Historiography and Representation in Safavid and Afsharid Iran || 1739: History, Self, and Other in Afsharid Iran and Mughal India

International Society for Iranian Studies

1739: History, Self, and Other in Afsharid Iran and Mughal IndiaAuthor(s): Ernest TuckerSource: Iranian Studies, Vol. 31, No. 2, Historiography and Representation in Safavid andAfsharid Iran (Spring, 1998), pp. 207-217Published by: Taylor & Francis, Ltd. on behalf of International Society for Iranian StudiesStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4311145 .

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Iranian Studies, volume 31, number 2, Spring 1998

Ernest Tucker

1739: History, Self, and Other in Afsharid Iran and Mughal India

AN IMPORTANT EVENT IN THE EARLY MODERN HISTORY OF INDIA WAS NADIR Shah's conquest, culminating in the battle of Karnal and the sack of Delhi in the spring of 1739. During this campaign, Nadir looted a huge part of the Mughal treasury, including the fabled Peacock Throne and the Kuh-i Nur diamond, and was responsible for the deaths of thousands of citizens of Delhi in a great slaugh- ter carried out by his army. Historians of India have viewed this invasion as a crushing blow from which the Mughal dynasty never truly recovered, paving the way for European power to become established on the subcontinent in the next few decades. It has been remembered by some Iranian historians as Nadir's crowning military achievement, after which he denied his country the benefits of his victory, wasting away the final years of his reign in an orgy of terror and blood.

The battle of Karnal and the Delhi massacre have long since passed into Indian and Iranian myth. In Delhi, the gate near where the massacre took place was known through the early twentieth century as the darvazah-i khun ("gate- way of blood") and the term niadirshihh became a shorthand for "massacre" in colloquial Indian parlance.' In Iran, Nadir's victory came to be incorporated into the tableau of great moments in Iranian history by his Qajar successors: a depiction of him at Karnal was included in the tableau paintings of the Chihil Sutun palace in Isfahan.

It is not the purpose of this paper, though, to review the circumstances and consequences of Nadir's invasion.2 Instead, it will examine how four contempo- rary observers on different sides of this pivotal conflict, the Persian chronicler Muhammad Kazim Marvi, the Indian scribe Anand Ram Mukhlis, the Punjabi poet Nijabat, and the Hindi poet Tilok Das focus on a common theme, despite considerable differences in tone, scope, and genre between their works. These authors all use their accounts of the Indian campaign to explore the significance of ties of loyalty and obligation between ruler and subject in their respective empires.

Marvi's Thrikh-i Calam-ara-yi Nidirl characterizes Nadir's seizure of the throne in 1736 at Mughan as a critical betrayal of the legitimate ruler of Iran, the Safavid cAbbas III. A large part of this work is aranged to show how Nadir and Iran payed a heavy price for this usurpation. Although Marvi had scant respect for the ruling abilities of the last Safavid shahs, he implies throughout his work

1. Laurence Lockhart, Nadir Shah (London: Luzac, 1938), 150. 2. For a recent account of newly-discovered Dutch sources on Nadir's invasion, see

Willem Floor, "New Facts on Nadir Shah's Indian Campaign," in Kambiz Eslami, ed., Iran and Iranian Studies: Essays in Honor of Iraj Afshar (Princeton, New Jersey: Zagros Press, 1998), 198-219.



208 Tucker

that Nadir made a fatal error in dethroning them. Instead, he should have retained them as spiritual figureheads while serving as dutiful subaltern to protect their domains.

Marvi addresses this theme in his account of the Indian campaign by recounting in some detail the life story of Sacadat Khan, the Persian-born gover- nor of Awadh. He presents Sacadat Khan as Nadir's Mughal antithesis: a subordinate whose exemplary loyalty to the Mughal emperor Muhammad Shah sharply contrasted with Nadir's perfidy toward the Safavids. Marvi portrays Sacadat Khan as a man who, like Nadir, rose from being a highwayman in Khurasan to become Muhammad Shah's most important lieutenant, but with one crucial difference. Marvi makes him an example because in spite of all the power he attained, his loyalty to the sovereign never wavered.

