Hopkins Wesenserschauung

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152 HUSSERL IN CONTEXT

and his related claim that minds power of attention is sufficient toseparate both the singular existence and existential qualities fromparticular ideas so as to make them become general such that thisneed is addressed, cannot be accounted for on the basis of hisempiricistic formulation of evidence.2 Rather than account for the

genesis of abstract ideas capable of existing in separation from theparticulars from which they arise, Lockes epistemology, in Husserlsview, presupposes precisely that which it is intended to provide anaccount of, viz.: non-particular meanings capable of referring to some(via general ideas) and all (via universal ideas) instances of a kind, alongwith the kinds (species) themselves and the general and universal termsthat express such ideas.3Husserl is emphatic that so long as the mindspower of attention is understood, with Locke, to be directed towardparticular ideas and their particular qualities, no amount of selection orshifting on the part of such attention can yield what abstractive theoriesbased on attention claim they can yield: meanings capable ofrepresenting the ideal thought contents that are the basis of thinking andcognition.4

In the case of Hume, Husserl argues that, notwithstanding Humes

attempts to overcome what he takes to be Lockes empirically unwar-ranted account of the genesis of abstract ideas on the basis of theseparation of mental contents from the quantitatively and qualitativelydetermined originals of experience, his arguments neverthelesspresuppose, as do Lockes, precisely that which they claim to provide anaccount of: non-particular meanings capable of representing (a) morethan one or all instances of a class and (b) the different kinds of classesthemselves.

With respect to (a), in Husserls view, Humes account of the as-sociative connection between general terms signifying particular ideasand the habitually informed imaginative power of the soul to surveyparticular ideas with a view towards their resemblances, simply assertsrather than shows how it is that the mind is able to recognize suchresemblances in the first place.5 Thus, for Husserl, the process which

would allow the particular idea to be applied in our reasoning as if itwere universal is in no wise established by Hume in accord with theempirical criteria of what counts for evidence, but rather, that this occursis simply asserted by Hume to be the case. According to Husserl, there isrelated to this the issue of how the individual idea comes by itsrepresentative function, in the sense of taking over or undergoingperformances (Leistungen) that another idea (or every individual idea in

2Ibid., vol. I, p. 427, Hua XIX/I, p. 219.3Ibid., vol. I, p. 387, Hua XIX/I, p. 171.4Ibid., vol. I, p. 405, Hua XIX/I, p. 192.5Ibid., Hua XIX/I, pp. 192-93.


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a class) would perform, which is likewise not accounted for by Hume.6In Husserls words, one can make no assertions at all, not even such asare singular . . . on a mere foundation of the direct presentations ofindividual. . . . For to intuit in plainly not to think.7 This is the casesince the individual idea in its putative representative function

presupposes the general concept that it is designed to replace. 8Regarding (b), according to Husserl, Humes account of the emergenceof the so-called distinctions of reason, wherein what is reallyinseparable in the object, e.g., figure and body figured, color and thefigure colored, is appealed to by the mind as if it were separable, islikewise unsatisfactory. In his view, Humes discussion of the insen-sible reflection whose alleged comparisons are held to yield suchresemblances, does not account for what circumstance picks out theresemblance at issue in the distinctio rationis.9 Humes recourse to thesimilarity between objectscannot account for the similarity at issue in thenon-particular meanings presupposed by the classes themselves (e.g.,shape, color) at stake in the distinctions of reason, since any finding ofsimilarity presupposes the finding of a similarity of this similarity withother similarities, and so on, ad infinitum, in the absence of a non-

particular, which is to say, generic meaning or principle guiding thefinding of similarities.10 In other words, the recognition of any givensimilarity will be incapable of accounting for the conditions which giverise to it if, from the start, access to general meaning is empiricisticallystipulated to be beyond the domain of experience, i.e., beyond what isepistemologically recognized as capable of being given with evidence.

Subsequent to these critical considerations, Husserl is able to formu-late a phenomenological theory of abstraction and therewith lay thebasis for the articulation of the method of seeing essences. In Husserlsview, the phenomenological theory of abstraction is able to account forwhat is aimed at by the traditional (i.e., empirical) talk ofabstraction, once the latters unwarranted restrictions of what countsfor intuition and evidence are removed and with this, the notions ofintuition and evidence, and therewith experience are suitablyexpanded. What is at issue here for Husserl is neither the empiricistsguiding assumption that general meanings are capable of representingmore than one instance of a class nor their stipulation that intuitionprovides originary warrant for all cognitive claims. Rather, thephenomenological theory of abstraction attempts to negotiate what it

6Ibid.7Ibid., vol. I, pp. 387-88, Hua XIX/I, p. 172.8Ibid., vol. I, p. 396, Hua XIX/I, p. 182.9Ibid.10Ibid., vol. I, p. 411, Hua XIX/I, p. 200.


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takes to be Humes entirely justified critique of Lockes absurd theoryof general ideas existing in separation from particular instances withoutthereby committing itself to Humes psychologistic alternative to Locke.

Husserl accomplishes this by arguing that intuition, i.e., theapprehending awareness of the so-called objects of experience thatcomprise the basis for cognition, has a scope that extends beyond theperception of individuals (e.g., this or that red colored object). Inaddition to the awareness of individual objects that is at issue in thetraditional understanding of intuition, Husserl maintains that the scopeof intuition is such as to include the perception of the species themselves(e.g., the non-individual concept of red) that are appealed to in logicalthinking. Essential to the recognition of the expanded scope ofintuition for Husserl is the corresponding recognition that the range ofexperience (Erfahrung) is such as to include the lived-experience(Erlebnis) of non-particular, which is to say, general and universalmeanings. Lived-experience of general and universal meanings involvesthe perception, or better, intuition, of the categories comprising suchmeanings, both in their function to cover or intend a certain range(Umfang) of individual instances (e.g., the class of individual red objects),

as well as in their status as meanings as such (e.g., the species red). Atissue in this latter intuition of the status of non-particular meanings assuch, is their presentation (Vorstellung) as that which is logicallygrasped and meant. In Husserls words:

It does not matter whether our accompanying individualintuition remains constant or varies continually: the logicalpresentation changes if its meaning (the sense belonging to the[logical] expression) changes, and stays the same as long as itsmeaning does so. We need scarcely stress here that thefounding [individual] appearance [for the logical presentation]

may drop out altogether.11

II. Categorial Intuition

Husserls so-called phenomenological breakthrough discovery ofcategorial intuition, then, is based on the premiss that non-individualobjects can be cognitively seen with respect to their presentation oflogical meaning. Despite, however, the analogy of such seeing withthe more familiar empirical seeing of individual objects, importantdistinctions between these two kinds of seeing are articulated byHusserl. He calls attention to the state of affairs that some of the aspectsof individual objects characterize the objects as wholes, whereas otheraspects are simply parts of the individual objects. He calls the latter

11Ibid., vol. I, p. 391, Hua XIX/I, p. 176.


