwith them.Thiswould

18DCAF,2003,OccasionalPaperNo.3: IntelligencePracticeandDemocraticOversight–APractitioner’sView,p4219Ibid.p72


apply both to those issuing orders and thosewho are expected to carry themout.Ofcourse,ifthoseissuingorderscomplywiththeabove,therewouldbenoproblemregardingwhat todoabout receivingamanifestly illegalorder– theywouldnothappen.

Theothersideofthiscoin,particularlyofconcerntointelligenceleadershipandmanagement, is the danger that officers will indiscriminately use the right todisobeyamanifestlyillegalordertorefuseordefyinstructionsthatarenotreallymanifestly illegal or that they misinterpret to be so. This could have adetrimentaleffectonthelevelofdisciplinerequired,bythenatureofthework,inanintelligenceorganisation.And, naturally, there is the question on the part of intelligence officers (at alllevels) ofwhatwouldbe thedanger for them in refusing toobeyamanifestlyillegal order. Doing so requires a high level of integrity, courage anddetermination and, without doubt, an effective system of protection fromvictimisation. If, for instance, you are the director-general of an intelligenceservice and you get a manifestly illegal order from the President or Minister,what would be the consequence of refusing to obey it and what protectionwould you have against those consequences? It might be easier, relativelyspeaking, lowerdown in thehierarchy,but at thathighest level yourability torefuse would depend on the integrity and understanding of the issuer of theorder.

ThemostcommontacticfordealingwithmanifestlyillegalordersthatthePanelwas made aware of was to ask for the order to be committed to writing.Apparently, inmost cases the order never came inwriting andwas no longerinsistedupon.

10.3.4 WereManifestlyIllegalOrdersIssued?

IntheperiodbeingreviewedbythePanel,itseemstherewerecertainlyalargenumber of manifestly illegal orders issued, reportedly from the level of theExecutive downwards. These ranged from breaches of the constitutionalprovisions regarding prejudicing or furthering the interests of political parties,downtotheconductingof intrusiveintelligenceoperationswithoutcomplianceto the law and including conducting intelligence operations that breached thelegislativelyprescribedmandatesoftheSSA.

The Panel askedmany of those who appeared before it: Have you ever beengivenamanifestlyillegalorderand,ifso,whatdidyoudoaboutit?

Some,whomthePanelknewhadbeenissuedsuchorders,simplyanswered‘no’–theylied.Or,insomecases,theyhadnounderstandingthatordersthatwereissuedwere indeedmanifestly illegal. Among thosewho admitted to receivingsuchorders,somedealtwithitbycallingontheNurembergDefence(‘anorderis


anorder’)or‘howdoyoudefyyourExecutive?’Othersclaimedtheyhadaskedfortheorder inwritingandothersthattheyhadsimplydefied.Somereportedsubsequentvictimisation.


a) In the period under review (and perhaps beyond) the Panel heard enoughevidencethattherehavebeenordersissuedtoandwithintheSSA,includingfromtheExecutive,whichinthePanel’sviewweremanifestlyillegal.

b) Thereappearstohavebeennoconsistentconsequencemanagementfortheissuingorobeyingofsuchorders.

c) Intelligence legislation,regulationsanddirectivesdonotadequatelyaddresstheissueofmanifestlyillegalordersandhowtodealwiththem.


a) Arisingoutofinvestigationsfollowingfromthisreviewandcurrentorfutureinvestigations by the IGI, there shouldbe firm consequences for thosewhoissuedmanifestlyillegalordersandthosewhowittinglycarriedthemout.

b) An urgent process be initiated, drawing on legal, intelligence and academicexpertise, to develop a clear definition of manifestly illegal orders asapplicabletotheintelligenceenvironmentandtorecommendproceduresandprocesses forhandling these. Suchprocessesandprocedures to include theconsideration thatall orders should be issued inwriting and protection forthoserefusingtoobeyorreportingamanifestlyillegalorder.

c) On the basis of the outcome of recommendation b) above, as well as thebroader reviewof relevant legislationandprescriptarising fromthis report,there should be relevant amendmentsmade to legislation, regulations anddirectivesdealingexplicitlywithmanifestlyillegalordersandtheprocessesfordealingwiththem,includingprovidingforthecriminalisationoftheissuingof,orcarryingoutof,amanifestlyillegalorder.

d) In line with the recommendations contained in the chapter of this reportdealing with Training and Development, the education, training anddevelopmentof intelligenceofficersshouldensureextensiveknowledgeandunderstandingoftheconstitutional,legislativeandotherprescriptsrelatingtointelligence as well as the definition of, and procedures for dealing with,manifestlyillegalorders.

e) Inadditiontod)above,thereshouldbeacompulsory inductionprogramme


foranymemberoftheexecutiveassignedwithpoliticalresponsibilityfortheintelligence services, aswell as any newly-appointed senior leaders of suchservices, thateducates themontherelevantprescriptsasmentionedaboveandonthenatureofmanifestlyillegalordersandtheconsequencesthereof.

f) Further, on the basis of the outcome of the process recommended in b)above,thereshouldbeanurgent,all-encompassingciviceducationcampaignforallmembersoftheservice/sonthemeaningofamanifestlyillegalorderandtheprocessesfordealingwiththem.


11 Training and Development

Focus Area: The effectiveness of Training and Development Programmes in capacitatingmembersoftheAgency.

11.1 TheIssueThe education, training and development of intelligence officers is an obviouslycriticalelementforensuringanunderstandingoftheconstitutional,policy,legislativeand prescriptive requirements of intelligence, for its professional and efficientconduct, an ever-developing knowledge-base, and a measure to ensure careerdevelopmentandprogressforintelligenceofficers.

11.2 SummaryofInputsThePanelinteractedwiththecurrentmanagementoftheSSA’sIA,aformerPrincipalofthethenSANAI,aswellasvariousmembersofmanagementandstaffandotherswhoexpressedviewsonintelligencetrainingovertheyears.The Panel also had access to the Intelligence Academy Prospectus. TheOrganisationalSurvey2014Reportalsohadrelevancetothistopicasdiscussedinanearlierchapter.

