Hospital Alliance Association Disaster Planning Conference March 6, 2012 - Flood Disasters - Impacts/Interdependencies Presenter: Sonny Fong, CDWR

Hospital Alliance Hospital Alliance AssociationAssociation

Disaster Planning ConferenceDisaster Planning Conference

March 6, 2012March 6, 2012

- Flood Disasters - - Flood Disasters - Impacts/InterdependenciesImpacts/Interdependencies

Presenter: Sonny Fong, CDWRPresenter: Sonny Fong, CDWR

CA Disaster SeasonsCA Disaster Seasons

What type of major disaster seasons are What type of major disaster seasons are there in CA each year?there in CA each year?

1)1) FireFire (normally runs from June to (normally runs from June to October)October)

2)2) Flood Flood (official flood season is from (official flood season is from October to April)October to April)

3)3) EarthquakeEarthquake (Year Around) (Year Around)

Critical Infrastructure – Critical Infrastructure – Interdependencies and ResilienceInterdependencies and Resilience

Pre 9/11/01 - CI included highways, roads, bridges, Pre 9/11/01 - CI included highways, roads, bridges, airports public transit, water supply facilities, wastewater airports public transit, water supply facilities, wastewater treatment facilities, solid waste and hazardous waste treatment facilities, solid waste and hazardous waste servicesservices

Post 9/11/01 – CI list expanded to a total of 18 sectors to Post 9/11/01 – CI list expanded to a total of 18 sectors to include agriculture and food systems, defense-industrial include agriculture and food systems, defense-industrial base, energy systems, base, energy systems, public health & health carepublic health & health care, , national monuments and icons, banking and finance, national monuments and icons, banking and finance, drinking water systems, chemical facilities,drinking water systems, chemical facilities, commercial commercial facilities, dams, emergency services, nuclear power, facilities, dams, emergency services, nuclear power, postal and shipping, transportation, telecommunications, postal and shipping, transportation, telecommunications, info technology, critical manufacturing, and government info technology, critical manufacturing, and government facilitiesfacilities

How is CI Interlinked?How is CI Interlinked?

Concept of “Lifeline System” developed to Concept of “Lifeline System” developed to evaluate performance of large, evaluate performance of large, geographically distributed networks during geographically distributed networks during earthquakes, floods, other natural earthquakes, floods, other natural disasters and man-made eventsdisasters and man-made events

Lifelines are grouped into six principal Lifelines are grouped into six principal systems: systems: electric powerelectric power, , gas and liquid gas and liquid fuelsfuels, , telecommunicationstelecommunications, , transportationtransportation, , waste disposalwaste disposal andand water supplywater supply

CI Interlink CI Interlink cont’dcont’d

Lifeline systems are interdependent – mostly by virtue of Lifeline systems are interdependent – mostly by virtue of physical proximity and operational interactionphysical proximity and operational interaction

Lifeline systems in congested urban/suburban Lifeline systems in congested urban/suburban environments have higher risks due to potential failure environments have higher risks due to potential failure impacts of the other systems – i.e. gas line failure with impacts of the other systems – i.e. gas line failure with electrical and water lines above or below itelectrical and water lines above or below it

Lifeline systems all influence each other i.e. electric Lifeline systems all influence each other i.e. electric power systems supply energy for pumping stations, power systems supply energy for pumping stations, storage facilities, and SCADA for equipment control of storage facilities, and SCADA for equipment control of distribution systems for oil, natural gas and chemicalsdistribution systems for oil, natural gas and chemicals

Over 86% of lifeline systems are owned and operated by Over 86% of lifeline systems are owned and operated by private companies private companies

Critical Infrastructure InterdependenciesType of Inter-dependency Energy –

ElectricEnergy - Gas/Oil

Water Communication

Transportation

Energy - Electric Highly connected and interdependent infrastructure for business and economic security

Power for control systems, pumping stations, storage, compressors, and facilities

Power for control systems, pumps, lift stations, and facilities

Power for switches and comm facilities

Power for signaling, switches, and public transportation

Energy - Gas/Oil Fuel for heat, generators and lubricants for electric facilities

Highly connected and interdependent infrastructure for business and economic security

