Historical Legacies, Institutional Change, And Policy

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Historical legacies, institutional change, and policyleadership: the case of Alexandre Millerandand the French factory inspectorate

Frieda Fuchs

Published online: 25 August 2009

# Springer Science + Business Media B.V. 2009

Abstract Focusing on Alexandre Millerand s reform of the French factoryinspectorate, this article highlights the dilemmas of mezzo-level administrativeleadership and policy reform in states that have strong administrative capacity, but low public trust and weak associational life. Building on the insights of theories of political and bureaucratic entrepreneurship derived from studies of American political development, the article challenges their taken-for-granted assumptionsand comparative applicability, and demonstrates the explanatory potential of theolder sociological institutionalism exemplified in the work of Philip Selznick. In particular, the article highlights the unintended consequences of the formal andinformal cooptation of targeted social groups for the reputational autonomy of administrative leaders, the (re)definition of institutional mission, and organizationalsuccess or failure.

This article examines the impact of state legitimacy and public trust in politicalinstitutions on the leadership potential of politicians and civil servants through ahistorical case study of the creation and evolution of the French factory inspectoratein the Third Republic (1870 1940). More specifically, it focuses on the efforts of Alexandre Millerand (1859 1943), the first Socialist (after Louis Blanc in 1848) tohold a ministerial post in any European country, 1 to advance the cause of protectivelabor legislation through the institutionalization of the factory inspectorate and the partial cooptation of organized labor. I argue that the case of Millerand s reform of the French factory inspectorate represents an excellent illustration of the historical-institutional constraints on leadership and policy innovation in a state with highadministrative capacity, but low in public trust and with a weak associational life. In

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1 Millerand (1859 1943) ( 1990 ).

F. Fuchs ( * )Department of Politics, Oberlin College, Oberlin, OH, USAe-mail: [email protected]


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the broadest sense, therefore, this article challenges the emphasis of traditionalhistorical institutionalism on state capacity as the independent variable that enablesor constrains political and administrative actors in their efforts to forge coalitions,shape policy, and engage in state-building. 2 By contrast, in line with some more

recent works on the problematic of legitimacy, trust, and consent,3

I argue that theFrench case illustrates the importance state legitimacy and institutional trust-buildingfor effective policy-making even in a democratic state with strong administrativecapacity.

In this respect, the contrast between the success of the nineteenth-century Britishstate in implementing a centralized model of factory inspection and the relativefailure of reformist politicians and administrators in France s Third Republic toreplicate Britain s success in this area of welfare state development is most telling.Despite their conscious adoption of the British model of factory inspection, strong

administrative capacity, and efforts to coopt key social groups, reformist Frenchelites failed to garner sufficient elite and mass support for protective labor legislation. I argue that one of the main reasons for this failure lies in the different degrees of legitimacy enjoyed by the British and French states. Traditionally definedas administratively weak in comparison to its French counterpart, the British statewas characterized by a significant degree of legitimacy (despite serious workingclass challenges to the state until the second half of the nineteenth century); a legacyof parliamentary centralization that facilitated policy implementation; sharedinformal norms governing elite political and administrative behavior (personal

integrity based on

gentlemanly qualities); and a tradition of cooperation betweencentral and local political and administrative elites. 4 Although these background

factors did not automatically ensure institutional success, they facilitated adminis-trative leadership tasks by providing the British factory inspectors with a degree of institutional autonomy that proved indispensable for institutional reputation-buildingand policy implementation. 5

By contrast, overcoming the historically-rooted distrust of different social groups(workers, but also employers) towards the state was one of the broader goals of reformist social policy in the French Third Republic, forcing political elites todevelop strategies better suited to a hostile environment. 6 Rather than engaging informal coalition-building, a taken for granted strategy in more legitimate andinstitutionally stable states with a strong associational life, reformist political elites inthe Third Republic attempted to garner support for their policies through the formal

2 For more on the state capacities approach, see Evans et al. ( 1985 ). See also Skowronek ( 1982 ),Skocpol and Finegold ( 1982 ) and Weir et al. ( 1988 ).3 See Levi ( 1997 ), Hardin ( 2002 ) and Daunton ( 2002 ).4 For a standard account of British and French state formation that highlights the contrast betweenBritain s weak state/ strong civil society and France s strong state/ weak civil society, see Badie

and Birnbaum ( 1983 ) pp. 105 115, 121 125. For more on the nexus between British local and national political and administrative elites, the greater legitimacy of the British state vis--vis its continentalcounterparts, and parliamentary centralization, see Redlich ( 1903 ) and Kriegel ( 1995 ) pp. 64 90. For theclassic interpretation of the French state, see de Tocqueville ( 1955 ). For more on French administrativecentralization, see Woloch ( 1994 ), Skocpol ( 1979 ) and Furet ( 1983 ).5 For the concept of institutional reputation-building, see Carpenter ( 2001a ). See article below for adiscussion of this concept.6 See Elwitt ( 1986 ) and Stone ( 1985 ).

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and informal cooptation of social groups that were either too decentralized anddisorganized (the working class) or too dispersed and divided (employers) to formreliable coalition partners. Moreover, the negative historical experiences of thesegroups with the centralized state meant that building trust and enhancing state

legitimacy were priority tasks for reformist political elites, even when such broader goals could compromise policy effectiveness. Ultimately, such tensions between theconflicting imperatives of enhancing state legitimacy and public trust, on the onehand, and policy effectiveness, on the other, forced reformist elites into politicalcompromises with the representatives of targeted social groups (especially workers),thus undermining the institutional autonomy of policy agencies (in this case thefactory inspectorate), and resulting in a series of unintended consequences that subverted formal organizational goals.

This broad and somewhat schematic contrast is not meant as an introduction to a

full-blown macro-comparison between the British and French cases. Rather, I wishto use Britain as a background case both because it served as a model for French policy-makers and because it can highlight more clearly the dilemmas of reformist leadership in a context in which some of the historical-institutional factors that facilitated the success of British factory inspection were missing. At the same time, Iuse the case of French factory inspection in order to demonstrate the limits of newer theoretical approaches on political and administrative leadership derived from thestudy of American political development and to revitalize some of the ideas of theolder sociological institutionalism as exemplified in the work of Philip Selznick. 7

I concentrate on the literature on American political development for severalinterrelated reasons. Firstly, unlike social movement theories, theories of revolution,or theories derived from the broader contentious politics approach that typicallyconcentrate on non-institutional leadership in unstable political situations, 8 theoristsof American political development focus on problems of institutional leadership in astable democratic regime. Secondly, the frequent (though not exclusive) emphasis of this body of literature on policy entrepreneurship and/or leadership in bureaucratic state agencies (the distinction between policy entrepreneurship and leadership isdiscussed below) makes the theoretical frameworks developed in this field well-suited to a case such as the French factory inspectorate in the Third Republic.Thirdly, rather than concentrating on the state as a macro-institution as is often thecase in various strands of historical institutionalism, theorists of American politicaldevelopment like Daniel Carpenter examine policy-making on the mezzo-level, i.e., at the level at which state and society interact most clearly, and with a view onthe reputation-building, trust-enhancing, and coalition-making strategies of policyentrepreneurs.

9This emphasis on the mezzo-level of state-building and the different

strategies of policy entrepreneurs in bridging the state-society gap is singularly

7 For the recent American political leadership/entrepreneurship literature, see Sheingate ( 2003 ), Miroff (2003 ), Carpenter ( 2001a ), Roberts ( 2006 ), Crowe ( 2007 ) and Schickler ( 2001 ). For more references, seeSheingate ( 2003 ) pp. 187 188, n. 12. For Selznick s older sociological institutionalist perspective onleadership, see Selznick ( 1983 [1957], 1984 [1949]).8 For representative works associated with these different theories, see Selbin ( 1993 ) and Aminzade et al.(2001 ).9 Carpenter ( 2001a ) pp.18 23.

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appropriate in the French case, as fostering public trust and reputation-building wereseen as pressing tasks by the republican elite in the Third Republic. Fourthly, theoristsof American political development have advanced a set of original ideas on policyentrepreneurship and leadership that can be selectively applied to both the British and

French cases in the area of protective labor legislation, but that require somemodifications if they are to have universal applicability. In particular, more often thannot, these theorists take for granted the main historical-institutional features of theAmerican polity with its limited central state capacity, administrative decentralization,relatively high levels of public trust, and strong associational life as the framework for developing a general theory of leadership (or political entrepreneurship). In theFrench Third Republic, however, where historical legacies and the institutionalenvironment were very different from the United States, some of these backgroundassumptions did not hold. As a result, political and administrative leaders faced

different tasks and were forced to develop innovative strategies in order to advancenew policies. For this reason, I argue that the French case represents an excellent vantage point for assessing the comparative leverage of theories of institutionalleadership derived from the study of American political development.

