Hopkins 2012_seeing-In and Seeming to See

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Zwicky, J. 2004. Robinson’s Crossing . London, ON: Brick Books.

Seeing-in and seeming to see

ROBERT HOPKINS

1. What is it to see some thing or scene, O, in a picture, P?Gombrichians offer the following answer:

(a) Our experience of ordinary pictures comprises both (i) visual experi-ence of P and (ii) visual experience as of O. (Lopes 2005: 39–40;Kulvicki 2009: 387–88; Newall 2011: 40)

(b) In such cases, (i) and (ii) occur simultaneously. (Lopes 2005: 31;Kulvicki 2009: §4; Newall 2011: 25)

(c) Our experience of some pictures, trompe l’oeils, comprises (ii) in theabsence of (i). (Lopes 2005: 39–40; Newall 2011: 26–27)

(d) When pictorial experience comprises both (i) and (ii), we are not

tempted to believe that O is before us. We are tempted to believeonly that P is. (Lopes 2005: 30; Newall 2011: 24–25)

Thus at the heart of seeing-in lies (ii), seeming to see the depicted object. Inthe case of ordinary pictures, this is the difference between seeing the marks

Analysis Vol 72 | Number 4 | October 2012 | pp. 650–659 doi:10.1093/analys/ans119 The Author 2012. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of The Analysis Trust .All rights reserved. For Permissions, please email: [email protected]

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without making sense of them and seeing them with understanding.

Throughout we see what is before us as a marked surface – hence (i). To

see what the marks depict is for (i) to be supplemented with visual experience

as of that scene.Thus far Gombrich himself would agree. However, he was not a

Gombrichian, since he rejected (b). He held that no picture elicits (i) and

(ii) simultaneously. Rather, we swing between awareness of ordinary pictures

as marks on a surface and apparent awareness of the depicted scene

(Gombrich 1960: 4–6). Gombrichians take the more plausible view that

before ordinary pictures we are simultaneously aware of their doublenature.1

What is true of some pictures is not true of all. Some fool the eye: in seeing

them, we seem to see nothing but the scene they depict. (Consider illusionisticpaintings of panelled doors, or the false ceilings of some baroque churches.)

Here, (c) tells us, we have (ii) without (i). We are completely unaware that

there is a marked surface before us, so the only element in our experience isseeming to see O. In such cases, we will be at least inclined to believe (falsely)

that O is really before us. (Of course, contextual clues or other factors may

prevent us from adopting that belief.) In ordinary cases, in contrast, while

one element in our experience is seeming to see O, the other element gives thegame away. The presence of (i) prevents us from even being tempted to

believe that things are as (ii) suggests – as (d) makes explicit.Can (i) and (ii) be transformed by occurring together? Some Gombrichiansthink so (Lopes 2005: 40; cf. Kulvicki 2009: 394). (i) may be transformed

when accompanied by (ii), since the marks may look different when we

supplement our awareness of them with visual experience as of O. Equally,(ii) may be transformed when accompanied by (i), since the intentional object

of (ii), O, may be ‘inflected’ by our awareness of the marks, so that it is not

the kind of thing we could even seem to see in other contexts. These inter-

esting, if vexed, claims threaten to complicate the argument to come.2

However, we can manage the threat by noting that any transformations to(i) and (ii) through combining them must be limited to the intentional objects

of those states. Combining (ii) with (i) may lead P to look different, and may

expand the range of features borne by what fills the role of O. But suchtransformations cannot be so drastic that either component ceases to count

as visual experience (as) of its object. Otherwise, all the Gombrichian claims

about these cases is that here seeing-in involves some state derived from (i)

and some state derived from (ii). Absent some specification of the states thus

1 It might be thought that a more obvious champion of ‘Gombrichianism’ is RichardWollheim (1980, 1987). However, the interpretation of the varying accounts of seeing-in

he offered is delicate. It is not clear Wollheim accepted (a) (Hopkins 2010: n 10), and clearhe did not accept the conjunction of (a) and (c).

