HISTORY AND MUSEUMS DIVISIONHEADQUARTERS, U.S. MARINE CORPSWASHINGTON, D.C.

U.S. MARINES IN GRENADA1983

by

Lieutenant Colonel Ronald H. Spector,U.S. Marine Corps Reserve

HISTORY AND MUSEUMS DIVISION

HEADQUARTERS, U.S. MARINE CORPS

WASHINGTON, D.C.

1987

Foreword

This short study of the role of the U.S. Marines in Operation Urgent Fury is in some ways an ex-periment in the writing of contemporary military history. The near-coincident Beirut deploymentand Grenada intervention presented us with the problem and opportunity ofcollecting operationalhistory in real time. The historical effort of the Marine Corps had not been thus challenged sincethe end of the Vietnam War. Grenada was barely underway when we were directed to send an oralhistorian to the scene to collect operationally oriented interviews from the participants.

Mr. Benis M. Frank, head of the Oral History Section, was on his way to Grenada by 30 Octoberand joined the 22d Marine Amphibious Unit as it was winding up its eventful stay in that smallisland nation. He crossed the Atlantic and Mediterranean with the Marines iii USS Guam and con-ducted some three dozen interviews before returning to Washington. There he handed offhis Grenadaresponsibilities to then-Major Ronald H. Spector, USMCR. and returned to his ongoing work onLebanon.

Major Spector was called to active duty and assigned the task of preparing a monograph on Ma-rines in Grenada. He worked closely with the special study group formed by the Commandant toevaluate the lessons of Urgent Fury and accompanied it to Grenada for first-hand observation. Theterm "monograph" was chosen advisedly. The work presented here does not purport to tell the "whole"story of Operation Urgent Fury. Rather, the object has been to deal as completely as possible withMarine participation in that operation.

The author, since promoted to lieutenant colonel, is a member of Mobilization Training Unit (Histor-ical) DC-7. MTU DC-7 is made up of a varying number of Reserve officers who have expertise inhistorical matters and who can be called upon to perform special historical tasks.

Each member of the MTU works on an assigned historical project throughout the year. But theultimate purpose of the MTU is to provide for the augmentation of the historical effort of the FleetMarine Forces in the event of mobilization or crisis situations. It is envisioned that in event of mobili-zation or in major deployments, as in the case of Vietnam, historical sections would be activatedat Fleet Marine Force. Marine amphibious force, division. wing. force service support group, and Ma-rine amphibious brigade levels to oversee such historical tasks as the submission of after-action reportsand command chronologies, the conduct of field interview programs. the collection of artifactsforexample, enemy weaponsand the supervision of combat art and combat photography programs.

Lieutenant Colonel Spector entered the Marine Corps in 1967 with a doctoral degree in historyfrom Yale and brief service as a civilian with the historical office of the joint Chiefs of Staff behindhim. He had finished his recruit training at Partis Island and was in his last week at the InfantryTraining Regiment at Camp Lejeune when he received orders assigning him as a historian with IIIMAF in Vietnam. He arrived in time for Tet and found the 3d Marine Division's historical teamat Khe Sanh and the ist Marine Division's historical team covering the battle of Hue.

Following his service in Vietnam, he taught history at Louisiana State University and worked asa historian for the U.S. Army Center of Military History, where he wrote the first volume of the Ar-my's official history of the Vietnam War, Advice and Support: The Early Years of the US. Army

w

in Vietnam. In 1984 he became associate professor and subsequently professor of history at the Univer-sity of Alabama. At present he is on an extended leave of absence from Alabama to serve as Directorof Naval History, the first civilian to hold this post. Beside Advice and Support, he is the authorof Eagle Against the Sun: The American lVar with Japan, which won the 1985 Theodore and Frank-lin Roosevelt Priae for Naval History and was a book-of-the-month club selection. He also is the authorof Admiral of the New Empire: The Life and Career of George Dewey and Professors of War: TheNaval War College and the Modern American Navy.

In the interests of accuracy and objectivity, the History and Museums Division welcomes com-ments on this history from interested individuals.

E. H. SIMMONSBrigadier General. U.S. Marine Corps, (Ret.)

Director of Marine Corps History and Museums

Preface

This brief account was prepared within a few weeks of the events it describes and relies heavilyupon the first-hand testimony of the participants as collected by Mr. Benis M. Frank and the author.The viewpoint presented, therefore, is very much that of the participants and the story is told almostentirely in terms of their perceptions and beliefs. The broader and more complete perspective madepossible by the passage of time, and the availability of further historical evidence must necessarilybe lacking. Nevertheless, I believe that the documentation of military events as soon after they occuras possible has a historical value far exceeding the concomitant disadvantages of haste, incomplete-ness, and parochial or partial perspectives. The observation of General Sir Ian Hamilton, "On theactual day of battle, truths may be picked up for the asking: by the following morning they havealready begun to get into their uniforms," cited by General Simmons at the onset of our projectthe statement will, I believe, prove as true for Grenada as for the Russo-Japanese war.

Several of the illustrations in the text are reproductions of the artwork of Lieutenant Colonel A.M. "Mike" Leahy, USMCR. who visited Grenada in December 1983 soon after the fighting and dida series of reconstructive paintings of events based on personal observation and participants' accounts.Lieutenant Colonel Leahy's work was done as a civilian combat artist under the auspices of the NavalInternal Relations Activity, Office of the Navy Chief of Information.

Mrs. Alexandra Chaker put in many long hours transcribing portions of the taped interviews andserving as clearing house for the same. Her assistance and support was truly indispensable in thecompletion of this project. The project was prepared under the direction of Mr. Henry I. Shaw, Jr.,Chief Historian, and Colonel John G. Miller, Deputy Director for Marine Corps History, to eachof whom the author is indebted for his support and encouragement.

Finally, the author is responsible for the content of the text, including the opinions expressed andany errors of fact.

RONALD H. SPECTORLieutenant Colonel.

U.S. Marine Corps Reserve

Table of Contents

Foreword iii

Preface V

Table of Contents vii

The SituationInitial Planning 2

Final Planning 5

The Initial Landing 6

The Capture of Grenville 8

Action at St. George's 9Grand Mal Bay 12

Movement Toward St. George's 16

The Grand Anse Operation 17

Continuing Operations in the Northeast 18

The Capture of St. George's 21

The Boundary Problems 21

Mopping Up on Grenada 22

Carriacou 23

Departure from Grenada 25

Footnotes 27

AppendicesCommand and Staff List, 22d MAU 2922d MAU Task Organization 31

Organization for Embarkation 33

Glossary 35

MapsGrenada and Carriacou Islands" 2

"Grenada, Showing 22d MAU Phase Lines" 4

"Sr. George's City" 15

"Carriacou Island" 24

VI'

U.S. Marines in Grenada, 1983The Situation - Initial Planning - Final Planning - Initial Landing - The Capture of Grenville

Action at St. George c - Grand Mal Bay - Movement Toward St. George 's - The Grand Anse OperationContinuing Operations in the Northeast - The Capture of St. George c - The Boundary Problems

Mopping Up on Grenada - arnacou - Departure from Grenada

The Situation

On the morning of 25 October 1983, Americanswere startled to hear President Ronald Reagan's an-nouncement that forces of six Caribbean nations andthe United States had landed on the island of Grena-da to "restore order and democracy" and to safeguardthe lives of approximately 1,000 American citizensthere.' The President's announcement came as a cli-max to a week of growing crisis and concern, whichhad begun with the deposing and subsequent mur-der of thc leftist Prime Minister of Grenada, MauriceBishop, by soldiers of a hard-line Revolutionary Mili-tars Council that had ties to Cuba and the Soviet Un-ion. Following the murder of Bishop and some of hisclosest politica! collaborators on the 19th. the Revolu-tionary Military Council, headed by army chief Gener-al Austin Hudson. imposed a round-the-clock curfewand closed the island's airport. Reports of riots andlooting appeared in the press.

On 23 October. the Organization of Eastern Carib-bean States formally requested United States assistancein dealing with what it called "the current anarchicconditions, the serious violations of human rights andbloodshed, and the consequent unprecedented threatto the peace and security of the region by the vacuumof authority in Grenada,"2 At the same time, theGovernor Genera! of Grenada, Sir Paul Scoon, hadsent a secret message to the Organization of EasternCaribbean States and to the governments of neigh-boring states, appealing for help to restore order tothe island. American leaders were already concernedabout the situation on Grenada, especially in regardto the safety and wellbeing of U.S. citizens on the is-land. Many of these were students at the St. George'sUniversity Medical School. State Department officialsreported that leaders of the People's RevolutionaryMilitary Council had "repeatedly raised impedimentsto the orderly evacuation of U.S. citizens." Under thesecircumstances, Secretary of State George P. Shultz latertold the press that the President believed it necessaryto act before American citizens might be hurt or takencaptive.

Among the units selected by Commander-in-ChiefAtlantic (CinCLant) for the Grenada operation was anamphibious task force whose commodore was Captain

Carl R. Erie, USN. This group, enroute from the Unit-ed States to the Mediterranean, consisted of the Na-vy's Amphibious Squadron Four (PhibRon 4) and the22d Marine Amphibious Unit (22d MAU). The squa-dron included the amphibious assault ship Guam(LPH 9), the amphibious transport dock Trenton (LPD14). the dock landing ship Fort Snelling (LSD 30), andthe tank landing ships Manitowoc (IST 1180) andBarnstable County (LST 1197). The embarked 22dMAU was under the command of Colonel james P.Faulkner. A Marine amphibious unit is the smallestof the Marine air-ground task forces and normally con-sists of a reinforced infantry battalion, a compositehelicopter squadron (which in a few cases includes theAV-8 Harrier, a fixed-wing, vertical short-take-off-and-landing [VS'JOLI attack aircraft), and a service sup-port group (MSSG) composed of maintenance, sup-ply, and service units.

The amphibious squadron had taken the Marineson board at Morehead City, North Carolina, on 17 Oc-tober. 'I'he 22d MAU consisted of Battalion LandingTeam 2/8 (BLT 2/8) (Lieutenant Colonel Ray L.Smith), Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 261(HMM-261) (Lieutenant Colonel Granville R. Amos),and MAU Service Support Group 22 (MSSG 22)(Major Albert E. Shively), along with a small MAUheadquarters element.

Battalion Landing Team 2/8 had recently undergonereorganization to conform to a new infantry battal-ion structure recently adopted by the Marine Corps.In its new incarnation the basic infantry battalion had43 officers and 779 enlisted men, 10 percent fewer thanunder the old structure, but with an increase in fire-power provided by such weapons as 24 additionalgrenade launchers (bringing the grand total to 134),8 additional Dragon antitank weapons for a new to-tal of 32, and 8 M2 .50-caliber machine guns. TheMarine Corps planned to add other crew-served in-fantry weapons, such as a new "Shoulder-launchedMultipurpose Assault Weapon" (SMAW), and MK1940mm machine guns, ro the battalion's armory, butthese were still in the pipeline at the time of deploy-ment. To enhance mobility and to handle the addi-jional heavy weapons. the battalion was equipped witha total of 52 jeepsdouble the number under theprevious organization. An additional two dozen jeeps

were available from the attached units of the battal-ion landing team, such as the artillery battery.

Tactical units were correspondingly smaller in thenew battalion. A rifle platoon, which previously con-tained 45 Marines, now had 36 men (including theplatoon leader), organized into three 11-man squads,each composed of two five-man fire teams and a squadleader. Proportional reductions also occurred in therifle companies' weapons platoons, and in the weaponscompany of the battalion.

Prior to deployment, the battalion landing teamand squadron had undergone an intensive period oftraining, with exercises designed to prepare them fora variety of combat contingencies. This had includedthorough training in night helicopter assaults. Over40 percent of the battalion's personnel had been withthe unit two years or more and many were veteransof an earlier tour in Lebanon. All of the squad lead-ers and more than a third of the fire team leaders hadcompleted the 2d Marine Division's Squad Leaders'Course and all lieutenants had completed the Infan-try Officer's Course4 This combination of training andexperience was to prove extremely useful.