The scenario described by the Mughal historian Anand Ram Mukhlis is virtually the inverse of Marvi's, but his diagnosis of the underlying problem is similar. His TaZkirah depicts Muhammad Shah, a hereditary sovereign, as weak and inconstant towards his subordinates, in contrast to Nadir, whom he characterizes as a paragon of decisive leadership. In Mukhlis's view, Muhammad Shah abdicated a basic responsibility of his position by failing to lend support to his vassals at critical moments, which proved a key factor in the disintegration of Mughal resistance.

The Punjabi poet Nijabat's portrait of Nadir's wazrr "Baqi Khan" as a faithful follower in contrast to the disloyal vassals of the Mughal court parallels Marvi's Sacadat Khan.3 His work depicts this "Baqi" as falling under the spell of the Hindu goddess of death and destruction, Kali, who appealed to his sense of honor to convince him of the need to avenge Timur's invasion of Iran by attack- ing India. Baqi Khan is shown to be absolutely faithful to Nadir as he assisted him in preparing for his invasion. Even while casting Nadir and his wazir as agents of Kali's divine wrath, Nijabat portrays them as enjoying a model leader- follower relationship.

In his poem Halat-i Nadir Shah va Muhammad Shiih, Tilok Das explores how Mughal commanders' lack of confidence in themselves and disloyalty to their sovereign led to outright defeatism. His account blames Mughal officials' belief in Nadir's invincibility for the collapse of India's defenses. To underscore the degree to which he believes negative Indian attitudes affected the outcome of events, he depicts the rare Mughal soldiers who dared confront Nadir in battle as successful, even if only temporarily. Tilok Das tries to show how acts of treachery at critical moments fatally weakened the Mughal side, chronicling in particular how Nizam al-Mulk sealed the fate of the Indian army during Nadir's advance on Delhi by betraying Samsam al-Dawla Khan-i Dawran, the only important commander to resist Nadir in this account.

In all these works, breakdowns in loyalty seem as decisive as battlefield engagements in determining the course of events. Although Marvi focuses on an upstart's usurpation, Mukhlis on a hereditary monarch's negligence, Nijabat on Kali's intervention, and Tilok Das on the widespread Mughal fear of Nadir, they all assume that a well-ordered society depends on reciprocal loyalty, obligation,

3. The identity of "Baqi Khan" is not clear. Perhaps Nijabat is referring to CAbd al- Baqi Khan Zanganah, one of Nadir's trusted associates, but never identified in Persian sources as his wazIr.



History, Self, and Other 209

and trust between ruler and subordinate and that there are dire consequences if either neglects them. For four writers steeped in late-medieval Indo-Persian political culture, such a shared assumption about the importance for the leaders of society of right conduct is not surprising. What is startling, though, is the degree to which each is willing to idealize aspects of a rival empire to criticize his own-a testament to the unsettled state of imperial ideologies in eighteenth- century India and Iran.

Sacadat Khan in Marvi's Tuirrkh-i 'alam-ara-yi NadirF

Muhammad Kazim Marvi's Thrtkh-i 'alam-cira-yi NMdirT remains one of the most important sources for Nadir's reign, written by a man who had accompa- nied Nadir through the Indian campaign and served him as a financial official in Marv. Although complimentary regarding Nadir's role as Iran's savior from foreign intervention and domination, the work criticizes Nadir's elimination of the Safavids. Marvi shows little respect for Shah Sultan Husayn or his son Tahmasb II, yet he depicts Nadir's 1736 seizure of the throne and the 1740 executions of Tahmasb II and his family as disasters for Iran. Marvi's account of these killings suggests that he held Nadir responsible for them even though they had been carried out by Riza Quli Mirza, Nadir's son. For Marvi, this act sealed the fate of Nadir's reign, since it created a cosmic imbalance that could only be redressed through his downfall. Marvi seems to place his hopes for Iran's salvation in Shahrukh, Nadir's blind grandson, because his ancestry united the Afsharid and Safavid lineages.4