In order to address some gaps in these theories of institutional leadership, I buildon the ideas developed by one of the key figures of the old sociologicalinstitutionalism Philip Selznick. 10 In contrast to the new sociological institution-alism or the political science variety of historical institutionalism, 11 Selznick accordsmore importance to the role of agency in institutional change. Unlike theorists of

American political development who explicitly recognize the role of agency, on theother hand, Selznick lays greater emphasis on the cultural and social environmentsas obstacles to the realization of organizational goals (such as the difficulties faced by the TVA as a federal state agency in the American South). In particular,Selznick s emphasis on the dilemmas opened by an institution s leaders attempts toengage in the formal and informal cooptation of social groups whose support iscritical to the success of its organizational mission under conditions of uncertainty or in a hostile environment, and the potential unintended consequences springing fromthis strategy (goal displacement and the substitution of organizational means for organizational ends), 12 seems singularly appropriate for explaining the institutionaltrajectory of the French factory inspectorate in the Third Republic where theimperative of rebuilding state legitimacy and fostering trust in the context of a weak associational culture restricted the maneuvering room for politicians and civilservants to advance new public ideals and forge stable coalitions.

The following analysis of the evolution of the French factory inspectorate thuscarries important implications for theories of leadership, policy entrepreneurship,

10 See Selznick ( 1983 [1957], 1984 [1949]).11

For more on the new institutionalism, see Powell and DiMaggio ( 1991 ), especially the editors introductory chapter, pp. 1 38. See also Meyer and Scott ( 1983 ), March and Olsen ( 1984 ), March andOlsen ( 1989 ), Scott ( 1981 ), Meyer and Rowan ( 1977 ), Fligstein ( 1990 ), Dobbin ( 1994 ) and Zucker (1991 ).

For representative scholars associated with historical-institutionalism, see Steinmo et al. ( 1992 ). Seealso Hall ( 1986 ), Dunlavy ( 1993 ), Hattam ( 1993 ), Immergut ( 1992 ) and Weir ( 1992 ).12 See Selznick ( 1983 [1957], 1984 [1949]). The terms goal displacement, formal and informal cooption,organizational mission, etc., are derived from these works. See article below for a discussion of these terms.

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and mezzo-level institutional change, and highlights the limits that historical legaciesof state-society relations impose on policy innovation in states with low levels of public trust and weak associational cultures. As the institutional dynamic of strongstates, weak societies still accurately characterizes some countries in the developing

world (including rapid developers like China) that face the task of forging andimplementing regulatory policies in social environments radically different from theUnited States, this case study of the French factory inspectorate may carry broader implications for the study of leadership, policy innovation, and institutional changein such contexts. 13

Political leadership, institutional change, and policy innovation: the valueand limits of theories of American political development

Recent debates in American political development have centered on the role of political leadership as an endogenous variable in institutional change. This renewedfocus on leadership developed as a corrective to historical institutional accounts that have been more successful in explaining policy continuity than political (or policy)change. 14 The new trend in the theoretical study of leadership in relation toinstitutional change is best exemplified in the 2003 Sheingate Miroff debate that appeared in Studies in American Political Development .15

Sheingate defines political entrepreneurs as individuals whose creative acts have

transformative effects on politics, policies, or institutions. 16

This definition isdeliberately broad since it enables Sheingate to apply it to a variety of politicalactors, from presidents to congressional politicians and middle-level bureaucrats. 17

Sheingate makes several suggestive theoretical claims. Firstly, in contrast tohistorical institutionalism that portrays institutions as regulative, normative, or cognitive mechanisms that limit, constitute, or constrain the range of alternativesactors confront, the focus on the transformative role of political entrepreneurshighlights the way entrepreneurs exploit uncertainty to engage in speculative acts of creativity that result in institutional transformation. Secondly, these acts of

13 For works that address questions of state autonomy, low trust, and legitimacy in the context of developing societies, see Migdal ( 1988 ), Migdal et al. ( 1994 ), Rose ( 1994 ), Mishler and Rose ( 1997 )and Chen (2005 ). It should be noted that Joel Migdal uses the term weak state to refer to a state that enjoys low legitimacy, irrespective of its administrative or military capacities. Likewise, for Migdal, theterm strong society refers to a traditional, clan-based society that is successfully able to resist stateintervention rather than to a society with a rich civic life (see Migdal 1988 ). State capacity theorists, bycontrast, use the term strong state to refer to a state that has strong administrative capacities,irrespective of its overall legitimacy.14

See Sheingate ( 2003 ) pp. 185

187. See also Campbell ( 2004 ) chap. 1 and Thelen ( 2004 ) pp. 1

38.15 Sheingate ( 2003 ) and Miroff ( 2003 ).16 Sheingate ( 2003 ) pp. 185 187 (quote on p. 185). Sheingate traces the concept of politicalentrepreneurship to Schumpeter ( 1942 ) while attributing its early application in political science to Dahl sclassic study of local power in New Haven (see Dahl 1961 ).17 Sheingate ( 2003 ) pp. 187 188. This definition also leaves open the question of whether politicalentrepreneurs are institutional insiders or outsiders, a contentious point in the early historical literatureon economic entrepreneurship. See Hwang and Powell ( 2005 ) pp. 180 181.

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speculative creativity are rendered possible by the heterogeneity of complexsystems. 18 According to Sheingate, such complex systems are characterized by built-in institutional uncertainty. In the American context, for instance, thecomplex system of overlapping authority (the separation of powers); the multiple

motivations of political actors (reelection; party allegiance; the prestige of office;the pressure of constituents); and the myriad of groups with a variety of politicalidentities (class, race, religious, regional) create opportunities for politicalentrepreneurship. At the same time, institutional complexity and heterogeneity provide political entrepreneurs with the resources (constitutional, institutional, partisan) for initiating change. 19

In addition to acquiring leverage on the basis of institutional complexity inheterogeneous systems, political entrepreneurs are ideally situated to exploit institutional ambiguity, which refers to the phenomenon that rules, institutional boundaries, and jurisdictions are not always transparent to political actors incomplex systems. Thus, the executive powers of the American presidency as theconstitutionally-specified locus of executive authority are not rigidly defined,opening opportunities for presidents to exploit institutional ambiguity. 20

In his attempt to explain the secret of entrepreneurial innovation, Sheingate buildson Schumpeter s idea that economic entrepreneurs exploit uncertainty in order toreconfigure existing ideas and interests in a new synthesis. Such acts of creativerecombination also characterize political entrepreneurs who recombine existingideas and interests for the purpose of forging new alliances among institutional

actors and social groups, initiating change, and stabilizing new institutionalconfigurations. Thus, entrepreneurial innovation can be defined as a speculativeact of creative recombination that, when successful, transforms the institutional boundaries of authority (original in ital.). 21

Sheingate s ideas about the conditions of entrepreneurial success or failure areless developed. The main variable explaining the likelihood of entrepreneurialsuccess concerns the level of entry barriers that could be specified by legal or electoral rules, various forms of incumbency advantage, and other institutional or social devices designed to limit political competition. 22 The outcome of entrepre-neurial innovation, on the other hand, must be assessed on a case-by-case basis:entrepreneurs may fail, their innovations may result in incremental or partialinstitutional change, or they may succeed in initiating large-scale institutionaltransformation. Whatever the case, the focus on political entrepreneurship forces usto rethink institutional change: what may appear as slow and cumulative institutionalchange may be the result of a series of endogenous entrepreneurial innovations that

18

Sheingate ( 2003 ) pp. 185

187.19 Ibid., pp. 191 194.20 For this reason, Sheingate treats American presidents as political entrepreneurs par excellence. Seeibid., pp.195 198.21 Ibid., pp.189 190.22 Ibid., pp.198 200. For a variety of reasons that Sheingate explores in some detail, entry barriers that are too low or too high may discourage entrepreneurial innovation in politics as much as in themarketplace, whereas intermediate entry barriers seem optimal for political entrepreneurship.

