Horowitz 2012 - Translation Alignment

8/3/2019 Horowitz 2012 - Translation Alignment

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/horowitz-2012-translation-alignment 1/22

Translation Alignment:Actor-Network Theory, Resistance,

and the Power Dynamics of Alliance

in New Caledonia

Leah S. Horowitz

Rutgers, the State University of New Jersey, New Brunswick, NJ, USA;[email protected]

Abstract: This study of resistance to multinational mining in New Caledonia

expands actor-network theory’s concept of translation by exploring ways that power dynamics affect alliances and the translations that both support and challenge them.Examining relationships among an indigenous protest group, environmentalist grassrootsorganizations, a human rights lawyer, the mining company, and the provincialgovernment, I argue that power often requires alliances, mediated by compatibletranslations. However, if alliances are to succeed, at least temporarily, these translationsmust be made compatible through a process of translation alignment. Ironically, thisalignment inevitably alters at least one of the translations, diminishing the power of theactor-network that articulated it to achieve its original goals. This paper’s findings alsoenhance radical geographical understandings of capitalism’s infrastructure, as unevendevelopment increasingly relies upon—yet finds it increasingly difficult to achieve—thealignment of local communities’ translations with those of the agents of industry.

Keywords: grassroots environmentalist organizations, indigenous protest groups,industrial development, Melanesia, multinational mining, political ecology

Introduction: Strategic Alliances at the GrassrootsOn 14 June 2006, the government of the Southern Province of the South

Pacific nation of New Caledonia organized a round table discussion between

representatives of a multinational mining project and Rheebu Nuu, an indigenous

Kanak protest group that had been targeting the project by blocking roads anddestroying millions of dollars’ worth of equipment. When the room emptied, Rheebu

Nuu leader Gabriel Kwuu1 informed the small crowd of supporters and journalists

who had gathered outside that the two sides were in the process of “constructing a

dialogue”.2 He then invited a few non-indigenous leaders of local environmentalist

grassroots groups, who had attended the meeting, to speak. They thanked Gabriel

for allowing them to participate in this dialogue; one, Andr e, promised that “we,

the environmentalist groups who support Rheebu Nuu”, would take up a collection

to help the protest group pay the fine imposed for the damages it had caused, and

the gathering dispersed on an optimistic note. Driving me home, however, Andr e

grumbled his discontent at the fact that during the round table discussion, Gabriel

“didn’t want us [environmentalists] to talk about” the project’s environmental

impacts. Just over 2 years later, Rheebu Nuu would sign a “Pact” with the mining

Antipode Vol. 44 No. 3 2012 ISSN 0066-4812, pp 806–827 doi: 10.1111/j.1467-8330.2011.00926.xC 2011 The Author Antipode C 2011 Antipode Foundation Ltd.



Translation Alignment 807

company, which one grassroots leader labeled a “deal with the devil” (Jean-Philippe,

pers. comm. 31 August 2009), and many environmentalists would refuse to talk with

the indigenous group’s main leader at all.

Strategic alliances are crucial to achieving goals, particularly in the absence of

other sources of power. Thus, individuals and groups often seek to work with

others toward common aims, pooling resources in order to achieve what theyotherwise could not. Sets of actors may coalesce around “discourse coalitions”,

shared concerns and ways of talking about them (Hajer 1995), although it is rare,

even impossible, for individuals or groups—particularly those with different socio-

cultural, economic and political interests—to have perfectly overlapping goals.

Moreover, pace Habermasian ideals of rational, moral communication, actors are

too self-interested to compromise their own, narrow aims in order to pursue shared

interests (McGuirk 2001). Meanwhile, the parties involved have different forms

and levels of power, including differences in “the socioeconomic and political

richness” of their social networks (Hillier 2000:35). Differing goals, self-interest, and

power differentials all result in “partnership dissonance” (Di Domenico, Tracey and

Haugh 2009:896), marked by “concealment, manipulation, and domination” (Zeitz

1980:86). In the process of negotiation, some groups will inevitably be excluded

from discussions, and/or will see their aims sidelined (Hillier 2000; Mouffe 1996).

This paper examines alliances in the context of a multinational mining project.

In particular, it focuses on the largely unexplored topic of alliances between

environmentalist grassroots groups and indigenous protesters. While numerous

studies have examined the “fragile overlapping agenda” (Tsing 2005:268)

sometimes shared by environmentalists and indigenous groups in the face of

threats to local ecosystems, the environmentalists in question are often internationalnon-governmental organizations (INGOs). Numerous studies point to ways in

which power discrepancies and divergent goals shape many INGO-indigenous

relationships. Few, however, have examined the power dynamics inherent

in alliances between non-indigenous, environmentalist grassroots organizations

(GROs) and indigenous GROs or communities. GROs, in contrast to powerful INGOs,

are locally based, “smaller, often membership-based organizations, operating

without a paid staff but often reliant upon donor or NGO support, which tend

to be (but are not always) issue-based and therefore ephemeral” (Mercer 2002:6).

In GRO–GRO relationships, power hierarchies are flattened, and indigenous statusoften becomes a distinguishing asset as it entails sources of influence that other

groups lack. Scholars studying these joint movements have noted their “precarious”

(Long 2000), fragile nature, due in part to cultural and class differences as well as

racial tensions, but also to different ideologies and rival socio-economic or political

interests, brought only temporarily “under a singular but tenuous agenda that

bridges different rural values and visions” (Larsen 2008:174). These alliances, then,

hang together only when strategically valuable for both parties (Catton 1997).

More broadly, this paper aims to enhance our understanding of alliance itself,

by examining the power differentials and dynamics inherent in groups’ efforts at

working jointly toward overlapping, but not entirely shared, objectives. I find a useful

lens for understanding these questions in Actor-Network Theory (ANT), particularly

its concept of “translation”. ANT, originally conceived as a sociological interrogation

C 2011 The Author Antipode C 2011 Antipode Foundation Ltd.



808 Antipode

of science and technology, has been used productively in analyses of scientific and

technological networks from the 1980s onward, but has also begun to be applied

throughout the social sciences to a wide range of topics. Here, I apply key concepts

from ANT to analyze relationships among Rheebu Nuu, an indigenous Kanak protest

group in New Caledonia that targeted a multinational mining project known as Goro

Nickel; the urban-based, environmentalist GROs that also opposed the project;3

ahuman rights lawyer; the mining company; and the provincial government. Through

the concept of “translation alignment”, this analysis expands ANT by exploring

the power dynamics that explain how translations triumph or are suppressed, and

how the success or failure of their alignment affects the alliances these translations

create. In the conclusion, I point to the fundamental irony that this case study

illustrates. Goal achievement relies upon alliance with influential others, which can

be accomplished only through aligning translations enough to achieve adequate

compatibility. However, this alignment, in order to succeed, inevitably requires

compromise of those very goals. This tension between a desire to achieve one’s

aims, and the necessity of working with those who do not share them, makes

alliances, and the power they entail, tenuous, fluctuating, and at constant risk of

collapse. This paper’s findings also enhance radical geographical understandings

of capitalism’s infrastructure, as uneven development increasingly relies upon—

yet finds it increasingly difficult to achieve—the alignment of local communities’

translations with those of the agents of industry.

Translation, Alliance and Power While ANT was elaborated chiefly by Michel Callon, Bruno Latour, and John Law,

here I will focus primarily on the version of “translation” most extensively articulated

by Callon (see also Law 1986) and described by Callon in the case of scallop

fisheries (1986b), the electric vehicle (1986a), and the economic market (1999),

and by Callon and Law (1988) in the case of a military aircraft project. This differs

significantly from the term as used by Latour (eg 1987).

