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CHAPTER I
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND, DETERMINANTS AND OBJECTIVES OF SOVIET POLICY TOWARDS INDIA
I. Historical Backeround
Cordial relations between the Soviet Union and India could not develop before the
mid-50s, although diplomatic relations were established on 13 April 194 7. 1 Their were
reasons behind such belated development of closer Soviet relations with India. First, the
Soviet Union was preoccupied '"Yith its own postwar problems such as rehabilitation of a
war devasted economy and the threat to her own security in the Cold War started by the
Western Powers, which, in turn, prevented Moscow from giving enough attention to
developing relations with the newly independent countries including India. Secondly, the
Soviet leaders suspected the policies of the Indian leadership during the 194 7-1952 period.
During Stalin's period, the Soviet Union suspected the genuine independence of
India. In most of the Soviet writings India was treated as an Anglo-American colony. The
strong presence of foreign capital in India and its continued membership in the British
Commonwealth of Nations was. considered a proof of the country's vassal status. The
Soviets believed that the British had merely changed the style of their control over India.
India's policy of non-alignment was seen as a hypocritical play between the two camps-
the imperialist and the socialist camps. India's membership in the Commonwealth of
Nations and opposition to Communist revolution in Malaya created suspicion in the Soviet
1 Devendra Kaushik, Soviet Relations with India and Pakistan (Delhi: Vikas Publications, 1971 ), p.26.
Union that India's non-alignment policy was not a really independent policy but a
camouflage for its basically pro -Western course? Nehru's visit to the United States in
October 19493 caused concern in Moscow. The Soviets were of the opinion that India
was moving towards the American camp. The Soviet weekly New Times wrote that the
vacancy left by Chiang Kai Shek was being offered to Prime Minister Nehru who would
play the role of Chiang Kai Shek on behalf of the American camp.4
From 194 7 to 1952, the Soviet Union took an indifferent attitude towards India.
But a slow change in the Soviet policy towards India could be marked towards the end
of 1952 and early 1953, i.e., during the last days of Stalin. The Soviet Union was
influenced by India's recognition of the People's Republic of China, India's role as an
independent anti-colonial power in and outside the U.N., particularly in the Korean War
and India's refusal to sign the Japanese peace treaty (1951). Stalin's successors continued
to support this. new course. Premier Georgy Malenkov in his address to the Supreme
Soviet on 8 August 1953 appreciated India's mediatory role in the Korean War and its
contribution to the efforts of peace-loving countries. He stated: "The position of such a
considerable State as India is of importance for the strengthening of peace in the East".
"We hope that relations between India and the Soviet Union will continue to develop and
strengthen with friendly cooperation as their key note", he further added. 5 This was an
2Iqbal Khanam, "Indo-Soviet Relations", Indian Journal of politics (Aligarh), vol.28, September-December 1984, p.ll7.
3Vijay Sen Budhraj, Soviet Russia And The Hindustan Subcontinent (New Delhi: Somaiya Publications, 1973), pp.36-37.
4"Chiang Kai Shek's Successor", New Times (Moscow), no.42, 12 October 1949, pp. 20-21.
5Pravda (Moscow), 9 August 1953.
2
early official expression of a Soviet shift in attitude towards India and its non-alignment
policy. In December 1953, the first comprehensive trade agreement was concluded
between India and the USSR laying the foundation of Indo- Soviet economic relations.6
Close relations between the Soviet Union and India were established in the
mid-50s. There were certain factors which were responsible for bringing the Soviet Union
and India closer to each other. The immediate objective factor which brought the two
countries closer to each other was derived from their security needs in the mid-50s. The
United States succeeded in persuading Pakistan to join the US-led military alliances in the
region. Pakistan joined the SEJ\TO (September 1954) and the Baghdad Pact (February
1955). 7 This event aroused the historical fear of the encirclement of the Soviet Union by
hostile powers. Under such conditions, it was natural for the Soviet Union to make
friendly overtures to India, an important country in this region which had refused to
participate in the Dullesian strategy of containing communism. It was India whose
non-participation in the military alliance system foiled the US attempt to complete the
encirclement of the USSR Hence, in the Soviet view, India's neutrality became a
minimum requirement for ensuring the Soviet security.8 Pakistan's participation in the
US sponsored military alliances also posed a security threat to India. As Pakistan became
a member of the US-led military alliance system, America concluded a mutual defence
assistance pact with Pakistan on 19 May 1954, in Karachi, under which it agreed to
6Jyotim10y Banerjee, "Security Relations", Seminar (New Delhi), no. 265, September 1981, p.l2.
7Richard B. Remnek, Soviet Policy towards India: The Role of Soviet Scholars in the Formulation of Soviet Foreign Policy (New Delhi: Oxford and IBH Publishing Company, 1975), p.l3.
l!Nirmala Joshi, "Regional Situation", Seminar, n.6, p.l7.
3
provide military aid to Pakistan.9 Though the US motive behind such military assistance
to Pakistan was to prevent the Communist expansion, it was clear that Pakistan was
preparing herself militarily to solve the Kashmir issue in her favour. This fact was
admitted by Feroz Khan, the then Foreign Minister of Pakistan, who stated: "We want
them (members of the Baghdad Pact) for our defence ... Our first duty is to strengthen our
. defence particularly against India no matter what others might say". But later on, this
argument was disapproved by the Pakistani President Ayub Khan. 10 It was quite natural
for India to perceive a security threat in the American military assistance to Pakistan and
the latter's membership of military pacts because of India's hostile relations with Pakistan.
Thus, convergence of the Soviet-Indian security interests against the backdrop of the
US-Pakistan alliance became instrumental in bringing the two countries closer to each
other. The basic community of interests created by the anti-imperialist aims of the two
countries provided the objective ground for their close relations, .whereas the US military
assistance to Pakistan, worked as decisive subjective factor behind India's favourable
response to the Soviet Union's friendly overtures aimed at thwarting America's design to
isolate the USSR in Asia and encircle it by hostile military blocs. 11
The signing of the Sino-Indian agreement on Tibet in 195412 embodying the five
principles of peaceful co-existence was highly appreciated by the Soviets. Moreover, the
9yed Vati Chaturshreni, Indo-US Relations (New Delhi: National Publishing House, 1980), p.223.
10S.S. Bindra, Indo-Pak Relations: Tashkent to Simla Agreement (New Delhi: Deep and Deep Publications, 1981 ), p.32. ·
11Devendra Kaushik, "The New Cold War: The Soviet Union and Eastern Europe", in Satish Kumar, ed., Yearbook on India's Foreign Policy. 1982-83 (New Delhi: Sage Publications, 1985), p.144.
12Keesing's Contemporary Archives (London), vol. 9, 1952-1954, p.l3588.
4
Bandung Conference of Asian and African nations, held in April 1955,13 added new
dimensions to the Soviet Union'& understanding of the Afro-Asian world and India's place
in it. The USSR realised the importance of uniting the forces of the newly independent
Afro - Asian countries to influence world politics.
A breakthrough in Soviet-Indian relations occurred in 1955, when state visits were
exchanged by the leaders of the two countries. Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru
paid a visit to the USSR from 7 to 23 June 1955. After his meeting with Premier Nikolai
Bulganian, a joint communique was issued on 23 June 1955, in which a convergent
position was found on a number of issues such as international recognition of China and
desirability of improved Soviet-'Yugoslav relations and disarmament. The two countries
also agreed that their relations would be guided by the five principles of peaceful
co-existence. 14 The return visit of the Soviet leader Khrushchev and Bulganin took place
in November - December 1955.15 This visit was a landmark in Soviet - Indian relations.
The Soviet leader Khrushchev publicly rendered Soviet support to India's position on
Kashmir and Goa which India needed strongly. 16 At a reception given by the Premier
of Kashmir in Srinagar on 10 December 1955, the Soviet leader Khrushchev stated: "The
question of Kashmir as one of the States of the Republic of India has already been
13Robert Litwak, "The Soviet Union in India's Security Perspective", in Timothy George and others, Security in Southern Asia 2: India and Great Powers (Aldershot: Gower Publishing Company, 1984 ), p. 76.
14Bimal Prasad, Indo-Soviet Relations. 1947-1972: A documentary study (New Delhi: Allied Publishers, 1973), pp.103-06.
15N.A. Bulganin, N.S. Khrushchev, Speeches During Sojourn in India, Burma and Mghanistan. November-December 1955 (New Delhi: Representative of TASS in India, 1956), p.ll3.
16"Statement of N.A. Bulganin and N.S. Khrushchev at a Press Conference in Delhi, December 14, 1955", in Bulganin, Khrushchev, n.l5, p.l03.
5
decided by the people of Kashmir. "17 The Kashmir issue had a direct bearing on Soviet
national interests due to its geographical position. Khrushchev was worried because of
Western opposition to India's policy towards Kashmir. He decided to support India on the
Kashmir issue because the inclusion of Kashmir in a non-aligned friendly India would
have served Soviet interests better than its merger in unfriendly Pakistan, which was
providing military bases for the Americans in that part of Kashmir which was under
Pakistan's control. 18
On 2 February 1955, the Soviet Union agreed to give assistance to India for
constructing a steel plant at Bhilai. 19 This agreement was significant as it came at a time
when negotiations to construct another steel plant had failed, and when the United States
was not willing to extend aid to the public sector. One of the political aims of the Soviet
Union behind such economic assistance was to reduce India's economic dependence on
Western countries. In their joint statement issued on 13 December 1955, both India and
the Soviet Union expressed their adherence to five principles of peaceful co-existence,
disarmament and opposition to military alliances or regional military blocs.20 During
their visit, the Soviet leaders concurred with the Indian view on three issues - Kashmir,
Goa and opposition to military alliances. This sharing of Indian perceptions could be
17Ibid., p.86.
18J.A. Naik, Soviet Policy towards India: From Stalin to Brezhnev (Delhi: Vikas Publications, 1970), p.91.
19"lndo-Soviet Steel Agreement", Foreign Affairs Record (New Delhi: External Publicity Division, Ministry of Ex1emal Affairs, Government of India), vol.l, no.2, February 1955, p.32.
20"Joint Statement By N.A. Bulganin, Chariman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, N.S. Khrushchev, Member of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR And Jawaharlal Nehru, Prime Minister of India, December 13, 1955", in Bulganin, Khrushchev, n.l5, pp.ll3-17.
