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Brand Reality: The JapanesePerspectiveJohny K. Johansson & Masaaki HiranoPublished online: 01 Feb 2010.

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joumal of Marketing Management 1999, 15, 93-105

Johny K Johansson 1 Brand Reality: The Japaneseand Masaaki Hirano2 Perspective

Georgetown University

Waseda University

Introduction

This study of the japanese perspective on brandreality draws on personal interviews in japaneseorganizations and published writings onbranding in japan. It first details the variousfactors which make brand reality such a naturaland powerful element of the successful japaneseorganizations. The study then discusses howbrand reality is created by japanese finns. Itends with the current efforts of the japaneseorganizations to manage and control theirfuture brand identity.

Brand reality, the sense among employees and other stakeholders of the brandas the unifying symbol of the organization, and the passionate commitment tosustaining this symbol, has been with the Japanese corporations since theirinception. Japanese corporations have long found it natural to clearly identifythemselves as guarantors of product quality and selVice perfonnance andconsumers have come to expect it. Procter & Gamble, with its many differentbrands in packaged goods, found it necessary to add its corporate logo at theend of every TV commercial in Japan. Of course, in Japan corporate and brandnames are often synonymous (Tanaka, 1993). A Sony Walkman is made by theSony Corporation, the Yamaha company makes both Yamaha pianos, sportsequipment and motorcycles, and a Honda car is built by the Honda Corporation.Even in the rare cases where brand names differ from corporate names (such asthe Matsushita Corporation with its National, Technics, and Panasonic brands)little doubt has been left about the maker of the products. Just as Japaneseconsumers have been taught through experience to trust Matsushita products, sothe founder, Mr. Matsushita himself, went to great lengths (through infonnalconversation, talks, a monthly magazine, videos, television appearances etc.) toexplain to employees "the Matsushita Way." This even though Matsushita andother Japanese companies have long been listed on major foreign exchanges.

The contrast to many Western organizations could hardly be starker. Even

1 McCrane/ShakerProfessorof InternationalBusiness and MarketingSchool of BusinessGeorgetownUniversityWashington,D.C.20007, U.SA

2 Professor of Infonnation Management Institute of Asia-Pacific Studies WasedaUniversityTokyo 169-0051,Japan

ISSN0267-257XJ99/010093+ 12 $12.0010 Westburn Publishers Ltd.

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94 johny K Johansson and Masaaki Hirano

though the conglomerate corporation exemplified by the notorious ITT'of HaroldGeneen is mostly a thing of the past, the corporate identity of many Westernfinns is something divorced from its market presence. Few American consumerswould know - or care - that Coleman tents come from the Sunbeamcorporation, that Eddie Bauer is a division of General Mills, or that Eurekavacuum cleaners are owned by Electrolux. Among more patriotic Europeancustomers, the fact that Swedish Saab is half-owned by American GeneralMotors, that Swiss Nestle owns French Vittel, and that Gennan BMW now ownsthe Rolls Royce name (while Volkswagen got Bentley and the factory) may bemore of a concern, but the realities of the free market system are presumablysoon accepted even by the most stubborn. Inside the merged or acquiredorganizations, however, the employees sense of belonging and identity is severelytested. Although a few Western organizations seem to have recognised theimportance of brand identity (Microsoft and Intel, Mercedes and BMW, and CocaCola come to mind), for many Western corporations brand reality must seem animpossible dream, a cmel joke.

Several of the factors which help make brand reality a "natural" for japaneseorganizations are discussed below. Then we will discuss the way japaneseorganizations create and sustain the value inherent in their brand reality. In thethird section we will present the efforts underway in japanese organizations tofurther enhance brand value now that the Western organizations have caught onto the importance of brand reality.

Drivers Of Japanese Brand Reality

For the japanese, the "reality" in brand reality comes from the parallelismbetween individual and corporate objectives. The brand symbolises thecorporation, the products on the market, but also the individual's sense ofidentity. A japanese employee "belongs" to the corporation in the same sensethat a son or daughter belongs to a family. The family name is the corporation'sname. The brand is who you are - a Toyota employee is a Toyota-jin, a "Toyota-man." Everything is in the name - and the name has to be protected andenhanced as any family name. It is a source of pride, for the employee as well ashis family members. Losing the name, even if voluntarily, means that you areautomatically a "ronin" -- without a "master," without an identity. On the flip side,the corporation has a responsibility to care for its employees, even its prodigalsons, one reason why big companies are reluctant to shed unprofitablebusinesses.

