Howard in the Nez Perce War

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HOWARD'S COMMAND AND CONTROL OFIDAHO'S NEZ PER CE WAR

A thesis presented to the Faculty o f the U.S. ArmyCommand and General Staff College in partialfulf illme nt of the requirements for thedegreeMASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

CHARLES K. FORD. MAJ , USAB.S.E.E., University of Idaho, Moscow, Idaho, 1979

Fort Leavenworth. Kansas1993

Approved for public rel eas e; distribution is unlimited.


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MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCETHESIS APPROVAL PA GE

Name of Cand idat e: Major Char les K. FordThe sis Title: Howard's Comm and and Control of Idaho'sNez Perce War

Approved by:

Qb.~BF& , Thesis Committee ChairmanJ e d l d R. Brown. Ph.D.

Accepted this 4th day of June 1993 by:

, Director, Graduate DegreePh il ip J.' Br oo ke s, Ph.D. Pr og ra ms

The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are thoseo f the student author and d o not necessarily representthe views of th e U. S. Army Command and General StaffColle ge or any other governmental agency. (References tothis study should include the foreg oing statement.)


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ABSTRACT

HOWARD'S COMMAND AND CONTROL OF IDAHO'S NEZ PERCE WAR BYMAJ Charles K. Ford, USA, 128 pages.This study investigates Brigadier General 01iver OtisHoward's command and control of Idaho's Nez Perce War of1877. The Nez Ferce War of 1877 aroused a wide range ofemotions in the public and military. While most Easternerslabeled the army as being bloodthirsty and inhumane, mostIdaho Territory settlers looked at the army as lifesavers.Secretary of War, George W. McCrary, recognized andcomplimented Howard for his endurance, courage, and skill,but General Sherman thought his former Corps Commanderlacked drive and aggressiveness. Should Howard have beenrelieved of command? The one armed praying BrigadierGeneral 0. 0. Howard did a very professional job when oneconsiders all the factors. Howard had to work quickly toprevent an Indian coalition uprising while musteringsufficient forces to protect the settler and subdue thehostile Nez Ferce. He faced a very experienced foe who hadthe means to fight a war in very demanding terrain. On theother hand, the army improperly equipped Howard'ssubstandard soldiers. Howard had to prosecute the war overa vast territory which crossed several lines of command.Upon reviewing the whole situation , Howard effectivelycommanded and controlled h i s operations to accomplish hismissions.

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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Most importantly, I thank my wife, Ginger, fo r herpatience and support in taking ca re of our th ree childrenduring the endless weekends and even ings while I researchedand w rote t hi s thesis. I greatly appr ecia te Ginger's andth e family's patience and support that the y have given meduring the "best year of our life." I also thank myChai rman , Dr. Jerold R. Brown for hi s guidance, patience,and understanding a s he pulled me through t he MMAS process.His task was an especially thankles s task; he proved t o b einstrumental in th is endeavor. T o him, I am eternallygrateful. I additionally thank th e staffs, on t he secondand th e third floors, of th e Combined Arms Research Libraryand of t he Idaho Historical Society Libr ary theirassistance. I am indebted t o Irv Faling for getting meinterested and providing m e insight into th e Nez Perce.And, I extend a special t han ks t o my proofreaders.


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L IS T OF FIGURES

F i g u r e 1, The Nez Pe rc e War . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9F i g u r e 2 , M i l i t a r y De pa rtm en t a nd D i v i s i o n s i n t h e West 33F i g u r e 3 , Nez P er ce Hands . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57


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CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

A gr ea t dea l o f cheap w i t has been wasted . . . overth e f a i l u r e of Gen. Howard 's command t o cat ch th el i g h t l y m ounted I n d i a n s i n a s t e r n chase, b u t t h e r ei s no so r t o f doubt t h a t Napo leon and Von Mo l tke ,i f reduced t o t he same co nd i t io ns . . . chasing anIn d ia n ra id e r o ve r h un dred s o f m i l e s . . . wouldf a i l i n t h e ta s k j u s t as sign all^.^Army and Navy Jou rna l , 8 Sept . 1877

D u ri ng t h e q u a r t e r c e n t u r y f o l l o w i n g t h e C i v i l War,as gr e a te r numbers o f Americans headed west, In d ia n warstook th e i r p l ac e of prominence. The waves of e mig rantschose e i t h e r t h e Oregon T ra i l , t h e San ta Fe T r a i l , o r t h eSmokey H i l l T r a i l a s t h e i r p a th t o t h e i r f u t u re s . F o l lo w i ngth e d isc ove ry of go ld i n Montana and Idaho, many s e t t l e r s ,i n a quest f o r lan d, go ld, commerce, or adv enture, nowheaded northwestward a lon g th e Bozeman T r a i l t o Montana and ~Idaho. As seve ra l m i l l i o n peop le made t h e i r homes i n th eWest, a showdown ove r la n d owne rship was brew ing between t h es e t t l e r s and Ind ian s . As a r e s u l t o f the se showdowns, 943engagements occ ur re d between th e US Army and th e v a r io u sI n d i a n t r i b e s . =


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Eleven of these engageme nts made up the Nez Perce Warof 1877. The Nez Perce conflict was only one in a series ofIndian struggles in the West that occurred as the country'sleaders and citiz ens fulfille d its Manifest Destiny. Othersignificant western conflicts included the Sioux in theNorthern Plains, the Kiowas and the Commanches in theSouthern Plain s, and the Apaches in the Southwest. Whilethe Nez Perc e War resulted from the culmination of unrestdue to the routine practice of uprooting Indians from theirhom ela nd, this war is noted a s , 'One of the most rem arka bleand dram atic camp aign s in all American history.'" Th earmy's pursuit of the heroic Nez Perce flight over theBitterroot Mountains towards Canada is rich in lessons.

Of the -numerous Indian wars that occu rred followingthe Civil Wa r, the Nez Perce War is an excellentillustratio n of the dynamic interaction s between the variousplayers' stre ngth s and weaknesses. These players were thearmy , the Indians, and the government. Because the NezPerce war produced voluminous, but extremely biased,first-hand documentati on, a modern understan ding of the NezPerc e War is a mixture of facts and fiction. This thesiscuts throug h the myths and focuses on Brigadier GeneralOliver Otis Howard, the commander o f the Military Departmentof the Columbia.


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General William T. Sherman, the Commanding Genera l,greatly influenced t he US Army's appr oach to and thehandling of the Indian problem. Sherm an desired to seecivilizatio n brought to the virgin terr itories o f the Westin order to tap the endless resources of the frontie r. Whenthe Indians int erfe red with th is process, Sh erman believedthat the Indians had to be crushed . Ye t, Sherman hadwritten the following about the Nez Perce af te r theirsurrender:

The Indians throughout displayed a courage and skillthat elicited universal prais e; they abstained fr omscalping, let captive women 80 free , did not commitindiscrimin ate murder of peaceful families which isusual 1-1, and fought with almost scientificskill , using advance and rear guards, skirmish-linesand field fortificati ons. Neve rthe less , they wouldnot settle down on lands set apart for them amplefo r their maintenance; an d, when comma nded by properauthority, they began resistance by murderingpersons . . . .The conduct o f the Nez Perce in their war against thegovernment not only engendered American s ympa thy. butbrought about change s in public policy dealing with I ndianaffairs.

Long known for being peaceful and helpful to both thesettlers and the military, the Nez Perce influenced theinitial development of the Paci fic Northwest by helping theLewis and Clark Expedition. In 1831, the Nez Perce'srequest for missionaries stimulated a wave of missionaryactivity which in turn brought more settle rs to the Pacific


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Northwest. Ye t, their request ultimately led to thelrcon fli ct over land. The Nez Perc e wanted their belovedWallowa Valley and their life-sty le as was allowed the m bythe 1855 Steven's Treaty.

Hostilities started at Slate Creek when wild youngwarriors murdered settlers who had recentl y wronged theirpeople. The young braves eventually stru ck down theinnocent along wlth the guilty before the chiefs gainedcontrol of the situation. How eve r, these selected murdersescalated into the Slat e Creek massacre. Fro m that pointon, the warring Nez Perce conducted their engagementsaccording to the recognized rules of civilized warfare asnoted by Sherman's comm ents above. Even though the NezPerce fought against the army , many citi zens in the easternUnited States openly approved of these coura geou s, humaneNez Perce warriors in their futile opposition. In the end.the Nez Perce's conduct during the war and Chi ef Joseph'spost-war visits to the East contribute d to the developmentof a more sympathetic American attitude toward the Indianproblem. Their actions also initiated some reforms in theCommission of Indian Aff air s, the forerunner of the Bureauof Indian Affairs.=

After the Slate Creek massacre occurred, the armyused force to get the warring Nez Perce to submit to thegovernment. Not only did Howard have a poorly trained and


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ill-equipped force struct ured f or a conventional w ar, he hadto conduct military operations in extremely rugged terralnunder very diverse adverse conditions.

During this campaign, every typ e of climatic hardshipwas experienced. In the spring, the combatants endured thedrenching co ld rains which made the rivers swift and theground too muddy to maintain their footing. The n, as theIndians and soldiers traveled across the rugged land , thesummer heat drained their strength. During the autu mn, theparticipants experien ced the entire spect rum of temperatureextremes. At midday, the summer heat scorched them, whilethe night brought a cold that in the morning left an inch ofice in thei r water buckets. At the conc lusi on of thecamp aign, the lightly clad soldiers and I ndians also had tobattle the e ff ec ts o f a blinding s n ow s t ~ r m . ~

A special correspondent from the Califor niaAssociated Pre ss accompanied Howard's for ce and provides uswith a description of the terra in and the eff ect s theweather had on it:

The country is most wild and rugged character.precipitous mountains and canyon rendering i textremely difficul t for troops to travel. Adding tothe natural obstacles, heavy and continuous rainshave made the mountains almost i m p a ~ s a b l e . ~Howard suffered constant and merciless criticism at

the time and has not fared to o well in the history that hasbeen recorded since. One military historian described


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Howerd'd performance as 'lethargic' and as an -em bar ras sme ntto the army.

In spite of the criticism and lack o f support fromhis superi ors both during and after the campaign, Howardpushed his men to their limits while pursuing th e nontreatyNez Perce for one hundred and fifteen days and ove r fifteenhundred miles. This thesis examines the effectivenes s ofHoward's command and control. To illustrate the furtherimplications of a historical stud y, it is appropriate torev iew the United States Army current definition of commandand control:

The process through which th e activities o f militaryforces are directed, coordinated, and controlled toaccomplish the mission. This process encompassesthe personnel, equipment, . . . and proceduresnecessary to gather and analyze in form atio n, to planfor what to be done, and to superv ise the executionof operation.'For Howard. ef fective command and control will be t he

successful completion of his threefold mission. Upon theoutbreak of hostilities, Howard had th e mission to cal m andprotect the settlers , to prevent a general uprising of thealienated Indi ans, and to rid the area of t he hostileIndians.