11.3 DiscussionAt the formation of the new intelligence services (NIA and SASS) in 1995, anIntelligenceAcademywasestablishedasaChiefDirectorateunderNIA, intendedtoprovide training to both NIA and SASS. The Academy was located on the mainintelligencecampus(nowcalled‘Musanda’)ontheDelmasRoadinPretoriaEast.Atthe time, therewas some consternationon thepart of SASS that theyhad limitedinfluence on the content and management of the Academy, in spite of variousattemptsatcreatingbodiestocoordinatesharedservicesbetweenthetwoentities.Around2002,thethenMinisterforIntelligenceServiceshadavisionofcreatingtheintelligenceacademyasa separateentity, servingbothNIAandSASS,with itsowncampus.A training campuswas created inMahikeng froma facility inherited fromthe formerBophuthatswana IntelligenceService.The2002 IntelligenceServicesActcreatedtheSANAIas‘anorganisationalcomponentintermsofthePublicServiceAct,1994 (Proclamation 103 of 1994), ofwhich themanagement and administration isunderthecontroloftheMinister’.ThatActspecifiedthattheAcademy:

(a)mustprovide training forpersons in, or conduct suchexaminationsortests as a qualification for the appointment, promotion or transfer ofpersonsinorto,theIntelligenceServicesordepartments,asthecasemay


be,astheMinistermayprescribe;and(b) may issue diplomas or certificates to persons who have passed suchexaminationsortests.

TheActalsoprescribedthattheAcademyshouldsetupatrainingfund.While this newly-established ‘stand-alone’ academy servedbothNIA and SASS andwasanswerabletotheMinisterinsteadofNIA,thePanelunderstandsthatSASSwasstill not happywith this arrangement and set up its own small training capacity tosupplementthetrainingofferedbySANAI.The2013GeneralIntelligenceLawsAmendmentActundidallofthis,disestablishedSANAIandgaveitsfunctionsandtheadministrationofthetrainingfundtotheSSA.Asshowninpreviouschapters,SANAIbecametheIAasaspendingcentreoftheSSAreportingtotheDG. In2017,withtheimplementationoftheSDP,theIAwasfurtherreducedtoachiefdirectoratereportingtotheDDGCorporateServices.AlthoughtheorganisationalstructureofSSAasof2016shows itasaseparatebranch, thePanelwas astonished to hear that, at the time of its deliberations, the DDG CorporateServiceswasalsoActingPrincipaloftheIA20.ThePanelwasalsosomewhatdisturbedto find, in its meeting with the IA management, that all of them were in actingcapacities.The Panel was not able to visit the Mahikeng campus of the IA, but some of itsmembers who had previously served in the intelligence community knew thecampus. The campus offers residential, administrative, teaching and recreationalfacilities. A number of submissions to the Panel expressed concern about thedistance of the campus from the SSA headquarters. There are advantages anddisadvantagestothisinthePanel’sunderstanding:

• Especiallyforlongercourses,itmakessensetohavearesidentialcampusthatkeeps students (and staff) away from the distractions of head office (andperhapshome).ThePanelunderstandsthattheIAhasestablishedasatellitecampusattheMusandafacilityinPretoriaforshortercourses.

• ThePanelunderstandsthatteachingandadministrativestaffdeployedtotheIA are often reluctant tomove toMahikeng from the ‘big cities’. ThismayimpactonthequalityofstaffassignedtotheIA.ThedistancefromGautengtoMahikengisalittleover300km,makingadailycommuteimpractical.

• Concern was also expressed to the Panel about the effects of thedeterioration of the town of Mahikeng on the IA and its campus, furtheraggravatingthewillingnessofstafftobasethere.

ThePanelwasnotabletocomprehensivelyevaluatethequalityofteachingattheIA,butanumberofissuesarisefromtheengagementsithadwitharangeofdirectandindirectstakeholders:

20ThePanelunderstandsthatthishasrecentlybeenrectified.


• The training provided is precisely that – training – instead of training,educationanddevelopment.Itisfocusedlargelyonimpartingskills.

• Thereisaneedforeffectiveleadershipandmanagementtraining.• Intelligencetrainingisstillstuckinthe‘post-WWII’intelligencephilosophy.• Thereisnotenough,orany,technologytraining.• Theviewsexpressedearlierarisingfromthe2014OrganisationalSurvey21are

worthrepeatinghere:o trainingattheIAisnotuptostandard;o thelocationofIAinMahikengisnotconduciveduetothedistance;o training is not customised to operational environments and that the

centralisationof thebudget for trainingat IAhas resulted in lengthyprocesses that impact onmemberswillingness to attempt to obtainapprovaltoattendingtraining;

o theselectioncriteriafortrainingisunclearandnotstandardisedwhichleads tounfairnessand favouritism in theselectionofmemberswhomayattendtraining.

• The Panel also heard the view thatmembers of the SSA are often sent ontrainingto‘getridofthem’or‘getthemoutofthesystemforawhile’.

• There isnosystematicutilisationof training,educationanddevelopmentaspartofacareerprogressionandperformancemanagementsystem.

• The IntelligenceAcademyhasbeensystematically ‘hollowedout’ since2009andtherehasthusbeennoeffectivetrainingforsometime.

AperusaloftheIA’scurrentcurriculumindicatestheneedfor:

• Continued emphasis throughout on the significance of a democratic state.Thatmeanshavingagoodsenseofwhydemocracyisapointofdepartureforthisnation.

• Training and development in resource economics – i.e. agriculturaleconomics,waterresourceseconomics,mineralresources,etc.

• Acomprehensivestudyandtrainingineconomicsisaprerequisiteparticularlyinanemergingmarketeconomyandglobalisation.

• Quantitativeanalysisandstudymustbestrengthened.• The research module needs attention in advanced data gathering and

understandingthelogicofinquiry,• Theeconomics emphasis should include a focuson geopolitics (historic and

contemporary)andwithit,discussiononSouthAfrica’snationalinterestandthestrategiesthatfollowinpursuittherefrom.