Initial Planning

On 18 October the Marines sailed for the Mediter-ranean, where they were scheduled to participate inan amphibious exercise in Spain before relieving the24th MAU as the U.S. element in the multinationalforce in Lebanon. Toward midnight on 20 October,as the amphibious task force was passing north of Ber-muda, Captain Erie received orders to turn south andrake station approximately 500 miles northeast ofGrenada. Although the message gave no reason at thetime, a modified track pattern was adopted to keepthe task force within easy sailing range of Grenada un-rd 25 October. If no further word had arrived by mid-night of 23 October, it would resume the transit tothe Mediterranean. The force immediately assumedan emissions control (EmCon) condition, under whichmessages could be received but not sent (radar andother electronics equipment did not transmit underEmCon). The formation headed south toward theCaribbean at 16 knots.5

Early the following morning, Captain Erie told theMAU commander about the message. ColonelFaulkner and his staff initially believed that if theMAU were committed to Grenada its mission wouldbe to evacuate non-combatants. At this point, the taskforce had no information on the location or precisenumbers of American citizens to be evacuated, but

Grenadaand

Carriacou Island

planning proceeded on the assumption that such in-formation soon would be provided.6

Information about Grenada itself was extremelysketchy. Marine ground units normally use militarymaps of 1:50,000 scale, but in the case of Grenada,no maps of any type were available on the ships. TheGuam did have a full set of nautical charts, which in-cluded one for Grenada (based on a 1936 British refer-ence chart). Lacking grid lines and other importantinformation, these had limited usefulness for opera-tions ashore. By a fortunate coincidence, CommanderRichard A. Butler, the chief staff officer of the am-phibious squadron, was an amateur yachtsman. Hehad sailed in Grenadian waters six years earlier, andwas familiar with the area. Although CommanderButler's visit in 1977 had been purely recreational, hisexperienced sailor's eye nevertheless had noted impor-tant features of the coast, tides, surf, and beach. Thesewould prove invaluable to the Marines as they plannedoperations for Grenada. At the request of ColonelFaulkner, Commander Butler soon became deeply in-volved with the MAU staff in examining options forGrenada.

There was one more benign coincidence. LieutenantColonel Smith had recently attended the ArmedForces Staff College. where his term paper had covereda hypothetical landing on Grenada. He, too, was quiteknowledgeable about the island.

On the afternoon of 22 October, Lieutenant Col-onels Smith and Amos met with Colonel Faulkner onboard the Giam, to discuss the projected Grenadaoperations. Major Earnest A. Vari Huss, the MAUoperations officer, presented courses of action for theevacuation of civilians. Planning focused on seizingand securing an evacuation site, should this provenecessary. Major Van Huss proposed a combined sur-face and air assault, with the primary objectives to be:the Grand Anse Beach area on the east coast, southof the city of St. George's: the partially completed Sa-lines airfield at the southwestern tip of the island; andthe high ground overlooking the Salines area, whichcontrolled the road network through which all trafficfrom St. George's would have to pass. One companywould land in assault amphibian vehicles (AAVs) acrossGrand Anse Beach, while a second company carriedout a heliborne assault into the Salines Airport. Tanksand trucks would follow the initial waves into GrandAnse. The units initially landed there would turn leftand become a blocking force, to cut off the airportfrom any reinforcements from St. George's. At thispoint. no one on either the MAU or PhibRon staffthought such an evacuation to be very likely. Most be-lieved that the task force was sailing toward Grenadaas a form of warning to the new rulers of Grenada.8"It's doubtful that we'll be called upon to carry outthis mission," Colonel Faulkner noted in his journal.

Those doubts notwithstanding, the 22d MAU con-tinued its planning and preparations for a mission stillviewed, at most, as an evacuation in a hostile environ-ment. Fortunately, much of the preliminary work com-pleted in anticipation of the expected Mediterreaneanlanding exercises would apply. The squadron and thebattalion landing team had already prepared loadingtables, serial assignment tables, a standard landingplan, and other key planning documents for an am-phibious landing. Company D had long been desig-nated as the surface assault company, Company E asthe initial air assault company, and Company F as thereserve.'0

In examining the requirements for an evacuation,the staff concluded that Salines Airport should be theprimary site for the processing of evacuees, but thata secondary site might also be required. They devot-ed some thought, therefore, to the insertion of thereserve rifle company into the northeast portion ofGrenada to secure Pearls Airfield, the principal com-mercial airfield on Grenada.

As planning proceeded, the battalion's Head-quarters and Service Company began preparations,together with the MAU Service Support Gtoup, to es-

tablish an evacuation control center. One problem thatsoon emerged was the lack of any State Departmentguidance concerning the mechanics of theevacuationdecisions about who would be eligible forevacuation; the probable number of people involved;and related matters. These concerns eased somewhatwhen the MAU received instructions for HMM-261 tosend a helicopter to Antigua and pick up five individu-als who would join the task force for the Grenada oper-ation." "We thought those five guys were going to beState Department people," Lieutenant Colonel Smithrecalled.12

While they waited for the anticipated State Depart-ment representatives, planning for an evacuation con-tinued. Captain Erie received another message at 2200ori 22 October, directing the amphibious ready groupto turn toward Grenada. Still another message.received around the same time, provided general in-formation on the strength and disposition of forcesin place on Grenada and advised that an intelligencepackage was on its way to the Guam from RooseveltRoads, Puerto Rico.

The Grenadian People's Revolutionary Army (PRA),as described in the second message to Captain Erie,numbered about 1,200 men, backed by a militia of2,000 to 5,000 men and 300 to 400 armed police.*The most capable elements of the Grenadian forces,and those posing the gravest threat to the landingforce, were the antiaircraft batteries. These reported-ly were equipped with Soviet-design 12.7mm and37mm antiaircraft guns with well-trained gunners. Inaddition, about 30 to 50 Cuban military advisors, anunknown number of Cuban civilians, and about 600Cuban construction workers** were believed to be onthe island.'

At the same time that the amphibious ready groupreceived these two messages, another message fromCommander, Second Fleet (ComSecondFit) advisedthe commodore that the U.S. Army would conduct anairborne assault on Grenada.' Aside from these mes-sages, Colonel Faulkner and Captain Erie had receivedno further guidance on the impending operation.Colonel Faulkner initially interpreted the three mes-sages to mean that the MAU would probably remainin reserve, as a backup or alternate to the Army, incase weather conditions made an airborne attack im-possible. In the MAU commander's mind, a landingon the southern coast near Point Salines continued to

*postlanding estimates of PRA strength. based on captured docu-ments was 500-600, plus 2,000-2.500 militia.

**postlanding estimates were 750-800 Cubans of whom perhaps25 percent were regular military.

GRENADAShowing 22d MAU

Phase Lines

Vioneters I

Caribbean Sea

PntS*ftnes

D-Da

Grand Ma! Bay

St Georges

o 2 E,Uenslond nséfiÈ

Grand Anse Campus

True BlueCam us

D+2

. Gouyave

TE 124.2X

TE 121

. Victoria

TF 124.2X

TE 121

4

Sauteurs

Mount St Catherines

Pearls .

Mount Home.

Mirabeau Hospital.

D+2

Pearls Airport

Grancilla.

Reguín Bay

0-Day

Photo courtesy of 22d MAU

This captured photograph shows members of Grenadas People 's Revolutionary Armyholding a night-firing exercise with a Soviet-made, quad-mount 12.7mm heavy machinegun prior to the landing of U S. forces. Antiaircraft guns like this were frequentlyencountered on Grenada, although they were not always vigorously employed.

be a possibility. He still viewed Pearls as an alternate.or at least a site for a followup landing.'

These ideas changed abruptly with the return of theCH-53 from Antigua, at 2200 on 23 October. Thehelicopter did not carry State Department represen-tatives, but brought liaison officers from CinCLant andsubordinate commands. These officers brought addi-tional intelligence information about Grenada and adraft operations order for the assault on the island.Vice Admirai Joseph Metcalf III. the Commander. Se-cond Fleet, would be in overall command of theGrenada operation, with a tactical designator of Com-mander, Joint Task Force 120. He assigned to the am-phibious force, now designated Task Force 124, themission of seizing the Pearls Airport and the port ofGrenville, and of neutralizing any opposing forces inthe area. Simultaneously. Army Rangers (Task Force121)together with elements of the 82d Airborne Di-vision (Task Force 123)would secure points at thesouthern end of the island, including the nearly com-pleted jet airfield under construction near Point Sa-lines. A carrier battle group (Task Group 20.5) andAir Force elements would support the ground forces.6

Lieutenant Colonels Smith and Amos, summonedto a meeting on the Guam, arrived just as the liaisonofficers were completing their briefing. Around 2400on 23 October, less than 30 hours before the sched-

5

uled H-hour, the battalion landing team and the squa-dron began planning for their assault on Grenada. Atmidnight. Lieutenant Colonel Smith made a brief no-tation in his journal, "It's on!"7

Final Planning

Admiral Metcalf had designated 25 October as D-day and had directed that no landing occur before0400 on that date. Lieutenant Colonels Amos andSmith wished to make the assault before first light,to minimize any antiaircraft threat to helicopters.With the prohibition on a pre-0400 attack, the MAUhad only a narrow time window for the landing. H-hour and L-hour, the times of the initial air and sur-face landings, were each set for 0400 on 25 October18

Rules of engagement were established which calledfor the use of only those weapons that were essentialto the success of the mission. 'Disruption to the localeconomy [is] to be minimized, commensurate withthe accomplishment of the mission."9 All Marinesreceived thorough briefings on the importance of es-tablishing friendly relations with the Grenadian peo-ple. As Lieutenant Colonel Smith stressed, the Marineswere liberating the Grenadians, not attacking them.2°

The MAU's original concept of operations called fora combined air and surface assault to seize objectivesin the Pearls and Grenville areas. Because the MAU

i

Photo courtesy of 22d MAU

The USS Guam (LPH-9), with its complement of Marine helicopters parked on the Jlihtdeck, steams through calm seas. Commodore of the task jòrce, which included the Tren-ton, Fort Snelling, Manitowoc, and Barnstable County. was Capt Carl R. Erie, USN

still had received little information about the islandit was about to attack, the planners wished to give theBLT commander the maximum strength and flexibil-ity to deal with whatever opposition might be wait-ing ashore. Commander Butler warned, however, thatthe beaches on the eastern side of the island, with theirconsistently high winds and heavy surf, might be un-suitable for surface landings.21

On 24 October, the Marines hurriedly completedtheir planning. Admiral Metcalf met in the earlymorning hours with the Commander-in-Chief, Atlan-tic and the commanders of the Army elements of hisjoint task force. As a result of this meeting, he changedH-hour to 0500. Amphibious Task Force 124 made arendezvous with its supporting carrier battle group(Task Group 20.5) off Barbados, and at 1745 AdmiralMetcalf and his staff arrived on board the Guam byhelicopter to assume command of the joint Task Force.They had received little more advance warning of theoperation than the Marines, and requested a briefingon the specialized aspects of the amphibious opera-tion and the capabilities of the Marine units withinthe amphibious task force. Later that day. MAU officersbriefed the admiral and his staff on the plans for theassault into the Pearls area. Except for the time changeof H-hour to 0500, Admiral Metcalf approved the planas presented.22

6

The Initial Landing

Near midnight, a SEAL* team slipped into thePearls area to conduct a beach reconnaissance. Around0200 on 25 October, she amphibious task force en-tered Grenadian waters. Two hours later, the SEALteam reported by radio, "Walking Track Shoes." thecodeword phrase for a marginal beach, where amphib-ian tractors might land with great difficulty and otherlanding craft not at all. After heating the SEAL team'sreport, Captain Erie directed that the initial assaultwould be exclusively by air.

The MAU quickly shifted to an alternate plan,which provided for two companies to be helilifted insuccession to the east coast to seize the Pearls Airportand the town of Grenville. Captain Erie agreed thatif, after daylight, the Marines already ashore identifieda suitable beach, a surface landing might then be car-ried out.23 As planners on board the Guam made theirfinal preparation, the enlisted Matines gathered intheir berthing spaces for the nightly movie. To put themen in the proper frame of mind for the landing, theship preempted the scheduled feature for a showingof Sands of iwo Jima, starring John Wayne.