Historical RootsSuch a paternalistic situation does not, of course, arise in a vacuum. A

historical tradition of feudalism, the well known system of landlord daimyos andtheir samurai vassals, lent itself easily to a concept of the corporation as lordingover its employees. The shogun Tokugawa froze the feudal system for nearly300 years, effectively blocking the spread of European-inspired enlightenment

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Brand Reality:The japanese Perspective 95

and democratic ideals. Only after the Meiji restoration in the 1870s did the newideas begin to be disseminated. Still, feudalistic sentiments were supported by afocus on the Pmssian model of Kaiser Wilhelm and Chancellor Bismarck ratherthan the less militaristic societies of France, England and the United States.

The result was a hierarchical society with the Emperor at the top, a stronggovernment bureaucracy, acceptance and even encouragement of businessgroupings, and a regulated labour market. With the mobilization up throughWorld War II, lifetime employment became the nonn, still maintained as theideal condition. In tum this led to the situation where employees have largelyfinn-specific skills, further limiting their mobility. Coupled with the lack ofnatural resources in japan, employee skills became the main source ofcompetitive advantage. For the employees, to prove a winner became all-important, and competition between finns and groups of finns took on theintense aura of a World Cup game still seen today. Thus, while success for manyWestern companies involves inimitable access to technology or natural resources,government protection or entrepreneurial luck, japanese assume that the mostsuccessful companies have the best people. Even though today some of theyoung people question the values that an older generation represent, thischallenge to the authority of age seems no more serious than in earlier times. IfWestern youth seem to fonn their values in high school and college, japaneseyoung people wait until they enter the organization they will belong to.

Drive Towards RecognitionIt is this focus on being recognised that drives many japanese corporations

still today to focus on size, including sales and market share. Why not profits?Because profits are necessarily kept less visible. Profits shown are taxed. Profitsshown can be - and often are -- manipulated. Even today when the .Americanprofit-seeking capitalists seem to be invincible, profits shown carry an unseemlyaura of selfishness in the Confucius-oriented ethics of japan. Market share is aless ambiguous and more acceptable measure. Large market share implies largesize, and even in japan bigger is better. Potential customers know you already.The company employs, and accepts responsibility for, more people. A largemarket share engenders power. In short, greater sales and market share meangreater public recognition. For example, the seating arrangement in themeetings of an industrial association is traditionally based on the company'sshare of the market And market share helps determine the societal obligationsof the company. For instance, the amount given to charitable causes varies withthe size of the company, and similar sized companies feel a need to give similaramounts.

A striking example of the pervasiveness of the desire for visibility and status isthe annual ranking of preferred workplaces. Every spring Recmit, a leadingJapanese research finn, publishes a ranking of which companies graduatingcollege students would like to work for. The 1998 rankings of a select set ofcompanies are given in Exhibit 1. While a similar listing for the U.S. wouldmainly be based on the respondents' balance between independence, challenging

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96 Johny K Johansson and Masaaki Hirano

work and economic security, in Japan security and pride in the social statusassociated with the job are paramount Thus, these rankings can in fact be seenas an indicator of the strength of a company's brand identity and perhaps evenbrand reality. Sony has clearly a very compelling brand identity among collegestudents.

In the end, the Japanese company, like any proud family, wants to berecognised, to be famous. The employees working for a famous company willhave an easier time financing a home, will be married to prettier girls, will bemore popular than their friends, colleagues, or competitors at other companies,and will simply feel better about themselves. With market share as the goal, thecompany's and the individual's objectives are aligned properly - with profits lessso. Profits, as Western employees know all too well, are primarily forshareholders, not for them.

Exhibit 1: 1998 Rankings of Companies as Places to Worko

Frequencies represent the number of students who named the company inresponse to the question: "Name five companies you would like to work for."Respondents were Japanese college juniors in March 1998, the time at whichtheir job search usually gets underway (N=13476).

CompanySonyToyotaHondaNECMatsushitaIBMJapanFuji XeroxFujitsuSegaCanonNissanToshibaMitsubishi CarsHitachiSharp

Rank178101430344047526166768087

Frequencies1352486479475398269254245211197173159142137117

*The listing is from Recmifs annual survey of Japanese colleges and universities.Only a few select companies with global presence are shown. Many of the listedpreferences involve domestic-only players, such as Japan Travel Bureau UTB),no.2 with 670 mentions, and Nippon Telephone and Telegraph (NIT), at third placewith 575 votes.