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real (realen) parts and the former abstract parts or moments.12 Inaccordance with his critique of Locke, Husserl insists that the abstractparts, i.e., the categorial objectivities, do not exist entirely apart from theindividual objects. Rather, the intuition of individual objects functions tofound the intuition of the categorial objectivities. As such, categorial

objectivity, while capable of being exhibited (aufweisen) as distinct fromindividual objects, is nevertheless still thought of by Husserl as beinginseparable from such objects. The lived-experience of categorialobjectivity is thus founded in the intuition of individual objects. Thefounded status of such objectivity, however, does not imply for Husserlthat the category is a real part, what he terms a piece, of theindividual object that serves to found it. Rather, its status is that of anabstract part, i.e., a moment,13 of the complex whole in which anempirical quality of an individual object, e.g., the red of a perceivedchair, is presented as an instance of the categorially intuited species, e.g.,red itself, which is likewise presented. That is to say, the presentationof the category red as an abstract moment of the perceived chair is nota piece of it like the legs or upholstery. Such pieces are capable of beingperceptually presented independently, which is to say, in separation

from, the concrete whole of the chair to which they belong. In contrast tothis, the chair does not contain the presented red as a real property, or,in other words, as a piece of the chair capable of being presented apartfrom the concrete whole of the chair itself. Even though the red, as anempirical quality of the chair, belongs to the chair as a perceived object,it cannot be separated from the perception of the chair as a whole.Rather, bringing into relief this, or for that matter, any other quality ofthe chair, takes place in new and special acts of explication, whatHusserl terms categorial intuition.

According to Husserl, intuitive access to the category as a presentedobjectivity, i.e., as an explicitly apprehended aspect of the perceivedindividual object which, despite its inseparability from the whole ofthe latter nevertheless manifests an objective status that is essentiallydifferent from its real parts, requires, then, the adoption of a new

attitude besidethe foundational natural attitude operative in the initialperceptual presentation of things. Husserl understands by the naturalattitude what has always been understood by perception: thegivenness in experience of independently existing (vis--vis theperceiver) objects, i.e., objects that are concrete. The initial unity ofthe perceptual object in this naturalistic sense is characterized by Husserlin terms of its straightforward presentation in one blow (ein Schlag).As such, this initial simple unity is disclosed to the emergent newattitude operative as the ground of categorial intuition, i.e., the nascent

12Ibid., vol. I, p. 437, Hua XIX/I, p. 231.13Ibid., vol. II, p. 467, Hua XIX/I, pp. 272-3.


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phenomenological attitude, in terms of a whole manifesting parts that donot stand out in relief. Insofar, however, as the unity of these parts isbrought into relief on the basis of an articulation that understands themto belong really to the independent object as a whole, in the sense ofbeing objects capable of separate presentation as pieces of this whole,such an articulation will suffer from the various kinds of incoherencethat Husserls critique of the empiricist epistemologies has shown toplague the attempt to account for non-particular meanings on the basisof the real properties of perceptually intuited individual objects.Therefore, the inevitable failure of the empiricistic attempt to render theintelligibility (i.e., the unity at issue in general and universal meanings)of that which is in terms of parts that are taken to be pieces of intuitedindividuals (i.e., independent, concrete objects), lies at the basis both ofHusserls incipient formulation of the phenomenological attitude, and ofthe categorial intuition that marks the emergence of this attitude.14

14The much discussed controversy over the so-called motivation for theadoption of the phenomenological attitude can be resolved once and for all byattending to the role played by Husserls critique of the empiricistic epis-

temologies at issue in the emergence of this attitude. Specifically, by showingthat the incoherences of these epistemologies rest on their tacit assumption ofthat which they would explain away, i.e., the lived-experience of non-particular meaning, this critique provides the motive for both the thematicturn to the latter as well as for the phenomenological program of systematicallyunfolding that which is given in such lived-experience, viz., categorial meaning.

Attending to the role of Husserls critique of empiricism does not, of course,account for the philosophical motivation per se underlying Husserls, or forthat matter, anyone elses philosophically critical attitude. Conflation of thismore original, and indeed, perhaps most original, issue of the motivation foradopting the philosophical attitude with what is at issue in the so-calledmotivation to take up the phenomenological attitude, burdens Husserlsphenomenology with task of accounting for what, to my knowledge, no extantphilosophy has yet been able to account for: themotive or motives for making, asit were, the critical turn to philosophy itself. This is not to say that this

problematic does not invite a phenomenological formulation that mightrecommend it over the various attempts in the tradition to account for such aturn. I have in mind here the task of genetically tracing the sedimented Sinnofthe beginning or beginnings in actual history of the philosophical turn that isindicated by the backward reference (Zurckweist) manifest in the static Sinnofthe philosophical attitude that informs Husserls phenomenological project.Such a task, however, lies beyond the scope of the present investigation.

Clarity regarding the motive for the adoption of the phenomenologicalattitude also provides clarity with respect to its much discussed relation to thenatural attitude. Inasmuch as the natural attitude becomes thematic as such onlyinsofar as it is critically superseded, the phenomenological attitude that emergesas a result of this critical supersession can be seen as the methodologicalfoundation for the genesis of what is delimited as the natural attitude assuch. This is to say, that the apprehending of the straightforward presentation ofperceptual unity in one blow has, as its precondition, the phenomenological


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Articulation, then, of the parts of the perceptual object as abstractmoments, and not real pieces, of the originally given whole requires thatthe natural claim of the intuited individual to provide the realfoundation for objectivity per se be dropped. The dropping of this claimushers in its wake the phenomenological attitude, and with it, themethodical capacity of treating the initially intuited individualpresentation as an exemplar of the categorial meaning co-presentedwith it. This is to say, that the inseparability of categorial meanings fromthe empirical qualities of the individual, and correlated to this, thecategorial intuition of the categorial meanings being founded in thesensuous intuition of the empirical qualities, turns out to have its basis inan ideal, and not a real, feature of objects; hence, the correspondingfoundation relation likewise turns out not to be real but ideal.What the denomination ideal indicates here is the non-real (i.e., notreal where real would mean the manifestation of sensible qualitiesthat connect sensible parts [pieces] with their likewise sensible foundingindividual object) categorial presentation of the connection between theabstract parts (moments) of the individual object and their founding,individually intuited exemplar.

