HRM in Mozambique: Homogenization, path dependence or segmented business system?

Journal of World Business 46 (2011) 31–41

HRM in Mozambique: Homogenization, path dependence or segmentedbusiness system?

Geoffrey Wood b,1, Pauline Dibben a,*, Chris Stride b,2, Edward Webster c

a University of Sheffield, Management School, 9 Mappin Street, Sheffield S1 4DT, United Kingdomb University of Sheffield, United Kingdomc University of Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, South Africa

A R T I C L E I N F O

Keywords:

HRM

Mozambique

Business systems theory

A B S T R A C T

A central debate in Human Resource Management (HRM) in emerging economies is whether nations

follow distinct paradigms, or if there has been homogenization towards low value-added policies or ‘best

practice’ HR systems. The literature on comparative capitalism indicates the existence of continuities

and path dependence, but often neglects emerging markets. This article seeks to address this gap through

exploring the nature of HRM in Mozambique and its relationship to business systems theory. Survey

results indicate diversity between companies, suggesting a segmented business system, and the article

concludes by discussing the implications of these findings for government policy and management

practice.

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One of the central debates in Human Resource Management(HRM) in the developing world is the extent to which individualnations follow distinct paradigms, or whether there has been ahomogenization of policies and practices (Budhwar & Debrah,2001; Haworth & Hughes, 2003: p. 669; Jackson, 2002). Bleakhouse theories of globalization and HRM suggest movementtoward low value-added policies and practices, characterized bylabour repression and almost complete absence of coherent peoplemanagement systems (Greider, 1997; Moody, 1997; cf. Hyman,2003). In other words, the assumption is that there is a globaltendency for Human Resource (HR) practices to converge into acommon lowest common denominator model, where employeeshave few rights. In contrast, more optimistic propositions pointtoward companies being driven by competitive pressures to takeemployees more seriously, develop their skills and competencies,communicate better, and to share responsibility (Armstrong,quoted in Storey, 2001: p. 12). In other words, whilst there maybe pressures to convergence, those companies that succeed willmake the most effective use of their human capital. Whilst therewill be always those who seek competitive advantage throughruthless cost-cutting, this is unlikely to prove a sustainable model,

* Corresponding author. Tel.: +44 0114 2223472.

E-mail addresses: [email protected] (G. Wood), [email protected]

(P. Dibben), [email protected] (C. Stride), [email protected]

(E. Webster).1 Tel.: +44 0114 2223483.2 Tel.: +44 0114 2223262.

1090-9516/$ – see front matter � 2010 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

doi:10.1016/j.jwb.2010.05.015

and will ultimately be eclipsed by those who make better usage oftheir people.

In contrast to these accounts of convergence, the literature oncomparative capitalism suggests the existence of continuities,reflecting the embedded web of relations linking companies withregulatory bodies, suppliers, competitors and customers, investors,employees and the wider community (Hall & Soskice, 2001;Whitley, 1999). This literature focuses on differences between thedeveloped economies, dividing them between liberal markets andcoordinated markets (Dore, 2000; Hall & Soskice, 2001). Othercategories have, however been identified, primarily concentratingupon differences between clusters of coordinated markets(Amable, 2003; Whitley, 1999), while Wood and Frynas (2006)have explained the persistently distinct pattern of both regulationand company-level practice in the emerging economies of EastAfrica as ‘segmented business systems’. A particular feature ofbusiness systems theory is that it places the company at the centreof its analysis (Whitley, 1999), making it relevant to understandingcompany level survey evidence.

Business systems theory, in simple terms, identifies threeoverall dimensions for comparing countries: ownership co-ordination, non-ownership co-ordination and employment workand relations (Whitley, 1999; Wood & Frynas, 2006). Whilst allthree are important, there has been relatively little research onwhat defines employment and work relations in Africa (Wood &Brewster, 2007), or on locating it within a business systemsframework (Wood & Frynas, 2006). One reason for this might bethe difficulty in relating a bundle of HR practices to a particularbusiness systems model that encapsulates the labour market

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G. Wood et al. / Journal of World Business 46 (2011) 31–4132

contexts of emerging economies; such labour markets tend to bedeeply segmented, most notably between the formal and informalsector.

This article seeks to address this gap in the literature throughexploring the nature of HRM in Mozambique, and its relationshipto business systems theory. Mozambique is particularly interest-ing, not only because of its increasing levels of Gross DomesticProduct (GDP), and its growing reputation as an economic ‘successstory’, but also because of its political stability (Clement & Peiris,2008). Its leadership structure has undergone a series oftransitions, from colonial rule, to state socialism, to neo-liberalism;political institutions have been transformed from colonial despo-tism to one-partyism, to (after a bloody civil war) multipartyism,prior to the more recent move to a democratic government.

Does Mozambique, following the convergence thesis, conformto an emerging global model (be it either a form of best or worstpractice) or does it remain on a distinct path? If the latter, are thereidentifiable sets of HRM practices being implemented followingthe template of a segmented business system, or is MozambicanHRM simply diffusely diverse, or operating at such a low level as tonot be considered as HRM at all? Based on the evidence from anextensive company-level survey, this article explores the extent towhich HR practices – or their absence – conform to a particulartype of business system. It then explores the implications of this forthe country’s future, and, more generally for emerging marketsthat currently exhibit similar trends.

1. HR in Africa and the Mozambican context

The existing literature on HR in Africa points to certain distinctfeatures, including paternalist management, informal patronagelinked to selection and recruitment, and some underlying notion ofreciprocal rights and duties (Jackson, 2002; Jackson, Amaeshi, &Yavuz, 2008; Kamoche, 2002). Indeed, Kamoche (2002) cautionsthat there is likely to be considerable variation in Africa, reflectingdifferent national historical trajectories. Much of the literature onAfrica focuses on the cultural dimension, and the differencebetween African values, such as shared concerns, deference to rankand interpersonal relationships, and western ‘best practices’ thatemphasise instrumentalism (see Jackson, 2006 for discussion ofthis). The role of specific institutional traditions in mouldingpractice is arguably of even greater importance (Wood & Brewster,2007). These institutions may include the financial system, theregulatory context, and the industrial relations system, all of whichmay have been influenced by a colonial legacy. Moreover, eventhough there may be common external pressures, African HRM isarguably unlikely to correspond directly to other nations. Poorterms of trade, weak political institutions, intense foreigncompetition, and misdirected aid all have negative consequences,regardless of (and often worsened by) what takes place at companylevel (Budhwar & Debrah, 2001; Kamoche, 2002; Kamoche,Debrah, Horwitz, & Nkomba, 2003; Wood & Frynas, 2006).National practices are likely to persist, both on the basis offamiliarity in an uncertain environment, and the fact that thesystem may serve specific interests well, and particularly thoseassociated with colonial rule (Wood & Frynas, 2006). Moreover,western ‘best practices’ may not always be appropriate, and inmany cases these have been imposed without an adequateunderstanding of the history of the country (Jackson, 2006).