Given his general agendas, Marvi's treatment of the Indian campaign becomes a meditation on loyalty, recording the depth of devotion shown by Mughal subordinates to their sovereign in implicit contrast to Nadir's own treachery towards his. Although the Tirikh-i 'alam-arai-yi Nadirl portrays each of his victories on the road to India in heroic terms, Muhammad Kazim consci- entiously records the ardent pro-Mughal sentiment of virtually every local ruler whom Nadir confronted. Marvi has Shahnavaz Khan, the govemor of Kabul, exclaim, "If I had known that Nadir possessed such an army and multitude, I would have sunrendered and sued for peace."5 The chronicle then reports that Shahnavaz Khan's associate replied, "Now we have no choice but to blockade ourselves in the fortress and prepare for a siege. If we once capitulate, and sur- render the fortress to [Nadir], then the people of India will curse us, our children, and our tribe for years and centuries to come .... I will sacrifice myself for the celestial-porched hearth of the Gurkani [Mughall dynasty."6 Marvi notes that even an awareness of Nadir's awesome military might could not diminish local rulers' allegiance to the Mughals.

4. For a comprehensive discussion of these points, see Ernest Tucker, "Explaining Nadir Shah: Kingship and Royal Legitimacy in Muhammad Kazim Marvi's Tdrrkh-i 'alam-ara-yi NddirT," Iranian Studies 26 (1993): 95-115.

5. Muhammad Kazim Marvi, Tarfkh-i calam-ara-yi Nddiri, 3 vols. pag. as one, ed. Muhammad Amin Riyahi (Tehran: Naqsh-i Jahan, 1364/1985), 563.

6. Ibid., 563-64.



210 Tucker

Marvi has the govemors of each city that subsequently fell to Nadir utter similar speeches. The deputies of Nasir Khan, the ruler of Peshawar, counseled him to give up before he confronted Nadir, pointing out that even Husayn Khan Afghan, at the head of an army of 500,000 seasoned Afghan troops, had been subdued. Nasir Khan replied that for centuries, Peshawar had been staunchly loyal to the emperors of India, and if he were to shirk his duty now, all of the people of Sind and Hind would forever curse him.7 Although describing how Nasir Khan eventually capitulated to Nadir, Marvi takes pains to depict him as a devoted Mughal loyalist to the moment of his defeat.

In Muhammad Kazim's version, the momentum of Nadir's campaign increased markedly with his conquest of Lahore. Nevertheless, the Mughal commander there, Zakariya Khan, rallied his troops as Nasir Khan had. He told his commanders, "If all the commanders of each country struggled this much, then Nadir's army would be definitely finished off. This combat is also for the sake of the rights of Muhammad Shah Gurkani, so that the people of India do not curse me ...."8 When he went to fight, though, he, too, observed the astonishing size of Nadir's army from the towers of Lahore and decided to submit to him, despite his profound attachment to the Mughals.

Curiously, Marvi represents Nadir as ultimately respecting these Mughal loyalties, despite having defeated the Mughals and their vassals in battle and allowed his army to lay waste to their capital, Delhi. For Marvi, what seems to have distinguished Nadir's treatment of India from his treatment of Iran is that after conquering India, he granted its throne back to Muhammad Shah, its hereditary ruler, and left the existing system of political relationships intact.9 This is apparently what Marvi would have had Nadir do in his own country: restore a Safavid ruler after delivering Iran from foreign and domestic threats. The ancestral legitimacy which Muhammad Kazim accords to the Safavids is thus extended to other established dynasties like the Mughals. Through the way he depicts the Indian campaign, Marvi implies that if Nadir had played the same role in Iran as he had in India, confirming the legitimate ruling dynasty on its throne after a campaign of military consolidation, he might have secured Iran's future.

