How do individuals think about immigration and …...Second, in asking how individuals think about immigration and asylum, I only look briefly to the cognitive science and psychology

ECPR Joint Session – Uppsala 2004 – Workshop 2004-03-31 “Who Makes Immigration Policy? Comparative Perspectives in a post 9-11 World”

Virginie Guiraudon and Gallya Lahav (Dir.)

How do individuals think about immigration and asylum?

Peter Loewen, PhD Candidate, Université de Montréal Researcher, Canada Research Chair in Electoral Studies1

Draft – do not cite without permission

1 I thank André Blais, the Canada Research Chair in Electoral Studies, for the resources and time to conduct this work. I also thank various colleagues in the Chair, Francois Gelineau, Daniel Rubenson, and Éric Belanger, for their comments. I also thank Jessica Fortin.

1.0 Introduction The question I seek to answer is straightforward: how do individuals think about immigration and asylum? Put more precisely, when asked about their opinions on immigration and asylum, what structures the opinions which individuals proffer, and do these structures differ between immigration and asylum? Finally, what is the role of information in the structuring of these opinions? In answering these questions, I break ground in three ways. First, I separate out asylum from immigration. Indeed, nearly all previous studies on public opinion toward migration have focused on immigration, implicitly assuming that thinking about asylum does not differ. I offer both theoretical reasons for why this may not be the case, and empirical evidence to that end. Second, I utilize cross-national data, which allows both for more confidence for the generality of my results, and for the incorporation of contextual-level data2. Finally, by treating information as a structuring factor in the thinking of individuals, rather than as an additional variable, I am able to better articulate the processes by which individuals think about immigration and asylum, and how these processes differ between the two phenomena. I address these questions and the larger question from which they derive over four parts. First, I set out my theoretical terms. Second, I present a theoretical review of the literature on public opinion toward immigration, as well as the role of information. I also theorize as to why we may expect differences between immigration and asylum. From this I derive a series of hypotheses. Third, I discuss the data and methods employed to test these hypotheses and then present my results. Finally, I conclude by addressing the central question of how individuals think about immigration and asylum. 2.0 Theoretical terms To clarify the significance of the question of how individuals think about immigration and asylum, it is helpful to set out what this paper is not seeking to address. It is not a work primarily concerned with what individuals think of immigration and asylum. Answering this question may very well provide interesting descriptive information on the differences in opinions held between immigration and asylum. It may also return interesting cross-national differences. But it would do little to tell us what lies underneath these opinions. Rather, the question of how individuals think about these issues is one that seeks to determine which factors structure these opinions, along the lines of if a then b. Second, in asking how individuals think about immigration and asylum, I only look briefly to the cognitive science and psychology which seeks to actually understand the physical and chemical processes by which individuals cognate. Instead, by asking how individuals think about these issues, I am mostly asking what factors correlate with their opinions, taking these as reflective of a not yet completely explained cognitive process. Uncovering these correlates is to uncover the elements in the causal relationship set out above. Annunciating how these relationships are facilitated in the brain is not the aim of this paper. 2 While both Jackson, Brown, Brown and Marks ( 2001) and Thalhammer, Zucha, Enzenhofer, Salfinger and Günther (2001) utilize cross-national data, they fail to incorporate contextual, level-2 controls.

How do individuals think about immigration and asylum? Peter Loewen. 2004-04-01. 2

Finally, I use the terms thoughts and public opinions interchangeably. Thus, thoughts are not here the hidden considerations of individuals, but their actual utterances when asked for their position on a specific issue. Thus, to ask how individuals think about immigration and asylum is to ask what factors determine the public opinions which we have already recorded. 3.0 Theory My theoretical review takes five parts. First, I review the two broad theoretical streams which inform theory of public opinion towards immigration – streams I term Economic-Social and Identity-Symbolic. Second, to generate some theoretical insight into the influence of contextual factors on how people think about migration, I briefly review literature on the relationship between immigration, unemployment, and support for extreme right parties. Third, I generate from these two reviews a series of hypotheses which apply equally to immigration and asylum. I then briefly present a series of rationales for why we may expect thinking on immigration and asylum to differ. To the degree that these are different phenomena, with different political, economic and indeed ethical implications, we should search for differences between them. Fifth, I present a rationale for why information should bear on how individuals think about immigration and asylum. 3.1 Existing theory on public opinion and migration While there is a relatively large extant theoretical and empirical literature on the factors which structure opinion toward immigration, both legal and illegal, there is none, to my knowledge, which addresses asylum specifically. Moreover, the majority of the literature on the structures of thinking towards immigration is based in the United States. However, I contend that the theoretical suppositions of these works can easily be extended to the European case, and can be used as a starting point for both immigration and asylum. Accordingly, I begin by assuming no difference between immigration and asylum (an assumption relaxed in section 3.4) Broadly speaking, there exist two sets of hypotheses about what factors structure opinions toward immigration. The first, here termed the Economic-Social hypotheses (ES), look to individual correlates and economic factors to explain opposition to immigration. There are, in fact, two types of arguments which flow from this line of reasoning. In the first, individuals structure their opinions towards immigration based on an individual-level cost-benefit analysis of the effects of immigration on their own well-being. As such, a low-income individual in a perilous employment situation is more likely to be opposed to immigration than a secure, well-off individual, as she is more likely to face job-market competition from immigration. Moreover, this individual is more likely to rely on various measures of governmental assistance, and may perceive immigrants as a burden on these scarce resources (Espenshade and Calhoun 1993; Espenshade and Hampstead, 1996, Harwood 1983, Citrin and Green 1990; Citrin, Green, Muste and Wong 1997). Thus, this line of reasoning takes factors like education and income as signalling the economic (in)security of an individual, which in turn tends toward support for restricting immigration.