For those who were able to sleep, reveille sounded

*The SEALS. whose naine represents an acronym for "sea.air-Iand'are the Navy's unconventional warfare specialists.

at 0100 for the Marines on board the Guam and theother ships of the amphibious task force. The infan-trymen ate a hurried meal and drew live ammunitionbelow decks, while flight deck crews and maintenancepersonnel made final preparations to launch the firsthelicopters from the Guam. Few of the pilots and noneof the crew chiefs in HMM-261 had any combat ex-perience. Most of the senior noncommissioned officers,however, had served in Vietnam. The squadron main-tenance officer, Major Melvin W. DeMars, Jr., care-fully parceled out these experienced men to eachaircraft so that, "In case there were the early jitters,which you'd obviously have on the first combat ex-perience for any of these young guys, they would havethat old hand right there to steady them or if theylooked to him, they'd know exactly what to do."24

At 0315 the first helicopters took off from theGuam, in total darkness. Operating under ErnCon res-trictions, the aircraft could communicate neither witheach other nor with the ship. All aircraft carried night

vision goggles, but some of the pilots had not yetqualified in their use. Four divisions of transports plusone escort division of gunships comprising a total of21 helicopters, launched from the Guam. The MAUdid not attempt to use holding sectors for the separateflight divisions, nor did it establish a rendezvouspoint 25

Intermittent rain squalls delayed the launching ofthe helicopters, so the first CH-46s, carrying elementsof Company E, and their AH-1 Cobra escorts werealmost a half hour late in reaching the landing zone,"LZ Buzzard," just south of the Pearls airfield. Therain had stopped by the time the helicopters ap-proached the landing zone. Although the sun was justbelow the horizon, and the sky was still dark, the pi-lots could begin to distinguish some terrain features.26

The original MAU plan had called for a heliborneassault directly onto the Pearls Airport. An examina-tion of aerial photos taken of the airport, however, con-vinced Lieutenant Colonel Amos that antiaircraft sites

Launching from the USS Guam at dawn on D-Day, an AH-1 Cobra attack helicopterand troop-carrying C'H-46s of HMM-261 are ready to assault and capture Pear/s Airporton Grenada's eastern coast. (Reconstructive art by LtCoIA. M. "Mike" Leahy, USMCR).

Photo courtesy of Navy Chief of Information

7

were probably located on the high hills surroundingthe field. At his urging, the MAU had changed thelanding zone to a location just south of the airfield,identified as an unused racetrack on the charts avail-able to the planners. Aerial photos seemed to confirmthat the new site, called LZ Buzzard, was a relativelyclear open area covered with small scrub brush.However, as the leading helos approached the so-called"racetrack," those pilots who wore the night vision gog-gles could make out tall palm trees and high scrubbrush. To Major DeMars, "lt almost looked like youwere landing in front of the Palm Springs J"2?

Lieutenant Colonel Amos immediately directed thehelicopters to make for the relatively clear northwestcorner of the zone, where the aircraft touched downwithout mishap. During the unloading, two TOWjeeps on one of the CH-53s became entangled andwedged in the cargo bay. After 30 minutes of unsuc-cessful attempts to free the vehicles, Marines tippedone TOW jeep out the rear cargo door, freeing thehelicopter but wrecking the TOW launcher. One manbroke an arm and another a leg during the unload-ing, but there were no other casualties as the Marinesquickly fanned out across the zone.28

Despite the unexpected appearance of palm treesand marshy soil in the landing zone, the wisdom ofchoosing LZ Buzzard was confirmed when two12.7mm antiaircraft guns in the hills near Pearls Air-port finally came to life, opening fire on the follow-ing waves of helicopters. The antiaircraft fire was erraticand inaccurate, probably because of the lingeringdarkness. Cobra gunships quickly silenced the antiair-craft guns with 20mm cannon and 2.75-inch rockets.

At LZ Buzzard, Company E's commander, CaptainHenryJ. Donigan HI, assigned one platoon to securethe perimeter and started moving the remaining twoplatoons toward the Pearls airfield. He dispatched asmall detachment from the 2d Platoon to mark thebeach area near Pearls for the still-hoped-for surfaceassault. Moving quickly, even with security elementsto their front and flanks, the two platoons closed onthe airport just as dawn was breaking. As the Marinesbreached a chain link fence surrounding the airfieldcomplex. Grenadian soldiers fired a few bursts fromtheir automatic weapons, then fled toward the westend of the runway. The Marines briefly returned fire,then fanned out to search the terminal area. By 0730they had secured the airfield, after searching twoCuban aircraft on the field and taking their crews intocustod .29

The AH-1 Cobras, which had flown ahead of theadvancing platoons to reconnoiter the route to the air-field, reported an antiaircraft gun position on Hill 275,

8

part ofthe high ground overlooking the airfield. Thissite resembled the positions that had fired on thehelicopters during the descent into LZ Buzzard, butit appeared to be unmanned. Lieutenant ColonelSmith, now on the scene with his Alpha commandgroup,* ordered one platoon to take Hill 275.Although the position now appeared to be manned,the enemy gunners were not firing their heavy weaponsat the advancing Marines, either because of panic orinability to depress the anicaircraft guns far enoughto hit troops on the ground. As the Marines ap-proached the crest of the hill, the Grenadian soldiersdropped their weapons and fled down the rear slope.The Marines pursued them down the hill, but-encumbered by packs. flak jackets, and riflestheyhad little chance of overtaking the local soldiers, cladonly in T-shirts and shorts. On the hilltop position theMarines found, in addition to the two 12.7mm anitair-craft machine guns, a cache of small arms and a largesupply of ammunirion.30

With the hill secure and antitank weapons posi-tioned to control the main avenues of approach to theairfield. Lieutenant Colonel Smith directed Compa-ny E to push on to the west, along the axis of a roadthat ran to the west of the airport. Since each platoonhad to move to the assembly area through ruggedwooded terrain, it took nearly two hours to repositionthe scattered platoons of the company. Just as the Ma-rines were about to move out to the west of the ter-minal area, they came under scattered 82mm mortarfire. Two or three rounds landed near the terminalcomplex and five more landed in the vicinity of LZBuzzard.' There were no casualties, however, and thefire soon ceased. As the Marines later learned, a roundhad misfired while still in the mortar tube, apparent.ly causing the crew to abandon its weapon. CompanyE later discovered the mortar intact, with a large num-ber of rounds nearby.

The Capture of Grenville

One hour after Company E had landed at Il Buz-zard. helicopters airlifted Company F into the Gren-ville area for the planned assault on the town. As inthe case of LZ Buzzard, aerial photos had given a falseimpression of the terrain, and the selected landingzone proved unusable. Lieutenant Colonel Amos. whowas controlling the insertion, could see only one suita-

sIn a tactical situation, a commander may divide his staff intotwo groups. Alpha and Bravo. The commander heads th light Al-pha group; his executive offker the other. Should enemy action makethe Alpha command group unable to control the situation, the Bravogroup takes over.

Photo courtesy of Navy Chief of Information

Pearls Airport, Grenada's princ:pal civilian airfield. was captured by Marines on D-Dayand temporarily renamed Marine Corps Air Station 'McAS,) Douglas in honor of a ser-geant major who died in Lebanon. The artist, with the help ofArmy andAir Force friends,recovered the seven-foot, scarlet-and-gold sign in December 1983 and gave it to the Ma-rine Corps Museum. (Reconstructive art by D'Col A. M. "Mike" Leahy, USMCR)

bic landing zone, a soccer field directly in the centerof the town. Although the field was large, level, andfree of obstructions, it was surrounded on all sides bya high brick wall. If the landing were opposed, thecompany would be in an untenable position. Lieu-tenant Colonel Amos knew, however, that the inser-tions at LZ Buzzard had been unopposed.Furthermore, he could see the people itt Grenville wav-ing, in apparent welcome to the Marines. He decidedto land the company on the soccer field. At approxi-mately 0630, Company F landed at the field, hastilydesignated "12 Oriole." There was no opposition there,and the company quickly deployed to secure the townand the port area.32

At both Pearls and Grenville, the Marines wererelieved to discover that most of the local population,far from regarding them as invaders, welcomed themas liberators from the rule of Hudson's military coun-

9

cil, which many Grenadians were describing as a gangof criminals and thugs. local citizens immediately be-gan to point out members of the militia and the Peo-ple's Revolutionary Army to the Marines, leading themto houses and other sites of concealed arms caches.Grenadians even loaned their vehicles to the Marinesfor use in gathering the considerable quantities of armsand ammunition that were being uncovered. Patrols,accompanied by local guides, moved into the coun-tryside to search out caches; and Marines establishedroadblocks to stop and identify members of the Grena-dian army and militia who were trying to escape de-tection by changing into civilian clothing.33

Action at St. George's

While the Marines in the Pearls area were con-solidating their positions and beginning to move out,U.S. Army Rangers, who had landed in the Salines area

at 0536, were encountering stiff resistance.* Planes car-

rying the lead elements of the Rangers had receivedheavy antiaircraft fire from the hills surrounding theuncompleted airfield. Once on the ground, theRangers found themselves heavily engaged againstpockets of armed Cubans irs the vicinity of the air-strip. Despite this opposition. the Rangers eventuallysucceeded in securing the airfield and evacuatingAmerican medical students from the nearby True Bluecampus of the St. George's University Medical SchooL

A special mission force, dispatched to rescue Gover-nor General Paul Scoon, had succeeded in reachingthe Governor's mansion but was now surrounded bya Grenadian army force with armored personnel car-riers. Early reports, which later proved erroneous, in-dicated that the special mission force had sustainedheavy casualties, was low on ammunition, and wasreceiving intense heavy weapons fìre.

To lift the siege of the Governor's residence, Ad-mirai Metcalf directed the amphibious task force, withCompany G still embarked in two ships. to conducta landing on the western side of the island. Augment-ing the company's firepower would be some of the bat-talion landing team's tanks, 'lOWs, and heavy machineguns, most of which were still on board ship. As animmediate measure to help the Army, Admiral Met-calf directed the four Cobras of HMM-261 to fly southand support the forces engaged in the Salines area.35

Captains John P. "Pat" Giguere and Timothy B.Howard had their Cobras on station in the Salines areawhen they received orders from the Guam's Helicop-ter Direction Center (HDC) to proceed south and con-tact "Spectre," an Air Force AC-130 gunship, for amission in support of the Army. Giguere and Howardwere unable to raise either the Air Force gunship orany Army unit with the radio frequency lists they hadbeen given. After failing to spot either enemy orfriendly units through visual reconnaissance, theyreturned to the Guam for fuel. On board the Guam,Captain DouglasJ. Diehl's "Darth Flight" (so namedbecause Diehi's squadron mates insisted that hesounded like movie villain Darth Vador on his radio)was preparing to relieve Giguere's flight on station,when Diehi's wing man, Captain Gary W. Watson,happened to pick up an Army frequency on hisreceiver 38

Once airborne, Diehi and Watson succeeded in con-tacting a forward air controller attached to the ist

*The initial assault on Salines was made by the ist Ranger Bat-talion, followed closely by the 2d Ranger Battalion. At 1405. a rein-forced battalion (2d Battalion. 325th Infantry) of the 2d Brigade,82d Airborne Division began landing at Point Salines.

10

Ranger Battalion. The forward air controller attempt-ed to direct the Cobras to a target, but it soon be-came apparent that the Army was using differentmaps. He could not give Diehi and Watson a precisefix on the target. Using a reflecting mirror, the Armycontroller finally succeeded in directing the Cobrasonto a house that concealed a 90mm recoiless rifle.Still uncertain as to the exact location of the house,Diehi and Watson began a run-in toward the targetarea. "That's it! that's it!" yelled the controller. "It'sright under you!"37

Watson peeled off sharply to the left and behindhim Diehl opened fire with his 20mm cannon. Circl-ing the target a second time, Watson fired a TOW mis-sile that entered a window and exploded, completelydestroying the house. As the house collapsed, threemen ran to a nearby truck, which had apparently car-ried the 90mm gun. Watson fired a second TOW andhit the truck, which blew up, with fragments hurtlinginto the air. When they returned to Guam for fuel,Diehi and Watson passed the frequency they had beenusing to Howard and Giguere. who had completedrefueling and were now airborne again.

Giguere and Howard made contact with a controllerwho directed them to attack Fort Frederick, an oldmasonry fort overlooking St. George's from the highground east of the town. Although the fort was a moresuitable target for naval gunfire, fear of damage to theheavily settled areas near the fort caused Admirai Met-calf to select an attack by the Cobras.38 Fear of col-lateral damage to houses near the fort also determinedthe Cobras' method of attackcausing the Cobras toremain on a fixed course for a dangerous length oftime.