In addition, because the intuited individual has lost its naturalisticclaim to provide the real foundation for objectivity per se, what is atissue in its individuality is no longer the indivisibility that is connotedby the natural sense of the word individual. Rather than designate anindividual in this sense, i.e., in the traditional sense of an individuum,the individuality of the phenomenologically treated individualobject as an exemplar designates the presentation of both an empiricalquality and the unqualified individual singular (individuelleEinzelheit)15 that, as it were, provides the empirically intuitivesupport (Anhalt)16 for the presentation of the empirical quality inquestion. Phenomenological reference to the object as an exemplarsignals that Husserl grants neither the independent existence from theperceptual agent that the traditional notion of an individual affirms northe parallel affirmation that the object is incapable of analysis, i.e., is

indivisible. Rather, at issue here is the ability of the nascent

attitude born of the critical recognition that the putative real relation orinherence of the perceptual part in the concrete whole disclosed by this unitycan only be coherently articulated in terms of a categorial unity. In otherwords, the reciprocal foundation relation of categorial meaning andperceptual exemplar (to be discussed below) is mirrored in the likewisereciprocal foundation relation of phenomenological and natural attitudes.

15Edmund Husserl, Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to aPhenomenological Philosophy, First Book, trans. F. Kersten (The Hague: MartinusNijhoff, 1982), p. 28 (translation slightly altered), Hua III, 1, p. 33

16Edmund Husserl, Logical Investigations, op, cit., vol. I, p. 393, Hua XIX/I,p. 178.


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phenomenological attitude to isolate (lostrennen) the exemplar suchthat its presentation remains identical in spite of the unlimitedvariation of all other empirical qualities in the context of its givenness.17According to Husserl, this means that it [the exemplar] remainsunaffected by the removal (Aufhebung) of any optional (beliebigen)

arrangement of cogiven contents whatsoever.18

Despite the fact that theindividual singular underlying such variation lacks the status ofindependent existence (i.e., substance) that is characteristic of theAristotelian this here (tovde ti), Husserl nevertheless uses this term todesignate the unqualified intuitive givenness that provides the supportfor the presentation of the empirical quality that is phenomenologicallyat issue here.

Further, since the presentation of categorial meaning presupposes thepresentation of the individual exemplar, i.e., a given empirical qualityalong with its supporting tovde ti, and vice versa, the nature of the idealfoundation relation at issue is reciprocal: the presentation of theindividual exemplar implies, and thus requires for its presentation,supplementation by categorial meaning, just as the presentation ofcategorial meaning likewise implies and requires for its presentation

exemplary supplementation.19According to Husserl, the upshot of the above state of affairs is that the

whole at issue for the phenomenological attitude is no longer to beunderstood in terms of the initially given concrete object presented instraightforward perception. Rather, the phenomenological whole that isat issue concerns the reciprocally founded co-presentation of categorialmeaning and the individual exemplar. In addition, as a result of therelinquishing of the natural claim of the individual, cumexemplar, to bean independent foundational concretion relative to objective meaningpresented by the category, the concretum at issue in thephenomenological attitude is not a real but an ideal whole. This is to say,with the emergence of the phenomenological attitude alongside thenatural attitude, the initially given unity of the perceptual wholepresented in accord with the latter is uncovered as presupposing, and

therefore requiring for the continual coherence of its unity, the

17Ibid., vol. II, p. 443, p. 238.18Ibid., (translation slightly altered).19See Richard Cobb-Stevens, who, following Jacques Taminiauxs analysis

of the relation between simple perception and categorial intuition that is at issuehere, writes: . . . Husserl strongly implies that there is a reciprocal founding-founded relationship between simple perception and categorial intuition . . . .[Hence] [e]verything points to the conclusion, therefore, that [for Husserl] cat-egorial intuition of the formal surplus expressed by descriptive terms [i.e.,categories] is a condition for the perception of particular objects and theirfeatures. Richard Cobb-Stevens, Being and Categorial Intuition, Review of

Metaphysics 44 (1990): 54.


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SEEING ESSENCES 159

supplementary unity yielded by categorial meaning. Unity then, is forHusserl not a real but a categorial predicate.20Likewise categorial andnot real is the concretum that functions to provide unity.

III. Ideation

Subsequent to the reversal at work in the methodical treatment of theindividual object as an exemplar, Husserls Revolution der Denkungsartbegins in earnest with the phenomenological articulation of thecategorial meaning co-presented yet unarticulatedso long as access to theobjects of perception remain understood within the ambit of thenatural attitude. Articulation of presented categorial meanings involvesboth what Husserl terms generalization and formalization. Theformer yields what he calls the material category, while the latteryields the formal category or categorial form. Material categories arepresented in a process designated by Husserl as ideational abstractionor ideation for short, and exhibit categorial unities that yield ahomogeneity with the similarities manifested by the exemplary

perceptual individuals necessary for their presentation. Formal categoriesare presented in a process referred to by Husserl as formalizingabstraction, or formalization, and exhibit categorial meanings which,while they are homogeneous with the material categories themselveswhose similarities yield what Husserl calls the homogeneity of form asform,21 are nevertheless heterogeneous with the empirical qualities ofthe exemplars that yield the material categories. Examples of materialcategories would include red, blue, color, physical thing, mental thing,while examples of formal categories would be subject form, predicateform, object form, likeness, difference, unity, plurality, whole, part,property.

Husserls account of ideation bears traces of both Lockes formulationof abstraction in terms of mental attention and Humes formulation of itin terms of the power of the soul to survey similarities among particular

ideas. The point of departure for Husserls account is the treatment ofthe initially perceived individual object as an exemplar. Subsequent tothis, the comparative survey of similar exemplars la Hume is said byHusserl to provide a reference (Beziehung) to the species of the materialcategory that functions to unify the similarity at issue. Following theemergence of this reference, Husserl maintains that the prescinding ofepistemic attention la Locke, from similar exemplars to the non-

20Edmund Husserl, Logical Investigations, op. cit., vol. II, p. 478, Hua

XIX/I, p. 286.21Edmund Husserl, Experience and Judgment, trans. J.S. Churchill and Karl

Ameriks (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1973), p. 249, Erfahrung undUrteil, (Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1985), pp. 297-98.


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particular meaning that their similarity points to as its referent, bringsinto relief (herausstellen) the presentation of the categorial meaning (Sinn)itself. In contrast, however, to what in his view is Humes misguidedattempt to ground the similarity at issue in the comparative survey ofsimilar exemplars in the intuited individuals themselves, Husserl holdsthat the original recognition of the similarity in question is guidedby thelived-experience22 of the non-particular meaning whosephenomenologically peculiar reciprocal foundation relation with themanifold of similar exemplars is presented through their comparison.And in contrast to what he takes to be Lockes equally misguidedcharacterization of attention in terms of the power to generate abstractmeanings in the guise of independently existing non-particular ideas,Husserl maintains that non-particular ideas can only be presentedthrough the manifold of individual exemplars that, at once, exemplifyabstract meaning and refer to it via their comparative similarity.