Second, there are less clear arguments about how individual factors such as sex, education, and gender should structure opinions. For example, some have contended that women are more likely to be opposed to immigration, or that, net all other factors older citizens are likely to be more opposed to immigration (Espenshade and Calhoun 1993; Espenshade and Hamsptead 1996; Harwood 1983). Finally, some analysts have suggested that the effects of higher income and more education extend beyond labour market competition. Indeed, following Espenshade and Calhoun (1993) not only are the richer and better-schooled less likely to be threatened by immigrant labour, but they are less likely to perceive that threat, and more likely to adopt progressive attitudes toward immigration. On the other hand, they have also pointed to the argument those who are more educated are simply more likely to develop sophisticated arguments to support the positions they would hold anyhow. As can be seen, this second line of reasoning does not match the clear logic of the first. As such, in the analysis performed below, I pay particular attention to the first, and introduce individual factors such as age, sex, and education simply as controls, making no theoretical claim as to their import. The second set of hypotheses, here termed the Identity-Symbolic hypotheses (IS), assumes that opinions toward immigration are structured less along the rational lines of economic and social factors. For example, Citrin and Green (1990) and Citrin, Green, Muste and Wong (1999) have shown conclusively that personal economic circumstances have little impact on opinion formation in the United States. Moreover, a series of convincing studies from an array of perspectives suggests that to the degree that opinion formation on immigration and asylum overlaps with questions of prejudice and difference we should expect individuals to rely on factors other than simple self-interest. For Quillian, for example, “Prejudice is characterized by irrationality (a faulty generalization) and emotional evaluation (antipathy)” (Quillian 1995: 587). In that understanding, measuring for rational individual satisfaction with personal finances, for example, possibly may not tap into the emotional and irrational domain of prejudice. In addition, at the group level, the work of Herbert Blumer (1958) contends that prejudices are often a response to threats to established group privileges and the feelings are not necessarily linked to the individual interests of group members. Finally, Sears and Funk (1991) have shown that dominant group members whose personal interests are not directly vulnerable to other groups are as likely to express prejudice than those individuals whose interests we would consider more directly threatened. Accordingly, we should look to opinion as structured by more subjective standards, particularly those which involve the collective identities and national myths to which individuals subscribe. Following Sniderman et al:

Social identity explanations concentrate on an array of group memberships. They take the key explanatory mechanism to be group categorization. And they presume the driving motive is a need for positive differentiation (Sniderman, Hagendoorn and Prior 2004:36).

Put another way, these arguments assume that when individuals think about immigration and asylum, they refer to the implications of these processes for the group to which they identify. Indeed, they may form seemingly rational explanations as to why the inflow of immigrants is bad for the country – for example, immigration lowers wages and takes away jobs – but at the core is an assumption that they represent the strengthening of a group to which the respondent is not a part. As such, individuals can rely on perceptions of the impacts of immigration or asylum which do not take account of their actual


personal economic situation, but instead that of the larger community. Individuals may also perceive immigration as threatening to the symbols, most often national, which are important to their group. Accordingly, opposition to immigration is couched not in economic terms, but in terms related to the negative effects on the dominant culture. An Arguments along these lines are that immigrants do not make a sufficient effort to learn the national language, do not subscribe to the national culture, and/or do not respect national institutions. 3.2 Contextual factors Because previous studies have typically focused on one country or another, they have not included contextual factors, such as the unemployment rate or the percentage of immigrants in a respondent’s city or country (for an exception to this, see Citrin, Green, Muste and Wong 1997). However, other works, particularly those investigating the relationships between unemployment, immigration, and the success of extreme-right parties, suggest that these factors should matter. This literature has typically had conflicting results on the influence of contextual factors (see Golder 2003a, 2003b for a comprehensive overview). Some works have found that the number of immigrants in a country affect the support of right-wing parties. Others have demonstrated that what matters is the rate of unemployment. Golder (2003a, 2003b), in the most advanced analysis of this question, demonstrated that while immigration and unemployment both matter, unemployment only predicts extreme-right support when unemployment is high. These findings suggest that we should include contextual measures in determining how individuals think, and that we should be conscious of their interaction. Contextual factors should affect how individuals think about immigration and asylum for at least two reasons. First, economic factors should affect how insecure individuals feel – indeed, high unemployment should prime individuals’ concerns about their own well-being. Second, we can expect, as the number of immigrants and/or asylum seekers increases or decreases, that individuals will refer to different experiences and facts when thinking about migration. Indeed, the more individuals are exposed to migrants, the more likely they are to have their prejudices or assessments confirmed or dispelled. In sum, an individual’s context matters, and researchers should take account of this. 3.3 Initial hypotheses From these literatures, I generate a series of hypotheses about expected effects. In presenting these hypotheses, I assume that if an increase in A leads to an increase in support for immigration, then a decrease in A will lead to an increase in opposition to immigration. This assumption, however, is relaxed in the analysis, the effects of which are noted in the discussion in section 4. According to the Economic-Social factors, I expect: H1: those with lower incomes are more likely to oppose immigration/asylum.


H2: the unemployed are more likely to oppose immigration/asylum, and this opposition is expected to increase the longer an individual has been unemployed. H3: the more educated are less likely to oppose immigration/asylum. According to Identity-Symbolic factors, I expect: H4: those who perceive immigration to have a generally negative economic effect are more likely to oppose immigration/asylum. H5: those who perceive immigration/asylum to have a generally negative effect on a national culture and way of life are more likely to oppose immigration/asylum. H6: Immigrants are less likely to oppose immigration/asylum, though this opposition will be attenuated based on their length of tenure in the country. H7: those who self-identify with the right are less likely to support immigration/asylum. Finally, taking account of contextual, national level factors, I expect: H8: higher levels of GDP per capita to increase support for immigration/asylum. H9: higher unemployment levels to increase opposition to immigration/asylum. H10: higher levels of immigration/asylum to increase opposition to immigration/asylum. 3.4 Differences between asylum and immigration. Thus far, following the literature, I have assumed that uniform processes shape thinking about immigration and asylum. However, there are competing explanations for why individuals may think differently about these issues. I present five such rationale here, in anticipation of different results. First, individuals are more likely to have interpersonal experiences with immigrants than with asylum-seekers, as immigrants make up a larger part of any population than asylum claimants. To the degree that individuals refer to personal experiences in thinking about migration, this may have an effect. Second, because of this lack of contact, individuals are more likely to draw their impression of asylum claimants from the media. To the degree that the media provides sensational and prejudicial accounts of asylum, we can expect differential processes. Third, as Gibney (1999) has observed, the practice of economic migrants claiming admission to countries under the guise of asylum has potentially negative consequences for citizens’ perceptions of asylum claimants, perceptions which may not carry over to immigrants proper. Conversely, individuals may invoke sympathy and compassion when thinking about asylum claimants, while considering immigrants as self-interested. Finally, asylum and immigration are simply not the same processes. A nation’s immigration policy is (mostly) an instrument used for the advancement of national interests, whether economic or demographic. Asylum, on the other hand, is largely an obligation of states. In other words, immigration is subject to political control in a manner that asylum is not. This reality may bear on the way individuals think about these phenomena, as they may view one phenomena in political terms and the other from the standpoint of morality or ethics. 3.5 The effects of information.


