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8202019 HSE - Loss Prevention in the Petrochemical and Chemical-process High-tech Industries in Taiwan
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullhse-loss-prevention-in-the-petrochemical-and-chemical-process-high-tech-industries 18
Loss prevention in the petrochemical and chemical-process
high-tech industries in Taiwan
Chien-Chung Chen a Tzu-Chi Wang b Lu-Yen Chen c Jie-Huei Dai a Chi-Min Shu a
a Process Safety and Disaster Prevention Laboratory Department of Safety Health and Environmental Engineering National Yunlin University of Science and Technology
123 University Rd Sec 3 Douliou Yunlin 64002 Taiwan ROC b Department of Chemical Engineering Chinese Culture University 55 Hwa-Kang Rd Yang-Ming-Shan Taipei 11114 Taiwan ROC c Department of Emergency and Resources National United University 1 Lienda Rd Miaoli 36003 Taiwan ROC
a r t i c l e i n f o
Article history
Received 13 August 2009
Received in revised form
23 April 2010
Accepted 25 April 2010
Keywords
Accidents
Chemical disasters
Emergency response
Loss prevention
Safety management
a b s t r a c t
Industrial safety has noticeably improved in recent years in Taiwan Despite these improvements
however serious accidents including explosions chemical releases and 1047297res have still occurred in
companies such as the Fu Guo Chemical Company (2001) Sin Hun Chemical Company (2005) Motech
Industries Inc (2005) and Nanpao Resin Co (2010) These accidents resulted in great loss of life and
property and further caused demands for improvement Chemical disasters usually result from the
combination of several mistakes or gross carelessness and are seldom caused by a single episode To
ensure the safety of operating handling and storing chemicals as well as to prevent chemical disasters
one must take many critical points into account such as techniques manufacturing processes operators
chemicals and emergency response In Taiwan the hazards and risks of high-tech companies are higher
than in other industrial sectors Therefore a variety of safety management methods and regulations
appropriate for high-tech companies have been generated We studied the current status of the indig-
enous loss prevention protocols based on the safety management of petrochemical and chemical-process
high-tech industries in Taiwan
Crown Copyright
2010 Published by Elsevier Ltd All rights reserved
1 Introduction
Highly developed industrial technology has not only resulted in
great advances but also in the expansion of the complexity and
scale of chemical processes resulting from the development of
process technologies in the chemical industries such as thin 1047297lm
transistor-liquid crystal displays (TFT-LCD) light emitting diodes
(LED) photovoltaics and semiconductor-related industries
However the harm from chemical disasters caused by machine
breakdowns operational mistakes poor design and mismanage-
ment among others has steadily increased (Chang Chang Shu ampLin 2005 Wu Shyu Yet-Pole Chi amp Shu 2009) In retrospect
serious 1047297res explosions and chemical release accidents that have
happened in recent years in Taiwan have been disastrous For
example on May 18 2001 a 6-ton reactor at the Fu-Kao Chemical
plant located at an industrialized park in the northern part of
Taiwan exploded due to a violent runaway polymerization reaction
of a batch production of acrylic resin Due to the lack of a proper
emergency relief and disposal system on the reactor the1047298ammable
chemicals were released and blanketed the entire process area The
catastrophic explosion leveled the plant and other nearby plants
including 16 high-tech companies The shock wave was so violent
that thousands of windows within a 500 m radius were shattered
(see Fig 1) Roughly 100 people were injured from 1047298ying glass and
several were hospitalized Fortunately the Fu-Kao workers were
able to escape in time and there were no deaths (Kao amp Hu 2002)
The second infamous example of an accident from a gross safety
violation was a 1047297re at Advanced Semiconductor Engineering (ASE)
which was a global leader in the integrated circuit (IC) packagingindustry On May 1 2005 its semiconductor packaging and testing
facilities were ruined by a 1047297re in its substrate plant in Chungli
Taiwan (see Fig 2) The facilities were not in operation at the time
of the 1047297re although some operators working overtime were on the
premises In total several 1047297re1047297ghters 1047297ve ASE employees and two
employees of outside contractors suffered minor injuries and had
to receive medical attention The1047297re had spread tothe third 1047298oor of
the eleven-1047298oor building and higher 1047298oors were spoiled by smoke
The losses from the 1047297re were expected to be enormous including
rebuilding costs as well as $19 million USD per month in lost
capacity Clients were also signi1047297cantly hampered by this accident Corresponding author Tel thorn886 5 534 2601x4416 fax thorn886 5 531 2069
E-mail address shucmyuntechedutw (C-M Shu)
Contents lists available at ScienceDirect
Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries
j o u r n a l h o m e p a g e w w w e l s e v i e r c om l o c a t e j l p
0950-4230$ e see front matter Crown Copyright 2010 Published by Elsevier Ltd All rights reserved
doi101016jjlp201004006
Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 23 (2010) 531e538
8202019 HSE - Loss Prevention in the Petrochemical and Chemical-process High-tech Industries in Taiwan
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullhse-loss-prevention-in-the-petrochemical-and-chemical-process-high-tech-industries 28
this may have resulted in remunerative compensation or even the
causation of clients shifting orders to ASErsquos competitors In
summary the damages were anticipated to reach $320 USDmillion
which is a huge loss for any company to take (Taipei Times 2005
The China Post 2005 The Epoch Times 2005)
The third example happened on January 8 2010 In this case
a huge blast with a mushroom cloud occurred at 248 pm at the
Nanpao Resin Co The 1047297re after a couple of explosions was not
extinguished until the following dawn (see Fig 3) Roughly4298 m2 of production and warehouse space was subsequently
destroyed Additionally Taiwan Steel amp Iron Co its neighbor was
partly damaged The accident took place at the cumene oxidation
tower in which a 1047298uid leak was identi1047297ed in the broken recycling
line A lack of a buffer zone at the bottom of the recycling line
resulted in the leaking followed by an unidenti1047297ed ignition source
The 1047297rm is one of the major producers for cumene hydroperoxide
(CHP) and dicumyl peroxide (DCP) in Taiwan Because of the severe
damage the plant was shut down fenced off and dismantled
The various indirect losses from these accidents are inestimable
including equipment repairs delay in plant re-commissioning loss
of market share and increases in insurance costs (Muniz Peon amp
Ordas 2007)
According to the annual reports of occupational disasters pub-lished by the Council of Labor Affairs (CLA) Executive Yuan Taiwan
the industries that have greater opportunities of having a chemical
disaster or accident are involved in the manufacturing of chemical
products or chemical materials are high-tech electronic industries
(semiconductors TFT-LCD and printed circuit board-related
sectors) and participate in the manufacturing and repair of elec-
trical and electronic machinery These three types of industries are
classi1047297ed as chemical-process industry In Figs 4 and 5 the data
collected from 2004 to 2007 show that 60 out of 156 1047297re and
explosion accidents and 419 out of 605 harmful substance contact
disasters occurred in these industries
As far as economic development is concerned these industries
are key sectors in Taiwan In 2007 the output value of all
manufacturing in Taiwan was approximately $485 billion USD
Among thesepetrochemical industries were about $52 billion USD
and the high-tech electronic industry was worth $119 billion USD
Therefore the output value of the chemical-process industries was
more than one-third of all manufacturing industries in Taiwan If
these accidents continue to occur they will damage the local
economy and adversely affect the international reputation of
Taiwan (Chen Wu Wang amp Shu2008LinTseng Wu amp Shu 2008
Tseng Liu Chang Su amp Shu 2008)
Countries all over the world have their own ways of preventingand coping with the serious detrimental effects resulting from
chemical disasters For instance in 1992 the OSHA of the USA
promulgated the Process Safety Management standards for
manufacturing highly hazardous chemicals to regulate companies
that handle large quantities of dangerous chemicals In Taiwan the
Labor Inspection Law was launched in 1993 of which Articles 26
and 38 state that dangerous workplaces of petrochemical indus-
tries including sites of manufacturing handling and use of
dangerous or hazardous materials and sites for manufacturing
agricultural chemicals should be approved or inspected by the
labor inspection authority It is expected that the establishment of
safety management systems in dangerous workplaces will help
identify and correct de1047297ciencies in the application of safety tech-
niques However there is no single management system that can beused to totally eliminate the risk of all accidents (Beatriz Manuel amp
Camilo 2007 Crowl amp Elwell 2004)
In the last two decades there have been various scales of
chemical disasters occurring in the chemical-process industries in
Taiwan Accordingly we considered and investigated the current
status of loss prevention in the petrochemical and chemical-
process industries in Taiwan
2 Current status of loss prevention in the petrochemical
industries in Taiwan
In chemical plants except for several well-known foreign
companies (egE I du Pont de Nemours and CompanyBASF andthe
DowChemical Company) and large domestic companies (eg Taiwan
Fig 1 The Fu Guo Chemical Company 1047297re and explosion of 2001 (Kao amp Hu 2002 The Center of Environmental Safety 2001 )
C-C Chen et al Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 23 (2010) 531e538532
8202019 HSE - Loss Prevention in the Petrochemical and Chemical-process High-tech Industries in Taiwan
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullhse-loss-prevention-in-the-petrochemical-and-chemical-process-high-tech-industries 38
Fig 2 The Advanced Semiconductor Engineering Inc 1047297re of 2005 (The Epoch Times 2005)
Fig 3 The Nanpao Resin Company explosion in January 2010 ( The Epoch Times 2010)
C-C Chen et al Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 23 (2010) 531e538 533
8202019 HSE - Loss Prevention in the Petrochemical and Chemical-process High-tech Industries in Taiwan
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullhse-loss-prevention-in-the-petrochemical-and-chemical-process-high-tech-industries 48
Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC) United Microelec-
tronics Corporation (UMC) China Petroleum Corporation (CPC)
Formosa Plastic Co (FPC) and AU Optronics (AUO) Corp) that have
established comprehensive safety systems the medium and small
indigenous chemical 1047297rms in Taiwan are still administered in tradi-
tional ways Although the manufacturing process is fast and the
product quality is well maintained safety issues are often neglected
or are lacking for a variety of reasons (Guidelines for Hazard
Evaluation Procedures 2008)
The CLA the authority of industrial and occupational safety in
Taiwan investigated labor safety and health counseling with
medium and small chemical plants from 2004 to 2006 In total 190
plants participated in this project which was categorized based on
the following safety issues
21 Process safety information
Most plants had basic protocols on accidents when they were
originally established However about half never updated the
information or reevaluated the potential hazards when process