Ideational comparison of two or more similar empirical qualities ofphenomenologically isolated perceptual exemplars, along with theprescinding shift in the cognitive regard from the exemplars as similar tothe non-individual meaning guiding the recognition of their similarity,

yields the presentation and corresponding intuition of the materialcategory whose unity governs the intuition of the exemplars as similar.Such unity is homogeneous with the similarity of the empirical qualitiesof the exemplary objects that at once refers to it and is governed by it. Asa result, predicative articulation of the relation (Relation) of thecategorial meaning to the exemplars is possible. For example,accentuating the categorial meaning red in its function to unify thesimilarity23 of an exemplary manifold of red balls makes possible thefollowing statement: red belongs to the balls (P belongs to S). Equallypossible is accentuating the balls insofar as they refer to the categorialmeaning red. This would make possible the statement: the balls are red(S are P). The possibility of making either of these statements on thebasis of the same state of affairs in no way implies that thesestatements are linguistically equivalent. For in statements of the first

22In reference to Hume, Husserl writes: He quite fails to mention, anddoes not see with operative lucidity, that in subjective lived-experienceuniversality itself is manifest . . . . Edmund Husserl, Logical Investigations, op.cit., vol. I, p. 404 (translation altered), Hua XIX/I, p. 191.

23The individual exemplars manifesting the empirical quality that, withtheir comparison, is presented as similar, are incapable of grounding the similar-ity in question. This is the case since such a grounding would be tantamount towhat for Husserl is an impossibility, i.e., the manifestation of a real basis forthe relation at issue in the similarity. Hence, it is the material category itself,which is manifest with the shift of attention from the individual exemplarsmanifesting the similar empirical quality, that functions to yield the unity ofthe similarity that is at issue in the being similar of these individual exemplars.


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kind the one general term as subject discharges a multiple ray ofpredication. Each individual ray terminates in a member of thecollection.24Statements of the second kind contain a multiple subject,a plural; a synthetic ray goes out from each member, directed toward thegeneral predicate, which is posited only once.25

It is important to note that for Husserl not only is either kind ofpredicative articulation of the relation between the exemplary manifoldand categorial meaning equally possible, but also that the pre-conditionfor either type of predicative articulation is the prior reference of theexemplars to the categorial meaning and the ideational seizing of thelatter in the prescinding shift of the cognitive regard. That is to say, thewhole S along with its part P must already be given together if thepredicative articulation P belongs to S is to be made; and that likewise,for the predicative articulation S are P to be made, the part P mustalreadybe given together with the whole S. In addition, the belonging ofP to S that is at issue in the articulation of the predicative statement Pbelongs to S is neither one of real inherence nor one of a synthesisaccomplished by the cognitive agent or subject. Rather, the belongingis ideal in the sense that what is articulated is the supplementation of

the manifested category P by the individual instances of S. Likewise, thebeing at issue in the articulation of S are P is neither real norsubjective. Again, it is ideal in the sense that what is articulated isthe manifestness of the category P as it supplements the individualinstances of S. Being in the sense of the copula, then, is neither a realnor subjective predicate for Husserl. Indeed, it is not a predicate at all,but the coming to manifestness or presence of the material category as itfunctions to supplement the two or more individual exemplars that yieldthe category, which manifestness in turn functions as the pre-conditionfor the predicative articulation of S are P.

IV. The Method of Seeing Essences (Wesenserschauung)

According to Husserl, ideation performed on the basis of the comparisonof empirical qualities of perceptual exemplars yields categorial meaningswith the status of empirical generality. Thus, for example, the non-individual presentation of the species red that guides the perception ofthe similarity of the empirical quality red manifested by the individualred balls is not unconditional. This is the case, since the categorial unity(i.e., the red) in question is contingent upon the similarity beingmanifested by the exemplars that comprise the comparative manifold. In

24Edmund Husserl, Experience and Judgment, op. cit., p. 328, Erfahrung undUrteil, op. cit., p. 394.

25Ibid.


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other words, the presented category in the example of the balls beingsimilar with respect to red exhibits the unity of just theseexemplars. Theexpectation that any red, and not just the red that guides the similarity ofthe compared manifold, will exhibit the unity manifested by thecategory, an expectation that Husserl characterizes in terms of a feltnecessity, requires something more than the empirical procedure ofcomparing perceptually given exemplars. In Husserls words:

Every felt necessity in an indication (Anzeichen) of an a prioriin the sense of an unconditioned, so-called apodictic uni-versality, which can be seen as such. Exhibiting (Aufweisung) itis the test of whether the felt necessity is a genuinely apodictic

one, and not a confusion with a merely empirical indication.26

The something more required for the exhibition of the a prioriindicated by the feeling of necessity is the method of seeing essences.This method is rooted in the methodical possibility of modifying theempirically given manifold of exemplars such that they are freed fromtheir character of contingency. It is based on the imaginative variation ofthe manifold of perceptual exemplars that yield the empirically limited

categorial meaning. Such variation occurs when the non-individualstyle (Stil)27 of the latter that emerges with the comparison of similarperceptual exemplars is taken, along with these exemplars themselves,as an arbitrary example (beliebigen Exempel) such that it receives thecharacter of a guiding model (Vorbild) for the production (Erzeugung)in imagination of an infinitely open manifold of variants. With thesystematic varying of what is initially experienced in accord with theempirically yielded non-individual style, ever new similar images(Bilder) or copies (Nachbilder), which are all concretely similar to theoriginal image (Urbild), 28 are yielded by the imagination.29 On the

26Edmund Husserl, Phenomenological Psychology, trans. John Scanlon (TheHague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1977), p. 52, Hua IX, p. 70 (translation slightly altered).

Husserl also refers to feeling as that which indicates non-particular (general)meaning in the instance of the individual cases in which a general name isunderstood. See Logical Investigations, op. cit., vol. I, p. 404, Hua XIX/I, p. 191.

27Edmund Husserl, Phenomenological Psychology, op. cit., p. 53, Hua IX, p.71.

28Edmund Husserl, Experience and Judgment, op. cit., p. 341, Erfahrung undUrteil, op. cit., p. 411.