On the fifth run. Captain Howard's Cobra was hitby antiaircraft fire. One round went through both en-gines. Several others entered the cockpit, woundingboth Howard and his copilot, Captain Jeb F. Seagle.The fire knocked Seagle unconscious. Howard's rightarm was useless and his right leg was broken. Despitehis wounds, Howard remained conscious and alert, andmanaged to land the stricken aircraft on a nearby soc-cer field. As he later recalled:

We were only at about 1,200 feet, which was another thingin our favor. I couldn't use che pedals, so I set the stick whereI thought it would level the hei icopter and propped my leftfoot around it. As I pulled it towards me, the bird hit hard.I was sure the crash would kill us. lt hit so hard the canopyremoval systems must have activated because all the win-dows blew out. Even though the helicopter bounced veryhard off the deck, it didn't flip over.39

Seagle regained consciousness immediately after thecrash landing and dragged Howard away from the

burning aircraft. As soon as they cleared the helicop-ter. the two pilots came under intensebutinaccuratefire from the troops in the vicinity of thefort. Howard persuaded Seagle to take his pistol, toleave him near the helicopter, and to go for help.Shortly after that, the burning Cobra exploded, ig-niting the 2.75-inch rockets still on board.

The explosion and flying rockets may have fright-ened or distracted the Grenadians, because their fir-ing ceased for a time. Howard, who had managed tosalvage his radio, began calling for help. The enemytroops now resumed their fire, as they walked slowlydown the hill. When they reached the edge of thefield, The earth started shaking." Howard recalled."I thought at first it was naval gunfire, but it was PatGiguere shooting 2.75 at them."40

The rocket attack scattered the troops on theground, leaving Captain Howard unmolested for thetime being. A CH-46 summoned by Giguere ap-proached St. George's to attempt a medical evacua-tion (MedEvac). By radio, Captain Giguere briefed

Major DeMars and First Lieutenant Lawrence M. King,Jr., the pilots flying the CH-46. "We were going tohave to fly in right past this triple-A [antiaircraft ar-tillery] site, right [over] the capital city of the islandto land in this LZ,' DeMars recalled. "He was goingto provide cover for me as I went in, as I set down,and [provide] escort back out. . . . That was a verydifficult thing for him to do, to have to cover an air-craft going into a landing zone with only one aircraftbecause, as he would come in to make his runs on tar-get and turn back off, he would have no one ro coverhim. So he was going to expose himself to some pret-ty serious triple-A fire in order to cover me into thezone."41

While Giguere attacked the antiaircraft site with20mm cannon and rockets, DeMars landed his CH-46in the field near Howard. The landing attracted moresmall arms fire to the field. A few rounds hit thehelicopter, slightly damaging the stabilizing equip-ment. The squadron maintenance chief, Gunnery Ser-geant Kelly M. Neidigh, a Vietnam veteran riding with

Capt feb F. Seagle drags Capt Timothy D. Howard away from their burning AH-1 Cobra,shot down by enemy antiaircraft fire near Fort Frederick. Capt Seagle was killed whilelooking for he/p for the badly wounded Howard, who was subsequently rescued by aCH-46 of HMM-261. (Reconstructive art by LtCol A. M. "Mike" Leahy, USMcR).

Photo courtesy of Navy Chief of Information

MCHC Photo Collection

The Commandant of the Marine Corps, Gen Paul X. Kelley, and Mrs. Kelley visit CaptTimothy B. Howard at Bethesda Naval Hospital, follo wing the Grenada operation. Thewounded Cobra pilot, whose life was saved by a daring rescue effort by GySgt KellyNeidigh. but who subsequently lost his right forearm, had asked to remain on active duty.

DeMars as a gunner, quickly disconnected himselffrom his intercom equipment and jumped from theaircraft. Armed with an M-16 rifle, he sprinted the40-yard distance to Captain Howard. Ignoring the firedirected at him, Neidigh half-dragged, half-carriedHoward back to the aircraft and hoisted him on boardwith the aid of the crew chief. Corporal Simon D.Gore, Jr. Still under fire, DeMars continued to waitin hopes of finding Captain Seagle, not knowing thathostile fire had already killed Seagle. Finally, with nosign of the second Cobra pilot, and with Howard's con-dition rapidly worsening. DeMars decided to take off.Covered by Giguere. the CH-46 passed safely over St.George's but the Cobra was soon hit by antiaircraftfire and crashed into the harbor with the loss ofGiguere and his copilot. First Lieutenant Jeffrey R.Schat-ver. The CH-46 flew Captain Howard to the

12

Guam. where he received medical treatment that savedhis life, but could not save his right forearm.42

Grand Mal Bay

While the Cobras were seeing action in the south.hurried preparations continued for an amphibious as-sault at Grand Mal Bay. Lieutenant Colonel Smith,ashore with two rifle companies in the Pearls/Grenvillearea, had trouble maintaining communication withthe Guam. Although he had heard earlier from theMAU operations officer that an operation in the GrandMal or Gouyave area was under consideration, Smithheard nothing more until approximately 1500 whenhis reconnaissance platoon commander, using a hand-held radio from a weather deck of the Fort Snelling.managed to contact him. The platoon commander in-

formed him of the impending assault and asked whatwas going on.43

With the same question in mind. Lieutenant Col-onel Smith boarded a resupply helicopter to theGuam, leaving his executive officer in command atPearls and Grenville. Arriving on board the flagship,Smith received a hurried briefing from Major VanHuss. The ultimate objective of the landing at GrandMal was to secure the Governor General's residenceand relieve the special mission force. Company Gwould land at Grand Mal Beach and Company Fwould land by helicopter from Grenville that veryevening.

Rushing to the Guam's flag plot compartment,Smith succeeded in getting the landing's H-hour post-poned from 1630 to 1830, to allow more time for plan-fling and coordination. The Manitowoc, carryingCompany G, had already lowered her ramps, launchedher safety boats, and was about to launch the first as-sault amphibious vehicles when word of the postpone-ment reached the bridge.44

For the Company G commander, Captain RobertK. Dobson,jr., the postponement was only the latestin a long string of perplexing events in a rapidly.changing D-Day situation. His company had beenloaded in amphibian tractors since 0345, for a planned0430 landing. The 0430 landing had been postponed

until 0530, then 0630, then 0730, then cancelled al-together until more information about the beachcould be obtained. To find out more about the con-ditions on the beach, which the SEALc had reportedas marginal, the MAU commander sent the com-mander of the amphibian tractor unit ashore in anempty vehicle with the unit's most experienced oper-ator. They reported that a surface landing was possi-ble but would be extremely difficult.5

Shortly after noon, Dobson received word that theamphibian tractors would go in empty, while thetroops were being lifted in by air. At 1330, as Com-pany G was staging on the flight deck for the helilift,the Manitowoc's commander summoned Dobson tothe bridge and informed him of the shift in landingsite from the Pearls area to the northwest coast. Thenew landing site reportedly was to be in the vicinityof Victoria (Captain Dobson still had no informationthat his company would land at Grand Mal Bay). Thecompany hurriedly reembarked in the amphibian ve-hicles, but as the ship neared Victoria, no word cameto land. Dobson was next told that his landing wouldprobably be at the coastal town of Gouyave, about fourkilometers south of Victoria.*

*The Mni.towoc sailed around the north end of Grenada. Otherships. including the Guam. sailed from the Pearls area around thesouchern end of the island.

Curious Grenadians inspect the ashes and rotor blade that represent the only remainsof the AH-1 Cobra helicopter piloted by Capt Timothy B. Howard. Both Capt Howardand copilot c'aptJeb F. Seagle survived the crash, but Capt Seagle died seeking aid.

Photo courtesy of 22d MAW

-I-

13

Gouyave also proved a false alarm, and as they sailedpast that town, Dobson summoned his platoon com-manders to a meeting in his stateroom. It was now1750 and rapidly growing dark. Dobson told his pla-toon commanders that he still had received no wordfrom the battalion, but that in view of the late hour,it seemed likely that the landing would be postponeduntil next morning. He instructed his platoon com-manders to secure all weapons and ammunition onboard the assault amphibian vehicles (AAV5) and tohave the men return to their berthing spaces for somemuch-needed sleep.

Dobson had just given these instructions when heagain received a summons to the bridge. The landingwould be at Grand Mal Bay at 1830. The selected site,designated LZ Fuel bccause of a small tank farm atone end, was long and extremely narrow, with highground rising steeply behind it. Several large fuelstorage tanks occupied the only area of flat groundbehind the beach and blocked egress from it. Betweenthe beach and the high ground ran the main roadsouth to St. George's.

The first AAVs launched from the Manitowoc at1830. It was now completely dark, with no moon. TheAAVs made for the beach in a single column, the onlypossible formation in view of the darkness and the factthat no one had marked or even reconnoitered LZFuel. By 1901, the first AAVs were ashore on the nar-row beach with no opposition. Captain Dobson stillhad received no orders or instructions and was out ofcommunication with everyone but the elements of hiscommand ashore. As Navy utility landing craft (LCUs),bearing tanks and jeeps with heavy machine guns andTOWs, began to land their cargo, the AAVs moved toparking areas near the fuel tanks. There were nowseveral hundred Marines crowded onto the tiny beach-head, 750 by 100 meters, with limited exit routes andhighly flammable fuel tanks close at hand.

Making the best of the situation while still await-ing instruction about his mission, Captain Dobsonsent two platoons, backed by antitank weapons, to es-tablish blocking positions on the coast road 200 metersnorth and south of LZ Fuel. He next posted securityon his flanks, sent his reconnaissance platoon to con-duct a road reconnaissance to the south, and settledin to wait for daylight and for new orders

At about 2300, the Marines at LZ Fuel heard thesound of a helicopter overhead. Dobson's men quick-ly rigged up a landing zone with some red lights anda strobe light to guide in the aircraft, which provedto be a UH-1 (Huey) carrying the MAU air liaisonofficer, Major William J. Su blette. Sublette brought

14

Dobson up to date on the operations of the preced-ing day and told him there were apparently strongenemy forces between Company G and St. George's.He also said that Company F would arrive in his areaby helicopter sometime after midnight. Dobson askedSublette to try to comact Lieutenant Colonel Smith,to inform him of Company G's current dispositions,and to ask for further guidance8 An hour later, Com-pany G again heard the sound of a helicopter as MajorSublette's Huey returned, leading in a CH-46 bear-ing the battalion commander.

Lieutenant Colonel Smith had also experienced aneventful evening. Following his conference on boardthe Guam, Smith had planned to return immediate-ly to Pearls, pick up his small command group, andjoin Company G on board the Manitowoc for the land-ing. It took almost 30 minutes for Smith to find ahelicopter to return him to Pearls. But that was onlythe beginning of his odyssey. The Guam's HelicopterDirection Center had mistakenly vectored his helicop-ter to Point Salines instead of Pearls. He spent 45minutes in the air and did not arrive back at Pearlsuntil 1810, 20 minutes before the scheduled H-hourfor Grand Mal.

Hastily rounding up his command group at Pearls,Smith returned to the helicopter and instructed thepilot to make for the Manitowoc or, since theManitowoc's exact position was by now uncertain, theGuam, It was now dark and the pilot had lost his com-munications with everyone but the Trenton, which hadremained on the northeast side the island. At the endof its fuel supply, Smith's helicopter finally landed onthe Trenton after an hour of fruitless searching. Afterfurther delay, Smith, "so frustrated [he] could barelysee," flew back to the Guam. He had left there sixhours earlier, for (he had expected) a six-minute flightto Pearls and a 20-minute flight to the Manitowoc.