One of the most startling pieces of evidence for this interpretation of Marvi can be found in his treatment of the story of Sacadat Khan Burhan al-Mulk, the longtime governor of Awadh and mainstay of the Mughal emperor. Before his treatment of the final clash of Mughal and Iranian forces at the battle of Karnal, Marvi offers a long excursus on Sacadat Khan's life, which in effect casts him as a parallel figure to Nadir by whose example Nadir's conduct might be judged.'0

According to Marvi, Sacadat Khan was an Iranian from Nishapur who as a young adult became a highwayman. At one point, he and his friends attracted the attention of the authorities in his home region, and had to flee to Mashhad. There, they continued their career of crime until they became known, and continued to head east towards India. Finally, they found themselves wandering in the deserts of Sind, with no food, no money, and no caravans to rob, until

7. Ibid., 637.

8. Ibid., 696.

9. Ibid., 749-52.

10. The following account of Sacadat Khan's life can be found in ibid., 701-8.




Sacadat Khan happened upon a hunting party led by Rahmat Allah Khan, described by Marvi as the governor of Lahore and father of Zakariya Khan.

This party came upon a ferocious lion, which Sacadat Khan managed to subdue with heroic effort. In return for his bravery and his service in defeating the lion, Rahmat Allah made him one of his officers. The rest of Marvi's account is a detailed explanation of how Sacadat Khan rose through the ranks by remaining loyal first to Rahmat Allah Khan, and later to Muhammad Shah Mughal as he became a more and more important military figure, fighting against the Rajputs when other commanders were ready to quit and never waver- ing in his loyalty to his masters.

Indian historians tell a very different story about Sacadat Khan's early career. They agree that he was of Nishapuri origin, but maintain that he was the son of a prominent qzlt who had emigrated with his father to India about 1709. He was said by them to have joined the service of Sarbuland Khan, who became gover- nor of Gujarat in around 1712.11 The divergence in the treatment of Sacadat Khan's early career between the Indian historians and Marvi reveals Marvi's desire to create a parallel figure to Nadir in the Mughal court, a man who had risen from highwayman to great general through heroic feats of personal prowess.

Why Marvi requires this particular narrative of Sacadat Khan's life becomes clear upon examining how he depicts Sacadat Khan's conduct at the Battle of Karnal. In Marvi's version, Sacadat Khan fought tenaciously for the Mughal emperor, refusing to capitulate until all hope was lost. He was finally captured and brought to Nadir, who asked him why he, as an Iranian, would work so hard to defend a foreign country.

As depicted in the Tarlkh-i c'lam-airii-yi Nadiri, Sacadat Khan replied, "It is now just short of forty years that I have worked to increase the power and kingly glory of the reign of Muhammad Shah, and I have become the principal Indian military commander. I have submitted all of the country of India which had been in revolt against this king to his obedience. Now for the sake of five days of mortal life, I could not allow disgrace upon the Iranian community . . . and let it be said that Sacadat Khan had stopped supporting Muhammad Shah's rights of so many years standing."'2 Nadir was apparently so impressed with Sacadat Khan that he sent his best physicians to treat him, but Marvi records that he soon died from his wounds, providing heroic closure to what was, in Marvi's depiction, a life of exemplary loyalty.

Comparison of this account to those of certain Indian historians is revealing. Although they concur with Marvi that Sacadat Khan was among the first to enter combat against Nadir on the Mughal side, they state that Sacadat Khan delayed a considerable time in reaching Muhammad Shah's camp, according to some sources, because he wanted to see the forces of his rival Samsam al-Dawla Khan-i Dawran go down in defeat so that he could appear later to save the

11. For a composite account of Sacadat Khan's life based on Indian sources, see Ashirbadi Lal Srivastava, The First Two Nawabs of Oudh (Lucknow: Upper India Publishing House, 1933), 1-3.

12. Marvi, TdrTkh-i, 728-29.



212 Tucker

Mughal side at just the right moment.'3 Some also assert that after Sacadat Khan capitulated, he was made Nadir's chief deputy and told Nadir that he could easily conquer Delhi.'4 Although these Indian sources blame this treason primarily on Sacadat Khan's pique at not having been appointed amtr al-umaraJ [chief military commander] by the Mughal emperor, their narratives provide a startling contrast to the portrait offered by Marvi.