29To my knowledge, Husserl nowhere provides a detailed account of theimaginative transformation of the initial, empirically intuited exemplar, into anoriginal image. Indeed, his writings appear to simply assert that this ispossible, and, on the basis of this assertion, to unfold the implications of such atransformation for the phenomenological method of seeing of essences. Thereis, however, in my view a detailed account of precisely this transformation in thetradition. I have in mind here the figure of Socrates account of novhsi"(noesis) in


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basis of this imaginative generation of an infinitely open multiplicityof variants, a universal unity shows itself (zeigt sich) as an invariantthat necessarily runs through (hindurchgeht) the manifold of variants.This unity, having come to the fore on the basis of the production ofvariants free from the constraint of contingency that limits the scope ofcategorial unity yielded on the basis of the comparison of empiricallygiven exemplars, remains throughout the total process of variationaccording to Husserl as that which an object . . . as an example of itskind, would not be thinkable as such (berhaupt).30

The universal so yielded stands out as an absolutely identical content,an invariable what,according to which all variants coincide: a universalessence.31As such, the cognitive regard may be directed toward itas theinvariable that prescribes limits for all possible variation practiced(gebten) in the subjective mode of the arbitrary, practiced on the sameoriginal image initially given in empirical experience. The essenceproves for Husserl to be that without which the object cannot beintuitively imagined as such.32This essence according to Husserl is theeidos, the ijdevain the Platonic sense, taken in purity from all metaphysicalinterpretations as that which is given immediately and intuitively in

imaginative variation. Crucial, then, for its apprehension is theformation of variants guided by the initial model in accord with thestructure of arbitrariness, such that the consciousness of I couldcontinue in this way . . . and so on, at my pleasure 33accompanies themanifold of variants yielded by the variation. This and so on manifeststhe infinite openness of the manifold, an infinite that, to be sure, doesnot imply for Husserl the actual continuation to infinity of all thevariants. Rather, it designates the remarkable and truly important34insight that the eidos is yielded in the awareness that any furthervariants will manifest the character of exemplary (exemplarischen)

Book VI of the Republic. Exploration of a connection between the problematicaddressed there by Platos Socrates and the problematic at issue here for Husserlwould involve: (1) making a case for a homology between the Socratichypotheses and the Husserlian empirical style, and showing how something likethe dianoetic transformation of the former into intelligible images is likewise atissue in the latters transformation into imaginary exemplars, and (2) showinghow this Socratic formulation of the problematic is the originary event whoseSinn is sedimented in Husserls formulation of the function of imaginativevariation for his method of seeing essences. Such an exploration is beyondthe scope of the present inquiry.

30Edmund Husserl, Experience and Judgment, op. cit., p. 341 (translationslightly altered), Erfahrung und Urteil, op. cit., p. 411.

31Ibid. (translation slightly altered.)32Ibid.33Ibid., p. 342, p. 413.34Ibid.


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arbitrariness with respect to the invariant unity that shows itself asrunning through their manifold. Husserl terms variants that haveachieved this status as optional singularizations of the one eidos(beliebige Vereinselungen des einen Eidos),35 or eidetic singularities forshort.

It is important to note at this juncture that the variants at issue in theseeing of the eidos are not exemplars of independently existingobjects, of concrete individuals posited as being in the sense ofremaining identically the same throughout all alteration andnonalteration. Rather, in Husserls words, it is necessary not tooverlook that the establishment of the example to be varied alreadydemands an intricate method.36 Not only must the natural claim ofthe empirically intuited individual to provide the real foundation ofobjectivity per se be dropped in accord with the critique of theempiricistic epistemologies (see section I above), but also thecommitment to the positing of the experienced world as the universalpermanent ground of being and as the universal field of all ouractivities37must become conscious and therewith consciously be putout of play. Only then can the status of the eidos emerge as the pure

conceptual essence (rein begrifflichen Wesen) of the infinity of possiblesingulars (Einzelheiten) that fall under it as its singularizations(Vereinzelheiten). According to Husserl, once these methodicalprerequisites are in place, it then becomes possible to speak Platonicallyof every conceivable exemplar referring to the eidos and therewithparticipating (Teilhabe) in it.38

For Husserl, then, the eidetic singular (Einzelne), which grounds theseeing of essences, is not in the proper sense an intuited individuum assuch.39 The unity at issue in the exemplary variation emerges as anindividuum only on the basis of the exchange (Wechsel) of non-essential moments, i.e., those moments that are manifested in the processof variation as appearing outside the essential moments which constitutethe identity of the eidos in question. Thus, in the example of the redballs, it is not the individuality of the balls given in perception thatcomprises the point of departure for the imaginative variation at issue inthe seeing of the essence red. Rather, it is that which emerges with theempirical comparison of the contingent manifold of balls (i.e., just theseballs) with a view toward their similar color, viz., the similar instances of

35Edmund Husserl, Phenomenological Psychology, op. cit., p. 54, Hua IX, p.73.

36Edmund Husserl, Experience and Judgment, op. cit., p. 360, ErfahrungundUrteil, op. cit., p. 437.

37Ibid., p. 350, p. 424.38Ibid., p. 350, p. 423.39Ibid., p. 345 (translation altered), p. 417.


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red as they refer to the overlapping empirical style of red, that comprisesthe point of departure for the imaginative production of variants thatwill lead to the exhibition of the eidos of this empirical style. Variation ofthese similar instances involves the imaginative production of images ofred that modify the experienced instances of red while yet continuing tomanifest themselves in terms of the overlapping guiding style red.Images of red that are darker, lighter, brighter, dimmer, duller, shinnier,etc., than the originally experienced instances of red, produced in thesubjective mode of exemplary arbitrariness such that the consciousnessemerges that no matter what arbitrary instance is chosen, any possiblevariant will manifest itself as a singularization of the same identicalunity red, is what is at issue here. Once the similiarity red that ismanifested by the initial manifold of balls is chosen as the guilding stylefor the production of variants, the fact that balls and not cars or books,indeed, the factual state of affairs per se that actually or even possiblymanifest this similarity, ceases to be relevant so far as the exhibition ofthe eidos of red as a material category is concerned. Likewise, whatdifferentiates the variants themselves, for instance, the brightness, gloss,etc., of the above example, remains a matter of cognitive indifference

insofar as the seeing of the eidos of red is of concern.

VI. Essential Seeing of the Connections Among Eidea. Levels of Universality

The exhibition of the eidos of the material category and therewith themanifestation of the exempary variants that, at once, disclose this eidosand function as its singularizations, rests then on the structure ofarbitrariness assumed by the methodically cognitive regard and theunique consciousness with a unique content that is its result: concreteunity founded in conflict, in incompatabilty. This remarkable hybridunity is at the bottom of essential seeing.40The unity at issue here, inaccord with its origin in free variation, only is for Husserl as eJn ejpiv

pollwn(one over many), i.e., is manifest only insofar as the multiplicity[of variants] as such is conscious as a plurality and never entirelyrelinquished from our grasp.41 This unity functions to indicate both (a)the necessary laws that determine what must belong to an exemplarysingularization in order for it to be an exemplification of a certain kind,and (b) the actualities that occur in the experience to which every eidos,as a founded objectivity, is bound. At issue with respect to (a), is theinitially seen eidos, e.g., red, functioning as an index for other materialeide that are referentially implied with its manifestness as the what of

40Ibid.41Ibid., p. 343 (translation altered), p. 414.