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Brand Reality:The japanese Perspective 97

Internal and External SymbolsOne consequence of the emphasis on recognition is a clear understanding of

the dual role of brand names as an internal as well as an external symbol. WhenSony's Morita, in the often retold 1956 anecdote, rejects an OEM offer from alarge American company with the words "Fiftyyears ago your name was nothing ..Today it is famous. In fiftyyears Sony will be famous," he is not simply speakingabout creating innovative products and memorable advertising (Morita 1987).He is putting into words the essence of the conviction and commitment amongthe Sony employees, the brand reality within Sony itself. That reality is priceless,and not for sale. Morita's only mistake was in the timing - it took less than halfthat time.

The internal role of brand reality is not simply as a powerful motivator. Itsummarises and defines organizational culture, it serves as a guide forindividuals far away from headquarters who make decisions according to the"Matsushita Way," it serves as a guide for the new and young hires who are stilllearning the unique ways of the corporation. 'this is the way we do it here atDentsu," is a typical example expressed in one of our interviews. job rotationhelps reinforce this company-specific style, allowing employees to develop theappropriate perspectives and skills useful in the organization. Also, a japanesemanager is guardian and teacher ("sempai" or senior) of a more recent hire("kohai" or junior), one of the most important of their managerial tasks. A majorreason employees in japan do not move easily between companies is the relativeuniqueness of their decision making style and the degree to which it is adjustedto the specific skills and personalities that make up the organization. As in thestone walls that surround the japanese castles, japanese companies try to fit bigand small pieces into something that is more than the sum of the individualparts - and brand reality is the glue that holds the wall together. In the Westthe stones in the wall are identical and are easily replaced - just as an employeecan easily move to another company to fill a vacancy.

The emphasis on "the company identity" is also closely related to the fact thatthe japanese are particularly reluctant to rely on national origin when evaluatingtheir companies' competitiveness. For Western observers it is clear that the"japanese" identity of a Sony or Toyota is a very salient attribute in the globalmarket place. Not so to the japanese. This is mainly because other japanesecompetitors are their strongest competitors, and thus country-of-origin cannot bea particular company's competitive advantage. In addition, of course, thecompetitive edge in product differentiation - a better quality product or newfeatures - is minimal because of benchmarking and "me-too" productdevelopment japanese managers are forced to look for intangible assets. Brandidentity is one such asset, all the more important because it is less easilyimitated.

Brand Identity in the MarketplaceExternally, the japanese also find it easy to see more in the brand than a

simple brand image which resonates with the customer and reduces theperceived risk of the purchase. The brand identity naturally is seen to carry over

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to the customer - the Sony customer is special, reflecting the Sony identity(something also recognised in the West see Kapferer, 1997). The identity is infact reciprocal -- what defines the image of a brand is not simply the positioningcommunication from the manufacturer. Rather, in the end, say the Japanese, hewho buys and uses a brand defines its image. If Toyota's image is conservative,this is because its buyers are conservative, not simply because Toyota wants toproject traditional values (although, for sustained success, it is of coursenecessary for communicated message and user profile to be aligned).

This conception of the role of brand identity in the marketplace also meansthat the Japanese emphasise brand awareness among non-users. For mostmarketers in the West brand image is a matter between buyer and seller. Butfor recognition at large, the powerful effect of brand reality among Japanese, it isof course necessary that the brand is well known among a broad spectnlln ofpeople. Wearing Levi's create no particular effect unless non-llsers alsorecognise and appreciate the Levi's name. Thus, brand effects work in a triad:Buyer-seller-third party. For a full brand effect a general awareness is required.Large market shares help to achieve the visibility, as do relentless marketingefforts.

How the Japanese Create Brand Reality

With the idea, if not the tenn, of brand reality coming naturally to them, thejapanese have not thought very strategically about the building of brand reality,or brand identity for that matter. In interviews it was palpable how the conceptsinvolved were new in name only -- conceptually, the japanese found the ideascommon-sensical. Now that they realise these issues are being emphasisedamong Western competitors, they are starting to pay more strategic attention tobranding, if nothing else at least for defensive reasons.