Muhammad Shah in the Tazkirah of Anand Ram Mukhlis

In general, one of the most interesting aspects of the Indian sources for this period is the degree to which they reflect the strongly-held and divergent views of the major players at the Mughal court. In addition to Muhammad Shah, each of the contenders for Mughal primacy in 1739-Nizam al-Mulk, Khan-i Dawran, Sacadat Khan, and the waztr Qamar al-Din Khan-commissioned chronicles that offered sharply barbed portraits of their rivals. Among the most interesting of these accounts is the Tazkirah of Anand Ram Mukhlis (1699-175 1), a secretary to Qamar al-Din Khan.'5 Anand Ram wrote as an eyewitness to Nadir's sack of Delhi.

Anand Ram's specific agenda is the opposite of Marvi's: he wants to show how the indecisive leadership of Muhammad Shah, the Mughal ruler, sealed the Mughals' fate against Nadir Shah. He chronicles Muhammad's weakness and indecision starting with his failure to appoint an ambassador to Nadir after Nadir had sent him two messengers in 1738 accusing the Mughals of aiding the Afghans. He then focuses on Muhammad's neglect of salary payments to Nasir Khan, the governor of Peshawar, generally upbraiding the sovereign for failing to meet his fiscal obligations to his subordinates.

In discussing the battle of Karnal, Anand Ram asks, "Had the Emperor himself led his powerful army to the support of [Sacadat Khan] Burhan al-Mulk, there would have been no cause to lament the loss of such a sardar as [Samsam al-Dawlah Khan-i Dawran] . . .and who can say that victory might not have smiled on his arms?"'6 The author is careful to note that everyone except Muhammad Shah seemed ready to continue fighting even after the setbacks of the first day.

Upon this preliminary defeat, Muhammad Shah overruled Nizam al-Mulk, then his principal adviser, and sued for peace, an outcome that seems inexplica-

13. Muzaffar Alam, The Crisis of Empire in Mughal North India (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1986), 279.

14. See, for example, Rustam Ali, "Tarikh-i Hindi," in H.M. Elliot, ed., The History of India as told by its own Historians (London: Trubner and Sons, 1877), 8:63.

15. Anand Ram Mukhlis also apparently served as Zakariya Khan's representative in Delhi. See Riazul Islam, A Calendar of Documents on Indo-Persian Relations (1500-1750), 2 vols. (Tehran and Karachi: Iranian Culture Foundation and Institute of Central and West Asian Studies, 1361/ 1982), 2:67.

16. Anand Ram Mukhlis, "Tazkira," trans. Lieutenant Perkins, in H.M. Elliot, ed., The History of India as told by its own Historians (London: Trubner and Sons, 1877), 8:84.



History, Self and Other 213

ble for Anand Ram. "Here was an army of 100,000 bold and well-equipped horsemen, held as it were in captivity, and all the resources of the Emperor and his grandees at the disposal of the Kazalbash [sic]!"'7 Traditional loyalties and obligations in this case were not abandoned by a usurping subordinate, but by a cowardly sovereign.

Anand Ram goes on to cite the exemplary behavior of Hajji Fulad Khan, the kutwail or chief magistrate of Delhi, in maintaining order before the arrival of the Iranian forces there. "The kutwal, no ordinary man, was at his post day and night; his exertions were unceasing, and, wherever there was an appearance of sedition, he seized and punished the guilty parties."" He reports that Muhammad Shah, in contrast, entered Delhi three days before the massacre and remained in its citadel, apparently not lifting a finger in defense of the city when Nadir's forces assaulted it. In the end, the only relief from the Delhi massacre was provided by Hajji Fulad Khan, who was ordered by Nadir to go through the streets and admonish the soldiers to stop the carnage.'9

The final indignity was a fine imposed by Nadir on the officials of the Mughal court, with which Anand Ram juxtaposes the marriage ceremony between Nadir's son and Muhammad Shah's daughter, describing the rich gifts presented by Muhammad to Nadir on this occasion and quoting in full the humiliating treaty of union that Nadir forced him to sign.20 The overall effect of the narrative is to provide a devastating critique of Muhammad Shah's total pas- sivity in the face of the invasion and sack of his capital city, revealing his abdi- cation of royal responsibility.