Fuel for treatment, heat, pumps and lift stations, & facilities

Fuel for heat, generators, and facilities

Fuel and lubricants for vehicles and facilities

Water (Potable and Wastewater)

Water for cooling and emissions control

Water for production, cooling and emissions control

Essential and highly dependent infrastructure for health and safety

Water for cooling facilities

Water transport for emergency response and construction

Communication (Landline, Cellular, Cable)

Distribution automation, EMS, & SCADA comm, & customer service & crew repair comm

SCADA communication, and customer service and crew repair comm

Control system and SCADA comm, and customer service and crew repair comm


Signal and control system communication, and crew repair communication

Transportation(Roads, Rail, Ports/Airports)

Transport of fuel and shipping of goods and materials, and inspection

Transport of fuel and shipping of goods and materials, and inspection

Transport of water and inspection

Transport of goods and materials, and inspection


System ResiliencySystem Resiliency Resilience is defined as “the ability to bounce back or Resilience is defined as “the ability to bounce back or

spring back into shape, position, etc. after being pressed spring back into shape, position, etc. after being pressed or stretched.” or stretched.”

Examples of Resilience Qualities as related to technical Examples of Resilience Qualities as related to technical elements:elements:

- Robustness (building codes, and construction - Robustness (building codes, and construction procedures for new or retrofit work)procedures for new or retrofit work)- Redundancy (technical substitutions and “work around” Redundancy (technical substitutions and “work around”

capabilities)capabilities)- Resource depth (availability of technical staff, equipment Resource depth (availability of technical staff, equipment

and materials for restoration and repair, resource and materials for restoration and repair, resource allocation)allocation)

- Timeliness (response time, system downtime, and Timeliness (response time, system downtime, and restoration time)restoration time)

Interesting FactInteresting Fact

US counties with levees, which US counties with levees, which account for only account for only 28%28% of all counties in of all counties in the country and only the country and only 37%37% of the total of the total US land area, are home to a US land area, are home to a whopping whopping 55%55% of the US population. of the US population. In 2004, a majority of Americans, over In 2004, a majority of Americans, over 156 million citizens, resided in these 156 million citizens, resided in these counties.counties.

Example of Urban & Non Urban Area Example of Urban & Non Urban Area LeveesLevees

What Are The Primary Influences What Are The Primary Influences Leading to a Levee Failure?Leading to a Levee Failure?

Fast and high water flows (embankment erosion)Fast and high water flows (embankment erosion) Wind-driven wave wash and high tidal influences specific Wind-driven wave wash and high tidal influences specific

to the Delta (both lead to over-topping)to the Delta (both lead to over-topping) Earthquakes (liquefaction and structural damage)Earthquakes (liquefaction and structural damage) Substandard construction methods and materials (lack of Substandard construction methods and materials (lack of

compaction, poor fill materials)compaction, poor fill materials) Seepage and boils (loss of levee soils due to water Seepage and boils (loss of levee soils due to water

piping) piping) * Burrowing animals* Burrowing animals Intentional acts Intentional acts

* * The next slide shows one of the types of animalsThe next slide shows one of the types of animals

Jihadist SquirrelJihadist Squirrel

Although Officials will never know for sure, it’s suspected that a Although Officials will never know for sure, it’s suspected that a burrowing animal caused the failure of Jones Tract Levee in 2004 burrowing animal caused the failure of Jones Tract Levee in 2004

which put 12,000 square acres under 8’-12’ of waterwhich put 12,000 square acres under 8’-12’ of water

Example of Wind Driven Wave “Wash” and Example of Wind Driven Wave “Wash” and High Water LevelsHigh Water Levels

How a Levee typically failsHow a Levee typically fails

Flooded NorCal Area in 1955Flooded NorCal Area in 1955

AFTERMATHAFTERMATH

Tragic Loss of Life

What Would A Levee Failure In SACTO. What Would A Levee Failure In SACTO.

Look Like??Look Like??

This short video will tell the “STORY”This short video will tell the “STORY”

What Would the flood impacts to What Would the flood impacts to

Sacramento be if a Flood Happens?Sacramento be if a Flood Happens?

The next slides will give you a betterThe next slides will give you a better

feel for what we’re in for. feel for what we’re in for.