Successful ProductsIn the Western literature brand identity and image are seen as drivers of

success. The "power" of their brands is the cause of the success of Coca Cola,AT&T, and 3M. While not denying this, the japanese are inclined to theopposite view. For the japanese finns, market success is what creates a powerfulbrand. The main way to build a strong brand is to capture a large share of themarket Any brand needs to build up a constituency of loyal customers. Oncesuccessful, new and weak brands gain stature. Even seemingly odd brand namestake on the magical aura of a power brand. So it goes with Honda, withNintendo, with Canon and with Bridgestone.

It is therefore not surprising if there are several examples where the japaneseinsistence on maintaining identity - and thus keeping their brand names intact -has been a problem in foreign markets. Toyota's suggestion of a "toy" was anearly drawback, aided and abetted by an unfortunate model called the "Toyopet"Softdrinks like "Pocari Sweat" and "Calpis" were early casualties as well, butdespite snickers, Fujitsu's "Facom" computers seem to have gained a measure ofsuccess abroad. In some cases where the japanese paid more attention to how

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Brand Reality:The japanese Perspective 99foreigners react to their brands, the changes have not necessarily been for thebetter.

The Datsun story is a case in point Here OAT represents the initials of thethree founders. They thought of the car as their "son," hence Datson, but "son" ifpronounced as romanized japanese suggested "loss." Since "son" in Englishsounds similar to "sun," a more upbeat association, the name was changed toDatsun. Despite some snickers in the West (Datsun or "That soon?"), the car wasvery successful, especially after the introduction of the sporty ZX model.However, after more than a decade in the U.S. market, Datsun was changed toNissan, the name of the corporation and the brand name already used in japan.According to the company the change was made mainly in order to get financialinvestors familiar with the company, a successful move, but the reaction in theauto market has been stubbornly negative. Going in the opposite direction, theToyo Kogyo corporation changed its name to that of its main brand, Mazda (forMatsuda, the founder of the company), as did Sony at an early stage in its growth.Because the National brand was already trademarked in the U.S., Matsushita'sgeneric-sounding National brand, still in use in japan, had to be changed toPanasonic, an improvement to many Western observers.

Apart from the strong sense of identity, there can of course be some marketadvantages to staying so close to the roots as the japanese do. japan's gradualemergence as a high-quality manufacturer of world-class products beginning inthe mid-1950s has been based on the products of its major corporations. Whenmade in japan stands for high quality and good design, a japanese-soundingbrand and corporate name, however difficult to pronounce, can engender apositive country-of-origin effect A striking example is that of Dixons, a Britishdiscount chain of electronics goods, whose store brand is japanese-sounding"Matsui." But the Japanese themselves, ever wary of a potential backlash, do notlike to dwell on national stereotypes, and play down this reason for usingjapanese-sounding brand names abroad. In any case, for the typical japanesecompany, there are several competitors who can claim the same national origin,and they are the ones to beat first

In all, the aesthetics of the name itself are still seen as a minor issue by thejapanese when compared to Western companies (Schmitt &; Simonson, 1997).The basic driver of brand creation is success. The analogy to sports is immediateand often expressed: What does it take to attract fans to the ball park? A winner- even if they play in white shoes.

By implication, quality products and superior service come before the brandname. More precisely, the final act of placing the brand name on a product doesnot come until quality and service are up to the required levels. As a strongproduct can build a brand name, so a weak or inconsistent product quality cansoon min it These are basic mles anywhere, but are always at the forefrontamong the successful japanese companies. The problems at Nissan, the automanufacturer whose market share has slipped consistently in recent years bothat home and abroad, are not placed on the change of name as Westernobservers are apt to do (Aaker, 1996). Rather, for the japanese, it is the lack of

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consistency of dealer service and attention to product quality which are theculprits. Typically, it was suggested that one problem for Nissan in the U.S. hasbeen too many dealers relative to unit sales, not allowing sufficient volume perdealer to justify the appropriate dealer attention to supporting the Nissanproduct line.

Relationship MarketingWhile basics are important, Japanese also allow for brand effects as "value

added." With competitive benchmarking and reverse engineering makingfunctional differentiation ever more difficult to sustain, the brand value addedallows some "soft" differentiation centring on image and identity. The goal is tocreate and keep loyal customers who become part of an "extended family"belonging to the corporation -- relationship marketing.