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an exemplary manifold, i.e., eide of color, spread, surface, brightness,sensuous quality, spatial thing. And at issue with respect to (b) are thesingularities of the initially seen eidos, e.g., exemplary variants of red,having a reference as well to something beyond themselves, only in thiscase, what is referred to are not material eide but the actualities ofexperience for which these variants, as pure possibilities of the materialeidos in question, function as the conditions of possible experience.42

The indication on the part of the essentially seen eidos of the materialcategory of other material categories that necessarily belong to its eideticsingularization in order for it to be an exemplification of a certain kind,is yielded on the basis of its connection with the difference that is bothmanifest and disregarded insofar as the concrete unity of the eidos inquestion can only be founded in the conflict of moments that areincompatible with it. Hence, in the example of the given red color, itsunity is manifest on the basis of the exchange of now this spread(Ausbreitung) and shape (Gestalt), now that spread and shape. Accordingto Husserl, it is clear that nothing can appear in conflict that has nothing incommon.43Thus, in the example of the eidos of the color red, not only isits identity manifest through the variation of, say, round and square red

objects; more important44 in Husserls view is that such a conflict ofshapes is only possible on the basis of the shape common to both figures.In Husserls words: Thus, every difference in the overlapping withothers, as an overlapping with their differences, points to a newuniversal, here shape, as the universal which momentarily comes tounity in the conflict belonging to superimposed (bereinanderliegenden)differences.45

The methodical fixing of the newly emergent universal as acommonality that is indicated in the conflict that manifests the eidos of amaterial category already exhibited to essential seeing, yields theguiding clue for a variation that makes manifest to essential seeingprecisely this newly emergent universal. This is accomplished in anattitude, which in the mode of complete absence of commitment, and thuswithout being bound to varying any already illuminated universal,46makes possible the seeking of the universal which lies beyond all the tobe seen and thereby limited universalities.47 At issue here is thelinking of series of variations in a unique (einzig) multiplicity48 that

42Ibid., p. 353, p. 427.43Ibid., p. 346 (translation altered), p. 418.44Ibid.45Ibid., (translation altered), pp. 418-419.46Ibid., p. 358 (translation altered), pp. 433-34.47Ibid.48Ibid., p. 357, p. 433.


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yields an eidos that is both different and more universal than the alreadymanifested eide. For instance, the eidos red is yielded on the basis of avariation that, beginning with an arbitrary red, yields a multiplicity ofvariants that, directed toward red, seizes it as what is common to thevariants such that whatever does not belong to this series of variations,e.g., a green, is rejected on the basis of its conflict with the goal [of] theattainment by variation of the seeing of red.49 Methodical interest,however, can also be directed to the following state of affairs, viz., thatthe variant green, despite its conflict with all the variants of red,nevertheless has something in common with them. The variant green,then, has therefore a point of overlapping (Deckung), [and] thiscommonality apprehended as a pure eidoscan determine the variation:then, the multiplicities of variation for red and green, as also for yellow,etc., belong together reciprocally; the universal is now color.50Thus thelinking together of the multiplicities of variation that yield the eide ofvarious colors, which is to say, the variation of these multiplicitiesthemselves such that no matter how it may proceed, [it] be simply avariation, that is, be joined together in general, in a thoroughly unifiedsynthesis of overlapping, with a pervasive universal,51 yields the

highest universalities, in this case, the eidos or idea of color. Once thehighest universalities are manifest in this manner, it can then be saidaccording to Husserl that they have at the same time the property ofbeing contained in all the particular universalities which it was necessary toproduce in this total variationbecause they belong to the limitedspheres of variation of the latteras that which is ideally common tothem.52 The limited universalities manifested by these eide (of thesecolors in the example), in turn, are manifest as having an idealparticipation in the idea of color.53In this connection Husserl can say:

ideas, pure universalities, can themselves function as variantsin their turn; thereupon from them, on a higher level, auniversal can be intuitively singled out (herauszuschauen), anidea from or of ideas; an idea whose extension is comprised of

ideas, and only mediately of their ideal singularities.54

On the basis, then, of the variation of the material eide themselves,various levels of material universality become explicable. Suchimaginative variation yields now this eidos (e.g., red), now that eidos

49Ibid.50Ibid., pp. 357-58 (translation altered), p. 433.51Ibid., p. 358 (translation altered), p. 434.52Ibid., (translation altered).53Ibid.54Ibid., (translation altered).


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(e.g., green), such that the manifold of material eide at issue in thevariation of eide here in question emerges. In concert with this state ofaffairs, the methodical singling out of one of the commonalities thatemerge on the basis of the conflict manifest in this variation of eideyields the sought after commonality that will provide the guidance forthe unfolding of higher levels of material universality. Unfoldingdifferent levels of the universalities manifest on the basis of thisvariation of material eide is worked out in terms of the methodicalexplication of the foundation relations that obtain between thematerial eide. These relations permit the articulation of an hierarchicalstructure of pure generalities. This hierarchy is manifest in terms of theseries of generality and specificity.55 This series, of necessity, has twolimits that never coincide. Ascending through specific to more genericeide, the highest genus is manifested by the abstract eidos of the materialcategory in question, i.e., the eidos that yields no universality above it.Descending, there is yielded the various specific eide that fall underthis highest genus, including the concrete limit of the material generalityin question, i.e., the material eidos which, admitting no further eideticparticularization (Besonderungen), is manifest in terms of its self-

sufficiency relative to the abstract eide above it. A self-sufficient eidosis therefore called a concretum by Husserl. A material eidos that is notself-sufficient is correspondingly called an abstractum.56 In thisconnection it is important to note that the distinctions at issue herebetween abstract and concrete are eidetic. As such, while a concretematerial eidos is self-sufficient relative to the abstract material eideabove it, it is also non-self-sufficient relative to the empiricallyunqualified individual singular that provides the empirically intuitivesupport for the presentation of the empirical quality and therewith thematerial eidos in question. Thus the this-here of the latter whosematerial essence is a concretum is accordingly called by Husserl anindividuum.57

The eidetic relationships manifested by the genus and species are suchthat, in the particular eidos, the more universal essence is immediately

or mediately contained.58 Articulation of the various immediate ormediate relations of containedness, which is to say, the whole and partrelations of unity or connectedness between the eide of materiallydetermined genera and species, occurs in accord with the foundation

55Edmund Husserl, Logical Investigations, op. cit., vol. II, p. 448, HuaXIX/I, p. 245.

56Edmund Husserl, Experience and Judgment, op. cit., pp. 335, 337, Er-fahrung und Urteil, op. cit., pp. 403-4, 406.

57Edmund Husserl, Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to aPhenomenological Philosophy, First Book, op. cit., p. 29, Hua III, 1, p. 35.

58Ibid., p. 25, Hua III, 1, p. 31.