6
possible due to change in the Soviet policy towards India and due to the embittered Soviet
relations with the West.
Yet, even during the heyday of development of Soviet-Indian relations in mid-50s,
Prime Minister Nehru refrained from criticising NATO. Despite the differences with the
United States on some issues, Nehru's Government maintained cordial and friendly
relations with the USA. Nehru did not want to earn disfavour of the Western countries.
In this context, the assurance given by the then Secretary General of the External Affairs
Ministry Pillai to the Canadian High Commissioner, Escott Reid, deserves attention. Pillai
gave assurance to Escott Reid that the reference to military pacts in the Indo-Soviet joint
communique issued after the 1955 visit of Khrushchev and Bulganin, did not apply to
NATO but only to the Baghdad Pact.21 On the other hand, Nehru strongly criticised the
formation of SEATO and Baghdad Pact. In the Lok Sabha of India, on 29 march 1956,
he stated " ... that the approach of military pacts, like the Baghdad Pact ~d SEATO, is a
wrong approach ... both for larger reasons and for the narrow reason of self-interest. ... "22
The understanding which was achieved between the Soviet Union and India
through exchange of state. visits in 1955 was further developed by the 20th Congress of
the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) held in February 1956.23 This
Congress pointed out the emergence of a vast peace zone of peace-loving states both
21 Escott Reid, Envoy to Nehru (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1981), p.140.
22Jawahar1a1 Nehru, Jawaharlal Nehru Speeches. March 1953 -August 1957 (New Delhi: Publications Division, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Government of India, 1958}, vol.3, pp.319-20.
23Pravda, 15 February 19 56.
7
socialist and non-socialist of Europe and Asia. 24 In his report to this Congress,
Khrushchev, the First Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU, specifically
referred to India as a "Great Power" and praised its contribution to strengthening of peace
in Asia and the whole world. 25 He also stated that the visit of Soviet representatives to
India confirmed the identity of views existing between the Soviet Union and Republic of
India on fundamental international issue, i.e., the preservation and consolidation of
universal peace and the national independence of all states. 26 He further stated that the
famous five principles of peaceful co-existence advanced by the People's Republic of
China and India and supported by the Bandung Conference provided the best form for
relations between countries with different social systems?7 The Indian Prime Minister
Nehru was impressed by the adoption of "a new line and a new policy" by the CPSU
Congress. In the Indian Parliament, he hailed it as "a step towards the creation of
conditions favourable to the pursuit of a policy of peaceful co-existence, is important for
us as well as others" _28
Cordial and cooperative relations with the Soviet Union by that time had become
the cornerstone of India's foreign policy. India and the USSR adopted a common
approach in the Suez crisis condemning the predatory character of Western colonialism.
2~.S. Khrushchev, Report of"the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union at the 20th Party Congress (New Delhi: Representative ofT ASS in India, 1956), p.19.
25Ibid., p.23 and 29.
26Ibid., p.27.
27Ibid., p.39.
28 Jawaharlal Nehru, India's Foreign Policy: Selected Speeches. September 1946-April 1961 (New Delhi: Publications Division, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Government of India, 1961), p.578.
8
Nehru promptly reacted to the Anglo-French-Israeli invasion of Egypt in October 1956.
However, the cordiality in Soviet-Indian relations was marred by India's unfavourable
attitude towards the Soviet Union in the Hungarian crisis (1956). In the Lok Sabha, Nehru
described the events in Hungary as "tragic" but showed his indication to accept the
Yugoslav assessment of the situation in Hungary that it was a revolt inspired by internal
reactionaries with foreign instigation and aid. 29 India abstained from voting on the
American sponsored resolution the UN General Assembly passed on 4 November 1956,
condemning the Soviet "intervention" while demanding the withdrawal of the Warsaw
Pact forces and authorising the Security Council to form a commission for thoroughly
investigating the Hungarian crisis.30 India did not vote in favour of this resolution as it
considered the tone and content ?fthe resolution objectionable. It did not like to condemn
any country and the institution of a commission to go into the affairs of Hungary. India
also abstained on the resolution passed on 9 November in the General Assembly calling
for the withdrawal of Soviet troops and the subsequent holding of free elections in
Hungary under the auspices of the UN. Nehru did not favour such election under the
auspices of the UN as he felt that this was contrary to the UN Charter and would reduce
Hungary to less than a sovereign state. 31 He made it clear in the Lok Sabha that when
India abstained in the voting on UN resolution, it stood for withdrawal and rejected the
other resolution due to the phrase that free elections were to be held "under the United
29lndia, Lok Sabha, Debates, pt.2, vol.9, no.3, 20 November 1956, col.38l.
30GAOR, yr 2, mtg 569, 4 November 1956, p.44.
31 "Nehru's Statement in Lok Sabha, 16 November 1956", see Nehru, n.28, p.556.
9
Nations auspices."32 On 19 November in the Lok Sabha he said, "We want foreign
forces to be withdrawn from Egypt as well as Hungary. "33 Later on, the Indian
delegation, together with those of Ceylon and Indonesia, moved a resolution which, while
incorporating the Western charges against the Soviet Union and the Soviet denial of them
demanded the Hungarian Government "to permit observers designated by the Secretary
General to enter the territory of Hungary to travel freely therein, and to report their
finding to the Secretary General. "34
Nehru's critical stand on. the Soviet intervention in Hungary greatly irritated the
Soviet leaders. Yet, they remained sympathetical towards India on the Kashmir issue. In
one meeting of the Security Council,held on 20 February 1957, the Soviet delegate
Sobolev pleaded for "direct approach" of "bilateral negotiations" for the peaceful
settlement of Kashmir question, and opposed to the matter of sending U.N. forces to
Kashmir for holding a plebiscite there. Js When the draft resolution sponsored by the UK,
the USA, China and Australia was put to vote on 20 February 1957 in the UN Security
Council, which recommended the despatch of UN forces to Kashmir in order to conduct
a plebiscite, the Soviet Union used its veto against the resolution.36 This support made
the Indian leaders realise that the Soviet Union was the most dependable friend of India.
The Soviet Union continued to support India on the Kashmir issue in later years. Like a
32Nehru, n.22, p.334.
33Ibid., p.327.
34GAOR, session 2. plen mtg 587, vol.l, 1956-57, p.188.
35SCOR. year 12, mtg 773, 20 February 1957, pp. 4-6.
36Ibid., p.29.
10
trusted friend, the Soviet Union in June 1957 extended support to India's unsuccessful
attempt to find a place on the proposed Five-Power Disarmament Commission in
London.37 The Soviet Union was not quite happy with Nehru's public criticism of the
soviet campaign against Yugosl(\via in the year 1958 and with Congress Party's campaign
against the Communist government in Kerala and also with Nehru's article "The Basic
Approach, "38 where he strongly criticised the Indian Communists as devotees of
violence. Nehru's views were strongly criticised by Soviet Academician Pavel Yudin.
Nehru was wise enough to moderate his anti-Soviet criticisms following the further
deterioration of Sino-Indian relations in 1959. Sino-Indian border clashes occurred in
August-September 1959.39 India needed Soviet support in the sense that the latter might
perswtde fraternal China to keep away from such hostilities. The border conflict put the
Soviets in a difficult position of· choosing between "fraternal" State with which relations
were deteriorating rapidly and a "bourgeoisie" State with which relations were being,
carefully cultivated. The Soviet Union preferred to be neutral in the Sino-Indian border
conflict. It called for the settlement of the dispute by means of direct negotiations between
Beijing and New Delhi. But over the next few years, the Soviet Union became critical of
China's attitude towards India. It enhanced its economic and cultural relations with India
and initiated a military assistance programme. In 1960, for the first time, India purchased
37Hemen Ray, Indo-SoYiet Relations. 1955-1971 (Bombay: Jaico Publishing House, 1973), pp.73-74.
38Jawahar1a1Nehru, "The Basic Approach", A.I.C.C. Economic Review (NewDe1hi), no.IO, 15 May 1958, pp. 3-6.
3~y, n.37, p.80.
11
arms from the Soviet Union such as helicopters and planes.40 In August 1962, the
military relationship strengthened further when the Soviet Government agreed to allow
India to produce Mig-21 aircraft under licence although it had supplied only Mig-19s to
China. 41 The Soviet decision to grant licence to India to manufacture Mig - 21 came at
the time when Sino-Soviet relations deteriorated to the lowest point.
However, during this short period of closeness, differences developed between the
Soviet Union and India over the Congo issue.42 Khrushchev got annoyed with Nehru
when in September 1961 in the Conference of Non-aligned countries held in Belgrade,
Nehru expressed his concern over the resumption of nuclear tests by the Soviet Union.
He stated that the danger of war coming nearer and had been enhanced perhaps by the
decision of Soviet Government to start nuclear tests.43 Nehru came to Moscow on 6
September 1961 to convey the message of the non-aligned countries to the Soviet
Government regarding this issue.44 He personally appealed to Khrushchev to stop further
nuclear tests and told that "it is not fitting for a great country to indulge in tests for
experiments of this type"; 45 Khrushchev explained the motives and reasons which led
the Soviet Union to decide to rt::sume nuclear tests. He stated that the Soviet Union was
4<>peter J.S. Duncan, The Soviet Union and India (London: Routledge, 1989), p.16.
41 Jyotinnoy Banerjee, "Moscow's strategic link with New Delhi: An Interim Assessment", China Report (New Delhi), vol.l9, no.1, January-February 1983, p.7.
42For details see Ray, n.37, pp.96-97.
43"Speech at the Conference of Non-aligned Nations, Belgrade, September 2, 1961", in Jawaharlal Nehru, Jawaharlal Nehru's Speeches. September 1957- April 1963 (New Delhi: Publications Division, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Government of India, 1964), vol.4, p.363.
4"The Hindu (Madras), 7 September 1961.
45Cited in Ray, n.37, p.99.
12
compelled to adopt this course in self-defence, because the Western Powers had stepped
up the arms race thereby aggravating the international situation. 46 Although Khrushchev
justified Soviet nuclear test, he was obviously embarrassed by Nehru's condemnation of
resumption of nuclear test by the USSR. In spite of these differences, Khrushchev
commended traditional friendship and growing cooperation between the Soviet Union and
India, and offered increased assistance for the economic development of India. The main
objective behind Khrushchev's decision to continue such friendship with India and
maintain understanding with Nehru was the Soviet leader's desire to use India as a
"bulwark" against the Communist China. The Soviet Union supported India on the
liberation of Goa from the Portuguese rule in 196147 which further strengthened the
Soviet-Indian relations.