Fir st, this thesis looks at the frontier army'sstructure, composition, and characteristics to see whatassets Howard had to execute his mission. Secondly, we willlook at the Indian's b ackground, struc ture, and the path


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that led to war in order to gain an understa nding ofHoward's enemy. To understand the atmosphere in whichHoward executed this mission, we will r ev ie w his diplomaticactio ns to prevent hostilities and his initial response totheir outbreak. Lastl y, we will look at his campaign t o s e ewhat he planned and how he supervised its execution. Thethesis conclud es with an overall analysis.

Howar d, as an Indian fighter and as an Indiandiplom at, was an important frontier figure. His own viewsof his frontier career and his written observations aboutthe tribes he encountered make his recollections a nimportant part of any well-rounded histo ry of the AmericanWest. Prior to the Nez Perce War, he protected the Indiansfrom the settlers while working on behalf of the Indians.Lat er, when the situati on dicta ted, Howard attempt ed to getthe nontreaty Nez Perce to accept the government's off ers .Upon the outbreak of hostil ities, he prosecuted thecampaign. o

In spite of enormous logistical ob stacl es, diffi cultterrain with ch allenging and changing we ather, sheer badluck. and repeated discouragements. Howard remained on thetrail to the bitter end. Did the one-armed general deserveto be relieved? After reviewing all the factors concernedand the situation o n hand, one will s ee that Howard did aprofessional job and that he was criticized for problemsbeyond his control.

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*Army and Navy Journal 8eptember 8, 1877, 73.aRumsel F. Weigley, H is t o r y of The Un ite d Btatem

&&y, (New Y o r k ~M cM il lr n P u bl is h in g Company, 1967), 269.SDeoartmmt of t h e Army, Center a4 M i l i t a r yH is to ry , k r i c a n M i l i t a r v H is to ry , (Washington DC:Government P r i n t i n s o f f i c e , 1989). 311; and John A.Carpente r, Sword and t h e O li v e Branch, 246.*Wi l l iam T. Sherman, "Report o f t h e Oeneral o f t h eArmy," Headquarter o f t h e Army, Washington DC, November 7,1877, of t h e Annual Report of t h e Sec re ta rv of War on t h eOaeratione of th e Department f o r th e F is c a l Yaar Endina June

30. 1877 (Washington8 i3ovmrnment P r i n t i n g O f fi c e , 1877),15.s F r r n c i r D. Ha ines, "Nea Parca and ShaehuniInfluence on Northwest His toryM 379-93 of Ormatar Americn~Essavr- i n Honor o f He rbe rt Eugene Bolton , (Berkeley and LosAngles: U n iv e rs i t y of C a l i f o r n i a Press, 1945), 391-2."C. E. S. Wood, "C hie f Joseph, The Nez Perce," TheCentury I f l u m t r a t s d Mo nthly Mamarina, May 1889, 141.%-m y' and Navy Jo urna l, 1 Septmmbrsr 1877, b2.Q%obarC Woostor. T ~ P i l i t a r y and Un i ted Btwtas

-Department o f t h e Army, FM 101-5-1. O ~ e r a t i o n a l(Wa(~nskingCen,DC r Qevarnment WinCiwqOffice, October 1985), 1-16.%*Robert M. U t l e y , I n t r o d u c t i o n t o 0. 0. Howard's

O F B@rsondl, O b s l ~ t - ~ a S ia n ~ ~dv iim t~wes , and Campaians Amanqth e l n d ia n r af th e a re at West w it h Some Accounts of The i rL i f a, Ha bits. T r a i t s , Re1 g i a n , Ceremonies, Dress SavaneI n s t i n c t s , and Custama i n Peace and War (New 'fo rk : Da CapoPress, l97 2) , v.

--O F B@rsondl, O % sl ~t -~ aS ia n~ ~dv iim t~wes , and Campaians Amanqth e l n d ia n r af th e a re at West w it h Some Accounts of The i rL i f a, Ha bits. T r a i t s , Re1 g i a n , Ceremonies, Dress SavaneI n s t i n c t s , and Custama i n Peace and War (New 'fo rk : Da CapoPress, l97 2) , v.


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F i g u r e 1 , Map of The Nez Per-ce War


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CHAPTER TWOTHE ARMY

The army 's I nd i an m i ss i on m er i t s no con s i de r a t i on i nd e t e rm i n in g i t s p r op e r s t r e n g t h , o r g a n i z a t io n , andcomposi t ion. l General Winf i e l d S. Hancock1876 Congressional Test imony

Wi th thousands o f u n c i v i l i z e d I nd i ans and on1y twohundred t wen ty - s ix m i l i t a r y pos t s , seven teen a r sena l s o rarm or ies, and +ou r storeho use s or dep ots manned by o n ly24,581 o f f i c e r s and s o l d i e r s s c a t t e re d th ro u gh o ut t h ecoun t r y , t h e utmost v i g i l a nc e was needed t o p r o t e c t t h el i v e s and p r o p e r t ie s o f o ur f r o n t i e r c i t iz e n s . ' A scommander of t h e Department of th e Columbia, B r i g a d ie rGenera l O l i ve r O t i s Howard had on l y e leven po s t s t o p r o t e c tt h e c i t i z e n s o f t h e s t a t e o f Oregon and t h e t e r r i t o r i e s o fIdaho and Washington. I n a d d i t i o n t o l i m i t e d number o fp o s t s and s o l d i e r s t o p r o t e c t t h e s e t t l e r s f ro m t h e In d ia n s,t h e a rm y 's s e n i o r l e a d e r s d i d n o t c o n si de r t h e I n d i a nmiss ion when s t r u c t u r in g , equ ipp ing , and t r a in in g th e army.

I n a d d i t io n t o p r o t e c t i n g our f r o n t i e r s e t t l e r s andt r a v e l r o u t e s , t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s Army i n 1877 had severa l


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rai lro ad, built roa ds, and atrung telegraph lines on thefrontier. They also explored and mapped unsettled fron tlerareas. '

In addition, the congressionally controlledreconstruction army of the South had finally ended itsoccupation of the defeated Confederate sta tes , but the roleof the army in domes tic issues continued.* The Hayesadministration used troops in a dozen state s to protectproperty during a wave of railroad strikes. The governors o fthese states requested the Federal soldiers to restore orderafter wage reductions caused the labor r i ~ t s . ~

Fr om the end of the Civil War until 1877, the UnitedStates essentially had two armies. Congress controlled onearmy through the reconstruction acts to administer theformer Confe derat e states. The other army, controlled bythe Presi dent, consisted of the staff and the line. Thissituation caused the already small army to have even few ertroops ava ilabl e fo r the de fe ns e of t he frontier.'

Amidst all this turmoil. the soldiers and officersrecei ved no pay because the House had not passed the annua larmy appropriation bill for the new fiscal year that startedon 1 July. The House and the Senat e could not agree oneither t he army's si ze or its prope rly employment.'

Having defin ed the roles of the army of 1877, thearmy's organization is examined. For admlnistrative


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purposes and to fix respo nsibi lity, the War Departmentdivided the country into ten military departments which werecommanded by either a brigadier general or the seniorcolonel in the department. The ten depa rtmen ts were underthe three geographic divisions, each commanded by a generalofficer. The President of the United States appointed andspecially empowered the department and divisionc ~ m m a n d e r s . ~

Although the War Department had set up geographicdepartment s under the geographic division fo r command andcontrol as well a s administrative sup port of the for ces , theboundaries were changed frequently or simply ignored. Thedepartment commanders were situated to gain perspectivewithout losing foc us on local conditi ons and had a largedegr ee of autonomy. They maintained contact with their postcommanders and set standards and guidelines. While thedepartment commanders could normally handle local Indiantrou bles, problems developed when the hostiles crosseddepartment geographic boundaries. In such cases. thedivision commanders had to coordinate and enforcecooperation between department commanders. When the hostileIndians crossed division geographic boundar ies, often thecommanding gener al or the Secretary of War had to make thevarious division and department commanders cooperate witheach other.'


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The Commanding General, Generalcontrolled matter s pertaining to the dcontrol of the army. The Secretary ofGeor ge W. McCr ary, controlled th e fisc

William T. She rman,iscipline and militaryWar, the Honorable

al, administrative.and logistical matters through his bureaus and staf fdepartment. Hen ce, the commanding general did not havehabitual control of these elements. Cons equen tly, thebureaus control led the distribution and divisio n o f theirsuppo rt; thereby, influencing the operational tempo. Thebureaus' control of the assets limited the commandinggeneral's control of his territorial commander^.'^

The War Department staff consisted o f ten bureaus orcorps: Adjutant General's Off ice , the Inspector General'sOff ice , the Quartermaster Department, the Judge AdvocateGeneral's Off ice , the Subsistence Depar tment, the OrdnanceDepartment, the Medical Department, the Pay Departmen t, theCorps of Engine ers, and the Signal Bureau. Except for theInspector General and Chief of Signal Off ic er , which had acolonel as their heads , brigadier ge nerals headed thevirtually autonomous staff elements.ll

The Adjutant General's Bure au, the custodian o frecords and archives , published the orders and determinedwhich units received replacements without consulting theCommanding General. During the Nez Perce War. GeneralSherman wanted the 2nd Infantry Regiment tr ansferred f rom


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the Department of the Sou th within the Division of the Eastto the Department of the Columbia within the Division of thePacific. Once the Adjutant General got around to publishi ngthe order, the Quartermaster's departme nt had already takenthe lead. Henc e, the Secretar y of War's st af f , withoutbeing required to consult the commanding gen eral, determinedmatters that directl y influenced the tempo of the militaryoperation^.^'

The Quartermaster of the Army provid ed tran sportati onand all supplies except rations and ordnance. Therefor e, hearranged for the movement of the 2nd Infantry Regiment fromGeorgia to Idaho. Likewise, the Subsiste nce Bureau and theOrdnance Bureau had to provide rati ons and ordnance--armsand ammunitions--for the 2nd Infantry Regiment as well asvolunteer units mustered for the crisis. Henc e, Howa rd,McDowell, and Sherm an had to rely on two staff elements,which they did not contro l, for critical reinforcement s forthe N ez Per ce War.'=

The other departments were the Judge AdvocateGeneral's Departme nt, respo nsib le for reviewi ng militarycourts and providing the Secretar y of War's legal advi ce;the Medical Departme nt, charged with health and hygiene o fthe army; the Pay Bureau, whose pay agents traveledendlessly to distribute soldiers' wages; the Corps ofEngineers, respon sible for conducting survey s and mapping


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expeditions plus overseeing coastal and harbor construction:and the Signal Corps , charged with weather forecasting andcomm unica tions , especially the emerging telegra phnetwork. l*