In complete contrast to the depiction of Muhammad Shah as weak and vac- illating, Anand Ram portrays Nadir as heroic and decisive, despite holding him responsible for the massacre of Delhi and the plunder of India. When discussing Nadir's advance through India, he notes, "this was no ordinary foe against whom they had to contend, no mere plunderer who would be sated with the spoil of a province and then return to his own country, but a leader of unshakeable resolution, who shaped his course with the sword."2' Anand Ram praises Nadir's pres- ence on the battlefield at Karnal as crucial for bolstering the morale of his troops. The Tazkirah describes one local ruler as "making an enemy to himself of a monarch favoured by fortune, whose sword, like the orb of light, had flashed over the world from east to west."22 In Nadir, Anand Ram sees all the qualities of resolution and decisive determination that Muhammad Shah lacked-basic attrib- utes necessary in a monarch who was to protect his domains.

17. Ibid., 87. 18. Ibid., 86. 19. Ibid., 89. 20. Ibid., 90-92. 21. Ibid., 78. 22. Ibid., 97.



214 Tucker

"Baqi Khan" in Nijabat's "Ballad"

In addition to court chronicles, more popular accounts of Nadir's invasion that circulated in India in the decades after the event have been preserved. One such work is a Punjabi poem on Nadir's invasion, apparently composed by Nijabat, that describes the twelfth/eighteenth century as a time in India when the natural order of things had become inverted. "The nobles usurped the rulers' dues, and collected treasure. Slaves rose and killed the king, the times took a subversive turn."23 Nijabat sharply delineates the factional politics of the court and its divi- sion into Turani (of Central Asian origin) and Irani (of Persian origin) groups. He accuses the Turanis, led by Nizam al-Mulk, of inviting Nadir to invade. At the crucial moment of Nadir's advance on Delhi, "the Turanis pledged their wond and inspired confidence. By telling lies and misrepresentations, they induced (the King) to lead out his army. They spread the net of trickery, faithlessness, and fraud."24 Nijabat contrasts these courtiers with a company of sanyasis, Hindu holy men. When Nadir derided them as "the beggars of India" they rose up under sanyasi Bhopat Nath, proclaiming, "the Punjab is our country and India is our jagir [land grant]."25 According to Nijabat, when these forces joined the conflict, the tide turned for awhile against Nadir as these brave Hindu ascetics killed 5,084 Georgians of Nadir's army.26

It is no surprise that Nijabat displays little affection for the Iranian invaders. Nadir is depicted as a conquering juggernaut, such that ". . the whole of India shook with [his] terror."27 As he began his campaign, "floods of tyranny were let loose, making the whole populace groan."28 Overall, the impact of the invasion is shown in a very negative light, with much description of plundering and loot- ing.

However, there is a recognition of Nadir's martial prowess. At the climax of the work, in the description of the tumultuous battle of Karnal, Nijabat sets a scene in which Nadir and Khan-i Dawran engage in single combat. He has Khan- i Dawran aim seven blows of his sword at Nadir but says that "steel deadened the blows of steel and they caused no wound."29 Then, "Nadir fired his gun which was completely of European Ifirang] origin. Its mother was Kal and father Narad, it was the full sister of the Dragon."30 Nadir had become the agent of much greater forces, channeling the power of the ancient Hindu goddess of death and destruction, Kali.

23. Nijabat, "Ballad on Nadir Shah's Invasion of India," trans. R.B. Kaul, Journal of the Punjab Historical Society 6, no. 1 (1917):17.

24. Ibid., 49.

25. Ibid., 52.

26. Ibid., 54. Perhaps the exact figure of casualties, entirely fanciful of course, fit best in the line for the rhyme scheme of the poem.