Mozambique is situated on the east coast of Africa. Itsrelationships with its neighbours South Africa, Malawi, Tanzaniaand Zimbabwe have impacted on migration and trade. Portuguesecolonial rule ended in 1975 after ten years of anti-colonial war.After independence the country was ruled as a socialist economy.This was followed by sixteen years of civil war. In late 1992 the warended, and in 1994 the first democratic elections were held. There

has been relative political stability since that time. The decline ofthe Soviet Union in the late 1980s sealed the fate of the socialistmodel. Mozambique was forced to adopt the neo-liberal prescrip-tions of the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The withholding ofWestern food aid in 1984 and 1986 provided the final push towardneo-liberalism (Hanlon, 2004). Instead of state-centred models ofdevelopment, neo-liberal convention held that the state wasincapable of providing solutions, and was part of the problem(Santos, 2006: p. 43). Donors demanded sweeping privatizations,with state assets often sold to friends and family of leadingpoliticians (Hanlon, 2004).

Mozambique was categorized as a ‘strong adjuster’ under termsof the structural adjustment programmes imposed in the 1990s.Today it is held up as a success story of such programmes (Clement& Peiris, 2008; Santos, 2006: p. 41). This is in contrast to the formerPortuguese colony of Angola, a significant producer of oil anddiamonds which now suffers from the ‘resource curse’, neglectingother economic sectors and basic infrastructure (Frynas & Wood,2001). However Mozambique’s success is underpinned by areliance on foreign aid. Within Mozambique, some 50% ofgovernment spending and 75% of public investment is fundedby external aid (Falk & Langfeldt, 2003: p. 238). At the same time,South African capital has made rapid inroads into Mozambique,most notably in the distribution sector. This resulted fromopportunities opened up by post-apartheid respectability andthe deregulation of markets (Daniel, Lutchman, & Naidu, 2004). Inpractice, this has led to a worsening of Mozambique’s balance ofpayments with South Africa

Political power in post-independence Mozambique – as was thecase in the colonial era – is highly centralized, and the dominantliberation movement, Frelimo, remains firmly in power, in part dueto the relative weakness of the principal opposition party, Renamo.Some 80% of the population lives in rural areas (Falk & Langfeldt,2003), and gross imbalances persist between the capital, Maputo,and the rest of the country. Most economic activity is concentratedin the capital, with a large gap in financial and human resourcesbetween it and the rest of Mozambique. Indeed, according to theUnited Nations Development Programme (UNDP), despite impres-sive overall growth rates, real GDP per capita has fallen in ruralareas (Hanlon, 2004). However, a gradual improvement in publictransport since the late 1990s has provided new opportunities forformal and informal trade, which may have mitigated some of theworst excesses of the adjustments.

2. Homogenization, path dependence, or segmented businesssystem in Mozambique?

The first way in which Mozambican business systems and HRpractices can be understood is within the context of globalhomogenization toward neoliberal practices. This approach tendsto see the country as being moulded by external circumstances. Interms of the HRM practices associated with neo-liberalism, lightregulation can be associated with little attention to peoplemanagement issues. A business climate characterized by weaksecurity of tenure, ineffective or absent unions, and hardlinearbitrary management (Moody, 1997; cf. Guest, 2001) exists.Within emerging economies, approaches to HRM are likely to becharacterized by a lack of legal protection for employees, heavylabour repression, the use of low skills production paradigms, andextremely low wages (Moody, 1997).

In contrast to this perspective, business systems theorysuggests that national institutional configurations are surprisinglyresilient. Company-level practices within individual nations arepath dependent, reflecting specific sets of historical circumstances(Whitley, 1999). The company lies at a centre of a complex web ofrelationships, which, whilst subject to periodic and ongoing

Table 1HR and segmented business systems.

Characteristics HR in a ‘‘Segmented’’ context

Role of Unions Weak

Involvement and

participation

Low. General workforce meetings, regular

informal communication

Training and development Considerable informal training

Security of tenure Low voluntary staff turnover, but low security

of tenure

Regulation Comprehensive regulations exist, but may be

poorly enforced and widely ignored

Source: Moody (1997), Guest (2001), Wood and Frynas (2006), Webster and Wood

(2005).

G. Wood et al. / Journal of World Business 46 (2011) 31–41 33

reconfiguration, is likely to prove surprisingly resilient. Indeed, astrand of existing research in Mozambique points to strongcontinuities (Pitcher, 2002; Webster & Wood, 2005; Wood &Haines, 1998). Such continuities could reflect underlying institu-tional realities making for a model broadly in line with thesegmented business system, developed to describe the situation inEast African countries such as Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania (Wood& Frynas, 2006). This model firstly points toward rigid internaldivisions between the export and non-export sectors, with acapitalized export orientated sector coexisting with a diverse non-export orientated sector, comprised of a mass of smallerenterprises and the informal sector. In small or family-ownedindigenous companies, employment relations tend to be unitaristand patriarchal, while in Transnational Corporations (TNCs) orstate sectors, companies can incorporate some elements ofpluralism. Secondly, there is the operation of informal networksof support which impact the nature of recruitment processes.These also link employers with employees, and employees withthe structurally unemployed. Thirdly, there is a tendency forconsistent regulatory failure, in terms of weak property rights,environmental safeguards, borders and customs, and financialinstitutions, and the enforcement of labour legislation.

In common with many other East African economies reforms inMozambique have primarily benefited elites: over-hasty privati-zations have often led to asset stripping, whilst a weakenedcapacity of the state to enforce laws or provide supportiveinfrastructure has resulted in a reversion to informality (Hanlon,2004). Moreover, there is a large degree of informality inemployment relations, and relatively weak enforcement of labourlegislation (Webster & Wood, 2005; Webster, Wood, & Brookes,2006). This is irrespective of the existence of labour legislation thatcovers collective bargaining, and the Constitution of the Republicof 1990, which provides workers with the right to a fair wage, restand vacation, a safe and healthy work environment, freedom ofassociation (including the right to belong to unions), and the rightto strike (Levy, 2003), together with a tripartite negotiating forum,which brings together the state, employers and unions, and setsthe minimum wage. Whilst this might suggest that the Mozambi-can legal context – in common with many other civil law basedlegal systems – provides a good body of rights for employees, thereality is rather more complex. Employment regulation inMozambique was formerly established under colonial rule, andwhile colonial citizens were entitled to all citizenship rights, theindigenas (natives) were subject to lower wages, inferior schoolsand forced labour. These inequities have been addressed in theory,but problems remain with the legacy of inequities in levels ofeducation and with the practical implementation of legislation(Santos, 2006). Government departments are heavily over-stretched and this means that the monitoring of company levelpractices is necessarily uneven (Levy, 2003: p. 9; cf. Hanlon, 1996:p. 70), while a large proportion of the workforce is engaged inpeasant production and informal sector activity, both of which areoutside of employment legislation. These various defining featuresof HRM within a ‘segmented business system’ are outlined inTable 1 below.