Rank heavy and politically in tune with theWashington establishment, bureau chiefs answered only to theSecretary of War and functioned outside of Sherman'sauthority. Likew ise, the division and department s t a f f s ,working for their bureau chiefs, functioned outside of theircommander's auth orit y. This total separation of the stafffrom the line gave the b u ~ e a u hiefs their own mini-armies.While the staff elements answered only to the secretary ofwar, the division and department comma nders answered toSherman. lS

The problem was one of control. Sherman hadregulatory control over military affa irs; McCrary hadregulatory control over staff and fiscal matters. WhileSherman announced requirements to conduct a campaign,McCrary set priorities for his sta ff. Furt herm ore, fiscaland staff control affected tro op operations within adepartment by i nflue ncing the distribution or diversion ofpersonnel and supplies. As an exam ple, Sherman's concernwas with the Nez Perce War, but the staff assigned some ofthe f e w available soldiers to the East to put down the laborriots. *


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charged that: - . . . the Regular Army is uomposed ofbum mer s, loaf ers, and foreig n paupers.'20

While there were a fe w brave-hearted men who enlistedfor adventure, many e ither wanted a means to the gold fieldsor simply couldn't find any other work. The quality ofsoldi ers did tempor arily increa se because of the highunemployment during the Panic of 1873. The post Civil Wararmy resembl ed the Europea n 18th century army that had to bekept away from the townspeople. Utley describes the armyas:

criminals, brutes, perverts, and drunkards. to namea few. But there were also active youths seekingadventure, men o f varying ability fleeingmisfortune, and foreign paupers who t urned out to beexcellent soldiers.21The characteristics of the soldiers and officers were

a mix of the past and the present. Th e army was uniq ue lnthat many of the offi cers and sold iers were not whole.Many , such as Howard, had lost a limb in the war o f therebellion. Missing a limb was not restricted to theofficers. A limping cavalry man was a common sight. ACivil War veteran, while enlisting in a regiment on activeservice in Montana, was questioned about his limp. 'It's anold wound and it's on ly so once in a while. I can ~ i d efirst-rate,' he pleaded, and s o was assigned to duty.Missing fingers and toes that were frozen off in winterexpeditions were considered only a minor inconvenience.2J


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The enlisted force varied widely in social andeconomic backgro unds. Although it included some skilledtradesmen. laborers, far mers , and even musicians andschoolte achers, the usual monthly pay of 8 13 to $22.execrable living conditions, and harsh disci pline offeredlittle incentive to -a tt ra ct a more elite caliber of men.Consequen tly, the civilian populous looked down upon thevery men they wanted to protect them fro m the nativesavages. Since it appealed to so few, the army had anextraordinarily high turnover rate. Twenty-f ive to fortypercent of the enlisted so ldiers either died, deserted, orwere discharged each year."

With t he harsh living condi tions and t he lure ofinstant wealth of gold f ield s, desertio n eroded the manpowerof the army. While the Department o f the Colu mbia gained208 solders in 1877, they lost 326: 173 to discharge , 16 todisability, 67 for other ca uses, 23 to deat h, and 4 7 todesertion.'. Beca use th e Hous e had not passed the annu alarmy appropriatio n bill, the issue of rations. c loth ing, andother provisions to enlisted men conti nued , but t he armyreceived no pay resultin g in a decline in morale. The highturnover , especially the desertions, ate away on the morale,discipli ne, and efficien cy of the army.


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Poor training further contributed to the problemscreated by the high loss and poor enlistment rates. Companyoff ice rs and soldiers, were inadequately trained to fight theIndians. The noncommissio ned officers (NCO) and of ficer s ofthe company. in theory, trained the soldiers how to performtheir duties. Severe undermanning, however, limitedtraining in the line units. Except for the rudimentaryinstruction at the recruit de pot, troops received littlemore training th an drilling on the post parade grounds.Training deficiencies were most glaring in horsemanship andmarksmanship. Due to a lack of funds, only a handful ofbullets were s upposed t o be used for target practice. Arecruit coul d, in fact, complete a five-year enlistment andnever fire his weapon.""

Predictably, the deficiencies in training would sho wup in the batt lefi eld. After the terr ible show ing of 1stCavalry at the opening battle o f the Nez Perce War, CPT DavePerr y, a company comma nder, underwent a court o f inquiry.His def en se centered on inadequate mounted training and lacko f ammunition. He blamed the unit's unsatisfactorype rf or ma nc eo n not being well drilled in firing whilemounted. Seco ndly , he testified that he was not at faultsinc e the troops ran out of ammunition. He claimed therewas no ammunition available for the operation. The courtcleared hi m of all charges.=*


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The army's embarrassing showing against the NezPerce. especially Colonel John Gibbon's 7th Infantrysurpri se attack at Big Hole, helped start a refo rm movementin the army training program. Four years later, the armyformed instructional companies at the recruiting depots. Inthese companies, recruits receive four months of trainingbef or e their first assignment."

While some felt that the United States Army wasbetter armed and equipped than anytime in its hlstory , theIndians and som e settlers were equitably or better armed andequipped for the time. Due to limited funding and sl owprocurements, the Department of the Columbia was armed wltha variety of weapons. The Ordnance Department had converted50,000 Civil War vintage Springfi eld rifled muskets to flrethe metallic cartridge. This Allin convers ion shortened the

ri fl e barrel and reduced the caliber f ro m .58 to .50. Inadditio n, the Cavalry used a variety of carbines: Spenc er,Sharps , and a variety of experimental models. The troopspreferred the Spencer, a .50 caliber repeater that was fedfrom a tube in the stock containing seven rounds. Anotherpopular model was the single-shot Sharps carbine. Inaddition to the Spencer and Sharps models, the army startedprocuring and issuing the 1873 ~pri n'g fiel d 45 calibe r riflefor the infantry and the 1873 Spring field .45 calibe rcarbine for the cavalry. The cavalry started receiv ing, as


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a si dea rm, the 'Peacemaker'; a Colt $ 4 5 eelibrrr e v ~ l v e r . ' ~

To complement their carbine and revolver, thecavalrymen carried a saber. However, due to its weight andclum sine ss, most men c ommonly carried a sheath knife insteadof the saber into the field. The infantrym an carried abayonet to complement his rifle. Both the cavalry and theinfantry used the prairie belt. a leather belt with canvaslo op ss ew ed on it, to carry their basic load ofa m m u n i t i ~ n . ' ~

To finish outfitting the frontier soldier of 1877,the cavalryman tied his gear--picket -pin, ca nteen , andutensels--to his saddle. The infantryman carried his gearin a blanket rol l slung over his sh oul der , or in aregulation knapsack."O

The soldier's cloth ing is important because thepursuit of th e Nez Perce occurred during the heat o f Julyand the sn ow of October. Howard's soldiers wore dark blueblouses and light blue trou sers trimmed in the distinctivecolors of his branch of service. This unifor m, made out ofonly one weight o f clot h, caused the soldier to roast in thesummer and freeze in the winter. The absence of seasonalclothing inflicted undue hardship on the soldier. Howard's-column left Idaho in July with only o ne unifor m with whichto endure the seve re swin gs in weather cond itions.


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Durlng the Nez.Perce war, the twelve-pound mountaznhowrtzer, the two-pound Hotchkiss mountain gu n, and theGatling gun supported the campaigning cavalry and infantry.While so me hailed them as super weapons that could disperse,repulse, and demoralize Indian concentrations, others deemedthe m useless in Indian warfare. The 12-pound mountainhowitzer originated during the Civil War, but s aw less usein the frontier than the Hotchkiss mountaln gun or theGatling gun. All three crew-served weapons were mounted onwheeled carriages, which decreased mobility.

General Miles raved about the effectiveness of thelight, compact 1.65 inch, 2-pound Hotchkiss mountain gun.except in timbered country around Yellowstone NationalPark."% Except for the last part of the war, the NezPerce War was fought entirely in timbered and mountainousterrain. In fac t, only at the Battle of Clearwater and theBattle of Bear P aw Mountain did the employment of mountaznguns significantly contribute to the defeat of the NezPerce. '

The Gatling g un, a forerunner of the machine gun.could fire 350 round s per minute, but the range was the sameas the rlfle . While the Gatling gun was employed during thecampaign. it hindered the army's mobility while contributinglittle to the army's firepower. The guns often jammed as a


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result of the refus e of black powder and high heat. Evenw i t h a part of an artillery regiment assigned to Howard'scomma nd, he had to detail men from the other units to manthe Gatling guns and other crew-served weapons.sJ

Mobility of the columns with their wagon andcrew-served weapons was the biggest problem the frontierarmy faced. Sin ce the infantry and cavalry carried theirsupplies and ammunition in wagons , mountainous or woodedterrain restricted their agility and rate of advance. I naddit ion, their mobility depended on the endurance of theirgrain-fed horses to sustain themselves on grass. Even whenthey carried adequate supplies of grain forage. their horsesbecame jaded and exhausted after extended c ampai gns.Colonel Haz en, of the Sixth In fantr y, state d:

After the fourth day's march of a mixed c omm and , thehorse does not march faster than the foot soldier,and after the seventh day , the foot soldier beginsto out march the horse , and from that time on thefoot soldier has to end h'is march earlier andearlier each day , to enable the cavalry to reac h thec a m p . . . .34

Doctrine called for the cavalry to ride to thebattle. then dismo unt to fight. Sin ce they had lighterweapons than the infantry and had to detail one in foursoldier to hold the horse s, the cavalry delivered lessfirepower upon the enemy. Even though the cavalry had poorstaying power and poor mounted p erfor mance , they were more


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likely to clos e with the Indians in combat. While thecavalry could not match the infantry for endurance on longdistance marches, the infantry could not keep up with thehighly mobile mounted Indian~.'~

Of the two parts of the army. line and st af f, theline manned t hose 226 military posts with forty regiments:twenty-five infantry regim ents composed of ten companieseac h, and ten calvary and five artillery regiment s withtwelve companies each. Each artillery regiment had twomounted batteries. A colonel commanded each of the fortyregiments with a lieutenant colonel serving as deputycommander or executive officer. Captains commanded, withthe assistance of a first lieutenant and a secondlieut enant , each of the 430 companies of the regiments. Ofthe assigned strengt h of 24, 501 , only 20, 610 officers andmen served in the line. As defined by the act of 1866,almost four thousand of fic ers and men manned the WarDepartment staff and its subo rdinate element^."^

After the Civil War, the army became a skelet onforc e because Congress reduced the total army strengthwithout deactivating any units. As a resul t, comm ander scombined two or more compani es to perform the work of one.For exam ple, Gibbons fought the Battle of Big Hole with sixcompanies of the Seventh Infantry. Together, the companies


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had only 19 officers end 146 enlisted men for an aver ag* of24 men per company. " 7

After the Civil War. one of the challenges fo r theWar Department was to sort out who would get the limitedvacancies. Regular offic ers had brevet rank in volunteerunits several grades above regular army grades. Inaddit ion, brevet grades had been liberally passed out fo rwartime s ervice not only to combat soldiers but also tostaff members who had never seen any combat. Volunteersapplied for the few regular army officer vacancies. Thissitu atio n caused intense competition and rivalry among theofficer corps. Officers would prefer charges against eachother for the slightest provocation or seek to steal theglory of a battlefie ld victory.3s