To achieve this objective, all employees in the Japanese corporation serve as"marketers." If a Honda employee finds a Honda car broken down on the side ofthe road, it is his responsibility to help the user. After all, it is "all in the family."At some stage all employees will have been in contact with customers - "c1ose-to-customers" is not simply a matter of sales people or marketing reps visitingcustomers, but a company-wide assignment Instead of laying off people in adownturn, the company may rotate employees into front-line sales jobs.

These well known Japanese principles have unquestionably a sense ofdesperation to them. To a Western observer, they seem to be last-ditch efforts tomaintain employment at all costs. Other brand building efforts are more similarto Western tactics. Offering new products free to prominent actors and famousathletes is a typical approach. Blanketing leading market areas with in-store andoutdoor promotions backed by intensive media blitzes is another. But these andsimilar measures are of course well known also in the West One can even arguethat the Japanese are less adept at some of these activities, especially whencompared to the superior event marketing and sponsorships evidenced bycompanies such as M~crosoft,Nike and Swatch.

Continuous ImprovementWhere the Japanese effort at building brand equity differs from that in the

West is at another level. In line with the notion that the finn's brand signifies apromise to customers, Japanese companies go to great lengths to provideproducts with state-of-the-art technology to its loyal customers. Just as qualityproducts are needed to build a strong brand name, so a constant stream of newand improved products is the best way to maintain the brand franchise. The wellknown "kaizen" (continuous improvement) principle rears its head again. Theproducts may come from the finn's own research and development efforts, orthey may simply be "me-too" versions of leading competitors' products. Theintensity of the resulting competitive rivalry has been noted by several observersof Japanese strategies Uohansson & Nonaka, 1996). What is not alwaysappreciated, however, is that the focus on competitors is driven by an underlyingcustomer orientation. As one interviewee in the electronics industry stated: "In

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Brand Reality:The japanese Perspective 101

the japanese marketplace, even the most loyal customer is willing to wait only afew months for his or her brand to introduce a matching product"

The "new and improved" product emphasis can be seen in the manner inwhich the new luxury cars from Honda, Toyota, and Nissan were introduced.Even though a lot of advertising and promotional efforts were undertaken, thebasic thrust for Acura, Lexus, and Infiniti was the reliance on test drive reportsand consumer satisfaction scores to establish an aura of superior quality. Theefforts behind the Acura involved the now notorious unravelling of the j.D.Powersatisfaction measures to generate high scores. As is well known, Honda simplyinstructed its dealers to ask customers what was needed to get "Excellent" ratingson all scale items - and then follow through on the customers' demands. Forbetter or worse, the practice is now of course common throughout the autoindustry.

Acura's arrival at the top of the customer satisfaction race in 1987 has sincebeen matched by both Lexus and Infiniti. Lexus also generated free publicitywhen early ratings by auto experts showed it superior to the Mercedes modelstargeted - and at a price level 25% below that of the Benz. Even the stature ofthe established Mercedes brand could not sustain such a difference, andMercedes was soon forced to engage in japanese-style brand maintenance, byintroducing a range of new models at lower price points.

The reasoning behind the creation of three new brand names for thejapanese luxury cars also illuminates the way japanese companies approachbrand building. Since Lexus and Infiniti to some extent patterned theirstrategies on the success of Honda's Acura, the most interesting case is Acura,the first entry.

Honda's decision to create a new upscale model was based primarily on thenotion that loyal Honda customers did not have a car to trade up to after theAccord. The decision to create a new name was based on market researchwhich showed that the prevailing image of Honda was too focused on mid-rangevehicles to be optimal, and even though there was a sentiment that the Hondaname should be used, publicity was counted on to help loyal Honda owners torecognise the maker behind the new brand. In addition, a new brand helpedsolve the problem that existing Honda dealers in some of the states with toughfranchise laws would have an option on any new Honda model. The companyknew that some dealers in the U.S. - as opposed to japan and Europe - wouldnot be able to provide the appropriate premises, sales people and superiorservice judged necessary.

The name Acura was picked with the help of an independent research finn inCalifornia. The finn generated several alternatives via computerisedcombinations, with Acura one among several to be registered by Honda's lawyers.The ultimate choice depended partly upon the positive association with"accuracy" and partly with the perceived advantages of a name starting with theletters Ac: The model would be found at the top of any list The effort involvedin building up a new brand was seen as a long tenn investment requiringpatience rather than deep pockets. Although success did come, it is interesting

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to note that after one year on the market the Acura was proclaimed a "failure"by the Wall Street Journal.