In summary, the Mozambican business system is likely to leadto specific types of HR practice at the firm level which broadlyconform to the idea of a ‘segmented business system’. Firstly,weaknesses in formal regulation and enforcement are likely toresult in widespread non-compliance with the law. Secondly, thisweakness may make for the persistence of a degree of consistencyin informal procedures and approaches that lower transactioncosts (cf. Marsden, 1999). Thirdly, whilst unions may have had ahistorical role, much of their influence is likely to be residual,rather than based on real power. Finally, recruitment, communi-cation and development are likely to be informal, whilst job

turnover rates may be low even if tenure is weak, owing to veryhigh unemployment. This leads to the following researchpropositions:

Proposition 1. The role of unions is, in practice, weak, even if there is

a formal union presence. A legacy of state sponsored unionism is likely

to lead to residual union presence in many companies. However, the

role and influence of unions is likely to be weak, partly due to

Mozambique’s colonial past and the underdevelopment of large areas

of the country.

Proposition 2. The dominant employee voice mechanisms are

centred on open ended workforce meetings and informal communi-

cation. Given proposition 1, it might be expected that employee voice

mechanisms are similarly weak. However, it cannot be concluded that

they will be totally absent, given the operation of informal support

mechanisms linking managers with staff, and the need to maintain

and bolster up existing rules and norms within the workplace.

Proposition 3. There is limited formal training, but on the job infor-

mal training in key areas. In the past, colonial era neglect of the

indigenous population and neo-liberal reforms which have limited the

ability of governments to spend money have resulted in weak official

vocational and technical training, while limited organizational

resources among many companies mean that any training is likely

to be informal and on the job.

Proposition 4. There is low job security. In the context of high

unemployment and industry restructuring, although there may be

relatively low levels of voluntary staff turnover, employment will be

insecure.

Proposition 5. Comprehensive labour legislation exists, but is poorly

enforced and widely ignored. A history of frequent regulatory changes

and the weak capacity of the state to enforce laws results in many

companies choosing to ignore the law in favour of accepted ways of

doing things.

3. Method

3.1. Survey administration

The research involved a questionnaire survey of 177 enterprisesbased in Maputo and Beira. This questionnaire was completed bythose responsible for human resource management or industrialrelations within each enterprise. The survey was conductedbetween July and November 2003, and was administered inperson by postgraduate students from Eduardo MondlaneUniversity and the University of Witwatersrand, with trainingfor field workers provided through a workshop.

What is likely to have changed since the survey wasconducted? On the one hand, the Mozambican economy hasalready been affected by the 2008–2009 economic crisis. This islikely to place further pressures on how firms manage their


people. How firms cope and the effect on people managementrepresents fertile ground for further enquiry. On the other hand,much existing literature on Mozambique points to long standingcontinuities: a defining feature of how Mozambican firms behavehas been consistency in the face of endemic crisis and rupture(Pitcher, 2002; Webster & Wood, 2005; Wood & Haines, 1998). Afollow up survey would, however, be valuable in exploring thenature and extent of the resilience of practices in the face ofrenewed crisis.

The questions were compiled based around Whitley’s (1999)defining features of HR practice, and centre on the presence ofspecific employee voice and representative mechanisms, securityof tenure, and investment in people (Webster & Wood, 2005). Tothis we added specific questions regarding the degree to whichfirms comply with the law, an important issue in an area where theenforcement of the law is generally weak. Whilst it might seemthat this would be unlikely to elicit truthful responses, it is perhapsan indicator of the weakness of such mechanisms if managersopenly admit to regularly breaking the law. Closed endedquestions were deployed, in order to limit ambiguity in responses,with, where appropriate, a Likert 5 point scale being used.

The field workers were supervised by a principal researchassistant who monitored progress on a twice-weekly basis. Beforecommencing the survey, a pilot study was carried out in order torefine individual questions and to calculate the appropriate samplesize.

3.2. Sample

The sample of companies was initially and primarily drawnfrom telephone listings, and therefore did not include thosecompanies that did not use a landline. Due to the high entrance andexit rates of companies within Mozambique, some companieswere removed from the original list, and following consultationwith employer and labour organizations, newly establishedcompanies were identified and included. The survey was limitedto Maputo and Beira and hence did not include key sectors, such asagriculture, forestry and the informal sector. However, havingdetermined a list of companies, stratified sampling was thenemployed, according to geographical area and sector.

Table 2Extent of formal union presence and role of unions, over whole sample and by sector.

Variable measuring union presence and role Category W

S

Do any of your employees belong to a trade union/s? ‘‘Yes’’ 6

Percentage of workers represented by unions? ‘‘1–29%’’

‘‘30–59%’’ 2

60–100% 3

Are permanent workers represented by unions? ‘‘Yes’’ 6

Are contract, i.e. fixed time workers represented by unions? ‘‘Yes’’ 1

Are part-time workers represented by unions? ‘‘Yes’’

Does your company have a collective bargaining

agreement with a union/s?

‘‘Yes’’ 5

Does collective bargaining take place at the workplace level? ‘‘Yes’’ 5

Does collective bargaining take place at the enterprise level? ‘‘Yes’’ 1

Does collective bargaining take place at the industry level? ‘‘Yes’’ 1

Does collective bargaining take place at some other level? ‘‘Yes’’

If a collective bargaining agreement exists, does management

believe that the company abides by its terms?

‘‘Yes’’ 8

If redundancies have occurred, were staff selected for redundancy

by agreement with union?

‘‘Yes’’ 1

Have you ever had any work stoppages or strike in this company? ‘‘Yes’’ 1

All %’s taken use N of valid response as base (i.e. missing, ‘Not Applicable’ and ‘Don’t Ka 62<N<160.b 67<N<175.

3.3. Measures

The questionnaire addressed each of the following areas: thenature of the company, the role of trade unions, involvementmechanisms, training, security of tenure, and regulation. Thenature and type of company was assessed by open-endedquestions regarding the size of the company (total number ofemployees), the type of industry (subsequently coded into fivesector categories; Tourism, Transport, Construction, Manufactur-ing and Other), and the location (coded into two categories:Maputo and Beira). The presence of unions was measured byasking whether any employees in the company belonged to a tradeunion, and if so, the percentage and type of workers that weremembers, including the figures for permanent and temporaryworkers, and for part-time workers. Additional questions on thenature of the organisation enabled a comparison between sectors.Following this, the questionnaire sought to assess the extent of therole of trade unions. One way of assessing this is through theexistence of collective bargaining agreements. A series of questionsasked about the presence of such agreements in the company as awhole and at each level. Respondents were also asked whether thecompany abided by collective agreements. Further questions askedabout union involvement in selecting staff for redundancy and theuse of work stoppages. Two further areas where a union mightexhibit influence, both of particular importance in a country suchas Mozambique where there are high levels of unemployment andlabour disputes, are job security and the mobilization of membersin collective action. The survey asked whether staff were selectedfor redundancy with union agreement and whether the companyhad experienced work stoppages or strikes. Response codings were‘Yes’, ‘No’, and ‘Don’t Know’ in each case. The full wording of eachmeasure is given in Table 2.