India faced a serious challenge in October 1962 due to the Chinese armed
aggression against India. 48 At t~is critical juncture, it was natural for India to seek Soviet
support. But it was difficult for the Soviet Union to give support to India against China
because of its involvement in the Cuban missile crisis where the Chinese had rendered
fullfledged support to the Socialist camp. Keeping into consideration this fact, the Soviet
leaders initially backed China in the Sino-Indian War as they needed Chinese support in
the Cuban missile crisis. The Soviet newspaper Pravda wrote its first editorial on the
Sino-Indian War on 25 October 1962, supporting the Chinese proposals for the end of the
46"1ndo-Soviet Joint Statement, II September 1961 ", in Prasad, n.l4, p.223.
47See SCOR, yr 16, mtg 987, 18 December 1961, p.26.
48S.P. Singh, Political Dimensions of India-USSR Relations (New Delhi: Allied Publishers, 1987), p. 75.
13
conflict and describing them as "constructive".49 But Nehru did not agree to accept the
Chinese proposal for ceasefire unless the Chinese troops were withdrawn to the position
of 8 September 1962. Lack of Soviet support to India at this critical hour for its security
served to stir-up anti-Soviet feelings. It appeared that certain degree of coolness crept into
Soviet-Indian relationship. However, the Soviet policy in the Sino-Indian War changed
when the Cuban missile crisis subsided and the Soviets did not require the Chinese
support. At that time, Pravda brought out another editorial on the Sino-Indian War on 5
November 1962, which expressed Soviet neutrality in the war. The editorial demanded
ceasefrre and peaceful settlement of the conflict through negotiation. It further expressed
that the bloodshed could not be allowed to continue. 5° It is clear from these two editori
als brought out by Pravda that the main concern of the Soviet Union was to maintain
peace in the region through negotiations and not through military means.
d' As the Sino-Soviet relations further deteriorated during 1963-64, a change could
be observed in the Soviet policy towards the Sino-Indian conflict. The Soviet Union
abandoned its policy of neutrality and started accusing China for fomenting a crisis. It
switched back to a policy of cordiality towards India which was manifested in the Soviet
military and economic assistance given to India. The purpose of Soviet aid to India was
to promote India's political and economic independence. In the political field too, the
Soviet Union remained consistent supporter of the Indian Government at the international
forums on the issue of Kashmir, which is directly related to India's national interest,
49J>rnvda, 25 October 1962.
50pravda, 5 November 1962.
14
i.e.,her territorial integrity.
Pakistan's growing relations with China also influenced the Soviet policy towards
India. A major consequence of the 1962 Sino-Indian border War had been the warming
of relations between India's two major adversaries - China and Pakistan. On 2 March
1963, a border agreement was signed between Pakistan and China.s1 Under this
agreement, Pakistan ceded 2,050 square miles territory from Pakistan occupied Kashmir
to China.s2 This agreement afforded de facto recognition to Pakistan's claim to Kashmir.
This new development, Sino-Pakistan rapprochement, increased Soviet concern in
the subcontinent as it had a bearing on Soviet security considerations. The Soviet Union's
relations with China had already been strained. In this situation, the Soviets were not
inclined to view favourably the development of close Sino-Pak relations and increase of
the Chinese influence in the region. Hence, at this point of time, the main concern of the
Soviet Union was to wean Pakistan away from China. The Soviet Union started
cultivating Pakistan from 1964-65 onwards and the result was Pakistan President Ayub
Khan's visit to Moscow in April 1965, the first ever visit by a Pakistani head of the
State.SJ
The development of Soviet-Pakistan relations caused much concern in India. The
Indian Prime Minister L.B. Shastri paid a visit to Moscow in May 1965,54 just after one
51 "Boundary Agreement between China and Pakistan, 2 March 1963 ", in R.K. Jain, ed., China. Pakistan and Bngladesh: Basic Documents, 1950-76 (New Delhi: Radiant Publishers, 1977), vol. 2, p.52.
52" Jawaharlal Nehru's Statement in Lok Sabha, 5 March 1963 ", India, Lok Sabha, Debates, series 3,
vol.l4, 5 March 1963, col. 2163.
53Singh. n.48, p. 116.
S4Foreign Affairs Record (New Delhi), vol. 11, no.5, May 1965, p.IO 1.
15
month of Pakistan President's visit to that country. The purpose of Shastri's visit to the
Soviet Union was to discuss the·recent flare-up of Indo-Pakistani fighting in the Rann of
Kutch and other important matters. The development of Soviet-Pale relations did not mean
that the Sovi~t Union had left India or India's importance decreased in the eyes of the
Soviets. In fact, the Soviet Union wanted to balance its relations with India and Pakistan.
It never thought of adopting a competitive approach to these two countries. The USSR
desired to be friendly with both India and Pakistan and never tried to incite one against
the other. The main objective of the Soviet Union in South Asia was to check the Chinese
influence in the region. When the Soviet Union got opportunity in the sense that Pakistan
responded favourably to Soviet overtures, the former actively engaged itself in weaning
Pakistan away from China. But at the same time, the Soviet Union did not want to expand
its relations with Pakistan at the cost of its primary regional relationship with India. As
such, the USSR felt it necessary to remove Indian misgivings about Ayub Khan's visit
to Moscow. During Shastri's visit, Premier Kosygin made it clear to Shastri that "when
the Soviet Union is striving to improve its relations with a third country,this does not have
to be at the cost of Soviet-Indian friendship ... ss He also clarified that the purpose of such
friendship was to "stabilize the situation in South Asia. "s6
The USSR adopted an impartial attitude towards India and Pakistan in the
hostilities in the Rann of Kutch. It sent similar messages to Indian and Pakistani
governments demanding a cessation of hostilities. The impartiality had also been shown
55Pravda, 16 May 1965.
56Prnvda, 9 May 1965.
16
in the Indo-Pak War of August 1965 fought on the issue of Kashmir. The USSR knew
very well that continuation of hostilities between India and Pakistan would weaken the
two countries and strengthen China in the region. This was the reason why A.N. Kosygin,
the Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, sent messages to both Lal Bahadur
Shastri and Ayub Khan on 4 September 1965 to stop military operations and settle the
dispute by peaceful means. He ~so offered Soviet good offices to settle their dispute. s?
On the contrary, C~a instigated Pakistan to continue fighting. It threatened India by
issuing an ultimatum to India on 17 September 1965 demanding the removal of all Indian
military establishment on the Chinese side of the Sikkim-Chinese border. ss
The Soviet Union became cautious due to the Chinese move and interference in
the Indo-Pak conflict. The Soviet leaders favoured a rapid termination of the Indo-Pak
conflict which was the best guarantee against any further escalation of the conflict and the
possible Chinese interv~ntion on behalf of Pakistan. Any Chinese involvement in the war
would have adverse consequences for India and would further affect peace and stability
in South Asia. Moreover, the Chinese involvement in the war would compel India to seek
military assistance from Washington which would ultimately jeopardise Soviet relations
with India and Soviet interests in South Asia. In that case, the Soviet Union might have
to abandon its neutral posture and get itself involved in the war. But the USSR did not
want any open hostility with China. Taking into consideration all these possible
consequences of the. Chinese involvement in the Indo-Pak War, the Soviet Union thought
57Pravda, 12 September 1965.
581ndia, Lok Sabha, Debates, series 3, vol.46, session 12, 17 September 1965, cols. 6332-335.
17
that the immediate termination of war was essential to maintain peace and stability in
India and Pakistan. Moreover, the Soviet Union was concerned, because the war was
taking place in a region immediately adjacent to the frontier of the Soviet Union. So, it
was necessary to stop the escalation of war immediately. The Soviet Premier Kosygin, on
17 September 1965, i.e., the day Indian Government received Chinese ultimatum, sent
message to both Prime Minister Shastri and President Ayub Khan in which he proposed
to have a direct meeting between the leaders of India and Pakistan on the Soviet soil,
preferably in Tashkent to reach an agreement on the establishment of peace between the
two countries. He also offered his good offices on request for this purpose. 59 The
lndo-Pak War came to an end when both India and Pakistan accepted the Security Council
resolution passed on 20 September 196560 and implemented the ceasefire. After the
ceasefire, on the initiative of Premier Kosygin, Prime Minister L.B. Shastri and President
Ayub Khan met in a conference held at Tashkent from 3 January to 10 January 1966.61
The Soviet leaders played host at Tashkent Summit and the agreement for the termination
of war and restoration of peace between India and Pakistan was signed at Tashkent on I 0
January 1966.62 This agreement CO\lld be concluded due to the great pains taken by
Premier Kosygin to bring the two sides closer. Although Kosygin's mediation did not suc
ceed in settling the political futu~e of Kashmir it brought to an end the immediate conflict.
The conclusion of Tashkent Agreement between India and Pakistan was a victory of
5~vda, 20 September I965.
60Singh, n.48, p.I25.
61Ka~ n.l, p.94.
62Thc Statesman (New Delhi), II January I966.
18
Soviet diplomacy. The Soviet Union emerged as a peace maker in the subcontinent. The
Soviet mediation helped in bringing rapprochement between India and Pakistan which was
essential to contain the Chinese influence.
The USSR tried to bring India and Pakistan closer to each other. It made efforts
to strengthen its relations with both India and Pakistan and to bridge the gap between the
two countries. The Soviet policy was directed to wean Pakistan away from the USA and
China so that it could build up ·both India and Pakistan as a counterpoise to China. In
continuation of this Soviet policy, the Soviet Premier Kosygin paid a five-day visit to
Pakistan in April 1968 (17 to 20 April 1968}, the first ever visit of the Soviet Prime
Minister to Pakistan. 63 The main purpose of this visit was to remove the Pakistani fears
aroused by Soviet decision to supply arms to India. Keeping in view Pakistani demand
for arms, Kosygin agreed to give a very limited quantity of arms to Pakistan such as
helicopters, spare parts for aircraft, some medium tanks and field guns. The Soviet Union
signed an arms deal with Pakistan in July 1968 during the visit of Commander-in-Chief
of the Pakistani Army General Yahya Khan to Moscow.64
India was watching these Soviet moves towards Pakistan during the few years
since Tashkent meeting and was seriously concerned over the new approach of the Soviet
Union towards India and Pakistan. The Soviet military assistance to Pakistan, which was
not friendly to India raised Indian anxieties. The Indian Prime Minister Mrs. Indira
63Kaushik, n. I , p. I 07.