The officers dealing with the Nez Perce Indianscould count on their age advancing faster th an their rank .It was not uncomm on for an officer to be a lieutenant f ortwo decades. Overcautiou sness and age prevented some fromsuccessfull y combatting the elusive Indians. Extremely slowadvancement --by today's standards--d iminished theirinitiative. Troubled by low pay, extremely sl ow promotions,and inadequate training, jealous office rs often magnifiedpetty quarre ls into major controversies instead of seekingself improvement. Besides fragmenting the officer corpsinto hostile factions, the conditions narrow ed the


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o f f i c e r s ' fo cu s. The p o s t p ara de g ro un d w i t h i t s two o rt h r e e com panies d e f i n e d t h e i r i n t e l l e c t u a l and p r o f e s s i o n a lsphere. The ge og ra ph ic a l ly s ca tt er e d companies seldom camet o ge t he r t o t r a i n a s a r eg im e nt. As a r e s u l t , o f f i c e r s hadl i t t l e t r a i n i n g f o r I n d ia n f i g h t i n g or an yth in g e ls e. AnIn d ia n scou t t o l d one o f f i c e r : "You men who fou gh t downSouth ar e c razy . They do n ' t know anyth ing about f i g h t i n gInd ians ." "7 Whether th e o f f i c e r s were a p rodu ct o f WestP o in t o r t he C i v i l War, th e sc ou t 's comment was em ph at i ca l ly

t r u e .What t h e army needed was n o t m ere ly more I n d ia n

f i g h t e r s , b u t o f f i c e r s who w ere I n d i a n t h i n k e r s . S i nc eH al le ck 's ten ure as Commanding Genera l o f th e Un i te d S ta te sArmy, th e army had focused on defending t h e resou rces o f th ehome land aga ins t f o r e i g n aggresso rs , no t dea l ing w i t hI n d i a n h o s t i l i t i e s . W h il e t h i s decade o f t h e 1 87 0's saw t h eo r i g i n of m i l i t a r y p ro f es s io n a li sm i n th e U n it ed S ta te s, t h efo c u s was on a Napoleonic ty pe war.

The Un ited St at es M i l i t a r y Academy, f o r many years,used as t h e i r s t an d a rd m i l i t a r y sc ie n c e and a r t t e x tb o o k CFTO 'C on or's t r a n s l a t i o n o f S. F. Gay de Vernon's T r e a ti s e onThe Brfime& 3 4 War 8 n d Ford1F ie ak lon . I n n d d i t l e n , B'Conn ort r an s l a te d a summary o f Baron de Jomin i f o r t h e cadets t os t ud y European s t r a t e g i c c on ce pts . J o m i n i ' s i n t e r p r e t a t i o nof Napoleon became th e edu ca tio n sta nd ard of West P o in t.


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As a result, newly commissioned West Point graduate8 a n t r ~ ~ dan army which, except for its size and frontier mission,resembled a minute scale Imperial force. Hence. armyofficers sa w their role as to defend th e country's resou rcesfrom European invasion. They did not conce rn themselveswith a military policy that dealt with the Indians or smallneighbors such as Mexico and Canada.*=

Indian campaigns found their way .i nt o professionalliterature as interesting history rather than as casestudies. Case studies could have improved the army'sorgan izati on, doctr ine, and officer education. Instead, thearmy focused on conventional means for their next foreignwar. When the 19th century conventional army foug ht anuncon venti onal enemy like the Indian. the army had tomobilize great numbers of soldiers to defeat the Indians.

Throughout the nineteenth ce ntu ry, the American Armyfought like the conventional forces of Europe. Americanmilitary doctrine cam e from European experiences andteachings. The United States, as a test of securi ty,measured itself against European military conventionalforce s. For Indian fighting, howev er, these tactics wouldwork only i f the India ns would stand and give battle. Onlyrarely did the Indians cooperate. Heavy columns of slo wmoving t roops with the heavy and noisy impediments of wagonsand cannons serve d to alert and scatter the Indians.


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Once the Indians scatter ed, the army was unable to brlng theenemy to a battle in which it could use its conventio naltactics:=

However, during the winter months the Indians losttheir mobility when their grass-fed ponies were weakened bythe lack of food and th e sev ere weather forced th em to stayin their camps and villages. The army would then attack theIndians' winter villa ges, which were heavily occupied by thewarriors' families. While destroying their food stockpi lesand possessions, the army inf licted heavy causalities on thesurprised warriors. Instead of developing a formal Indianfighting doctrine to deal with the Indian mobility, themilitary contin ued to emulat e Europe's military.*=

When an Indian uprising occurre d, the depletedcompan ies were too weak to handle it without a dditio nalcompanies. Transporting these additional companies to thecrisis was extremely costly and time consuming. Since theunder- trained , poorly equipped army had to be able to movequickly in order to implement the vague government policy,command and contro l of the se forces was critic al. Movementof the frontier army. however, was serio usly hindered by thedistin ct, confusing chain of command from the post commanderto the Commanding G eneral, General William T. Sherman.

In summar y, f ew in the national leadership cared agreat deal about Indian affair s until a crisis threatened


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the peace on the frontier. When Indian hostilitiesdisturbed the peaceful front ier, the national leaders wantedan immediate end to the disturbance. Yet, because thenation's leaders had previously paid little attention toIndian warfare, high level military officials did notorganize or equip t he army to perform the dominate missionthey were called upon to do. This omission compounded thechallenges of Howard's command and control during the NezPerc e war. Beside being tasked for many nondefense rol es ,Howard commanded units organized and equipped for aconventiona l war instead of his unconventional e nem y, theNez Perce. The additional burdens of the administrative andthe organizational quagmires of the army's command and staffmade more difficult for him to command and control thesoldiers and equipment needed to prosecute the campaign.Whlle Howard had a difficult task and was pressed to meetthe demands placed upon him. he had a force that was notimpotent.


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Endnotes'Robert M. Ut ley , F ro n t ie r Regularsr The Un i tedSt ate s Army and th e Indian s, 1866-1891 (L in co ln: U n iv e rs i t yo f Nebraska Pres s, 1984) 45.=Wi l l i am T. Sherman, "Report o f t h e General of t h eArmy," He ad qua rters o f t h e Army, Washington D. C., November7, 1877, of t h e Annual Re nort o f t h e S ec re ta ry of War on t h eOeera t ions o f t h e Department f o r t h e F i s c a l Year EndinaJuno, (Washington : Government P r i n t i n g O ff ic e , 1877) 1-13.=Robert M. U tle y, "The F ro n t i e r and th e AmericanM i l i t a r y T r a d i t io n , " t h e i n t r o d u c t i o n o f S o l d i e r s West.B i oa ra p h ie s fro m t h e M i l i t a r y F r o n t i e r , e d i t e d by Pa ulAndrew Hutton, (L in co ln: U n iv e rs i t y of Nebraska Press,

4Russel l F. Weig ley, H is to ry of the Un i ted Sta tesw,New York: MacMillan P u b li s h in g Company, 1967) 266.Wmerican M i 1 t a r y H i s t o r y , Un i t e d S ta te s Army,Cen te r ' o f M i l i t a r y H is to ry . (Wash ington D. C.: US GovernmentP r i n t i n g O f f ce, 1989) 285. .&Department of t h e Wmy, Center of M i l i t a r yHis to ry , American M i l i t a r y H is t o r y , (Wash ington DC:Government P r i n t i n g O f f i ce , 1989) 284.'Robert Wooster, The M i l i t a r y and U ni te d S tate sIn d ia n P ol ic y, 1865-1903, (New Haven: Yale U n iv e rs i t y

Pre ss, 1988) 87.W t l e y , F ro n t ie r Reau la rs 13-14.V t l e y , F r o n t ie r A r m y 33.ao1bid.

% =U t ley , F ro n t i e r Regu lars 31-32.l X I b i d .


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' y f a i ~ l r wDowning, Zndiwn Fighting Army, (NewYork: Charl es Scribner's Son, 1944) 15.

laPeter Camejo, Racism. Revolution. Reaction.1861-1877: The Rise and Fall of Radical Reconstruction, (NewYork: Monad Press, 1976) 30.'-Robert M. Utlev. "The Frontier and the AmericanMilitary Tradition," the. introduction to Paul Andrew Hutton,Soldiers West, Bioaraphies from th e Military Frontiers,(Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1987) 8.znArmy and Navy Journal, 20 Oct 1877, 170.ZlRobert M. Utley, Frontier Regulars,(Bioomington: Indiana University Press, 1977) 23.---Fairfax Downing, Indian-Fighting Army 22.Z"Utley, Frontier Renulars, 23.Z4Yajor General Irwin McDowell , "Mi itary Divisionof Paci fic Report", 113 of "Report of the Secretary of Warto t he 4 8 Congress," 17 November 1877.lwRobert Wooster, The Military and United StatesIndian Policy, 1863-1903, (New Haven: Yale University

Press, l988), 32."OIdaho Statesmen, 8 March 1879, Boise, IdahoTerritory.T7Ztley, Frontier Requlars, 24.zeDowny, Indian Fighting Army, 17; and Utley,Frontier Regulars, 69-71.x7Utley, Fruntier Regulars, 71-75.

"lYs1 lowstone Pa rk , established in 1872, was theNation's first National Park.


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7.--- - , isna ld I::. F is he r , Thunder i n th e Mounta ins . TheG.tory 3 .f t h r ) Nez ?ere@ War, :Caeur D'Ale ne, Idaho : a lp h aOmega, 1992; 312.Z 't it ley , F ro n t i e r Requ la rs , 72-73.T4Ut ley , F ro n t i e r Regu la rs SO."= t i t l ey , Ibid.JoSherman, "Report of t h e Genera l o f t h e A rmy," 5 ;

and 14 Stat. 532-58 c i t e d i n U t l e y, F r o n t i e r R egu lars , 11.,371'did.

SvdL:ry, F r o n t ie r Regu lars 21; and Wooster, T h eM ~ l i t a r y nd t h e US I n d ia n P o l i c y 71, 62.LeEwzeel F. Weigley , The Am er ica n Way o f War: AH i s t o r y o i t h e U n i te d S ta t es M i l i t a r y S t r a te n v and P o l i c v ,(i3iooming~can: I n d i a ~ a i v e r s i y Press, 1977) 88.41'&ei51e. The Am er ican Wav o f War 82-83.I -".+.*;;ley, The Gcnorican Way O f War 67..,.:I. ." -i . c y , F ~ * a n t i c rRe gu la rs SO; and We igley, The

Aws- ican * av s4 War 1T9.