The second proposition related to employee voice mechanisms.The survey asked a general question concerning whether compa-nies used any form of involvement mechanism. Following this, aseries of questions (each similarly coded with ‘Yes’, ‘No’, or ‘Don’tKnow’ response options) sought to assess the existence of variousdistinct forms of communication, focusing firstly on ‘top down’methods such as notice boards and team briefings, and then onconsultation systems involving feedback, such as suggestion boxes

hole Sectora

ampleb Tourism/Restaurants Manufacturing Construction Transport

9.6% 60.6% 77.6% 73.5% 56.5%

9.3% 12.1% 6.8% 14.7% 8.7%

2.4% 18.2% 25.4% 29.4% 8.7%

7.9% 30.3% 45.8% 29.4% 39.1%

7.3% 59.4% 75.9% 69.7% 52.2%

5.0% 3.2% 16.4% 31.3% 9.1%

2.6% 3.2% 0.0% 3.1% 8.7%

0.0% 20.6% 62.7% 57.6% 39.1%

2.9% 48.0% 66.7% 58.6% 23.8%

8.8% 0.0% 12.8% 32.1% 28.6%

3.4% 8.0% 22.9% 7.1% 9.5%

1.5% 0.0% 0.0% 7.1% 0.0%

9.6% 100.0% 88.9% 88.9% 100.0%

1.9% 11.1% 24.0% 0.0% 11.1%

8.3% 0.0% 29.0% 14.3% 16.7%

now’ responses are excluded).

Table 3Extent of information sharing systems, over whole sample and by sector.

Variable measuring extent of information sharing system Category Whole Sectora

Sampleb Tourism/

Restaurants

Manufacturing Construction Transport

Does your organization have an information sharing system? ‘‘Yes’’ 83.3% 89.7% 85.5% 88.2% 50.0%

Information sharing systems: does your organization use notice boards? ‘‘Yes’’ 20.1% 5.6% 28.8% 25.8% 6.7%

Information sharing systems: does your organization use team

briefings/cascade briefings?

‘‘Yes’’ 14.4% 25.0% 11.8% 10.0% 6.7%

Information sharing systems: does your organization use shop

steward/workplace representative briefings?

‘‘Yes’’ 21.6% 2.8% 46.2% 10.0% 6.7%

Information sharing systems: does your organization use

company newsletter?

‘‘Yes’’ 16.3% 13.9% 15.7% 13.3% 13.3%

Information sharing systems: does your organization use some

other system?

‘‘Yes’’ 77.0% 69.4% 78.8% 76.7% 80.0%

Employee consultation: do you make use of suggestion boxes? ‘‘Yes’’ 6.4% 2.6% 11.3% 5.9% 0.0%

Employee consultation: do you make use of workplace surveys? ‘‘Yes’’ 4.1% 5.3% 4.8% 0.0% 4.3%

Employee consultation: do you make use of briefings where feedback

is solicited?

‘‘Yes’’ 15.7% 21.1% 22.6% 8.8% 0.0%

Employee consultation: do you make use of some other system? ‘‘Yes’’ 77.1% 70.3% 74.6% 81.8% 86.4%

All %’s taken use N of valid response as base (i.e. missing, ‘Not Applicable’ and ‘Don’t Know’ responses are excluded).a 132<N<159.b 147<N<174.


and workplace surveys. The complete list of measures appears inTable 3. The third proposition focused on training. The surveyenquired about different forms of training, such as informalworkplace based scenarios, sponsored courses, or cross-trainingfor multiple jobs/multi-skilling, with respondents asked toindicate the presence or absence of each type within theircompany. The full set of measures is displayed in Table 4.Proposition four states that ‘there is low job security’. This conceptwas measured by seven questions; the first asked the percentage ofworkers employed within the company who had permanentcontracts with rights to benefit packages, whilst the next seriesaddressed the occurrence, extent of and selection for redundancy.The complete list of questions is given in Table 5. The fifth, and finalproposition is that ‘comprehensive labour legislation may exist, but

that it will be poorly enforced and widely ignored.’ The first part ofthis proposition was addressed qualitatively through reference tolegislation, and to previously published research studies relating tothat legislation. The second was tested through analysis of theresponses to two sets of questions: the existence of a range ofminimum workplace conditions such as paid overtime, severancepackages, and paid vacation; and recruitment practices,

Table 4Extent of training, over whole sample and by sector.

Variable measuring extent of training Category

Is cross-training for multiple jobs/multi-skilling practised in

your organization?

‘‘Yes’’

Do you make use of informal workplace based training? ‘‘Yes’’

Do you make use of formal workplace based training (uncertified)? ‘‘Yes’’

Training and development: do you make use of formal workplace

based training (certified)?

‘‘Yes’’

Training and development: do you make use of sponsored courses

with outside training body (technical)?

‘‘Yes’’


with outside training body (administrative)?

‘‘Yes’’


with outside training body (managerial)?

‘‘Yes’’

Training and development: do you make use of some other system? ‘‘Yes’’

All %’s taken use N of valid response as base (i.e. missing, ‘Not Applicable’ and ‘Don’t Ka 157<N<160.b 171<N<174.

specifically focused on ‘Word of Mouth’ and ‘Selection withoutinterview?’. These measures are given in full in Table 6.

3.4. Analysis

Having first examined the properties of our sample in termsof company size, sector, and location, we then investigated theevidence supporting or contradicting our five propositions. Foreach proposition, this took the form of a two-stage process: firstthrough descriptive statistics showing the level of each measurerelated to that proposition, over the whole sample and withineach sector; and then, due to the dichotomous nature of ouroutcome variables, through a series of logistic regressionanalyses. Logistic regression enabled us to simultaneouslyexamine the effect of sector, location, and company size onone or more key measures of the concept investigated in thatproposition. When predicting the presence/absence of Informa-tion Systems, Training and Labour Legislation from sector,location and size, a potentially mediating dichotomous variablemeasuring the presence/absence of an HR department in thecompany was also included as a predictor.