27. Ibid., 65.

28. Ibid., 38.

29. Ibid., 64.

30. Ibid.




Kali apparently had quarreled with Narada, a Hindu god of wisdom identified in this account as her husband, whom she felt had not provided well for her. In her pique, she decided to incite Nadir to invade India.3' Nijabat has Kali, in the guise of a disheveled old woman, visit Nadir Shah and his waztr, whom Nijabat calls "Baqi Khan," to sow her plot of destruction. She told Nadir about the factional strife at the Mughal court. When summoned before Baqi Khan, she described herself as the goddess who summons warriors and creates combat. Ini- tially, the wazrr dismissed her, saying "Thy eyes are sprinkled with blood, and thy tongue is harsh. When people see thee fly they all laugh. . . . Thou wishest to see wrestlers in the arena; this is thy verdict. But our country is prosperous, all live happily.... You have come to pass a night in the inn and have created a muddle. You had better go back to your country, and start on your way early in the morning."" The wazir treated her politely but firmly rejected her entreaties.

However, she then delivered a speech about the need for Iranians to seek revenge for Timur's plunder of Iran: "When Taimur [sic] went after devastating your country, he left behind him not even a sign of habitation. The wealth of your country was plundered and taken away by the Punjabis. . . . In a dig at him, she asked, "How can the habits of a duck equal those of a hawkT?34 This offended the waztr's sense of honor, and he was moved to exclaim, "We will conquer Delhi throwing the weight of our swords on the heads. . . .We will pil- lage armies, banners, highways, and streets. . . . May God avenge that (dishon- our of our) turban today. It will then be as if Hajis [sic] of Mecca have performed hundreds of pilgrimages."35 Although the goddess Kali is identified as the instigator of Baqi Khan's rage, he is shown to defend his honor through vigorous assertion of Nadir's right to avenge the wrongs committed by Timur.36 Nijabat also indirectly casts him as a better Muslim than the Mughals, by having Bai Khan equate this campaign with a pilgrimage to Mecca. Although in the service of Kali's destructive powers, Baqi Khan rose to avenge his country.

After Kali set events in motion and invasion preparations had begun, Nadir consulted with Baqi Khan, who advised him to act with caution concerning a letter from some notables of Delhi summoning him to India: "Oaths are tricks to deceive kings. We should first send there an ambassador, intelligent and wise. He should go in advance and see the arrangements there."37 Working hard to further Nadir's cause, Baqi Khan then selected Shahbaz Khan as an ambassador, giving him detailed instructions about how he should act and what he needed to find out. Baqi Khan's persistent and faithful pursuit of Nadir's interests contrasted with the treachery of Muhammad Shah's followers, who were ready to swear fealty to Nadir, calling him "pure, faultless, wonderful, true Lord."38

31. Ibid., 22-25. 32. Ibid., 28. 33. Ibid., 29.

34. Ibid. 35. Ibid., 30. 36. This is a very curious juxtaposition considering the degree to which Nadir

admired and even modeled himself on Timur. 37. Ibid., 34-35. 38. Ibid., 33.



216 Tucker

Nadir Shah in the Poem of Tilok Das

The .Halat-i Nadir ShaTh va Muhammad Shah of Tilok Das, a Hindi poem on Nadir's invasion dateable to perhaps a decade after Nadir's death (ca. 1757), is another popular work. Like Nijabat's Nadir Var, it focuses on the root causes of Nadir's invasion, blaming it on the disloyalty of Nizam al-Mulk. The work opens with Muhammad Shah becoming captivated by his love for a beautiful wife, Malika Zamani, which leads Tilok Das to observe that "the ways of love preserve neither house nor name nor tranquility."39 Intoxicated by his queen, Muhammad began to ridicule Nizam al-Mulk, whom he described as "a black monkey . . . . See, clever one, the shining of the lamp-black on his eyes, he sounds like drum-beating, how he jingles as he goes ...... 0 Such words enraged Nizam al-Mulk, who wrote a letter inviting Nadir Shah to invade India, "Having by reason of one word become untrue to his salt [i.e. Muhammad Shah]."4' For Tilok Das, these were the key events that set Nadir's campaign in motion: the negligence of the king and the angry reaction of his subordinate. With this initial causation established, Tilok Das depicts Nadir as a ruler who wrought havoc and disaster in India because he was believed by almost every Mughal official to be invincible.