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(M ISSOURI

DEPARTMENT OC THE MISSOURI (MISSO~RI)

DEPARTMBNTOF- -- D g p ~ ~ ~ f i ~ ~ ~ ~ bOVNDARIESDlV l f ONAL B J U N ~ ~ ~ ' ~ ~

~hiu,,.Milir~rrvC ; r w@M J ' vZ, a. l th e n i l i t a r v D e p a r t m e n t and D i v i s i o n s i n the west~ 1 3 ~.li 1 = ~ u d A ie d S t a t e s . InJi an Pol-,source:Robert ~ o o s t e r - ~


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I ave known

CHAPTER THREENEZ PERCE INDIANS

t he Nez Pe rce t r i b e s i nce 43. Theywere under my cha rge as Su pe rinten de nt o f In d ia nA f f a i r s fro m J une 1857 u n t i l 1859. They ar e th ef i n e s t spe cim ens o f t h e a b o r i g i n a l r a c e upon t h i sc o n t i n e n t and been f r i e n d l y t o t h e w h i te s f ro m t h et im e of Lewis and Clark. '

J. W. NesmithOregon Senator

The rea de r sh ou ld und erstand t h e background and waysof t h e peacefu l and he lp in g Nez Perce Ind ia ns. To fu r t h e rap pre c ia te Howard 's command and co n t r o l cha l lenges, t h i schapter w i l l re ve a l how these pea cefu l I nd ian s cou ld be suchs k i l l e d w a r r i o r s t h a t t h e y alm ost d efe ate d t h i s c o u n t r y ' sbes t gene r a ls and so l d i e r s . F i n a l l y , t he chap t e r w i l ldem onstrate what caused th e Nez P erce t o ta k e up arms.Wh ile a r ch aeo log i s t s c l a im t o be ab l e t o t r a ck t he Nez Pe rcea n ce s to rs f ro m t h e S i b e r ia n p l a i n s a c r os s t h e B e r in g S t r a i tt o th e P a c i f i c Nor thwest more than 50,000 years ago, th e NezPerce have t h e i r own legend about t h e i r or ig ins . ' Theybe l i ev e t he Coyo te S p i r i t , Spee l y i c r ea ted them f o l l o w i ng ane p i c b a t t l e w i t h a m on ste r. A f t e r S p e e l y i s le w t h emonster, he cu t th e monster ' s body i n t o p ieces , wh ich hep ro m p tly th re w i n a l l d i r e c t i o n s . M i ra c u lo u s ly , t h e p ie c e s


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of monster became Ind ian t r i b e s . Speel y i s f r i e n dcomplimented him on a job w e ll done, b u t asked him who wouldl i v e i n t h e i r most b elo ve d v a l le y . For t h e i r b e a u t i f u lva l l e y , Spee ly i had saved th e monster 's h ea r t t o make thel a s t and be st t r ib e -- t h e Nez Perce o r Nimpaus as th eyo r i g i n a l l y c a l l e d th em se lve s. The C oyote S p i r i t , S p e e ly i ,r e p o r t e d l y s a i d , " L e t t h i s be t h e i r hom eland f o r e v e r. " =

Whi le bo th th e I nd ian legend of Spe e ly i and thea r ch a e olo g ic a l f i n d i n g s a r e i n t r i g u i n g , t h i s I n d i a n le ge ndpr ov id e s i n s i g h t about th e Nez Perce. The Nez Ferce lov edth e lan d t h a t they had l i v e d on f o r so many years .Secondly , t h e be l i e f t h a t t he Nez Perce o r i g i na t ed fr om t hem o n s te r 's h e a r t s ym b oliz ed t h e i r h e a r t f e l t k in dn es s. I nfa c t , t he Nez Perce are be t t e r known f o r t h e i r peacefu lachievements i n th e set t le m en t and development of th e

P a c i f i c No rthwes t than t hey a r e f o r massacre o f s e t t l e r s andIn di a n wars, in c lu d in g th e Nez Perce War.4

H i s t o r i a ns c r e d i t t he F rench-Canad ian t r appe r s t ha tt ra d e d i n t h e a re a w i t h t r a n s l a t i n g p i e rc e d noses i n t o NerPerce. They c a l l e d them "Cho pu nnis h" o r p ie rc e d nosesbecause they wore s h e l l s i n t h e i r noses when t h e Europeansf i r s t made con tac t w i th them.

The f i r s t recorded encounCer with the Ne@ F@w@o c c ur re d d u r i n g t h e Le w is and C l a rk E x p e d i t io n , o i i i c i a l l yc a l l e d the Corps o f D iscovery . Th is f i r s t e xposure t o the


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Nez Perce re in f or ce d the Ind ian legend th a t th e Nez PerceIn d ia n s were warm-hearted people.

A f t e r c ro s s in g t h e L o l o t r a i l , t h e e x p e di ti o n met t h eNez Perce Indians. The ext rem ely hungry and t i r e d ex plo re rshad j u s t comp le ted a f i f t y - t w o days jou rney t r a ve r s i ng t hega te of th e mountains on th e Miss ou r i R ive r i n Montana t ot h e c r e s t o f t h e L o10 Pass i n t h e B i t t e r r o o t M o u n t a i n s .Whi le th e ex p lo re rs took f i f t y - t w o days, th e Nez Perce cou ldcover t h e same distaaeeimnf6onrddp s6. TR~esS$uw~mggmmmhbe~~of th e Lewis and C lark p a r t y k i l l e d and butchered a NezP e rc e h o rs e w i t h o u t p e rm i ss io n . I n s t e a d of r e t a l i a t i n g f o rt h i s he inous ac t , t h e Nez Perce g r ee ted t he s t r ang er s w i t hopen-hearted h o s p i t a l i t y and gave them food and sh el te r . "

A f t e r t h e exp lo r e r s had r ecove red fr om t h e i r j ou r ney ,W i l l i am C lark and Mer r iwether Lewis he ld a c o u n c i l w i t h t h eNez Perce ch iefs . They exp la ine d t o th e Nez Perce th a t th eGreat Whi te Fa the r , Pr es ide nt Thomas Je f fers on , had se ntthem t o e x p lo r e a r o u t e t o t h e P a c i f i c . The e x p e d i ti o nl eader s asked f o r t he I nd i an s ' he lp . Besides g i v i ng themfood, th e Nez Perce showed them t h e be st r o u te and tau gh tthem how t o b u i l d dugout canoes. They used thas a canoes ont h e i r j ou rney down t h e r i v e r s t oward p r esen t day Por t l and .B efo re d e p a rt in g , t h e e x p l o r e r s gave t h e I n d i a n s g i f t s f o rt h e i r k indness . Whi le the p a r t y canoed down th e C learwater ,Snake, and Columbia Riv ers , th e Nez Perce too k c ar e o f th e


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e x p e d i t f a n ' a ~x h ru s t8 d w rm w. On th e Corps o f D i s c o v e ry ' sr e t u r n t r i p from t h e P a c i f i c Ocean t o S t . L o ui s i n 1806,t h e y p i c k e d up t h e i r r e j u v e n a te d h o rse s and en jo y ed t h e l rnew found f r i e n d s ' h o s p i t a l i t y a ga in , t h i s t i m e f o r s i xweeks. Dur ing th a t t ime , th e snow had me l ted s u f f i c i e n t l yf o r t h e ex p lo re rs t o r ec ro ss t h e mountainous L o lo F a ~ s . ~

Dur ing th e i r extended t im e w i t h Nez Perce , thee x p lo re rs made and recor ded numerous ob se rva tio ns . Howardand o th e r gove rnment o f f i c i a l s cou ld have ga ined g rea ti n s ig h t and knowledge about th e Nez Perce Ind ia ns f rom th eLewis and Cla rk jou rna ls . For example , bes ides le a rn in gg r e a t d e t a i l s abou t t h e L o l o T r a i l , t h e Nez P e r c e ' s r o u t e ofegress dur ing th e war, Howard cou ld have a ls o learne d abouth i s a d v e r s a ri e s ' s o c i a l s t r u c t u r e , l e a d e rs h i p , and c u l t u r e .

From t h e Lew is and C la rk jo ur na ls , we can l e a r n howth e Nez Perce organ ized themselves so c ia l l y . The jou rn a l ss t a t ed t h a t these Ind ian s co ns is te d o f many au tonomousi n d iv i d u a l bands. The Nez Perce Ind iana , numbering se ve ra lthousand peop le , re s id ed i n sev era l hundred separa teautonomous v i l la g e s . Each v i l l a g e had a permanent camp s i t el o c a te d i n a v a l l e y . N ot s u r p r i s i n g 1y, th e bands c la imedo wn ers hip of t h e l a n d n ea r t h e i r v i l l a g e . They l e f t t h e i rhomeland t o f i s h d u r ing t he annual sa lmon runs , t o d ig camasand ko use ro o t s on t h e p r a i r i e s , and o c c a s io n a l l y t o huntbu f fa lo i n Montana.'


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Each v i l l a g e o r sm a l l band cons i s ted o f seve ra lexten ded f a m i l i e s l i v i n g u nder t h e l e a d e r s h i p of i t s ownch ie f and cou nc i l . O f t he t e n t o f i f t y a d u l t m ales w i th i neach band, th re e or fo ur o f th e o ld er and more respectedmen, th e band's e ld e rs or headsmen, and t h e i r c h ie f s wouldc o n s t i t u te th e band 's co un c i l wh ich was an in fo rma lgovern ing body. F requ en t l y , t he ch ie f was a b lood r e l a t i v eo f a m a j o r i t y o f t he band. M ost o f ten , t h e c h i e f ' s sonwould become c h ie f upon h i s f a t h e r 's death. The ch ie f 'ap r im a ry f u n c t i o n i n th e v i l l a g e was t o s e t t l e d is pu te s. Thev a ri o u s Nez P erce bands seldom q ua rre le d among themselves;they w ere no rm a l l y f r i e n d l y t o one anothe r. I n te rbandmarr iages c e r t a in l y d rew th e g roups c loser . - Be ingex t rem e ly i n d i v i d u a l i s t i c , t h e Nez Pe rce recogn ized nosupreme head c h ie f t a in because t h e i r o rg an iza t i on p rec ludedi t .

With such a l oose soc i a l o rg an i z a t i on the re wasl i t t l e a u t h o r i t y f o r t h e le ad ers . The c h i e f and t h e o th e ri n f l u e n t i a l headmen had l i t t l e a u t h o r i t y over t h e i rf o l l o w e r s . a c h i e f d e r iv e d h i s a u t h o r i t y m a i n ly from h i sp er so na l i t y and h i s suppor t f rom the o th er members o f th eband. I n t h e i r v i l l a g e , t h e c h i e f , w i t h t h e a i d of p u b l i cop in ion, cou ld norm al ly keep h i s young men under co n tr o lmost of t h e time..