Shortly after Lieutenant Colonel Smith's landing onthe Guam, Major Sublette returned from LZ Fuel inhis Huey. Sublette offered to lead Smith to Grand MalBay. Smith quickly loaded his command group intoa CH-46 and set out on his long-delayed journey toLZ Fuel.9

There was so little room on the narrow beach at LZFuel that Smith's CH-46 had to land with its backwheels in the surf. As the rear ramp came down andthe command group waded ashore, Smith reflectedthat this was a new first, "A heliborne ship-to-shoremovement where you still had to wade through thesurf."°

Smith sent Major Sublette back to Pearls with wordto Lieutenant Colonel Amos to bring in Company F

GranØAnse Beach

r )ÇL ) -Fort Frederick -Prison

>' \Fort Adoiphus L

J

)

t

15

as soon as possible. He then collected his subordinatecommanders and briefed them on their mission. Ex-cept for Smith himselfwho had a good military mapcaptured at Pearlsthe Marines lacked reliable mapsof the area. Dobson's platoon commanders were stillusing photo copies of the Navy charts, which lackedgrid squares. Consequently, for locating and report-ing unit positions Smith established a simple clocksystem using the easily visible Queen's Park Racecourseas the base point.51

While on board the Guam, Lieutenant ColonelSmith had learned' that an estimated battalion ofCuban troops was still in the St. George's area, andthat a second battalion. possibly Cuban, was some-where to the north of Grand Mal Bay. Smith directedCaptain Dobson to station one platoon, reinforcedwith Dragon antitank weapons, facing northward asa rear guard and to send the reconnaissance platoonon foot, down the road that led toward the Queen'sPark Racecourse. Dobson's remaining two platoons,riding in AAVs and accompanied by tanks, would fol-low the recon platoon to the racecourse. Company F,on its way by air from Grenville, was to land at IlFuel, link up with Dobson's rear guard platoon andfollow Company G south toward the racecourse andSt. George's.52

Around 0400. Company F began to arrive at GrandMal Bay Since the tiny landing zone at LZ Fuel al-lowed room for only two helicopters to unload simul-taneously, it was nearly daylight before the entirecompany had finished landing. Meanwhile, Dobson'sAAV column had secured the racecourse, challengedby only a few scattered rounds of RPG fire. A cap-tured PRA officer later told the Americans that histroops in the area, frightened by the sounds of theamphibian vehicles and tanks rumbling noisily downthe road during the dark night, had quickly taken totheir heels.

Movement Toward St. George

Lieutenant Colonel Smith had planned for Com-pany G to secure the high ground overlooking St.George's and the Governor's residence. Once hereceived word that Dobson had encountered scantresistance, however, he ordered the company to makedirectly for the Governor General's house. Leaving thetanks and AAVs to provide a base of fire from theracecourse. Dobson advanced rapidly up the moun-tain path leading to the residences of the PrimeMinister and the Governor General. One squad out-posted the unoccupied Prime Minister's residence,while the remainder of the company continued on tothe Governor General's house. There they easily linked

16

up with a special mission team of 22 men. inside thehouse were Governor General Sir Paul Scoon, his wife,and nine other civilians. All were evacuated to theGuam

Lieutenant Colonel Smith had now arrived at theracecourse with Company F. He ordered Company Gto continue west along the ridge line that was the siteof the Governor General's residence, and to secure FortFrederick, the 18th century masonry fortress that domi-nated the entire St. George's area.

In talking with local Grenadians, Dobson gainedthe impression that the fort had suffered heavy attacksfrom AC-130 gunships, but that a unit of at least com-pany size remained inside. The fort was well suppliedwith ammunition. Dobson decided to send part of hiscompany to seize an adjacent piece of high ground,located about 300 meters north of the fort. From there,they could provide covering fìre. Dobson then ad-vanced through dense foliage along the ridgeline withhis remaining force. As they approached the fort, theMarines observed parties of men climbing down thefar side of the walls. Estimating that the PRA mightbe abandoning the position. Dobson decided to presson, getting as close as possible to Fort Frederick whilestill under cover of his machine guns.

To their surprise, Dobson and his men were ableto enter the fort unopposed. Inside, the Marines ob-served a number of uniforms scattered over theground. The fort's defenders, apparently unnerved bythe sight of the long columns of Marines snakingtoward them, had quickly decided to abandon theirmilitary calling and return to civilian life. A capturedPRA officer, Major B. Gahagan, later explained thereasons for the disintegration of the Grenadian forces.PRA commanders, said Gahagan, did not expect acombined helicopter and surface assault at night anddid not expect an attack of any sort north of St.George's. "This combined night assault was a psycho-logical shock to the FRA" Gahagan reported, "where-by the few remaining senior officers present opted andagreed to pass the word to lay down their arms andreturn home."

Large quantities of weapons, including lightmachine guns, AK-47 assault rifles, heavy machineguns. and great stacks of ammunition were left be-hind in Fort Frederick. Nearby, Marines discovered atruck with three new 82mm mortars and two trucksheavily loaded with antiaircraft ammunition. In un-derground tunnels below the fort, which had houseda headquarters of some type, Dobson's men foundquantities of significant documents, including an armsagreement recently signed by Nicaragua, Cuba,Grenada. and the Soviet Union, as well as situation

Photo courtesy of Navy Chicf of Information

Army Rangers dash out from the ramp of an HMM-261 CH-46 onto the Grand AnseBeach and move forward under fire io rescue American medical students at one of twoSt. George 's campuses. Overhead covering fire is delivered by a Navy A-7 Corsair andan Air Force AC- 130 gunship. (Reconstructive art by LiCol A. M. "Mike" Leahy, USMCR)

maps detailing the island's defenses and the locationof PRA 1orces.

The Grand Anse Operation

While Lieutenant Colonel Smith's two companieswere consolidating their positions in the St. George'sarea, the helicopters that had transported them toGrand Mal prepared for quite a different mission. Lateon the afternoon of D-day. the American commanderslearned that the True Blue campus was only one oftwo campuses of St. George's medical school. A largenumber of students. perhaps as many as 200, were lo-cated in the medical school annex at Grand AnseBeach on the southeast coast of Grenada, south of St.George's. Army commanders at Point Salines had beenin telephone contact with the students and hadplanned an evacuation for the following day.56

Admiral Metcalf directed the MAU commander tomake HMM-261 available to support U.S. Army forcesin the assault on Grand Anse to evacuate the students.

17

The pilots and crews of HMM-261 had left theGuam expecting to lift the Marines for an assault onVictoria or Gouyave and were surprised to learn of theirnew mission. At Salines Airport, Lieutenant ColonelAmos conferred with the commander of the 2d RangerBattalion, Army Lieutenant Colonel Ralph L. Hagler,Jr., an old friend and classmate from the Virginia Mili-tary Institute. Seated on concrete blocks in the un-finished terminal of the newly captured airfield,Hagler and Amos hastily planned the comingheliborne assault.

The beach at Grand Anse was short and extremelynarrow, with a dense growth of palm trees and otherplants extending almost to the water's edge. TheCH-46s, carrying a company of Rangers. would landon the beach in three divisions of three helicopterseach. Four CH-53s would follow to pick up and evacu-ate the students. Finally, the nine CH-46s wouldreturn, again in three waves, to extract the Rangers.

Lieutenant Colonel Amos, airborne in a UH-1, woulddirect the belo operations and coiltrol both the NavyA-7 Corsair attack aircraft from the carrier Indepen-dence and an Air Force AC-130 gunship. Further firesupport would be available from naval gunfire ships,Army artillery and mortars, and the two remainingCobras of HMM-261. Sharing the command-and-control Huey with Lieutenant Colonels Amos andHagler was another Army officer acting as a fire sup-port coordinator

A fierce sense of resolve swept through the squa-dron as the men learned the details of their mission."The first thing that popped into our minds was, wewere going to rescue U.S. citizens,' recalled MajorFrank L. Brewer, who was designated to lead the firstdivision of CH-46s. The Iranian hostage rescue at-tempt was on everyone's mind." Many of the CH-53pilots in HMM-261 had trained at New River Air Sta-tion under instructors who had flown on the Iranianrescue attempt. Amos's closest friend, in fact, had beena flight leader on that mission. "Lieutenant ColonelAmos said to me. 'Regardless of what happens o anyof our aircraft or any of the Rangers on that beach,it's going to go down." Brewer recalled later. "We werecoming out with something. or there was not goingto be an air frame left."

At 1600, the CH-46s left Salines for the short flightto Grand Anse. Supporting fires by artillery, mortars,and close air support aircraft on suspected PRA andCuban positions near the campus began about fiveminutes later. This fire did not lift until 20 secondsbefore the nine CH-46s touched down at Grand AnseBeach at 1615. Scattered, but steadily increasing smallarms and automatic weapons fire greeted the helicop-ters as they maneuvered into the crowded beach area.Waist gunners returned fire with their right side.50-caliber machine guns. The helicopters, in a roughechelon formation, touched down in a swirl of sandand dust on the narrow beach. Rangers raced downthe lowered rear ramps and headed for the nearbybuildings that housed the medical school annex.59

The narrowness of the beach area forced the lasthelicopter in line too close to the overhanging palmtrees. A rotor blade brushed a palm tree, and the pi-lot had to shut down and abandon his damagedhelicopter. As the last of the eight undamaged air-craft cleared the beach, Amos called in the fourCH-53s. Hagler had remained in telephone contactwith the students and instructed them to place mat-tresses in front of their windows, and to keep undercover. They were not to rush out when the first groupof helicopters arrived, but to wait for the Rangers to

's

take them to the CH-53s. A few seconds after theCH-53s touched down, the first American studentsand other evacuees began loading aboard. In a fewminutes, the last CH-5 3 had left Grand Anse Beach.Despite intermittently heavy fire on the beach, theevacuation concluded without serious casualties.80

As the CH-53s were approaching the beach, LanceCorporal MartinJ. Dellert, crew chief of the downedCH-46, broke from cover and began a hasty inspec-tion of his aircraft. The spot where the helo had shutdown had now became the hottest area on the beach,a target for incoming mortar rounds and fire fromsmall arms and automatic weapons. "I thought hemust be looking for somebody," recalled the squadronmaintenance chief, Master Sergeant George T. Cur-tis. "I couldn't fathom why he had run to this aircraft[in the face of the heavy fire) and he's scrambling allover it . . . . He ran back to the pilot and he said tohim, 1 think we can y it.' So the pilot, the copilot,and the gunner ran back to the airplane and turnedit up.' Vibrating and shaking severely, the CH-46 liftedoff the beach and lurched back to Salines.61

By this time, the remaining CH-46s were return-ing to the beach. Lieutenant Colonel Amos directedthe aircraft to land by threes so that the Rangers wouldbe able to board as they disengaged gradually fromthe fire fight. The first division successfully complet-ed their extraction, but as the second division waslanding, another CH-46 struck a palm tree. Part ofthe tree trunk fell through the rotor blades, completelydestroying the rotor system. The crew of the disabledhelicopter quickly jumped on board one of the tworemaining helicopters and the extraction continued.A few of the Rangers of the downed aircraft inflatedone of the life rafts carried by the helicopter andjoined the Navy," paddling out to sea, where they

were picked up by the destroyer Giron. The operationcost the squadron one CH-46. and another onedamaged, but close to 200 civilians had been evacu-ated without injury and without loss of any Rangersor Marine airmen.62 It was, as one pilot put it, 'A realsuccessful flUS5IOfl."3

Continuing Operations in the Northeast

While the squadron and Companies F and G hadbeen occupied with new missions in the southwest,Company E had continued operations in the north.During the late afternoon of D-day, the companyreceived an intelligence report that armored vehicles,including at least one tank, were approaching fromthe north. This was one of several erroneous reportsreceived that day about attacks, either threatened or

in progress. against the Marine positions at Pearls.The report caused Company E to begin hurried prepa-rations to withstand a mechanized attack. SecondLieutenant Rand W Hammel's ist Platoon, the north-ernmost Marine unit, began to erect antitank obsta-cles. Although many Grenadians offered to stay andhelp (one man even offering to dismantle his houseto provide materials for a roadblock), Lieutenant Ham-mel's men urged them to leave the area and seek safetyfarther south. These people began to stream down thenorth-south road, passing through the position ofCompany F in the Grenville area. Not knowing thatthis evacuation was taking place at Company E's be-hest, Company F interpreted the stream of civiliansas confirmation of the fact that an enemy attack wasimminent.

The Marines soon learned that the "mechanized at-tack," was only a false alarm, but nerves were on edgeas Company E took up its night defensive positions.Captain Donigan established a blocking position,backed by antiarmor weapons, on the major roadwayleading into the air terminal complex from thesoutheast. He set up another blocking position on thenorth-south road to the west of the airfield. These po-sitions could call upon the battalion's 81mm mortars,which had come ashore during the day. (The arrivalof the mortars, incidentally, had touched off anotherfalse alarm. A radio operator interpreted a messagefrom Company E that the mortars were ashore as areport that, The Marines ashore are receiving mortarfire.")