Translation, in this definition, involves associating “heterogeneous entities” to

form an actor-world through assigning, to each, “an identity, interests, a role to

play, a course of action to follow, and projects to carry out” (Callon 1986a:24).In this way, the translator becomes the “spokes[person] of the entities he [or she]

constitutes,” expressing or interpreting “their desires, their secret thoughts, their

interests, their mechanisms of operation” (Callon 1986a:25). Meanwhile, “roles are

not fixed and pre-established” (Callon, Law and Rip 1986:xvi), and different actors

may combine and define these entities in completely different ways to “construct

a plurality of different and incommensurate worlds” (Callon 1986a:24), none of

which can be shown to be any more “real” than the others. Having “spoken for”

the other entities in the scenario it has delineated, the translator next attempts to

make itself an “obligatory passageway”, “a strategic point through which the actor-

world must pass” (Callon 1986a:27). In other words, the translator defines what the

other actors desire to obtain, and then attempts to demonstrate that the only way

to achieve these goals is with the translator’s assistance or approval.





This first “moment” of translation, “problematization”, involves the definition

of the problem and its solution. The subsequent three moments are all oriented

toward the achievement of this solution through the manipulation of other actors

and intermediaries. The second moment, “interessement”, involves “one entity

attracting a second by coming between that entity and a third” (Callon, Law and Rip

1986:xvii). Thus, interesting other actors signifies forging privileged relationships,a “system of alliances”, between them and the translator by convincing them to

accept the translator’s definition of their identities and desires, to the exclusion of all

other definitions. This may be achieved through “seduction or a simple solicitation”

or, if necessary, through “pure and simple force”. Ultimately, the purpose of

interessement is to “corner the entities to be enrolled” (Callon 1986a:209), in

preparation for the third moment of translation, “enrolment”, which involves

putting into action the roles defined for the other actors during the problematization

phase. At this juncture, to make the translation a success, the translator requires

the cooperation of the other actors and intermediaries, who must enact the roles

assigned to them. This requires a series of “multilateral negotiations, trials of strength

and tricks” (Callon 1986a:211). However, these negotiations can only be carried

out with a few representatives of each actor-network to be enrolled. Finally, then,

the fourth moment of translation is “mobilization”, in which these representatives

attempt to convince the other members of their constituency to enact the roles

agreed on their behalf. At every stage, seduced or forced to follow the itinerary thus

laid out for them, actors and intermediaries experience “displacement”, the literal

movement necessary to “solidify” the actor-worlds and thus render the translation

successful (Callon 1986a:28).

However, a translation—which fundamentally means an attempt to define andcontrol others—may very well not succeed. Indeed, “[e]ach actor is relatively

unpredictable, because any translation is constantly being undone” (Callon

1991:152). This dynamism is due in large measure to resistance on the part

of enrolled entities, who reject the translations imposed upon them in favor of

their own, such that “the destiny of most spokes[persons] is thus to be brutally

contradicted” (Callon 1986a:25). The translation may fall apart at any of the four

moments: the other actors may reject the definition of themselves and their desires,

the invitation to ally themselves with the translator, the roles assigned to them, or the

agreement negotiated on their behalf by their putative representatives. Clearly, then,translation is inherently a power struggle, and the alliances it forges unstable and

subject to influence from competing translations. Echoing Foucault’s understanding

of power as a “perpetual battle” (1975:35), ANT theorists (eg Latour 1986; Law

1991) have stressed that power (both “power over” and “power to”) must be

analyzed not—or not only—as a possession or capacity but rather as relational,

dependent upon and limited by the ability to persuade or coerce others who

simultaneously pursue their own goals. Power lies in networks, and thus is contingent

upon the successful—albeit often short-lived—enrolment of (at least some) others.

These insights are all crucial to the understanding of alliances. However, I argue

that while ANT views translation as a power struggle, it does not account adequately

for the effects of power inequalities on alliances and the translations that both

support and challenge them. In the framework this paper outlines, I propose that




810 Antipode

alliances are normally inequitable (see also Routledge 2008), with partners relying to

different degrees on their relationship. When the parties’ translations differ, which

is nearly inevitable, these may overlap enough to allow alliances to persist for a

while but may ultimately cause these partnerships to collapse, to the detriment

of the more dependent party. The translation that prevails will likely be the one

that is most compatible with the translations of (other) powerful institutions—thoseactors (in keeping with the above definition of power) able to convince or coerce

others in the pursuit of desired outcomes. However, the risk of such engagements is

that in order to prevail, a translation may have to be modified in order to be made

compatible with those of powerful potential allies. This process of making competing

translations compatible I term “translation alignment”. This is similar in some ways

to “frame alignment,” particularly “frame bridging” as outlined by Benford and

Snow (2000:624), yet incorporates a consideration of the power dimensions of

interpretation, of attempts to achieve desired outcomes, and of the manipulation

of one’s own, or others’, goals.

New Caledonia and Opposition to Goro NickelThis study explores the intricacies and outcomes of competing and mutating

translations, and the power dynamics they entail, in the context of resistance to

a multinational mining project in New Caledonia. New Caledonia is a particularly

appropriate site for exploring issues surrounding alliance in a context of industrial

development. This island nation, colonized by France, has long been fraught with

tensions between the different ethnic groups that call it home. Its abundant natural

resources, gravely threatened by mining activity for nearly 140 years, are valuedvery differently by distinct communities with vastly different relationships to its

landscapes (see Horowitz 2004, 2008).

New Caledonia is a Melanesian archipelago with a population of approximately

231,000 (ISEE 2008), comprised of several ethnic groups: Melanesians, known as

Kanak (45%), people of European ancestry (34%), as well as Asians, Pacific Islanders,

and others (ITSEE 2001). The Europeans include two culturally distinct groups: a

small population of expatriates, and the descendants of prisoners deported to New

Caledonia during its era as a French penal colony in the nineteenth century. Sixty

percent of the population is concentrated in the capital, Noumea, where mostmembers of non-Melanesian ethnic groups reside, while rural villages are almost

entirely peopled by Kanak. New Caledonia has been administered by Metropolitan

France since 1853. In the early 1970s, militant, nationalist, anti-colonialist political

parties formed, and the 1980s witnessed a series of violent uprisings, known as

“les Evenements” (the Events), which ended in 1988 with the Matignon Accords

(see Freyss 1995; Henningham and May 1992). A referendum in 1998 resulted

in the acceptance of the Noumea Accords, which made provisions for a gradual

devolution of some administrative authority, although New Caledonia remains a

French possession. It also initiated legislative changes to allow for greater expression

of Kanak identity, including the creation of a Customary Senate which advises the

government on a range of issues. Training and economic development programs

were promised, and a new referendum would be held in 15–20 years’ time.





Figure 1: New Caledonia and the Vale Nouvelle-Caledonie project area

Grande Terre, the main island, is estimated to possess nearly 25% of the world’s

nickel reserves (Mining Journal 1999) and is the second largest producer of ferronickel

and the fifth greatest source of nickel ore (Lyday 2006). Mine sites have beenscattered across Grande Terre ever since the first nickel mine opened in 1874.

New Caledonia currently possesses only one nickel refinery, located near Noumea,

which uses pyrometallurgical technology, but two more refineries are in progress

(see Horowitz 2004). The more advanced project, which has attracted far more

controversy, is Vale Nouvelle-Caledonie, known until December 2008 (and still

locally referred to) as Goro Nickel, at the southern tip of Grande Terre (Figure 1).