Whole Sectora

Sampleb Tourism/

Restaurants


65.9% 66.7% 70.5% 70.6% 58.3%

70.1% 46.2% 88.7% 71.4% 62.5%

27.0% 23.1% 30.6% 34.3% 12.5%

19.8% 25.6% 21.7% 11.4% 12.5%

40.7% 43.6% 41.9% 32.4% 39.1%

32.9% 23.1% 30.6% 37.1% 43.5%

32.4% 20.5% 35.5% 31.4% 39.1%

7.6% 0.0% 6.6% 14.7% 8.3%

now’ responses are excluded).

Table 5Job security, over whole sample and by sector.

Variable measuring job security Category Whole Sectora

Sampleb Tourism/

Restaurants


Percentage employees permanent with rights to company’s standard

benefit package or benefits covered by agreement?

31–70% 22.7% 7.5% 25.8% 42.9% 16.7%

71–100% 64.8% 87.5% 62.9% 25.7% 75.0%

Have you made staff redundant within the past year? ‘‘Yes’’ 28.2% 13.2% 27.9% 47.1% 26.1%

If you made staff redundant within the past year

Percentage of workforce made redundant? Mean % in

sample/sector

22.7% 15.2% 24.6% 22.9% 21.7%

If you made staff redundant within the past year, were staff selected

on ‘Last in, first out’ basis?

‘‘Yes’’ 2.2% 20.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%

If you made staff redundant within the past year, was an entire section,

plant or division closed?

‘‘Yes’’ 39.1% 40.0% 50.0% 37.5% 20.0%

If you made staff redundant within the past year, were staff selected

by voluntary redundancy?

‘‘Yes’’ 20.0% 0.0% 40.0% 6.3% 20.0%

Do you have employment security policies (to offset worker concerns

about job loss due to productivity increases)?

‘‘Yes’’ 82.4% 87.2% 81.0% 71.4% 87.5%


Table 6Extent of labour legislation, over whole sample and by sector.

Variable measuring labour legislation Category Whole Sectora

Sampleb Tourism/

Restaurants


Is overtime paid, via collective agreement or otherwise? ‘‘Yes’’ 74.2% 72.2% 69.0% 93.8% 66.7%

Is severance package available via collective agreement or otherwise? ‘‘Yes’’ 43.0% 61.1% 22.8% 53.1% 38.9%

Are breaks during working day available via collective

agreement or otherwise?

‘‘Yes’’ 88.1% 88.9% 84.5% 93.8% 88.9%

Is paid vacation available via collective agreement or otherwise? ‘‘Yes’’ 76.1% 88.9% 69.0% 75.0% 72.2%

Is sick leave available via collective agreement or otherwise? ‘‘Yes’’ 77.6% 88.9% 69.0% 75.0% 72.2%

Are any categories of staff recruited by Word of Mouth? ‘‘Yes’’ 38.2% 28.2% 55.7% 32.4% 16.7%

Are any categories of staff selected without interview? ‘‘Yes’’ 26.4% 7.7% 37.7% 37.1% 16.7%



4. Results

Of the 177 companies who responded, thirteen failed to provideinformation on the background variables of sector, size andlocation. Of the remaining 164, 24% were from the tourism/restaurant sector, 39% were from manufacturing, 21% fromconstruction, 14% from the transport sector, with 1% from othersectors. The median size of company was 65 employees, with thesmallest company having 10 employees and the largest 13,000. Themajority of companies (67%) were located in the Maputo region.78% of companies claimed to have an HR department. This wasmore likely to occur in larger companies (Spearman r = 0.31) thansmaller ones. The direct relationships between these backgroundvariables and ten key HR practices are given in Table 7.

Table 2 presents an overview of the descriptive findingspertaining to proposition 1. Union membership existed in almost70% of companies, and 38% of workplaces had membership levelsof 60% or over. However, these numbers varied dramatically forpermanent and temporary workers, so that only 15% of companiesreported that their fixed-contract i.e. temporary workers wererepresented by unions. Similarly, less than 3% of companiesreported that part-time workers benefited from union member-ship. Mozambique, in common with many other emergingmarkets, has seen a decrease in formal sector employment, butincrease in unemployment and informal sector work. This haspresented significant challenges for trade unions since they have

generally struggled to organise informal sector workers. Moreover,the findings here suggest that they also struggle to representvulnerable workers within the workplace. Union membership wasfound to vary by sector. Membership figures were generally higherfor manufacturing, construction and transport than for tourism/restaurants. In terms of representation of temporary workers, thenumbers were highest for construction (31%), while the figures forpart-time workers were highest in the transport sector (9%), albeitthat this figure was still very low.

The first set of items assessing the extent of union role withincompanies related to: whether the company had a collectiveagreement with a union, at which level collective bargaining tookplace, since unions that embrace industry level negotiation arelikely to be more influential on individual employer practices andalso engage more actively with government; and whether thecompany abided by it. In response to the first question, 50% ofcompanies stated that they had a collective bargaining agreementin place, but the number varied by sector, being higher formanufacturing (63%) than for tourism/restaurants (21%). In mostorganizations, collective bargaining appears to have taken place atworkplace level, and industry level bargaining appears to berelatively low, but more often undertaken in the manufacturingsector (23%). When asked if they believed that management abidedby the rules of the collective bargaining agreement, almost allrespondents believed that this was the case. Unions had not beeninvolved at all in selection of staff for redundancy in the

Table 7Correlations between the existence or lack of HR practices, and company size, sector, region and HR department.

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15

1 Company Size

2 Industrial Sector dummy:

Tourism (vs Transport)

�0.14


Manufacturing (vs Transport)

0.17 �0.46


Construction (vs Transport)

�0.09 �0.30 �0.42

5 Region: Maputo (vs Beira) 0.08 0.19 0.04 �0.15

6 Presence of HR Department:

Yes (vs No)

0.11 �0.10 �0.04 0.10 0.25

7 Pay for performance plans in

organization: Yes (vs No)

0.06 0.07 0.00 �0.01 0.21 0.21

8 Performance based pay in


0.08 �0.02 0.03 0.00 �0.09 �0.04 0.16

9 Job enlargement practised in


�0.10 0.15 �0.07 0.04 �0.02 0.02 0.12 0.12

10 Employment security policies

in organization: Yes (vs No)

0.02 0.08 �0.01 �0.13 0.04 0.01 0.21 �0.05 0.10

11 Staff recruited by Word of

Mouth in organization: Yes (vs No)

0.14 �0.12 0.29 �0.06 0.29 0.16 0.01 �0.04 �0.05 0.15

12 Staff selected without interview

in organization: Yes (vs No)

�0.02 �0.25 0.19 0.12 0.08 0.13 �0.14 �0.10 �0.11 �0.13 0.15

13 Cross-training for multiple jobs/

multi-skilling in org: Yes (vs No)

�0.06 �0.01 0.05 0.03 �0.18 �0.08 0.01 0.16 0.50 0.08 �0.17 �0.04

14 Use of formal workplace based

training (certified) in org: Yes (vs No)

0.29 0.10 0.05 �0.10 0.24 0.20 0.08 �0.05 0.12 0.04 �0.03 0.13 0.11

15 Information sharing system in


0.02 0.12 0.08 0.09 0.17 0.13 0.15 �0.01 0.20 0.04 0.02 �0.01 0.12 0.15

16 Collective bargaining agreement

with union(s) in org: Yes (vs No)

0.19 �0.30 0.23 0.10 �0.20 0.20 0.07 0.09 0.17 0.05 �0.13 0.14 0.30 0.24 0.10

Phi Correlation coefficients, 148<N<175.


construction sector and in only 24% of workplaces in themanufacturing sector, while percentages of companies whereunion mobilization through work stoppages had occurred rangedfrom 14% of companies in construction to 29% of companies inmanufacturing.