In the confrontation with Zakariya Khan, Nadir was visited by Zakariya's Hindu secretary (divdn), who told him, "[Zakariya Khan] would fight without a doubt. . . if it had been any other than yourself. When Ram is friendly, all are friendly; Ram adverse, there are no friends.... ,42 Based on his view that Nadir was divinely favored, he capitulated and his city, Lahore, was plundered. Other cities suffered the same fate, although in several cases, Tilok Das describes how local Muslim commanders capitulated even though their Hindu secretaries, such as Bisambhar Das, the secretary of Adinah Beg in Jalandhar, wanted to keep fighting.43

In the narrative of Tilok Das, Khan-i Dawran is depicted as the only Mughal commander to confront Nadir. Tilok describes the result of the battle between Nadir and Khan-i Dawran as a defeat for the former. Tilok has Nadir exclaim to Nizam al-Mulk in a letter, "You have called me from Kabul, from what end did I come, to be thus disgraced[?]."' Khan-i Dawran observed to Muhammad Shah, "Nadir Shah has proved a thing of nought; when well fought with, he fled from battle," giving the lie to the common belief about Nadir's power.45 However, in Tilok Das's version, Khan-i Dawran ultimately fell victim to Nizam al-Mulk's treachery too, dying after being wounded by Nizam al-Mulk's forces.46

39. Tilok Das, Hiilat-i Nadir Shaih va Muhammad Shah in William Irvine (trans.), "Nadir Shah and Muhammad Shah, a Hindi poem by Tilok Das," Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society of Bengal 66, no. 1 (1897): 48.

40. Ibid.

41. Ibid., 49.

42. Ibid., 50.

43. Ibid., 51.

44. Ibid., 54.

45. Ibid.

46. Ibid.




Apart from Khan-i Dawran and the Hindu secretaries, the real hero of the story was a holy man who stood up to Nadir:

One Almast, a holy recluse, lived in a house. Seeing his body, Nadir Shah enquired, "You are an ascetic and holy man, show me your mira- cles." Then the faqir looked and said, "Nadir Shah, first display your own." Then Nadir . . . said, "Shut your eyes, behold whatever you like." Shutting his eyes, the faqir saw a fine army with Nadir .... From [Delhi] to Atak was that army . . . a splendid array. Opening his eyes then said the faqir, "Behold, I will now show wonders, shut your eyes and look!" Then when the Shah had closed them, he saw the soldiers the faqir had seen arrayed, all lying headless. Then said the Shah, "Holy man! Look favorably on me." Then spoke the faqir, "If you wish to be preserved, delay not one moment, at once set out for Kabul." Then Nadir Shah sent for his men, ordered them to march.47

This Hindu sage was able to affect Nadir in ways that great Mughal commanders could not, simply by not bowing down to him. By showing contrary examples, Tilok Das indirectly criticizes the Mughal leaders' idealization of Nadir's power, suggesting that if they had shown the least amount of resistance, Nadir would not have been able to conquer India at all.

Conclusions

Marvi's praise of Sacadat Khan's loyalty, Anand Ram's portrayal of Muhammad Shah's flaws, Nijabat's depiction of Nadir's faithful wazdr, and Tilok Das's critique of Mughal officials oddly complement each other. It is not surprising that all these writers blame the downfalls of their respective empires partly on the abandonment of traditional roles by their monarchs and their subordinates, since a common concern for the correct balance of obligations in the Islamicate "circle of justice" would have informed their views on good government. The intriguing aspect of the comparison is that each writer uses idealized visions of elements of the other empire to criticize his own, perhaps reflecting a growing self-critical awareness in eighteenth-century Indo-Persian historiography-an awareness sharpened by the enormous strains placed on longstanding conceptions of society, religion, and politics by the upheavals of the era.

Ernest Tucker, Department of History, U.S. Naval Academy

47. Ibid., 56.