UrbanUrban FloodFlood ScenarioScenario

SacramentoSacramento AreaArea LeveeLevee BreaksBreaks(Estimates as of 2005)(Estimates as of 2005)

Urban Flood Scenario: Sacramento Area levee break

What is the direct cost of a significant flood with levee overtopping and breaching in the Sacramento area?

What are the other impacts of a flood in the Sacramento area?

••

••

Hypothetical levee breach scenarioLarge regional flood (1 in 200 chance) with high flows in Sacramento River and American River

Sacramento River at I Street : near “Danger” stageAmerican River at H Street : exceeds “Danger” stage

Three levee breaches, each 300 ft in width: American River breach near California State University Sacramento River breach into Natomas Sacramento River breach near Pocket area

1.1.

2.2.

3.3.


Areas of inundation

• Natomas• Downtown / Land Park• Pocket area• River Park


Depths of floodingInundated area

1 ft or more 100 square miles 6 ft or more 85 square miles10 ft or more 67 square miles15 ft or more 33 square miles20 ft or more 6 square miles


Flooding depths

Areas of deep flooding

NatomasDowntownLand ParkGreenHaven

PocketRiver Park


Sacramento neighborhoods

Population at risk


0 to 1 ft

1 to 6 ft

6 to 10 ft

15,000 – 20,000 people

69,000 – 80,000 people

39,000 – 45,000 people

Depth of flooding Population

10 to 20 ft 96,000 – 100,000 people

239,000 – 268,000 estimated people

20 ft or greater 20,000 – 23,000 people

Inundation of critical facilities


4 Hospitals, 2 have 1 ft or more

26 Medical/health facilities, 19 have 1 ft or more

193 Licensed care facilities, 176 have 1 ft or more

65 Schools, 59 have 1 ft or more

Inundation of critical response facilities and lifeline utilities


12 Fire stations, 9 have inundation depth of 4 ft or moreSignificantly reduces service for emergency response such as fire

suppression, search and rescue, and emergency medical response

1 Police station, minor flooding

38 Power substations, including 3 high voltage substations

16 Wastewater pump stations; likely many collection pipe breakages

1 Water treatment plant; water not drinkable

2 Airports; including 13 ft flooding of Sacramento Intl. Airport

Property damage

Residential $9.2 billionCommercial $1.3 billion Industrial $0.5 billionPublic buildings $0.2 billionTotal $11.2 billion

DamageCategory


Includes damage to structures, contents,vehicles, landscaping, and other property. (From USACE)

Economic impacts

Displacement (temporary housing and relocation) $ 1.5 billion (average displacement time = 10 months, and 230,000 residents displaced)

Lifeline utilitiesLoss of electric power $ 188 per person per dayLoss of water (complete loss) $ 103 per person per day

(potability loss) $ 43 per person per dayLoss of wastewater (no treatment) $ 33 per person per day (partial treatment) $ 8 per person per day

Cost to repair $ 24 million minimum

CostCategory


Summary of direct cost for levee-breach scenario

Property damage $ 11.2 billionDisplacement/temporary housing $ 1.5 billionLifeline utility repairs $ 24 millionLevee repair and pumping cost $ 58 millionEmergency response and recovery $ 16 million

CostCost items

$ 12.8 billion minimum


Larger, deeper hypothetical floods would cause even greater damage and disruption to the Sacramento area


Net indirect fiscal impacts up to $15 billion min.

Indirect fiscal impacts for levee-breach scenario• Displaced residents may not return

• Loss of jobs and incomes

• Loss of sales and property taxes

• Reduction in gross regional product (all goods and services)

• Long term impact to development patterns and economic activity

• Emergency response and recovery

What can we learn from the New Orleans flooding from Katrina?


SacramentoNew Orleans

Population flooded

Fatalities

547,000

1,053

239,000 – 268,000

Unknown

Flood insurance policy holders

City of Sacramento 45,228County of Sacramento 14,423

Current policies*2005 est


Area

In 2005, 50,000 parcels removed from 100-year regulated floodplain in Sacramento.

Much of Sacramento now qualifies for less expensive flood insurance.