In order to assess the unique impact of the size of organization,region or sector on the existence and role of unions, we used a pairof logistic regression analyses, predicting the outcomes to ‘Do anyof your employees belong to a trade union’, and ‘Does yourcompany have a collective bargaining agreement with a union?’Company size was found to have a significant positive impact uponthe existence of unions within a company. Companies in Beirawere more likely to have union presence than those in Maputo. Asimilar pattern of effects emerged for the existence of collectivebargaining, with larger companies and those in Beira more likely tohave it, and with an additional sector effect emerging: the odds of acompany in the manufacturing or construction sectors havingcollective bargaining were around 3 times higher (specificallyExp(B) = 2.83 and 3.57, respectively) than for those from thetransport sector.

To test the second proposition that employee voice mechan-isms exist primarily through open ended workforce meetings andinformal communication, we examined items relating to the useand type of any form of involvement mechanism. Over threequarters of valid respondents (83%) used some form of informationsharing system, although this varied according to sector, with onlyhalf of transport companies stating that they did this. Of thedownward communication methods, shop steward/workplacerepresentative or team briefings and newsletters were mostfrequently reported, although this also varied to some extent bysector. The most frequent response was under the option ‘othersystem’, generating an additional set of open-ended responses, inwhich informal means of communication were most oftenmentioned. Following this, respondents were asked aboutconsultation mechanisms involving feedback; the most popular

mechanism was the use of briefings where feedback is solicited,although even this was the case for only 16% of companies,suggesting a limited degree of deliberative engagement withdecision-making at the individual level. Again, informal meanswere referred to most frequently. In most cases, therefore,communication flows were downward, irregular, and informal.

We then used logistic regression analysis in order to determinewhich, if any, of company size, industrial sector, region and thepresence of an HR department impacted upon the presence orabsence of any information sharing system. The complete resultsare given in Table 8. Only sector had a significant effect, with theodds of tourism, manufacturing and construction having suchsystems being between 5.5 and 11.5 times of those for thetransport sector.

To test our third proposition, the responses to a range ofquestions covering various forms of training, from formal trainingthat involved external courses to more informal means, wereanalyzed. While the majority of companies used informal workplacetraining (70% of companies), less made use of sponsored courseswith outside training bodies, although as expected the percentage ofcompanies using external training was at its highest (41%) whentraining was for technical workers. The existence of outside coursesmay be attributed to the fact that more recently a wide range ofinternational donors have funded training, albeit that his has largelybeen within the public sector. The number using in-house certifiedtraining was lower. Companies in the tourism sector were mostlikely to report that they used this, but with only 25% of thesecompanies responding positively to this question. This may be due toa large proportion of the population still not being educated furtherthan primary level, a Millenium Development Goal that thegovernment is seeking to address through its poverty reductionstrategy (PARPA). Large numbers of workers, and, in the context of acolonial past, particularly those from indigenous backgrounds, areunlikely to have reached an educational level where they can easilytake part in formal certified training.

Table 8Predicting extent of information sharing system from size, region, sector and presence of HR department.

Predictor variables aDependent variable: Does your organization have an information sharing system?

B Wald Exp(B) Model Pseudo R2

Company size (total no. of employees) 0.001 0.186 1.000

Industrial sector 15.506*

Sector dummy: Tourism (vs Transport) 2.229 9.299* 9.293

Sector dummy: Manufacturing (vs Transport) 1.712 8.567* 5.542

Sector dummy: Construction (vs Transport) 2.445 10.260* 11.532

Region: Maputo (vs Beira) 0.699 2.021 2.012

Presence of HR Department: Yes (vs No) 0.941 3.066 2.564

Overall Model Fit 0.238

* p<0.05.a N = 141.

Table 9Predicting extent of training from size, region, sector and presence of HR department.

Predictor variables aDependent variable: Do you make use of

informal workplace based training?

bDependent variable: Training and development: do you

make use of formal workplace based training (certified)?

B Wald Exp(B) Model Pseudo R2 B Wald Exp(B) Model Pseudo R2

Company Size (total no. of employees) 0.001 0.615 1.001 0.001 4.239* 1.001

Industrial Sector 11.238* 4.222

Sector dummy: Tourism (vs Transport) �0.585 0.918 0.557 1.207 2.088 3.345

Sector dummy: Manufacturing (vs Transport) 1.295 4.235* 3.651 0.408 0.248 1.504

Sector dummy: Construction (vs Transport) 0.452 0.548 1.571 �0.088 0.008 0.916

Region: Maputo (vs Beira) �0.729 2.432 0.483 1.312 3.440 3.713

Presence of HR Department: Yes (vs No) �1.098 3.908* 0.333 1.332 2.698 3.787

Overall Model Fit 0.229 0.225

* p<0.05.a N = 139.b N = 141.


Logistic regression was used to predict the extent of training bycompany size, region, sector, and presence of an HR department.Both sector and region had a significant effect upon the use ofinformal workplace training, with it being more likely to occur inmanufacturing, and to a lesser extent, construction, than intourism or transport. It was also more likely to be available incompanies in Beira. Conversely, the only variable with a significantimpact upon formal workplace training was company size, withlarger companies more likely to have such certified schemes. Thefull results are shown in Table 9.

To test the fourth proposition based on the existence of jobsecurity within companies, respondents were asked to state thepercentage of workers that were permanent with rights to thecompany’s standard benefit package. Over two-thirds (65%)reported that over 70% of their workers were permanent. However,these figures varied dramatically by sector, with companies (26%)in the construction sector less likely to have such a predominanceof workers on permanent contracts. Respondents were also asked ifstaff had recently been made redundant (in the past year), and if so,how many. The percentages of companies who had made anyredundancies differed substantially across the sectors, ranging

Table 10Predicting job security from size, region and sector.