Both Honda and Toyota have successfully introduced their luxury models athome in Japan - but under their corporate marques (as, for example, the HondaLegend, and the Toyota Celsio). By contrast Nissan, with several existing modelsat the upper end, introduced the Infiniti name in Japan, with less success. TheAcura name is only found in the North-American market Lexus is used in North-.America and Europe, while Infiniti is a global name. The new names were usefulto avoid potentially negative stereotypes of japanese as producers of luxury cars,but as we have seen, the major rationale had more to do with marketing basics.

Newer Branding Thinking

One would perhaps have expected that the difficulties in the Japanese domesticeconomy in the 1990s would have curtailed the brand building and maintenanceefforts by the japanese companies, and to some extent this is the case. The rateof new product introductions in Japan, for example, has slowed noticeably asdemand has tapered off, even though companies with a global presence(including Sony and Matsushita in consumer electronics, and Honda and Toyotain autos) still maintain the pace in other markets. But according to ourinterviews, the increased emphasis on brand equity in the West has alsoregistered in japan, and companies do spend more on promotion and advertisingthan before to sustain established brands in Japan. The general impression isthat current practices are becoming more like those in the West separatingbrands from products.

Product Still Going StrongNevertheless, the emphasis on "quality products and service first" is still very

much alive. A good example is again provided by Honda. Stung by the loss ofBritish venture partner Rover to BMW two years ago, Honda has moved stronglyto revitalise and upgrade its main brand, the Honda Accord. Dramatic designinnovations has allowed the company to build three Accord models on oneadjustable platfonn, saving costs while allowing localisation. A slightly largerAccord for the U.S. market is accompanied by a slimmer European version and asmaller Asian model. The American version has already become the leadingmodel in its market This is in stark contrast to the Accord Wagon, built in Ohioand very successful in japan. It was introduced in japan with a "HondaManufacturing America" sticker at the height of the trade conflict in 1990, andwas timed well for the increased japanese interest in outdoor life styles.

Honda has also created a task force with the assignment of sketching thebrand identity which Honda should have in 10 years, and the path of arrivingthere. Unusual for a japanese company, not because of the long time horizonbut because of the active management of the brand identity, the task force beganby studying the history of the company, its past product introductions, and theaccumulated market research over the years. This enabled the task force to

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Brand Reality:The japanese Perspective 103

identify the one concept which summarised the essence of Honda's identity:"Kodawari," or "Uncompromising." It then developed a three-step revolvingprocess - clarify, penetrate, evaluate - which provides a basic blueprint for thestewardship of the brand identity over time. It is perhaps not surprising ifjapanese as we)) as Western observers consistently single out Honda, togetherwith Sony, as the best managed japanese brands (Kapferer 1997, Katahira 1996).

Stature and Vitalityjapanese companies are familiar with the Y&R division of brand equity into

"stature" and "vitality" (Brandt & johnson, 1997). However, many areuncomfortable with too much analysis, and seem to prefer to join the twoconcepts into a brand "spirit" which energises both employees and customers.This spirit is reflected in the brand name, which in japan is more of arepresentative "emblem" or "family crest" ("noren" in japanese, referring to thecurtains with their kanji symbols hanging over the doors of sma)) sushi shopsand establish a positive association between store name and reputation). This isanother reason why brand reality -- feeling passionate about sustaining the brand- comes so naturally to the japanese employee. By contrast the American senseof brand seems to derive from the branding irons used for cattle in cowboymovies, a subtle but telling difference for the japanese and some Westernobservers (Macrae, 1996).

However, the new thinking, exemplified by ad agencies such as Dentsu, isbased on the stature-vitality split The Dentsu brand stewarding system involvesboth elements, and separates the measurement as well as the creative objectivesalong this division. As in the West brand vitality is primarily seen to createbrand loyalty among existing customers, and is sustained with the help ofinnovative new products, events marketing, and an emphasis on freshness andyouth in the marketing communications. Brand stature, on the other hand, isviewed as more relevant for first-time buyers and for segments with oldercustomers. The first-time buyers need the risk reduction which comes withstature, and older customers are more interested in the status conferred by thebrand. The marketing communications sustaining the brand stature need tohave a broad appeal, to build brand awareness among non-customers as well.While vitality is necessary for keeping customers and is akin to a one-to-onerelationship with the customer, stature is projected from the customer's peers,from whom recognition and approval must come forth.