Having outlined the importance of individual- and contextual-level considerations, and having anticipated the possible differences between immigration and asylum, I turn now to my final question. What role does information play in the way individuals think about immigration and asylum? More specifically, do individuals with more accurate information about the dynamics of migration in their country think in different ways than those with inaccurate information (here again, think refers to how, not what)? Note that this is not only to ask whether individuals with more information hold different opinions. Instead, it is to go farther and ask whether individuals with more information draw on different pieces of information than those with less information. Students of public opinion have long-wrestled with the question of how individuals with little or no information can formulate political opinions. Early research, especially that of Converse (1964), demonstrated that individuals are remarkably uninformed. However, more recent research has argued that individuals with low information are able to make reasoned choices by using heuristics, essentially mental shortcuts which do not require large amounts of information in making political judgements (Sniderman, Brody, and Tetlock 1991). Following this research, what is of interest is not whether individuals with different information levels think differently, but whether their mental outcomes are the same. Indeed, Tables 3 and 4 demonstrate that an individuals’ opinion on immigration and asylum is not independent of the amount of information they possess3. In other words, individuals with low information do not reach the same conclusions as those with high information. This, then, further begs the question of whether individuals with more information think differently than those with high information, a research area which has received much less attention. There are many reasons to believe that this is likely, chief among them our understanding of the mind as a series “modular capacities”. As Kuklinski and Quirk observe:

The mind is not a single, general-purpose calculator that applies universal principles to deal with all kinds of problems… these modules contain very specific built-in assumptions about how the world works and which responses are useful. They are deployed automatically, without conscious thought, and have limited flexibility (Kuklinski and Quirk 2000, 163).

It follows from this that individuals with accurate information about immigration and asylum are likely to employ different modules in thinking about these issues than those with low information. They are more likely to think specifically about migration, rather than resorting to assumptions based on prejudice or difference. This is similar to the difference between central and peripheral reasoning, also brought to bear on public opinion by Kuklinski and Quirkm through originally developed by Fiske and Taylor (1991):

In central processing, used when attention and motivation are high, people employ more mental resources, think more systematically, and allow data to shape inferences. In peripheral processing, used when attention and motivation are low, they employ fewer resources, rely on

3 The Chi-square results at the bottom of Tables 3 and 4 indicate that the opinions expressed on immigration and asylum are not independent of the amount of information an individual has.


simple heuristics, and use top-down, stereotypic inferences (Kuklinski and Quirk 2000, 163).

It equally follows from this that individuals who possess accurate information on asylum and immigration are likely to devote more and attention to these questions, and are thus likely to rely on different methods in thinking about migration. In sum, individuals with high information may simply think differently than those with low information. 4.0 Data, Methods, and Results To test these hypotheses, I use data from the first module of the European Social Survey (ESS), married to various contextual measures from the OECD, UNHCR, and International Migration Organisation. (The sources and construction of each variable are noted in the appendix). After testing these hypotheses, I lay out my method for measuring information effects. All in all, my analysis includes 15 countries: Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom. Fully-specified, this results in an N of approximately 16000 (which is reduced to 10000 when testing for information effects). To allow us to detect for differences in the structures of opinions towards immigration and asylum, I created a dependent variable for each: Immigration and Asylum. In both cases, the variables are categorical, with -1 representing a preference for more restrictive immigration/asylum policy, 1 a preference for more liberal immigration/asylum policy, and 0 representing a more or less status quo position. It is worth noting that while the ESS includes a large battery of questions on immigration and asylum, none is particularly well-suited on its own to act as a dependent variable without some manipulation. The exact procedure for creating each of these dependents is included in the appendix. Finally, as regards these variables, it should be noted that I take asylum to be a subset of immigration. Accordingly, when respondents are asked “What about people from outside of Europe, should we allow more or less?”, I do not assume that they make a conscious exclusion of asylum. However, the Asylum dependent is derived from a question which solely addresses refugee policy. Thus, any conflation of the two topics will be reflected in the dependent variable for immigration, and not asylum. My analysis proceeds in the same fashion for both of the dependent variables. I first regress opinion against Economic-Social factors, including Age, Female, Education, Unemployed, Length of Unemployment, Income, Immigrant, and Immigrant Time. The final variable reads 0 when an immigrant arrived in the last year, and reaches 1 when the immigrant has been in the country for five or more years. Similarly, Length of Unemployment reads 0 when the respondent has been unemployed for less than 3 months, and gradually reaches 1 when the respondent has been unemployed for five or more years. Age, Education, and Income are all 0 to 1 continuous variables, reading from the minimum to some maximum value (detailed in the appendix). Female and Immigrant are both dummy variables that take on the value of 1 if the respondent is a female or an immigrant, respectively. Then, retaining these ES factors, the IS factors of Left-Right, Economic Impact, and Cultural Impact are added. Left-Right indicates the respondent’s self-described political position on