Inco, a multinational mining company based in Canada, purchased the mining rights

to the Goro site in 1991 and completed a pilot refinery there in 1999. Due to the low

mineral content of the soils, the refinery would use hydrometallurgical technology.This procedure, which had never before been implemented in New Caledonia,

involves the use of acid under pressure to leach nickel and cobalt from the ore.

The resulting effluent, containing additional dissolved metals, would be discharged

into the nearby lagoon through a pipeline. In 2006 Inco was purchased by CVRD,

a Brazilian multinational mining company, which in 2007 changed its name to

Vale. Representatives of Goro Nickel’s new parent company quickly announced

their intentions to proceed with the project (Ribot 2007). Commercial operations at

full capacity are planned for 2013 (Vale 2010), despite delays caused by several

accidents including massive spills of sulfuric acid in April 2009 and April 2010

(Cochin and Ribot 2009, Mainguet 2010).

Meanwhile, New Caledonia is considered a “hotspot” for biodiversity, with

exceptionally high numbers of endemic species that are severely threatened,




812 Antipode

especially by mining activity (Kier et al 2009; Labrosse et al 2000; Richer de Forges

and Pascal 2008). In the early 2000s, local residents began to express increasing

concerns about New Caledonia’s threatened ecosystems. A multitude of GROs

formed and splintered, with names such as Action Biosphere, Coordination de

Defense du Sud, Corail Vivant, Gondwana, Mocamana, and Point Zero/Baseline,

mostly led by urban-based expatriates or Caledonians of European ancestry. TheseGROs took a range of approaches to the Goro Nickel project, with some choosing

not to engage with this issue, others seeking to influence the company to ensure

the best possible environmental performance, and others opposing its existence

entirely. It was the latter, most extreme environmental GROs that worked most

closely with Rheebu Nuu, and this paper focuses on them and their relationships

with the indigenous group.

In 2002, Rheebu Nuu, which means “eye of the country” in the indigenous

language of Numee, was formed specifically to focus on Goro Nickel. The group

is led entirely by Kanak but has support from environmental NGOs based in

Noumea, Australia, Canada and France, as well as an international citizen support

base. While not entirely opposed to the mining project, Rheebu Nuu has concerns

about its potential environmental impacts, particularly on the marine resources

upon which the local population depends for subsistence and livelihood. They are

also concerned that Kanak will not benefit adequately from employment with the

project, as evidenced by the company’s bringing workers from the Philippines for

the construction phase. Rheebu Nuu works closely with another organization, the

Indigenous Committee for Natural Resource Management (CAUGERN4), created in

2005. For 6 years, Rheebu Nuu initiated a series of actions, including the distribution

of pamphlets denouncing Inco’s activities, the holding of public meetings at localvillages, open letters sent to political leaders, legal action in the courts, and blockades

of the construction site which turned into violent encounters with armed police.

Then, on 27 September 2008, 12 Rheebu Nuu leaders, 25 customary authorities

and two Goro Nickel representatives—from all sides, only senior males—signed a

“Pact for Sustainable Development of the Far South [of New Caledonia]” (hereafter

“the Pact”). Through this agreement, the mining company committed to creating a

corporate foundation to fund local sustainable development initiatives, setting up a

Consultative Customary Environmental Committee (CCCE5), recruiting and training

local “environmental technicians”, and implementing an extensive reforestationprogram. In exchange, Rheebu Nuu members implicitly committed to “assert their

point of view not through violent or illegal actions, but by dialogue” (Goro Nickel,

Conseil Coutumier de l’Aire Drubea Kapume and Comite Rheebu Nuu 2008:7).

Additionally, “[a]ll contestations between the Rheebu Nuu Committee and Goro

Nickel are irrevocably ended” by the agreement (Goro Nickel, Conseil Coutumier

de l’Aire Drubea Kapume and Comite Rheebu Nuu 2008:16). On 14 July 2009,

Rheebu Nuu leaders publicly denounced the Pact, “suspending” their signature and

“lodging a complaint” against the company. They cited a leak of thousands of liters

of sulfuric acid which had destroyed a freshwater ecosystem in April that year and the

company’s poor handling of the incident, and complained that the company, now

called Vale, had refused to honor its financial commitment to OEIL, a monitoring

center set up by the Southern Province the previous year (Mapou and Vama 2009).





Table 1: Timeline of some events in the Vale Nouvelle-Caledonie project

1991 Inco purchases mining rights to Goro site, commencesGoro Nickel project

1999 Inco completes pilot refinery2001 Customary authorities lead intravillage discussions on

how to address threats and opportunities from GoroNickel

2001 Environmentalists take two Kanak leaders to Canada2002 Rheebu Nuu createdOctober 2004 Southern Province grants permit to operate refinery2005 Goro Nickel begins construction of commercial refinery1–18 April 2006 Violent protests: equipment burned, gendarmes injured,

people arrested April 2006 Experts hired to provide “second opinion” on

environmental impacts14 June 2006 Administrative court of New Caledonia annuls permit due

to insufficient environmental impact assessment

14 June, 12 July 2006 Round Tables with Goro Nickel and Rheebu Nuu,mediated by Southern ProvinceOctober 2006 CVRD purchases Inco2006–2008 Negotiations between Goro Nickel, Rheebu Nuu, and

customary authoritiesNovember 2006 Experts present final report on environmental impacts2007 CVRD changes its name to Vale2007–2008 Vale conducts additional environmental and

socio-economic impact assessments2008 Commercial refinery construction completed27 September 2008 Vale Inco, customary authorities, and Rheebu Nuu sign

Pact

October 2008 Southern Province grants new permit to operate refineryDecember 2008 Goro Nickel changes its name to Vale Inco

Nouvelle-CaledonieMarch 2009 Monitoring center, OEIL, created1 April 2009 Thousands of liters of sulfuric acid leak from refinery into

nearby creek14 July 2009 Rheebu Nuu temporarily denounces PactOctober 2009 Consultative Customary Environmental Committee

(CCCE) createdFebruary 2010 Environmental technicians begin training programMarch 2010 Vale Inco produces first grams of nickel and cobalt

21 April 2010 Second major acid spillMay 2010 Vale Inco Nouvelle-Caledonie changes its name to ValeNouvelle-Caledonie

Translation Alignment

Outside observers speculated that Rheebu Nuu was feeling pressure from Kanak

communities, who had not yet received any benefits. However, the protest group

continued the dialogue with Vale, and the CCCE and training program were created

a few months later (see Table 1).

I have conducted fieldwork in New Caledonia since 1998, and began to study the

Goro Nickel project in 2006 (see Horowitz 2009, 2010). From June to September

2006 and in October 2009, I conducted semi-structured interviews with 86 residents




814 Antipode

of the villages nearest to the mine site. I also conducted interviews with 31 people

in Noumea, including leaders and members of Rheebu Nuu and several GROs, New

Caledonia-based representatives of international NGOs, government officials, and

mining company representatives. Additionally, I attended GRO meetings as well

as round table discussions involving Rheebu Nuu, GROs, the government and the

mining company. In March, May and December 2006, and July–November 2009,I conducted telephone interviews with an additional 11 people, as well as follow-

up discussions with previous interviewees. These included NGO and GRO leaders,

lawyers, researchers, and mining company officials, based in Australia, Canada,

France and New Caledonia. All translations from the French, both oral and written,

are my own. I have used pseudonyms for all interviewees.