The Brand Life CycleAs in the West the product life cycle's decline stage is often rejected by the

Japanese. The "kaizen" notion of continuous improvement naturally suggeststhat products can live for a long time, provided they are kept technologically up-to-date. The same is true for brand life cycles. The earlier stages of the brandcycle -- introduction, growth, and maturity - are used to fashion a brand'smarketing strategy, although here the Japanese seem to mainly be followers, notleaders of Western companies.

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104 Johny K Johansson and Masaaki Hirano

For example, as a new brand is introduced, the main objective is the creationof stature, primarily accomplished, as we have seen, with the help of a superiorproduct and product-focused communications. As in the West, a strong parentcan be useful, and in most cases the corporate parent will supply the endorsingidentity. When Kao introduced its new cosmetics line, Sofina, the companythought it useful to avoid mentioning its corporate identity, associated as it waswith detergents. The product concept was focused around a superior new facecleansing technology, sufficiently unique for the brand to stand alone. However,test market results showed that the endorsement from established Kao namewas a strong purchase motivator, and "Kao Sofina'" became the name, helpingthe company to a successful entry in a very competitive field. In foreign marketswhere the Kao brand is not so well known, the leveraging effect is weaker andthe line has not been so successful.

Similar experiences are of course typical also in the West The one novelconcept used that we uncovered revolved around the marriage of vitality andstature. While stature building is a matter of product perfonnance andpromotion to create trial, the role of brand vitality is to sustain product statureover the brand life cycle. Stature is not built or lost in a short period of time -but vitality can be. Vitality is created out of a sense of excitement,innovativeness, and presence. These are factors which involve media advertising,publicity, and an urgency created by rapid product introductions. An image ofvitality on the market side is the counterpart to brand reality internally in theorganization. While brand stature can convey status among society at large, forbrand reality to produce superior employee perfonnance, brand vitality isinstnunental.

Summary

Brand reality is a concept that comes naturally to the Japanese corporation. Thenotion that there are employees that care passionately about the brand nameand are willing to work hard to sustain the organization's identity are values thatlie close to the core of the individual employee's selfworth. Anything less thanthe full commitment is unacceptable.

But, with few exceptions, on the marketing side of brand management theJapanese still are followers. Although some well known companies - Sony,Honda, Canon, and others - have managed to develop powerful brands throughhigh quality products, the majority of japanese finns still do not separate brandsfrom products. The idea of separate "brand equity accounting" is new to them,and the logical consequence of considering the possibility of "selling" a brandname is still abhorrent

The "management" of the brand is therefore somewhat of an anachronism injapan. To traditional japanese it seems another idea spawned by barbarianWesterners, whose conceptions of self have not yet reached maturity.Individualistic ideals make it necessary for Western organizations to invent newnotions to solve consequent problems in motivating groups and organizations.

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Brand Reality:The japanese Perspective 105

The japanese have already solved that problem. They are cool about it havingtranscended the fire which commitment lights in Western employees. While afire in the belly can motivate employees for some short periods, they bum outand in the long run the war is won by those with ice in the stomach.

References

Aaker, DavidA (1996), Building Strong Brands, NewYork: Free Press.Brandt Marty and johnson, Grant (1997), Power Branding, San Francisco:

International Data Group Inc.johansson, johny K and Nonaka, Ikujiro (1996), Relentless: Tile Japanese Way of

Marketing, NewYork: HarperBusiness.Kapferer, jean-Noel (1997), Strategic Brand Management, 2nd ed. London:

Kogan Page.Katahira, H. (1996), Tile Principles of Power Brands (In japanese), Tokyo:

Kodansha.Macrae, Chris (1996), Tile Brand Cilartering Handbook, London: The Economist

Intelligence Unit.Morita, Akio (1987), Made in Japan: Akio Morita and Sony. With Edwin M.

Reingold and Mitsuko Shimomura. London: Fontana/Collins.Schmitt Bernd and Simonson, Alex (1997), Marketing Aesthetics: Tile Strategic

Management of Brands, Identity, and Image, NewYork: Free Press.Tanaka, Hiroshi (1993), "Branding in japan." In David A Aaker and Alexander

Biel, ed's., Brand Equity and Advertising. Hillsdale, New jersey: LawrenceErlbaum Associates, Inc.

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