By way of emphasis, given the Panel’s findings earlier in this report about thesystematic non-compliance with the Constitution, White Paper, Legislation,

21SeeChapter6


RegulationsandDirectives, thequestionarisesas towhatextent traininghasbeenused, especially over the last decade or so, to inculcate a knowledge andunderstandingoftheseprescriptsandanattitudeoftheinviolabilityofcompliance.Thoughtneedstobegiventowhetherasinglecurriculumisappropriatefordomesticandforeignintelligenceoperatives.Ofcourse,therearecertainelements(suchastheonementioned inthepreviousparagraph) thatarecommon.But,operatingontheforeign terrainhas importantdifferences to thedomestic terrain. Forone, youareoperating in ‘enemy territory’ and breaking the laws of the target country withpossibly very serious consequences. In thedomestic terrain (assumingyouoperatewithintheprescripts)youareoperating in ‘friendlyterritory’.More importantly,anintelligenceofficerworking in the foreign terrainneedsaprofoundknowledgeandunderstanding of international relations, diplomacy and, of course, a detailedknowledge of the country and region he or she will be working in, plus languageability.Adomesticoperative,ontheotherhand,needsadetailedknowledgeofthevarious prescripts governing the conduct of intelligence in the domestic terrain, aprofoundunderstandingofSouthAfricansociety,politicaleconomyetc.Thereisalsothequestionofadifferenceofculturebetweenforeignanddomesticservices.The Panel was informed about some initiatives on the part of the IA and itspredecessor to partner with institutions of higher learning. This seems acommendable idea, but perhaps needs to be properly strategized, structured andmanaged,basedon theneedsof theAcademyrather thansimply the ‘offerings’ofthese institutions. Itmayalsobe importanttopartnerwithothertraining instituteswithingovernment, suchas the trainingentitiesofDefenceandCrime Intelligence,the National School of Government, the DIRCO Academy, the SARB Academy andothers.


a) Education, training and staff development are not given the necessaryattentionbytheSSA,resultinginahaphazardandinferiortrainingsystem.

b) In recent years the Intelligence Academy has been hollowed out withfrequentstaffchangesandactingappointments,bereftofeffectiveleadershipand insufficient attention and priority given to it, leading to a toxicenvironment.

c) Training and development are not an integral part of career-pathing andperformancemanagementintheAgency.

d) Education,traininganddevelopmentshouldbeanintegralpartofdevelopingaprofessional,conscientiousandeffectiveintelligenceservice.


11.5 RecommendationsThePanelrecommends:

a) The establishment of an Advisory Panel, consisting of retired practitionerswith training expertise, academics with expertise in security, a humanresourcesspecialist,anICTexpert,riskmanagementexpertandeconomist,toattendto,andensureoperationalisationof,thefollowing:

• Reviewthevisionandmission,scopeandstructureofanationalintelligencetrainingandeducationcapacityfortheintelligencecommunity.

• Confirm the intelligence doctrine, oriented towards the Constitution, andbased on the revised White Paper, NSS and other relevant policies andprescripts.

• Developappropriatecurricula,includinggeneral,executiveandspecialised,continuous training and education, taking into account the differences ofoperatingintheforeignanddomesticterrains.

• Guide the establishment of a professional and appropriately trained andeducatedfaculty(teachingandtrainingstaff)andmanagementcadre.

• Develop an appropriate career advancement protocol to guide staffrecruitment,development,deploymentandpromotion.

• Developandconfirmguidingvaluesforintelligencetrainingandeducation.• Guide or develop exit options for existing staff and recognition and

accommodation of former intelligence officers and officials if and whereneeded.

• Determine collaborations and partnerships with accredited academicinstitutions,selectNGOs,specialistorganisationsandagencies,andrelevantgovernmenttraininginstitutions

• ReviewtheappropriatenessoftheMahikengcampusanddevelopaplanforitsuse,ifany,aswellasotherinternaltrainingfacilities.


12 Coordination

Focus Area: The effectiveness of intelligence and counter-intelligence coordinationwithintheAgencyandbetween theagencyandother SouthAfrican intelligenceentities and thecapacityandroleofNICOCinthisregard.

12.1 TheIssueIn all the commissions and reviews that followed major intelligence failures inwestern democracies (such as 9/11 and the Iraqi non-existent weapons of massdestruction), the key finding has always been a lack of coordination betweenintelligenceservicesandsometimeswithinservices.Andthesefindingshavealwaysledtoamarkedstrengtheningofcoordinationmechanisms.ThequestionarisesastowhetherSouthAfricamustwaitforamajorintelligencefailurebeforeitaddressesitsownweaknessesinintelligencecoordination.

12.2 SummaryofInputsThePanelreceivedbriefingsfromthecurrentandpastIntelligenceCoordinatorspluspresent andpastNICOC staffmembers and also solicited the viewsof current andformerministersof Intelligence/StateSecurityaswellas formerandcurrent seniorleadersoftheSSAanditspredecessorservices.ItalsohadinterviewswiththeheadsoftheCrimeIntelligenceDivisionofSAPSandoftheIntelligenceDivisionoftheSADF.A number of documents proved very useful to the Panel’s deliberations on theseissues,including,interalia:

• The Ideal NICOC CoordinatingMechanism – submitted to the Panel by thecurrentNICOCCoordinator

• InputonIntelligenceCoordination–submittedtothePanelbytheMinister• The Challenges of Intelligence Coordination in South Africa – developed in

2005

12.3 DiscussionThis report has already dealt to some extent with the challenges of coordinationinside the SSA, especially as it relates to coordination between the foreign anddomesticarmsaswell asbetween theanalysisandoperationsarms.Wehavealsostressed that the sheer size of the SSA makes effective management and thuscoordinationdifficult.Inthischapterwefocusonthecoordinationofthebroaderintelligencecommunity,includingdefenceandcrime intelligenceandother relevantarmsof thestate,with


particularfocusontheroleofNICOCandtheCoordinatorforIntelligence.

It is important to understand the crucial place that NICOC occupies in the overallintelligencevaluechain,at leastasconceivedby the foundersofourconstitutionaldemocracyandpost-apartheidintelligencedispensation.Itissupposedtobethekeyinterfacebetweentheagenciesthatcollect intelligenceandtheclientswhoneedtomake use of it, ensuringall-source input into the intelligence picture and effectiveprocessingandevaluationoftheassessmentproductthatgoestothepolicy-makers.TheConstitution,WhitePaperandlawsofourcountryareveryclearonthemandateandpowersofNICOC.TheConstitutionsaysinSection210:

Nationallegislationmustregulatetheobjects,powersandfunctionsoftheintelligenceservices,includinganyintelligencedivisionofthedefenceforceorpoliceservice,andmustprovidefor—(a)theco-ordinationofallintelligenceservices;[Ouremphasis]

TheWhitePaperspellsthisoutinmoredetail.Itsays:

an interdepartmental intelligence coordinatingmechanism, the NationalIntelligenceCoordinatingCommittee(NICOC)willcoordinatetheactivitiesof the intelligence community and will act as the key link between theintelligencecommunityandpolicy-makers.NICOCwillbechairedbyaCo-ordinator for Intelligencewhowill be accountable to thePresident. [Ouremphases]

ItfurtherdefinesthefunctionsofNICOCas,interalia:

• to advise the government on policy relating to the conduct ofintelligenceatnational,regionalandlocallevels

• tocoordinatetheconductofallintelligencefunctionsandthecollectiveintelligenceresourcesofthecountry

• tocoordinatetheproductionofnationalstrategicintelligence• to avoid and to eliminate conflict, rivalry and unhealthy competition

betweenthemembersoftheintelligencecommunity[Ouremphases]Section4oftheNationalStrategicIntelligenceActdefinesthefunctionsofNICOCas:

(a) toco-ordinatetheintelligencesuppliedbythemembersoftheNational

Intelligence Structures toNicocand interpret such intelligence for usebytheStateandtheCabinetforthepurposesof-(i) thedetectionand identificationofanythreatorpotential threat

tothenationalsecurityoftheRepublic;(ii) the protection and promotion of the national interests of the

Republic;


(b) forthepurposesofthefunctionscontemplatedinparagraph(a)-(i) to co-ordinate and prioritise intelligence activities within the

NationalIntelligenceStructures;(ii) toprepareandinterpretintelligenceestimates;

(c) to produceanddisseminate intelligencewhichmayhavean influenceonanystatepolicywithregardtomattersreferredtoinparagraph(a)forconsiderationbytheCabinet;

(d) afterconsultationwiththedepartmentsoftheStateentrustedwiththemaintenanceofthesecurityoftheRepublic,toco-ordinatetheflowofnationalstrategicintelligencebetweensuchdepartments;

(e) attherequestofanyDepartmentofState,toco-ordinatethegatheringof intelligence and without delay to evaluate and transmit suchintelligence andany other intelligence at the disposal of theNationalIntelligenceStructuresandwhichconstitutesdepartmentalintelligence,tothedepartmentconcerned;and

(f) tomakerecommendationstotheCabinetonintelligencepriorities.[Ouremphases]

Oneoftheproblemslongidentifiedwiththewordingofthelegislationisthatitgivesthesepowersandresponsibilitiesto‘NICOC’–literallythecommitteeoftheheadsofservices–anddoesnotprovideforNICOCasanorganisationorforthepowersoftheCoordinator. It is obvious that it is not possible for a committee to successfullyperformall the functions legislated to it throughsomesortof consensualdecision-making.ThecompositionoftheNICOCcommitteepriortotheestablishmentofSSAconsistedoftheCoordinator for Intelligence, theDGofSASS, theDGofNIA, theHeadoftheSAPSCrimeIntelligenceDivisionandtheHeadoftheSANDFIntelligenceDivision.Inaddition to the statutorymembership, theCommittee also co-opted theDG in thePresidency, DG of Foreign Affairs/DIRCO, the Head of the Financial IntelligenceCentre(FIC),theDGofHomeAffairsandothers.WiththeestablishmentoftheSSA,the Directors Foreign and Domestic branches of the Agency became statutorymembersoftheCommitteeinplaceofthepreviousDGsofNIAandSASS.ThePanel receivedanumberof inputs fromNICOCstaffand frommembersof theanalysisarmsoftheSSA,sayingthattheDGofSSAhadgiveninstructionstolimittheprovisionofintelligencereportstoNICOC.WealsoreceivedareportthatoneformerMinisterhadwantedtoturnNICOCintoaunitintheMinistry.The challenges of intelligence coordination in South Africa have been with thecountrysincetheearlydaysofdemocracy.Thekeyviewofmostofthoseengagedbythe Panel on this issue is that the policy and legislative prescripts on intelligencecoordinationarebasicallysoundbutthattheyaremorehonouredinthebreach.Thecoordinatedentities resist the functionsofNICOCspecified in theWhitePaperandlegislation and thus, over the years, the Intelligence Coordinator has struggled toachievetheaimsandpurposesofintelligencecoordination,inspiteofmanyreviews,


strategicretreatsandhigh-leveldiscussionsbetweenthevariousplayers.Currently,NICOCisaspendingcentreoftheSSA.Thismeansthatitisfinanciallyand,to some extent, logistically and administratively dependent on one of the servicesthat it is supposed to coordinate. There have been recommendations in variousreviewsover theyears that it shouldbeestablishedasan independententitywiththe Coordinator for Intelligence as accounting officer. In addition, concern wasexpressed to thePanelbyDefence Intelligence thatNICOCwas ‘dominated’by theSSA.AsnotedearlierinthediscussionontheSSA’sStrategicDevelopmentPlan,theSSA,in its long-termvisionandthinking, totally ignoredthestatutory roleofNICOCandgaveitselfmanyofthefunctionsthatshouldbecarriedoutattheNICOClevel.Amajority of the pertinent interlocutors of the Panel on intelligence coordinationandNICOC expressed the view that NICOC should be located in the Presidency orcloser to the Presidency. The current Minister disagreed with this largely on thegroundsthattheproblemwasnotstructuralbutfunctional.


a) SouthAfrica’sintelligencecoordinationhasfacedseriouschallengessincethebeginningofthedemocraticdispensationthatvariousreviewsandinitiativeshave failed to address. The time is now opportune to address thesecourageouslyandfundamentally.

b) While there are a number of improvements that can be made to thelegislation governing intelligence coordination, the fundamentals of theWhite Paper and legislation are correct but there has been a consistentfailureonthepartofthecoordinatedentitiestocomplywiththeseprinciplesandlegislation.Thislackofcompliancehasbecomeworseinthelastdecadeorso.

c) ItisnotappropriatethatNICOCshouldbelocatedinoneministrywhiletwooftheentitiesitissupposedtocoordinatereporttotwodifferentministers.

d) NICOCanalystsshouldbeabletodrawon,notonlytheintelligencefromtheintelligencedepartments,buton the relevantknowledgeofall governmentdepartments,academia,researchinstitutesandotherexperts.



a) NICOC should be relocated to the Presidency to give it the necessaryauthority to ensure compliance by the intelligence departments with theprescriptsonintelligencecoordination.

b) The task team recommended earlier in this report to look at the overallarchitecture and legislation of the intelligence and security communityshouldfactorintherecommendationsofthisPanelinsofarastheyrelatetointelligencecoordinationandNICOC.

c) In the meantime, urgent measures should be put in place to ensurecompliancebytheintelligenceserviceswiththeWhitePaperandlegislativeprescripts on intelligence coordination with consequences for non-compliance.


13 Oversight

FocusArea:Theeffectivenessandappropriatenessoftheexistingoversightmechanismsinensuringaccountabilityandtransparency.