Sources of information

Results reported are based on information developed for and supplied by:

Sacramento Area Flood Control AgencyUS Army Corps of EngineersCalifornia Department of Water Resources

City and County of Sacramento Sacramento Municipal Utility District

Information provided was developed for flood defense infrastructure planning and design.


What Are Flood Impacts To The Delta?What Are Flood Impacts To The Delta? Should an earthquake occur which causes the failure of the levees for Should an earthquake occur which causes the failure of the levees for

the Eight Key Western Delta Islands it’s anticipated that salt water the Eight Key Western Delta Islands it’s anticipated that salt water intrusion would occur which would lead to the shutdown of the State intrusion would occur which would lead to the shutdown of the State Water Project (SWP) and the Central Valley Project (CVP). The saltwater Water Project (SWP) and the Central Valley Project (CVP). The saltwater intrusion impacts would be for a long period of time (a year or more)intrusion impacts would be for a long period of time (a year or more)

- - CVP provides source water for approximately 1.8 Million acres of CVP provides source water for approximately 1.8 Million acres of farmland through the Central Valleyfarmland through the Central Valley

- SWP provides source water for approximately 650,000 acres of - SWP provides source water for approximately 650,000 acres of farmland throughout the state and for over 25 Million peoplefarmland throughout the state and for over 25 Million people

- SWP is the State’s 5- SWP is the State’s 5thth largest electric power generator largest electric power generator - Both SWP and CVP are components of the Flood Control System- Both SWP and CVP are components of the Flood Control System - Significant impacts to State and National Economies- Significant impacts to State and National Economies - agriculture, power, manufacturing, tourism, environmental, water - agriculture, power, manufacturing, tourism, environmental, water

quality, recreation, transportation, quality of life .…………… quality, recreation, transportation, quality of life .……………

It should be noted that flood impacts of most Delta Islands/regions would It should be noted that flood impacts of most Delta Islands/regions would be similar to those of an urban area however at a varying and lesser be similar to those of an urban area however at a varying and lesser degree.degree.

LocationLocation Western most tract of theWestern most tract of the

57 tracts or islands in the 57 tracts or islands in the Sacramento DeltaSacramento Delta

Meeting point of Sacramento, Meeting point of Sacramento, Solano, and Contra Costa Solano, and Contra Costa CountiesCounties

At the confluence of the At the confluence of the Sacramento and San Joaquin Sacramento and San Joaquin Rivers, near the mouth of the Rivers, near the mouth of the Sacramento and also bordered by Sacramento and also bordered by Three Mile SloughThree Mile Slough

Early HistoryEarly History 1855: First settled1855: First settled 1869: Dikes built, the first island 1869: Dikes built, the first island

to be carved out of the peat zoneto be carved out of the peat zone 1869: Substantial levees built on the island by Chinese 1869: Substantial levees built on the island by Chinese

laborerslaborers Early 1870’s: Sherman Island flooded annuallyEarly 1870’s: Sherman Island flooded annually 1874: Reclamation and preservation costs for Sherman 1874: Reclamation and preservation costs for Sherman

Island’s levees totaled $500,000 ($6.2 million today)Island’s levees totaled $500,000 ($6.2 million today) 1875: Levee last breached and it was decided not to 1875: Levee last breached and it was decided not to

reclaim the land, creating Lower Sherman Island Lakereclaim the land, creating Lower Sherman Island Lake Property sold to the State of California for one dollar. Property sold to the State of California for one dollar.

Today the area is owned by the California Department Today the area is owned by the California Department of Fish and Game as a game preserve to guarantee of Fish and Game as a game preserve to guarantee hunting access to the publichunting access to the public

Sherman Island

Ownership TodayOwnership TodayMuch of the land is owned Much of the land is owned

by DWR and leased for by DWR and leased for agriculture (2002: DWR agriculture (2002: DWR owns 8,146 of 9,183 acres)owns 8,146 of 9,183 acres)

Sherman Lake is managed Sherman Lake is managed as a State Waterfowl Areaas a State Waterfowl Area

Sacramento County Park Sacramento County Park (including boat launch) (including boat launch) located on Island and open located on Island and open year roundyear round

Infrastructural RoleInfrastructural RoleProtects water export facilities in the Protects water export facilities in the