parameters equipment or raw materials were altered This led to
two consequences
a Due to neglecting the safety issues associated with new tech-
niques and new reagents or insuf 1047297cient safety equipment in
plants and to a lack of professional analysis to completely
ascertain the risk during the process poor operation control or
improper storage was possible
b Although the equipment may have been regularly replaced the
piping and instrumentation diagrams (PampIDs) were not revised
on a regular basis This situation led to unforeseen risks for the
personnel engaged in the maintenance of equipment due to the
unknown equipment conditions
New knowledge from external safety information such as
recently launched laws and regulations emerging safety tech-
nology and updated chemical information among others has been
rapidly conveyed to each company through various means like
seminars assistance counseling and inspection because authori-
ties now pay much more attention to chemical hazards This
external safety information is accepted by most companies but the
practical act of carrying out the required actions varies depending
on the human resources and level of safety awareness in the plants
22 Process hazard analysis
Most medium and small companies considered the processhazard analysis as preliminary hazardrecognition Therefore safety
management emphasized the safety equipment in coping with
speci1047297c hazards Only a few companies systematically analyzed the
operating steps and safety procedures such as sequence 1047298ow
pressure temperature composition and facility breakdown for
accident prevention
Older plants unlike newer ones have not updated safety
requirements and lack subsidiary safety devices for temperature and
pressure control or monitoring devices to prevent overheating and
alarm devices to monitor maintain and control plant safety If the
systems have not experienced an accident for a long time they may
believe their plants are safe and that there is no problem with the
facility or the safety management system in place This complacency
is how many out of control accidents happen Therefore it isimportant to carry out systematic process safety analyses like
a hazard and operability study (HAZOP) or failure modes and effects
analysis (FMEA) to study how to protect the operating unit from
accidents with the current equipment (Bernatik amp Libisova 2004)
23 Operating procedures
Eighty percent of the plants have already formulated complete
standard operating procedures (SOPs) for their major processes
However in most cases they are not properly carried out The SOPs
for safety issues are usually only a formality for real tasks and are
not routinely updated in many plants Operators often perform
their assignments based on experience so that the SOPs are
different from real operating procedures Consequently newoperators or apprentices are often confused and this creates hidden
hazards (Meel et al 2007)
24 Management of process change
Management of process change is often the most neglected
aspect of process safety management in plants In Taiwan pro-
cessing research and development is of a high standard which
means that the process parameters and raw materials are contin-
uously tested and modi1047297ed in plants In addition unregulated
pipelines and devices are often replaced by established methods
but some management of process changes have not been
established
0
10
20
30
40
50
6
31
18
36
11
47
25
42
2006 200720052004
N u m b e r s o f f i r e a n
d e x p l o s i o n a c c i d e n t s
Year
All manufacturing sectors
Chemical process industries
Fig 4 Proportion of 1047297re and explosion disasters in chemical-process industries in
Taiwan between 2004 and 2007 (The annual reports on labor inspection 2004 2005
2006 amp 2007)
0
40
80
120
160
200
N u m b e r s o f h a r m f u l s u b s t a n c e s c o n t a
c t d i s a s t e r s
105
160
152
197
97
131
65
117
2006 200720052004
Year
All manufacturing sectors
Chemical process industries
Fig 5 Proportion of the harmful substance contact disasters in chemical-process
industries in Taiwan between 2004 and 2007 (The annual reports on labor inspection
2004 2005 2006 amp 2007)
C-C Chen et al Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 23 (2010) 531e538534
8202019 HSE - Loss Prevention in the Petrochemical and Chemical-process High-tech Industries in Taiwan
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullhse-loss-prevention-in-the-petrochemical-and-chemical-process-high-tech-industries 58
25 Training
Plants with potential risks and chemical hazards should plan
necessary staff training in basic safety knowledge The necessary
safety knowledge differs depending upon the characteristics of the
plant However all personnel must be well trained to understand
the hazardous character of the chemicals being used and the basic
concepts of preventing disasters and emergency response
According to our investigation over 60 percent of the training
done in chemical-process plants that have taken part in the assis-
tance project was disquali1047297ed This was because of less-than-
capable trainers the incorrectness of the training courses long
intervals between training sessions the lack of approval and testing
of trainees and the use of workers without proper training The
most common mistakes that could be averted by proper training
are unintentionally misusing protection equipment unknowingly
using non-1047298ameproof tools in a classi1047297ed 1047298ameproof area and
storing incompatible chemicals in the same location
26 Contractor management
Although most plants have some system for managing
contractors hazard awareness in satellite-af 1047297liated organizations isnot normally well managed The basic reason for contractor
management regulations is that the safety systems are not well
executed in over 50 percent of the plants An example of this would
be not conforming to speci1047297c regulations in the use of hot work
permits or the failure to use 1047298ameproof tools Therefore high risks
associated with improper contractor management are inevitable
27 Incident investigation
Incident investigation is very important for all levels of industry
According to the accident iceberg theory for each severe accident
many near misses and minor incidents with similar causes occur
The level of accident severity in small and medium chemical plants
is higher than in many other industries but the implementation of incident investigation in small and medium chemical plants is
typically inferior to other sectors Investigations were carried out
completely in only 56 percent of chemical plants involved in the
study To prevent severe accidents from happening again incident
investigations should be strengthened in plants in the process
industries (Basso et al 2004)
28 Hot work permit
Hot work permits have received much attention in chemical
plants that have a high risk for 1047297re andor chemical release Despite
this attention it has been shown that 8 percent of chemical plants
never controlled hot work whereas only 60 percent controlled it
completely Hot work was not governed completely in theremaining approximately 30 percent probably due to lack of
awareness of ignition sources such as uncontrolled vehicles
29 Mechanical integrity
The number of accidents that occur due to equipment break-
down or wear has increased yearly since 1994 This reveals that
due to lack of appropriate maintenance and repairs the equipment
is gradually deteriorating in manufacturing plants The common
mistakes are electrical equipment deterioration 1047298ameproof
equipment having lost its protection pipelines being broken safety
equipment being broken or malfunctioning safety relief valves not
functioning properly and maintenance records and documents
being neither veri1047297
ed nor current Although the authorities audit
and check these plants the 1047297xes are delayed to try to get the work
done hurriedly in order to make a pro1047297t This is a common
phenomenon in the small and medium chemical plants studied
Fig 6 is a radar chart that presents the proportion of the process
safety management implementations carried out by small and
medium chemical plants that joined this assistance project
3 Current status of loss prevention in chemical-process
high-tech plants in Taiwan
The chemical-process high-tech industry such as semi-
conductor TFT-LCD LED and photovoltaic fabrication is the
dominant economic lifeline in Taiwan Because the processes are
complicated and many of the chemicals used are toxic highly
1047298ammable or explosive (Tables 1e3 show the characteristics of
common chemicals and specialty gases in the high-tech industry)
high-tech manufacturing buildings are all built to the highest
standards of safety Moreover the newest regulations and safety
management methods are introduced to avoid accident occurrence
(Hirano 2004 Reyes amp Beard 2008) Yet even though the high-
tech industry has been developing for nearly three decades inci-
dent information and experience is lacking (Rotaru et al 2008)
Although every plant apparently has faultless safetyequipment andsafety management toxic gas and chemical leaks or 1047297re accidents
frequently occur in Taiwan The current status of loss prevention
programs in high-tech plants in Taiwan is described as follows
31 Process safety information
Due to suf 1047297cient human resources and complete safety systems
in high-tech plants the process safety information seems abun-
dant complete and impeccable All information such as material
safety data sheets (MSDS) equipment information and PampIDs is
intact and updated periodically However this new industry uses
a variety of toxic and exotic chemicals Therefore many chemical
characteristics are unknown or occasionally intentionally ignored
bringing imminent danger or long-term health threats to the workenvironment (Rigas Konstandinidou Centola amp Reggio 2003)
32 Process hazard analysis
Most high-tech plant buildings fall within the de1047297nition of
a dangerous workplace Because they use many kinds and large
Fig 6 Proportion of the implementations of the process safety management regula-
tions carried out by small- and medium-sized chemical plants in Taiwan (Chen Lin
Wu amp Shu 2006)
C-C Chen et al Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 23 (2010) 531e538 535
8202019 HSE - Loss Prevention in the Petrochemical and Chemical-process High-tech Industries in Taiwan
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullhse-loss-prevention-in-the-petrochemical-and-chemical-process-high-tech-industries 68
quantities of chemicals they must follow the regulations mandated
by the CLA in Taiwan to assess the process safety for a dangerous
workplace However these assessments are only for restricted
chemical processes and equipment so the regulations do not
encompass the entire process
Furthermore most of the high-tech plant buildings have
established occupational health and safety assessment systems
(OHSAS 18001) and they obey the requirement to carry out peri-
odic risk assessment The depth and width of the risk assessmenthowever depends on the experience and ability of the assessment
staff Moreover according to the trends of the high-tech industry in
Taiwan incident and minor loss information is treated as con1047297-
dential making accessing and learning from it very dif 1047297cult for
anyone in other plants
Proprietary processes and operating procedures are complex
and loss prevention information is exclusively shared within high-
tech plants so it is very important for the staff at a particular plant
to have the ability to conduct their own independent risk assess-
ment The hidden hazardthat failsto be identi1047297ed is always the key
to a subsequent accident (Suardin Mannan amp Halwagi 2007)
33 Operating procedures
To meet the request of international organizations for stan-
dardization (ISO) high-tech plants have all established required
SOPs However because the equipment is so precise and intricate