a -1 to 1 (left to right) scale. Similarly, Economic Impact and Cultural Impact are -1 to 1 scales (derived from a series of questions detailed in the appendix) which indicate the respondents belief about the impact of immigration, whether negative (-1), positive (1), or somewhere in between. Finally, I add to these contextual, national level factors: Unemployment, per capita GDP, and Immigrants/Aslyum seekers per 10004. In the case of the number of immigrants or asylum seekers per 1000 population, I took the total number in the last ten years for the respective cases.5 By including all of these variables in the final model, I follow Sniderman et al.’s observation that these different factors are not necessarily mutually exclusive, and that “concerns about both economic well-being and national identity underlie reactions to immigrant minorities in Western Europe, to some discernible extent” (Sniderman 2004, 35-6). Indeed, to sort through these hypotheses about the way individuals think about migration, we need to recognize that they are probably working concurrently. Accordingly, it is the relative strength of each hypothesis which should be of particular interest. I use a multinomial logit (MNL) to test the effects of these variables. The MNL has several distinct advantages. First, it is better suited to address categorical dependent variables than an OLS model. Second, it makes no assumption about the ordinal relationship between the values of the dependent variable. Put another way, it does not assume that there is a consistent, single-peaked configuration of the dependent variable for all respondents6. This frees me of the assumption that all respondents order the possible outcomes in the same manner, necessarily placing the status quo in the middle of their preference ordering. Third, and most importantly, the MNL returns a different set of coefficients for each category which are read as probability statements about the odds of the respondent choosing that category against the base group. Thus, if the status quo is our base group, we can have different factors predicting movement towards restricting immigration than those which predict movement towards increasing immigration. In other words, it does not assume that factors have a symmetrical effect, and thus allows us to uncover different causal mechanisms for support for restriction and expansion.7

4 Following Golder (2003a)’s work on the interactive effects of unemployment and immigration in generating support for extreme right parties, I also conducted this analysis with these two factors interacted. However, the results returned were either insignificant, or highly collinear and disruptive to the model. Accordingly, I opt for a specification which does not interact these measures. 5 Instead of all of these contextual factors, it is possible to simply include a dummy for each country, which would in effect create a new constant for each country. While this would tell us which nations are more or less favourable towards migration in the aggregate, it would not allow us to test the different effects of these different factors at the individual level, which can only be ascertained by including them separately. To get the country level constants, one needs only to calculate the value of the contextual factors using the national levels of said factors. 6 Formally, single-peakedness exists when all respondents assign the same order along a single axis to the available preferences. Assuming this order is A B C, this means that any individual who first prefers A will thus prefer B to C. Likewise, an individual who prefers C will prefer B to A. 7 For a longer examination of the case for asymmetry and the MNL, see Loewen and Fortin (2004).


Table 1 reports the results for Immigration and Table 2 the results for Asylum. I first review the cases of immigration and asylum separately, and then consider the theoretical implications of their comparison.

[Insert Table 1 about here] Beginning with Economic-Social factors, we see that as respondents grow older, net all other factors, they are more likely to support less immigration. However, age has no effect on support for more immigration. Moreover, the more educated are more (less) likely to support more (less) immigration. Net all other factors, the unemployed are more likely to support more immigration. Finally, increased income pushes respondents towards a status-quo position, decreasing support for both more and less immigration. Thinking about immigration is strongly and symmetrically influenced by Identity-Social factors. Indeed, the better (worse) an individuals’ evaluation of the cultural and/or economic impact of migration, the more (less) they are to support more immigration, and the less (more) likely they are to support less immigration. Similarly, those who identify with the right are more likely to oppose more immigration, and more likely to support less immigration than those on the left. Finally, turning to contextual factors, the higher the number of immigrants per 1000 citizens in the last ten years, the more likely respondents to support more or less immigration, as opposed to the status quo. General unemployment levels increase support for less immigration, but have no effect on the likelihood of supporting more immigration. Finally, higher GDP, net all other factors, makes individuals less likely to support more immigration.

[Insert Table 2 about here] Turning to Asylum, a respondent is more likely to favour a generous asylum regime over the status quo as she becomes older. Conversely, as a respondents’ education and income increase, they are less likely to support a more generous asylum policy. Moreover, as predicted by the Economic-Social hypothesis, a respondent who is unemployed is less likely to favour a more generous policy. This opinion, however, is not affected by the term of their unemployment. The Economic-Social factors which structure an opinion favouring less generous policy over the status quo are not symmetrically-opposite to those which structure support for a more generous policy. Indeed, being a female makes one less disposed to supporting a less generous policy. However, increased education does make one more likely to favour a less generous policy. Moreover, on this side of opinion, income and age have no effect. Finally, while an unemployed individual is less likely to support this policy, their opinion becomes increasingly favourable as the term of their unemployment increases. Importantly, the Identity considerations which structure a support for less generous asylum policies are symmetrical and opposite to those structuring support. An individual is more (less) likely to support a generous (less generous) asylum policy the more positive (negative) their evaluation of the economic and cultural consequences of migration.