64Raghunath Ram, Soviet Policy ':fowards Pakistan (New Delhi: S.Chand & Company Ltd., 1983), p.203.
19
Gandhi reacted on 9 July 1968 in Calcutta while talking to newsmen. She said: 11We are
not happy with the reported Soviet offer of arms to Pakistan ... .''65 But she also made it
clear that India's policy towards the Soviet Union would not undergo any change. 66 Mrs.
Gandhi even apprised the Soviet leaders of India's concern. The matter of Soviet decision
to supply arms to Pakistan was seriously discussed in the Indian Parliament. Mrs. Gandhi
informed the Lok Sabha that she had received assurances from the Soviet Government
that the Soviet agreement with Pakistan would not be allowed to affect Indo-Soviet
relations or harm India's interests.67 The argument given by the Soviet Union was that
the arms deal was only symbolic and would not upset the military balance in South
Asia. 68 It could further be argued that their limited military assistance to Pakistan would
increase Soviets' leverage then~ - an influence which would be exercised against any
military venture. 69 The Soviets considered the arms. deal as a means of neutralising the
growing Chinese influence there and reaffirming its balanced policy towards
India-Pakistan subcontinent. However, India had to subdue its official reaction on this
issue due to its economic and military dependence on the Soviet Union. But Indian
dissatisfaction with the Soviet approach towards the subcontinent prompted her to make
attempt to expand the scope of its diplomatic manoeuvrability. For instance, in August
6Yn1e Statesman (Calcutta), lO July 1968.
6ilndia, Lok Sabha, Debates, series 4, vol. 18, session 5, 22 July 1968, col.290.
68Pravda, 29 July 1968.
6~ohammed Ayub, "Soviet Arms Aid to Pakistan", Economic and Political Weekly (Bombay), 19 October 1968, pp. 1613-614.
20
THESIS 327.47054
Su59 So
Ill II II II \Ill 111111111111 TH6820
1968 and January 1969, Mrs. Indira Gandhi approached the Chinese Government about
a possible normalisation of relations although China was unreceptive to these overtures. 70
A careful analysis of the Soviet policy towards India and Pakistan in the 60s
reveals that the Soviet Unio~ had been motivated by its national interests in the region.
Since India and Pakistan were strategically important for the Soviet Union due to their
geographical location close to its southern borders, the latter wanted to maintain peace and
stability in this area and keep this area free from outside interference. The establishment
of friendly relations with only India would not have served Soviet purpose. Pakistan was
equally important for the USSR due to the former's strategic location. From the very
beginning, the Soviet Union tried to develop good relations with Pakistan. But the latter's
joining of Western military alliances thwarted Soviet attempt in this direction. The Soviets
were aware of the reality that no amount of economic aid would be as effective as a
symbolic supply of arms to Pakistan. Moscow agreed to supply arms to Pakistan only with
a view to wean Pakistan away from China as well as the Western camp. It was not
interested in exploiting the Indo-Pakistani conflict by giving arms aid to Pakistan. Its
move to go in for an arms deal with Islamabad was aimed at increasing its influence
there. It was genuinely interested in improving relations with both India and Pakistan. It
made sincere efforts since the days of Indo-Pakistani War of 1965 and the Tashkent
declaration to bridge the gulf between the two countries. It always demanded a mutual
and bilateral settlement of the lndo-Pak conflict through peaceful means. It never wanted
a war between India and Pakistan as it would invite the possible intervention of outside
7~h Kapur, "India and the So,iet Union", in K.P. Mishra, ed., Foreign Policy of India: A book of readings (New Delhi: Thomson Press, 1977), p.264.
I r-\ A r ~~;,.~ ~ ' q ~\', v~~\~.7· I T ~ g ( t:n: ~t ,\~-· ~- •.
\. ,, ., ....., ,~
21
.•. '\.. ·:;
powers and lead to escalation of conflict which would definitely affect Soviet national
interests.
During the late 60s, the Soviet-Indian relations were marked by strains and
stresses. First, the Government of India discovered in 1968 certain Soviet maps which
showed the borderterritory of Aksai Chin, claimed by India as belonging to China. India
was upset by discovering such Soviet maps. Despite Indian protests in 1956, 1958 and
1966, no alterations were made in the Soviet maps favouring the Chinese position in the
territorial dispute. Secondly, the critical stand of Indian Government on the Soviet
inv~ion of Czechoslovakia on 21 August 196871 along with Polish, Bulgarian, Hun
garian and East German armed forces annoyed the Soviet Union. Most of the Indian
newspapers condemned the Soviet bloc intervention in Czechoslovakia. The Indian
delegate G. Parthasarathi in the U.N. Security Council discussion expressed India's firm
"respect for the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of Czechoslovakia". He
demanded the withdrawal of foreign forces from Czechoslovakia and the "safety and
security of its leaders and people. '172 Despite Indian support to the Czech people against
the Soviet intervention, India abstained from voting on the Western sponsored draft
resolution, condemning Soviet and her allies' armed intervention in Czechoslovakia which
was moved in the Security Council on 22 August 1968.73 India preferred to abstain from
voting in the Security Council against the Soviet Union, because it was not in favour of
71 Ray, n.37, p.167.
72SCOR, year 23, mtg 1443, 22 August 1968, p.26.
731bid., p.29.
22
incurring Soviet displeasure.
Thirdly, the Soviet and Indian stand differed on the Nuclear Non-Proliferation
issue. The Soviet Union was one of the sponsors of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
which was signed in the year 1968.74 India did not sign the treaty on discriminatory
ground and resisted Soviet pressure to sign it. India wanted to keep her nuclear options
open to protect her national interest. However, the Soviets tried to persuade India to
refrain from developing her own nuclear weapons.
Besides the above mentioned issues, there were some other issues on which Indian
and Soviet positions diverged such as India's reluctance to recognise the Provisional
Revolutionary Government of South Vietnam and the German Democratic Republic.
Furthermore, differences developed due to India's negative response to Brezhnev's
proposal for an' Asian collective security system' which India viewed as directed against
China. The Soviet prop~sal for establishing collective security system in Asia was intro
duced in June 1969.75 This proposal carne up in the immediate aftermath of the
Sino-Soviet border War, which flared up on the Ussuri River in the Demanskiy island
area in March 1969.76 During 1969, the Soviet Union increasingly perceived a threat
from China. It was widely believed that the real motive behind the Brezhnev proposal was
the need to counteract the Chinese threat. Brezhnev' s proposal for collective security
74Vinod Bhatia, Indira Gandhi and Indo-Soviet Relations (New Delhi: Panchsheel Publishers, 1987), p.29.
75Soviet Review (New Delhi : Published by the Infonnation Department of the USSR Embassy in India), 14 June 1969, p.55.
760.B.Borisov and B.T.Koloskov, Soviet-Chinese Relations. 1945-1970 (Bloomington and London: Indiana University Press, 1975), p. 322.
23
system incorporated the principles like renunciation of use of force, respect for
sovereignty and non-interference in internal affairs etc. keeping in line with the principles
of the UN charter.77 Perhaps, the inclusion of the "inviolability of borders" indicated that
Moscow placed the onus for Sino-Soviet border tensions on Beijing, which had concluded
final border agreements with most of the countries on its periphery with the exception of
the Soviet Union and India.
India did not react favourably to Brezhnev's plan. The Indian Prime Minister Mrs.
Indira Gandhi's first response to Brezhnev's proposal was not enthusiastic. She stated on
10 June 1969 that "unless each country is strong in itself, even collective security will not
amount to much. "78 She further expressed her opinion regarding Asian collective security
system while delivering a speech before the members of the Diet in Tokyo on 25 June
1969. According to her, the Asian collective security system proposed by the Soviet
Union was probably meant to restrain the USA and China from making inroads into
Asia. 79 Mrs. Gandhi stated that China was showing an inclination to spread its influence
in Asia and that in such a situation it was desirable that all the countries in Asia should
have political and economic stability to prevent Chinese expansionism. 80 But India did
not endorse the idea of Asian collective security system fearing that India's interest in it
would further alienate China.81 At a time, when India was trying to normalise its
77Soviet Review (New Delhi), 28 March 1972, p. 24.
78Times of India (New Delhi), II ·June 1969.
79Summarv of World Broadcasts/F E-3110, 25 June 1969.
80Ibid.
81 Times of India, 28 June 1969.
24
relations with China joining of ~y such Soviet sponsored collective security arrangement
would have only foreclosed the door of improvement of relations with that country. At
a Press conference held in Djakarta, Mrs. Gandhi stated: "If he is talking of military
alliance or pact, we would disagree. If he is talking of economic cooperation, it would be
a different matter." 82Mrs. Gandhi described "an alliance of Asian countries as useless
since an alliance of one group would cause an immediate reaction by another with a
consequent increase in tensions. "83 India did not want to be drawn into a military
alliance as it was against her policy of non-alignment. Besides, it did not like to make
itself dependent on any outside power to protect its security interests. India was not even
enthusiastic about the regional economic cooperation plan proposed by Kosygin. As
Pakistan did not accept this plan, India also felt reluctant to endorse the Soviet initiative
for regional cooperation. India also refused to accept Kosygin's offer to mediate the
Ganges river water dispute between India and East Pakistan.
However, these differences did not affect the overall bilateral relationship as the
two countries emphasised those areas where their interests and policies converged. For
instance, both the Soviet Union and India adopted similar positions vis-a-vis the Middle
East and Vietnam conflict. In the Arab-Israeli conflict of 1967, both the Soviet Union and
India asked for Israeli withdrawal from occupied Arab territories and supported the UN
sponsored Jarring peace mission. In the case of Vietnam, the USSR and India registered
their opposition to the American bombing campaign against North Vietnam. Their
82Hindustan Times, 1 July 1969.
83Cited in Hemen Ray, "SO\iet Diplomacy in Asia", Problems of Communism (Washington, D.C.), March-April 1970, p. 78.
25
opposition was incorporated even in successive joint Soviet-Indian communiques from
1965 onwards. But, still the point of difference remained between the USSR and India as
the latter's position was not extended to an overall criticism of American policy in
Vietnam.