Predictor variables aDependent variab

B

Company Size (total no. of employees) 0.001

Industrial Sector

Sector dummy: Tourism (vs Transport) �0.655

Sector dummy: Manufacturing (vs Transport) 0.180

Sector dummy: Construction (vs Transport) 1.265

Region: Maputo (vs Beira) 1.065

Overall Model Fit

a N = 139.* p<0.05.

from 47% in construction to just 13% in tourism. Whereredundancies had occurred, the mean percentage made redundantwas just above 20%, with relatively little variation across sectors.The selection methods for making people redundant varied fromclosing a whole division or plant (39% of companies who had maderedundancies had done this) to a last-in first out basis, which wasmuch less frequent (2%); such an approach might lead to retainingthose workers who were most experienced, although converselymight inhibit selection on the basis of skill level. There was markedvariation in the popularity of each of these methods across sectors;for instance, while in manufacturing, 40% of companies selected byvoluntary redundancy, no companies took this step in the tourism/restaurant sector. Finally respondents were asked about theexistence of a policy on job security, with over four-fifths statingthat this was in place in their company. The full results are shownin Table 5.

The impact of size, sector and region on whether a company hadmade any redundancies in the previous year was then assessedusing logistic regression; both location and sector had a significantrelationship to the probability of redundancies occurring as shownin Table 10. The odds of a construction company making

le: Have you made staff redundant within the past year?

Wald Exp(B) Model Pseudo R2

2.099 1.000

10.112*

.783 .520

.081 1.197

3.600* 3.542

5.109* 2.900

0.160

Table 11Predicting extent of labour legislation from size, region, sector and presence of HR department.

Predictor variables Dependent variable: Is overtime

paid, via collective agreement or

otherwise?a

Dependent variable: Is severance

package available via collective

agreement or otherwise?b

Dependent variable: Are breaks

during working day available via

collective agreement or otherwise?c

B Wald Exp(B) Model

Pseudo R2

B Wald Exp(B) Model

Pseudo R2

B Wald Exp(B) Model

Pseudo R2

Company Size (total no. of employees) <0.001 0.913 1.001 0.001 3.361 1.001 0.001 0.465 1.001

Industrial Sector 6.178 17.241* 4.852

Sector dummy: Tourism (vs Transport) 0.774 1.277 2.168 1.240 3.150* 3.457 0.994 0.909 2.702

Sector dummy: Manufacturing

(vs Transport)

0.367 0.347 1.443 �0.760 1.177 0.468 �0.674 0.531 0.510

Sector dummy: Construction

(vs Transport)

2.108 5.456* 8.229 1.343 3.403* 3.832 0.378 0.112 1.459

Region: Maputo (vs Beira) �0.068 0.019 0.934 1.786 11.308* 5.964 �20.216 0.001 0.001

Presence of HR Department: Yes (vs No) 0.581 1.285 1.788 0.261 0.221 1.298 1.213 2.806 3.362

Overall Model Fit 0.145 0.348 0.294

Predictor variables Dependent variable: Is paid vacation available

via collective agreement or otherwise?d

Dependent variable: Is sick leave available

via collective agreement or otherwise?e

B Wald Exp(B) Model Pseudo R2 B Wald Exp(B) Model Pseudo R2

Company Size (total no. of employees) <0.001 0.903 1.001 <0.001 0.007 1.000

Industrial Sector 5.474 4.401

Sector dummy: Tourism (vs Transport) 1.496 3.530 4.463 1.073 1.577 2.924

Sector dummy: Manufacturing

(vs Transport)

0.061 0.009 1.063 �0.381 0.331 0.683

Sector dummy: Construction

(vs Transport)

0.576 0.606 1.779 0.005 0.001 1.005

Region: Maputo (vs Beira) �1.479 6.021* 0.228 0.323 0.462 1.381

Presence of HR Department:

Yes (vs No)

�0.842 1.475 0.431 �0.169 0.079 0.845

Overall Model Fit 0.175 0.077

a N = 128.b N = 127.c N = 128.d N = 128.e N = 126.* p<0.05.


redundancies were three and a half times that of a transportcompany, and the odds of a company in Maputo makingredundancies were almost three times that of a company in Beira.

The final proposition concerned the existence and enforcementof labour legislation. Whilst companies are unlikely to state withina survey that they break or ignore the law, responses to a smallnumber of questions on their minimum workplace conditions andrecruitment practices help to shed some light on this. As Table 6shows, paid overtime, work breaks, paid vacation, and sick leavewere provided in 75% of companies or more, although it might beexpected that all companies would and should provide these.There was substantial variation in provision by sector: perhapssurprisingly, tourism and construction were more likely to claim tooffer these benefits to their workers. The provision of severance

Table 12Predicting extent of formal union presence and role of unions from size, region and se

Predictor variables aDependent variable: Do any of you

to a trade union/s?

B Wald Exp(B)

Company size (total no. of employees) 0.011 9.988* 1.011

Industrial sector 3.599

Sector dummy: Tourism (vs Transport) 0.944 2.012 2.569

Sector dummy: Manufacturing (vs Transport) 1.203 3.466 3.329

Sector dummy: Construction (vs Transport) 0.893 1.763 2.444

Region: Maputo (vs Beira) �1.304 7.401* 0.271

Overall Model Fit

a N = 133.b N = 134.* p<0.05.

packages was, however, generally lower (43% of the wholesample), particularly in construction (23.8%). This variation maybe explained by the government provision of substantial severancepackages for employees in particular sectors in the wake of large-scale redundancy, with the assistance of the World Bank.

Levels of inequitable practices in recruitment and selection,specifically recruiting people by word of mouth, and selecting staffwithout an interview, were currently used within a significantminority of companies (38% and 26%, respectively). Again, thesepolicies appeared to vary according to sector as shown in Table 6.Construction and manufacturing were most likely to employ suchmethods. The widespread existence of such informal recruitmentcould enable many companies to sidestep discriminatory legisla-tion on race and gender.

ctor.

r employees belong bDependent variable: Does your company have a

collective bargaining agreement with a union/s?

Model Pseudo R2 B Wald Exp(B) Model Pseudo R2

0.007 12.081* 1.007

8.019*

�0.073 0.010 0.929

1.273 4.170* 3.572

1.040 2.611 2.830

�1.488 10.763* 0.226

0.291 0.380


Logistic regression was used to assess the extent to which theexistence of the various employment conditions/provisions couldbe predicted by size, sector, region, or the presence of an HRdepartment. The results in Table 11 indicate that sick leave andbreaks were unrelated to any of these predictors. Sector had aneffect on paid overtime and severance package provision (theformer significantly more likely to occur in construction, the lattersignificantly more likely to occur in construction and tourism).Location also had an effect on severance package provision(Maputo companies were more likely to provide it) and paidvacation (Beira companies).

Finally, as a supplementary analysis, the relationship betweenthe existence of ten key HR practices covered over the fivepropositions was assessed using phi correlation coefficients (givenin Table 7, rows, cols 7 to 16), in an attempt to see whether anyparticular patterns of concurrent practice use existed. In fact, otherthan a very strong positive relationship between cross-training formultiple jobs and job enlargement (phi = 0.50), all other correla-tions were of small to medium size or below, and there wassubstantial variation in sign (of the 45 correlations almost a thirdwere negative); hence there was no evidence to support anypatterns of concurrent use of either subsets of practices, or as asingle block (Table 12).