Meanwhile, Company F had staged at Pearls for itsairlift to Grand Anse, which got underway at 0330.65Company E spent most of D Plus i in the vicinity ofthe Pearls Airfield. Throughout the day, Grenadiancivilians continued to bring in arms and ammunitionand lead Marines to nearby arms caches. During theafternoon a motorized patrol, riding in vehicles loanedby local residents, followed friendly Grenadians to alarge truck, sitting camouflaged on an agriculturalroad. The truck carried a full load of small arms andammunition. Behind the truck, Marines found a load-ed four-barrelled 12.7mm antiaircraft gun. The Ma-rines secured the gun to the back of the vehicle.hot-wired the truck to get it started, and returned toPearls with their haul. Other Marine search parties,with Grenadian guides, found quantities of militarypacks and cartridge belts and more small arms.

On 27 October, Company E received orders to car-ry out a reconnaissance in force to the Mount Homearea, about three kilometers east of Grenville. Cap-tured documents had identified Mount Home as the

19

headquarters of the regional People's RevolutionaryArmy battalion. Captain Donigan departed Pearls witha reinforced rifle platoon mounted in Marine jeepstogether with trucks and flatbeds borrowed from theGrenadians. Two 10W jeeps and some Dragon teamsaccompanied this heterogeneous convoy. Fuel for allvehicles came from stores captured at Pearls Airfield.

The reconnaissance force met no resistance, andreceived a warm welcome from civilians along the way.At their destination the Marines found two buildingsof the Mount Home Agricultural Center that evidentlyhad served as a battalion command post. One of thesecontained a complete communications center withmodern radio equipment, as well as maps and docu-ments. Both buildings held large quantities of mili-tary equipment and propaganda material.

Local residents urged the Marines to move on to thenearby Mount St. Catherine television and microwaverelay station, where they thought PRA troops mightbe found. After considerable effort, a few vehicles ofthe convoy managed to push their way up the narrowprecipitous road to the top of Mount St. Catherine.As they reached the crest of the ridgeline, in a heavyrain squall, the Marines saw a handful of soldiersretreating down the opposite slope, carrying what ap-peared to be an 82mm mortar. The Marines openeda heavy fire on the fleeing figures, but appeared toinflict no casualties. They received no return fire. Asearch of the hillside area yielded a number of 82mmmortar shells and some antitank rounds.

A driving rain brought new hazard to the returntrip down the steep slope of Mount St. Catherine. ADragon jeep towing a trailer jackknifed and over-turned, injuring the driver and a passenger. Since therewas no possibility of landing a medevac helicopter inthe heavy rain, the Marines placed the casualties onimprovised stretchers and loaded them onto a flatbedtruck for the remainder of the journey down themountain. At a schoolyard near the base of the slope,the company's forward air controller was able to callin a CH-46 to carry out the casualties. The reconnais-sance force then returned to the airfield without fur-ther incident.66

The following day, another platoon-sized recon-naissance force, searching to the north of Pearls, tooka wrong turn and found itself on the outskirts of atown named Sauteurs on the northern coast of the is-land. about 10 kilometers northwest of Pearls. Sincethe force had encountered no opposition on their ap-proach or withdrawal. Captain Donigan proposed toreturn and seize Sauteurs. Before his proposal couldbe acted upon, however, the battalion command post

received a report ola very large arms cache at MirabeauHospital, which was actually a small village nearMount Home.

Departing for Mirabeau Hospital with his motorizedplatoon recon force, Donigan moved eastward withcaution, arriving at his objective in the late afternoon.Donigan left the vehicles concealed at the bottom ofa draw, with a small detachment to provide security,while the remainder of the Marines proceeded on footto a cave which, according to local civilians, concealedan arms cache. Finding the cave empty, Donigandecided to push up the hilt toward the MirabeauHospital.

Advancing along the heavily wooded ridge, the Ma-rines fanned out by fire teams. Near the top, the woodschanged to a banana patch. The Marines encountereda civilian carrying coconuts and detained him to keephim from giving a warning to others. As the lead fireteam crested the hill, the point man abruptly stoppedand silently pointed to his rifle to indicate possibletrouble. In the clearing at the top of the hill were threemen standing next to a Land Rover. A Marine shout-ed, "Freeze!" The three men stopped, exchanged some

hurried words, then broke and ran. The Marinesopened fire, hitting two of the men. The third manran into a house, out the rear door, and down themountain. The two wounded men, one of whom sub.sequentiv died, were later identified as Cubans.

At almost the same time, the Marines left in thedraw to guard the vehicles came under fire from anunknown number of enemy. The Marines respondedand a short fìrefìght ensued in the fading light. Aftera few minutes, the enemy broke off the fight. The Ma-tines suffered no casualties.

Captain Donigan and his patrol, having heard ofthe fight by radio, now returned to the convoy vehi-cles, bringing with them the captured Land Rover andthe wounded Cubans. Donigan began to take the con-voy back along the draw. As they withdrew, the Ma-rines received fire from a nearby ridgeline. Theyreplied with small arms and machine gun fire andfired a LAW antitank rocket into a group of seven toeight figures on the ridgeline. The Marines were un-scathed once again. Enemy casualties could not im-mediately be determined but subsequent inter-rogation of PRA officers revealed that some casualties

Prisoners, suspected members of the Grenadthn People 's Revolutionary Army, are es-cortedby Marines to temporary compounds located atQueen s Park Racecourse just northof St. George's. ¡n the background ¿s a jeep mounting a .50-caliber machine gun.

Photo courtesy of Sgs Christopher Grey, USMC

20

probably had been inflicted on their units as a resultof this action. Captain Donigan's force returned to theairfield without further contact.67

The Capture of St. George's

While Company E was extending its operations inthe northeast section of Grenada, Companies F andG were completing the capture of strong points aroundSt. George's. During the night following the captureof Fort Frederick, a jeep on a resupply run to Compa-ny G had a meeting engagement with a Soviet-madeBTR 60 armored personnel carrier in the road betweenFort Frederick and the Governor General's residence.A quick shot at close range with a LAW antitank rocketknocked out the BTR.68

For D plus 2, Lieutenant Colonel Smith receivedthe mission of attacking south to seize Richmond HillPrison, Fort Adoiphus, and Fort Lucas.86

Shortly after daylight, however, Lieutenant ColonelSmith encountered three American journalists,* whoinformed him that Richmond Hill Prison was nolonger guarded. Immediately radioing this informa-tion to Captain Dobson. Smith ordered him to geta platoon to the prison as fast as possible. Fort Lucas,in actuality only an old unmanned gun battery posi-tion, was occupied along the way. By 0800, Dobsonhad secured the now-empty prison and was beginningto move on Fort Adolphus.7°

Unlike Richmond Hill Prison, Fort Adolphus wasdefinitely occupied. Dobson's men could see an un-recognizable flag flying above it, and considerablemovement within the complex. Smith and Dobsondiscussed using TOW and heavy machine gun fire to"prep" the fort before Dobson's men attacked. AdmiralMetcalf told Smith that naval gunfire and air supportwould also be available, if needed. "I'm not sure whatstopped us horn doing it," recalled Lieutenant ColonelSmith. "The only thing that stopped us from goingin and prepping it, is that we had been so successfulwithout shooting that I recall consciously making adecision: 'It's working, let's just keep doing it the waywe're doing it.' And I said, 'Just scout it our. If youtake any fire, back off and we'll blow the hell out ofit."' Dobson's men cautiously closed in on Fort Adol-phus. until they encountered the Venezuelan ambas-sador. The unfamiliar flag flying above the fort wasthe flag of Venezuela, and Fort Adoiphus was, in fact,the Venezuelan Embassy.

With the forts overlooking St. George's now in

*These reporters were among a handful who had slipped intoGrenada despite the initial ban on press travel to the island. Theban was lifted after the securing of all military objectives.

21

hand, Company F proceeded into the town itself. TheMarines encountered no resistance and spent most oftheir time searching for weapons caches and takinginto custody men who had been identified by the lo-cal residents as members of the PRA.

The Boundary Problem

In order to let the Marines continue their advancesouth. the Commander,Joint Task Force 120 changedthe boundary between the MAU units (Task Group124.2) and elements ofthe Army's 82d Airborne Di-vision (Task Force 121). The boundary shifted southto the grid line which ran from Ross Point on the eastcoast to Requin Bay on the west. Information aboutthis important change, however, did not reach all unitsof the 82d Airborne. To compound the difficulty. theMarine and Army units involved had not yet ex-changed liaison officers. A linkup communications fre-quency had been designated, but call signs had notbeen disseminated and joint fire support control meas-ures were not in use. The result was that Marine andArmy units remained unaware of their close proximi-ty to each other.72

The area under the control of the two Marine com-panies in the south had now grown so large that Lieu-tenant Colonel Smith was obliged to form a provisionalrifle company, drawn from his artillery battery (whoseguns had remained on board ship). This provisionalcompany's mission was to patrol St. George's, freeingCompanies E and F for other tasks.

Toward evening of D plus 2, Smith received infor-mation that the boundary line between the Marinesand the 82d had again been shifted south. This wouldallow the Marines to secure the Ross Point Hotel onMartin's Bay, just south of St. George's harbor, andro link up with the 82d Airborne. Word of this se-cond boundary change also failed to reach the 82d.

Reports said that as many as 400 Canadian, Brit-ish, and American nationals were at the Ross PointHotel, and were eager to be evacuated. Since Presi-dent Reagan was planning to address the nation ontelevision that same evening, Washington leaders wereanxious to make sure that all American citizens on theisland were safe and had been accounted for. Compa-ny F arrived at the pleasant seaside hotel just after darkto find less than two dozen foreign nationals, mostlyCanadians. Although they were glad to have the pro-tection of the Marines, few of them wished to be evacu-ated from Grenada.

With no sign yet of units of the 82d Airborne, Corn-pany F assumed night defensive positions around thehotel. The following morning, the lead elements of

the 2d Battalion. 325th Infantry, reached the hotel.The company and platoon commanders of the 2d Bat-talion still had not been briefed on the planned link-up and were surprised to find Marines in the area. Onecompany commander told the Marines that his menhad considered the Ross Point Hotel and vicinity a freefire zone. It eventually became clear that only the di-vision commander and the brigade commanders in the82d knew about the boundary changes made theprevious day. The confusion about boundaries causedthe Marines to worry continually about the where-abouts of friendly forces during the final days of theoperation.

Mopping Up on Grenada

By the end of D plus 3, the island was under thecontrol of U.S. and Caribbean forces. The followingday brought a slower tempo of operations. In the St.George's area, Marines continued to search for enemypersonnel and weapons, while those in Pearls extend-ed their patrolling operations farther north and west.Admiral Metcalf came ashore and looked at Marinepositions and the operations around St. George's.Commanders of the Caribbean peacekeeping forces,who were scheduled to relieve the Marines in the cityand who had already taken position in some of thenearby forts, arrived for meetings and orientation.Preparations also were underway for the turnover ofthe Marine area of operations to the 82d Airborne.In St. George's. local citizens aided the Marine ar-tillerymen of Lieutenant Colonel Smith's provisionalrifle company in locating high-ranking former officialsof the Grenadian government, including DeputyPrime Minister Bernard Coard and his wife Phyllis,Minister of National Mobilization Selwyn Strachan,and Lieutenant Colonel Liam James, all members ofthe Central Committee of the NewJewel Movement,Grenada's revolutionary political party.75

Meanwhile, in the north, preparations went forwardfor the attack to seize Sauteurs. During D plus 4. Com-pany E learned through its local informants that thePRA regional battalion commander, a Lieutenant Ge-orge, was staying in Grenville. Grenadians guidedLieutenant Rand \X/. Hammel's ist Platoon to the cor-rect house. George surrendered quietly to the Marines,and divulged much information about the locationof PRA and militia units in Sauteurs78 That afternoon,the MAU commander gave final approval for the moveto Sauteurs. Company E left Pearls for Sauteurs at 0330the following morning.