In the decade of 1970s the Soviet-Indian relations were marked by many
divergences although their interests converged on certain issues, such as the crisis in East
Pakistan which erupted in March 1971 and also on the Chinese aggression against
Vietnam in 1979. The situation in East Pakistan deteriorated with the imposition of
military rule, which led to the outbreak of a civil war between West and East Pakistan.
Due to the atrocities committed on the Bengali people of Ea5t Pakistan by the Pakistani
Junta many of them started fleeing to India. The influx of refugees to India increased day
by day and reached to a number around I 0 million. 84 This development created a major
domestic political instability . for the Indian Government. This created several
socio-economic and political problems for India and turned the internal affairs of Pakistan
into a serious crisis for India. The influx of refugees put a burden on India's limited
resources. Naturally, India was interested in resolving the crisis as soon as possible so that
the refugees could return to their own country.
The Soviet Union did not want the escalation of civil war in East Pakistan which
might lead to a major war between India and Pakistan and possibly result into the
involvement of outside powers in that war. Of course, a war in South Asia with the
84Baljit Singh, "India's Foreign Policy Under New Leadership: A Glimpse into the 1980s", in Lawrence Ziring. ed., The Subcontinent in World Politics: India. its Neighbours and the Great Powers (New York: Praeger, 1978), p.l23.
26
involvement of outside powers was not in the interest of the USSR. The USSR was
basically interested in the maintenance of peace and stability in South Asia which would
serve the Soviet objective. Hence, the Soviet President Podgorny sent a letter to President
Y ahya Khan of Pakistan on 2 April 1971 in which the former expressed his concern about
the situation in East Pakistan and advised the Pakistani leadership to take immediate
measures to stop the bloodshed and repression against the populace in East Pakistan and
to tum to methods of a peaceful political settlement. 115 But Pakistan did not give any
importance to Podgorny's letter. Pakistan considered it as interference in the domestic
affairs of Pakistan and interpreted it as a partisan stand. However, the Soviet Union was
genuinely concerned over suppression of the freedom of the people of East Pakistan and
the problem created for India by the influx of refugees from East Pakistan. Moscow
condemned military repression and atrocities in East Bengal. It favoured the adoption of
immediate measures to stop bloodshed in Pakistan and recommended a peaceful political
solution to be worked out within Pakistan. During his visit to the USSR, Swaran Singh,
the External Affairs Minister of India, held talks with the Soviet Premier AN. Kosygin
regarding the refugees question and both of them considered it necessary that Pakistan
should take urgent measures to stop the influx of refugees from East Pakistan. They also
suggested that additional steps be taken to ensure that peace was restored in East Pakistan
and conditions created for the safe return of the refugees to their homes. 86 Thus, the
Soviet and Indian stand fully converged on this refugee issue.
85Pravda, 4 April 1971.
86"Friendly visit completed", Pravda, 9 June 1971.
27
ln the meantime, there started a process of rapprochement between the People's
Republic of China and the United States. Pakistan played the role of a middleman in
organising Henry Kissinger's secret visit to China via Rawalpindi in July 1971 87 in order
to improve Sino-US relations, which culminated in the Sino-US-Pak alignment against the
Soviet Union and India. Prime Minister Chou-En-Lai promised to extend all help to
Pakistan in the event of "lndip.n expansionists" daring to launch aggression against
Pakistan. 88 Henry Kissinger warned L. K. Jha, the Indian Ambassador in the United
States, that in the event of China helping Pakistan in a war with India, India should not
count on the US support. 89 The Sino-US-Pak axis increased India's concern for its
security. Under these circumstances, the Soviet support became critical for India. Mrs.
Gandhi realised that only a strong Soviet support would enable India to discourage
Pakistan and her supporters from plunging the subcontinent into a bloody conflict and
guarantee India's secu~ity. The Soviets were also concerned at the development of a
Sino-American rapprochement.· They were not in favour of another wasteful and
destabilising war in the subcontinent from which in their perception only China might
gain. Such a development would have posed a threat to Soviet security interest. Thus, here
the Soviet and Indian interests converged and required a joint effort to deter the outbreak
of war in the subcontinent. It was under such circumstances that the Soviet-Indian Treaty
87Raghunath Ram. "Soviet Policy towards India from Tashkent Conference to the Bangladesh War", International Studies (New Delhi), vol.22. no.4, 1985, p. 365.
l!l!Ibid.
28
of peace, friendship and cooperation was signed in New Delhi on 9 August 197190 for
a period of twenty years, which was a high watermark in Soviet-Indian relations. The
treaty bound both the Soviet Union and India to extend each other all out support in the
event of an outside aggression. Article IX of the treaty stated:
Each of the High Contracting Parties pledges to refrain from giving assistance to any third party taking part in an armed conflict with the other side. In the event that either side is attacked or threatened with attack, the High Contracting Parties will immediately enter into mutual consultations in order to eliminate this threat and take appropriate effective measures to ensure the peace and security of the other countries. 91
The purpose of India's signing the treaty of peace, friendship and cooperation was
to safeguard her security, whereas from the Soviet point of view, the main purpose of the
treaty was to formalise and extend Russian influence for immediate purpose of stabilising
the situation in South Asia.92
In spite of India's repeated demand for creating conditions for the safe return of
Bengali refugees, Pakistan Government remained adamant and continued the genocide
instead of taking any fresh step in the direction of a political settlement of the problem.
India extended full support to the Mukti Bahini (Bangladesh Liberation Force) fighting
for the liberation of East Pakistan from the West Pakistani military regime. On 3
December 1971, Pakistani Air F:orce launched an attack on nine Indian Air fields in the
West and North including Kashmir.93 With this a war broke out between India and Paki-
~imes of India, I 0 August 1971.
91 Pravda, 10 August 1971.
92TI1e Times (London), 28 September 1971.
93T.N. Kaul, Diplomacy in Peace and War (New Delhi: Vikas Publishing House, 1979), p.l84.
29
stan. Indian Government gave both moral and material support to the Mukti Bahini. On
6 December 1971, India recognised Bangladesh and its Independent Government. 94 On
16 December, West Pakistan forces surrendered to the Joint Command of India and
Bangladesh forces. 95 India declared a unilateral ceasefire on the Western front on 17
December as her mission, i.e., the liberation of Bangladesh was fulfilled. 96 Thus, the war
fmally came to an end on 17 December with the announcement of unilateral ceasefire by
India.
The Soviet Union stood firmly with India in the Indo-Pak War of 1971. It was
compelled to change its policy of balancing relations with both India and Pakistan and
reverted to its Indo-centric orientation of pre-1965 Indo-Pak conflict. When the war broke
out, the Soviet Premier Kosygin criticised Pakistan for the outbreak of the war in the
Indian subcontinent. At a dinner speech at Copenhagen on 4 December, he made an
appeal to all the peace-loving countries to extend help in bringing an end to the lndo-Pak
War and also urged for an immediate solution of the internal political crisis in East
Pakistan in accordance with the outcome of December 1970 elections. Moreover, he
emphasised normalisation of relations between India and Pakistan.97 The first statement
of the Soviet Government on Indo-Pak War was issued on 5 December. The TASS
statement condemned the military regime of Pakistan for the breakdown of March
negotiations between Yahya Khan and Mujibur Rahman, arrest of Mujib and mass terror
941bid.
95India, Lok Sabha, Debates. vol.IO, no.25, 16 December 1971, co1s. 146-47.
96-yfie Statesman, 18 December 1971.
91Pravda, 6 December 1971.
30
in East Pakistan and held Pakistani regime responsible for it for not adopting any measure
in the direction of a political solution and for continuing war preparations against India.
This statement also warned Pakistan by saying that, "Pakistan's armed attack against
India, under whatever pretext, would evoke most resolute condemnation by the Soviet
Union which would not remain indifferent to the events taking place in her direct
neighbourhood and thereby involving her security". It demanded the leaders of Pakistan
and other countries "to refrain from steps, which might invite their involvement in the
conflict and bring further aggravation of the situation in the Indian subcontinent". 98 The
USSR also extended valuable support to India in the Security Council of the United
Nations. It vetoed the US draft resolution moved in the Security Council which was aimed
at bringing ceasefrre to rescue the Pakistani military regime.99 By vetoing the Security
Council resolution the Soviet delegate foiled the attempt to censure India at the world
body and impose a solution on it.
While the Soviet Union extended support to India on the East Bengal crisis and
in the Indo-Pakistan War of 1971, the stand adopted by the Soviet Union on Bangladesh
crisis was different from that of India. The Soviet Union from the very beginning of the
crisis demanded a peaceful political settlement of the problem within the framework of
a United Pakistan. It was not in favour of dismemberment of Pakistan and did not
visualise the prospect of an ind~pendent Bangladesh. Since Pakistan was geographically
and strategically important for the Soviet Union, it did not want to jeopardise its relations
!It! Ibid.
99SCOR, yr 26, mtg 1613, 13 December 1971, pp.72-93.
31
with the former by supporting the liberation struggle of the people of East Pakistan. Even
later, when the Soviets recognised that the crisis in East Pakistan was a liberation struggle
they wanted to avert the possibility of a war and were only interested in the maintenance
of peace and stability in the subcontinent. However, when full scale war started in
December 1971 between India and Pakistan and the latter was openly supported by the
USA and China, the Soviet Union was left with no option but to render full support to
India with a view to defusing the crisis. On the other hand, India was sympathetic to the
demands of the Awami League. When the West Pakistani Government did not restrain
itself from pursuing a repressive policy towards the people of East Pakistan and did not
make any effort to restore normal situation there, India extended its helping hand to the
liberation forces in East Pakistan. India wanted to mitigate the sufferings of the people
of East Bengal even by helping them to create a separate independent state and India
could do so successfully. From this analysis, it is clear that when their national interests.
demanded both the Soviet Union and India differed from each other. But these differences
were contained when their strategic perspectives coincided.
The victory of India over Pakistan and the emergence of Bangladesh as a
sovereign, independent nation had clearly changed the balance of power in the
subcontinent in India's favour. India emerged as the dominant regional power.
Consequently, India's strategic perception was changed. It no longer perceived a serious
threat from a weak and dismember~d Pakistan. India was capable of safeguarding her
western frontier as was proved in the 1971 War. Similarly, the threat from China lost its
intensity due to China's preoccupation with the Soviet threat and its internal
32
developments. Under such conditions, India's dependence on the Soviet Union had less
ened. In this changed strategic situation, India desired to play a leading role in the region
and not to get too much burdened with Soviet friendship or too dependent on Soviet ties.