Moreover, the more an individual self-identifies as being on the political right (left), the more likely they are to support a less (more) generous policy. Contextually, individuals are less (more) likely to support a more (less) generous asylum policy the higher the number of asylum applications made in their country in the last 10 years per 1000 citizens. Higher unemployment rates act to push opinions towards the status quo from either direction, while higher GDP leads to support for a generous asylum policy and less support for a less generous policy. Assessing the hypotheses individually, we see that H1 – that lower income decrease support for immigration/asylum – receives mixed support. H2 – which posits that the unemployed are less favourable to immigration – does not perform as expected for Immigration. This variable and its interaction performs as expected for Asylum. H3, the education hypotheses, performs as expected for immigration, but not for asylum. H4, 5, and 7, as previously detailed, perform strongly and as expected. H6 – which predicts positive opinions towards immigration/asylum among immigrants – is never significant (contrary to much of the research performed in North America). H8, for GDP, performs as expected for Asylum, and H9, measuring unemployment effects, also performs as expected for Asylum. Finally, for H10, migration levels only have an effect for Asylum, though the effects here are consistent and as expected. Taking together this information on Immigration and Asylum policy, I can address the first two of my three questions. Namely, what does public opinion theory – especially that addressing prejudice and tolerance – suggest will structure these opinions, and what actually structures them? And, do these structures differ? First, in the cases of both immigration and the smaller subset of asylum, Economic- Social factors have some bearing on the manner in which individuals think about immigration and asylum. However, their effects are generally asymmetrical, and are much weaker than contextual and especially Identity-Symbolic concerns. Indeed, IS factors, including Left-Right orientation, consistently and strongly predict opinions towards both Immigration and Asylum, and in both directions. This lends support to the hypotheses that symbolic factors play a larger role in structuring individuals’ thoughts than rational cost-benefit calculations. Second, immigration and asylum opinion structures do differ across some Economic-Social and contextual factors. However, the factors which exercise the most influence over the way an individual thinks about immigration and asylum are similar and symmetrical. With these data in hand, I tentatively side with the answer that how individuals think about asylum and immigration is largely similar. It remains, however, to test the effects of information on these structures. Clearly, to test for different information effects we need to measure a respondent’s level of relevant information. Traditional survey measures like political or general knowledge are not sufficient. Accordingly, I separate high information from low information respondents based on four questions, outlined in the Appendix. Respondents who are able to answer two or more questions of four correctly are taken to possess High Information. Because the information required to determine correct answers to these questions is difficult to come by, the respondents on which these effects are tested are


(for now) drawn from subset of the previous sample that includes Denmark, Finland, Hungary, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom.8 After determining respondents’ levels of information, I run each model with the original variables and an interaction between High Information and the variable. When these variables are significant, they allow us to determine the marginal effect of each factor on those respondents with high amounts of information. When an information variable is insignificant, we can reason that its base term exerts a similar (or no) influence on the thinking of those with different levels of information.

[Insert Table 7 about here]

Table 7 shows the results only for Asylum, as the level of information has no effect on how individuals think about Immigration for any variables. However, information does bear significantly and in multiple ways on the way individuals think about Asylum. However, these effects are limited to how an individual comes to a position of demanding a less generous Asylum policy over the current practice.

[Insert Figures 1-5 about here] Figures 1 to 5 demonstrate the results of various simulations on information effects. As Figure 1 demonstrates, as individuals with high information move from a negative to positive evaluation of economic impacts, they move from less likely to support less asylum than those with low information [p(less|High Information)=.7 versus p(less|Low)=.78] to more likely (0.52 versus 0.41). Similar results are returned for the perceived cultural impact of migration. In other words, for individuals with high information, the effect of perceptual factors like the perceived economic impact of immigration exert less influence over their opinions. For a contrary example, consider Figure 4, showing the effects of the number of asylum claims in the last ten years. The number of asylum seekers has no differential effect on those with little information. However, for those with high information, the number of asylum seekers has a profound effect. Indeed, this suggests (as does Figure 5) that individuals with high information are more likely than low information individuals to rely on contextual information in forming their opinions on asylum. More generally, these results suggest that individuals with high information are less likely to rely on feeling heuristics in assessing asylum, instead drawing on more focussed and relevant information. Moreover, it suggests that there is a measurable difference in the way individuals think about immigration and asylum, as thinking about immigration is not different between those with high and low information. Taken together, these results are important both for our theoretical understanding of these opinion structures, but also for policy makers who are interested in understanding how to shift opinions on migration. Indeed, the evidence suggests that gains can be made 8 Tables 5 and 6 show the results of running the final specifications from Section 4 on this subset. Little difference exists, suggesting that the information effects presented are unlikely to be a simple artefact of the smaller sample of countries.


in improving opinion toward asylum simply by correcting individuals’ information about the dynamics of migration in their own country. Moreover, these results suggest that for both immigration and asylum, policy makers can make for more receptive public opinion by making clear the economic and cultural benefits of migration. 5.0 Conclusions

I conclude by answering the question with which I started: How do individuals think about immigration and asylum? This is best answered in three parts. First, when we do not consider information effects, individuals think in largely the same way for Immigration and Asylum. When asked for their opinion, they draw on similar factors, most often those which take account of the subjective, group-level implications of migration, rather than individual considerations. They also sometimes rely on contextual factors to drive their thinking. This suggests that thinking about migration – that is, public opinion – is not simply the aggregation of rational positions, but instead reflects a collection of subjective feelings and even prejudices.

Second, the things which structure their thinking more often than not exert a symmetrical influence, influencing how they think about more generous migration policy in the same way they think about a less generous policy. Moreover, this finding is not simply an artefact of the model, but instead an accurate picture of opinion structures. Accordingly, policy makers can be confident that the reversal of underlying prejudicial opinions is likely to not only to decrease the support for less migration, but also increase the support for more migration.

Third, the amount of information an individual possesses changes the way she thinks about asylum, if only marginally, by allowing contextual factors to exert more influence and subjective evaluations less influence. It follows from this that there are potential gains to be made in public opinion not only by addressing prejudices, but also by increasing the stock of information which individuals possess.

The importance of these findings is increased by three factors. First, these findings are not restricted to one state. Indeed, the cross-national nature of my data suggests that these results can be generalized. Furthermore, it suggests that cross-national efforts to improve public opinion toward migration are not likely to work at cross purposes, should states take up such collective campaigns. Second, because I have considered a number of hypotheses simultaneously, we can be more certain that the Identity-Symbolic factors, clearly the strongest and most consistent factors in thinking about immigration and asylum, exist independently of Economic-Social factors. Finally, this is the first study of opinion toward immigration and asylum which has tested for the structural effects of information. Taken together, these suggest that across Europe a clear, multi-faceted structure underlies thinking about migration.