In Search of Indigenous Legitimacy: TranslatingRheebu NuuOver the last few decades, international institutions and the general public have paid

increasing attention to the plight of indigenous peoples (Karlsson 2003; Merlan

2009). Notably, the United Nations (UN) lists New Caledonia as one of the “16

Non Self-Governing Territories” on its “decolonization list” of nations that should

become autonomous (United Nations 2007). Because of the political and moral

legitimacy the local indigenous people possessed, non-indigenous environmentalist

GRO leaders based in New Caledonia insisted on the strategic necessity of working

with them: “We will never be able to do it seriously, if we don’t have the Kanak

with us” (Marcel, pers. comm. 14 July 2006), as “we will never have the legitimacy

that they have . . .

in the eyes of the international collectivity” (Marcel, pers. comm.15 July 2006). As Christophe noted bitterly, members of non-indigenous ethnicities

do not have the same “lip service” paid to them by the United Nations and other

international agencies (pers. comm. 22 July 2009). Instead, “former colonists”—

as the descendants of deportees and other settlers are viewed—have to “take

responsibility” for their ancestors’ destruction of Kanak lands (Marcel, pers. comm.

15 July 2006). Clearly, the GROs needed the Kanak on their side. Therefore, they

needed to “translate” both the Kanak and Goro Nickel. Through the process of

problematization, the environmentalists had to define the indigenous community

as powerless victims of a rapacious multinational, who were deeply attached to their natural resources and who desired the same goal as the environmentalists: that of

forcing the company to leave, or at least ensuring that the project would cause

no ecological damage, with no room for compromise. Also, the environmentalists

had to interest the Kanak, allying themselves with Rheebu Nuu in an attempt to

convince the group to accept its enrolment into the position outlined for it and to

mobilize its constituency into participating in the protest actions. In the process,

the GROs needed to invent themselves as the spokespersons or representatives of

Rheebu Nuu and the entire Kanak people. As elaborated below, the four moments

of translation did not occur in sequence but co-evolved.

As part of their problematization of the mining project, the GROs needed to

position themselves as the obligatory passage point for the company, ensuring that

the project could only proceed with their approval, if at all. They attempted this





through a series of actions at the national and international scales, working through

their networks in the NGO world to pressure the local and French governments as

well as funding bodies in Europe and Japan. They also tried to become the obligatory

passageway for the Kanak, positioning themselves as the source of the information

and contacts necessary to fund and continue the struggle. This was simultaneously

a project of interessement, an attempt to make themselves the privileged alliesof the Kanak by severing any other potential relationships, such as to the mining

company or government. In 2001, two environmentalists took two influential Kanak

to Inco’s headquarters in Canada, where they confronted Inco officials and met with

representatives of an environmental and social justice NGO (who had provided the

flights) as well as with Innu and Inuit who had faced a similar project on their lands.

The GRO leaders were pleased that their Kanak colleagues engaged fully with the

situation, challenging Inco officials to explain why they had not asked permission of

the customary landowners before beginning their activities and why they persisted

in neglecting indigenous people’s rights when that approach had failed elsewhere.

Upon return to New Caledonia, the Kanak leaders put together a “solid dossier”

and met with local customary authorities to plan how to address the “aggression”

facing them. The GRO leaders believed that this awareness-raising resulted in the

creation of Rheebu Nuu (pers. comm. 22 July 2009).

Thus, the environmentalists aimed to translate themselves as having been the

ultimate force, or at least inspiration, behind the indigenous protest group. When I

remarked to Arthur that at the time of my previous fieldwork, in 2001, the Kanak had

not seemed to make much use of international rights-based discourses, he agreed

that over the subsequent 5 years, with his help, they had begun to discover the

power of a discourse of “recognition of the basic rights of indigenous people” (pers.comm. 10 June 2006). Arthur felt that he had “started a process” in 2000 by talking

with influential Kanak and making speeches in local villages, and then “pushed”

the Kanak to take action (pers. comm. 22 March 2006). Marcel similarly saw the

indigenous people’s increasing “maturity” and “awareness of their legitimacy” as

a “victory” for the environmentalists (pers. comm. 15 July 2006). Although the

GROs’ attempt to sue the company was unsuccessful, they felt this action had

provided Rheebu Nuu with the “momentum” necessary for their successful suit

against the company in June 2006, which resulted in the revocation, due to an

insufficient Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA), of Goro Nickel’s permit tooperate the refinery it was constructing.6 Meanwhile, the environmentalists felt

that the relationship was mutually beneficial; their work was “complementary” to

that of Rheebu Nuu (Marcel, pers. comm. 14 July 2006), as they possessed “a

certain expertise” (Stephane, pers. comm. 24 June 2006), including “technical” and

“scientific” information. Andr e described their role as that of “supplier” as, behind

the scenes, they could “provide Rheebu Nuu with the necessary environmental

facts” which the indigenous group would “have its militants apply” by making

demands of the provincial government or the mining company (pers. comm. 23

June 2006). While Andr e was proud that his GRO was “close” to the “customary

authorities” and boasted that while “we recognize their legitimacy, they recognize

the work that we do” (pers. comm. 29 August 2006), Marcel admitted that




816 Antipode

the environmentalists were, in some sense, “manipulators”, albeit with Kanak

“complicity” (pers. comm. 15 July 2006).

Indeed, Marcel “reproached” himself for having been responsible for “pushing”

the Kanak to resist the mining project, which had resulted in violence (pers. comm.

15 July 2006). This had included several blockades that culminated, in April 2006, in

a 2-week stand-off in which four gendarmes were injured, 36 people arrested, andover 1 billion FCFP (approximately $US 13 million) of damage caused to the mining

company’s equipment. The environmentalists attempted to distance themselves

from this violence, at least outwardly. As Andr e emphasized, “We don’t always

agree . . . Rheebu Nuu acts as it sees fit to act on the ground, and there, of course,

we can’t intervene.” However, he lamented with some frustration that “our way is

. . . done on paper, in front of tribunals, and that’s been going on since . . . Some

GROs, they’ve been here for 25 years and nothing has come of it” (pers. comm. 23

June 2006). Secretly, therefore, the GRO leaders were pleased that the indigenous

group had “done an excellent job” of creating an “electroshock” that got their point

across; Marcel recognized that “in their position, that’s exactly what I would have

done” (pers. comm. 15 July 2006). This social position was not shared by the non-

indigenous environmentalists, however. Andr e and others had supported Rheebu

Nuu discreetly by supplying provisions to the protestors camped along the road

to the mine site, yet did not feel that they were able to participate overtly in such

actions. First, they could not “play a game like that”, which “risked harming the

quality of our actions” as the GROs’ image would be damaged if they were viewed

as violent extremists themselves (Marcel, pers. comm. 15 July 2006). Moreover,

Stephane was concerned that, as an expatriate (like many local environmentalists),

he was in a “more delicate position” than that of the indigenous people, who had“nothing to lose” as the government could not expel them from the country (pers.

comm. 23 July 2009).