This desire of India was reflected in India's rejection of a Soviet offer to mediate between
India and Pakistan and its insistence on negotiation with Pakistan on a bilateral basis.
India had many political differences with the USSR in spite of having treaty
relations with the latter and the latter's support to India in the Indo-pak War of 1971. The
post - 1971 relations between the Soviet Union and India was marked by many
divergences on issues such as Asian collective security, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty, conversion of the Indian Ocean into a zone of peace, Sino-Indian normalisation
of relations, recognition of Kampuchea, the concept of 'natural ally' of Non-aligned
countries and Mghanistan crisis. In fact, a divergence appeared in the Soviet-Indian
relations in 1973 itself as India did not endorse the 'Asian collective security' proposal
when it was revived after the Bangladesh War. Leonid Brezhnev during his November
1973 visit to India, personally tried to persuade the Indian leadership to join the Soviet
sponsored Asian collective security arrangement. In his address to the Indian Parliament
on 29 November 1973, he laid emphasis on both the political and economic aspects of the
idea of collective security in Asia. 100 Since Mrs. Gandhi did not respond to the
Brezhnev plan it was omitted from the final communique. Mrs Gandhi was more
interested in normalising India's relations with China and she considered this step as more
effective for solving India's security problem. In spite of India's rejection of the Soviet
1rorimes of India, 30 November 1973.
33
proposal of Asian collective security, in subsequent years, the Soviet leaders during their
exchange of state visits and in their talks with their Indian counterparts renewed the
Soviet call for joint efforts of the Asian states to ensure peace and security iJl the region.
Yet, India did not endorse even this more general proposal. Thus, in this security related
issue the Soviet and Indian positions diverged.
Difference was seen in the Soviet-Indian relations on the nuclear issue. India's
peaceful nuclear explosion in May 1974101 at Pokhran was not received well in the
USSR Yet, the Soviet media ~efrained from publicly condemning India. Rather they
repeated India's phrase about peaceful purposes and also drew attention to the Chinese
nuclear capability.
Another issue, in which a divergence appeared in the Soviet-Indian relations, was
the issue of making the Indian Ocean a zone of peace. In order to remove threat of a
Super Power arms race in the Indian Ocean, ~e Non-aligned countries at their Lusaka
Summit in 1970 proposed that the Indian Ocean be declared as a 'zone of peace'. India
supported this proposal. India also extended full support to the Sri Lankan sponsored
resolution no. 2832 passed in .the UN General Assembly on 16 December 1971 on
Declaration of the "Indian Ocean as a zone of peace". 102 Both the Super Powers
abstained on the motion and argued that the implementation of such a proposal would
interfere with freedom of navigation. India was not happy over abstention of the Soviet
Union. Since that time, the proposal has. been regularly raised at the UN and NAM
101 K.K.Pathak, Nuclear Polig• of India: A Third World Perspective (New Delhi: Gitanjali Prakashan, 1980), p.l32.
102UN Document, A/Res/2832, session 26, 16 December 1971.
34
meetings, but attempts to convene an international conference on the Indian Ocean have
failed. When in November 1973, the resolution for making the Indian Ocean a zone of
peace was moved again in the General Assembly, both the Super Powers once again
abstained, whereas India voted for the proposal. The Soviet Union's stand on this matter
was that it should not be treated equally with the U.S.A. in the militarisation of the Indian
Ocean. According to the Soviet Union, her interests in the Indian Ocean arose due to
American presence and her movement in the Indian Ocean was purely for defensive
purpose. It was true that, the Soviet Union adopted a defensive strategy and responded to
the US military build-up in the Indian Ocean by its naval deployments. But India raised
her voice against the Super Power rivalry in the Indian Ocean. The Soviet Union was
dissatisfied with India as the latter equated the Soviet Union with the US, for militarising
the Indian Ocean and creating tensions in the region.
However, later on, during Brezhnev's visit to India in November 1973, a
compromise was reached between the Soviet Union and India. In the Indo-Soviet joint
communique which was issued at the end of the visit, both the countries agreed to
participate together with other countries, on an equal basis in order to find out fair
solution to the question of making the Indian Ocean a zone of peace. 103 Thus, at last
despite the continuing disagreement on Super Power rivalry in the Indian Ocean the
Soviet-Indian stand converged on the issue of making the Indian Ocean a zone of peace.
In addition to the abov~ mentioned divergences, the Soviet Union and India
differed in their perceptions of China. India made attempts to improve her relations with
103Singh, n. 48, p.208.
35
China as she desired to lessen her dependence on the Soviet Union for her security needs.
India thought that better relations with China would definitely strengthen her security. In
fact, India tried to normalise her relations with China during the late 60s itself as a reac-
tion to improvement of Soviet-Pakistan relations and particularly Soviet - Pakistan arms
deal of 1968. Mrs. Gandhi declared on 1 January 1969 India's willingness to open up
talks with China without insistence on its acceptance of Colombo proposal as a
precondition. 104 It was very much clear that this step of Mrs. Gandhi was taken with
a view to ward off the Soviet move to get closer to Pakistan. By attempting to improve
relations with China India played the China card to make the Soviet Union pay more
attention to India rather than Pakistan. However, India's overture towards China was not
responded.
The Soviets felt concerned due to Mrs. Gandhi's offer in January 1969 to China
regarding border talks with no precondition. Soviet dependence on India's support
increased after the bloody conflict with China in March 1969 on the Ussuri river. 105
Keeping in view the object of getting Indian support and keeping India away from its
steps to normalise relations with "China, the Soviet Defence Minister Grechko visited New
Delhi in March 1969. Premier Kosygin also paid a visit to New Delhi in early May to
attend the funeral of Indian President Zakir Hussain. Both Grechko and Kosygin
emphasised that India with an unsettled border dispute could hardly afford to take any
104Nancy Jetly, India-China Relations 194 7-77: A Study of Parliament's Role in the Making of Foreign Policy (New Delhi:Radiant Publishers, 1979), p.259.
105Borisov and Koloskov, n. 76.
36
chance by ignoring or even minimising the dangers of a sudden conflict with China. 106
At the time of Foreign Secretary Kewal Singh's Moscow visit in November 1975, the
Soviet weekly New Times brought out an article entitled, "Peking's provocations against
India". In this article the Soviet author asserted: "Evidently the shots fired by the Chinese
troops on the Indian patrol parties were Peking's reply to India's desire to normalise
relations with China"_l07 In the early months of 1976, further divergence was marked
in Indian and Soviet perceptions of China. Several gestures of goodwill were made by
India towards China. The development of India's better relations with China
coincidentally took place at the time when the Sino-Soviet rift became irrevocable. This
led to divergences in Indian and Soviet perceptions of China. Sino-Indian diplomatic
relations were restored to ambassadorial level in 1976. On 15 April1976, India's External
Affairs Minister, Y.B. Chavan announced in the Lok Sabha India's decision to restore its
. diplomatic representation in Beijing to the ambassadorial level. 108 K.R. Narayanan
assumed the post of India's Ambassador to China on 7 July 1976.109 Beijing also named
its Ambassador to India, Chen Chao Yuan on 12 July 1976 who arrived in Delhi in
September 1976.110 Mrs. Gandhi paid a visit to Moscow in June 1976 with a purpose
to explain India's China policy to Moscow and gain further Soviet support in the form
106-yfie Hindu, 24 October 1969.
107Y.Gotlober, Y.Shtykanov, "Peking's Provocations· Against India", New Times(Moscow), no. 46, November 1975, p.12.
108India, Lok Sabha, Debates, vol.60, 15 April 1976, col.l04.
109Jetly, no. 104, p.289.
11 <1'hid.
37
of enhanced economic cooperation. On the other hand, the Soviet Government wanted
reassurances from Mrs. Gandhi that the change regarding China would not affect
Indo-Soviet relations. While deiivering welcome address Brezhnev spoke about "forces
of Asia, which ignoring the rights and sovereignty of states, are striving to subordinate
other people to their rule". Mrs. Gandhi, however, replied that "Darkness is not dispelled
by cursing but by lighting lamps. Along with international efforts for peace, each country
must act on its own to reduce areas of suspicion and to enlarge areas of goo~will". I I I
The succeeding Janata Government of India, which came to power in 1977, u 2
continued efforts towards India's normalisation of relations with China. However, the new
Government cleared its stand regarding India's relations with the USSR. When A.B.
Vajpayee, the External Affairs Minister was asked a question, "whether India's friendship
with the Soviet Union will come in the way of improving relations with China", he
replied that the new lead~rs "do not feel that the process of normalisation between India
and China should be at the cost oflndia's friendship with any other country". At the same
time, he did not forget to reassure the Chinese that "India's existing good relations with
any country need not be an obstacle to the promotion of better relations with China". I 13.
The Soviets reacted to India's normalisation with China during the Indian Foreign
Minister Vajpayee's visit to Mo~cow in September 1978. The Soviet leaders resorted to
anti-Chinese rhetoric and warned India about China's designs on normalisation. Vajpayee
111The Statesman, 9 June 1976.
112Singh, n.48, p.220.
113Far Eastern Economic Review (Hong Kong), 7 October 1977, p. 32.
38
made it clear to his counterpart Groinyko that India desired to improve its relations with
China as part of its policy of normalising and improving ties with its neighbour. He
assured that his visit to China would in no way affect Indo-Soviet friendship and asserted
that India had its own experience of China and New Delhi's "eyes and ears were wide
open". 114
Vajpayee paid a visit to China on 12 February 1979. 11s He had to cut short his
visit abruptly due to the Chinese invasion of Vietnam at the time when he was their state
guest. Prime Minister Desai expressed his "profound shock and distress" over the Chinese
action and demanded the immediate withdrawal of the Chinese troops from Vietnam. 116
The Soviets reminded the Indian people who were still having misperceptions about
China's game with India that China had occupied 36,000 square kilometres of Indian
territory, supported separatists within India, interfered in Kashmir and threatened India's
security by constructing the strategic highway through Karakoram. "The timing of the
aggression against Vietnam to coincide with the Indian Foreign Minister's visit to China
once again demonstrated to the world the duplicity of the Chinese leaders and their utter
disregard for India's prestige".117
The anti-Chinese attitude of the Soviets was also seen in the Soviet Premier
Kosygin' s visit to India during 9 to 15 March 1979. In his Parliamentary address, he
114Quoted in Robert C. Horn. Soviet-Indian Relations: Issues and lnfluence(New York: Prneger, 1982), p.163.