2 For critical discussion of the second, see Hopkins 2010.

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derived, this would hardly be informative (cf. Budd 1992: 271). In particular,

since the state derived from (ii) might count as some rather different state,such as visualizing O, it would be quite unclear what remains of theGombrichian’s central contention, that seeing-in involves seeming to see. (Itis to secure something more contentful that I formulate (a) to (d) in terms of

what pictorial experience ‘comprises’.)Gombrichians face a two-part challenge. In the ordinary case, pictorial

experience cannot be simply the combination of (i) with (ii). For if the twoexperiences were related only by occurring simultaneously, pictorial experi-

ence as a whole would be disjoint. The two scenes it represented as beforeme, marks on a surface and a woman in a landscape, would be wholly un-related. They would be as unrelated as the scene I now see and the verydifferent scene I now visually imagine. Disjointness would be avoided were

the contents of (i) and (ii) somehow integrated, so that together they present asingle view of the world before me. But pictorial experience then threatens to

be contradictory, representing what is before me as marks, while also repre-senting it as something quite different, such as a woman in a mountainouslandscape, wearing a mysterious smile. Seeing the woman in the picturewould then be as contradictory as the illusion in which the cliff behind the

waterfall looks both moving and still. Ordinary pictorial experience is neitherdisjoint nor contradictory. It somehow relates the woman to the marks I see

before me. And in doing so, it represents what is before me as somethingperfectly coherent: a picture of a woman wearing that smile. How do (i) and(ii) relate, such that pictorial experience avoids disjointness, and is notcontradictory either?

Gombrichians accept this challenge (Kulvicki 2009: 388, §IV). And, whilethey have not distinguished its two parts, disjointness and contradiction,

perhaps this is because they hope that a successful response to one willalso address the other. However, it is another question whether any response

is successful. I argue that the two best developed responses fail.

2. Dominic Lopes attempts to tackle the challenge by appeal to the idea of design-seeing. Design, for Lopes, amounts to those visible features of themarked surface in virtue of which it depicts what it does. Design-seeing is

the perception of design:

design-seeing: a visual experience of a picture as a configuration, on atwo-dimensional surface, of marks, colours, and textures in virtue of which the surface depicts a scene. (2005: 28)

Lopes also offers a gloss: design-seeing ‘amounts to seeing design features as

responsible for seeing-in’ (2005: 28).This gloss is reasonable, since seeing-in is our grasp on what pictures

depict. It is also helpful, since the twin challenge of contradiction and dis-jointness concerns pictorial experience. What Lopes needs is some way to




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relate (i) and (ii). Now, one eccentricity of Lopes’s terminology is that he uses‘seeing-in’ not (as I and most others do) to refer to pictorial experience asa whole, but to refer to one of the two components he takes to be involved,

(ii). Thus we can gloss the gloss as follows:

(DS) design-seeing: seeing features of the picture as responsible for ourhaving visual experience as of O.

In short, the features seen in (i) are seen as responsible for (ii). That promisesto bind the two elements in pictorial experience in precisely the way requiredto overcome disjointness.

There is an ambiguity in the notion at the heart of (DS), one thing’s beingresponsible for visual experience as of another. The idea might be that thething, X, renders us able to experience that which is there anyway. In thissense the light from a candle renders visible the writing on the cave wall, orthe transparency of a pond renders visible its bottom. Call this form of re-sponsibility revelatory. Alternatively, the idea might be that X generates theexperience in its entirety. It does not make visible what is already there to beexperienced, but generates the experience ex nihilo (as does electrical stimu-

lation of the cortex in ‘phosphene vision’ (Brindley & Lewin 1968)). Call thisform of responsibility generative.

Lopes clearly intends a reading of (DS) on which the responsibility attrib-uted to the marks is generative. This allows him to treat design-seeing asreflecting the role the design really plays. The marks do not make visible

some scene which was there anyway. In many cases the depicted scene doesnot exist outside the picture, and, even if it does, is not present to be seen.Design’s role is generative, not revelatory; and design-seeing, to be accurate,should be seeing it as such.

Lopes’s idea is that, in the relevant cases, pictorial experience involves notmerely (i) experience of P and (ii) experience as of O, but also design-seeing –the experience described in (DS).3 However, appeal to (DS) will not serve his

needs. It may help with disjointness, but it leaves the challenge from contra-diction intact. The appeal is presumably supposed to remove contradiction inthe following way. The marks we see do not reveal what is before us to be,say, a woman; rather, they are seen to be wholly responsible for our experi-ence as of such a thing. In virtue of involving Design-seeing, understoodgeneratively, experience reveals that there is no woman to be seen: she is aproduct of the marks’ working on us. The contradiction between (i) and (ii) isthus banished. Unfortunately, this does not solve the problem so much as

move it around. Design-seeing reveals that the woman is not real, but part of

3 Lopes speaks as if (i) is design-seeing, i.e. as if our awareness of P is awareness of it as

design. It makes no difference to the argument to follow whether he is right about this.