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h l though the wh i tes cons ide red t he Nez Perce a t r i b eo r e ven a n a t i o n , t h e Nez P erc e l a ck e d a d i s t i n c t t r i b a lorg an iza t io n. The Nez Perce were groups o f peop le w it h acommon lang uag e and a common c u l t u r e . x o W hile a lang uag eand cu l t u r e i n some ways u n i f ie d these autonomous in d iv id u a lbands, t h e i r c u l t u r e a l s o p o l a r i z e d them i n t o tw o d i f f e r e n tgrou ps --the Upper and Lower Nez Perce. The Upper Nez Percel i v e d i n t h e re g io n d ra in e d b y t h e Salmon and th e C le a rwa terr i v e r s i n what i s now Idaho. As roamers , they tended t ob orro w t h e i r c u l t u r e fro m t h e f a r away p l a i n s t r i b e s e as t o fth e B i t t e r r o o t Moun ta ins. On th e o th e r hand, th e seden ta ryLower Nez P erce l i v e d i n t h e Imnaha and Grande Ronde Riv err i v e r s i n p resent -day no r the as te rn Oregon -and sou the rnWash ington, u n t i l they go t horses. The l a t t e r g roup drewt h e i r c u l t u r e f ro m t h e c l o s e r C olum bia R i v e r and P a c i f i cCoast t r i b e s . Even though a common language and c u l t u r a lt r a i t s a id e d c oh es io n, t h e i r g eo g ra p hi ca l s i t u a t i o n s andt h e i r t r a v e l h a b i t s e v e n t u a l l y p o l a r i z e d t h e Nez Pe rce i n t otwo d i s t i n c t group^.'^

The common c u l t u re and t r i b a l l o r e t h a t u n i f i e d t h ed i f f e r e n t bands drew upon a c o l o r f u l p a s t f i l l e d w i t hd ra m a ti c e ve nts. The Nez Pe rc e ' s c u l t u ra l t i e s w i t h t h e i rd i s t a n t n e ig h bo rs were p r i m a r i l y due t o t h e i r c o n s i d er a b l ec om m un ic atio n s k i l l s and w i l l i n g n e s s t o t r a v e l . The NezPerce c o u ld u n d erstan d b o th t h e s ig n la ng ua ge o f t h e P l a in s


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In d ia ns and th e Chinook d ia le c t o f t h e coast . The Lower NezP erce, e s p e c i a l l y , roamed a v a s t a re a i n t h e i r e f f o r t s t oba r t e r f o r goods. From t he coas t, t hey t r aded f o r seash e l l sw i th which the y adorned themselves; f rom th e p la in s camefe at he re d war b onnets and b u f f a lo horned-headdresses.Throughout h i s to ry , t hey wandered over th e vas t a reas o fmounta ins, p la in s , va l l e ys , and sagebrush p la te au s no tmer e ly t o t r a de and acqu i r e new t h i ng s , bu t a l so t o hun t andt o f is h . '=

The Nez Perce f i r s t a cqu i red horses f rom th eSho shonis between 1710 and 1720. Once mounted, t h e i ra b i l i t y t o t r a v e l in cre as ed g r e a t ly . W i th in a g e ne ra tio n ,they had bred a toughness i n t o these horses t o match th erugged t e r r a i n i n wh ich t hey l i v ed . The i r ho rses were soundof wind and l imb , hard-hoofed, sure foo ted and in c re d ib ly

du rab le . The I nd i a ns h i g h l y va lued t hese ho rses f o r t h e i rtremendous endurance. The ho rse now al lo w ed th e Nez Percet o make more fre q u en t s easona l eastward and westwardJourneys.

On t h e i r j ou rneys over L o l a Pass t o t h e b u f f a10co un t ry o f Montana a t th e headwaters of th e M iss ou r i andYe ll ows t one r i v e r s , t hey t ook eve r y t h i ng w i t h them. The i rbaggage i n c lu d e d t h e i r e n t i r e f a m i l i e s - - c h i l d r e n andgrandparents --an ima ls , horses , dogs and a l l t h e i r p or ta b lepossess ions. Even a f t e r th e m iss ion ar ie s taugh t them


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c a t t l e r a i s i n g , t h e L ower Nez Fe rce c o n t in u e d th e i r a nn ua lbu f f a l o hun ts fo r two reasons . The Ind ian s va lued theb u f f a l o r ob e s and t h e t r i p s were a p a r t o f t h e i rt r a d i t i ~ n . ' ~

The Nez Perce ho rses were a fo ca l p o i n t f o r t h e i rc u l t u re . To th e Nez Perce, t h e i r horses were a form ofwea l th, a means o f t ra ns po r ta t io n , and an a l l y on t h e h u n to r on th e warpath . Because the y had deve loped t h e i r wa rr in gc a p a b i l i t y t o p r o t e c t t h e i r p r i z e d ho rs e and o th e rpossess ions , the y cou ld sa fe ly roam a wide area.

S inc e t h e i r h o rs e s expanded t h e i r h o r i z o n s , t h e yguarded and p ro te c te d them f rom th iev es and h o s t i l e In d ia nwar p a rt ie s . Nez Perce war p a r t ie s o f te n went on th eof fe ns iv e through out Idaho and Oregon ag ai ns t th e Shoshonis,th e Nez Perces ' t r a d i t i o n a l enemies. They a ls o t ra ve led t ono rt he rn Idaho and Washington t o enco unter th e Spokane andCoeur D 'A lene Ind ian t r ib e s . These two t r i b e s weresometimes f r ie n d s and a t o the r times, enemies. Du r ing t h e i rbu f f a10 h un t in g t re k s t o Montana, they o f te n encounteredh o s t i l e Crow, S ioux or B lack fe e t . There fore , th e Nez Perced eve lop ed a f i g h t i n g c a p a b i l i t y o u t o f s e lf -d e fe n se w h i l et r a v e l i n g and t o p r o t e c t t h e i r v a lu a b le h ors es fro m r a i d i n gf h LW@g ,

The Hudson Bay Company in tr o d u ce d a new f a c t o r i n t oNez Perce w arr ing ca p a b i l i t y- - t h e gun. The B la ck fe et , one


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of t h e i r enemies, had guns, so th e Nez Perce needed guns t opr o te c t th e i r f a m i l i e s and horses. The neares t source wasi n the Dakota count ry . I n 1805, a pa r t y o f Nez Percew a r r i o r s d e cid ed t o t a k e a b o l d co u rs e o f a c t i o n a nd t r a v e lth ro u gh h o s t i l e l a n d i n s ea rc h o f guns i n t h e Dakotacou ntry. They t r a v e le d over snow choked L o lo Pass andthrough the open p la in s o f th e Ye llowstone and Missou r ir i v e rs . These lands were th e homeland o f th e h o s t i l eBla ck fee t , S ioux, and Crow. S ince these th re e Ind ian t r i b e swere alr ea d y armed w it h guns, th e Nez Perce needed t o a vo idthem t o r ea ch t h e f u r t r a d e r s i n t h e D a kota c o u nt ry t oprocure guns.

The Nez Pe rce 's success fu l t re k f o r guns no t on lyin cre as ed t h e i r l e t h a l i t y , b u t i t ga ve them an op po r tu n i t yt o rehe arse t h e a r t of evading an enemy. They chose ashrewd r o u t e and d i d much n i g h t r i d i n g w i t h t h e use of f a s thorses. Hav ing e x t ra horses a l l owed th e Nez Perce t o ro ta tet h e i r mounts as th e rugged t e r r a i n wore them down. The NezPerce w ar r i o r s s uc ce ss f u l l y ob t a ined t h e des i r ed guns anda c q u ir e d t h e s k i l l s t h a t w ould s e r ve them w e l l i n t h e 1877war.

The Nez P erce d i d n o t l i m i t t h e i r war t ime l eade r sh i pt o t h e i r n orm al c h i e f s . I n war, o n l y t h e most c a pa b lew a rr io rs would assume lea de rsh ip. A war c h ie f d id no t havet o be a c h ie f f rom one o f t h e many In d i a n bands. The


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p o s i t io n no rma l ly went t o th a t wa r r io r who had mastd i s t i n g u i s h e d h im s e l f i n war o r on a b u f f a lo h u nt . Theyoung ma les g rew up w i t h th e w ar r io rs t o le a rn by exampleabout horses , hunt in g , and spo r t ing . A f te r a young In d i anproved h im se l f as a t r u e horseman and a gre a t hun ter , heth e n accom panied t h e wa r r i n g p a r t i e s t o l e a rn f i r s t hand howt o f i g h t . U n l ik e th e army, th e Nez Perce changed war ch ie fst o whoever be s t rep resen ted the co un c i l ' s des i re .17

Bes ides ac qu i r in g combat expe r ience wh i le r a id in go t h e r I n d i a n t r i b e s o r d e fe n di ng t h e i r t r i b e , t h e Nez Pe rc ega ined expe r ience f rom f ig h t in g a long s i de th e army. TheNez Perce had a ided th e so ld ie rs s in ce th e es tab l i shmen t o farm y p o s t s i n t h e P a c i f i c North wes t. The I n d ia n s le a rn e dmuch from the se e nco unter s

I n 1855, Ch ief Kam iakin of th e Yakima fomented anu p r i s l n g w i t h a c o n fe d e ra t io n of P a c i f i c N o rth we st I n d i a nt r i b e s . He wanted a g e n e ra l I n d ia n u p r i s i n g t h ro u g h ou t t h er e g i o n wh ich h e b el ie v e d would d r i v e away a l l w h ~ t e e t t l e r sfrom th e In d ia n homeland. But, th e po we rfu l Nez Percena t io n s tood w i th th e gove rnmen t and p reven ted a t o t a lu p r i s i n g . Fo l l o w in g t h i s i n c id e n t , Nez Perc e s c o u ts s erve dw i t h an army column of 157 s o ld ie r s t o end t h i s war wh ich i sRBW ~ R B W Ra5 Cke I p ok a n m I n d i a n War." I n 1858, t h e NezP erce a ga in a l l i e d w i t h t h e men i n b l u e a g a i ns t a newc o a l i t i o n o f h o s t i l e In d i a n t r i b e s . The c o a l i t i o n c o ns is te d


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of w a r r io rs from t h e Spokane, Coeur D'Alene, Palouse, andYakim a t r i b e s . These h o s t i l e t r i b e s a g a in u n s u c c e s s f u l l yt r i e d t o d r i v e t h e w h i te s fro m t h e I n d i a n ' s hom eland. Theo f f i c i a l army d i sp a t ch e s fro m t h e 1858 campa ign c i t e d th eN e i P e rc e f o r b r a v e l y and p r o f e s s i o n a l l y s e r v i n g a s s p ie s ,gu ide s, guards , and f i g h t e r s . The army campaign commanderasked Ne i Pe rce Ch ie f Lawyer what he de s i re d t o be pa id f o rh i s t r i b e s ' s e r v i ce s . Ch ie f Lawyer r e p l i e d , "Peace, plo ws,and schools." Al thoug h a pea ce- lo v ing peo ple who ar e

aga ins t war, th e Ne i Pe rce p roved t o be b rave and s p i r i t e dw a r r i o r s a s w e l l a s b e in g i n d u s t r i o u s worke rs .