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relations manifest by the material eide in question. At issue here are theeidetic relations that are manifest to essential seeing in terms of thedifferent levels of universality that are always contained, in the end, in agiven concrete material eidos.

b. Genus and Species

The determination of a given material eidos with respect to thedesignations of genus or species is unfolded in accord with whether itfunctions as (a) a member of the manifold variants of eide that manifestthe conflict whose difference is disclosive of a unity common to, orbetter, through, their differences, or whether (b) it manifests the eidositself whose unity is disclosed by the conflict in question.

In the case of (b), the material eidos, as a result of its encompassing thesimilarity yielded through the differences of the material eidecomprising the exemplary manifold, exhibits a wider range than anyisolated eidos that comprises the latter, and hence, a wider universality.At issue in the wider range of (b) is the contrast its unity manifests (as

one side of the reciprocal foundation relation obtaining between it andthe manifold disclosive of it), with any eidos belonging to this manifold(as the other side of this reciprocal foundation relation). Relative to anygiven material eidos constitutive of the conflict in (a) that yields theencompassing unity in question, the universality of the material eidosmanifest in the material eidos unity exceedsthe scope of universality atissue with respect to the members of the exemplary manifold.

Thus what is eidetically at issue here is (1) the reciprocal or two-sidedfoundation relation between members of the manifold of eide in conflictand the (higher level) eidos whose unity is disclosed by such conflict.That is to say, the manifold of eide whose conflict provides thefoundation for, and thus founds, the commonality yielded through theirconflict, are, in turn, when exhibited in terms of the material eidos thatprovides the foundation for this commonality, disclosed as having their

foundation in the material eidos itself whose unity founds the similarityof the different eide that comprise the variants at issue in the manifold.And (2), at issue here is also the state of affairs that emerges when thefoundational role manifest by the material eidos of the commonality atissue, as a foundation that encompasses at least two59eide manifesting asimilarity in conflict, is contrasted with any one of the latter. For anymember of the exemplary manifold, despite its state of affairs of likewisemanifesting a foundational roleinasmuch as the eidos of thecommonality at issue cannot be given without the similarity manifestedby its (i.e., the member of the exemplary manifold) conflict with other

59Edmund Husserl, Experience and Judgment, op. cit., pp. 327, 337,Erfahrung und Urteil, op. cit., pp. 393, 406.


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eide functioning as variants, just as this conflict cannot be given withoutthe commonalityis nevertheless limited in terms of the difference itmanifests with respect to the other eidos or eide at issue in the manifoldin question. Thus the foundational role of any eidos belonging to themanifold of variants, as determined via its reference to the single eidosfounding the commonality it manifests through its difference with theother eidos or eide manifest as its variants, is manifest as having alimited referential scope vis--vis this single eidos itself, whosefoundational reference has a range of at least the two eide that yield theminimal condition for the manifestation of its encompassing unity.

As a consequence of this wider range of the foundational reference ofthe single eidos founding the commonality manifested by the manifoldexemplary variants of eide, the single material eidos in questionwarrants the designation of genus. In contrast, any material eidosbelonging to the manifold of exemplary variants, as a consequence of itsfoundational reference to the single material eidos founding itscommonality with the other eide of its manifold, warrants the des-ignation of species. Thus, for example, the variation of the materialeide of red, blue, green, etc., which variation is yielded on the basis of

linking together the manifolds of eidetic singulars that yield the eidos ofnow red, now blue, now green, etc., yields the material eidos of color asthat which unites the commonality constituted through the similarityof the manifested difference between now red, now blue, now green, etc.Eidetic intuition of the material eidos color as it functions to found, i.e.,unify, the commonality in question, discloses as the condition of suchfounding the reference to the two or more manifold eide (red, blue,green, etc.,) whose similarity, manifest through their difference, yieldsthe commonality unified through the material eidos color in itsfunctioning as the foundation of this commonality. Hence, the genericstatus of color. Eidetic intuition, in turn, of any eidos belonging to themanifold of eide in question, e.g., red, discloses its reference to the singlematerial eidos color as the foundation of its commonality with, e.g., theblue, that it is both different from and similar to as a result of this

reference. Hence, the specific status of red.

c. The Hierarchical Structure of Pure Universalities

Once the designation of genus and species is articulated with respect to agiven assemblage of reciprocally founding material eide, theirhierarchical place among the other universalities that are refer-entiallyimplicated by the assemblage in question may likewise be articulated onthe basis of the further unfolding of the foundation relations of thesereferentially implicated eide. In the above example, the material eidosmanifested by the genus color refers to the material eide of the specificcolors necessary for its givenness. These latter, in turn, refer not only to


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founded in the eidos of surface through the mediation of the eidos ofcolor, and the eidos of color is founded in the eidos of surface throughthe mediation of shape, the eidos of brightness, qua its reciprocalfoundation relation with the eidos of surface, is so founded via themediation of the eide of both color and shape.

When more mediate and less mediate (or immediate) foundationrelations are contrasted, the former are disclosed relative to the latter asabstract and thus, as manifesting a higher level. At issue here withrespect to what Husserl calls the hierarchical structure of pureuniversalities (Allgeimeinheiten)60 is thus not the range of the eide inquestion relative to one another, as in the case of the designationsgenus and species. But rather, the issue concerns the state of affairsin which two foundational tandems of eide that have an eidos incommon admit of further eidetic differentiation, insofar as the non-common eidos of one tandem requires the presence of a mediating eidos(or more mediating eide) in order for its reciprocal foundationrelationship with the eidos in common to obtain. The non-common eidosrequiring mediation (or more mediation) is disclosed as abstract, inthe sense of its being more removed or distant from the eidos in

common, relative to the non-common eidos which does not require such(or as much) mediation. For example, the eide of color and brightnessboth exhibit reciprocal foundation relationships with the eidos ofsurface. When these two foundational tandems of eide are compared,however, the eidos of color manifests itself as requiring the mediation ofa single eidos, that of shape, in order for its foundation relation with theeidos of surface to obtain, whereas the eidos of brightness manifestsitself as requiring the mediation of two eide, color and shape, in orderfor its foundation relation with the eidos of surface to obtain. Hence, forHusserl, this greater remove or distance of the eidos of brightness fromthe eidos of surface renders it more abstract and therefore, asmanifesting a higher level, than the eidos of colors more immediatefoundation relation with the eidos of surface.

d. Abstract and Concrete Material Eide

In addition to manifesting an hierarchical structure on the basis of thecontrast between the immediacy and mediacy of their foundationalrelations, foundational assemblages of eide also point to empiricalactualities61 which bind (binden) them to concrete experience. Forexample, the material eidos of surface not only points to the eide ofcolor, shape and brightness with which it is reciprocally founded (and

60Ibid., p. 356, p. 432.61Ibid., p. 352, p. 426.