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resulted in partial success, a possibility that mainstream institutional theories and path-dependence approaches are poorly equipped to take into account. 23

Sheingate s theory of political entrepreneurship contains a number of suggestive propositions that can be used to study political innovation in non-US contexts as

well. Nevertheless, as Miroff has pointed out, Sheingate s transposition of theeconomistic and individualistic connotations of the concept of entrepreneurship ontothe sphere of politics carries the risk of distorting the distinctive features of politicalaction. In contrast to money as the universal yardstick of economic success, there isno comparable unambiguous measure of political success. More importantly,Sheingate s entrepreneurs act in the political world by exploiting opportunitiesand imposing themselves on others; political leaders interact with followers. 24 As aresult, while some of the qualities that Sheingate attributes to entrepreneurs may berequired of political leaders, successful leadership also relies on the construction of

public meanings and the appeals to political values. These public meanings and political values are indispensable for winning the support of other political elites, andthey are equally critical for informing and mobilizing support from the citizenry. This appeal to elite and broader public values is especially critical when leadersinitiate large-scale institutional or policy changes with lasting consequences, i.e.,when the transformations in public meanings becomes a pressing task. 25 Both because the term leadership is less reductionist than entrepreneurship and because it focuses attention on the socially embedded and relational aspects of power, Miroff contends that it better captures the complex choices of political agents in the face of

conflicting social pressures.26

Miroff s emphasis on values and the relational character of leadership is mirroredin other works that focus on the conditions of successful institutional transformation.One good example is provided by Daniel Carpenter s The Forging of Bureaucratic Autonomy, a work that both Sheingate and Miroff refer to in order to buttress their respective cases. 27 Like Sheingate, Carpenter uses the term entrepreneurship to refer to successful policy innovators. Carpenter s focus is on middle-level officials whocarved out spheres of autonomy within the US federal government and initiatedsuccessful policy innovations that resulted in lasting institutional change, albeit withvarying degrees of success (e.g., the Post Office, the Department of Agriculture, andthe FDA) at a distinct time in American history, the period of dynamic but sporadicstate-building from the Civil War to the Progressive Era. 28

Carpenter s key argument is that the success of bureaucratic entrepreneurs is predicated on a strategy of institutional reputation-building whereby policyinnovators manage to legitimize themselves as efficient providers and moralguardians of valued public services. Once they carve out the sphere of distinct competence, officials gain the necessary leverage to forge institutional autonomy. Autonomy prevails, argues Carpenter, when agencies can establish politicallegitimacy a reputation for expertise, efficiency or moral protection and a uniquely

23 Ibid., pp.200 201.24 Miroff ( 2003 ) pp. 206 207 (quote on p. 207).25 Ibid., p. 207.26 Ibid., p. 205.27 Carpenter ( 2001a ).28 Ibid., pp.1-36.

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diverse complex of ties to organized interests and the media and induce politiciansto defer to the wishes of the agency even when they prefer otherwise. 29 A key rolein preserving bureaucratic autonomy is played by social networks that constrain theattempts of powerful politicians to undermine specialist officialdom. Bureaucratic

agents with a distinct reputation for efficiency and competence become institution-ally autonomous coalition-builders and policy-makers who are able to resist external pressures from politicians, organized groups, and clienteles. 30

Rejecting the Weberian distinction between political leaders and bureaucraticofficials, Carpenter views bureaucratic officials as policy entrepreneurs who, like politicians, strategically court the support of organized groups, forge durablerelationships with clienteles, and seek to legitimize their authority. In contrast to Bringing the State Back In literature, Carpenter s account does not necessarily link political innovation and coalition-building to large-scale transformation, arguing that

his approach is less about the state writ large than about the bureaucratic state writ small specific agencies and their policy innovating power. 31 Moreover, instead of viewing autonomy as a fixed attribute of the state, Carpenter argues for a conditional notion of autonomy as defined by the ability of entrepreneurial agents to overcomethe hostility of social groups and politicians, build legitimacy, maintain institutionalreputation, and meet recurrent and new challenges. As Carpenter documents, thiswas a task that only a few agencies achieved with any measure of success in theAmerican context (e.g., the USDA during the Progressive era). Because Carpenter does not confine bureaucratic entrepreneurship to instances of large-scale transfor-

mation but insists on its continuous presence in

routine politics,

he contends that his approach to entrepreneurship has comparative leverage beyond the Progressive period, and perhaps beyond the United States. 32

Carpenter s empirical focus on conditional autonomy as inherently political andgrounded in the day-to-day reality of bureaucratic agents engaged in coalitional politics has its theoretical roots in Philip Selznick s Leadership in Administration, awork that all participants in recent debates go back to. 33 However, unlike participants in recent debates, Selznick provides us with additional criteria for assessing the viability of administrative leadership strategies and emphasizes therelationship between institutional leadership, legitimacy, autonomy, and cooperationwith social groups in a way that speaks directly to my argument about the relativefailure of factory inspection in France. The idea that institutional autonomy is anecessary condition of organizational integrity underpins Selznick s theoreticalinsights about such diverse organizations as the TVA and the Bolshevik party. 34

Selznick argues that the leaders ability to create new value commitments andcompetencies is what transforms organizations into institutions. While an organi-zation is a structure regulated by formal rules and procedures that equip it for aspecific task, an institution is predicated upon an appeal to values and commitments

29 Ibid., pp.3 5 (quote on p. 4).30 Ibid., pp. 14 18. See also Carpenter ( 2000 , 2001b ).31 Carpenter ( 2001b ) p.115. For the Bringing the State Back In literature, see Evans et al. ( 1985 ).32 Carpenter ( 2001b ) pp. 113 115, 117 (quote on p. 115).33 See Selznick ( 1983 [1957]). The intellectual debt that Carpenter owes to Selznick s (1983 [1957]) isnoted in Miroff ( 2003 ) p. 207.34 See Selznick ( 1952 ) and 1984 [1949]. See also Selznick ( 1996 ).

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needed to motivate an organization s members and legitimize it among the public.To institutionalize, argues Selznick, is to infuse with value beyond the technicalrequirements of the task at hand (Selznick s italics). 35 Thus understood,institutionalization is a precondition for long-term organizational survival: it is the

commitment of the organization s members to a set of values and a well-definedinstitutional mission that transforms an organization from an expendable tool intoan institution prized for its own sake. Such an infusion with value and the creation of social entanglements or commitments have instrumental consequences:for the prizing of an institution as a tool of personal satisfaction enablesorganizations to mobilize the commitment of personnel and external followers beyond the execution of merely technical tasks. 36 The task of leaders, therefore, isto define and maintain institutional purpose and preserve an organization s integrity.Conversely, leadership failure results in expendability, i.e., the readiness with

which the organization or practice is given up or changed in response to newcircumstances or demands. 37

Selznick s idea that administrative leadership plays a decisive role in institutionallegitimacy is successfully elaborated in Carpenter s work on bureaucratic autonomy.However, Selznick s focus on the role of contextual factors as a potential source of unintended consequences like goal-displacement (a change in organizational purpose, often springing from a substitution of organizational ends by organizationalmeans) adds a dimension that is not sufficiently integrated into newer theories of leadership and institutional change. Unintended consequences such as goal

displacement

may spring from a variety of sources, from initial value commitmentsto organizational responses, threats in the environment, the actions of interest groups, and the social background of administrative personnel. Furthermore,unintended consequences resulting in goal displacement are not necessarily negative,for new institutional goals may enhance institutional autonomy, an outcome that needs to be assessed on a case-by-case basis. 38

Selznick s contention is that cooptation, or the process of absorbing newelements into the leadership or policy-determining structure of an organization(Selznick s italics) is an especially important source of goal displacement.Cooptation becomes important when the threat to organizational survival is acute.Organizations with a weak social base operating in a hostile environment are likelyto face a daunting task in meeting the conflicting imperatives of coopting socialgroups while preserving institutional autonomy. 39 As Selznick notes, co[o]ptation

35 Selznick ( 1983 [1957]) p.17.36 Ibid., pp. 4 22, 65 74.37 Ibid., pp. 16 20. Note that Selznick s emphasis on the role of values and leadership to maintaininstitutional purpose and integrity in the face of internal and external challenges provides us with a moreadequate explanation of institutional change than the new sociological institutionalism s emphasis on the

impersonal cultural templates and rituals. See Selznick ( 1996 ). For a sharp critique of the new sociologicalinstitutionalism by one of Selznick s former students, see Stinchcombe ( 1997 ). The failure of the newinstitutionalism to take into account the role of agency in institutional change is highlighted in Karabel andBrint ( 1991 ) and Hall and Taylor ( 1996 ).38 For Selznick s discussion of unintended consequences and goal displacement, see ( 1984 [1949]) pp.253 264. For his statement that unintended consequences are not necessarily negative, see ibid., p. 254,n.11.39 Ibid., pp. 12 16, 259 261 (quote on p. 13).