In the GROs’ “enrolment” of Rheebu Nuu, then, roles were laid out for each

party: the GROs would be the ultimate driving force behind the protests, and

the brains of the operation, providing the knowledge required to counter Goro

Nickel’s claims. In a complementary role, Rheebu Nuu would take action—violent,

if need be—to pressure the government and company into making the necessary

changes to their operation, or shutting it down altogether. The environmentalists

were therefore content to allow the indigenous group, with its political and morallegitimacy in the eyes of the international community, to be the public face of

their protest, positioning themselves instead as its “supporters”, as long as Rheebu

Nuu maintained the identity and desires assigned to it within the GROs’ actor-

world. Behind the scenes, however, the environmentalists attempted to maneuver

themselves into the position of “spokespersons” for the protest group, and indeed

for all Kanak institutions. For instance, in 2006 Andr e sent the provincial government

a document insisting that his GRO “supports the Rheebu Nuu Committee in its

demands concerning Goro Nickel’s chemical refinery”. Meanwhile, though, the

document characterized Rheebu Nuu—and indeed all Kanak groups—as simply

sharing his GRO’s criticisms, insisting that the government should “comply with our

remarks, our conditions and our demands which are also those of CAUGERN and

the Customary Senate”. In this translation, Rheebu Nuu became part mask, part






818 Antipode

basis in customary authority was, in fact, at the core of Rheebu Nuu’s identity, and

provided it with political legitimacy in the eyes of Kanak villagers, differentiating the

group from non-indigenous GROs (Horowitz 2009). The protest group also had its

own translation of its desires and goals: rather than aiming to preserve the local

ecosystem at all costs, their leaders stated in 2006 that their main goals were to halt

the project long enough to allow further environmental impact assessments to beperformed, and to put in place a Heritage Fund (Fonds patrimoine) for the Kanak

people, supported by a percentage of mining profits from all companies operating

in New Caledonia. In this translation, Rheebu Nuu was neither “environmentalist”

nor “anti-environmentalist”, inappropriate Euro-American terms (see Hames 2007;

Nadasdy 2005), but was fighting for the interests of the Kanak in the face of

an exogenous threat to their landscapes and livelihoods. Their own project of

interessement involved seeking alliances and support from the most powerful

networks available, which meant turning to discourses of indigenous rights. In

2006, one Kanak leader flew to Europe to take a course on indigenous rights offered

by the UN. He remarked that New Caledonian provincial authorities and mining

company officials were stuck in “colonial times”, unaware of any rules other than

their own; meanwhile, the Kanak had “advanced” by discovering institutions such

as the UN and the European Union as well as international conventions (Paul, pers.

comm. 9 June 2006). Like the Maasai described by Hodgson (2002:1095), Kanak

leaders learned to reframe their concerns “in the terms of the indigenous rights

movement” and thus “gained greater visibility, increased legitimacy, and enormous

resources”. Some of these resources took the shape of support from a wide range of

NGOs and GROs around the world.8 Rheebu Nuu leaders communicated with these

groups via e-mail and visited them overseas (their tickets purchased with NGO funds) or welcomed them to New Caledonia where they jointly met with Goro

Nickel officials. They shared experiences and ideas with other indigenous groups in

Australia, Canada and French Guiana, and kept the world informed of their plight via

a website in English and French, designed and maintained by a bilingual expatriate

volunteer. Their supporters included scientists and lawyers both overseas and at

home, who—owing to their interest in environmental and/or human rights issues—

worked for a pittance that was raised through village-scale fundraising activities

such as bingos and t-shirt sales. While Rheebu Nuu leaders appreciated the support

of the GROs, the international NGOs, the lawyers, and the citizens from aroundthe world who championed their cause, these groups and individuals could only

take supporting roles while the protest group leaders themselves would remain the

spokespersons of the Kanak as a whole, and therefore the sole obligatory passageway

for the mining company and the government. They did not hesitate to make their

autonomy, even from the lawyer, clear by “suspending” their signature of the Pact

less than a year later, yet continuing to negotiate with the company. Simultaneously,

they insisted upon their position as representatives of, and unique spokespersons

for, the Kanak people by citing their reason for dissatisfaction as the “incapacity”

of the company to “honor its commitments” to “the southern chieftainships, the

young people, and the population in general” (Mapou and Vama 2009).

Ultimately, there were three major differences between Rheebu Nuu and the

GROs. First, due to its indigeneity, the protest group had a special, internationally





recognized status that afforded it sympathy and support, from powerful institutions

and ordinary citizens alike, around the globe. Secondly, its social position allowed

it to engage in violent activities that the non-indigenous environmentalists could

not pursue. Finally, Rheebu Nuu’s purpose was not to shut down the mining

project entirely, but rather to ensure that the Kanak received the greatest economic

benefits for the least environmental cost. These three factors meant that RheebuNuu could exert greater pressure on—yet allow more scope for negotiation with—

the mining company. Thus, the company had to take the indigenous protest group

into account, and to perform its own translation of them. In this translation, the

protest group’s “motivations” were unclear; company officials and the right-wing

local press were convinced that the group’s two main leaders, former politicians,

had ambitions to re-enter politics. Meanwhile, the group’s concerns resulted largely

from ignorance of the environmental controls being implemented by the project,

a Goro Nickel official insisted (pers. comm. 13 June 2006). Crucially, Rheebu Nuu

was not the spokesperson for the Kanak people as it “does not represent . . . the

totality of Kanak society” but was, rather, a localized fringe element, a fact that “we

tend to forget too easily” (pers. comm. 13 June 2006), although this translation

was somewhat challenged in March 2008 when Rheebu Nuu won the local county

elections. Nonetheless, when the Pact was finalized 6 months later, company officials

emphasized that it had been signed “not only with Rheebu Nuu” but also with 25

customary authorities (pers. comm. 7 October 2009), in a move that functioned

to displace the protest group from its claimed position as sole spokesperson for

the Kanak and hence to dilute its influence. In translating the situation, company

representatives repeatedly portrayed themselves as providing enormous benefits to

the Kanak people through the employment and economic development the projectrepresented. Thus, they tried to “interest”—or at least to claim that they had already

interested—the “majority” of the Kanak population, by coming between them and

the protestors with the promise of future financial gain. Through the Pact, however,

they also managed to interest Rheebu Nuu itself, cutting the group off from the

government and the GROs. In particular, they strove to enroll the protest group

through its main leader, Gabriel Kwuu, making him the president of the CCCE in

October 2009.

The provincial government, meanwhile, had already attempted to enroll Gabriel

seven months earlier by making him the chairman of the board of OEIL,9

an“observatory” composed of local politicians and customary authorities as well as

representatives of environmental GROs and industry (including, oddly, Vale itself),

and charged with monitoring the project. This effort to enroll, simultaneously,

industry and its opposition symbolizes the government’s precarious balancing act

as it translated the mining project as a significant source of revenue for the province

and country, yet also positioned itself as an independent spokesperson for its

constituency and as sharing Rheebu Nuu’s environmental concerns. In response

to broad-based anxieties about the project’s environmental impacts, the Southern

Province commissioned first a government agency based in Metropolitan France,

and then a group of scientists based in France and Canada and approved by Rheebu

Nuu, to provide “independent” assessments (see Horowitz 2010). However, when

the protest group took the President of the Southern Province to court, accusing




820 Antipode

him of accepting a bribe from the company, he replied by suing Gabriel Kwuu for

libel, insisting that Kwuu was using “any means, including violence, libel and slander

. . . But this brutal strategy of no compromise won’t prevent me from . . . acting so

that the construction of this refinery may proceed because it will create activities

and employment for our youth” (quoted in Les Nouvelles cal edoniennes 2006).

Meanwhile, the provincial government attempted to position itself as the obligatorypassage point for the company through its right to grant permits (although this

authority was challenged in June 2006 when the administrative court of New

Caledonia revoked the company’s permit to operate its refinery). It also tried to

claim a position as the obligatory passageway for the protest group, facilitating

negotiations between it and the company (although the government itself was

ultimately excluded from these negotiations). Thus, in a series of clumsily alternating

dance steps, the Southern Province attempted to interest both Goro Nickel and

Rheebu Nuu, each time by presenting itself as protecting one from the threat posed

by the other.