and the procedures are so minute and complex it is dif 1047297cult to
encompass all the safety procedures in the SOP Besides operators
do not always follow the guidelines and the SOPs are not always
suitable for their processes points which are usually ignored
leading to accidents in these plants
34 Management of change (MOC)
Parameters and processes for equipment maintenance are
changed frequently and procedures for MOC are not always
elaborated on in high-tech plants Therefore industrial safetystaff does not always know of the changes to the usual process
parameters Because the alterations are often too frequent and
complicated to be recorded it is not clearly de1047297ned what should
be announced or accessed for the hazard More than half of all
1047297re and chemical release accidents occur because the MOCs are
not well implemented
35 Emergency planning and response
The emergency response plan in high-tech plants is usually
developed for ideal conditions If a large-scale accident occurs it
becomes dif 1047297cult to address by the procedures and organization inthe emergency response plan Because the occurrence and evolu-
tion of an accident cannot be predicted the emergency response
plan should not put emphasis on the response 1047298ow but on the
principles of treatment of the victims of a disaster of evacuation of
the requirements for shutting down the gasliquid supply and of
the requirements for transferring the command in a timely manner
By instituting and training employees on well-developed plans
fatal accidents due to mistakes made by the staff during an emer-
gency response can be avoided One example of this type of acci-
dent was the 1047297re that resulted from a silane cylinder leak that
happened at one photovoltaic fabrication plant in Taiwan
36 Employee participation
Practically there may be up to a thousand employees in a single
high-tech plant and they likely have an educational background
that is higher than those in other industrial sectors Having
employees participate in safety work or risk-reducing safety
measures depends on the safety awareness of senior managers and
organizations (Shaluf Ahmadun amp Shariff 2003)
Whether or not the organization or upper management places
a strong emphasis on safety can often be discovered by checking
the relationship between plant production and the annual plans in
the plants The high-tech industry has a market cycle When plants
are operating at full capacity many shorten the duration of annual
shutdowns or prolong the period between shutdowns to catch up
with orders and all employees participate in the work to increase
production All of these circumstances can result in accidents
37 Training
High-tech plants should follow sound training protocols with
extraordinary diligence However because of the nature of the
high-tech profession some problems might occur such as
whether an instructor is competent whether teaching materials
are adequate and whether employees follow the program to
receive the training One common fault is that the training which
is supposed to be done by a knowledgeable engineer is instead
done by an apprentice or inexperienced engineer because the
advanced employee cannot leave their position for too long It is
dif 1047297cult to estimate the damage caused by these insuf 1047297ciently
trained personnel
Table 1
Characteristics of common corrosive chemicals utilized in high-tech companies
(Urban 2006)
Material Application TLV-TWA IDLH
HCl Etching 5 ppm e
H3PO4 Etching 1 mgm3 100 ppm
H2SO4 Etching 1 mgm3 80 ppm mgm3
HF Etching 3 ppm 20 ppm
HNO3 Etching 2 ppm 100 ppmTMAH Photo e e
TLV-TWA threshold limit valueetime weighted average
IDLH immediately dangerous to life and health
TMAH tetramethylammonium hydroxide
Table 2
Characteristics of common solvents used in high-tech companies (Pohanish amp
Greene 2003 Urban 2006)
Material Application TLV-TWA IDLH Explosive limits
Ac eton e Phot oet chi ng 750 ppm 20000 ppm 25e128
IPA Photoetching 400 ppm 20000 ppm 2e12
HMDS Photo e e 07e31
Photoresist Photo e e e
IPA isopropyl alcohol
HMDS hexamethyldisiloxane
Table 3
Characteristics of common specialty gases used in high-tech companies (Carson amp
Mumford 1995 Urban 2006)
Material Application TLV-TWA IDLH Explosive limits
AsH3 Implant 005 ppm 6 ppm 45e78
BF3 Implant 1 ppm 100 ppm e
B2H6 Deposition 01 ppm 40 ppm 08e88
SiCl2H2 Dif fusion 05 ppm e 41e99
PH3 Implant 03 ppm 200 ppm 16e
98BCl3 Implant e e e
SiH4 Depositio n 5 ppm e 14e96
SF6 Etching 1000 ppm e e
NF3 Etching 10 ppm 2000 ppm e
C-C Chen et al Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 23 (2010) 531e538536
8202019 HSE - Loss Prevention in the Petrochemical and Chemical-process High-tech Industries in Taiwan
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullhse-loss-prevention-in-the-petrochemical-and-chemical-process-high-tech-industries 78
38 Contractor management
Generally speaking the majority of high-tech companies in
Taiwan have good contractor management systems in which
various methods are employed to carefully screen contractors in
advance Nevertheless some serious accidents including 1047297re and
leakage have still occurred in high-tech companies due to reckless
operation by contractors For example an arsine leak in one plant
caused many operators to be hospitalized a silane leak in another
plant led to a con1047298agration and a 1047297lling error of water treatment
reagents resulted in a chlorine leak
39 Incident investigation
Incident investigations in high-tech plants are performed
cautiously and con1047297dentially Information regarding incident
investigations is closed not only between one business and
another but also between subsidiary companies in the same
business group The industrial safety staff often encounter the
problems of important questions being evaded and intentional
concealment when they investigate an incident or false alarm In
the case of an evacuation caused by a false 1047297re alarm althoughthe engineering department knew the whole story they were
unwilling or reluctant to share the true details which make
incident investigation dif 1047297cult However if a serious accident
occurred the regional labor safety department from CLA would
initiate a thorough investigation seeking out the root cause and
proposing prevention measures for future operation
310 Compliance audits
Each high-tech company has its own audit system for safety
management The industrial safety staff usually perform the
primary audit whereas a department manager generally does the
secondary audit The auditorrsquos experience and ability affectswhether a violation of a safety regulation or potential hazard can
be identi1047297ed However a high-tech company is comprised of
many different technologies and departments so most industrial
safety staff audits only the technology in which they specialize
The safety audits mostly focus on super1047297cial mistakes therefore
many serious mistakes such as equipment safety protections
being illegally bypassed are often not discovered
311 Pre-startup safety review
The equipment in high-tech companies usually goes through
a pre-startup safety inspection before being put into of 1047297cial regular
production The inspected items include supply systems safetymonitoring equipment pipelines vent systems and emergency
shutdowns However some plants still put the equipment into
production without a pre-startup safety inspection due to urgent
production demands
312 Hot work permit
A hot work permit receives signi1047297cant attention in high-tech
companies so very few plants have accidents because of poor
management of hot work permits These hot work permits however
should be expanded to 1047297re control (ie any chemicals that might
cause a 1047297re should be kept away from a 1047297re or external thermal
source)
313 Mechanical integrity
Unlike petrochemical plants general maintenance in high-tech
companies is conducted quite well and thus accidents are seldom
caused by equipment aging and pipeline corrosion
4 Conclusions
Most of the plants in the chemical industries that are small or
medium scale require counseling and assistance to effectively
improve loss prevention (Fig 6) The labor commission will be able
to provide personalizedassistance based on the actual conditions of
each plant if it categorizes and classi1047297es the data accumulated from
the 190 plants that accepted counseling and assistance For
example plants with suf 1047297cient manpower budget and certain
levels of safety management can be provided with thorough
assistance regarding safety management However those having
inferior safety management should be offered extraordinary
assistance on key subjects so that they can obtain the correct
knowledge and develop experience to further avoid serious risks
The best effect will be achieved if the plants are guided and assisted
on the basis of their individual needs
In Taiwan the hazards and risks of high-tech companies are
higher than in other industrial sectors Therefore a variety of safety
management methods and regulations appropriate for high-tech
companies have been generated and implemented However it
is crucial for managers and industrial safety specialists to think
carefully about how to completely identify understand and control
potential hazards associated with the manufacturing processes
Furthermore they need to determine and address uncertainties
that arise from any operational errors or incidents across the whole
range of stages in manufacturing
Acknowledgments
The authors are deeply grateful to Mr A MJaneshek of The Dow
Chemical Co Freeport Texas USA for his valuable assistance and
suggestions
References
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Beatriz F M Manuel M P amp Camilo V O (2007) Safety management systemdevelopment and validation of a multidimensional scale Journal of LossPrevention in the Process Industries 20 52e68
Bernatik A amp Libisova M (2004) Loss prevention in heavy industry risk assess-ment of large gasholders Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 17 271e278
Carson P Aamp MumfordC J (1995) Thesafehandlingof chemicalsin industry(2nded)New York USA Longman Scienti1047297c amp Technical
Chang M K Chang R R Shu C M amp Lin K N (2005) Application of risk basedinspection in re1047297nery and processing piping Journal of Loss Prevention in theProcess Industries 18 397e402
Chen C C Lin S Y Wu S H amp Shu C M (2006) Precautions against chemicalaccident in small and medium plant in Taiwan In The 18th annual conference for Chinese Institute of Environmental Engineering (pp 667) Taichung Taiwan ROCTunghai University
Chen K Y Wu S H Wang Y W amp Shu C M (2008) Runaway reaction andthermal hazards simulation of cumene hydroperoxide by DSC Journal of LossPrevention in the Process Industries 21 101e109
Crowl A amp Elwell I (2004) Identifying criteria to classify chemical mixtures ashighly hazardous due to chemical reactivity Journal of Loss Prevention in theProcess Industries 17 279e289
Guidelines for hazard evaluation procedures (2008) The American Institute of Chemical Engineers (3rd ed) New Jersey USA John Wiley amp Sons
Hirano T T (2004) Accidental explosions of semiconductor manufacturing gases in Japan Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 17 29e34
Kao C S amp Hu K H (2002) Acrylic reactor runaway and explosion accident
analysis Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 15 213e
222
C-C Chen et al Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 23 (2010) 531e538 537
8202019 HSE - Loss Prevention in the Petrochemical and Chemical-process High-tech Industries in Taiwan
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullhse-loss-prevention-in-the-petrochemical-and-chemical-process-high-tech-industries 88
Lin Y F Tseng J M Wu T C amp Shu C M (2008) Effects of acetone on methyl ethylketone peroxide runaway reaction Journalof Hazardous Materials 153 1071e1077
Meel A OrsquoNeill L Levin J Seider W Oktem U amp Keren N (2007) Operationalrisk assessment of chemical industries by exploiting accident databases Journalof Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 20 113e127