W hi le th e cause of th e Nez Perce War can e a s i l y bea t t r i b u t e d t o t h e s e t t l e r s s t e a l i n g t h e I n d ia n ' s homeland,t h e i n t r o d u c t i o n o f C h r i s t i a n i t y upon t h e N e i P ercep o l a r iz e d c u l t u r e c o n tr ib u te d s i g n i f i c a n t l y t o t h e problem .A l though t h e Ne i Pe rce so c i e t y co ns is ted o f autonomousbands, t h e Ne i Pe rc e c u l t u re p o la r i z e d them i n t o twofra cti on s- -U pp er Nez Pe rce and Lower N ei Perce. TheI n d i a ns ' f i r s t e xposure t o t h e army s t a r t e d t h e i r C h r i s t i a nexper ience.

Dur ing the long s t ay o f Lew is and C la rk , th e NezPerce became aware o f C h r is t i an be l i e f s and p r ac t i c es . TheInd ian s saw th e ex p lo re rs and subsequent t r ap pe rs p ray , readt h e i r B i b le s , and d is c us s t h e i r s i n g l e Gre at S p i r i t . ' *The N e i P erc e fo un d t h e w h i t e s ' r e l i g i o n i n t e r e s t i n g because


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l i t e r a t e I n d i a n s c o u ld s u r v i v e t h e c ha ngin g w o rl d o f w h it edom inat ion t o come.

They c o u ld n o t f o rg e t t h a t t h e y a l s o had t o d e ve lo p am i s s io n t h a t c o u l d be s e l f - s u s t a i n i n g w h i l e co p in g w i t hIn d ia n needs and customs. From th e mis s ion , the y pro vid edth e I n d ia n s w i t h m e dic in e s, c l o th s , m e ta l u t e n s i l s , guns,and o th e r va lu ab le t r a d in g goods.zs S t i l l , t h e Sp a ld in g shad known th a t a s e t t le d C hr is t ia n i ze d commun ity cen te redaround fa rming would bes t s ur v i ve t he expansion o f th ep ioneer . The o ld ways o f b u f f a lo hu n t in g and- sa lmon f i s h in gc o n f l i c t e d w i t h new s e t t l e r s m oving i n t o t h e i r t e r r i t o r y .TO accomp l ish t h i s task , Spa ld ing had t o be bo th a fo remanand a pasto r.=4

As t h e m i s s i o n a ri e s d is co ura ge d t h e t r i b a l t r a d i t i o n so f ro o t ga the r ing and b u f f a lo hun t ing , they encouraged th eg ro w in g o f t y p i c a l g ard en v e g e ta ble s and t h e ra i s i n g o fdomest ic l i ve s to c k- -c a t t le , sheep, and hogs. 'By removingth e need fo r b u f f a lo h u n t i n g , t h e Ne i Perc e c o u ld ha veavo ided w ar fa re w i th th e P la in s Ind ians .'"

The m iss io na r ie s were most succ ess fu l i n mak ingfarme rs and co n ve rt s of t h e more sed enta ry Upper Nez Percefac t ion . I n co n t ra s t , th e roaming Lower Nez Perce re s i s t e dconve rs ion and th e ag ra r ian 1 f s t y 1e. No tew orth ye x c e p ti o n s t o t h i s t r e n d o f c o n ve r si on w i t h i n t h e L ower NezPerce In d ia n s were Chief Old Joseph and h i s two sons, Young


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Joseph and O l lok o t . Ch ie f O ld Joseph, an i n t e l l i g e n t andr e s o u r c e f u l l e a d e r, l e d t h e W allow a band t h a t l i v e d i n t h e i rb e a u t i f u l l a n d u n t i l w h i te men began t o s t e a l i t . Chief OldJoseph's sons , key lead e rs i n th e 1877 War, spent t h e i rboyhood a t t h e L apw ai M i s s io n u n t i l i t s c l o s u r e w h ich wasdue t o t h e Sp a ld in g s ' d e p a r tu re a f t e r t h e Whitm anm assacre."L The Sp a ld in g s ' d e p a r tu re l e f t t h e C h r i s t i a nNez Perce Ind ian s t o th e i r own dev ices fo r twen ty - fou ryears . "7

As men tioned ea r l i e r , th e Spa ld ings had no t conve r teda l l th e Nez Perce be fo re t h e i r depa r tu re . Many o f themo b j e c t e d t o fa rm i ng and t h e m i s s i o n a r i e s ' a t t a c k s on 1i uor,gambl ing, and polygamy. As a r e s u l t , th e Nez Perce In di an ss e p a ra ted i n t o a C h r i s t i a n g ro up a nd a n o n -Ch r i st ia n o rDreamer 's g roup. The Dreamers be l ie ve d i n a b le nd o f

C h r i s t i a n i t y and I n d i a n pagan b e l i e f s . C h ie fToo -hu l-hu l-so te , a Dreamer's r e l i g i o u s leade r o r med ic ineman, l e d th e Snake Riv er band w it h 183 Ind ian s wh ich fough ti n t h e Nez Perce War."-

W ith t h e i n t r o d u c t i o n of C h r i s t i a n i t y t o t h e NezPerce peop le , th e gap be tween th e two po la r iz e d groupse n la rg e d w i t h t h e s i g n i n g o f t r e a t i e s b y t h e U n i t ed S t a t e sand the Nmz Pmrcm. Dur ing th e twen ty -two yea rs be fo re th eou tb reak of th e war, government t r e a t i e s s lo w ly nu r tu re d th eseed o f h o s t i l i t y w i t h i n t h e Low er Nez P erc e ~ n d i a n s . The


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f i r s t governm ent r e p r e s e n t a t i v e t o sow t h e seed o f h o s t i l i t ywas th e am bit io us , new ly ap po inted gove rnor of WashingtonT e r r i t o r y , I saac S tevens .

I n 1855, Governor Stevens wanted t o calm th e P a c i f i cNor thwest a f t e r th e Whitman massacre so he could get at ra n s c o n t i n e n t a l r a i l r o a d r o ut e. If e c o u l d c on v in c e a l lt h e v a r i o u s t r i b e s t o l i v e on r e se r v a ti o n s, he c o uld g e t t h en e x t t r a n s c o n t in e n t a l r a i l r o a d b u i l t a lo ng t h e n o rt h e rnrou te. Governor Stevens lo bb ie d Congress f o r money t on e g o t i a t e t r e a t i e s w i t h a l l t h e a re a t r i b e s . When th es et r e a t i e s p u t th e I n d i a n s on r e s e r v a t i o n s f o r e v e r , t h e l a n dwould the n be opened t o t h e new s e t t le rs .

The f i v e ma jor t r i b e s o f th e Co lumbia Basin --NezPerce, Cayuse, U m a ti l la , W alla Walla, Yakima--met i n th eWa lla Wa lla Va l l ey a t an anc i en t I nd i an coun c i l g rounds .With s i x thousand In di a ns and one hundred whi tes, GovernorS te ve ns worked o u t a t r e a ty . = * 6 s f i f t y - e i g h t c h i e f s ,headmen, and deleg ates, s ign ed th e t r e a t y of 1855, the yceded a p o r t i o n of t h e i r l a n d t o t h e U n i te d S ta te s .k c o r d i n g t o t h e Commission of I nd i an A f f a i r s , t he Nez Pe rceo r i g i n a l l y i n h a b i t e d t h e c o un tr y i n Id ah o between t h e B i t t e rRoot and Blu e Mountains. The n o rt h e rn boundary was th ePalouse Rive r ; th e south ern boundary was th e Salmon R ive rVa l ley . The t r e a t y ceded on l y a p o r t i o n o f t h e I nd i a n l andt h a t l a i d t o t h e w est and so uth . O f t h e major In d ia n bands,


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Ch ief Lawyer occupied th e Kamiah V al le y, B ig Thunder t h eLapwai, Timothy t h e Alpowai, Joseph th e Wallowa, and B i l l yth e Salmon Riv er V al ley.s o

Be fore d isband ing th e conference, th e army presentedg i f t s t o th e va r iou s ch ie f s , headmen, and de lega tes . Aspayments f o r th e ceded land, th e government promised t r i b a lan nu i t i es i n th e fo rm o f schoo ls, teachers , shops, saw mi l l s ,and g r i s t m i l l s . s s

Wh i le t h e l o s s o f l a n d was n o t a s i g n i f i c a n t e ve nt t oany o f th e Nez Perce , two pr o v i s i on s o f th e 1855 t r e a t yp ro ve d t o be a p re c u rs o r of t h e d i f f i c u l t i e s t o come.F i r s t , t h e t r e a t y a ttem pted t o change t h e i r c u l t u r e i n t h ea re a s o f l e a d e r s h i p and t r a v e l i n g . The t r e a t y p r o h i b i t e dany wh i te , excep t gove rnment o f f i c i a l s , t o re s i de on theI n d i a n r e s e r v a t i o n w i t h o u t t r i b a l p e rm i ss io n . The t r e a t ya ls o took away th e Nez Perce a b o r i g in a l way o f l i f e ,s p e c i f i c a l l y b u f f a l o h u n ti ng on t h e p la i n s . The sedentaryUpper Nez Perc e q u i c k l y a cc ep te d t h i s r e s t r i c t i o n s in c e th e yseldom roamed th e bu f f a l o hu nt in g. The Lower Ne i Perces im p l y i gn o re d t h e t r a v e l r e s t r i c t i o n . T h i s a c t i o n p l a nt e dt h e seeds f o r t h e f u t u r e c o n f l i c t of 1877.