115Times of India. 13 February 1979.
11 6-J'imes of India, 19 February 1979.
117Cited in Horn. n.ll4, p.166.
39
referred to the Chinese action as "criminal" seeking to decide the fate of another nation
by use of force. 118 He asserted that India and the Soviet Union had emerged as forces
that would not permit such an outrage. 119 Kosygin even warned the Indians that "China
might want to teach India a lesson at some point in the future, just as it had sought to do
with Vietnam in the present" .120 He stressed on the need for further coordinating the
efforts of peace-loving forces like India to overcome the threat to peace on the Asian
continent. 121 The joint communique which was issued at the end of Kosygin's visit
referred to "massive armed attack by China" and called for "immediate unconditional
withdrawal of the Chinese troops from the territory of Vietnam". 122Thus, a convergence
was found in the Soviet arid Indian stand on Chinese aggression on the Socialist Republic
of Vietnam.
The Soviet Premier Kosygin sought to give impression of identity of views
between India and the USSR on the Chinese issue as he declared that "the talks have
ended very successfully indeed and we have agreed on all subjects".123 But the fact was
that on this issue Kosygin failed to persuade India and differences still persisted. The
Indian Prime Minister Morarji Desai made it clear to the Soviets that normalisation with
China would still be pursued when circumstances permitted.
1181ndian Express (New Delhi), 10 March 1979.
11"rhe Statesman (New Delhi), 11 March 1979.
1201bid.
121 Soviet Review (New Delhi), Supplement to no.14, 1979, p.10.
122Pravda, 16 March 1979.
12~imes of India, 16 March 1979.
40
The USSR and India adopted different positions on the issue of the recognition of
Vietnam installed Heng Samrin regime in Kampuchea. The Soviet Union backed the Heng
Samrin regime of Kampuchea but the Janata Government of India had taken a posture of
non-recognition. However, when Mrs. Gandhi came back to power in India after the
elections in January 1980, she reversed the Janata policy of non-recognition of Heng
Samrin's Government of Kampuchea. Her Government announced its recognition ofHeng
Samrin regime on 7 July 1980.124 So, at last India took similar position with the Soviet
Union on Kampuchea issue by recognising Heng Samrin's Government.
Besides all these, India did not like the concept of 'natural ally' of the non-aligned
countries. Cuba and other allies of the Soviet Union in the Non-aligned Summit held at
Havana in 1979 argued that the USSR and the Socialist countries were the 'natural ally'
of the non-aligned countries. 12s The caretaker Government of India headed by Charan
Singh strongly objected and opposed the attempt to revise the basic principles of the
NAM. So, this stand of India was not liked by the Soviet Union.
Lastly, the Soviet intervention in Mghanistan towards the end of 70s widened the
divergences existing in Soviet-Indian relationship. The USSR sent troops to Mghanistan
to protect the revolutionary regime there and intervened in Mghanistan to install Babrak
Karmal's Government on 27 December 1979. 126 India never favoured foreign
intervention in any country. The Indian Prime Minister Charan Singh conveyed to the
12+rriclib Chakraborti, India and Kampuchea: A phase in their relations. 1978-81 (Calcutta: Minerva, 1985), p.78.
125Duncan, n.40, p.62.
1~ew York Times. 28 December 1979.
41
Soviet Government, through its Ambassador in New Delhi, "India's deep concern at the
substantial involvement of Soviet military forces in Afghanistan and sought their
withdrawal as soon as possible" .127 This issue will be discussed in further detail m
chapter three.
ll. Determinants and Objectives of Soviet Policy towards India
The Soviet policy towards India has to be studied in the broader context of the
Soviet policy towards South Asia. The Soviet Union has pursued an active policy in South
Asia since 1955. India is a major country in South Asia with which the Soviet Union
forged strong political, economic and diplomatic ties. In order to have a comprehensive
understanding of Soviet-Indian relations it is necessary to analyse critically the
determinants which have shaped the Soviet foreign policy towards India.
There were geopolitical, strategic, ideological, economic as well as international
factors which influenced the making of Soviet policy with regard to India. These factors
motivated the USSR to forge strong links with India, the major power in the South Asian
subcontinent. The most important factor which compelled the Soviet Union to take interest
in India was the latter's geographic location. India is located in close proximity to the
southern frontier of the former USSR sharing borders with China and Pakistan. The
northern frontier of the Indian ~ubcontinent is the Pakistani occupied area of Kashmir,
which is almost contiguous to the Tazik Republic of the erstwhile Soviet Union. The
127Bimal Prasad, "India and Afghanistan Crisis", International Studies (New Delhi), vol.19, no.3, July-September 1980, p.635.
42
Indian state of Jammu and KaShmir was thus geopolitically important for the former
USSR. The Soviet Union looked at the lndo-Pak subcontinent close to its soft belly as an
area of great strategic importance for its security. It feared any foreign military presence
in this area as that would expose its southern flank to attack.
There is good reason to believe that on account of its strategic location India
continued to figure prominently in Soviet security thinking since the days of the Bolshevik
Revolution. The Soviet Union is quite vulnerable to the air power of a hostile power
based in Kashmir. The Soviet Central Asian Republics could easily be attacked through
long-range bombers stationed in northern Kashmir. 128 Naturally, the Soviets were quite
worried over the possibility of American presence in this area. The Soviet attitude towards
the Kashmir problem was largely determined by such anxieties. It would thus be proper
to conclude that the Soviet policy towards India was mainly determined by the
geopolitical factor. Moscow's policy was influenced by bro~der considerations such as the
security of its Central Asian territory and the growing Sino-Soviet rift. Mter the
development of Sino-Soviet rift, the Soviet Union wanted to contain the Chinese influence
in Asia. In this context, the strat~gic location of the Indian subcontinent was an important
factor for the Soviet Union. The prime objective of the foreign policy of the Soviet Union
was to ensure its own security. India could be helpful to the Soviet Union in this context
by not joining the hostile alliance system and not allowing her territory to be used as a
possible launching point for attack on the Soviet Union.
Apart from the above mentioned geographical position of India, its proximity to
128Hemen Ray, How Moscow sees Kashmir (Bombay: Jaico Publishing House, 1985), p. 9.
43
the Gulf and location in the Indian Ocean made India more important for the Soviet
Union. The presence_ of hostile powers in this area was likely to pose a security threat to
the Soviet Union. Hence, in order to safeguard her security the Soviet Union was obliged
to have good relations with India. As such, the Soviet-Indian relations became close and
friendly largely due to the convergence of their national interests. Issues which had a vital
bearing on India's security considerations also impinged on Soviet strategic perceptions.
The Soviet Union extended valuable support to India on several major foreign policy
issues and the latter occupied a pivotal place in Soviet security considerations. When the
United States pursued the strategy of containing communism through a network of
military alliance system and one of the South Asian countries, Pakistan joined the SEATO
(September 1954) and the Baghdad Pact (February 1955), 129 it aroused the Soviet fear
of being encircled by hostile countries. India's refusal to join these alignments made the
encirclement incomplete. Hence, the Soviet Union developed a vital stake in India's
non-alignment policy which served as the minimum requirement of Soviet security
interest. In the late 50s, the development of Sino-Soviet schism further added to Soviet
security concern. The policy makers in the Soviet Union saw a friendly India as a possible
counterweight to China. All that the Soviet Union wanted, however, was to frustrate the
US design to establish a solid phalanx in South Asia to contain it. Since the beginning of
Sino-Soviet rift Moscow had sought to counter the Chinese influence in the area as well.
It could effectively meet the situation on its southern flank only by maintaining cordial
12~emnek, n. 7.
44
relations with both India and Pakistan. 130 So, the Soviet Union wanted to have influence
in both India and Pakistan instead of having influence in India alone. Thus, geopolitical
and strategic factor served as an important determinant of the Soviet foreign policy
towards India.
The role of ideological factor is no less important in shaping the Soviet foreign
policy towards India. Although the Soviet Union established diplomatic relations with
India on 13 April 1947, 131it took a long time for Moscow to pursue an active policy
towards India. The reason was that the Soviets were ideologically not prepared to accept
the fact of India's peaceful attai~ment of political independence in 1947. They were still
not convinced about the fact that the British had lessened their grip on the subcontinent.
According to the Soviet viewpoint, the Mountbatten plan for the partition of India into
two separate states was aimed at perpetuating the political turmoil in the subcontinent
necessitating an arbiter's role for Britain pursuing the policy of "divide and rule". The
Soviets believed that India had changed its status from a colony to only a semi-colony
which was not a significant step in the Marxist typology. 132
India did not find a place in Andrei Zhdanov' s two camp thesis which was
pronounced at the Cominform in September 1947. 133 At the Cominform, Andrei
Zhdanov, the chief Soviet delegate, who was a leading member of the politburo put
13<>J\..D.Kapur, Soviet strategy in South Asia: Perspectives on Soviet Policies towards the Indian Subcontinent and Mghanistan (New Delhi: Young Asia Publications, 1983), p.~O.
131 Kaushik, n.l.
132Remnek, n.7, p. 6.
133Ibid., p.2.
45
forward a "two-camp" analysis of the international situation where he divided the world
into two hostile camps: "the imperialist and anti-democratic camp, headed by the United
States, aimed at strengthening imperialism and stifling democracy", and "anti-imperialist
and democratic camp led by the Soviet Union which wanted to undermine imperialism
and consolidate democracy. "134 Zhdanov demanded the Communist Parties to "take into
their hands the banner of defence of the national independence and sovereignty of their
countries". Keeping in view the Cold War situation in the world the Soviet Union sought
to oppose and weaken the imperialist bloc through the revolutionary activities in the
colonies under the aegis of Communist Parties. Zhdanov did not refer in his statement to
the class leading. the "powerful movement of national liberation". He did not even mention
about the role to be assigned to the national bourgeoisie and big capitalists in their
anti-imperialist national liberation movement. mBut Andrei Zhdanov included India
among those exceptional states which though not socialist were not part of the imperialist
camp either. India was seen by him as sympathising with the anti-imperialist (i.e., Soviet)
campY6 Zhdanov's 'two camp' theory proclaimed by the first Congress of the
Cominform however kept India out of active Soviet interest as it did not fit into the
ideological line of the Soviet Union. E. Zhukov, Corresponding Member of the Academy
of Sciences of the USSR, applied Zhdanov's 'two camp' theory to the colonies in an
article entitled, "The Growing Crisis of the Colonial System", which appeared in the 15
134Budhraj, n.3.