Muniz B Peon J amp Ordas C (2007) Safety management system developmentand validation of a multidimensional scale Journal of Loss Prevention in theProcess Industries 20 52e68
PohanishR Pamp Greene SA (2003)Wileyguide to chemical incompatibilities(2nded)New York USA John Wiley and Sons
Reyes J amp Beard N (2008) A systematic approach to managing safety Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 21 15e28
Rigas F Konstandinidou M Centola P amp Reggio G T (2003) Safety analysis andrisk assessment in a new pesticide production line Journal of Loss Prevention inthe Process Industries 16 103e109
Rotaru A Constantinescu C Rotaru P Moan A Dumitru M Socaciu M et al(2008) Thermal analysis and thin 1047297lms deposition by matrix-assisted pulsedlaser evaporation of a 4cn type azomonoether Journal of Thermal Analysis andCalorimetry 92 279e284
Shaluf M Ahmadun F amp Shariff A (2003) Technological disaster factors Journalof Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 16 513e521
Suardin J Mannan M amp Halwagi M (2007) The integration of Dow rsquos 1047297re andexplosion index (FampEI) into process design and optimization to achieve
inherently safer design Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 20 79e90
Taipei Times (2005) ASE issues positive outlook in wake of Chungli factory 1047297rehttpwwwtaipeitimescomNews
The annual reports on labor inspection (2004 2005 2006 amp 2007) Council of LaborAffairs Executive Yuan Taipei Taiwan ROC
The Center of Environmental Safety (2001) The explosion of Fu Guo ChemicalCompany httpwwwtsintedutwadminssafetyE5B7A5E5AE89E58DB1E5AEB3danger-1-1htm
The China Post (2005) ASE assesses damage caused by 1047297re at Chungli plant http
wwwchinapostcomtwbusiness2005050361901ASE-assesseshtm TheEpochTimes (2005) Aninvestigation of 1047297re accident of Advanced Semiconductor
Engineering Inc httpwwwepochtimescomb5551n907054htmThe Epoch Times (2010) The Nanpao Resin Company explosion on January 08
2010 httpepochtimescomb51019n2780991htmTseng J M Liu M Y Chang R H Su J L amp Shu C M (2008) Emergency response
plan of chlorine gas for process plants in Taiwan Journal of Loss Prevention in theProcess Industries 21 393e399
Urban P G (2006) (7th ed)Bretherickrsquo s handbook of reactive chemical hazards Vols1e 2 Burlington USA Academic Press
Wu S H Shyu M L Yet-Pole I Chi J H amp Shu C M (2009) Evaluation of runaway reaction for dicumyl peroxide in a batch reactor by DSC and VSP2
Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 22 721e727
C-C Chen et al Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 23 (2010) 531e538538
8202019 HSE - Loss Prevention in the Petrochemical and Chemical-process High-tech Industries in Taiwan
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullhse-loss-prevention-in-the-petrochemical-and-chemical-process-high-tech-industries 28
this may have resulted in remunerative compensation or even the
causation of clients shifting orders to ASErsquos competitors In
summary the damages were anticipated to reach $320 USDmillion
which is a huge loss for any company to take (Taipei Times 2005
The China Post 2005 The Epoch Times 2005)
The third example happened on January 8 2010 In this case
a huge blast with a mushroom cloud occurred at 248 pm at the
Nanpao Resin Co The 1047297re after a couple of explosions was not
extinguished until the following dawn (see Fig 3) Roughly4298 m2 of production and warehouse space was subsequently
destroyed Additionally Taiwan Steel amp Iron Co its neighbor was
partly damaged The accident took place at the cumene oxidation
tower in which a 1047298uid leak was identi1047297ed in the broken recycling
line A lack of a buffer zone at the bottom of the recycling line
resulted in the leaking followed by an unidenti1047297ed ignition source
The 1047297rm is one of the major producers for cumene hydroperoxide
(CHP) and dicumyl peroxide (DCP) in Taiwan Because of the severe
damage the plant was shut down fenced off and dismantled
The various indirect losses from these accidents are inestimable
including equipment repairs delay in plant re-commissioning loss
of market share and increases in insurance costs (Muniz Peon amp
Ordas 2007)
According to the annual reports of occupational disasters pub-lished by the Council of Labor Affairs (CLA) Executive Yuan Taiwan
the industries that have greater opportunities of having a chemical
disaster or accident are involved in the manufacturing of chemical
products or chemical materials are high-tech electronic industries
(semiconductors TFT-LCD and printed circuit board-related
sectors) and participate in the manufacturing and repair of elec-
trical and electronic machinery These three types of industries are
classi1047297ed as chemical-process industry In Figs 4 and 5 the data
collected from 2004 to 2007 show that 60 out of 156 1047297re and
explosion accidents and 419 out of 605 harmful substance contact
disasters occurred in these industries
As far as economic development is concerned these industries
are key sectors in Taiwan In 2007 the output value of all
manufacturing in Taiwan was approximately $485 billion USD
Among thesepetrochemical industries were about $52 billion USD
and the high-tech electronic industry was worth $119 billion USD
Therefore the output value of the chemical-process industries was
more than one-third of all manufacturing industries in Taiwan If
these accidents continue to occur they will damage the local
economy and adversely affect the international reputation of
Taiwan (Chen Wu Wang amp Shu2008LinTseng Wu amp Shu 2008
Tseng Liu Chang Su amp Shu 2008)
Countries all over the world have their own ways of preventingand coping with the serious detrimental effects resulting from
chemical disasters For instance in 1992 the OSHA of the USA
promulgated the Process Safety Management standards for
manufacturing highly hazardous chemicals to regulate companies
that handle large quantities of dangerous chemicals In Taiwan the
Labor Inspection Law was launched in 1993 of which Articles 26
and 38 state that dangerous workplaces of petrochemical indus-
tries including sites of manufacturing handling and use of
dangerous or hazardous materials and sites for manufacturing
agricultural chemicals should be approved or inspected by the
labor inspection authority It is expected that the establishment of
safety management systems in dangerous workplaces will help
identify and correct de1047297ciencies in the application of safety tech-
niques However there is no single management system that can beused to totally eliminate the risk of all accidents (Beatriz Manuel amp
Camilo 2007 Crowl amp Elwell 2004)
In the last two decades there have been various scales of
chemical disasters occurring in the chemical-process industries in
Taiwan Accordingly we considered and investigated the current
status of loss prevention in the petrochemical and chemical-
process industries in Taiwan
2 Current status of loss prevention in the petrochemical
industries in Taiwan
In chemical plants except for several well-known foreign
companies (egE I du Pont de Nemours and CompanyBASF andthe
DowChemical Company) and large domestic companies (eg Taiwan
Fig 1 The Fu Guo Chemical Company 1047297re and explosion of 2001 (Kao amp Hu 2002 The Center of Environmental Safety 2001 )
C-C Chen et al Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 23 (2010) 531e538532
8202019 HSE - Loss Prevention in the Petrochemical and Chemical-process High-tech Industries in Taiwan
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullhse-loss-prevention-in-the-petrochemical-and-chemical-process-high-tech-industries 38
Fig 2 The Advanced Semiconductor Engineering Inc 1047297re of 2005 (The Epoch Times 2005)
Fig 3 The Nanpao Resin Company explosion in January 2010 ( The Epoch Times 2010)
C-C Chen et al Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 23 (2010) 531e538 533
8202019 HSE - Loss Prevention in the Petrochemical and Chemical-process High-tech Industries in Taiwan
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullhse-loss-prevention-in-the-petrochemical-and-chemical-process-high-tech-industries 48
Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC) United Microelec-
tronics Corporation (UMC) China Petroleum Corporation (CPC)
Formosa Plastic Co (FPC) and AU Optronics (AUO) Corp) that have
established comprehensive safety systems the medium and small
indigenous chemical 1047297rms in Taiwan are still administered in tradi-
tional ways Although the manufacturing process is fast and the
product quality is well maintained safety issues are often neglected
or are lacking for a variety of reasons (Guidelines for Hazard
Evaluation Procedures 2008)
The CLA the authority of industrial and occupational safety in
Taiwan investigated labor safety and health counseling with
medium and small chemical plants from 2004 to 2006 In total 190
plants participated in this project which was categorized based on
the following safety issues
21 Process safety information
Most plants had basic protocols on accidents when they were
originally established However about half never updated the
information or reevaluated the potential hazards when process
parameters equipment or raw materials were altered This led to
two consequences
a Due to neglecting the safety issues associated with new tech-
niques and new reagents or insuf 1047297cient safety equipment in
plants and to a lack of professional analysis to completely
ascertain the risk during the process poor operation control or
improper storage was possible
b Although the equipment may have been regularly replaced the
piping and instrumentation diagrams (PampIDs) were not revised
on a regular basis This situation led to unforeseen risks for the
personnel engaged in the maintenance of equipment due to the
unknown equipment conditions
New knowledge from external safety information such as
recently launched laws and regulations emerging safety tech-
nology and updated chemical information among others has been
rapidly conveyed to each company through various means like
seminars assistance counseling and inspection because authori-
ties now pay much more attention to chemical hazards This
external safety information is accepted by most companies but the
practical act of carrying out the required actions varies depending
on the human resources and level of safety awareness in the plants
22 Process hazard analysis
Most medium and small companies considered the processhazard analysis as preliminary hazardrecognition Therefore safety
management emphasized the safety equipment in coping with
speci1047297c hazards Only a few companies systematically analyzed the
operating steps and safety procedures such as sequence 1047298ow
pressure temperature composition and facility breakdown for
accident prevention
Older plants unlike newer ones have not updated safety
requirements and lack subsidiary safety devices for temperature and
pressure control or monitoring devices to prevent overheating and
alarm devices to monitor maintain and control plant safety If the
systems have not experienced an accident for a long time they may
believe their plants are safe and that there is no problem with the
facility or the safety management system in place This complacency
is how many out of control accidents happen Therefore it isimportant to carry out systematic process safety analyses like
a hazard and operability study (HAZOP) or failure modes and effects
analysis (FMEA) to study how to protect the operating unit from
accidents with the current equipment (Bernatik amp Libisova 2004)
23 Operating procedures
Eighty percent of the plants have already formulated complete
standard operating procedures (SOPs) for their major processes
However in most cases they are not properly carried out The SOPs
for safety issues are usually only a formality for real tasks and are
not routinely updated in many plants Operators often perform