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tells us something about the process by which an institutional environment impingesitself upon an organization and effects changes in its leadership, structure, or policy. 40

Selznick distinguishes between formal and informal cooptation. Whereas formal

cooptation is predicated on the incorporation of new elements through official and public channels, informal cooptation is hidden and outside of public view or scrutiny. Formal cooptation occurs under conditions of acute threats to organiza-tional survival and aims at acquiring legitimacy through the integration of a relevant public. The relevant public can be either a group that can enhance anorganization s stature due to its considerable public prestige or, alternatively, a grouptraditionally excluded from power. In the latter case, the cooptation of the group srepresentatives broadens the organization s social base and helps foster its inclusive image. 41

A second and related rationale behind formal cooptation is the need to secure thesupport of a relevant group for the purpose of carrying through administrativeobjectives. Typically, such a need arises when the organization lacks adequateresources or has few channels for reaching the public. The relevant group, bycontrast, possesses resources or social connections necessary for the execution of select organizational goals. 42

As an organizational strategy, formal cooptation assumes that the coopted groupwill take part in policy-making without altering the substance of policy. In other words, formal cooptation is oriented towards legitimation or accessibility, not

informal deals that could lead to a

transfer of actual power

to the coopted group.Although power-sharing is not envisaged, it is assumed that the relationship betweenthe organization and the group will be mutually beneficial. The organization relieson the group to bolster legitimacy and realize administrative objectives, while thecoopted group enjoys status recognition associated with public office. 43

In the case of the TVA, an agency set up under the New Deal to distributefertilizers and provide other services to underprivileged groups in the South, thecooptation of powerful farm groups was an adaptive response designed to overcomeinstitutional deficiencies (weak resources, questionable legitimacy, and low level of social support). In the process, the organization was transformed from a grassroots-oriented agency with a social mission to help the poor into one that gave way tospecial interests. This transformation eventually called into question its role at thenational level. Instead of becoming a spokesman for the underprivileged, TVA cameto be viewed as a champion of the very same farmers groups whose power it wasdesigned to undercut. 44

Although he applied this theoretical framework to a US-based bureaucraticagency, Selznick s ideas seem even better suited to capture the dilemmas of institution-building in historical contexts in which some of the factors that facilitated policy entrepreneurship in the US were either absent or weak. In this respect, two

40 Ibid., p.13.41 Ibid., pp.13 16, 259 261.42 Ibid.43 Ibid.44 Ibid., pp. 262 264.

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factors that scholars of American political development take for granted stand out in particular: the associational landscape in which political leaders operate and statelegitimacy. Firstly, the associational landscape of a strong society (the US) in whichgroups vie for influence presents a very different set of constraints on leaders

interested in maximizing jurisdictional boundaries than in states in whichassociational life is weaker (France).

45In a strong society, the relationship between

state and social actors is typically more cooperative, as both parties share a belief intheir capacity to initiate policies or transform existing institutions. In a weak societyin which critical policy target groups are hostile to the state the opportunities for coalition politics based on reputation-building are more limited. Rather than viewingcooperation as a means to accomplish desirable private goals while simultaneouslyadvancing the public good, state officials and social actors are distrustful if not always openly hostile to each other. In this context, policy-making is typically a top-

down affair, while social actors often try to subvert or resist state-imposed policies or regulations. The combination of fewer opportunities for interaction and cultural barriers between state officials and social groups (especially pronounced amonglower-class groups) inhibits cooperation. 46

Secondly, the problem of developing new administrative capacities takes on adifferent meaning in centralized states in which state autonomy is so pro-nounced that it negatively affects legitimacy. In such contexts, political leadersmay find themselves compelled to engage in a tactic of reputation-building andtrust-enhancement through the cooptation of hitherto excluded groups into the

policy-making process. As a result, the risk of unintended consequences andgoal-displacement is higher, while the ability of administrative leaders toinnovate may be more limited.

The following case study of the French factory inspectorate is designed tohighlight such constraints on political-administrative leadership in a historicalcontext marked by excessive state centralization, the historically grounded mistrust between state agents and social actors, and a weak associational landscape in whichthe target policy groups (especially workers) became the object of formal andinformal cooptation rather than coalition-building. I use the French case to sketch theelements for a theory of political-administrative leadership that combines the insightsof scholars of American political development with those of Selznick s sociologicalinstitutionalism. More specifically, I highlight the relevance of the followingelements for such a theory: 1) Sheingate s idea that leaders engage in creativerecombination in order to forge new ideological syntheses and exploit institutionalambiguity for the purpose of policy innovation; 2) the importance of appeals to public values as a source of legitimacy for new policies and coalition building(Miroff); 3) the notion that reputational autonomy is a necessary condition for acquiring legitimacy and organizational success (Carpenter); and 4) Selznick semphasis on the unintended consequences of formal and informal cooptation ininstitutional environments defined by low trust between state agents and targeted

45 For the classic contrast between the US s strong associational landscape and its weak Frenchcounterpart, see de Tocqueville ( 2000 ). See also de Tocqueville ( 1955 ). For more on the Americanassociational landscape during the progressive era, see Carpenter ( 2000 ) p.125.46 For French society s ambivalence towards the administrative state, see Hoffmann ( 1963 ).

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policy groups. I argue that these elements of the theories analyzed above arecomplementary rather than contradictory, and can be selectively applied to different cases of political-administrative leadership. However, I also argue that some of thesetheoretical propositions may require qualification in view of the enabling or

constraining effects of different historical legacies of state-society relations onadministrative leadership and policy innovation.

The British precedent and the creation of the French factory inspectorate

The French factory inspectorate was based on the British precedent. As the first industrial nation, Britain began experimenting with centralized factory inspection at an early date (1833). Initially created with the limited purpose of addressing the most

egregious abuses of the factory system and improving the working conditions of protected groups (women and children), during the next four decades the Britishfactory inspectorate developed into a larger organization that addressed the labor conditions of adult male workers as well. By 1876, the number of factory inspectorshad increased more than fourfold since its founding (from twelve to more than fiftyinspectors). 47 The main consequence of this organizational growth was that it enabled the factory inspectors to shorten the workday and effectively enforceindustrial safety and hygiene standards in a large number of factories, particularly inthe textile trade. Because the labor of protected workers (women and children) could

not be separated easily from that of adult male workers in the factory setting, factoryinspection had a positive spillover effect on the labor conditions and bargaining power of adult male workers. 48 Moreover, the argument of employers and laissez-faire economists that factory legislation was undermining the competitiveness of British industry by imposing excessive costs on employers was refuted by thefactory inspectors investigations. By forcing employers to invent labor-savingdevices and rationalize production, protective labor legislation provided anindirect incentive for increased efficiency and productivity. 49

The main factors that explain the success of the British factory inspectorate areworth explicating, even if briefly, both because they illustrate the explanatory potential of some of the theoretical assumptions outlined above and because theyoffer the necessary background for understanding the failure of its French

47 In 1833, the British inspectorate consisted of four inspectors aided by a small staff of sub-inspectorswhose numbers expanded from eight to fourteen during the first ten years of its existence. By 1876, thefactory inspectorate consisted of 55 inspectors divided into various grades. See Royal Commission onthe Factory and Workshop Acts ( 1876 ) pp. lxxxvii lxxxviii. Scholarly writings on the early history of protective legislation (factory acts) are extensive and include such well known works as Hutchins and

Harrison ( 1903 ), Henriques ( 1979 ), Thomas ( 1948 ), Driver ( 1979 ) and Ward ( 1962 ).48 The spillover effect of protective labor legislation on adult male workers is analyzed in Webb ( 1889 )esp. pp. 862 865, Webb ( 1901 ) pp. 65 74 and Webb and Webb ( 1911 ) pp. 355 361.49 For the classic analysis of the rationalization of British industry as a consequence of factorylegislation, see Marx ( 1979 ) 1, esp. pp. 394 395, 635. For more on laissez faire opposition to British protective labor legislation, see Blaug ( 1958 ). For an excellent discussion of the overall positive impact of British protective labor legislation (or factory legislation) on productivity, wages, profits, prices, andforeign trade, see Jeans ( 1892 ).

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counterpart. In the first place, although the British factory inspectorate was aninstitution that initially consisted of only four head inspectors and eight assistants, 50

it was also an institution that was created by an Act of Parliament. The support of Parliament as the undisputed locus of legitimacy and sovereignty (the principle of

Parliamentary Supremacy) meant that the factory inspectorate enjoyed a consider-able degree of institutional autonomy from its inception. Secondly, the head factoryinspectors were recruited from the ranks of respectable gentlemen who weretrusted to remain objective in their investigations of the factory question and neutralin disputes between employers and workers. Thirdly, the British factory inspectoratewas a highly centralized institution invested with considerable enforcement powers.These enforcement powers allowed the inspectors to impose sanctions on recalcitrant employers and raise the cost of defection for violators. Over time, such actions raisedthe credibility of inspectors as neutral enforcers of factory legislation among

workers, while their objective and scientifically-based investigations of factoryconditions enhanced the institution s profile in the eyes of the educated middle-class public. Fourthly, the factory inspectorate s leaders complemented this reputation- building strategy with organizational expansion that increased their administrativecapacity. 51 Fifthly, the factory inspectors developed a synthetic ideology that included elements of Tory paternalism, utilitarianism, and British nationalism. Thisact of creative recombination (Sheingate) enabled the factory inspectorssimultaneously to appeal to the material and ideal interests of very different constituencies, from conservatives to liberals and select representatives of the

working class, while preserving institutional autonomy and avoiding the pitfalls of formal and informal cooptation. To paraphrase Miroff, the development of thissynthetic ideology represented a successful leadership strategy predicated on theconstruction of public meanings and the appeals to political values, in this case thevalues of a middle-class public concerned with the negative effects of factoryconditions on the moral life of the nation. 52 It is worth pointing out that none of these achievements came easily, as a considerable leadership effort was required toovercome the resistance of employers, the attacks of laissez-faire economists on protective labor legislation as economically unsustainable, and the indifference of the working class to industrial safety and hygiene standards. By the time of theadvent of the French Third Republic (1871), the positive effects of British factoryinspection had become visible, making it a model for France and other industrializing countries. 53

The history of the French factory inspectorate began in 1872 when the lawyer Eugne Tallon drew up and presented a legislative report to the Chamber of Deputies

50 Factory and Workshops Act (1876), pp. lxxxvii lxxxviii.51

These four points are a concise summary of some of the major findings of Hutchins and Harrison(1903 ) and Thomas ( 1948 ).52 The blending of these different ideological currents to justify British protective labor legislation (or factory legislation) is discussed in Martin ( 1969 ) and Fuchs ( 2001 ). Martin s essay explores the fusion of paternalism and utilitarianism, while Fuchs dissertation builds on Martin s ideas by exploring the impact of nationalist discourse.53 The previous paragraph represents a very concise summary of some of the main conclusions I reachedin my dissertation.