13.1 TheIssueThe framers of our Constitution and democratic intelligence policy and legislationcreatedanoversightsystemforourintelligenceservicecomparabletothebestintheworld,comprisingabi-cameral,multi-partyparliamentarycommittee–theJSCI–andtheIGI.Thequestionis:giventheabusesandinfractionsidentifiedinthisreport,didtheseoversightmechanismsfunctioneffectivelyandifnot,whynot?

13.2 SummaryofInputsThePanelreceivedinputsfrom:

• ThecurrentIGIandhisoffice• AformerIGI• TheformerChairoftheJSCI,currentNationalSecurityAdvisor• TheJSCI

Keydocumentsrelatingtotheoversightissueinclude:• TheConstitution• TheWhitePaper• TheIntelligenceServicesOversightAct40of1994• TheMatthewsCommissionReport• Report of the Task Team on the Review of Intelligence-Related Legislation,

RegulationandPolicies,April2006

The Commission also looked at the oversight mechanisms of other democraticintelligencejurisdictions.

13.3 DiscussionOversightcanbeconductedbytheexecutive(principally,butnotexclusivelybytherelevantMinister), the judiciary, the legislature and administrative bodies that areindependentof theexecutive. In thecaseofSouthAfrica,oversight responsibilitiesaredistributedbetweentheMinisterofStateSecurity,theJSCI,theIGI,ChapterNineinstitutionssuchastheSouthAfricanHumanRightsCommission(SAHRC),thePublicProtectorandtheAGSAandthejudiciary,includingthejudgeresponsibleforlawfulcommunicationinterceptsintermsoftheRICA.This chapter deals primarilywith the specialised intelligenceoversightmechanisms


createdviatheConstitution,theWhitePaperandtheIntelligenceServicesOversightAct – viz. the Parliamentary Joint Standing Committee on Intelligence and theInspector-Generalof Intelligence.Other chaptersdealwith the roleof theMinisterforStateSecurity,theAGandotherentities.


Section210ofTheConstitutionsaysnationallegislationmustprovidefor:…civilianmonitoringoftheactivitiesofthoseservices[theintelligenceservices]by an inspector appointed by the President, as head of thenational executive, and approved by a resolution adopted by theNationalAssemblywithasupportingvoteofat least twothirdsof itsmembers.

TheWhitePaperonIntelligence,undertheheading‘ControlandCoordinationofIntelligence’,says:

It was agreed by the TEC that a number of control measures toregulatetheactivitiesofthecivilianintelligencecommunityshouldbeimplemented.Thecontrolmechanismsincludethefollowingprinciplesandpracticalmeasures:• AllegiancetotheConstitution;• SubordinationtotheRuleofLaw• Aclearlydefinedlegalmandate;• Amechanismforparliamentaryoversight;• Budgetarycontrolandexternalauditing;• An independent Inspector-General for Intelligence -oneeach for the

twocivilianintelligenceservices;• Ministerialaccountability;• Theabsenceoflawenforcementpowers.

[Ouremphases]

Itfurthersays:Of thesemeasures, themost important is aproposedmechanism forparliamentary oversight over the different services and departmentswithfunctionsrelatingtointelligence(seeParliamentaryCommitteeonIntelligenceBill).Thebillmakesprovisionforthefollowing:

• AJointStandingCommitteeforParliamentwithfunctionsandpowers

that will allow it to receive reports, make recommendations, orderinvestigationsandholdhearingsonmattersrelatingtointelligenceandnationalsecurity.Thecommitteewillalsoprepareandsubmitreports


toparliamentabouttheperformanceofitsdutiesandfunctions.• TwoInspector-Generals22–oneeachforeachservice–whosefunctions

will include reviewing the activities of the intelligence services andmonitoringtheircompliancewithpolicyguidelines.Thesetwopersonswillhaveunhinderedaccesstoclassifiedinformation.

The Intelligence Services Oversight Act gives effect to these high-level policypositionsonoversightoftheintelligencecommunity,extendingtherolesoftheJSCIandtheIGItoalsocovertheDefenceandCrimeIntelligenceservices.

AccordingtotheAct,thefunctionsoftheIGI,interalia,are:

• to monitor compliance by any Service with the Constitution, applicable

lawsandrelevantpoliciesonintelligenceandcounter-intelligence;• toreviewtheintelligenceandcounter-intelligenceactivitiesofanyService;• toperformall functionsdesignatedtohimorherbythePresidentorany

MinisterresponsibleforaService;• to receive and investigate complaints from members of the public and

members of the Services on allegedmaladministration, abuse of power,transgressionsoftheConstitution,lawsandpolicies;

TheActsaysthattheIG:… shallbeaSouthAfricancitizenwhoisafitandproperpersontoholdsuchofficeandwhohasknowledgeofintelligence.[Ouremphasis]

ItfurthergivestheIGIextensiveaccesstotheinformationoftheServices.ItsaystheIGI:

shallhaveaccesstoanyintelligence,informationorpremisesunderthecontrol of any Service if such access is required by the Inspector-Generalfortheperformanceofhisorherfunctions,andheorsheshallbeentitledtodemandfromtheHeadoftheServiceinquestionanditsemployeessuch intelligence, information, reportsandexplanationsastheInspector-Generalmaydeemnecessaryfortheperformanceofhisorherfunctions;

IntermsoftheJSCI,theActdefinesitsfunctions,interalia,as:

• toconsidertheauditedfinancialstatementsoftheServices;• to consider the reports of the Evaluation Committee established by the

SecretServicesAct;• toconsiderreportsfromthejudgeappointedintermsofRICA;

22 Note: this was later reduced to one IGI to cover all four intelligence services (SASS, NIA, DefenceIntelligenceandSAPSCrimeIntelligence)


• to consider any legislation and regulations relating to the intelligenceservices;

• to review and make recommendations regarding inter-departmentalcooperation;

• toorderinvestigationbytheheadofaserviceortheIGIonanycomplaintreceivedbythecommittee;

• toreferanyrelevantmattertotheSAHRC;• to deliberate upon, hold hearings, subpoena witnesses and make

recommendations on any aspect relating to intelligence and the nationalsecurity,includingadministrationandfinancialexpenditure;

• toconsiderandreportontheappropriationofrevenueormoneysforthefunctionsoftheServices.