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Harwood, Edwin. 1983. “Alienation: American Attitudes Towards Immigration,” Public Opinion, 6:49-51. ILO immigration data: http://www.ilo.org/pubcgi/links_ext.pl?http://www.cobise.ch /ilm/english/ilmstat/stat02.asp Jackson, James S; Kendrick T Brown; Tony N. Brown; Bryant Marks. 2001. “Contemporary immigration orientations among dominant-group members in Western Europe”. Journal of Social Issues 57(3): 431-456. Kitschelt, Herbert. 1996. The Radical Right in Western Europe: A Comparative Analysis, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.


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Kuklinski, J.H., and P.J. Quirk. 2000. “Reconsidering the Rational Public: Cognition, Heuristics, and Mass Opinion.” In Elements of Reason: Cognition, Choice, and the Bounds of Rationality, ed. A. Lupia, M.D. McCubbins, S.L. Popkin. Cambridge University Press. Loewen, P., and J. Fortin. 2004. “Two sides of the same coin: measuring support for and opposition to immigration in Canada.” Paper presented at the 2004 Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago, Ill. April 14, 2004. OECD GDP Data: http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/48/5/2371372.pdf?channelId=33715 &homeChannelId=33715&fileTitle=Gross+Domestic+Product+per+Capita+for+OECD+Countries OECD Immigration Data: http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/23/50/2956498.xls?channelId =33931&homeChannelId=33729&fileTitle=A.1.1.+Inflows+of+foreign+population+into+selected+OECD+countries OECD Unemployment Data. http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/41/13/18595359.pdf. Quillan, Lincoln. 1995. “Prejudice as a Response to Perceived Group Threat: Population Composition and Anti-Immigrant and Racial Prejudice in Europe,” American Sociological Review, 60(4):586-611. Sears, David O., Carolyn L. Funk, 1991. “The Role of Self-Interest in Social and Political Attitudes,” Advances in Experimental Social Psychology, 24(3):1-91. Sniderman, P.M., R.A. Brody, and P.E. Tetlock. 1991. Reasoning and Choice: Explorations in Political Psychology. New York: Cambridge University Press. Sniderman, P.M., L. Hagendoorn, and M. Prior. 2004. “Predispositional Factors and Situational Triggers: Exclusionary Reactions to Immigrant Minorities.” American Political Science Review, 98(1): 35-50. Thalhammer, Eva; Zucha, Vlasta; Enzenhofer, Edith; Salfinger, Brigitte, Ogris Günther. 2001. “Attitudes towards minority groups in the European Union. A special analysis of the Eurobarometer 2000 survey on behalf of the European Monitoring Centre of Racism and Xenophobia”. Viena: Sora. UNHCR asylum data: http://www.unhcr.ch/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/home/opendoc.pdf?tbl= STATISTICS&id=3d075ec32&page=statistics


http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/48/5/2371372.pdf

http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/23/50/2956498.xls?channelId

http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/41/13/18595359.pdf

http://www.unhcr.ch/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/home/opendoc.pdf

Table 1 – Structures of Thinking on Immigration Coef. (S.E.) Coef, (S.E.) Coef, (S.E.) Less Immigration Age 0,65*** (0,11) 0,53*** (0,11) 0,54*** (0,11) Female -0,07* (0,04) -0,05 (0,04) -0,05 (0,04) Education -1,05*** (0,09) -0,86*** (0,09) -0,89*** (0,09) Unemployed 0,14 (0,13) 0,18 (0,13) 0,14 (0,13) Unemployment Time -0,39 (0,25) -0,40 (0,25) -0,39 (0,25) Income -0,80*** (0,10) -0,73*** (0,10) -0,61*** (0,11) Immigrant -0,30 (0,25) -0,15 (0,25) -0,08 (0,25) Immigrant Time 0,02 (0,06) 0,01 (0,06) 0,01 (0,06) Economic Impact -1,68*** (0,06) -1,09*** (0,07) -1,07*** (0,07) Cultural Impact -1,17*** (0,06) -1,19*** (0,06) Left Right 0,29*** (0,05) 0,28*** (0,05) OECD foreigners 0,00** (0,00) Unemployment 0,05*** (0,01) GDP 0,01 (0,00) Constant 0,89*** (0,08) 0,92 (0,08) 0,53*** (0,15) More Immigration Age -0,03 (0,14) 0,15 (0,14) 0,11 (0,14) Female -0,03 (0,05) -0,06 (0,05) -0,06 (0,05) Education 0,61*** (0,11) 0,43*** (0,11) 0,40*** (0,11) Unemployed 0,47*** (0,16) 0,42*** (0,16) 0,41*** (0,16) Unemployment Time -0,51 (0,32) -0,53 (0,32) -0,52 (0,32) Income -0,39*** (0,13) -0,42*** (0,13) -0,34** (0,14) Immigrant 0,23 (0,24) 0,15 (0,25) 0,16 (0,25) Immigrant Time -0,01 (0,06) -0,01 (0,06) -0,01 (0,06) Economic Impact 1,06*** (0,08) 0,50*** (0,09) 0,56*** (0,09) Cultural Impact 1,09*** (0,08) 1,11*** (0,08) Left Right -0,45*** (0,06) -0,41*** (0,06) OECD foreigners 0,00*** (0,00) Unemployment 0,02 (0,01) GDP -0,03*** (0,01) Constant -0,99*** (0,10) -1,20 (0,10) -0,75*** (0,20) N 16128 16128 16128 Rsq-adjusted 0,08 0,12 0,12