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the effect the marks induce. How, then, can another element in that experi-

ence – indeed the very element thus supposedly brought about – be visual

experience as of a woman? This element, seeming to see a woman, presents

her as real. Design-seeing presents the woman as nothing but a figment of our

pictorial consciousness, while (ii) presents her as really before us. (DS) and

(ii) directly contradict one another.4

How might Lopes respond? It will not help to abandon the generativereading of (DS). There are two alternative readings. We could adopt the rev-

elatory reading, or we could propose a reading neutral between generativity

and revelation, on which design-seeing represents design as responsible for (ii),but neither in the generative nor in the revelatory way. (It merely represents

design as responsible somehow for (ii).) The revelatory reading only reinforces

the initial contradiction between (i) and (ii). On that reading, design-seeinginvolves seeing the marks that make up the picture as revealing what is

anyway there to be seen, a smiling woman. But how can one thing act so as

to reveal itself to be another of a quite different nature? And, while the neutral

reading doesn’t intensify the conflict between (i) and (ii) in this way, it doesn’t

do anything to mitigate it either. To remove the contradiction between (i) and

(ii), we need the generative reading. Only that reflects the non-contradictory

way things really are: the marks being before us, O being nothing more than

the intentional object of an experience they induce in us. Anything less than

the generative reading leaves the original tension unresolved.A second possible response questions whether we’re interpreting (ii) cor-

rectly. Must visual experience as of O present O as real? If not, (ii) is in

tension neither with (DS), read generatively; nor with (i). However, it is hard

to discard this construal of (ii) without abandoning Gombrichianism. For

how can (c) be true, unless we construe (ii) in the way now called intoquestion? When the eye is fooled by trompe l’oeil, the depicted scene really

looks to be before us: we seem to see O. If our experience of ordinary pictures

involves an experience of this kind, supplemented by experience of the marks,

experience of ordinary pictures must also involve O’s being given as real.Might our experience of trompe l’oeil be transformed when combined with

(i), so that what formerly presented O as real no longer does? Remember that

for Gombrichianism to remain informative, it must restrict changes in (i) and

(ii) due to combining them to changes to their intentional objects. The move

from presenting O as real to no longer doing so hardly fits that bill. One

central difference between seeming to see something and visualizing it is that

the former necessarily presents its object as real (Sartre 2004: 11–4). Failure to

4 If (DS) entails that (ii) occurs, the upshot is that, on the generative reading, (DS) is inco-

herent. Whether (DS) has that entailment depends on further issues best passed over here.




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do that secures that the state cannot be visual experience as of O, and opens upthe possibility that it is visualizing. To abandon the idea that (ii) presents O asreal is thus precisely the sort of move that renders Gombrichianism uninforma-tive. Indeed, at least until more is said about what (ii) does involve, the positionis no longer even incompatible with an account on which pictorial experienceis the combination of (i) with visualizing O.

Third, and finally, Lopes might ask whether tension between (i) and (ii)requires some assumption about the space each purports to represent. There’sno contradiction, after all, between there being a marked surface somewhere,and there being a woman somewhere, provide the places in question aredistinct. There are two ways to develop this suggestion.

On the first, the viewer does not experience the marks as where she ex-periences the woman to be, for (i) and (ii) present entirely distinct spaces. Onespace is represented as containing marks on a surface, a gallery wall, and soforth. The other is represented as containing a smiling woman. Neither spaceis given as in any way related to the other, and thus there is no contradictionbetween (i) and (ii).

This proposal faces a question: in which of these spaces does the subjectexperience herself to be? If both, the tension between (i) and (ii) returns, writlarge. Instead of experiencing a single space before her as containing both amarked surface and a woman, she now experiences herself both as in a spacecontaining a marked surface and as in a (discrete) space containing a woman.

This option merely replaces one contradiction with another at least as gross.If, in contrast, we take only one of the two spaces to be given as that thesubject occupies, then the proposal faces a familiar problem. Presumably itseems to the subject that (i) captures the space in which she herself stands.That is why, as (d) claims, when forming belief she will be disposed to judgethat P is really before her, and not that O is. So it is (ii) that presents a spaceas real, but as not containing the subject. However, our experience of trompel’oeil presents the depicted object as not merely real, but here, where we are.How can (c) be true, if experiences of trompe l’oeils and of ordinary pictures

differ in this respect? The only recourse is to claim that this feature of trompel’oeil experience is lost, when (ii) and (i) are combined. However, if (ii), whencombined with (i), ceases to involve the presentation of O as where the sub-ject is, again it has been transformed in ways not limited to its intentionalobject, O. Unless (ii) presents O as both real and where I am, it is unclear thatit is best thought of as visual experience as of O, as opposed (say) to anapparent visual memory as of O, or some novel state akin to clairvoyance, asfolklore conceives that. Once more the view is saved only at the cost of itsinformativeness.