The attacking force split into two parts. A raidingparty, "Team Mike," would seize the PRA camp nearSauteurs prior to the general advance on the town. At

22

the same time, the 81mm mortar platoon would es-tablish a position on Mount Rose, about halfway bet-ween Sauteurs and the airport, to support the attackif needed and to establish a radio relay station. At0515, Team Mike signaled that it had occupied thecamp without opposition. Reaching the edge of thetown, the main force, under Captain Donigan. parkedtheir vehicles and entered Sauteurs on foot. At firstlight, the people of Sauteurs were startled to find Ma-rines deployed in their town77

Having been advised by intelligence reports thatSauteurs was short of food, Company E had broughtlarge numbers of spare rations. A food distributionpoint was established with the assistance of local cler-gymen and Red Cross workers. By mid-morning, mostof the town's 300 people had received food from theMarines. The citizens, apprehensive at first, soon be-came friendly and cooperative. They willingly identi-fied PRA members and the locations of arms caches.One Grenadian persuaded the PRA regional com-mander to surrender himself voluntarily to the Ma-rines. The commander also furnished informationabout other members of the PRA, as well as the loca-tion of additional arms and equipment.78

Company E, minus one platoon that had remain-ed at the airport, spent a quiet night in Sauteurs. Cap-tain Donigan had set up blocking positions on theprincipal avenues of approach to the town and Ma-rines patrolled the streets without incident. Early inthe evening, a midwife summoned Hospital Corpsman2d Class Glen M. Scott, the company's senior corps-man, to a house where a Grenadian woman had justgiven birth and was experiencing complications, in-cluding severe hemorrhaging. A quick examinationconvinced Scott that the woman would require im-mediate hospitalization. The company's call for amedevac helicopter had to be relayed by the stationat Mount Rose to Pearls Airfield, from Pearls to theTrenton and from the Trenton to the Guam, locatedoff the southwest coast. The company managed to es-tablish communications with the Trenton, but thatship was unable to contact the Guam, in turn.

At an improvised landing zone, Captain Thomas M.Davis, the forward air controller, was receiving peri-odic updates on the woman's rapidly deteriorating con-dition from Scott. A feeling of frustration spreadthrough the company as the time slipped by with nosign of a medevac. Scott made a grim report: "If wedon't get a bird here real soon, we're going to lose her."Captain Davis turned his radio to the helicopter fre-quency and put out a general call for any helicopterin the area. Finally, around 2045. the Marines at the

landing zone heard the welcome sound of helicopterrotors.

One of Captain Davis' calls had finally reached theGuam. and a CH-46 piloted by Major Richard J. Gal-lagher and Captain John L. Quick flew from the shipto carry out the emergency medevac. Since it was un-clear whether the landing zone was safe, two Cobras,píloted by Captain Douglas J. Diehl and Major LarryD. Outlaw, escorted the medevac helicopter. MajorOutlaw established radio contact with Captain Davisand led the CH-46 into the landing zone, which Da-vis had illuminated with the headlights of a jeep. Thehelicopter evacuated the Grenadian woman to theGuam's sick bay, and she was soon out of danger.

While Company E was at Sauteurs, the two com-panies in the Saint George's area received a new mis-sion: to seize Gouyave and Victoria on the northwestcoast. These were the only towns of any size not yetin American hands. Lieutenant Colonel Smith ex-pressed concern about moving both companies up thecoast. This would leave insufficient forces to providesecurity for St. George's, and to guard the detentioncenter which the Marines had established. By now asubstantial number of detainees had been gathered.

Following a brief meeting on board the Guam, theorder for this advance up the coast was modified toallow Company F to remain in the St. George's areawhile Company G, mounted in AAVs. moved onGouyave and Victoria. The movement began at 1530.A UH-1 command-and-control helicopter, with thesquadron commander and battalion operations officer(S-3) aboard, provided the communications link be-tween the battalion rear and the moving column. Justoffshore, two tanks on board two LCU landing craftaccompanied the column, either to provide fire sup-port or to come ashore if needed. TOW helicopterswere on station above the column. Close air supportand naval gun fire support were also available.80

Company G experienced no opposition, but on theoutskirts of Gouyave, the Marines encountered a largetank ditch. Fortunately, a bulldozer, evidently onceused to dig the ditch, was still in the vicinity. The Ma-rines quickly hot-wired the dozer and used it to fillthe ditch. Captain Dobson left a platoon behind atGouyave and continued on toward Victoria, encoun-tering no opposition and arriving in the town around1900.81

Carrzacou

While Company E spent the night in Victoria, staffofficers of the battalion landing team on board theGuam were planning for yet another operation. Forsome time, unconfirmed reports had told of PRA

23

unitsor possibly even North Korean soldiersstillactive on the island of Carriacou, one of the two in-habited islands between Grenada and St. Vincent.There were also unconfirmed reports that membersof the PRA were escaping to Carriacou from Grena-da. With this in mind, Admiral Metcalf ordered theamphibious task force to conduct a combined surfaceand air landing on Carriacou prior to daylight on 1November.82

On 31 October, men and equipment of the MAUre-embarked from such widely scattered points as Sau-teurs, Victoria, Pearls, and St. George's. Elements ofthe 82d Airborne Division assumed responsibility forpositions previously held by the Marines. By 1950 on31 October, all ground combat elements of the MAUwere back on board ships of the amphibious task force,and heading for Carriacou. At 1846, the initiatingdirective for the Carriacou operation arrived, just asstaff officers were completing their final plans for theassault.

The concept of operations called for one companyto be inserted by air in the vicinity of the LauristonPoint Airstrip, near the northwest coast of the island,just west of the town of Hilisborough. The companywould then advance and seize Hillsborough. At thesame time, a second company would land at Tyrrel Bay,to attack and seize a suspected PRA training base nearthe east end of the island. A SEAL team landed earlyon the morning of 1 November to reconnoiter theLauriston Point area. At 0530 Company F landed inhelicopters on the airstrip while Company G, in as-sault amphibian vehicles, landed at Tyrrel Bay. MostMarine commanders privately expected little or no op-position, but ample air and naval gunfire support wereavailable to back up the assault if needed.83

In any event, the people of Carriacou welcomed theMarines even more warmly than the people on themain island of Grenada. Many of the citizens hadworked or studied in the United States, or had rela-tives who had done so. Some even suggested to Lieu-tenant Colonel Smith, perhaps not altogether in jest,that he run up the American flag and annex the is-land. The local PRA members, who had alreadychanged into civilian clothes, voluntarily surrendered.The Marines also confiscated a huge store of arms, am-munition, and equipment at Belair Estate, the aban-doned PRA headquarters, located on a mountain nearthe center of the island.

Lieutenant Colonel Smith was so confident aboutthe security situation on Carriacou that he paroled the19-man PRA platoon, telling them to return to their

CARRIACOU ISLANDo

Kilometers P

1 2 3

24

Photo courtesy of Sgt Christopher Grey, USMC

Shortly after landing at Treu Bay on Carriacou Island, Capt Robert K. Dobson, Jr.,Commanding Officer, Company G, 2dBattalion, 8th Marines, questionssome friendlynatives from hai perch in an amphibian tractor. Marines, landing by sea and air, u'erevirtually unopposed and swiftly overran the small island to end the Grenada campaign.

homes and to muster back in the town at 0800 thenext morning. By late afternoon, Smith recalled, "Theatmosphere in Hilisborough was more like that of aliberty port," than a battle zone.85 Major Sublette, theair liaison officer, arrived to find, "A Navy Huey, a Ma-rine Huey. and a Marine [CH-46] . . . in the LZ. Thepeople were being given tours of the helicopterswalking around them. The kids were climbing all over.It was like an air show. . . . A soccer game startedand Tony Morales [a member of the squadron S-4 sec-tion] . . . , was out playing soccer with a couple ofNavy guys against the locals."86

Departure from Grenada

At 0700 the following morning, 2 November, ele-ments of the 82d Airborne Division arrived to relievethe Marines. At 0800, the PRA platoon mustered asordered and went into the custody of the newly ar-rived paratroopers. By late afternoon on 2 November,all Marines had returned to their ships and the am-

phibious task force resumed its interrupted journeyto the Mediterranean.

A week later, the Marines of the 22d MAU assem-bled topside on the ships of the task force, to take partin the traditional cake-cutting, toasts, and otherceremonies of the Marine Corps birthday. Later, as thebirthday banquet was drawing to a close, a messagearrived for Lieutenant Colonel Amos, the acting MAUcommander*:

lo 22d MAU: ALTHOUGH YOU HAVE SCARCELYClEANED OFF THE SAND OF GRENADA WHERE YOUWERE MAGNIFICENT, YOU NOW WILL SHORTLYRELIEVE 24TH MAU IN BEIRUT. ONCE THERE YOUWILL ASSUME THE KEY ROLE IN OUR EFFORTS 10BRING PEACE 10 LEBANON. YOU HAVE PROVENWITHOUT DOUBT THAT YOU ARE UP TO THE TASKAS OUR VERY BEST. GODSPEED AND A HAPPY208TH. SE.MPER FIDELIS, RONALD REAGAN.

*Colonel Faulkner had been called to Atlantic Command head-quarters in Norfolk. He rejoined the MAU later.

U.S. Department of State and Department ofDefense, Grenada. A Preliminary Report, Washing-ton, D.C. December 16, 1983, p. 1.

Ibid, p. 2.Ibid.22d MAU Preliminary AAR for Operation Urgent

Fury: Operational Summary of Landing Force Par-ticipation, dtd 1Nov83.

Ibid.Col James P. Faulkner, intvw, 13Nov83 (Oral Hist-

Coli, MCHC, Washington, D.C.), hereafter Faulknerintvw.

Ibid; Cdt Richard A. Butler, USN, intvw, 4Nov83(Oral HistColl, MCHC. Washington, D.C.), hereafterButler intvw.

Faulkner inrvw; LtCol Ray L. Smith intvw, 8Nov83,pp. 4-6 (Oral HistColi, MCHC, Washington, D.C.),hereafter Smith intvw.

Faulkner intvw.Smith intvw, p. 5.Smith intvw, pp. 3-6; Faulkner intvw.Smith intvw. pp. 6-7.22d MAU, Operation Urgent Fury AAR, 15Jan84,

p. 6.Faulkner intvw.Ibid.USCinCLant msg to ComSecondFlt, 10Oct83;

ComSecondFit memo to ComUSAtlantic, 23Nov83,Subj: Urgent Fury, Lessons Learned (Grenada Files,U.S. Marine Corps Development Center. Quantico,hereafter

EGrenada Files, MCDEC]).

Smith intvw, p. 8.Ibid.22d MAU Operation Urgent Fury AAR, 15Jan84

(Grenada files, MCDEC).Smith intvw, p. 56.Ibid.; Butler intvw.22d MAU FragO 01-83 (Operation Urgent Fury)

24Oct83, pp. 1-3 (Grenada Files, MCDEC).Faulkner intvw; Butler inrvw; Smith intvw; 22d

MAU msg to CGFMFLant, 30Oct83, Subj: SITREP 8(Grenada Files, MCDEC).

Maj Melvin J. DeMars intvw, 5Nov83, pp. 3-4,(Oral HistColl, MCHC, Washington, D.C.), hereafterDeMars intyw.

Footnotes

HMM-261, Detachment "H" Urgent Fury AfterAction Report, dtd 3Dec83, Enclosure (3) (GrenadaFiles, MCDEC).

LtCol Gtanville K. Amos intvw, 7Nov83 (OralHistColl, MCHC, Washington, D.C.), hereafter Amosintvw.

DeMars intvw.Capt HenryJ. Donigan intvw, 6Nov83, pp. 5-7

(Oral HistColl, MCHC, Washington, D.C.), hereafterDonigan intvw.

Ibid., pp. 6-10.Ibid., pp. 9-10; Smith intvw, pp. 3-15.Donigan intvw, p. 11.

Amos intvw.Smith intvw; Donigan intvw.Maj Earnest A. Van Huss intvw, 2Nov83 (Oral

HistColl, MCHC, Washington. D.C.), hereafter VanHuss intvw; Faulkner intvw.

VAdmJoseph Metcalfe III, intvw, 2Nov83 (Grena-da Files, MCDEC), hereafter Metcalfe intvw; Faulknerintvw.

Capt Timothy B. Howard inrvw, 6Dec83 (Grena-da Files, MCDEC), hereafter Howard intvw; CaptDouglas J. Diehi intvw, 7Nov83 (Oral HistColl,MCHC, Washington, D.C.), hereafter Diehi intvw.

Diehl intvw.Howard intvw; Metcalfe intvw.Howard intvw; "Grenada Vet Describes Longest

Hour," Rotovue (MCAS, New River, N.C.), 1Dec83,p. 1; HMM-261 AAR, 3Dec83, p. 16. (Grenada Files,MCDEC).