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Commission were known as divisional inspectors). 61 Composed of respected localnotables with undisputed moral authority, it was thought, the commissioners would be in an ideal position to educate their fellow citizens about the purpose of factoryinspection and act as social conciliators, thereby balancing the power of the civil

service.62

By empowering the local commissions to appoint departmental inspectors,the members of the 1873 Assembly hoped to allay fears that still another body of central government officials with large discretionary powers was in the making. 63 Inaddition to balancing central state power through local influence, this system had theadditional advantage of drawing previously excluded local constituencies into the policy process.

These two important departures from the British model the lack of a headinspector and the delegation of power to local commissions led to a series of unintended consequences. To begin with, in the absence of a head official, the

inspectors failed to develop a uniform enforcement code. Scattered over their respective regions and deprived of coordinated leadership or stable communicationchannels, the first fifteen divisional inspectors varied in their methods of inspection and enforcement, provoking considerable employer resistance. In theory,at least, the task of supervising the inspectorate and working out a uniformenforcement code based on the inspectors monthly reports was the responsibilityof the Higher Labor Commission. However, the Higher Labor Commission was poorly qualified for this task and removed from the inspectors day-to-dayexperience, with the consequence that its instructions were abstract and

impracticable. Instead of creating greater uniformity, the Higher Labor Commis-sion often reinforced the inspectors tendency to rely on their own methods of enforcement. 64

A second danger that the British experience had made clear, but the lessons of which were not necessarily apparent at the time, concerned the delegation of important administrative functions to unpaid local officials. In Britain, factoryinspection was created in order to overcome the discretionary behavior of localnotables who posed a threat to the development of impersonal bureaucratic norms. InFrance, by contrast, local notables were granted discretionary powers in the hope of keeping in check state officials 65 who had a tradition of abusing bureaucratic power.

62 Rapport de Tallon (11 mai 1872) pp. 56 57 and Deuxime dliberation, sess. 8 February, 1873, p.329 in Tallon and Maurice ( 1875 ).63 Weissbach ( 1989 ) pp. 201 202 and Deuxime dliberation, sess. 8 February, 1873, in Tallon andMaurice ( 1875 ) pp. 299 334. See also van Overbergh ( 1893 ) p. 206.64

van Overbergh ( 1893 ) pp. 166 184, Bec ( 1907 ) pp. 52 54 and Rouanet ( 1890 ) pp. 401 402. See alsoColmart ( 1899 ) pp. 69 85. The understaffing of the inspectorate and the poor coordination between thedivisional inspectors (appointed by the Higher Labor Commission) and the departmental inspectors(appointed by the local commissions) were two additional factors that exacerbated the problem of unevenenforcement. See ILO ( 1923 ) pp. 38 39.

61 See Law of 19 May, sect. VII, arts. 20 21 in ibid., pp. 227 228; and Rapport de Tallon (11 mai1872), in Tallon and Maurice ( 1875 ) pp. 56 57.

65 Weissbach ( 1989 ) pp. 201 202 and Deuxime dliberation, sess. 8 February, 1873, in Tallon andMaurice ( 1875 ) 299 334. See also van Overbergh ( 1893 ) p. 206. For more on the centralization of theBritish factory inspectorate, see Thomas ( 1948 ) pp. 46 47, 57 58, 63 64.

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However, since the local commissions were composed of unpaid officials whofrequently lacked the requisite qualifications, they had few incentives to meet their obligations. Moreover, since the sources of local funding were meager, thecommissions were reluctant to appoint additional departmental inspectors (new

appointments were made in only 20 out of 87 departments). Finally, since manycommissions were composed of notables who were closely aligned with employers,they tended to appoint compliant inspectors. Without the support of local notables,the inspectors could neither bridge the gap between the state and local constituenciesnor acquire legitimacy in the wider society. Ultimately, the poorly paid andcompliant departmental inspectors did not make for a reliable auxiliary administra-tive force. 66

The next generation of politicians attempted to address some of these problems,especially in view of growing labor unrest. 67 In 1892, the National Assembly

passed a new protective labor law designed to reduce the workday of women andchildren and improve the functioning of the factory inspectorate. 68 More specifically,the law abolished the existing local commissions and replaced them with purelyadvisory local bodies that no longer had the power to appoint inspectors. 69

Henceforth, the Minister of Commerce nominated suitable candidates for depart-mental inspectors himself. 70 However, this positive step did not free the inspectorsfrom dependence on local mayors whose broader role in the Third Republic was toserve as the main bulwark against state-appointed prefects and other intrusive centralstate officials. 71

In the case of factory inspection, the state had accorded the mayors anindependent enforcement role in the hope they would mediate in routine disputes between employers and inspectors. The mayors most important power resided in theissuing of age certificates to parents who wanted their children to work in factories.Although proof of age was legally required for employment, the mayors and their staffs often issued age certificates without ascertaining the real age of the children or,conversely, refused to issue them on the pretext of inadequate funding for printingthe necessary forms or hiring additional staff. 72 Despite the occasional support of departmental prefects, the factory inspectors were largely unsuccessful in securing

66 See van Overbergh ( 1893 ) pp. 156 159, 163 175, Marini ( 1936 ) pp. 54 56, Monteil ( 1909 ) pp. 30 32,40 44, Durand ( 1902 ) pp. 62 85 and ILO ( 1923 ) pp. 38 39.67 Much of this unrest took place in the wake of the Second International (1889). See Cross ( 1989 ) pp.71 73. See also Sorlin ( 1966 ) pp. 356 364.68 This law was known as Loi du 2 novembre 1892 sur le travail des enfants, des filles mineures et desfemmes dans les tablissements industriels (or the Law of 2 November 1892). Its purpose was to reducethe work of children to ten hours a day and of women to eleven. For the legal text, see RpubliqueFranaise. Ministre du Commerce ( 1895 ) pp. 233 245.69

See section VII, articles 24 and 25 of the Law of 2 November 1892 reprinted in ibid., p. 242; Vanlaer (1897 ) p. 724 and Durand ( 1902 ) pp. 114 119. See also Guesde ( 1901 ) 2, p. 221.70 See section VI, art. 16 of the Law of 2 November 1892, in Rpublique Franaise. Ministre duCommerce ( 1895 ) p. 227.71 For more on the political role of the mayors in this era, see Wright ( 1986 ).72 See Vanlaer ( 1897 ) p. 735. The mayors unwillingness to comply with the legal provisions of work-timeregulations for protected workers remained a thorny issue for the factory inspectors even in the yearsleading up to the First World War. See L application des lois rglementant le travail en 1911 ( 1912 ).

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the mayors cooperation, with the result that employers were able to engage in lawevasion. 73

The power of mayors to block reform confirms Stanley Hoffmann s view of theThird Republic as a stalemate society in which peculiar informal arrangements

made possible the coexistence of antagonistic political actors in an attempt to foster consensus.

74The delegation of important duties to mayors was one way to minimize

confrontation between highly placed state officials and private individuals (employ-ers) that was seen as detrimental to regime stability. In the case of the factoryinspectorate, this stalemate came to an end with Alexandre Millerand s ascent to theMinistry of Commerce, which opened new opportunities for political entrepreneur-ship and policy innovation.