Difficult to Exclude: Signing a (Faustian?) PactThe very factors that forced the company and government to take Rheebu Nuu

into account—that made these protestors “difficult to exclude” (Marcel, pers.

comm. 5 August 2009)—also allowed them to ignore the environmentalist GROs

who were not indigenous, violent, or willing to negotiate. Not surprisingly, the

indigenous group was consistently prioritized in negotiations with Goro Nickel and

the government, leaving the environmentalists almost literally fighting for a place

at the table. In 2004, the Southern Province created a Committee for Information,Consultation and Environmental Impact Monitoring of the Goro Nickel Refinery

(Cicsieug10), with “participating members” from the municipal and provincial

governments, customary authorities, Goro Nickel, and Rheebu Nuu. CAUGERN,

five environmentalist GROs and a research institution were also invited to attend,

but were told that “in the aim of transparency, the GROs and the press may attend

the meetings without, however, participating, neither in the debates nor in voting”

(Cicsieug 2005). When they spoke out anyway, they were no longer notified of the

meetings (Marcel, pers. comm. 5 August 2009).11 During the 14 June 2006 round

table discussion, a GRO leader “saluted Rheebu Nuu’s courage” in managing tocreate a situation in which a dialogue could occur and thanked the group “for

having included us in their actions”. However, it was clear that Rheebu Nuu’s

leaders, having carved out a place for themselves at the negotiating table, were

content to leave the GROs in the role of sidekicks. Planning the order of speakers at

a meeting on the eve of the round table discussion, the group’s main leader listed

“first Rheebu Nuu, CAUGERN, the Customary Senate, and afterward the GROs”

although he insisted that “the GROs are here next to us” and that it was important

to “anchor the place of the GROs in the debate”. In September 2008, Gabriel Kw uu

attended a meeting of Ensemble pour la Planete, an umbrella group of GROs of

which Rheebu Nuu was a member, and announced that the indigenous group

and several customary authorities from the Southern Province were about to sign

a “Pact” with Goro Nickel. The GROs were “a little stunned and didn’t agree at





all” with this decision (Stephane, pers. comm. 23 July 2009). The signing of the

Pact marked the beginning of a significant rift between Rheebu Nuu and the GROs,

with some environmentalists refusing to talk with Kwuu (Jean-Philippe, pers. comm.

31 August 2009) and others “hanging back” or washing their hands of the issue

altogether.

In summary, although each group had a unique translation of the situation,the GROs’ translation was fundamentally incompatible with the translations, and

specifically the goals, of both the Southern Province and, more importantly, Goro

Nickel. Rheebu Nuu’s translation, in contrast, while differing in highly significant

ways, was compatible enough with the translations of the government and company

to allow them to become their privileged interlocutors, to the exclusion of all other

groups and individuals. Power, in this instance, derived from the ability not only “to

enrol, convince and enlist others on terms which allow the initial actors to ‘represent’

the others” (Murdoch 1995:748)—in other words, to manipulate other actors—

but also from the strategic ability to ally themselves with others who were in a

position to help them achieve their goals, or a mutually agreed-upon version of these

goals. The environmentalists’ translation crumbled, and their power dissipated, as

the indigenous group—for whom the relationship was far less crucial—refused to

perform the role laid out for it and thus abandoned this uneasy alliance, and as the

environmentalists refused to engage, either through physical force or negotiation,

with the company. The provincial government, seemingly unable to decide which

party it desired to ally itself with more, ultimately alienated both, who succeeded

in ignoring it. Meanwhile, Rheebu Nuu and Goro Nickel were able to align their

translations of each other just enough to allow them to achieve an agreement—

brokered by yet another ally, the lawyer—that eliminated (at least putatively) thethreat of violent protest in return for the promise (if the refinery ever became

operational) of benefits for the Kanak. The relational, contingent power they shared

was tenuous, however, dependent on the willingness of each to maintain that

alliance, which was called into question when Rheebu Nuu leaders denounced the

Pact. It also relied on the ability of each to claim that this agreement represented

the interests and desires of the Kanak people, which was challenged when villagers,

angered by the Pact, withdrew their support for the protest group, as will be

discussed in a future paper.

Conclusions: What’s Gained and Lost in TranslationAlignment

As this paper has attempted to demonstrate, ANT’s concept of translation, when

applied with a strong focus on the effects of power inequalities on this process,

can provide fundamental insights into the formation and dissolution of alliances,

as well as dissonance within these relationships. Such an analysis can help to

explore ways that the power struggles inherent in alliances are informed by

the parties’ different interpretations of the desires and goals of the actors and

intermediaries involved in the situation, and by their attempts to impose particular,

and incompatible, solutions that involve mutually exclusive privileged roles for

themselves. In the case examined in this paper, environmentalist GROs, Goro




822 Antipode

Nickel, the Southern Province, a human rights lawyer, and of course Rheebu Nuu

itself, all had different translations of the mining project and indigenous protest

against it. In a nutshell, the environmentalists translated Rheebu Nuu as having

been indirectly created by the GROs and as working with them to prevent the

company from damaging local ecosystems. The lawyer, overlooking the group’s

concerns about natural resources, and about autonomy even from well-meaningoutsiders, translated Rheebu Nuu as interested only in respect and recognition of

their indigenous rights and as representative of all Kanak. Goro Nickel translated

Rheebu Nuu as an isolated group of marginal extremists who understood neither

the company’s environmental management strategies nor the fact that the project

would bring enormous benefits to the Kanak, and yet also, ironically, as partners

with whom they could come to a mutually satisfactory, and irrevocable, agreement.

The Southern Province translated Rheebu Nuu alternately as concerned citizens to

support and as violent lawbreakers to suppress. Thus, each actor-network imputed

a particular identity(ies), and particular interests, to the indigenous group and,

through processes of interessement and enrolment, tried to maneuver itself into a

position of spokesperson and obligatory passageway for it and/or the other actor-

networks. Rheebu Nuu itself, meanwhile, rejected all these portrayals and translated

itself as uniquely representing the environmental, livelihood, and indigenous rights

concerns—which were fundamentally inseparable (see Horowitz 2010)—of all

Kanak.

Through these processes of interessement and enrolment, tenuous alliances

formed and shattered. GRO leaders felt that they needed to associate themselves

with Rheebu Nuu in order to achieve legitimacy in the eyes of the international

community as well as to fulfill their own moral imperative. The indigenous group,however, while welcoming all sources of assistance, had a wide international support

network that did not oblige them to conform to an environmentalist agenda they

did not entirely share. Meanwhile, the protest group’s indigenous legitimacy and

forceful actions, in combination with an agenda that allowed for negotiation with

the mining company, led to the privileging of its leaders in all interactions with the

government and the company, and to the exclusion of the GROs. The signing of a

Pact with Goro Nickel resulted in the rupture of the fragile and unbalanced coalition

between the indigenous group and the environmentalists who had supported it,

and who now felt that they had enabled it to work against the goals that they wereunwilling to compromise. Meanwhile, Rheebu Nuu had lost its role as spokespersons

for the Kanak people, many of whom became disillusioned with the group for

its agreement to allow the refinery to enter into operation. It had alienated the

provincial government, who were not signatories to the Pact and thus would play

no role in helping to enforce the commitments it outlined. Even its alliance with

the human rights lawyer was shaken when the group denounced the Pact he had

brokered a year previously. Thus, incompatible translations ultimately resulted in the

dissolution of alliances and of the translation alignments that had briefly supported

them. Meanwhile, Rheebu Nuu’s own translation, and that of Goro Nickel, was

able to prevail through a more formalized translation alignment, creating a tenuous

alliance that—at least temporarily—empowered both parties. However, the very act

of alignment altered the protest group’s translation. All its environmental concerns,





earlier posited as essential in its struggle, had not been addressed. Construction of

the pipeline that would dump effluent into the local marine environment, a huge

source of anxiety for local populations who relied on fishing, continued unabated;

and a Heritage Fund would not be created.