Table 2 – Structures of Thinking on Asylum Coef, (S.E.) Coef, (S.E.) Coef, (S.E.) More Generous Age 0,34*** (0,12) 0,15 (0,12) 0,04 (0,12) Female -0,20*** (0,04) -0,19*** (0,04) -0,19*** (0,04) Education 0,06 (0,09) 0,37*** (0,10) 0,35*** (0,10) Unemployed -0,36*** (0,12) -0,32*** (0,13) -0,30** (0,13) Unemployment Time 0,47* (0,26) 0,48* (0,26) 0,45* (0,26) Income 0,44*** (0,11) 0,56*** (0,11) 0,16 (0,12) Immigrant -0,54** (0,26) -0,41 (0,26) -0,39 (0,27) Immigrant Time 0,09 (0,06) 0,09 (0,06) 0,06 (0,07) Economic Impact -1,15*** (0,06) -0,44*** (0,07) -0,50*** (0,07) Cultural Impact -1,33*** (0,07) -1,35*** (0,07) Left Right 0,33*** (0,05) 0,38*** (0,05) UNHCR9201 0,03*** (0,00) Unemployment -0,03*** (0,01) GDP -0,01*** (0,00) Constant 0,32*** (0,08) 0,31 (0,08) 0,58*** (0,15) Less Generous Age 0,84*** (0,13) 0,95*** (0,13) 1,06*** (0,13) Female 0,06 (0,04) 0,05 (0,04) 0,07 (0,04) Education -0,16 (0,10) -0,29*** (0,10) -0,15 (0,10) Unemployed -0,29** (0,14) -0,32** (0,14) -0,25* (0,14) Unemployment Time 0,33 (0,30) 0,33 (0,30) 0,32 (0,30) Income -0,25** (0,12) -0,32*** (0,12) -0,24* (0,13) Immigrant 0,45* (0,25) 0,40 (0,25) 0,23 (0,25) Immigrant Time -0,08 (0,06) -0,08 (0,06) -0,05 (0,06) Economic Impact 0,78*** (0,07) 0,45*** (0,08) 0,44*** (0,08) Cultural Impact 0,66*** (0,07) 0,72*** (0,08) Left Right -0,17*** (0,05) -0,25*** (0,05) OECD foreigners -0,03*** (0,00) Unemployment -0,11*** (0,01) GDP 0,02*** (0,00) Constant -0,04 (0,09) -0,12 (0,09) 0,36*** (0,16) N 15860 15860 15860 Rsq-adjusted 0,04 0,07 0,09


Table 3 – Immigration opinions by different information levels Information Level Immigration Opinion 0 0,25 0,5 0,75 1 Total Less Immigration 766 2425 1576 247 19 5033% 56,17 49,55 46,95 42,37 59,69 49,2 Same 419 1737 1171 213 10 3550% 30,7 35,5 34,87 36,55 30,57 34,7 More Immigration 179 731 610 123 3 1647% 13,14 14,95 18,18 21,09 9,75 16,1 Total 1364 4893 3357 584 32 10230% 100 100 100 100 100 100 Pearson chi2=60.241, Pr=0.0000 Table 4 – Asylum opinions by different information levels Information Level Asylum Opinion 0,00 0,25 0,50 0,75 1,00 Total Less Generous 612 2489 1405 200 6 4712% 45,75 51,87 42,63 34,67 18,85 46,93 Same 375 1116 899 201 16 2607% 28,05 23,26 27,28 34,75 49,25 25,96 More Generous 351 1194 991 177 10 2723% 26,20 24,87 30,09 30,58 31,90 27,11 Total 1339 4799 3295 578 32 10042% 100,00 100,00 100,00 100,00 100,00 100,00 Pearson chi2=122.2, Pr=0.0000


Table 5 – Full Immigration model on data subset Coef. (S.E.) Less Immigration Age 0,72*** (0,14) Female -0,02 (0,05) Education -0,72*** (0,11) Unemployed -0,24 (0,19) Unemployment Time 0,30 (0,37) Income -0,67*** (0,15) Immigrant -0,66* (0,34) Immigrant Time 0,14* (0,08) Economic Impact -1,19*** (0,10) Cultural Impact -1,52*** (0,09) Left Right 0,32*** (0,06) OECD foreigners 0,00*** (0,00) Unemployment 0,14*** (0,02) GDP -0,03*** (0,01) Constant 1,03*** (0,20) More Immigration Age 0,25 (0,19) Female -0,08 (0,06) Education 0,44*** (0,14) Unemployed 0,32 (0,22) Unemployment Time -0,83* (0,48) Income -0,41** (0,19) Immigrant 0,11 (0,34) Immigrant Time 0,00 (0,08) Economic Impact 0,49*** (0,12) Cultural Impact 1,25*** (0,11) Left Right -0,44*** (0,08) OECD foreigners 0,01*** (0,00) Unemployment 0,06*** (0,02) GDP -0,06*** (0,01) Constant -0,23 (0,28) N 10230 Adj, R-sq 0,16


Table 6 – Full Asylum model on subset Coef. (S.E.) Less generous Age -0,10 (0,15) Female -0,22*** (0,05) Education 0,42*** (0,12) Unemployed -0,45*** (0,18) Unemployme~m 0,70* (0,38) Income -0,03 (0,16) Immigrant -0,76** (0,36) ImmigrantT~e 0,14 (0,09) EconomicIm~t -0,70*** (0,10) CulturalIm~t -1,14*** (0,09) LeftRight 0,46*** (0,06) UNHCR9201 -0,03*** (0,00) Unemployment -0,28*** (0,02) GDP 0,05*** (0,01) _cons 1,19*** (0,20) More generous Age 1,17*** (0,17) Female 0,09 (0,06) Education -0,35*** (0,13) Unemployed -0,46** (0,20) Unemployme~m 0,68 (0,41) Income 0,09 (0,17) Immigrant 0,63* (0,33) ImmigrantT~e -0,13 (0,08) EconomicIm~t 0,63*** (0,11) CulturalIm~t 0,77*** (0,10) LeftRight -0,41*** (0,07) UNHCR9201 -0,03*** (0,01) Unemployment -0,07*** (0,02) GDP 0,01 (0,01) _cons 0,18 (0,21) N 10042,00 Adj, R-sq 0,10