The historical-institutional context of Millerand

s leadership

Alexandre Millerand (1859 1943) was one of the towering figures of the FrenchThird Republic and the first Socialist (other than Louis Blanc) to hold a ministerial post in any European country. 75 As a young lawyer from a lower middle-classrepublican family, Millerand was elected to the Chamber of Deputies as anindependent Socialist when he was only twenty-six (1885). Having established hisreputation by defending the civil rights of workers charged with inciting labor unrest at a time when low unionization rates (less than ten percent in the early 1890s) made

workers politically vulnerable, Millerand espoused parliamentary socialism as amatter of conviction. 76

The cause of parliamentary socialism was given a significant boost when theSocialists won their first big legislative victory in the 1890s (50 representatives tothe 485-seat National Assembly in 1893). This success was followed by Millerand sfirst attempt to unify the Socialist party on a platform of social reform and union

74 For more on the stalemate society, see Hoffmann ( 1963 ) esp. pp. 3 21. For the origin of the term stalemate society, see Crozier ( 1973 ).

73 The inspectors could do little to combat the mayors corruption other than by notifying the Ministry of Commerce. The Ministry tried to address this problem by issuing circulars that cautioned the prefects towatch for corrupt practices, or, in more extreme cases, by instructing them to contact the mayors. Mayorswho failed to cooperate with the prefects could be prosecuted in administrative courts, which rarelyhappened in practice. The inspectorate s troubled relationship with the mayors helps highlight theconsiderable autonomy that the latter enjoyed in local administration. For more on the mayors autonomyin local affairs and their failure to comply with labor legislation (e.g., the 1898 accident law), see Archives Nationales, (hereafter AN)/F22/493 (1899 1921), Correspondence between the Minister of Labor andWelfare (Direction du travail ) and the Prefect of Seine-et-Oise, 20 January 1913 and 4 June 1913; and AN/ F22/475 (1899 1914), Minister of Labor and Social Welfare (Direction de l assurance et de la prvoyancesociale) to the Prefect of l Aisne, 13 May 1910.

75

In the course of his long political career that practically overlapped with the historical life-span of theThird Republic, Millerand occupied successive cabinet posts as Minister of Commerce (1899 1902),Minister of Public Works (1909 1910) and Minister of War (1912 1915). After the Great War, Millerandwas appointed Prime Minister (1920) and President of the Republic (1920 1924), eventually ending hiscareer, like many elderly French statesmen of the time, as Senator (1927 1940). See Millerand (1859 1943) ( 1990 ).76 Milbank-Farrar ( 1977 ) pp. 9 47, Derfler ( 1977 ) p. 25, 125, 174, Persil ( 1949 ) pp. 11 17, Weill ( 1911 ) pp. 286 293 and Price ( 1987 ) p. 247.

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rights (Saint-Mand Program, 1896). 77 The dream of a unified Socialist party,however, was shattered when Millerand became Minister of Commerce (1899) inWaldeck-Rousseau s cabinet, which earned him the hostility of the militant wing of the working-class movement. 78

Millerand s selling out to the bourgeoisie was motivated by his belief that thelabor movement needed parliamentary leverage in order to pass reforms that wouldimprove labor conditions and help integrate workers into the republican polity. Thisgoal was shared by moderate bourgeois republicans who felt compelled to court theSocialists on account of their electoral strength, renewed labor conflict (in 1899alone more than 3 million workdays were lost to strikes), and the republic slegitimacy crisis in the aftermath of the Dreyfus Affair. Waldeck-Rousseau s cabinet was designed to bring the moderates of left, center, and right in the defense of therepublic against radical challengers from the extreme right and left. 79

During his 3 years as Minister of Commerce, Millerand initiated significant labor legislation. 80 The most important of his reforms included the so-called MillerandDecrees (1899) that extended welfare benefits to public service workers (minimumwage, regulated work hours, and a guaranteed day off per week); the drafting of theold-age pensions bill, a landmark piece of legislation that was passed duringMillerand s subsequent service as Minister of Public Works (1910); and the creationof regional labor councils that provided the institutional framework for collective bargaining three decades later, under the Blum government (1936 1940). Millerand backed these reforms with a new and highly capable administrative staff that formed

the core of the new Ministry of Labor (founded in 1906).81

These policy innovations and organizational achievements were impressive giventhe troubled relations between the state and the working class and Millerand scontroversial role in the labor movement. A series of institutional obstacles presented additional constraints on reform: a conservative Senate whose membersdisproportionately represented rural interests and exercised legislative veto; thesystem of two-ballot voting that diminished the democratic potential of universal

78 Milbank-Farrar ( 1977 ) pp. 50 54, Millerand (1859 1943) ( 1990 ) p. 291, Bourdeau ( 1899 ) and Persil(1949 ) pp. 45 63. Millerand was expelled from the French Socialist Party in 1904, while his pariahstatus became a topic of debate at the Sixth Congress of the Socialist International. Characteristically,Lenin used the term Millerandism to refer to any socialist who had been coopted by the capitalist class by accepting a government post. The threat of expulsion from the Socialist party haunted French socialistsuntil 1936, the year in which Lon Blum formed his national unity government and became the secondsocialist politician to occupy a government post in the Third Republic. See Derfler ( 1977 ) p. vii, pp. 161 162 and Millerand (1859 1943) ( 1990 ) p. 291.79 Milbank-Farrar ( 1977 ) pp. 48 54, 58 59, 83 87 and Derfler ( 1977 ) pp. 173 174.80

The major social reforms that republican politicians had ratified prior to Millerand s accession to hiscabinet position included the 1884 law on associations and the 1898 law on accident insurance. For moreon these reforms, see Weill ( 1911 ) pp. 411 425.81 Milbank-Farrar ( 1977 ) pp. 57 74, 84 87, Derfler ( 1977 ) pp. 166 170, 180 190, 207 215 and Persil(1949 ) pp. 19 44. Millerand s followers consisted of a dedicated group of civil servants and lawyers whowould carry forward his reform vision in the Ministry of Labor. This group included Eugne Petit, Arthur Fontaine, Aim Lavy, Robert Persil, and Joseph Sarraute. See Derfler ( 1977 ) pp. 166 167. For Millerand srecollections of the labor reforms he initiated as Minister of Commerce, see Millerand ( 1911 ).

77 Millbank-Farrar ( 1977 ) pp. 28 32, 41 47, Hanley ( 2002 ) p. 61, Table 4.2 and Weill ( 1911 ) pp. 286 293.

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adult male suffrage and lowered labor representation; a weak executive that couldnot break parliamentary deadlock; and, legislative rules that resulted in high cabinet turnover. 82 The scope for political innovation was further limited by the precariouslegitimacy of the republican regime that necessitated the voluntary support of local

officials, employers, and workers, Millerand s ambivalent reputation among work-ers, and the opprobrium of some employers who resented his role as a labor lawyer. 83 Moreover, since there was no ideological equivalent of British-style Tory paternalism that could legitimize social reform among conservative elites, the possibilities for creative recombination (Sheingate) were limited. 84 Finally, theappeal to broader public values (Miroff) was fraught with ambiguity in a context inwhich republicanism did not enjoy a hegemonic hold on society.

These constraining features of the institutional environment were balanced by a set of enabling conditions. Firstly, Millerand s rise to the Ministry of Commerce occurred

at a time of profound institutional crisis, a favorable climate for political innovation,especially since French social legislation was still in its formative stages. Secondly,Millerand could make use of his considerable institutional powers to promote sociallegislation, if necessary by administrative decree. Thirdly, in Sheingate s terms,Millerand was in a position to innovate precisely because institutional rules andadministrative competencies in the area of labor legislation were ambiguous, givinghim and his staff considerable leeway to experiment with institutional reforms.Fourthly, Millerand s own position was institutionally ambiguous in the sense that hestood at the center of a coalition more united in its desire to protect the republic than

by a more specific policy agenda.85

Consequently, Millerand was in a good positionto acquire support from moderate Socialists, bourgeois republicans, and ChristianSocialists, all of whom agreed on the necessity of addressing the labor question.Finally, as Carpenter argues, the ability of political entrepreneurs to build a diverse political and social base enhances elite autonomy. In Millerand s case, this diversitycharacterized not only the political coalition at whose center he stood, but also the policy experts that he incorporated into legislative and extra-legislative bodies.

Millerand s reform project encountered the greatest obstacles in the area of protective labor legislation, which he thought held a unique promise for bridging thegap between employers and workers. In his effort to reform the factory inspectorate,Millerand employed a variety of leadership strategies, from statutory improvementsin protective labor laws to the administrative reorganization of the inspectorate, theformation of commissions intended to promote trust between inspectors, employers,and workers, and reliance on neutral policy experts. Most consequentially, Millerandengaged in the formal cooptation of organized labor in the hope of making theinspectorate more inclusive and broadening the social base of reform support. Theultimate goal of these different strategies was to enhance the inspectorate sreputational autonomy and administrative capacity by fostering trust amongemployers and workers, and gaining the support of middle-class public opinion.

84 For the impact of Tory paternalism on British protective labor legislation, see Driver ( 1979 ).85 Defler ( 1977 ) pp. 216 219.