TheCommittee’saccesstoinformationisnotasextensiveasthatoftheIGI.TheActsaystheheadofaserviceisnotobligedtodisclosetotheCommittee,interalia:

• the identity of any person or body engaged in intelligence or counter-

intelligenceactivities• any information thatwas provided to a service under express or implied

assurancesofconfidentiality

13.3.2 Inspector-GeneralforIntelligence

The recent controversybetween the IGI and the formerDGof SSAaround thewithdrawaloftheIGI’ssecurityclearancehasraisedoncemoreanissuethathasbeenontheintelligencecommunity’sagendaforsomeyears–theissueoftheindependenceoftheofficeoftheIGIfromoneoftheentitiesthatitoversees.The 2006 Report of the Task Team on the Review of Intelligence-RelatedLegislation,RegulationandPolicieshadthistosayonthismatter:

SimilarlytoNICOC,theOfficeoftheInspector-GeneralforIntelligencehasamandatethatextendsbeyondthecivilianintelligenceservices,but has to account financially and administratively to one of theservices that it is expected to inspect – NIA. While this may beadministratively convenient, from the point of view of the need foractualandperceived independence, thisarrangement isuntenable…It is therefore important to provide theOIGIwith an organisationalstatus thatgives its headAccountingOfficer statusandallows it toreceiveandmanageitsbudgetindependentlyofNIA.

The 2008Matthews Commission Report agreed with the findings of the 2006report:

The Task Team recommended that the OIGI be given independent


organisational status, allowing it to receive and manage its budgetindependently ofNIA and affording the Inspector-General full controlover the resources and activities of the Office. The OIGI could beestablished as either a government agency or a Schedule 3organisation in terms of the Public Service Act No. 103 of 1994. TheInspector-General would remain functionally accountable to the JSCIbut would be financially and administratively accountable to theMinisterforIntelligenceServicesforthepurposesofthePublicFinanceManagementActNo.1of1999.

WeagreethattheOIGIshouldhaveindependentstatus.TheprocessofestablishingthisstatuswasunderwayinAugust2008.

In fact, theprocess toestablish this statushasneverhappenedorat leastwasputasidewiththechangeinintelligencemanagementin2009.

ThePanelwasnotaninvestigationtaskteamandwasthereforenotabletoformanevidence-basedjudgementontheissueofthewithdrawalofthecurrentIGI’ssecurity clearance.ThePanelwasnotable tomake final senseof these claimsand counter-claims, but noted that there are some concerns regarding thecurrentIGI.ThePanelwasparticularlyconcernedwithhistakingtheissueofhisindependence to court insteadofhandling it, asothershavedonebeforehim,throughcommunity-widereviewprocesses. Inrelationtothewithdrawalofhissecurityclearance,theIGIdidnotusethelegallyprovidedrecoursetoappealtotheMinister,who,intheend,didindeedreinstatehisclearance.

Over theyears, therehavebeenanumberof issues raisedabout the roleandfunctioningoftheIGIandhisorherofficeapartfromtheissueofindependence,particularlyinthetworeportsquotedfromabove.

The2006TaskTeamReportmadethefollowingfindings:

• The Task Team agrees that the Office of the Inspector-General for

Intelligence should be given independent status, allowing the Inspector-GeneraltohavefullcontrolovertheresourcesandactivitiesoftheOIGI.

• The Task Team agrees that the legislative mandate of the Inspector-Generalshouldbeamendedtoexcludeinvestigationsintohumanresourcecomplaintsorgrievances.

• OntheissueofthepowersoftheInspector-General,theTaskTeamagreesthat:§ TheInspector-Generalshouldnothavepowerstosubpoenawitnesses.§ Persons appearing before the Inspector-General for purposes of an

investigation or inspection should have no automatic right to legalrepresentation.

§ ThefindingsoftheInspector-Generalinanyinvestigationorinspectionshouldnotbeenforceable,butshouldserveasrecommendations.


• The Task Team strongly supports the need for the urgent issuing ofregulationsgoverningtheconductofinvestigationsandinspectionsbytheInspector-General.

• On the issueof obligatory consultationwith the Inspector-General in thedraftingoramendingoflegislationorregulations,theTaskTeamfindsthatthis would be an unnecessary additional step in the legislation-makingprocess,butagreesthatsuchconsultationshouldtakeplaceasamatterofgoodpracticewhereverpossible.

The2008MatthewsCommissionReportagreedwithmostofthefindingsofthe2006report,except:

• ItdidnotagreethatpersonsappearingbeforetheIGIshouldnothave

automaticrighttolegalrepresentation.• Itdidnotagree that it shouldnotbemandatory for legislation tobe

consultedwiththeIGI.

Over a decade has passed since these two sets of findings on the OIGI weremade byministerial-appointed entities. It appears to the Panel that, with thechange in administration in 2009, there was no follow-up on theserecommendations. The Panel understands, however, that there has been anattempttodraftandpromulgatetheregulationsgoverningtheOIGI.Theseweredrafted in 2010 and submitted to the then Minister and the JSCI, but it wasdecidedtoputtheseonholduntilthepromulgationoftheGILAA–theActwhichamendedall related intelligence legislation toprovide for theestablishmentofthe SSA. After GILAA was promulgated in July 2013, the regulations wereredraftedandprovidedtothethenMinister in2014whodidnotrespond.TheregulationswereprovidedtothethenChairoftheJSCI inNovember2014,buttheOIGIhasheardnothingsince.

OneofthekeyconcernsofthePanelisthelongperiodsoftimethattheIGIposthasbeenvacant.Between1995and2004therehadbeentwoshort-livedIGIs–one for sixweeksandone for sixmonths.Arising fromthis concern, thePanelreceivedanumberofproposalsthataDeputy Inspector-Generalof IntelligencepostshouldbecreatedtoallowtheincumbenttoactintheabsenceoftheIGI.AquestionofconcerntothePanelwastowhatextenttheOIGIhadplayedarolein identifying and curbing the abuses that had occurred in recent years in theSSA.Ofcourse,thefactthatthepostwasvacantfortwoyearsatacrucialtimedidnothelp.However, thePaneldidhave sightof anumberof IGI reportsonabuses,suchasthereportonthePrincipalAgentNetworkandotherswhichdidindeed identify problems and recommend corrective action. But, as far as thePanel could ascertain, no action or consequence management took place inresponsetotheIGI’sreports.ThisraisesthequestionastowhethertheservicesshouldbeobligedtoactonthefindingsandrecommendationsoftheIGIsimilartothestatusoftherecommendationsofthePublicProtector.Thiswouldneedfurtherthought.