their assignments based on experience so that the SOPs are
different from real operating procedures Consequently newoperators or apprentices are often confused and this creates hidden
hazards (Meel et al 2007)
24 Management of process change
Management of process change is often the most neglected
aspect of process safety management in plants In Taiwan pro-
cessing research and development is of a high standard which
means that the process parameters and raw materials are contin-
uously tested and modi1047297ed in plants In addition unregulated
pipelines and devices are often replaced by established methods
but some management of process changes have not been
established
0
10
20
30
40
50
6
31
18
36
11
47
25
42
2006 200720052004
N u m b e r s o f f i r e a n
d e x p l o s i o n a c c i d e n t s
Year
All manufacturing sectors
Chemical process industries
Fig 4 Proportion of 1047297re and explosion disasters in chemical-process industries in
Taiwan between 2004 and 2007 (The annual reports on labor inspection 2004 2005
2006 amp 2007)
0
40
80
120
160
200
N u m b e r s o f h a r m f u l s u b s t a n c e s c o n t a
c t d i s a s t e r s
105
160
152
197
97
131
65
117
2006 200720052004
Year
All manufacturing sectors
Chemical process industries
Fig 5 Proportion of the harmful substance contact disasters in chemical-process
industries in Taiwan between 2004 and 2007 (The annual reports on labor inspection
2004 2005 2006 amp 2007)
C-C Chen et al Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 23 (2010) 531e538534
8202019 HSE - Loss Prevention in the Petrochemical and Chemical-process High-tech Industries in Taiwan
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullhse-loss-prevention-in-the-petrochemical-and-chemical-process-high-tech-industries 58
25 Training
Plants with potential risks and chemical hazards should plan
necessary staff training in basic safety knowledge The necessary
safety knowledge differs depending upon the characteristics of the
plant However all personnel must be well trained to understand
the hazardous character of the chemicals being used and the basic
concepts of preventing disasters and emergency response
According to our investigation over 60 percent of the training
done in chemical-process plants that have taken part in the assis-
tance project was disquali1047297ed This was because of less-than-
capable trainers the incorrectness of the training courses long
intervals between training sessions the lack of approval and testing
of trainees and the use of workers without proper training The
most common mistakes that could be averted by proper training
are unintentionally misusing protection equipment unknowingly
using non-1047298ameproof tools in a classi1047297ed 1047298ameproof area and
storing incompatible chemicals in the same location
26 Contractor management
Although most plants have some system for managing
contractors hazard awareness in satellite-af 1047297liated organizations isnot normally well managed The basic reason for contractor
management regulations is that the safety systems are not well
executed in over 50 percent of the plants An example of this would
be not conforming to speci1047297c regulations in the use of hot work
permits or the failure to use 1047298ameproof tools Therefore high risks
associated with improper contractor management are inevitable
27 Incident investigation
Incident investigation is very important for all levels of industry
According to the accident iceberg theory for each severe accident
many near misses and minor incidents with similar causes occur
The level of accident severity in small and medium chemical plants
is higher than in many other industries but the implementation of incident investigation in small and medium chemical plants is
typically inferior to other sectors Investigations were carried out
completely in only 56 percent of chemical plants involved in the
study To prevent severe accidents from happening again incident
investigations should be strengthened in plants in the process
industries (Basso et al 2004)
28 Hot work permit
Hot work permits have received much attention in chemical
plants that have a high risk for 1047297re andor chemical release Despite
this attention it has been shown that 8 percent of chemical plants
never controlled hot work whereas only 60 percent controlled it
completely Hot work was not governed completely in theremaining approximately 30 percent probably due to lack of
awareness of ignition sources such as uncontrolled vehicles
29 Mechanical integrity
The number of accidents that occur due to equipment break-
down or wear has increased yearly since 1994 This reveals that
due to lack of appropriate maintenance and repairs the equipment
is gradually deteriorating in manufacturing plants The common
mistakes are electrical equipment deterioration 1047298ameproof
equipment having lost its protection pipelines being broken safety
equipment being broken or malfunctioning safety relief valves not
functioning properly and maintenance records and documents
being neither veri1047297
ed nor current Although the authorities audit
and check these plants the 1047297xes are delayed to try to get the work
done hurriedly in order to make a pro1047297t This is a common
phenomenon in the small and medium chemical plants studied
Fig 6 is a radar chart that presents the proportion of the process
safety management implementations carried out by small and
medium chemical plants that joined this assistance project
3 Current status of loss prevention in chemical-process
high-tech plants in Taiwan
The chemical-process high-tech industry such as semi-
conductor TFT-LCD LED and photovoltaic fabrication is the
dominant economic lifeline in Taiwan Because the processes are
complicated and many of the chemicals used are toxic highly
1047298ammable or explosive (Tables 1e3 show the characteristics of
common chemicals and specialty gases in the high-tech industry)
high-tech manufacturing buildings are all built to the highest
standards of safety Moreover the newest regulations and safety
management methods are introduced to avoid accident occurrence
(Hirano 2004 Reyes amp Beard 2008) Yet even though the high-
tech industry has been developing for nearly three decades inci-
dent information and experience is lacking (Rotaru et al 2008)
Although every plant apparently has faultless safetyequipment andsafety management toxic gas and chemical leaks or 1047297re accidents
frequently occur in Taiwan The current status of loss prevention
programs in high-tech plants in Taiwan is described as follows
31 Process safety information
Due to suf 1047297cient human resources and complete safety systems
in high-tech plants the process safety information seems abun-
dant complete and impeccable All information such as material
safety data sheets (MSDS) equipment information and PampIDs is
intact and updated periodically However this new industry uses
a variety of toxic and exotic chemicals Therefore many chemical
characteristics are unknown or occasionally intentionally ignored
bringing imminent danger or long-term health threats to the workenvironment (Rigas Konstandinidou Centola amp Reggio 2003)
32 Process hazard analysis
Most high-tech plant buildings fall within the de1047297nition of
a dangerous workplace Because they use many kinds and large
Fig 6 Proportion of the implementations of the process safety management regula-
tions carried out by small- and medium-sized chemical plants in Taiwan (Chen Lin
Wu amp Shu 2006)
C-C Chen et al Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 23 (2010) 531e538 535
8202019 HSE - Loss Prevention in the Petrochemical and Chemical-process High-tech Industries in Taiwan
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullhse-loss-prevention-in-the-petrochemical-and-chemical-process-high-tech-industries 68
quantities of chemicals they must follow the regulations mandated
by the CLA in Taiwan to assess the process safety for a dangerous
workplace However these assessments are only for restricted
chemical processes and equipment so the regulations do not
encompass the entire process
Furthermore most of the high-tech plant buildings have
established occupational health and safety assessment systems
(OHSAS 18001) and they obey the requirement to carry out peri-
odic risk assessment The depth and width of the risk assessmenthowever depends on the experience and ability of the assessment
staff Moreover according to the trends of the high-tech industry in
Taiwan incident and minor loss information is treated as con1047297-
dential making accessing and learning from it very dif 1047297cult for
anyone in other plants
Proprietary processes and operating procedures are complex
and loss prevention information is exclusively shared within high-
tech plants so it is very important for the staff at a particular plant
to have the ability to conduct their own independent risk assess-
ment The hidden hazardthat failsto be identi1047297ed is always the key
to a subsequent accident (Suardin Mannan amp Halwagi 2007)
33 Operating procedures
To meet the request of international organizations for stan-
dardization (ISO) high-tech plants have all established required
SOPs However because the equipment is so precise and intricate
and the procedures are so minute and complex it is dif 1047297cult to
encompass all the safety procedures in the SOP Besides operators
do not always follow the guidelines and the SOPs are not always
suitable for their processes points which are usually ignored
leading to accidents in these plants
34 Management of change (MOC)
Parameters and processes for equipment maintenance are
changed frequently and procedures for MOC are not always
elaborated on in high-tech plants Therefore industrial safetystaff does not always know of the changes to the usual process
parameters Because the alterations are often too frequent and
complicated to be recorded it is not clearly de1047297ned what should
be announced or accessed for the hazard More than half of all
1047297re and chemical release accidents occur because the MOCs are
not well implemented
35 Emergency planning and response
The emergency response plan in high-tech plants is usually
developed for ideal conditions If a large-scale accident occurs it
becomes dif 1047297cult to address by the procedures and organization inthe emergency response plan Because the occurrence and evolu-
tion of an accident cannot be predicted the emergency response
plan should not put emphasis on the response 1047298ow but on the
principles of treatment of the victims of a disaster of evacuation of
the requirements for shutting down the gasliquid supply and of
the requirements for transferring the command in a timely manner
By instituting and training employees on well-developed plans
fatal accidents due to mistakes made by the staff during an emer-
gency response can be avoided One example of this type of acci-
dent was the 1047297re that resulted from a silane cylinder leak that
happened at one photovoltaic fabrication plant in Taiwan
36 Employee participation
Practically there may be up to a thousand employees in a single
high-tech plant and they likely have an educational background
that is higher than those in other industrial sectors Having
employees participate in safety work or risk-reducing safety
measures depends on the safety awareness of senior managers and
organizations (Shaluf Ahmadun amp Shariff 2003)
Whether or not the organization or upper management places
a strong emphasis on safety can often be discovered by checking
the relationship between plant production and the annual plans in
the plants The high-tech industry has a market cycle When plants
are operating at full capacity many shorten the duration of annual
shutdowns or prolong the period between shutdowns to catch up
with orders and all employees participate in the work to increase
production All of these circumstances can result in accidents
37 Training
High-tech plants should follow sound training protocols with