Clearly, then, whether and with whom the actor-networks were willing to align

their translations determined the outcomes of their engagements. The GROs,unwilling to compromise their goals, refused to align their translation with that of

anyone else and saw their aims frustrated. Rheebu Nuu opted to align its translation

not with that of the environmentalists who wanted to stop the project but instead

with that of the mining company, which the indigenous group felt it would never be

able to halt completely, and which offered the community direct monetary benefits.

In the process, however, the protest group lost not only its original objectives but

also many of its previous allies. The provincial government tried to convince both

parties that its translation was already in alignment with that of each, but succeeded

only in making itself appear irrelevant to both. In aligning its translation with that

of Rheebu Nuu, Goro Nickel seemingly altered its vision of the group from marginal

extremists to negotiation partners. However, it very pointedly signed the Pact first

with 25 customary authorities, placing space for Rheebu Nuu signatures at the very

end of the list. Meanwhile, it did not change its translation of itself as representing

a major economic development initiative that would benefit the entire country, nor

did it swerve from its foremost goal of pursuing profit to enrich its shareholders,

arguably its most influential allies. Thus, it seemed to be the only actor-network

heading toward the realization of something very close to its original plans.

Taking as its starting point an ethnographic study of an alliance between

environmentalist GROs and an indigenous protest group, and working outward toencompass an analysis of the multiple networks of influence in which this relationship

was enmeshed, this paper elaborates ANT’s useful framework of translation by

arguing that power, translation and alliance are all intimately intertwined. Power,

in this analysis, derives largely from the ability to forge and maintain alliances with

other key actors, although these alliances, and hence this power, are constantly

changing and subject to collapse. Crucially, the success of alliances depends upon

the compatibility of the translations on which they rely. Hence, power often depends

upon alliances, mediated by mutually compatible translations. Thus far, this analysis

might predict, with Li (2000:174), that “[t]here is the potential for the developmentof a broad social movement, in which urban activists and rural people can begin

to articulate shared interests,” or concur with Lohmann (1995:226) that “interest

groups” can make “strategic alliances with diverse actors in which . . . each group

acts in a way which will benefit the others in their own terms”. However, this

study sounds a note of caution to these more sanguine analyses, emphasizing

that translations are rarely, if ever, perfectly compatible. In line with the findings

discussed above, this paper argues that if the alliances are to succeed, the translations

that engender them must be made compatible through a process of translation

alignment. Ironically, though, this alignment, in turn, inevitably alters at least one

of the translations, thus diminishing the power of the actor-network that articulated

it to achieve its original goals.




824 Antipode

More optimistically, an insight for radical geography merits a brief mention here.

In a globalizing world, it is increasingly important for the agents of capitalism to

align their translations with those of the communities their activities impact upon.

This is gradually opening a space for these communities to drive an ever-harder

bargain by resisting alignment of their own translations. While various factors

ultimately converged to pressure Rheebu Nuu into signing the Pact as a futurepaper will explain, their struggles and successes demonstrated to the company

that it could no longer assume that the Kanak would quietly accept mining’s

environmental damages as they had done for well over a century. Instead, the

protest group found power—and maintained autonomy—by forging networks of

multiple alliances. The GRO leaders learned, too late, the impossibility of ensuring

this now powerful indigenous actor-network would align its translation with theirs,

and turned from an over-reliance on that inherently shaky alliance to other, more

compatible, relationships and strategies.

AcknowledgementsI am deeply grateful to the residents of Goro, Unia and Waho for their generous hospitalityand to all interviewees for their time. Thanks also to Tim Forsyth, Stuart Kirsch, and twoanonymous reviewers for insightful comments. The School of Earth and Environment of theUniversity of Leeds and the Groupement de Recherche Nouvelle-Caledonie, of the CentreNational de la Recherche Scientifique, funded the fieldwork component of this research. Of course, all errors of fact or interpretation are exclusively my own responsibility.

Endnotes1 This name, and all names of interviewees in this paper, are pseudonyms.2 All translations from French are my own.3 Although, according to the above definition, Rheebu Nuu would technically be considereda GRO, it was locally distinguished from the environmentalist groups (known, in French,as associations ) via the rubric “comit e ”. Following that division, in this paper I refer to the“associations ” as GROs and to the “comit e ” as a protest group.4 Comite AUtochtone de GEstion de Ressources Naturelles.5 Comite Consultatif Coutumier Environnemental.6 Oddly, in the Southern Province these permits are separate, so that—as was the casehere—a company could have a permit to build a refinery that it did not have permission tooperate.7 He used the term “peuple premier ”, in contrast to the more usual “autochtones ”, which Ihave translated as “indigenous people”.8 A notable, if not surprising, exception was the local WWF office, which declined to workwith Rheebu Nuu (or, indeed, to address mining impacts directly) as, in the words of the

WWF representatives, it was “too political” (pers. comm. 21 June 2006).9 The observatory’s acronym, “OEIL” (Observation et l’information sur l’environnement),French for “eye”, is a clear attempt to co-opt Rheebu Nuu’s name, which translates as “eyeof the land”.10 Comite d’information, de concertation et de surveillance sur les impacts

environnementaux de l’usine de Goro.11 It is ironic that, in the end, the government itself was also excluded from the pact signedbetween Goro Nickel and Rheebu Nuu.





ReferencesBenford R D and Snow D A (2000) Framing processes and social movements: An overview

and assessment. Annual Review of Sociology 26:611–639Callon M (1986a) The sociology of an actor-network: The case of the electric vehicle. In M

Callon, J Law and A Rip (eds) Mapping the Dynamics of Science and Technology: Sociology of Science in the Real World (pp 19–34). Basingstoke: Macmillan

Callon M (1986b) Some elements of a sociology of translation: Domestication of the scallopsand the fishermen of St Brieuc Bay. In J Law (ed) Power, Action, and Belief: A New Sociology of Knowledge? (pp 196–233). London: Routledge & Kegan Paul

Callon M (1991) Techno-economic networks and irreversibility. In J Law (ed) A Sociology of Monsters: Essays on Power, Technology, and Domination (pp 132–161). New York: Routledge

Callon M (1999) Actor-network theory—the market test. In J Law and J Hassard (eds) Actor Network Theory and After (pp 181–195). Oxford: Blackwell/Sociological Review

Callon M and Law J (1988) Engineering and sociology in a military aircraft project: A networkanalysis of technological change. Social Problems 35(3):284–297

Callon M, Law J and Rip A (eds) (1986) Mapping the Dynamics of Science and Technology:Sociology of Science in the Real World . Basingstoke: Macmillan

Catton T (1997) Inhabited Wilderness: Indians, Eskimos, and National Parks in Alaska . Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press

Cicsieug (2005) Compte rendu de la r eunion du vendredi 25 novembre 2005 [Minutes of themeeting held on Friday 25 November 2005]. Unpublished document, Noumea: ProvinceSud, Direction des Ressources Naturelles.