Howard intvw.DeMars intvw, pp. 9-11.DeMars intvw, p. 11; HMM-261, 3Dec83, p. 6.Smith intvw, pp. 21-22.Ibid.. pp. 22-23.Faulkner intvw; Butler intvw; Capt Robert K. Dob-

son intvw, 8Nov83 (Oral HistColl, MCHC, Washing-ton, D.C.), pp. 3-5, hereafter Dobson intvw.

Dobson intvw, pp. 5-7.Ibid., pp. 7-10.Ibid., pp. 10-11; Maj William J. Sublette intvw,

3Nov83 (Oral HistColl, MCHC. Washington, D.C.),hereafter Sublette irìtvw.

Smith intvw, pp. 22-27.Ibid., p. 27.

Ibid.. p. 28.Ibid.. pp. 28-30; BLT 2/8 FragO 19-83 (Grenada

Files, MCDEC).Dobson intvw, pp. 12-13; Smith inrvw, pp. 31-32.BLT 2/8 After Action Report for the Grenada

Operation. 250ct-2Nov83, 8 Nov83, p. 7 (GrenadaFiles, MCDEC).

Smith intvw, pp. 32-35; Dobsori intvw, pp. 15-17.Faulkner inrvw; Van Huss intvw.Amos intvw.Maj Frank L. Brewer intvw, 10Nov83 (Oral Hist-

Coli, MCHC, Washington, D.C.), hereafter Brewerintvw.

Amos intvw; DeMars intvw, pp. 22-23.DeMars inrvw, pp. 23-25; Brewer intvw.MSgr George T. Curtis inrvw, 8Nov83 (Oral Hist-

Coil, MCHC, Washington, D.C.).DeMars intvw, pp. 24-30; Brewer intvw.DeMars intvw, p. 29.Van Huss inrvw; Smith inrvw, pp. 31-40; Doni-

gan inrvw, pp. 15-17.Donigan intvw, pp. 15-19; Van Huss intvw.Donigan inrvw, pp. 19-31.Ibid., pp. 41-48.Manuscript "Journal of Grenada Operations" by

liCol Ray L. Smith (Copy in MCHC). hereafter SmithJournal.

BLT 2/8, After Action Report for Grenada Opera-

tion, 250ct-Nov83, 8Nov83, p. 18; Smith intvw, pp.42-43.

Smith intvw, pp. 44.Ibid., pp. 44-46.[Task Force Repon], BLT 2/8 After Action Report

for Grenada Operation, p. 21; Smith intvw, pp. 54-56;Capt Michael J. Dick intvw, 7Nov83 (Oral HistColI,MCHC, Washington, D.C.).

Ibid.Smith intvw, pp. 53-54.BLT 2/8 After Action Report for Grenada Opera-

tions, pp. 7-10.Ibid.; Donigan intvw, pp. 49-51.Donigan intvw, pp. 51-54.Ibid.. p. 54.Ibid., pp. 58-61; Dich! irnvw.BLT 2/8 After Action Report for Grenada Opera-

tion, p. 18; Smith Journal; Smith intvw, pp. 72-74.Smith inrvsv. p. 73.Butler intvw; Smith intvw, pp. 75-77; 22d MAU

Preliminary After Action Report for Operation UrgentFury, p. 3.

Butler intvw; 22d MALT Preliminary After ActionReport for Operation Urgent Fury, p. 3; Smith intvw,pp. 7 5-78.

Smith intvw, pp. 77-79.Ibid., p. 80.Sublene inrvw.

Appendix A

Command and Staff List22d MAU

Commanding OfficerExecutive OfficerS-1

S-2

S-3S-4

Sergeant MajorH&S CompanyCompany ECompany FCompany GWeapons CompanyBattery H, 3/10

Commanding OfficerExecutive OfficerS-1

S-2

S-3S-4

Maintenance OfficerSergeant Major

Headquarters, 22MAU

Commanding Officer Col James P. FaulknerExecutive Officer LtCol Ronald R. RiceS-1 lstLt Kenneth R. BergmanS-2 Capt Paul M. JungelS-3 Maj Earnest A. Van HussS-4 Capt Albert J. MartinAir Liaison Officer Maj William J. SubletteFire Support Coordinator lstLt Billy D. MartinSenior Judge Advocate Maj Donald R. JilliskyHeadquarters Commandant lsrLt Tom F. AnslerSergeant Major SgrMaj Thomas E. Donahue

BLT 2/8

HMM-261

MSSG-22Commanding Officer Maj Albert E. ShivelyExecutive Officer Capt Charles H. RucksOperations Officer Capt Dennis A. CervenyFirst Sergeant lstSgt Donald E. Short

LtCol Ray L. SmithMaj Joseph J. Streitz

CWO-2 David D. HuberCWO-4 Ronald D. Lamben

Capt Steven D. Anderson2dLt John C. WattsSgtMaj Calvin Lynn

Capt Billy J. ClarksonCapt Henry J. Donigan III

Capt Michael E. DickCapt Robert K. Dobson, Jr.

Capt Chris J. GuntherCapt Bradley M. Gates

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LtCol Granville R. AmosMaj Frank L. Brewer

Maj Gerald A. BannerlstLt Michael J. Mattie

Maj Richard J. GallagherMaj Frederick J. Moon

Maj Melvin W. DeMars, Ji.SgtMaj Daniel W. Piper

Appendix B

22d MAU Task Organization

HEADQUARTERS, 22D MARINE AMPHIBIOUS UNITHeadquarters, 22d Marine Amphibious UnitDetachment, Photo Imagery Interpretation Unit, Wing Headquarters Squadron 2. 2d Marine Aircraft Wing*Detachmcnt Redeyc Platoon, Forward Area Air Defense Battery, Marine Air Control Group 28, 2d Marine

Aircraft WingSubteam, Interrogation Translation Team, Headquarters Battalion, 2d Marine Division*Detachment Marine Air Base Squadron ¡ (Direct Air Support Center), 2d Marine Aircraft WingDetachment (Photo), Marine Air Base Squadron 31, Marine Air Group 31, 2d Marine Aircraft Wing*Detachment 8th Communications Battalion, 2d Force Service Support Group*Section. Sensor Control and Management Platoon, Headquarters Battalion, 2d Marine DivisionSubteam, Counter Intelligence Team. Headquarters Battalion, 2d Marine Division

BATTALION LANDING TEAM 218, 2D MARINE DIVISION2d Battalion, 8th MarinesBattery H (Reinforced), 3d Battalion, 10th MarinesDetachment. Headquarters Battery, 3d Battalion, 10th Marines3d Platoon, Company A, 2d Tank Ba'ttalion4th Platoon (Reinforced), Company A. 2d Assault Amphibian BattalionDetachment. Headquarters and Service Company, 2d Assault Amphibian Battalion2d Platoon, Company D, 2d Combat Engineer Battalionist Section, ist Platoon, Antitank (TOW) Company. 2d Tank Battalionist Platoon, Company A, 2d Reconnaissance Battalion

MARINE MEDIUM HELICOPTER SQUADRON 261. 2D MARINE AIRCRAFT WINGMarine Medium Helicopter Squadron 261 (Reinforced)Detachment, Marine Heavy Helicopter Squadron 362Detachment, Marine Light Attack Helicopter Squadron 167Detachment, Headquarters and Maintenance Squadron 26Detachment, Marine Air Base Squadron 26Detachment, Marine Wing Support Group 27

MARINE AMPHIBIOUS UNIT SERVICE SUPPORT GROUP 22, 2D FORCE SERVICE SUPPORT GROUPHeadquarters, Marine Amphibious Unit Service Support Group 22Detachment, 2d Landing Support BattalionDetachment, 2d Maintenance BattalionDetachment, 2d Dental BattalionDetachment, 2d Medical BattalionDetachment, 2d Supply BattalionDetachment, 8th Engineer Support BattalionDetachment, 8th Motor Transport BattalionDetachment, Headquarters and Service BattalionDetachment, Explosive Ordnance Disposal PlatoonDetachment. Military Police Company, Headquarters Battalion, 2d Marine Division

*These units remained behind as CONUS standby. 24-hour alert forces under the deployment control ofthe Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Atlantic.

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Appendix C

Organization for Embarkation

USS Guam (Amphibious Assault Ship 9)Commander. Amphibious Squadron 4Headquarters, 22d Marine Amphibous UnitCompany E, Battalion Landing Team 2/8Company F, Battalion Landing Team 2/8Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 261

USS Trenton (Amphibious Transport Dock 14)Headquarters, Battalion Landing Team 2/8Headquarters, MAU Service Support Group 22Weapons Company, Battalion Landing Team 2/8Shore Party, MAU Service Support Group 22Navy Beachmasrer Unit

USS Fort Sne/ling (Dock Landing Ship 30)Tank Platoon, Battalion Landing Team 2/8TOW Section. Battalion Landing Team 2/8Navy Underwater Demolition TeamReconnaissance Platoon, Battalion Landing Team 218

USS Manitowoc (Tank Landing Ship 1180)Company G, Battalion Landing Team 2/8Motor Transport Platoon, MAU Service Support Group 22Assault Amphibian Platoon, Battalion Landing 'Feam 2/8

USS Barastable County (Tank Landing Ship 1197)Battery H, 3d Battalion, 10th MarinesEngineer Detachment, MAU Service Support Group 22

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A-7 Corsair TIThe U.S. Navy's carrier-based, single-seat, single-engine, jet attack aircraft.

AH-1 Huey Cobra - Bell attack helicopter with a crewof two. Armament includes a chin-mounted 20mmmachine gun. plus a variety of other ordnance, de-pending upon the mission. The latest version carriesthe TOW antitank missile.

AARAfter action report submitted after a combatoperation.

AC-130 SpectreAir Force's attack version of the four-engine, turbo-prop C-130 transport aircraft. Uses amodern version of the Gatling gun to deliver a highvolume of fire on ground targets.

AK-47 - Russian-designed Kalashnikov 7.62mm gas-operated assault rifle. Effective range of 400 meters.

AAVAcronym for assault amphibian vehicle, previ-ously called an amphibian tractor. Current model isthe LVTP-7.

BLT Battalion landing team, composed of an infantrybattalion reinforced by artillery, tanks, and other com-bat support units.

BTR-60 - Soviet-made 8-wheeled armored personnelcarrier.

CH-46 Sea StallionDual-piloted, twin-engined, sin-gle main rotor, medium transport helicopter whichcan lift 16 tons of cargo over mission radius of 50 miles.

Dragon - Medium antitank/assault weapon, consistingof a manpacked, tube-launched, optically-tracked,wire-guided missile with a range of approximately1,000 meters.

Appendix D

Glossary

LZLanding zone.

M-16US-made 5.56mm gas-operated automatic ri-fle. The standard U.S. infantry assault rifle.

MAUMarine amphibious unit, consisting of a smallheadquarters element, a battalion landing team, acomposite helicopter squadron, and a service supportgroup. The smallest Marine air-ground task force.

Mk-19 40-mm machine gunAn automatic grenadelauncher capable of engaging infantry and lightly ar-mored vehicles from 65 meters out to 2,200 meters.

82mm mortar - Soviet-designed, smooth-bore mortarweighing about 123 pounds. Can fire U.S-made 81mmmortar rounds, but not vice versa.

New Jewel Movement - Grenadian acronym for NewJoint Endeavor for Welfare, Education, and Liberation.The political arm of the Grenadian revolutionarygovernment.

PRA People's Revolutionary Army. Military arm ofthe Grenadian revolutionary government.

RPG - Soviet-designed, light-weight, shoulder-firedrocket launcher used as an antitank or assault weapon.

SMAWAcronym for shoulder-launched, multi-purpose assault weapon. The planned replacement forthe LAW.

TOWAcronym for tube-launched, optically-tracked,wire-guided missile. Heavy antitank and assault mis-sile available in both ground and air-launchedversions.

LAW Light antiarmor weapon, a shoulder-fired rock- UH-I HueyTwin-engine, two-seat, single-piloted.et launcher with a discardable tube. single-rotor, utility helicopter.

The device reproduced on the back cover isthe oldest rniiitaiy insignia in continuous usein the United States. It first appeared, asshown here, on Marine Corps buttons adopt-ed in 1804. U'ith the stars changed to fivepoints this device has continued on MarineCorps buttons to the present day.