extraordinary diligence However because of the nature of the
high-tech profession some problems might occur such as
whether an instructor is competent whether teaching materials
are adequate and whether employees follow the program to
receive the training One common fault is that the training which
is supposed to be done by a knowledgeable engineer is instead
done by an apprentice or inexperienced engineer because the
advanced employee cannot leave their position for too long It is
dif 1047297cult to estimate the damage caused by these insuf 1047297ciently
trained personnel
Table 1
Characteristics of common corrosive chemicals utilized in high-tech companies
(Urban 2006)
Material Application TLV-TWA IDLH
HCl Etching 5 ppm e
H3PO4 Etching 1 mgm3 100 ppm
H2SO4 Etching 1 mgm3 80 ppm mgm3
HF Etching 3 ppm 20 ppm
HNO3 Etching 2 ppm 100 ppmTMAH Photo e e
TLV-TWA threshold limit valueetime weighted average
IDLH immediately dangerous to life and health
TMAH tetramethylammonium hydroxide
Table 2
Characteristics of common solvents used in high-tech companies (Pohanish amp
Greene 2003 Urban 2006)
Material Application TLV-TWA IDLH Explosive limits
Ac eton e Phot oet chi ng 750 ppm 20000 ppm 25e128
IPA Photoetching 400 ppm 20000 ppm 2e12
HMDS Photo e e 07e31
Photoresist Photo e e e
IPA isopropyl alcohol
HMDS hexamethyldisiloxane
Table 3
Characteristics of common specialty gases used in high-tech companies (Carson amp
Mumford 1995 Urban 2006)
Material Application TLV-TWA IDLH Explosive limits
AsH3 Implant 005 ppm 6 ppm 45e78
BF3 Implant 1 ppm 100 ppm e
B2H6 Deposition 01 ppm 40 ppm 08e88
SiCl2H2 Dif fusion 05 ppm e 41e99
PH3 Implant 03 ppm 200 ppm 16e
98BCl3 Implant e e e
SiH4 Depositio n 5 ppm e 14e96
SF6 Etching 1000 ppm e e
NF3 Etching 10 ppm 2000 ppm e
C-C Chen et al Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 23 (2010) 531e538536
8202019 HSE - Loss Prevention in the Petrochemical and Chemical-process High-tech Industries in Taiwan
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullhse-loss-prevention-in-the-petrochemical-and-chemical-process-high-tech-industries 78
38 Contractor management
Generally speaking the majority of high-tech companies in
Taiwan have good contractor management systems in which
various methods are employed to carefully screen contractors in
advance Nevertheless some serious accidents including 1047297re and
leakage have still occurred in high-tech companies due to reckless
operation by contractors For example an arsine leak in one plant
caused many operators to be hospitalized a silane leak in another
plant led to a con1047298agration and a 1047297lling error of water treatment
reagents resulted in a chlorine leak
39 Incident investigation
Incident investigations in high-tech plants are performed
cautiously and con1047297dentially Information regarding incident
investigations is closed not only between one business and
another but also between subsidiary companies in the same
business group The industrial safety staff often encounter the
problems of important questions being evaded and intentional
concealment when they investigate an incident or false alarm In
the case of an evacuation caused by a false 1047297re alarm althoughthe engineering department knew the whole story they were
unwilling or reluctant to share the true details which make
incident investigation dif 1047297cult However if a serious accident
occurred the regional labor safety department from CLA would
initiate a thorough investigation seeking out the root cause and
proposing prevention measures for future operation
310 Compliance audits
Each high-tech company has its own audit system for safety
management The industrial safety staff usually perform the
primary audit whereas a department manager generally does the
secondary audit The auditorrsquos experience and ability affectswhether a violation of a safety regulation or potential hazard can
be identi1047297ed However a high-tech company is comprised of
many different technologies and departments so most industrial
safety staff audits only the technology in which they specialize
The safety audits mostly focus on super1047297cial mistakes therefore
many serious mistakes such as equipment safety protections
being illegally bypassed are often not discovered
311 Pre-startup safety review
The equipment in high-tech companies usually goes through
a pre-startup safety inspection before being put into of 1047297cial regular
production The inspected items include supply systems safetymonitoring equipment pipelines vent systems and emergency
shutdowns However some plants still put the equipment into
production without a pre-startup safety inspection due to urgent
production demands
312 Hot work permit
A hot work permit receives signi1047297cant attention in high-tech
companies so very few plants have accidents because of poor
management of hot work permits These hot work permits however
should be expanded to 1047297re control (ie any chemicals that might
cause a 1047297re should be kept away from a 1047297re or external thermal
source)
313 Mechanical integrity
Unlike petrochemical plants general maintenance in high-tech
companies is conducted quite well and thus accidents are seldom
caused by equipment aging and pipeline corrosion
4 Conclusions
Most of the plants in the chemical industries that are small or
medium scale require counseling and assistance to effectively
improve loss prevention (Fig 6) The labor commission will be able
to provide personalizedassistance based on the actual conditions of
each plant if it categorizes and classi1047297es the data accumulated from
the 190 plants that accepted counseling and assistance For
example plants with suf 1047297cient manpower budget and certain
levels of safety management can be provided with thorough
assistance regarding safety management However those having
inferior safety management should be offered extraordinary
assistance on key subjects so that they can obtain the correct
knowledge and develop experience to further avoid serious risks
The best effect will be achieved if the plants are guided and assisted
on the basis of their individual needs
In Taiwan the hazards and risks of high-tech companies are
higher than in other industrial sectors Therefore a variety of safety
management methods and regulations appropriate for high-tech
companies have been generated and implemented However it
is crucial for managers and industrial safety specialists to think
carefully about how to completely identify understand and control
potential hazards associated with the manufacturing processes
Furthermore they need to determine and address uncertainties
that arise from any operational errors or incidents across the whole
range of stages in manufacturing
Acknowledgments
The authors are deeply grateful to Mr A MJaneshek of The Dow
Chemical Co Freeport Texas USA for his valuable assistance and
suggestions
References
Basso B Carpegna C Dibitonto C Gaido G Robotto A amp Zonato C (2004)Reviewing the safety management system by incident investigation andperformance indicators Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 17 225e231
Beatriz F M Manuel M P amp Camilo V O (2007) Safety management systemdevelopment and validation of a multidimensional scale Journal of LossPrevention in the Process Industries 20 52e68
Bernatik A amp Libisova M (2004) Loss prevention in heavy industry risk assess-ment of large gasholders Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 17 271e278
Carson P Aamp MumfordC J (1995) Thesafehandlingof chemicalsin industry(2nded)New York USA Longman Scienti1047297c amp Technical
Chang M K Chang R R Shu C M amp Lin K N (2005) Application of risk basedinspection in re1047297nery and processing piping Journal of Loss Prevention in theProcess Industries 18 397e402
Chen C C Lin S Y Wu S H amp Shu C M (2006) Precautions against chemicalaccident in small and medium plant in Taiwan In The 18th annual conference for Chinese Institute of Environmental Engineering (pp 667) Taichung Taiwan ROCTunghai University
Chen K Y Wu S H Wang Y W amp Shu C M (2008) Runaway reaction andthermal hazards simulation of cumene hydroperoxide by DSC Journal of LossPrevention in the Process Industries 21 101e109
Crowl A amp Elwell I (2004) Identifying criteria to classify chemical mixtures ashighly hazardous due to chemical reactivity Journal of Loss Prevention in theProcess Industries 17 279e289
Guidelines for hazard evaluation procedures (2008) The American Institute of Chemical Engineers (3rd ed) New Jersey USA John Wiley amp Sons
Hirano T T (2004) Accidental explosions of semiconductor manufacturing gases in Japan Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 17 29e34
Kao C S amp Hu K H (2002) Acrylic reactor runaway and explosion accident
analysis Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 15 213e
222
C-C Chen et al Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 23 (2010) 531e538 537
8202019 HSE - Loss Prevention in the Petrochemical and Chemical-process High-tech Industries in Taiwan
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullhse-loss-prevention-in-the-petrochemical-and-chemical-process-high-tech-industries 88
Lin Y F Tseng J M Wu T C amp Shu C M (2008) Effects of acetone on methyl ethylketone peroxide runaway reaction Journalof Hazardous Materials 153 1071e1077
Meel A OrsquoNeill L Levin J Seider W Oktem U amp Keren N (2007) Operationalrisk assessment of chemical industries by exploiting accident databases Journalof Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 20 113e127
Muniz B Peon J amp Ordas C (2007) Safety management system developmentand validation of a multidimensional scale Journal of Loss Prevention in theProcess Industries 20 52e68
PohanishR Pamp Greene SA (2003)Wileyguide to chemical incompatibilities(2nded)New York USA John Wiley and Sons
Reyes J amp Beard N (2008) A systematic approach to managing safety Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 21 15e28
Rigas F Konstandinidou M Centola P amp Reggio G T (2003) Safety analysis andrisk assessment in a new pesticide production line Journal of Loss Prevention inthe Process Industries 16 103e109
Rotaru A Constantinescu C Rotaru P Moan A Dumitru M Socaciu M et al(2008) Thermal analysis and thin 1047297lms deposition by matrix-assisted pulsedlaser evaporation of a 4cn type azomonoether Journal of Thermal Analysis andCalorimetry 92 279e284
Shaluf M Ahmadun F amp Shariff A (2003) Technological disaster factors Journalof Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 16 513e521
Suardin J Mannan M amp Halwagi M (2007) The integration of Dow rsquos 1047297re andexplosion index (FampEI) into process design and optimization to achieve
inherently safer design Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 20 79e90
Taipei Times (2005) ASE issues positive outlook in wake of Chungli factory 1047297rehttpwwwtaipeitimescomNews
The annual reports on labor inspection (2004 2005 2006 amp 2007) Council of LaborAffairs Executive Yuan Taipei Taiwan ROC
The Center of Environmental Safety (2001) The explosion of Fu Guo ChemicalCompany httpwwwtsintedutwadminssafetyE5B7A5E5AE89E58DB1E5AEB3danger-1-1htm
The China Post (2005) ASE assesses damage caused by 1047297re at Chungli plant http
wwwchinapostcomtwbusiness2005050361901ASE-assesseshtm TheEpochTimes (2005) Aninvestigation of 1047297re accident of Advanced Semiconductor
Engineering Inc httpwwwepochtimescomb5551n907054htmThe Epoch Times (2010) The Nanpao Resin Company explosion on January 08
2010 httpepochtimescomb51019n2780991htmTseng J M Liu M Y Chang R H Su J L amp Shu C M (2008) Emergency response
plan of chlorine gas for process plants in Taiwan Journal of Loss Prevention in theProcess Industries 21 393e399
Urban P G (2006) (7th ed)Bretherickrsquo s handbook of reactive chemical hazards Vols1e 2 Burlington USA Academic Press
Wu S H Shyu M L Yet-Pole I Chi J H amp Shu C M (2009) Evaluation of runaway reaction for dicumyl peroxide in a batch reactor by DSC and VSP2
Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 22 721e727
C-C Chen et al Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 23 (2010) 531e538538
8202019 HSE - Loss Prevention in the Petrochemical and Chemical-process High-tech Industries in Taiwan
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullhse-loss-prevention-in-the-petrochemical-and-chemical-process-high-tech-industries 38
Fig 2 The Advanced Semiconductor Engineering Inc 1047297re of 2005 (The Epoch Times 2005)
Fig 3 The Nanpao Resin Company explosion in January 2010 ( The Epoch Times 2010)
C-C Chen et al Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 23 (2010) 531e538 533
8202019 HSE - Loss Prevention in the Petrochemical and Chemical-process High-tech Industries in Taiwan
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullhse-loss-prevention-in-the-petrochemical-and-chemical-process-high-tech-industries 48
Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC) United Microelec-
tronics Corporation (UMC) China Petroleum Corporation (CPC)
Formosa Plastic Co (FPC) and AU Optronics (AUO) Corp) that have
established comprehensive safety systems the medium and small
indigenous chemical 1047297rms in Taiwan are still administered in tradi-
tional ways Although the manufacturing process is fast and the
product quality is well maintained safety issues are often neglected
or are lacking for a variety of reasons (Guidelines for Hazard
Evaluation Procedures 2008)
The CLA the authority of industrial and occupational safety in
Taiwan investigated labor safety and health counseling with
medium and small chemical plants from 2004 to 2006 In total 190
plants participated in this project which was categorized based on
the following safety issues
21 Process safety information
Most plants had basic protocols on accidents when they were
originally established However about half never updated the
information or reevaluated the potential hazards when process
parameters equipment or raw materials were altered This led to
two consequences
a Due to neglecting the safety issues associated with new tech-
niques and new reagents or insuf 1047297cient safety equipment in
plants and to a lack of professional analysis to completely
ascertain the risk during the process poor operation control or
improper storage was possible
b Although the equipment may have been regularly replaced the
piping and instrumentation diagrams (PampIDs) were not revised
on a regular basis This situation led to unforeseen risks for the
personnel engaged in the maintenance of equipment due to the
unknown equipment conditions
New knowledge from external safety information such as
recently launched laws and regulations emerging safety tech-
nology and updated chemical information among others has been
rapidly conveyed to each company through various means like
seminars assistance counseling and inspection because authori-
ties now pay much more attention to chemical hazards This
external safety information is accepted by most companies but the
practical act of carrying out the required actions varies depending
on the human resources and level of safety awareness in the plants
22 Process hazard analysis
Most medium and small companies considered the processhazard analysis as preliminary hazardrecognition Therefore safety
management emphasized the safety equipment in coping with
speci1047297c hazards Only a few companies systematically analyzed the
operating steps and safety procedures such as sequence 1047298ow
pressure temperature composition and facility breakdown for
accident prevention
Older plants unlike newer ones have not updated safety
requirements and lack subsidiary safety devices for temperature and
pressure control or monitoring devices to prevent overheating and
alarm devices to monitor maintain and control plant safety If the
systems have not experienced an accident for a long time they may
believe their plants are safe and that there is no problem with the
facility or the safety management system in place This complacency
is how many out of control accidents happen Therefore it isimportant to carry out systematic process safety analyses like
a hazard and operability study (HAZOP) or failure modes and effects
analysis (FMEA) to study how to protect the operating unit from
accidents with the current equipment (Bernatik amp Libisova 2004)
23 Operating procedures
Eighty percent of the plants have already formulated complete
standard operating procedures (SOPs) for their major processes
However in most cases they are not properly carried out The SOPs
for safety issues are usually only a formality for real tasks and are
not routinely updated in many plants Operators often perform
their assignments based on experience so that the SOPs are
different from real operating procedures Consequently newoperators or apprentices are often confused and this creates hidden
hazards (Meel et al 2007)
24 Management of process change
Management of process change is often the most neglected
aspect of process safety management in plants In Taiwan pro-
cessing research and development is of a high standard which
means that the process parameters and raw materials are contin-
uously tested and modi1047297ed in plants In addition unregulated
pipelines and devices are often replaced by established methods
but some management of process changes have not been
established
0
10
20
30
40
50
6
31
18
36
11
47
25
42
2006 200720052004
N u m b e r s o f f i r e a n
d e x p l o s i o n a c c i d e n t s
Year
All manufacturing sectors
Chemical process industries
Fig 4 Proportion of 1047297re and explosion disasters in chemical-process industries in
Taiwan between 2004 and 2007 (The annual reports on labor inspection 2004 2005
2006 amp 2007)
0
40
80
120
160
200
N u m b e r s o f h a r m f u l s u b s t a n c e s c o n t a
c t d i s a s t e r s
105
160
152
197
97
131
65
117
2006 200720052004
Year
All manufacturing sectors
Chemical process industries
Fig 5 Proportion of the harmful substance contact disasters in chemical-process
industries in Taiwan between 2004 and 2007 (The annual reports on labor inspection
2004 2005 2006 amp 2007)
C-C Chen et al Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 23 (2010) 531e538534
8202019 HSE - Loss Prevention in the Petrochemical and Chemical-process High-tech Industries in Taiwan
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullhse-loss-prevention-in-the-petrochemical-and-chemical-process-high-tech-industries 58
25 Training
Plants with potential risks and chemical hazards should plan
necessary staff training in basic safety knowledge The necessary
safety knowledge differs depending upon the characteristics of the
plant However all personnel must be well trained to understand
the hazardous character of the chemicals being used and the basic
concepts of preventing disasters and emergency response
According to our investigation over 60 percent of the training
done in chemical-process plants that have taken part in the assis-
tance project was disquali1047297ed This was because of less-than-
capable trainers the incorrectness of the training courses long
intervals between training sessions the lack of approval and testing
of trainees and the use of workers without proper training The
most common mistakes that could be averted by proper training
are unintentionally misusing protection equipment unknowingly
using non-1047298ameproof tools in a classi1047297ed 1047298ameproof area and
storing incompatible chemicals in the same location
26 Contractor management
Although most plants have some system for managing
contractors hazard awareness in satellite-af 1047297liated organizations isnot normally well managed The basic reason for contractor
management regulations is that the safety systems are not well
executed in over 50 percent of the plants An example of this would
be not conforming to speci1047297c regulations in the use of hot work
permits or the failure to use 1047298ameproof tools Therefore high risks
associated with improper contractor management are inevitable
27 Incident investigation
Incident investigation is very important for all levels of industry
According to the accident iceberg theory for each severe accident
many near misses and minor incidents with similar causes occur
The level of accident severity in small and medium chemical plants
is higher than in many other industries but the implementation of incident investigation in small and medium chemical plants is
typically inferior to other sectors Investigations were carried out
completely in only 56 percent of chemical plants involved in the
study To prevent severe accidents from happening again incident
investigations should be strengthened in plants in the process
industries (Basso et al 2004)
28 Hot work permit
Hot work permits have received much attention in chemical
plants that have a high risk for 1047297re andor chemical release Despite
this attention it has been shown that 8 percent of chemical plants
never controlled hot work whereas only 60 percent controlled it
completely Hot work was not governed completely in theremaining approximately 30 percent probably due to lack of
awareness of ignition sources such as uncontrolled vehicles
29 Mechanical integrity
The number of accidents that occur due to equipment break-
down or wear has increased yearly since 1994 This reveals that
due to lack of appropriate maintenance and repairs the equipment
is gradually deteriorating in manufacturing plants The common
mistakes are electrical equipment deterioration 1047298ameproof
equipment having lost its protection pipelines being broken safety
equipment being broken or malfunctioning safety relief valves not
functioning properly and maintenance records and documents
being neither veri1047297
ed nor current Although the authorities audit
and check these plants the 1047297xes are delayed to try to get the work
done hurriedly in order to make a pro1047297t This is a common
phenomenon in the small and medium chemical plants studied
Fig 6 is a radar chart that presents the proportion of the process
safety management implementations carried out by small and
medium chemical plants that joined this assistance project
3 Current status of loss prevention in chemical-process
high-tech plants in Taiwan
The chemical-process high-tech industry such as semi-
conductor TFT-LCD LED and photovoltaic fabrication is the
dominant economic lifeline in Taiwan Because the processes are
complicated and many of the chemicals used are toxic highly
1047298ammable or explosive (Tables 1e3 show the characteristics of
common chemicals and specialty gases in the high-tech industry)
high-tech manufacturing buildings are all built to the highest
standards of safety Moreover the newest regulations and safety
management methods are introduced to avoid accident occurrence
(Hirano 2004 Reyes amp Beard 2008) Yet even though the high-
tech industry has been developing for nearly three decades inci-
dent information and experience is lacking (Rotaru et al 2008)
Although every plant apparently has faultless safetyequipment andsafety management toxic gas and chemical leaks or 1047297re accidents
frequently occur in Taiwan The current status of loss prevention
programs in high-tech plants in Taiwan is described as follows
31 Process safety information
Due to suf 1047297cient human resources and complete safety systems
in high-tech plants the process safety information seems abun-
dant complete and impeccable All information such as material
safety data sheets (MSDS) equipment information and PampIDs is
intact and updated periodically However this new industry uses
a variety of toxic and exotic chemicals Therefore many chemical
characteristics are unknown or occasionally intentionally ignored
bringing imminent danger or long-term health threats to the workenvironment (Rigas Konstandinidou Centola amp Reggio 2003)
32 Process hazard analysis
Most high-tech plant buildings fall within the de1047297nition of
a dangerous workplace Because they use many kinds and large