Southern Delta from saltwater intrusion by Southern Delta from saltwater intrusion by displacing water and maintaining the displacing water and maintaining the salinity balancesalinity balance

State Hwy 160 State Hwy 160 Three major power linesThree major power linesUnderground gas fieldsUnderground gas fields

Brannan-Andrus Levee Maintenance District, Levee Break: June Brannan-Andrus Levee Maintenance District, Levee Break: June 21, 197221, 1972

• • National Disaster declared June 27, and Breach closed July 26 National Disaster declared June 27, and Breach closed July 26 • • Estimated total damages 1981 dollars: $91 million Estimated total damages 1981 dollars: $91 million • • US Army Corps repaired break, US Army Corps repaired break, • • 35% of City of Isleton was inundated35% of City of Isleton was inundated Webb Tract, RD 2026, Levee Break: Jan.18, 1980Webb Tract, RD 2026, Levee Break: Jan.18, 1980 • • 850 feet wide, 60 feet deep 850 feet wide, 60 feet deep • • US Army Corps repaired break Approximately $12 million US Army Corps repaired break Approximately $12 million • • 4 month delay in breach repair 4 month delay in breach repair • • Corps first repaired Holland Tract due to availability of equipment, Corps first repaired Holland Tract due to availability of equipment,

materials materials • • Sustained extensive landside erosion damage; Corps rocked inside Sustained extensive landside erosion damage; Corps rocked inside Holland Tract-RD 2025, Levee Break: Jan. 18, 1980 Holland Tract-RD 2025, Levee Break: Jan. 18, 1980 (about 1 hour after Webb) (about 1 hour after Webb) • • 250 feet wide, 40 feet deep 250 feet wide, 40 feet deep • • US Army Corps repaired break Approximately $8 millionUS Army Corps repaired break Approximately $8 million

Lower Jones Tract-RD 2038, Levee Break Sept. 26, 1980 Lower Jones Tract-RD 2038, Levee Break Sept. 26, 1980

• • 275 feet wide, 55 feet deep 275 feet wide, 55 feet deep

• • Reclamation District managed Levee Break contract, paid with Reclamation District managed Levee Break contract, paid with warrants warrants

• • Breach repaired prior to AT & SF railroad embankment failure Breach repaired prior to AT & SF railroad embankment failure

• • Fearing flood surge Trapper Slough was raised by US Army Corp Fearing flood surge Trapper Slough was raised by US Army Corp

• • Total estimated costs to RD, SJ County, EBMUD and DWR: $5.6 Total estimated costs to RD, SJ County, EBMUD and DWR: $5.6 million million

• • Corps costs estimated $700,000 Corps costs estimated $700,000 McDonald Island- RD 2030, Levee Break August 23, 1982, McDonald Island- RD 2030, Levee Break August 23, 1982,

Governor’s Disaster August 25,1982 Governor’s Disaster August 25,1982

• • 600 feet wide, 40-85 feet in depth 600 feet wide, 40-85 feet in depth

• • Approximately $13 million in total levee damages Approximately $13 million in total levee damages

• • RD instigated repairs immediately, Contract with Dutra, paid with RD instigated repairs immediately, Contract with Dutra, paid with warrants warrants

• • FEMA Disaster declared on Sept. 24, 1982 FEMA Disaster declared on Sept. 24, 1982

• • Breach 90 % complete in last week of SeptemberBreach 90 % complete in last week of September

Venice Island-RD 2023, Levee Break Nov. 30, 1982, Venice Island-RD 2023, Levee Break Nov. 30, 1982, during highest tide since 1955 during highest tide since 1955 • • 500 feet wide, 40 feet deep 500 feet wide, 40 feet deep • • Approximately $ 9 million in total levee damages Approximately $ 9 million in total levee damages • • DWR sent inspectors on 12/1/82 State Disaster Assistance was DWR sent inspectors on 12/1/82 State Disaster Assistance was

initiated initiated • • Corps performed limited PL-84-99 Corps performed limited PL-84-99 • • District signed emergency repair contract with Dutra on 12/8/82 District signed emergency repair contract with Dutra on 12/8/82 • • District paid for repairs using warrants District paid for repairs using warrants • • FEMA disaster declared 2/22/83 and was backdated to Nov 1982 FEMA disaster declared 2/22/83 and was backdated to Nov 1982 • • As of 12/30 the break repair was 90% complete As of 12/30 the break repair was 90% complete