The IGI noted that there were a series of legacy issues from previouscertificationsthatremainedunaddressed.Theseincludethefollowing:• TheinvolvementoftheMinisterofStateSecurityinoperationalworkand

administrativedecision-makingoftheSSA;• Certain forms of intrusion such as surveillance and targeting are not

regulated through legislationorministerial regulation, in spiteof the factthat there is a constitutional requirement to legislate such objects andpowers;

• IntermittentrestructuringwithintheSSAhadcreatedrestructuringfatigue;• ContinuedpoliticisationoftheSSAremainedaproblem;• The blurring of the lines between covert and overt operations, where

covertresourcesarebeingusedforovertpurposes;• PoororinadequatetrainingonSSAOperationalDirectives;• The SSA approved framework for the Cover Support Unitmay not be in

compliancewiththeConstitutionandapplicablelaws;• Theappointmentsof seniormanagersofSSAareoftenmadeoutside the

prescribedrecruitmentprocesses;• Thereisacultureofnon-accountabilityintheSSA;• Therearealargenumberofactingcapacityappointments;• TheSSAdoesnothaveaninternalcollectivebargainingmechanism;• TheSSAdoesnotmaintainadequateintegratedelectronicaudittrailsand

logsontheuseofintrusivemeasures;• The administration of applications for intercept of communication is

inadequate;• There is inadequate access to theOIC’s real-time intercepts by the SSA’s

DomesticOperations;• Therearenumerousbarrierstoeffectiveforeignintelligencecollectionand

liaison;• Intelligenceandcounter-intelligenceactivitiesatprovinciallevelhavebeen

seriouslycompromisedbythelackofdedicatedhumancapacityinstrategicareas.

This long list of issues that remainedunaddressed includesmanyof the issuesidentifiedbythePanelandsuggeststhattheIGIwasnotbeingtakenseriouslybytheSSA.

13.3.3 JointStandingCommitteeonIntelligence

TheJSCIisacommitteeofParliamentandisthereforecomprisedofmembersofParliament–bothhouses–variouslyrepresentingtheirpoliticalparties:inotherwords, politicians. In the vision of the founding mothers and fathers of ourconstitutionaldispensation,itwasdesignedasamechanismforourintelligenceservices (as required by other departments of state) to be accountable toParliamentwhiletakingintoaccountthesensitivenatureofintelligencework.


Ultimately,theeffectivenessoftheJSCIrestsontheintegrityofitsmembers,inparticulartheirabilitytoriseabovenarrowparty-politicalinterestsinpursuanceoftheiroversightrole.Italsorestsontheabilityofmembersofthecommitteetounderstand the complexities of the intelligence world. The current NationalSecurity Advisor, who served as amember of the Committee for three years,morerecentlyasitsChair,expressedconcernwiththequalityofsomemembersoftheCommittee.

However,itdidseemtothePanelthattheJSCIplayedlittleroleinrecentyearsincurbing the infractionsof theSSAand thatnoeffectiveoversighton itspartwas carried out. In fact, it would seem that the Committee, with an ANCmajority,wasitselfaffectedbythepoliticisationandfactionalisationseenintheANC, in Parliament, in the intelligence community and in other arms ofgovernment.TheJSCIwasunabletoengagesubstantivelywiththePanel.ThePanelwastoldthat most of the Committee members were new and had no institutionalmemory.Inaddition,theChairoftheCommitteewaschangedthricesince2014andtheprocessofreplacementtooktime;renderingtheCommitteerudderless.Members of the Committee further pointed out that they do not serve in theCommitteeonafull-timebasisandwereonlyabletomeetonceaweekforafewhours.Thecumulativeeffectoftheseissueswasaptlycapturedbyonememberwhoadmittedthat theCommitteehad ‘lostcontrol’of theiroversightroleandthatthreeoftheirannualreportshadnotbeenpresentedtoParliament.


13.4.1 General

a) The fundamentals of South Africa’s intelligence oversightmechanisms aresound, although, over the medium-term, they can be finessed withreferencetorecentinternationaldevelopmentsinthisarea.

b) The oversight mechanisms have failed to act effectively in recent years,especiallyinrelationtotheinfractionsidentifiedinthisreport,largelyduetoneglectorpoliticisationandfactionalisation.

c) Whatever the architecture and specifics are for the intelligence oversightmechanisms,itisimportantthattheyshouldhavetheconfidenceandtrustof the intelligenceservices inorder toensure theservicesplayopencardswiththem.

13.4.2 Inspector-GeneralofIntelligence


d) The findings and recommendations of the 2006 and 2008 reviews cited inthischapter,insofarastheydealwiththeIGI,arefundamentallycorrect.

e) It was a serious dereliction of duty on the part of successiveMinisters ofStateSecuritythattherecommendationsofthetworeviewswerenottakenfurther and that the long-awaited regulations governing the functioningoftheOIGIhavestillnotbeenpromulgated.

f) TheOIGIshouldbeestablishedasaseparateentity,independentoftheSSAoranysuccessorservice,withitsownadministrationandbudget.

g) ThelegislativerequirementfortheIGItohaveknowledgeofintelligenceisavalidandimportantrequirementinordertoallowhimorhertobeabletodetectanyattemptstopullthewooloverhisorhereyes,butalsotoallowtheservicestohaveconfidenceandtrustintheincumbent.

h) GiventhepowersgiventotheIGIbylegislation,itisaseriousfailurethattheIGIposthadbeenleftvacantforsolong,andthatthecreationofaDeputyIGIpostisdesirable.

i) TheOfficeoftheIGIshouldbegivensomelegislatedstatus.

13.4.3 JSCI

j) TheJSCIoverthepast fewyearshasbeen largely ineffectiveand impacted

bythefactionalismoftheANC.k) The Committee is divided and unable to articulate a coherent collective

responseonthestateofintelligenceinthecountry.l) Theabsenceof/changestotheChairoftheCommitteecoupledwitha lack

ofinstitutionalmemoryhascontributedtothedysfunctionalityoftheJSCI.

13.5 Recommendations

a) UrgentlyprocessandpromulgatetheregulationsgoverningthefunctioningoftheIGI.

b) Urgently institute a formal investigation into the issues surrounding thewithdrawaloftheIGI’ssecurityclearance.

c) Establish a task team to review and oversee the implementation of therecommendationsof the2006and2008 reviews insofaras they related totheIGI.

d) ProposeareviewofthefunctioningoftheJSCI.e) Giventhedemandsofintelligenceoversight,theideaofadedicatedcapacity

fortheJSCIneedstobeexploredfurther.