Cochin C and Ribot S (2009) Pollution chimique a l’usine Vale Inco [Chemical pollution atthe Vale Inco factory]. Les Nouvelles cal edoniennes . 3 April

Di Domenico M, Tracey P and Haugh H (2009) The dialectic of social exchange: Theorizingcorporate-social enterprise collaboration. Organization Studies 30:887–907

Foucault M (1975) Surveiller et punir. Naissance de la prison [Discipline and punish. The birthof the prison]. Paris: Gallimard

Freyss J (1995) Economie assist ee et changement social en Nouvelle-Cal edonie [Assisted

economy and social change in New Caledonia]. Paris: Institut d’etudes du developpementeconomique et social de l’Universite de Paris, Collection Tiers monde, Presses universitairesde France

Goro Nickel, Conseil Coutumier de l’Aire Drubea Kapume and Comite Rheebu Nuu(2008) Protocole d’accord portant pacte pour un developpement durable du Grand Sud[Memorandum of understanding concerning a pact for the sustainable development of theFar South]. Unpublished document, Noumea

Hajer M A (1995) The Politics of Environmental Discourse: Ecological Modernization and the Policy Process . Oxford: Clarendon Press

Hames R (2007) The ecologically noble savage debate. Annual Review of Anthropology 36:177–190

Henningham S and May R J (eds) (1992) Resources, Development and Politics in the Pacific

Islands . Bathurst: Crawford House PressHillier J (2000) Going round the back? Complex networks and informal action in local planning

processes. Environment and Planning A 32:33–54Hodgson D L (2002) Precarious alliances: The cultural politics and structural predicaments

of the indigenous rights movement in Tanzania. American Anthropologist 104:1086–1097

Horowitz L S (2004) Toward a viable independence? The Koniambo Project and the politicaleconomy of mining in New Caledonia. The Contemporary Pacific 16:287–319

Horowitz L S (2008) Destroying God’s creation or using what He provided? Cultural modelsof a mining project in New Caledonia. Human Organization 67:292–306

Horowitz L S (2009) Environmental violence and crises of legitimacy in New Caledonia.

Political Geography 28:248–258Horowitz L S (2010) Twenty years is yesterday: Science, multinational mining, and the politicalecology of trust in New Caledonia. Geoforum 41(4):617–626




826 Antipode

ISEE (2008) Population-societe [Population-society]. Institut de la statistique et des etudeseconomiques. http://www.isee.nc/tec/popsociete/popugeneral.html (last accessed 29

April 2009)ITSEE (2001) Nouvelle-Cal edonie en bref 2001 [New Caledonia in brief 2001]. Noumea: Institut

Territorial de la Statistique et des Etudes EconomiquesKarlsson B G (2003) Anthropology and the “indigenous slot”: Claims to and debates about

indigenous peoples’ status in India. Critique of Anthropology 23:403–423Kier G, Kreft H, Lee T M, Jetz W, Ibisch P L, Nowicki C, Mutke J and Barthlott W (2009) Aglobal assessment of endemism and species richness across island and mainland regions.Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America 106:9322–9327

Labrosse P, Fichez R, Farman R and Adams T (2000) New Caledonia. In C Sheppard (ed) Seas at the Millennium: An Environmental Evaluation (pp 723–736). Amsterdam: Elsevier Science

Larsen S C (2008) Place making, grassroots organizing, and rural protest: A case study of Anahim Lake, British Columbia. Journal of Rural Studies 24:172–181

Latour B (1986) The powers of association. In J Law (ed) Power, Action, and Belief: A New Sociology of Knowledge? (pp 264–280). London: Routledge & Kegan Paul

Latour B (1987) Science in Action: How to Follow Scientists and Engineers through Society .

Cambridge, MA: Harvard University PressLaw J (1986) The heterogeneity of texts. In M Callon, J Law and A Rip (eds) Mapping the

Dynamics of Science and Technology: Sociology of Science in the Real World (pp 67–83).Basingstoke: Macmillan

Law J (1991) Power, discretion and strategy. In J Law (ed) A Sociology of Monsters: Essays onPower, Technology, and Domination (pp 165–191). London: Routledge

Les Nouvelles cal edoniennes (2006) Philippe Gomes porte plainte contre Raphael Mapou[Philippe Gomes lays charges against Raphael Mapou]. 27 May

Li T M (2000) Articulating indigenous identity in Indonesia: Resource politics and the tribalslot. Comparative Studies in Society and History 42:149–179

Lohmann L (1995) No rules of engagement: Interest groups, centralization and the creativepolitics of ‘environment’ in Thailand. In J Rigg (ed) Counting the Costs: Eeconomic Growthand Environmental Change in Thailand (pp 211–234). Singapore: Institute of Southeast

Asian StudiesLong D (2000) The precarious movements of aboriginal peoples and their supporters: A case

study of the Lubicon First Nation Coalition. In D A Long and O P Dickason (eds) Visions of the Heart: Canadian Aboriginal Issues (pp 387–410). Toronto: Harcourt Canada

Lyday T Q (2006) The mineral industry of New Caledonia. In USGS (US Geological Survey)(ed) U.S. Geological Survey Minerals Yearbook (pp 17.1–17.2). Reston, VA: US GeologicalSurvey

Mainguet Y (2010) Une colonne s’effondre a Goro [A column collapses at Goro]. Les Nouvelles cal edoniennes 23 April

Mapou R and Vama A (2009) Djii Djaru 2009, le Comite Suspend Sa Signature du Pacte et

Porte Plainte contre Vale Inco NC [Djii Djaru 2009, the committee suspends its signatureof the Pact and lays charges against Vale Inco NC]. Unpublished document, Noumea

McGuirk P M (2001) Situating communicative planning theory: Context, power, andknowledge. Environment and Planning A 33:195–217

Mercer C (2002) NGOs, civil society and democratization: A critical review of the literature.Progress in Development Studies 2:5–22

Merlan F (2009) Indigeneity: Global and local. Current Anthropology 50:303–333Mining Journal (1999) Inco’s new PAL. 29 October Mouffe C (ed) (1996) Deconstruction and Pragmatism. New York: RoutledgeMurdoch J (1995) Actor-networks and the evolution of economic forms: Combining

description and explanation in theories of regulation, flexible specialization, and networks.Environment and Planning A 27:731–757

Nadasdy P (2005) Transcending the debate over the ecologically noble Indian: Indigenouspeoples and environmentalism. Ethnohistory 52:291–331





Ribot S (2007) Usine du Sud : CVRD donne des garanties mais n’avance aucun chiffre[Southern Refinery: CVRD provides guarantees but doesn’t issue any figures]. Les Nouvelles cal edoniennes 3 March

Richer de Forges B and Pascal M (2008) La Nouvelle-Caledonie, un «point chaud» de labiodiversite mondiale gravement menace par l’exploitation miniere [New Caledonia, aglobal biodiversity “hotspot” seriously threatened by mining]. Journal de la Soci et e des

Oc eanistes 126–127:95–112Routledge P (2008) Acting in the network: ANT and the politics of generating associations.Environment and Planning D: Society and Space 26:199–217

Tsing A L (2005) Friction: An Ethnography of Global Connection. Princeton: Princeton UniversityPress

United Nations (2007) Decolonization United Nations success story, albeit unfinishedone, Deputy Secretary-General tells special committee. http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2007/gacol3151.doc.htm (last accessed 30 August 2009)

Vale (2010) About Vale Inco Nouvelle-Caledonie: History. http://www.vale.nc/pages-eng/propos/history.htm (last accessed 10 November 2010)

Zeitz G (1980) Interorganizational dialectics. Administrative Science Quarterly 25:72–88

Documents

Horowitz 2012 - Translation Alignment