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which in turn are immediately and mediately founded with respect toone another); it also points to a body as that of which it is the limit.62In Husserls words:

Thus we are finally led to a concrete object, here a spatialthing, of which the color is an abstract moment. To be sure, noprocess of variation from a given color leads to such an object.Variation which sets out from the abstract always leads only to the

abstract.63

This pointing of the eidos of surface to a body as an empirical actualitydiscloses the latter in terms of its status as the concretum which, whilemanifesting the limit of the assemblage of eide in question, insofar asthese cannot be given independent of this empirical actuality,nevertheless cannot itself be given without the assemblage of eide atissue. Hence, the reciprocal foundation relationship between empiricalactuality and abstract, because mediated (by the concreta manifested bythe empirical actuality at issue), eidetic determinations.

Although all material eide, relative to the eidetically unqualifiedindividual singulars (individuelle Einzelheiten) that provide empirically

intuitive support for the presentation of empirical qualities andtherewith the exemplars whose variation discloses these eide, areabstract, i.e., non-independent moments of the empirical actualitiesin question, Husserl nevertheless distinguishes between abstract andconcrete material eide. Far from implying any inconsistency onHusserls part, what is at issue in this latter distinction is whether (1) agiven eidos is yielded from other eide (e.g., the eidos of color from theeide of colors, shape from shapes) or from empirical qualities that arenon-self-sufficient and hence founded in other empirical qualities (e.g.,the eidos red from red empirical qualities, qualities which are foundedin the empirical qualities of shape, surface and ultimately in empiricallyactual bodies); or (2) whether a given eidos is yielded from empiricalactualities which are concrete in the sense of manifestingactualities that are given without being founded in other actualities,and are thus self-sufficient (e.g., the eidos thing from spatiallyextended bodies). Despite the state of affairs that both kinds of eide atissue here are abstract in the sense that neither can be yielded withouttheir respective founding exemplary manifolds, Husserl designates thoseyielded in accord with (1) as dependent or abstract, and thoseyielded in accord with (2) as concrete.64

62Ibid., p. 358, p. 434.63Ibid., p. 358, p. 435.64Ibid., pp. 337, 359, pp. 406-7, 435.


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e. The Eidetic Distinction Between Material and Formal Eide

The highest genus of concreta Husserl calls a region.65According toHusserl, regional essences have no other, higher, universalities abovethem, and they set a fixed, unsurpassable limit to all variation. A

fundamental concept of a region cannot be converted into another byvariation.66 There is, however, a further operation possible, i.e.,formalization. According to Husserl, formalization is a mode ofseeing essences that is the result of performing variations not on thevariants drawn from the empirical actualities of experience (Er-fahrung),i.e., founded empirical qualities or their founding empirical concreta, butrather, the result of performing variations on variants that are drawnfrom the material eide themselves, including the region, along with theirvarious foundation relationships. Guidance for the variation at issue informalization is provided by apprehending two or more material eideunder the heading of the formal category something in general. Infundamental contrast to the variation of materially determinedexemplary contents that are disclosive of material eide and theiressential relations, formalizing variation involves apprehending the

material eide and their essential relations as clues indicative of theformal category object-in-general, and requires a disregarding, andemptying of all objective, material determinations.67 What this entails,then, is the production of multiplicities of variation that are founded onthe experience of internal and external relations, concrete and abstractstates of affairs, sets, collections and unity that are either initially co-manifest by material eide and their essential relations or are so manifestwith the performance of certain operations (e.g., collection,organization into sets) upon them and their exemplars, but which are inno way determined by the material contents in question. The formal eideyielded by the variation at issue in formalization are thus at onceheterogeneous with the material contents that are disclosive of thematerial eide and their essential relations, and homogenous with these(material) eide and the formal operations (e.g., collection, organization

into sets) themselves that are performed upon them. According toHusserl: We obtain therewith ideas of the formal region object-in-general.Itincludes the ideas of the forms of possible objectivities.68

VII. Insight into Essence in Full Concretion and the Problem ofUnrevealed Relativities

65Ibid., p. 359, p. 435.66Ibid. (translation altered).67Ibid.68Ibid., p. 360, p. 436.


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According to Husserl, the initial apprehension of the material eide ofconcreta and their regions is tainted by a relativitywhich is not revealedand taken into account.69 This relativity concerns the both the internaland external horizons of the empirical concreta that are manifest in

terms of systems of possible variation, and the reference to the subjectwhose experience is disclosive of the concreta in question. The formerrelativity discloses the concrete region of the thing in general as having areference to the context of an infinitely open nature in general, andfurther, of a possible concrete world in general.70The latter relativitydiscloses the reference to a community of subjects in general, whoseopen environing world it [the possible concrete world] is.71Only whenthese relativities are taken into account do

we obtain an insight into essence in full concretion. Everycontemplation of essence (Wesensbetractung) which is on alower level and remains stuck in a implicit relativity is not, onthat account, without result; but it is abstract and, in whatconcerns the sense of its result, has an imperfection whichpermits grave dangers. An abstract, although pure, essence isdependent; correlatively, it leaves unknown essences open; it isa heading for dependent possibilities, whose thematicvariation has a sphere of nonthematic covariation attached to it

which codetermines the thematic sense.72

This insight into essence in full concretion is for Husserl preciselywhat the old ontology and its parallel epistemology has failed toacheive. Not seen by the tradition, then, is what for Husserl is

the enormous task of a systematic exhaustion of ontologicalconcretion . . . [and the clarification of] the method of theconcrete intuition of essence and of an intuition of essences ingeneral. Every concept of essence attained according to anauthentic method, even though one-sided, belongs at the sametime to universal ontology. All ontological relativity is with

respect to essence.73

Whether Husserl himself saw with sufficient clarity the difficulties thathave been noted, by followers and critics alike, regarding the impact thatthe assumptions underlying the traditional questions that guide the

69Ibid., p. 363, p. 441.70Ibid.71Ibid.72Ibid., p. 363, pp. 441-2.73Ibid.


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problems treated by the old ontology have on his notion of auniversal ontology rooted in the methodical seeing of essences, whichontology and method, after all, he fashioned as the definitive response tothese traditional problems, is a question whose answer cannot beexplored here. That is to say, the question of whether the relativities ofhistorical meaning, of social, cultural and political environing worlds, ofmasculine and feminine aspects of subjectivity, and indeed, of both anatural world and subjectivity itself, permit concrete essential unfoldingand articulation in accord with the fundamental distinctions betweenuJlh, morfhJ and ei[dh that guides both his and Greek ontology; and thusthe question whether these relativities can be suitably addressed by aphilosophical method guided by the goal of disclosing the apriorioperative and limiting all possible experience, is a question whosediscussion and possible answer (or answers) defines the future projectsand prospects of philosophy operating in the style of a Husserliantranscendental phenomenology at all.74

74Husserls answer to this question, judging by his last great work, TheCrisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology, trans. David Carr(Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1970) would be of course anunequivocal yes.

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Hopkins Wesenserschauung