5. Discussion

The central question of this article is whether in Mozambiquethere has been homogenization toward a neoliberal model, whetherthere are strong signs of path dependence, or whether Mozambiquefulfils the criteria for a segmented business system. In terms ofhomogenization toward neo-liberalism, the findings point towardslow security of tenure, low levels of certified training, and weaksystems of information sharing and workplace democracy. Howev-er, low levels of training echo the generally low educationaldevelopment within the continent, while a lack of consultation couldreflect the presence of patriarchal companies within a traditionalAfrican society, particularly one with a colonial past. These havebeen broadly translated into Taylorist work systems, with hierar-chical lines of authority and limited on the job training. Neverthe-less, there was evidence of some companies engaging in ‘bestpractice’ HR techniques, suggesting that a simple assumption ofhomogenization or path dependence is not appropriate.

The segmented business system implies that there arecomprehensive regulations in place, but with limited enforcement.The analysis of labour legislation suggests that Mozambique has areasonably well developed set of labour laws, adding strength tothis proposition, with this survey revealing that enforcement oflegislation on working conditions and recruitment is not alwayspresent, particularly in the construction and manufacturingsectors. Second, the assumption that trade unions have a weakrole within the workplace also appears to be supported: even ifunions are recognized, employee voice is generally individual anddirect, and with a lack of industry level bargaining. The industrialrestructuring that has taken place following structural adjustmentand liberalization would have affected the union’s ability toorganize formal sector workers. Moreover, although manycompanies offered a job security policy, there have also beenlarge numbers of redundancies and limited provision of severancepackages in some sectors, particularly in construction, which alsohas the lowest proportion of workers on permanent contracts.Similarly, whilst the use of systematic training strategies does notseem apparent, there are high levels of informal training; a positivemove forward, given Mozambique’s colonial history and post-conflict situation.

A further question concerns the cause of this diversity betweencompanies. In Mozambique, there has been a large influx of

foreign owned companies, primarily of South African or Portu-guese origin. They were attracted to Mozambique by naturalresources, recent economic and political stability, and usefulmaritime trading routes. It was therefore expected that theremight be some notable differences between large multinationalcompanies and indigenous companies that focus on the homemarket. In exploring the extent to which region, sector and sizeimpacted upon different sets of HR practices, no consistent set ofrelationships emerged. This might probably reflect the complexi-ties of ownership and corporate governance in Mozambique. Akey distinction here is between local companies and quasi-localcompanies (those owned by Portuguese nationals, with closepersonal or family links to Mozambique), and ‘foreign’ companies,whose parent company is neither based in Mozambique nor in theformer colonial metropol (Wood & Haines, 1998). Within theformer, capital is more likely to be secured informally or viapersonal arrangements, and within the latter via more ‘modern’sources. This places differing pressures on managers, not simply interms of a greater short term or long term orientation, but also inconsistency and long term organizational goals. To put it anotherway, the Mozambican economy is segmented (cf. Wood & Haines,1998), but the lines of segmentation are complex, and do notdirectly correspond to physical size or a chosen area of operation.The role and effect of the different corporate governance regimesin Mozambique is clearly important, and deserves furtherinvestigation, not only in understanding company behaviour inthat country, but more broadly across tropical Africa and in otheremerging markets.

6. Managerial relevance

Drawing on extensive company level survey evidence, we haveinvestigated the extent to which HR practices conform to aparticular type of business system. In common with othercountries in East Africa, Mozambique appears to broadly conformto a segmented business system model. The next question is whatare the implications of this for the future of such countries, both interms of economic development, and in terms of the workingpopulation? Moreover, how can improvements be made to thecurrent system in order to ensure good HR and Industrial Relations(IR) practices? Mozambique is clearly following a path that is bothdistinct, but also similar in many respects to other countries inAfrica in terms of HRM policy and practice. To what extent isMozambique likely to remain on this trajectory, and what are thepossibilities and prospects for reform?

First, enforcement of both labour legislation and formalcollective agreements appears to be weak, and therefore needsto be addressed through additional capacity of governmentdepartments and political will, while unions might attempt toincrease their influence through industry level bargaining orinternational linkages (Collings, 2008). Second, companies relyheavily on ad-hoc informal workplace training, mitigating thesystematic development of human resources. A more effectivetraining program would require greater levels of state support,backed up by further budgetary support by international institu-tions. Third, large companies within Mozambique, and particularlythose within manufacturing and construction, might proactivelyseek to implement their job security policies, provide additionaltraining for black Mozambicans and establish fairer recruitmentpractices. Such practices might help to address previous inequitiesand build a sustainable economy. A fourth way forward would beto further develop ‘local production systems’, where locally basedinter-company relations and ties encourage higher value addedalternatives (Crouch & Voelzkow, 2004), and progressive multina-tional companies with evidence of ‘best practice’ are provided withincentives to develop backward linkages with local suppliers, in


order to promote local economic development and knowledgeexchange.

The study has highlighted the limits of legalistic approaches tounderstanding work and employment relations across tropicalAfrica. In many countries, the state is so weak that laws are widelyignored. Understanding the causes and nature of embeddedconvention may be of greater relevance. It also highlights the factthat whilst ad-hoc and informal HR practices may be the only viablemethod of coping with persistent crisis, the widespread use of suchmechanisms is not without problem. A lack of formality can lead tolimited organizational memory and may limit the possibilities foreconomies of scale that come from greater formality, whilstweaknesses in official training provisions preclude the developmentof skills beyond a relatively basic level. Yet, in such contexts, how isHRM to progress? There is no clear answer to this question, but itdepends both on better governance at national level, and thedevelopment of managerial and general human capacities at thelocal level, which in turn, requires greater and more effectiveallocation of state spending than has been possible in the past.Finally, as is the case with all surveys, this study only provides asnapshot of practices. A follow up survey, and similar surveysconducted across tropical Africa would shed more light on the natureand extent of the informal/embedded HR paradigm, and anytendencies to evolve towards a more formal and regulated model.

Acknowledgements

The support of the United States Department of Labor (USDOL)is acknowledged, as is the Federal Mediation and ConciliationService (FMCS) for contracting us to undertake this research andfor their assistance during the research phase. We also acknowl-edge the work of fieldworkers from Witwatersrand and EduardoMondlane University- Denise Malauene, Elize Muianga, FilipeMartins, Rachel Matavele, Crimildo Jose, and Eva Magumane, andparticularly Beata Mtingyizana.

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http://www.labournet.de/diskussion/gewerkschaft/hyman.html

Documents

HRM in Mozambique: Homogenization, path dependence or segmented business system?