The second way to develop the idea of distinct spaces claims that, whileboth P and O look to be before the subject, in the space she herself occupies,they do not look to be in the same place within that space. This, however,takes us from Lopes’s attempt to handle the challenge of disjointness




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and contradiction to the rather different response offered by other

Gombrichians.

3. John Kulvicki and Michael Newall attempt to meet the contradiction chal-

lenge by analogy with experiences of transparency. How can my experienceof ordinary pictures present what is before me as both a painted surface and a

richly three-dimensional scene? Kulvicki’s and Newall’s answer is that

seeing-in is in key ways like seeing one thing through another. When I see

someone through a dirty window pane, my experience represents, without

contradiction, both the person and the pane, since I see one as further away

than the other. Similarly, seeing-in without contradiction involves my seem-

ing to see both P and O because P and O are represented as lying at different

distances from my point of view:

(e) (i) represents P as at distance d1 from my point of view, (ii) repre-

sents O as at distance d2 from my point of view, and d16¼d2.

Of course, I don’t see P as transparent. I see it for what it is, an opaque

marked surface (Newall 2011: 34). To that extent, seeing-in differs from

seeing-through, and to that extent seeing-in retains an element of contradic-

tion (Kulvicki 2009: 392–93). Nonetheless, the central difficulty is resolved:

there is no contradiction between (i) and (ii). Call the combination of (a) to

(e) Transparency Gombrichianism.

Consider the Rotation Argument:

(1) If P and O are represented as lying at different distances in the space

before me, then if my perspective on P manifestly shifts, while my

perspective on O manifestly stays the same, the relative orientation of

O to P must look to change.

(2) As I move around P, my perspective on P manifestly shifts, but my

perspective on O manifestly stays the same.(3) As I move around P, it is not the case that O’s orientation relative to

P looks to change.

So,

(4) P and O are not represented as lying at different distances in the

space before me—(e) is false.

I take it that premiss (3) is obviously true. As I shift left and right before most

paintings, I am fully aware that my relation to the picture is changing, and yet

I do not see the scene visible in it as moving relative to the frame or canvas.

There might, I suppose be pictures where this happens, though I cannot thinkof any. Certainly for the vast majority of pictures it does not. The argument

thus threatens to prove Transparency Gombrichianism false as an account of

our experience of the vast majority of pictures.




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What of (2)? Can the view claim that my perspective on O does seem to

shift, as I move around the picture? It is certainly possible to induce changes

in the scene visible in a surface by moving. Sometimes those changes amount

to a shift in my apparent relations to O. (I find I have this with certain

pictures, provided I concentrate on particular surfaces of the objects visible

in them.) Generally, however, they do not. (As I find, even in the cases just

mentioned, if I concentrate on any particular object as a whole.) Instead,

changes in the scene visible in P are limited to changes in the objects visible

therein. For instance, as the angle from which we view a picture of a tree

becomes more oblique, the tree seen in it tends to become thinner (Gombrich

1960; Brown 2010). Such changes do nothing to undermine (2). Even if O

thins as I move relative to P, my apparent perspective on O remains un-

changed. I see, for instance, the person head on, not from ever further off to one side. It’s easy to grasp why. In general, changing our perspective on an

object necessarily brings new facets of it into the open. Just this happens with

the picture, if it has a substantial frame. More of the side of the frame heaves

into view as we shift our relation to it. In contrast, no change in relation to a

picture will bring new facets of the represented object into view. For the

facets of O visible in P are determined by the marks on the surface, and,

provided P is flat (as pictures usually are), we see all the marks from every

position from which it is possible to see O in P at all.5

A different objection to (2) accepts that I do not see my relations to Ochanging as I move before P, but claims that I don’t experience them as

constant, either. Experience is simply silent on the matter. From each position

before P, I see O as related to my point of view, but at no position do I

experience that relation as continuous with, or different from, my relation to

O from other positions. This, however, looks desperate. As I move, I am

aware of my changing relations to P. Why, then, should I not be aware of

continuity or change in my relation to O? According to (e), O and P are given

5 E. Bruce Goldstein found that a subject’s estimate of the relative directions along certainaxes through a depicted object varies with the angle from which the picture is viewed (see

Goldstein 1987 and, for critical discussion, Koenderink et al. 2004). Since subjects record

those estimates by directing a pointer sitting beneath the picture towards or away fromthemselves, this might be taken to show that the apparent orientation of those axes to the

subject’s perspective shifts, thereby casting doubt on (2). I dispute this interpretation of theresults. However, even if right, it hardly supports Transparency Gombrichianism.