1351bid., pp. 37-38.
136Hom, n.ll4, p.2.
46
December issue of the Journal Bolshevik. 137 In this article, he suggested to form a broad
revolutionary front led by the coptmunists against the imperialists. He assigned a positive
role to the Communist Party of India for leading India towards full independence. 138
~hukov brought out another article, "The Colonial Question after the Second World War",
in Pravda of 7 August 194 7, wherein he wrote that "the grant of formal independence to
the colonies by no means guaranteed their actual independence." 139Stalin too refused
to recognise the fact that these colonies had become independent and denounced their
independence as sham independence. India's non-alignment policy was denounced as an
"imperialist device to slander: the USSR by placing it(Russia) on the same level with
American imperialism. "140 The· Soviets viewed Indian bourgeoisie as reactionary and
in "the camp of imperialism". Stalin's bipolar world view obstructed the possibility of
developing fruitful relations between the Soviet Union and the newly independent
countries of South Asia.
During Stalin's period, a policy of open hostility was pursued against the ruling
elites or the national bourgeoisie in the former colonies. This policy continued till
Khrushchev came to power. Although a change in the Soviet policy towards the newly
independent countries started appearing during the last days of Stalin, it was only after
Stalin's death in 1953 that the Soviet Union became seriously concerned with the Third
137Buclhraj, n.3, p.39.
138Ibid.
13~. Zhukov, "The Colonial Question After The Second World War", English translation in A.Z. Rubinstein, ed., The Foreign Policy of the Soviet Union (New York: Random House, 1972), p.427.
140Cited in Budhraj, n.3, p.57.
47
World in general and with South Asia in particular. The Soviet approach towards India
changed in response to the Indian foreign policy stand on 1) support for the seating of
Communist China in the UN., 2) refusal to condemn China in the Korean War and its
offer. to mediate that conflict, 3) refusal to sign a Japanese peace treaty at Sanfrancisco
in 1951. These policies of India made quite clear to the USSR that India's non-aligned
policy would not be an obstacle to Soviet interests and that India was not an "imperialist
lackey".
It was Khrushchev who changed the orientation of Soviet policy towards the newly
independent countries, including India. He explored the possibility of Leninist thesis
regarding the possibilities for a communist nationalist alliance against the imperialist
designs. Four decades earlier, Lenin had laid the ideological foundations for the
communist alliance with the forces of national liberation in the context of his theory of
imperialism. In the. opinion of Lenin, nationalist movements in Asia led by revolutionary
minded elements of the bourgeoisie were worthy of support by the proletariat, because
they created the internal conditions necessary for Capitalist (and then Socialist)
development and they were directed against the imperialist powers. Khrushchev revised
Lenin's policy of extending support to the national liberation movement in the Third
World which was aimed against imperialism. He held the view that Soviet assistance to
this movement would further Soviet interests. He recognised the need for a temporary
alliance between the communists and the national bourgeoisie to fight against Western
imperialism. 141 In his report to the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet
141Robert H.Donaldson, "Soviet Involvement in South Asia and the Indian Ocean Region", in Roger E. Kanet, ed., Soviet Foreign Policy in the 1980s (New York: Praeger, 1982), p.333.
48
Union, Nikita Khrushchev, the First Secretary of the Party, put emphasis on the
importance of the uncommitted nations in international politics. He referred to the
emergence of a "peace zone" comprising "both Socialist and non-Socialist peace-loving
states of Europe and Asia who have proclaimed non-participation in blocs as the principle
of their foreign policy. "142 As a matter of policy shift the USSR also recognised that
for the socialist transformation of Society violence was not considered essential and that
under certain circumstances it could be achieved even under a Parliamentary system.
Besides, the Soviet Union recognised that according to a country's concrete
socio-economic conditions, historical traditions, it could have its own specific path of
socialism. It further recognised-the need of extending support to a country which might
follow non-capitalist path of development. 143 This very declaration removed the
ideological obstacle which stood in the way of peaceful co-existence between countries
following different social systems. The 20th Congress adopted peaceful co-existence as
a fundamental principle of Soviet foreign policy.144 "And this is natural, for there is no
other way in the present-day conditions. Indeed, there are only two ways: either peaceful
co-existence or the most destructive war in history. There is no third way."145 So, the
Soviet Union felt the necessity of supporting the non-aligned states and forging some sort
of alliance with them which would ultimately help the Soviets to strengthen their own
position vis-a-vis the West. Consequently, the Soviet Union made a positive evaluation
142Khrushchey, n.24.
143Ibid., pp.41-45.
144lbid., p.37.
145Ibid., p.39.
49
of the role of the nationalist leaders and nationalism in the world revolutionary process.
Khrushchev announced that the Soviet Union would consolidate the bonds of friendship
and cooperation with the Republic of India, Burma, Indonesia, Afghanistan, Egypt, Syria
and other countries, which stood for peace, and would support ~untries, which refused
to be involved in military blocs, and sought to preserve peace. 146 According to him, the
countries which had gained .independence since World War II still faced serious problems:
"the aftermath of the colonial misrule". Their main difficulties were the lack of economic
independence as the key econ?mic positions continued to be controlled by "foreign
monopoly capital". Therefore, he asserted that the Soviet Union could play a crucial role
by offering these new nations an alternative to their Western ties, i.e., by offering modem
equipment and technology and establishing mutually beneficial trade "free from any
political or military obligations. "147 As Khrushchev declared in the 20th Congress:
These countries, although they do not belong to the Socialist World system, can draw on its achievements to build up an independent national economy and to raise the living standards of their peoples. Today they need not go begging for up-to-date equipment to their former oppressors.
They can get it in the socialist countries, free of any political or military obligations. 148
He further stated:
The very fact that the Soviet Union and the other countries of the Socialist camp exist, their readiness to help the under-developed countries with their industrial development on terms of equality and mutual benefit are a major
146Ibid., p.46.
wHom, n.ll4, p.5.
14MK.hrushchev, n.24, p.24.
50
stumbling block to colonial policy. The imperialists can no longer regard the underdeveloped countries solely as potential sources for the extraction of maximum profits. They are compelled to make concessions to them. 149
During the Khrushchev period, the Soviet policy towards India was also in line
with its new policy of developing relations with the non-Communist countries. In order
to implement Khrushchev's new policy of establishing state- to-state relations with
existing governments, support for local communists was dropped out. The basic goals of
the Soviet foreign policy in Asia at that time were to counter the Chinese influence and
contain the US moves. In this context, India occupied a very important place in the new
Soviet strategy based on the~e twin objectives. The Soviet Union found India ideologically
more close to it as both the countries were opposed to colonialism, imperialism and
racialism which to a large extent determined the Soviet policy towards India. In fact, the
anti-imperialist principles of the two countries brought them closer to each other. In the
context of changing Soviet perceptions towards the Third World, India occupied a
prominent place in the Soviet foreign policy. India was large in size and population and
strategically located near the Soviet borders and held a prominent position in the Indian
Ocean region. It was economically more developed than the other states in Asia and
politically also seemed to be stable. Above all, India's policies of non-alignment and its
emphasis on morality in foreign affairs had given India an important position in world
politics. Therefore, India, which was most significant and powerful Third World country
was likely to respond to Soviet overtures among those states that fitted in the Soviet
policy framework.
1491bid.
51
The Soviet policy towards India was also determined by economic consideration.
India provided the source of rehitively inexpensive food, raw materials, consumer goods
and semi-manufactured articles which could be paid for in soft currency due to the rupee
trade system. In addition to that, with the advancement of technological level of Indian
industry it has become a source of more sophisticated products and services, advantageous
to the Soviet economy and available in rupee currency. Besides, India provided a ~heap
market to Soviet manufactured goods in comparison to the increasingly competitive world
markets. India served as a customer to the products of the Soviet defence industry. Thus,
the consideration of getting economic benefits out of its contact with India also influenced
the making of Soviet foreign policy towards India.
Lastly, the role of international factor was also very important in influencing the
Soviet policy towards India. Soviet relations with America and China served as constant
determinants in the Soviet foreign policy towards India. The beginning of Soviet
mvolvement in the Indian subcontinent was primarily motivated by its worsening relations
with America in the Cold War period. In particular, the Soviet activity in India grew in
the wake of the conclusion of the US - Pakistan defence agreement of 1954 under which
the USA agreed to provide military assistance to Pakistan. Towards the late 50s,
Sino-Soviet relations started deteriorating. Coincidentally, India's relations which China
also worsened. At this juncture, the Soviet policy makers showed more interest in
developing strong ties with India and use India to contain the Chinese influence in South
Asia. The Soviet Union did not want China to become a dominant Asian power.
Therefore, the USSR desired to use India as a counterweight against China in Asia. In the
mid-60s, after the Sino- Indian border War, relations between China and Pakistan became
52
close. At this moment, the Soviet Union tried to wean Pakistan away from China and this
Soviet effort brought a change in the Soviet policy towards India. Over the years,
Soviet-American and Soviet-Chinese relations continued to shape the Soviet policy
towards India.
Thus, all the above mentioned factors have influenced the making of Soviet
foreign policy towards India. Tlie objectives of the Soviet Union in India can be inferred
from the former's policies and behaviour towards India. First, the Soviet Union wanted
to maintain peace and stability in the Indian subcontinent as this would help her to realise
the principal objective of her foreign policy, i.e., to safeguard her own security. The
Soviet Union particularly sought Indian stability. Second, one of the basic objectives of
the Soviet policy towards India was to reduce Western influence there as far as possible.
Third, the Soviet Union wanted to reduce or at least contain China's involvement in South
Asia and therefore, wanted to use India as a counterweight against Chinese expansion. In
fac~ this has been a major goal of the Soviet Union since 1959 when Sino-Soviet
relations started deteriorating.
Fourth, the Soviet Union has sought to secure its own influence in India, since the
latter is a bastion against Chinese expansion.
Fifth, the Soviet Union wanted to advance close relationship with· India in order
to get India's support on many global and regional issues.
Sixth, the Soviet Union wanted to get economic benefits from Indo-Soviet rupee
trade.
Lastly, the Soviet Union wanted socialist economic development in India.
53