Mildred Island, RD 2021, Levee Break Jan 27,1983, Mildred Island, RD 2021, Levee Break Jan 27,1983, 1000 Acres Not Reclaimed 1000 Acres Not Reclaimed • • Corps of Engineers under PL-84-99 rocked inside levee to protect Corps of Engineers under PL-84-99 rocked inside levee to protect

adjoining islands adjoining islands • • FEMA approved request to help repair after approx. one month FEMA approved request to help repair after approx. one month • • District let island stay flooded; chose not come up estimated $250,000 District let island stay flooded; chose not come up estimated $250,000

share of costs share of costs

Bradford Island-RD 2059, Levee Break: December 3,1983 Bradford Island-RD 2059, Levee Break: December 3,1983 • • 600 feet wide, 40-50 feet deep 600 feet wide, 40-50 feet deep • • State Disaster declared December 9, 1983, NO federal disaster State Disaster declared December 9, 1983, NO federal disaster

declaration declaration • • District paid repairs with warrants District paid repairs with warrants • • Approximately 84% of rock placed in break by Feb 29, 1984 Approximately 84% of rock placed in break by Feb 29, 1984 New Hope Tract, February 20 1986 New Hope Tract, February 20 1986 • • 170 feet wide levee break, repaired at approximately $900,000 170 feet wide levee break, repaired at approximately $900,000 • • Finished placing rock in break on March 20, 1986 Finished placing rock in break on March 20, 1986 • • RD paid for levee work with warrants, FEMA Disaster declared Feb 21, RD paid for levee work with warrants, FEMA Disaster declared Feb 21,

1986 1986 Tyler Island- RD 563, 1986 Levee Break, February 19 1986, Tyler Island- RD 563, 1986 Levee Break, February 19 1986,

Two levee breaks in same general area Two levee breaks in same general area • • RD paid for levee work with warrants, FEMA Disaster declared 2/21/86 RD paid for levee work with warrants, FEMA Disaster declared 2/21/86 • • 2 levee breaks approximately, each about 300’ in length; began repairs 2 levee breaks approximately, each about 300’ in length; began repairs

immediately immediately • • Approximate cost to repair both breaks: $3 million 1996-97 Flood - Approximate cost to repair both breaks: $3 million 1996-97 Flood -

Project levees on San Joaquin River System - Corps of Engineers Project levees on San Joaquin River System - Corps of Engineers repaired under Public Law 84-99repaired under Public Law 84-99

1996-97 Flood 1996-97 Flood • • Project levees on San Joaquin River Sys. Project levees on San Joaquin River Sys. • • Corps of Engineers repaired under Public Law Corps of Engineers repaired under Public Law

84-99 84-99

Upper Jones Tract Levee Break, June 5, Upper Jones Tract Levee Break, June 5, 2004 2004

• • Levee breach was approximately 300’ wide Levee breach was approximately 300’ wide • • 12,000 square acres of mostly agricultural land 12,000 square acres of mostly agricultural land

flooded to depth of 12' averageflooded to depth of 12' average• • Repair of breach took over 5 weeks of 24x7 Repair of breach took over 5 weeks of 24x7

emergency construction work emergency construction work • • Dewatering of Island took over 45 days of Dewatering of Island took over 45 days of

continuous around-the-clock pumping continuous around-the-clock pumping • • Emergency breach repair and dewatering cost Emergency breach repair and dewatering cost

to State in excess of $30 Million to State in excess of $30 Million • • Threatened infrastructures included a railroad, Threatened infrastructures included a railroad,

source water supply for the South Bay, liquid source water supply for the South Bay, liquid fuel supply for airport and interior levees fuel supply for airport and interior levees protecting major transportation routes and protecting major transportation routes and urban areasurban areas

Flood Control Projects and Agencies

Final Questions?Final Questions?

Documents

Hospital Alliance Association Disaster Planning Conference March 6, 2012 - Flood Disasters - Impacts/Interdependencies Presenter: Sonny Fong, CDWR