The second t roub lesome pr ov is io ns o f th e 1855 t r e a t yadd ressed the Nez Perce ' s so c i a l s t ru c tu re and leade rsh ip .E a r l ie r , we no ted t h a t th e Nez Perce so c i e t y con ta ined


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extended fa m i l ie s grouped i n t o autonomous bands. Theseautonomous bands now i d e n t i f i e d themselves p r i m a r i l y ase i t h e r D reamers o r Ch r i s t i ans . P r ev i ou s l y , a tempora ryco un c i l comprised of the c h ie fs of th e var io us bands wou ldaddress any iss ue s ap ply in g t o a l l Nez Perce. Now, t h et r e a t y p ro v id e d f o r a s a l a r y f o r a head c h ie f. *=

The Nez Pe rce then had t o e le c t a head ch ie f whowould dec ide f o r a l l t h e Nez Perce, wh ich was inc on s is ten tw i t h t h e i r c u l t u r e and t r a d i t i o n . The t r i b e a l s o had t oe le c t twe lve sub-ch ie fs who as s is ted th e head ch ie f andworked as a l i a i s o n between wh i tes and Ind ians . H is to r ia n sh av e c i t e d t h e head c h i e f p o l i c y a s b e in g t h e l e a d i n g c auseo f t h e 1877 Nez Pe rc e War because i t n eg ate d t r a d i t i o n a l a ndc u l t u r a l c o u n c i l l e a d e rs h i p s t y le . s s

The d is c o v e r y o f g o l d by E l i a s P i e r c e i n t h eC le arw ate r D i s t r i c t i n 1860 changed ev ery thin g. Mine rs overr a n t h e Nez P e rc e R e s e rv a tio n i n v i o l a t i o n o f t h e 1855t r e a t y . The I nd i an agent, A. J. Cain at tempted t o keep th ei l l e g a l m iners o ut by b lo c kin g a l l t r a i l s w i th In d ia nscou ts . Su r p r i s i ng l y , t h e m iner s were no t a cause f o r wo r ryby th e Nez Perce. They be l iev ed th e mine rs would ev e n tu a l lyle ave l i k e t h e fu r t ra pp e rs had b e fo re them. But , th e NezPerce had no t counted on th e m in ing economy or th e s e t t l e r st h a t came w i t h t h e m i ne rs and s tayed a f t e r t h e go l d andminers had le f t .= -


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To fu r t h e r aggra vate th e problem of encroachment onth e Nez Perce land, th e U n i te d S ta te s government,p re oc cu pie d w i t h i t s C i v i l War, c o nt in u ed t o d i sr eg a rd t h e i r1855 t r e a t y o b l ig a t i o n s. A government app oi nt ed commissionneq o t ia te d a new t r e a ty th a t eased th e bu rden on th ewar - to rn gove rnment wh i le fu r th e r open ing th e land t os e t t l e r s . To add some o rd e r t o t h e s i t u a t i o n , t h egovernment ordered fo u r c a va lr y companies t o camp ne xt t oth e c o u n c i l s i t e as a show o f f o r c e . As t h e n e g o t i a t i o n sbecame heated over t h e iss ue of t h e Wallowa V a l le y i nOregon, th e Lower Nez Perce In d ia ns s im p ly l e f t th en e g o t i a t i o ns i n p ro te s t.

Under t h e p ro v i s i o n s o f t h e 1855 t r e a t y , t h egovernmen t rep re se n ta t i ve s igno red th e depar tu re and ca r r ie don n e g o t i a t i o n s w i t h t h e h ea d c h ie f . The new t r e a t ya d ju s te d t h e re s e rv a t i o n s i z e b y ce d in g t e n th ou sa nd a c re sof Nez Perce lan d t o th e government. W hile t h e Upper NezP erce l o s t l i t t l e la n d, t h e Lower Nez P erce l o s t t h e i rbeloved Wallowa Va l ley. Only th e f or ty -seven ch ie fs andheadmen from th e Upper Nez P erce sign ed t h i s new tr e a t y .The fo u r Lower Nez Perce bands seceded and became known,t h e r e a f t e r , as t h e n o n t r e a t y I nd ia n s. The p r e v i o u s c u l t u r a land r e l i g i o u s d i f f e re n c e , t h a t had been th e c ra c k, would nowd i v i d e the Nez Pe rc r i n t o two d i s t i n c t f a ct io n s. "'


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The government p o s i t i o n was th a t the t re a ty ap p l ie dt o a l l Nez P erc e I n d i a n s s i n c e t h e head c h i e f s ig n ed i t .The Commissio.n of In d i a n A f f a i r s in s t r u c te d th e LapwaiI n d i a n ag en t t o i n f o rm t h e n o n t r e a t y I n d i a n s t h a t t h e T r ea tyo f 1863 a p p l ie d t o them as w e l l . One more ste p had beentaken toward war.=-

The no nt re at y Nez Perce con t inue d t o work through th eI n d i a n a g e n ts i n an a t te m p t t o h ave t h e t r e a t y r ev e rs e d.Based upon a Se creta ry of I n t e r i o r recommendation, P res ide ntGrant signed an exec ut i ve o rder i n 1873 t h a t s e t a s id e th eWallowa v a l l e y f o r Chief Jose ph's band. However, underpre ss ure from Governor Grover of Oregon, Grant succumbed t op o l i t i c a l p r e ss u re and re ve rs ed h i s e a r l i e r e x e c u ti veorder . When Chief Joseph learn ed of th e s i t u a t i o n , he to r eup h i s B ib le over the lo s s o f h i s homeland. The seed o fh o s t i l i t y began t o blossom i n t o a c o n f l i c t .

S i nce t h e t im e o f t h e Lew is and C la r k Exp ed i t i on , t heNez Perce had l i v e d i n peace w i th t h e wh ites . From th ef i r s t w h i t e s ' r e c o r d i n g s of i n t e r a c t i o n w i t h t h e Nez Pe rc e,t h e y had been f r i e n d l y and h e l p f u l t o w h i t e s e t t l e r s . W itht h e a r r i v a l of t h e m is s io n ar ie s , c u l t u r a l d i f fe r e n c e sbetween t h e Upper Nez Pe rce and Lower Nez P erce sharpened.The t r e a t ie s w i th th e Un i ted S ta tes government weakened th eu n i f y i n g aspec ts o f language and common c u l t u r a l t r a i t s .The 1863 T r e a ty f i n a l l y d i v i d e d t h e Nez P erc e i n t o tw o


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Endnotes' Idaho Semi-weekly World, ( Idah o C i t y , Id aho

T e r r i t o r y ) , August 1877." A l v i n M. Josephy, J r . , "O r i g in s o f t h e Nez PercePeo ple", Idaho Yesterdays, (S pr ing Issue , 1962; Volume V I ,

Number 1) 2-3." B i l l G u l ick , Ch ie f Joseph Country , Land o f th e Nez

Perce, (C ald we l l Idaho: Caxton P r i n te r s , L td. , 1981) 6-7.-Franc is D. Ha ines , "Nez Pe rce and Shoshoni

In f lu en ce on Nor thwest H is to ry " , 379-93, i n Greater Amer ica,Essays i n Honor o f He rbe rt Eugene B olt on , (Be rkeley and LosAng les : U n i ve rs i t y o f C a l i fo rn ia Press, 1945) 379.

= B i l l Gu l i c k , Ch ie f Joseph Co u n t r y 21.&Ronald K. Fis her , Thunder i n th e Mountains , The

S t o r y o f Nez Pe rce War, (Coeur D'A lene , Idaho: Alp ha Omega,1992) 14-7.

'Mark H. Brown, The F l i g h t o f th e Nez Perce,(L in col n: U n iv e r s i t y o f Nebraska, 1982) 20-21.

"F ra nc is H aines, Nez Perc es, 15.*F ra nc is Haines, Nez Perce , (Norman: The U n i v e r s i t y

o f Oklahoma Press , 1955) 86.'OF rancis Ha ine s, Nez Pe rces . 14-15' " B i l l Gu l i ck , Ch ie f Joseph Count ry : Land o f the

Nez Perce, (C ald w ell , Idaho: The Caxton P r in t e rs , Lt d ,l 9 8 l ) , 9-10.

' "Gul ick, Ib id . , 11; and A lv i n M. Josephy J r . , T h eP a t r i o t Ch iefs , (New York: The V ik in g Press, 1962) 315.

' " B i l l G ul ic k, Ch ief Joseph Cou ntry, 17-18.14Lucu l lus V i r g i l McWhorte r, Ye l low Wol f, h i s OwnStory, (C ald we l l , Idaho: The Caxton P r i n te rs , Ctd. , 1940)

25-26.


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+3Gulick, Ibid., 48: and Josephy, Patriot Chief315.

+&Bill Gulick, Chief Joseph Country 21."Helen Howard, Saga of Chief Joseph 16"R. Ross Arnold, Indian Wars of Idaho (Caldwell,Idaho: The Caxton Printers, LTD., 1932) 25-7.SgAlvin M. Josephy, Jr., The Nez Perce Indians andthe Opening of the Northwest, (New Haven: Yale UniversityPress, 1965) 81."ORrown, Flight of the Nez Perce 21."Merrill D. Real, "I W i l l Fight No More Forever":Chief Joseph and the Nez Perce War, (Seattle: University ofWashington Press) 15-16.""Fisher, Thunder in the Mountains 51.'"Mark H. Brown, The Flight of the Nez Perce, 22=*Real, "I Will Fiqht No More Forever" 16."=Fisher, Thunder in the Mountains 5.*&The superstitious Cayuses killed the Whitmans and

destroyed their mission because they believed that theWhitmans' "bad medicine" caused the measles out break thatkilled many of them."'Allen & Eleanor Merrill, "Talmack," 4 in IdahoYesterday, 1964, Volume 8 Number 3, page 2-14."*Real, I Will Fight No More Forever, 16; andFisher, Thunder In The Mountains 50."9Gul ick, Chief Joseph Country, 96-101.

aiHolon Howard, Saga of Chief Joseph 55-57.


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sZRrown, F l i g h t of th e Nez Perc e, 23.=-Fisher , Thunder i n th e Mountains 60.=*Beal , I W i l l Fight No More Forever 18-20.=sE l l i s P axson Oberho l tzer , A Hi st ory of The Un i te dS ta te s Sinc e The C i v i l War, (New York: M cM il l ia n Company,

1926) 424.=-Addison, Saga of Ch ie f Joseph 76-79.


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F i g u r e 3 , Map of th e Nez Per-ce HandsSource: A l v i n N. Josephy. JI-.. The Nez P e r c e Indi_ans andt h e o p e n i n s o f t h e No rt hw e 5. t. 162-3.


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CHAPTER FOURTHE INDIAN DIPLOMAT

Howard to o k w i t h h im t o h i s f i r s t f r o n t i e r command,The Department of th e Columbia, a re p u ta t i o n as anI n d i a n d i p l o m a t i s t . '

Rober t N. U t l ey , H i s t o r i a nThus f a r , we have looked a t t h e F r o n t i e r Army of

1877 and t h e Nez Perce. We have lea rn ed something of t h ec a p a b i l i t i e s and l i m i t a t i o n s o f t h e fo rm e r F r o n t i e r Army andha ve seen how th e seed o f h o s t i l i t y l a t e r d ev elo pe d w i t h inth e Nez Perce. T hi s cha pter w i l l look a t Howard'sinvo lvement i n th e Nez Perce War by address ing h i s r o l e asan I nd ian d ip lomat .

To pu t Howard i n p roper p ers pe ct iv e , i t i s n ec ess aryt o know something about h im. Howard 's r o l e as an In d ia nd ip lomat can be v iewed i n fou r phases. The f i r s t phasec o n s i s t e d o f H ow ard's a c t i v i t i e s and s e r v i c e s a s a d ip lo m a tf o r th e Nez Perce p r i o r t o th e peace commission o f 1876.The second phase e n ta i l e d h i s r o l e as peace cornmissioner.Dur ing t h i s phase, Howard 's a t t i t u d e changed toward th eno nt re at y Nez Perce. The t h i r d phase of Howard 'sd i p lo m a t i c l i f e was h i s r o l e on be h al f o f t h e U n i te d S t a te s


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