Goldstein’s main result was that the effect varies with the axis. For axes perpendicularto the picture plane, subjects direct the pointer so that it continues to point towards them,

as the picture turns. The further off perpendicular an axis, the closer the pointer comes to

following the picture as it turns away from the subject. However, for no axis does the

pointer simply track the picture’s changing orientation. Thus for any axis through thedepicted object, there is divergence between its orientation to the subject’s perspective and

the picture’s orientation to that perspective. Given this, (e) predicts that the orientation of the object to the picture should look to change. Thus, even so interpreted, Goldstein’s

results support a revised Rotation Argument.




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as lying in the same space. How can this be, if my relations over time to the

one are not bound by the laws of geometry that bind my relations to the

other?Thus if Transparency Gombrichians are to block the argument, they must

deny (1). However, (1) is supported both by geometry and by experiences of

seeing one thing through another. Can Transparency Gombrichians claim

these facts about geometry and seeing-through somehow fail to transfer toour experience of pictures?

To do so, they must make a claim parallel to that just rejected in assessing

(2). Perhaps what experience is silent on as we move before P is not how our

relation to O changes, but how the relations between P and O develop. From

each point from which we view P, O looks to be behind it. Since from dif-

ferent positions P’s relation to us has shifted, and from every position O’srelation to us is the same, logic requires that P and O are moving with respect

to one another. But what logic requires and what experience represents are

distinct. Experience neither represents P and O as in unchanging relations,

nor represents their relations as changing.In effect, this is to claim that pictorial experience is not closed under logical

implication. No doubt closure fails at some point: there will be implications

sufficiently arcane that experience does not capture them, for all that it cap-

tures the ‘premisses’. It is another question, however, whether it fails to re-

flect even the simplest implications of its explicit content. It is hard to imaginea case of seeing-through in which manifest movement relative to the trans-

parent screen and manifest stability in our relations to what is seen through it

are not accompanied by a sense of the latter moving relative to the former.

Why should seeing-in be different?Of course, there is one important difference between seeing-in, as

the Gombrichian conceives it, and seeing-through. The latter is generally

veridical; the former, qua seeming to see O, is not. So it is not hard to

understand how differences might arise. Seeing-through obeys the laws of

geometry and seeing-in does not, because only the former involves veridicalexperience of something that itself obeys those laws. However, the challenge

is not to explain how there might arise experiences with the features claimed,

but to make sense of there being such experiences at all. Consider a

non-veridical case of seeming to see one thing through another. How can

the two look to be in the same space, if only one changes its relations to us,

while their relations to each other remain constant? The problem is in under-

standing how there could be an experience with this content. The attempt to

reject (1) leaves Transparency Gombrichians facing precisely the same

difficulties.The Rotation Argument offers good grounds to reject the Transparency

Gombrichian view. (e) does not offer a satisfactory way to meet the contra-

diction challenge. Since appeal to design-seeing was equally unsatisfactory,




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Gombrichianism should be rejected. Seeing-in, at least in the ordinary case,does not involve seeming to see O.6

Department of Philosophy,University of Sheffield

Sheffield S10 2TN, [email protected]

References

Abell, C. and K. Bantinaki. 2010. Philosophical Perspectives on Depiction. Oxford:Oxford University Press.

Brindley, G.S. and W.S. Lewin. 1968. The sensations produced by electrical stimulation

of the visual cortex. Journal of Physiology 196: 479–93.Brown, J.H. 2010. Seeing things in pictures. In Philosophical Perspectives on Depiction,

eds. C. Abell and K. Bantinaki, 208–36.

Budd, M. 1992. On Looking at a Picture. In Pyschoanalysis, Mind and Art: Perspectiveson Richard Wollheim, eds. J. Hopkins and A. Savile, 259–280. Oxford: Blackwell.

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6 For helpful comments, I am very grateful to Fabian Dorsch, Dominic Gregory and John

Kulvicki.




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Hopkins 2012_seeing-In and Seeming to See