83 Milbank-Farrar ( 1977 ) pp. 85 86 and Persil ( 1949 ) pp. 214 215.

82 See Derfler ( 1982 ) pp. 20 21. For a more general discussion of the institutional arrangements and political culture of the Third Republic, see Stanley Hoffmann ( 1963 ).

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Building social consensus through formal cooptation and cooperation:Millerand s reform of the factory inspectorate

Millerand s first step in reforming the factory inspectorate was the law of 30 March

1900, which was designed to reduce the work hours of protected workers women, young adolescent females, and children to 10 h

86over the next 4 years.

An indirect consequence of this law was the reduction of the working hours of adult men who worked in mixed factories, i.e. together with protected workers. In practice this meant that more than one million men would benefit from the new ten-hour workday (and an almost equal number of women and children). 87

Millerand s law directly contradicted the law of 1892 that separated protectedfrom unprotected workers. The separation of protected from unprotected workersappeared counterproductive in a factory system in which their labor was inextricably

linked. The existence of separate work schedules for different categories of workershad a particularly disruptive effect on the production cycle, giving employers anincentive to evade the law. The law of 1900 proposed to remedy this situation bystipulating that all workers in mixed factories and workshops should work nolonger than 10 h. 88

Employers who opposed Millerand s law especially resented the fact that four-fifths of the workforce would benefit from legislation that was initially intended toimprove the plight of children, arguing that French industry could not afford anacross the board two-hour reduction of the workday. 89 Militant labor leaders who

had struggled for an eight-hour workday ever since it became one of the main goalsof the Second International (1889), on the other hand, saw Millerand s ten-hour dayas an act of betrayal. 90

Millerand attempted to overcome the mistrust of employers and workers bystrengthening the consultative role of two institutions: the Higher Labor Council(Conseil suprieur du travail ) and the French Association for Protective Labor

86 The Law of 30 March 1900, ( La Loi du 30 mars 1900 sur le travail des ouvriers adultes dans lestablissements personnel mixte or La Loi Millerand ), like the Law of 2 November 1892, defined theterm child to mean any person (male or female) between the ages of 13 and 16 insofar as it related to thelength of the workday. Like the 1892 law, it prohibited children below the age of 13 from being employedin factories. Another category of workers protected by this law were young adolescent women, i.e. femaleworkers between the ages of 16 and 18. For the Law of 30 March, 1900, see Mass ( 1904 ) pp. 306 307.See also the Law of 2 November 1892, see sect. I, arts. 1 3, reprinted in Rpublique Franaise. Ministredu Commerce ( 1895 ) p. 227.87 Lavy ( 1902 ) pp. 40 42, Milbank-Farrar ( 1977 ) pp. 62 63, Derfler ( 1977 ) pp. 179 180 andStone ( 1985 ) p. 131. According to Millerand, the number of men affected by the law was 1,111,335,the number of women 603,185 and the number of children, 433,677. See Millerand ( 1906 ) p. 19.88 Stone ( 1985 ) pp. 126 129, Viet ( 1994 ) 1, pp. 244 247, Derfler ( 1977 ) p. 179, Louis ( 1904 ) pp. 232 236 and Breton ( 1900 ). See also Rouanet ( 1900 ).89

Breton ( 1900 ); Association nationale franaise pour la protection lgale des travailleurs (ANFLT)(1905 ) esp. pp. 150 157, Derfler ( 1977 ) p. 179 and de Seilhac ( 1903a ). The employers argument wassummed up by an influential spokesman for the Association des industriels du Nord de la France asfollows (1904): That we should march ahead and set an example [by reducing the workday] is a verywonderful thing; nevertheless we should not sacrifice our industry; we should not rush because when yourush you risk falling (my translation). See ANFLT ( 1905 ) p. 153.90 Derfler ( 1977 ) p. 180, Cross ( 1989 ) pp. 125 127, Louis ( 1904 ) pp. 234 235 and Levine ( 1914 ) pp.251 259.

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Legislation ( Association nationale franaise pour la protection lgale du travailleur ).As important new arenas for public debate on labor reform, these two institutions brought together political reformers, inspectors, and representatives of employers andworkers.

Founded in 1891, the Higher Labor Council was a legislative body whose maintask was to investigate labor questions.

91The Council s fairly academic approach,

however, quickly exposed it to the criticism of militant labor leaders such as JulesGuesde. 92 Millerand s idea was to transform this body into one resembling theBritish Royal Commissions. Like the Royal Commissions, the Council would become a forum for public debate and investigation, offering enlightened insightsinto social issues in a way understandable to the average citizen. Thus transformed,the Higher Labor Council would form an important counterweight to the Higher Labor Commission whose heavy-handed interference and dry technical reports

undermined the inspectorate s autonomy and did little to shape public opinion. Byincluding the elected representatives of unions and employers associations into theCouncil, Millerand hoped to bridge the gap between two mutually antagonisticsocial constituencies. 93

The idea of including workers into a legislative body on the basis of unionaffiliation rather than class background (as was the case in other consultative bodies)was an important policy innovation. In Millerand s vision, the integration of workersinto policy-making was a means to transform unions from instruments of class warfareinto legitimate partners such as the British Trades Union Congress (TUC). By taking

part in Council deliberations together with

respectable

employers and experts, theworkers would not only be defending their class interests, but also elevating their public status and opening prospects for improved relations on the shop floor. 94

The second body Millerand used to mobilize support was the French Associationfor Protective Labor Legislation. Founded as the French branch of the InternationalAssociation for Protective Labor Legislation in 1900, its purpose was to offer adviceon French legislation and work towards the establishment of an international labor code with the help of the International Association s headquarters in Basel. 95 Thestrong objections of French employers to the reduction of the workday convincedMillerand that international cooperation was a necessary condition for the success of protective labor legislation on the national level. 96 Just like the Higher Labor

92 Jules Guesde ( 1901 ), 2, p. 125.

91 Dpasse ( 1891 ).

93 See decree of 1 Sept. 1899 reprinted and discussed in Lavy ( 1902 ) pp. 66 72, Bourdeau ( 1903 ) p. 405,Weill ( 1911 ) p. 421 and Persil ( 1949 ) pp. 26 27. One-third of the Council s members were elected by professional workers associations and another third by professional employers associations. Theremaining third was appointed by the Minister of Commerce and consisted mainly of academics,legislators, lawyers, and civil servants. Millerand held high hopes for the Higher Labor Council, statingthat the Higher Labor Council will play a similar role to the grand royal commissions in England that

compile and bring to light through their relentless and minute investigations the grievances of labor (mytranslation). See Lavy ( 1902 ) p. 72.

95 Bauer ( 1921 ) p. 29 and Jay ( 1910 ) p. 316, incl. n.1.96 Having passed the highly controversial Law of 30 March 1900, Millerand realized how important it wasfor the French government to play a leading role in ratifying international labor treaties that would help protect national industries against unfair competition and weaken employer resistance. See Pic ( 1900 ) pp. 178-179, incl. nn. 1-2 and ANFLT ( 1905 ) pp. 115-116.

94 See Lavy ( 1902 ) pp. 66 70 and Millerand ( 1906 ) pp. 24 25.

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Council, the French Association for Protective Labor Legislation was envisaged as aforum for bringing together employers, labor leaders, and reformers in a neutralsetting. 97

Leading reform experts, drawn from the ranks of academia, the legal profession,

and administration were meant to represent the public interest and played animportant mediating role in both organizations, giving the debate on labor reforma degree of intellectual consistency lacking in other policy areas. 98 Bothinstitutional arenas served as important vehicles for enhancing trust betweenemployers and workers and building public support for protective labor legislation.In addition, the public exchange of views on the reduction of the workday, theregulation of home work, the repos hebdomadaire, and state arbitration, left a positive impression on public opinion, creating a more favorable climate for labor reform. 99

Millerand s leadership in the commissions proved to be of singular importance in breaking policy deadlocks on issues pertaining to protective labor legislation. 100

Millerand, however, was also well aware of the fact that the two institutional pillars of his policy were insufficient, and that all labor laws would remain dead letters, whichserve no function in the absence of a serious factory inspectorate, i.e., one capableof effective and uniform enforcement. 101 For this reason, Millerand established the practice of having the divisional inspectors meet periodically at the Ministry of Commerce in Paris to coordinate their law enforcement practices. 102 In a further attempt to provide the inspectorate with the administrative capacity necessary for

effective and uniform enforcement, Millerand successfully persuaded the NationalAssembly to increase the inspectorate s staff from 106 to 121 (1899 1902). 103

Realizing that enhanced administrative capacity would not automatically produceresults, Millerand also attempted to give the inspectors a more visible public role byinviting four of them to take part in the 1900 congress of the InternationalAssociation of Protective Labor Legislation. Henceforth, the Ministry of Commerceregularly included inspectors in official delegations to the International Associationof Protective Labor Legislation. 104 By inviting the inspectors to take part in thedeliberations of the Association s French branch and write six of its reports,

98 Lavy ( 1902 ) p. 71.99 Between 1900 and 1914, the French Association for Protective Labor Legislation conducted more thanfifty inquiries on child and female labor, the length of the workday, homework, hygiene and industrialsafety, unemployment, and labor conflicts. Frequently, the labor issues addressed by the Associationoverlapped with those preoccupying the Higher Labor Council. Thus, in 1907 the Higher Labor Councilreported on factory inspection, while the French Association of Labor Legislation followed up two yearslater. See Conseil suprieur du travail (CST) ( 1907a , b) and ANFLT ( 1909 ).100 Thus, in the course of the French Association s debates on the shorter workday (1904), Millerand andFagnot (an official investigator in Millerand s ministry), persuaded employers to drop their opposition tothe unified working day. See ANFLT ( 1905 ) pp. 57 62, 105 116.101 See Millerand s speech of 25 July 1900 in CIPLT ( 1901 ) pp. 466 467 (quote on p. 467).102 Lavy ( 1902 ) p. 99.103 Ibid., p. 103, Price ( 1914 ) p. 195 and Millerand ( 1900 ) p. 574.