14 Conclusion(WhatWentWrong?)

Throughout its deliberations, every nowand then, the Panel had to raise itself above thevastamountofwrittenandverbalinformationbeforeitandaskitselfthequestion:‘Whatonearthwentwrong?’ThePanelacceptedthatitwasestablishedpreciselybecausetherewasaconcerninthemindofthePresidentandtherecentlyappointedleadershipofthecivilianintelligence community that thingshad indeed gonewrong.Andmuchof the informationavailabletothePanelconfirmedthatthingshadgonebadlywrong.Itmust,however,besaidthatthefindingsofthisPanelonwhatwentwrongdonotimpugneverymemberoftheStateSecurityAgencyanditsmanagement.Theinformationavailableto thePaneland the interviews it conducteddid showthat thereweremany thingsgoingrightandmanymembersdoingtheirbestinadifficultenvironment.Withsomeexceptions,thePanelhasnotpointedfingersatparticular individuals.Thiswaslargelyduetothefactthatitwasnotaninvestigativecommissionortaskteak–itwasnotable to ascertain blame without having had the time and capacity to hear additionalevidence,tore-examinewitnessesonthebasisoffurthertestimonyheard,ortoexamineinminutedetaildocumentationandother records thatmighthave servedasevidence. SuchworkwillneedtofollowtheoutcomeofthisPanel’sfindingsandrecommendationswhereappropriate.In sum, and at a high level, these are the key things, in the viewof the Panel that ‘wentwrong’:

• Fromabout2005,withtheemergenceofthedivisionsintheANC,therehasbeenagrowing politicisation and factionalisation of the civilian intelligence communitybasedon the factions in theANC.Thishasbeenpartlyaggravatedby the fact thatmanyoftheleadershipandmanagementoftheintelligenceserviceshavecomefromanANCand liberationstrugglebackgroundandhaveseemingly, insomecases,notbeen able to separate their professional responsibilities from their politicalinclinations. This became progressively worse during the administration of theformer President, with parallel structures being created that directly served thepersonal and political interests of the President and, in some cases, the relevantministers.Allthiswas incompletebreachoftheConstitution,theWhitePaper,thelegislationandotherprescripts.

• From about 2009, we saw a marked doctrinal shift in the civilian intelligencecommunity, away from the prescripts of the Constitution, White Paper andlegislationandplaingoodpractice.Thiswasmostpubliclyreflectedinthechangeofname from ‘national intelligence’ to ‘state security’. But, more seriously, it wasreflected in the increasing turn to covert structures and projects, the PAN and SOprojects, and was taken to extremes in the proposals contained in the StrategicDevelopmentPlan.

• TheamalgamationofNIAandSASSintotheSSAwasamonumentalblunder.Apartfrom the fact that it did not take place on the basis of a formal change of policy


involvingparliamentaryandpublicconsultationandwasinitiallyirregularlyeffected,it did not achieve its stated intentions of reducing expenditure, effecting bettercoordination,reducingduplicationandsoon.Itmighthaveachievedsomeofthoseinsmallmeasure,butitcreatedmoreproblemsthanitsolved.

• There is a disproportionate application of secrecy in the SSA stifling effectiveaccountabilityandfacilitatingseriousnon-compliancewithcontrolsincludingblatantcriminality.

• Duetowide-rangingresourceabuse,theSSAbecameineffecta‘cashcow’formanyofitsmembersandexternalstakeholders.

These, in theviewof thePanel,are thekeyanswers to thequestion:WhatWentWrong?But,ofcourse,therearemanysubsidiaryanswersinthebodyofthereport.

[EndofReport]


Appendix A – Panell ist Biographies

PANELISTS

DrSydneyMufamadi(Chairperson):isDirectoroftheSchoolofLeadershipintheFacultyof

Management at the University of Johannesburg. He has previously served asMinister of

SafetyandSecurityandasMinisterforProvincialandLocalGovernment.

ProfessorJaneDuncan:isaprofessorandHeadoftheDepartmentofJournalism,Filmand

TelevisionattheUniversityofJohannesburg.BeforethatsheheldaChairinMediaandthe

Information Society at Rhodes University and was Executive Director of the Freedom of

ExpressionInstitute.

MrBarryGilder:iscurrentlyDirectorOperationsattheMapungubweInstituteforStrategic

Reflection(MISTRA)andwaspreviouslydeputydirector-generaloftheSouthAfricanSecret

Service,deputydirector-generaloftheNationalIntelligenceAgency,director-generalofthe

DepartmentofHomeAffairsandCoordinatorforIntelligence.

Dr Siphokazi Magadla: is a Senior Lecturer at the Political and International Studies

departmentatRhodesUniversity.She isa formerResearchConsultantat the Institute for

SecurityStudies.

MrMurrayMichell:istheformerHeadoftheFinancialIntelligenceCentre(FIC).

MsBasetsanaMolebatsi: isaqualifiedattorney,co-founderanddirectorofHarrisNupen

Molebatsi Inc. Her experience includes constitutional law, public law, and general

commerciallaw.ShewaspreviouslytheChairpersonoftheWomen’sLegalCentreTrust.

Rtd.LtGeneralAndrePruis:From1995servedontheAdvisoryCommitteeoftheMinister

of Safety and Security. Served as Divisional Commissioner Operational Response Services

andDeputyNationalCommissionerOperationalServicesoftheSouthAfricanPoliceServices

(SAPS). Retired from the SAPS in 2011 with rank of Lieutenant-


General.

Mr Silumko Sokupa: is a former Provincial Head of NIA in the Eastern Cape; former

Counter Intelligence General Manager in the South African Secret Service and Deputy

Director-General, SASS, responsible for theAfricancontinent.; SpecialEnvoy forPresident

ThaboMbekiinCoted’Ivoire;CoordinatorforNationalIntelligenceuntilretirement.

Professor Anthoni Van Nieuwkerk: Coordinates peace and security studies at theWits

School of Governance. He is a foundingmember of the Institute of Global Dialogue and

servedonthesteeringcommitteesoftheSouthAfricanCouncilon InternationalRelations

andtheConcernedAfricansForum.

Professor Sibusiso Vil-Nkomo: Senior Research Professor at the University of Pretoria,

ChairpersonoftheBoardofGovernorsoftheMapungubweInstituteforStrategicReflection

and former Public Service Commissioner of the democratic government of South Africa.

Knowledgeableinorganisationaldevelopment,policyandgovernance.