Table 7 – Asylum opinion and information effects Asylum Coef, Std, Err, Less Generous Age 0,05 (0,19) HI*Age -0,60** (0,31) Female -0,17*** (0,07) HI*Female -0,20* (0,11) Education 0,47*** (0,16) HI*Education 0,04 (0,24) Unemployed -0,42* (0,22) HI*Unemployed -0,03 (0,39) Unemployment Time 0,35 (0,46) HI*Unemployment Time 1,00 (0,81) Income 0,05 (0,20) HI*Income -0,11 (0,33) Immigrant -0,72** (0,36) HI*Immigrant -0,50*** (0,07) Immigrant Time 0,10 (0,09) HI*Immigrant Time 0,08 (0,05) Economic Impact -0,82*** (0,12) HI*Economic Impact 0,46** (0,20) Cultural Impact -1,21*** (0,11) HI*Cultural Impact 0,36** (0,19) Left Right 0,40*** (0,08) HI*Left Right 0,10 (0,13) UNHCR9201 -0,01 (0,01) HI*UNHCR9201 -0,03*** (0,01) Unemployment -0,26*** (0,03) HI*Unemployment -0,08* (0,04) GDP 0,03*** (0,01) HI*GDP 0,04** (0,02) _cons 1,14*** (0,21) More Generous Age 1,08*** (0,21) HI*Age 0,49 (0,33) Female 0,09 (0,07) HI*Female 0,00 (0,11) Education -0,56*** (0,17) HI*Education 0,42 (0,25) Unemployed -0,54** (0,25) HI*Unemployed 0,20 (0,41) Unemployment Time 0,51 (0,51) HI*Unemployment Time 0,50 (0,85) Income 0,20 (0,23)


HI*Income -0,34 (0,36) Immigrant 0,64** (0,33) HI*Immigrant 0,45*** (0,07) Immigrant Time -0,14 (0,08) HI*Immigrant Time 0,02 (0,05) Economic Impact 0,56*** (0,14) HI*Economic Impact 0,03 (0,22) Cultural Impact 0,75*** (0,13) HI*Cultural Impact -0,18 (0,21) Left Right -0,36*** (0,09) HI*Left Right -0,11 (0,14) UNHCR9201 -0,02*** (0,01) HI*UNHCR9201 -0,04*** (0,01) Unemployment -0,02 (0,03) HI*Unemployment -0,13*** (0,05) GDP 0,00 (0,01) HI*GDP 0,04*** (0,02) _cons 0,11 (0,22)


Figure 1: Effects of Perceived Economic Impact

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Figure 2: Effects of Perceived Cultural Impact

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Figure 3: Effects of Left-Right orientation

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Figure 4: Effects of asylum population

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Appendix 1 – Variables Dependents Immigration : -1, none or less immigrants, 0 some immigrants, 1 more

immigrants The ESS, contrary to the American National Elections Studies, on which much previous analysis as been performed, lacks a simple question on whether individuals believe their country should have more, less, or the same amount of immigrants. Instead, the survey uses four questions (D4-D7) for four different groups of migrants – people of the same race or ethnic group, of a different race, from richer countries in Europe, and from poorer countries in Europe – each time allowing the respondent to choose between: allow many to come and live here, allow some, allow few, allow none. I take “allow many to come and live here” to be analogous to increasing immigration, “allowing some” as analogous to the status quo, and “allowing few” or “none” to represent a desire for restriction. Accordingly, I created a scale representing the average score over those for questions. I then grouped those with a score in the lower third on the scale (-1 to –1/3) as favoruign less immigrations, those in the middle third supporting the status quo of some immigration, and those in the top third (1/3 – 1) as supporting more immigration. Asylum : -1 less generous, 0 no opinion, 1 more generous. From D51 – “The government should be generous in judging people’s applications for refugee status”. Those who disagreed or disagreed strongly were score –1, and those who agreed or agreed strongly were scored 1. Those who neither agreed or disagreed were placed at 0. Demographics Age: – 0 to 1, youngest to oldest Female: 1 female, 0 male Education: 0 to 1, none to secondary level of tertiary Unemployed: 1 unemployed, 0 other Long-term: .33 unemployed for 3 months or more, .66 for longer than 12

months, 1 for more than 5 years Income: – 0 to 1, lowest to highest within each country’s scale. Immigrant: – 1 if not born in the country, 0 otherwise Immigration Time: – 0-1, measuring length of time in the country (shorter to longer,

in intervals, maximum is 20 years or more) (0 for those who are not immigrants)

LeftRight: -1 to 1, left to right, self-described Perceptions Wages: -1 to 1, people coming to the country have a negative (postive)

impact on wages Jobs: -1 to 1, people coming to the country have a negative (postive)

impact on jobs Benefits: -1 to 1, people coming to country have a negative (postive)

impact on benefits Economic Impact: average of previous three.



CulturalLife: -1 to 1, people coming have a negative (postive) impact on cultural life

Worse: -1 to 1, country is made a worse (better) place by people coming here

CulturalImpact: average of previous two. Contextual Factors Unemployment: 0 to 100, level of unemployment in 2002, as reported by the

OECD. GDP: purchasing power parity, per capita, in thousands per person,

2002, as reported by the OECD. UNHCR9201: number of asylum applicants over the last ten years, per 1000

population, as reported by the UNHCR. OECD foreigners: # of foreign born migrants over last ten years, per 1000

population, as reported by the OECD.

Information

Information: Individuals were scored as high information if they answered two or more of the following four questions correctly:

- Thinking of people coming to live in (country) nowadays from other countries, would you say that: most are of the same race or ethnic group as the majority of (country’s) people, most are of a different race or ethnic group, or is it about half and half?

- Now thinking about people coming to live in [country] nowadays from other countries within Europe, would you say that most come from the richer countries of Europe, most come from the poorer countries of Europe, or, is it about half and half?

- Now thinking about people coming to live in [country] nowadays from other countries outside Europe, would you say that most come from the richer countries outside Europe, most come from the poorer countries outside Europe, or, is it about half and half?

- Out of every 100 people living in (country), how many do you think were born outside (country).

The correct answers for the first three questions were derived from ILO data on migration over the last ten years. Correct answers for the last question (+/- 1 percent) were taken from OECD data.

Documents

How do individuals think about immigration and …...Second, in asking how individuals think about immigration and asylum, I only look briefly to the cognitive science and psychology