97 For more on this body and its non-partisan nature, see Stewart ( 1989 ) p. 53.

104 Viet ( 1994 ) 1, pp. 337 339, 398, n. 141. The four inspectors invited to participate in the proceedings of the 1900 Congress were Laporte, Harl, Pourcines, and Barral. See sess. 26 and 27 July 1900 in CIPLT(1901 ) pp. 493 537.

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Millerand increased the inspectors visibility and put an end to their institutionalisolation. 105

Among the most important elements of Millerand s strategy was the establish-ment of stronger communication channels between inspectors and workers. In his

circular of 19 January 1900, Millerand instructed the inspectors and the secretaries of trade unions and bourses du travail to exchange information on law enforcement intheir respective districts on a regular basis. While labor representatives wereencouraged to inform the inspectors about workers complaints, the inspectors wereexpected to inform the Ministry of Commerce about the number of complaintsinvestigated and the sanctions imposed on employers. 106 A similar purpose wasserved by the series of conferences held in the bourses de travail throughout Francein 1900, in which the inspectors informed workers of the benefits of protective labor laws. 107

As Millerand explained in his circular, workers rarely voiced their complaints tofactory inspectors in the past, because they feared reprisals 108 and also because of their hostility to state officialdom. Millerand intimated that the inspectors couldovercome this mistrust only if they went beyond their formal role as neutral lawenforcers and presented themselves as officials who would educate workers about their rights and treat them as partners. This partnership, however, could become areality only if workers were recruited into the inspectorate. The incorporation of elected trade union delegates into the inspectorate (instead of their appointment onthe basis of competitive state exams) had been a long-standing working-class

demand.109

Not surprisingly, many employers opposed this attempt to the transforminspectorate into an ally of trade unions. 110

As a result, Millerand developed an alternative solution for increasing working-class representation by abolishing the elitist point system that automatically grantedthe graduates from the grandes coles or universities a thirty-point advantage onstate examinations and by deemphasizing highly technical qualifications that wouldmake workers ineligible. In this fashion, a qualified worker without higher education

105 Viet ( 1994 ) 1, pp. 337 339. The French Association for Protective Labor Legislation delegated six of its reports to the factory inspectors. The inspectors reports were devoted to the abolition of night work (1909) (1911); the enforcement of protective labor legislation in the public state sector (1908); theimprovement of labor conditions of female shop assistants (1906) and of workers in factories feu continu(1912); and accident prevention (1909).106 See Actes et documents officiels ( 1900 ). Circulaire en date du 19 janvier 1900 (hereafter cited asCirculaire 19 janvier 1900).107 Millerand ( 1900 ) pp. 577 578. See also AN/F22/563 (1900 1912), La confrence de dimanche. La loisur les heures de travail et la loi sur les accidents. Journal de Flers, 25 April 1900, Les lois ouvrires.Confrence faite par M. l inspecteur du travail. Journal de Caen, 2 May 1900 and La confrence de M.

linspecteur du travail. l

Echo rpublicain du Valois et de l

arrondissement de la Seine, 18 March 1900.108 Circulaire 19 janvier 1900, pp. 190 191.109 Beginning in 1894, Guesde and Vaillant authored several draft bills that were aimed at increasing therepresentation of workers within the inspectorate. See Guesde ( 1901 ) 2, pp. 219 234, 245 250 andANFLT ( 1909 ) p. 72. As early as 1885, workers congresses began passing resolutions that called for theappointment of worker delegates. For further details, see Viet ( 1994 ) 1, p. 313, incl. n. 50; and Aris(1998 ).110 Viet ( 1994 ) 1, p. 313.

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could enter the service. 111 In return, working-class inspectors were expected toundergo rigorous training that would qualify them for impartial and technicallycompetent enforcement. These selection procedures resulted in the recruitment of eleven working-class candidates into the inspectorate between 1901 and 1905. 112

Millerand s decision to recruit inspectors from the working class was unprece-dented. The hierarchical French civil service traditionally excluded the less educatedlower social strata, and the inspectorate, largely composed of the alumni of eliteschools, universities, and higher institutes, was hardly an exception. 113 Thus, it waslogical to expect more resistance to the idea of working-class inspectors from withinthe inspectorate itself. Interestingly enough, this did not transpire. 114

The receptiveness of the French inspectorate to recruiting workers has to beunderstood against the background of the British precedent. With the emergence of astrong trade union movement in the 1870s, the British inspectorate was forced to

consider the idea of appointing working-class inspectors. In 1873, chief inspector Redgrave objected to the recruitment of workers, stating that this would compromisethe inspectorate s neutrality. 115 As a result, when Parliament finally appointedworking-class inspectors (1893), it did so on terms that were socially acceptable, i.e., by relegating workers to the subordinate role of assistants. 116

By contrast, in France, the inspectors never succeeded in projecting neutrality andsecuring autonomy. In view of their repeated failures at law enforcement, theworkers saw the inspectors as colluding with employers. 117 The task, then, was not to project an image of neutrality at all costs, but rather to regain the workers trust.

For this reason, Millerand, who initially wished to create assistants on the Britishmodel, was sufficiently impressed by inspector Laporte s expert recommendation toincorporate workers into the service on an equal footing. 118

This attempt to improve the inspectorate s relations with a key social constituencywas not unprecedented. In the past, however, Ministries of Commerce had encouragedcooperation between inspectors and employers, not inspectors and workers. Byallowing inspectors to become honorary members of employer safety associations,such as the Association des industriels de France, and awarding periodic prizes tothese associations for safety inventions, ministers hoped to encourage thedevelopment of new safety techniques and improve relations with employers. 119

Millerand s attempt to create a complementary set of relations between inspectorsand workers was intended to overcome the perception of inspectors as employers

112 Between 1901 and 1905 eleven new inspectors of working-class origin were recruited into the service.See ANFLT ( 1909 ) p. 69. Prior to Millerand s reforms (between 1892 and 1900) only 6.7 per cent of theinspectors had a parent of working-class or peasant origin. Between 1901 and 1914, that number increasedto 50 per cent. See Donald Reid ( 1998 ) p. 117, incl. n. 15.113

Reid ( 1998 ) pp. 115

116.114 Viet ( 1998 ) p. 50 and Reid ( 1986 ) p. 73. For a different perspective, see Stewart ( 1989 ) p. 85.115 ILO (1923 ) p. 48.116 Hutchins and Harrison ( 1903 ) pp. 248 249.117 Aris ( 1998 ) pp. 53 55.118 CIPLT ( 1901 ) pp. 529 530.119 Reid ( 1986 ) p. 75. For the prizes see Association normande pour prvenir les accidents du travail(1896) pp. 243 244.

111 Millerand ( 1900 ) pp. 575 576 and ANFLT ( 1909 ) pp. 68 69.

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The strategy of recruiting workers into the inspectorate offers a good illustrationof Selznick s idea of the formal cooptation of a relevant public. Millerand s hopewas that formal cooptation would foster the institution s inclusive image, make tradeunionists more responsible for effective enforcement, increase the workers public

status through the occupation of office, and give union leaders an incentive toeducate workers and persuade them to cooperate with the inspectors. The strategy of formal cooptation did bear some results, as the participation of unions in lawenforcement increased working-class cooperation and helped meet the organizationalneeds of the understaffed factory inspectorate. Henceforth, the inspectorate was not as dependent on the National Assembly for funding and could strengthen itsorganizational capacities independently. The inspectors reports to the Higher Labor Commission in the 1900s testify to their improved relations with trade unions andhighlight the positive effects of this cooperation on enforcement. 125

It needs to be pointed out that Millerand s cooptation strategy was also formal inthe sense that it was designed to preserve the factory inspectorate s status as the solelegitimate authority in charge of enforcem

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Historical Legacies, Institutional Change, And Policy