Fig 6 Proportion of the implementations of the process safety management regula-
tions carried out by small- and medium-sized chemical plants in Taiwan (Chen Lin
Wu amp Shu 2006)
C-C Chen et al Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 23 (2010) 531e538 535
8202019 HSE - Loss Prevention in the Petrochemical and Chemical-process High-tech Industries in Taiwan
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullhse-loss-prevention-in-the-petrochemical-and-chemical-process-high-tech-industries 68
quantities of chemicals they must follow the regulations mandated
by the CLA in Taiwan to assess the process safety for a dangerous
workplace However these assessments are only for restricted
chemical processes and equipment so the regulations do not
encompass the entire process
Furthermore most of the high-tech plant buildings have
established occupational health and safety assessment systems
(OHSAS 18001) and they obey the requirement to carry out peri-
odic risk assessment The depth and width of the risk assessmenthowever depends on the experience and ability of the assessment
staff Moreover according to the trends of the high-tech industry in
Taiwan incident and minor loss information is treated as con1047297-
dential making accessing and learning from it very dif 1047297cult for
anyone in other plants
Proprietary processes and operating procedures are complex
and loss prevention information is exclusively shared within high-
tech plants so it is very important for the staff at a particular plant
to have the ability to conduct their own independent risk assess-
ment The hidden hazardthat failsto be identi1047297ed is always the key
to a subsequent accident (Suardin Mannan amp Halwagi 2007)
33 Operating procedures
To meet the request of international organizations for stan-
dardization (ISO) high-tech plants have all established required
SOPs However because the equipment is so precise and intricate
and the procedures are so minute and complex it is dif 1047297cult to
encompass all the safety procedures in the SOP Besides operators
do not always follow the guidelines and the SOPs are not always
suitable for their processes points which are usually ignored
leading to accidents in these plants
34 Management of change (MOC)
Parameters and processes for equipment maintenance are
changed frequently and procedures for MOC are not always
elaborated on in high-tech plants Therefore industrial safetystaff does not always know of the changes to the usual process
parameters Because the alterations are often too frequent and
complicated to be recorded it is not clearly de1047297ned what should
be announced or accessed for the hazard More than half of all
1047297re and chemical release accidents occur because the MOCs are
not well implemented
35 Emergency planning and response
The emergency response plan in high-tech plants is usually
developed for ideal conditions If a large-scale accident occurs it
becomes dif 1047297cult to address by the procedures and organization inthe emergency response plan Because the occurrence and evolu-
tion of an accident cannot be predicted the emergency response
plan should not put emphasis on the response 1047298ow but on the
principles of treatment of the victims of a disaster of evacuation of
the requirements for shutting down the gasliquid supply and of
the requirements for transferring the command in a timely manner
By instituting and training employees on well-developed plans
fatal accidents due to mistakes made by the staff during an emer-
gency response can be avoided One example of this type of acci-
dent was the 1047297re that resulted from a silane cylinder leak that
happened at one photovoltaic fabrication plant in Taiwan
36 Employee participation
Practically there may be up to a thousand employees in a single
high-tech plant and they likely have an educational background
that is higher than those in other industrial sectors Having
employees participate in safety work or risk-reducing safety
measures depends on the safety awareness of senior managers and
organizations (Shaluf Ahmadun amp Shariff 2003)
Whether or not the organization or upper management places
a strong emphasis on safety can often be discovered by checking
the relationship between plant production and the annual plans in
the plants The high-tech industry has a market cycle When plants
are operating at full capacity many shorten the duration of annual
shutdowns or prolong the period between shutdowns to catch up
with orders and all employees participate in the work to increase
production All of these circumstances can result in accidents
37 Training
High-tech plants should follow sound training protocols with
extraordinary diligence However because of the nature of the
high-tech profession some problems might occur such as
whether an instructor is competent whether teaching materials
are adequate and whether employees follow the program to
receive the training One common fault is that the training which
is supposed to be done by a knowledgeable engineer is instead
done by an apprentice or inexperienced engineer because the
advanced employee cannot leave their position for too long It is
dif 1047297cult to estimate the damage caused by these insuf 1047297ciently
trained personnel
Table 1
Characteristics of common corrosive chemicals utilized in high-tech companies
(Urban 2006)
Material Application TLV-TWA IDLH
HCl Etching 5 ppm e
H3PO4 Etching 1 mgm3 100 ppm
H2SO4 Etching 1 mgm3 80 ppm mgm3
HF Etching 3 ppm 20 ppm
HNO3 Etching 2 ppm 100 ppmTMAH Photo e e
TLV-TWA threshold limit valueetime weighted average
IDLH immediately dangerous to life and health
TMAH tetramethylammonium hydroxide
Table 2
Characteristics of common solvents used in high-tech companies (Pohanish amp
Greene 2003 Urban 2006)
Material Application TLV-TWA IDLH Explosive limits
Ac eton e Phot oet chi ng 750 ppm 20000 ppm 25e128
IPA Photoetching 400 ppm 20000 ppm 2e12
HMDS Photo e e 07e31
Photoresist Photo e e e
IPA isopropyl alcohol
HMDS hexamethyldisiloxane
Table 3
Characteristics of common specialty gases used in high-tech companies (Carson amp
Mumford 1995 Urban 2006)
Material Application TLV-TWA IDLH Explosive limits
AsH3 Implant 005 ppm 6 ppm 45e78
BF3 Implant 1 ppm 100 ppm e
B2H6 Deposition 01 ppm 40 ppm 08e88
SiCl2H2 Dif fusion 05 ppm e 41e99
PH3 Implant 03 ppm 200 ppm 16e
98BCl3 Implant e e e
SiH4 Depositio n 5 ppm e 14e96
SF6 Etching 1000 ppm e e
NF3 Etching 10 ppm 2000 ppm e
C-C Chen et al Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 23 (2010) 531e538536
8202019 HSE - Loss Prevention in the Petrochemical and Chemical-process High-tech Industries in Taiwan
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullhse-loss-prevention-in-the-petrochemical-and-chemical-process-high-tech-industries 78
38 Contractor management
Generally speaking the majority of high-tech companies in
Taiwan have good contractor management systems in which
various methods are employed to carefully screen contractors in
advance Nevertheless some serious accidents including 1047297re and
leakage have still occurred in high-tech companies due to reckless
operation by contractors For example an arsine leak in one plant
caused many operators to be hospitalized a silane leak in another
plant led to a con1047298agration and a 1047297lling error of water treatment
reagents resulted in a chlorine leak
39 Incident investigation
Incident investigations in high-tech plants are performed
cautiously and con1047297dentially Information regarding incident
investigations is closed not only between one business and
another but also between subsidiary companies in the same
business group The industrial safety staff often encounter the
problems of important questions being evaded and intentional
concealment when they investigate an incident or false alarm In
the case of an evacuation caused by a false 1047297re alarm althoughthe engineering department knew the whole story they were
unwilling or reluctant to share the true details which make
incident investigation dif 1047297cult However if a serious accident
occurred the regional labor safety department from CLA would
initiate a thorough investigation seeking out the root cause and
proposing prevention measures for future operation
310 Compliance audits
Each high-tech company has its own audit system for safety
management The industrial safety staff usually perform the
primary audit whereas a department manager generally does the
secondary audit The auditorrsquos experience and ability affectswhether a violation of a safety regulation or potential hazard can
be identi1047297ed However a high-tech company is comprised of
many different technologies and departments so most industrial
safety staff audits only the technology in which they specialize
The safety audits mostly focus on super1047297cial mistakes therefore
many serious mistakes such as equipment safety protections
being illegally bypassed are often not discovered
311 Pre-startup safety review
The equipment in high-tech companies usually goes through
a pre-startup safety inspection before being put into of 1047297cial regular
production The inspected items include supply systems safetymonitoring equipment pipelines vent systems and emergency
shutdowns However some plants still put the equipment into
production without a pre-startup safety inspection due to urgent
production demands
312 Hot work permit
A hot work permit receives signi1047297cant attention in high-tech
companies so very few plants have accidents because of poor
management of hot work permits These hot work permits however
should be expanded to 1047297re control (ie any chemicals that might
cause a 1047297re should be kept away from a 1047297re or external thermal
source)
313 Mechanical integrity
Unlike petrochemical plants general maintenance in high-tech
companies is conducted quite well and thus accidents are seldom
caused by equipment aging and pipeline corrosion
4 Conclusions
Most of the plants in the chemical industries that are small or
medium scale require counseling and assistance to effectively
improve loss prevention (Fig 6) The labor commission will be able
to provide personalizedassistance based on the actual conditions of
each plant if it categorizes and classi1047297es the data accumulated from
the 190 plants that accepted counseling and assistance For
example plants with suf 1047297cient manpower budget and certain
levels of safety management can be provided with thorough
assistance regarding safety management However those having
inferior safety management should be offered extraordinary
assistance on key subjects so that they can obtain the correct
knowledge and develop experience to further avoid serious risks
The best effect will be achieved if the plants are guided and assisted
on the basis of their individual needs
In Taiwan the hazards and risks of high-tech companies are
higher than in other industrial sectors Therefore a variety of safety
management methods and regulations appropriate for high-tech
companies have been generated and implemented However it
is crucial for managers and industrial safety specialists to think
carefully about how to completely identify understand and control
potential hazards associated with the manufacturing processes
Furthermore they need to determine and address uncertainties
that arise from any operational errors or incidents across the whole
range of stages in manufacturing
Acknowledgments
The authors are deeply grateful to Mr A MJaneshek of The Dow
Chemical Co Freeport Texas USA for his valuable assistance and
suggestions
References
Basso B Carpegna C Dibitonto C Gaido G Robotto A amp Zonato C (2004)Reviewing the safety management system by incident investigation andperformance indicators Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 17 225e231
Beatriz F M Manuel M P amp Camilo V O (2007) Safety management systemdevelopment and validation of a multidimensional scale Journal of LossPrevention in the Process Industries 20 52e68
Bernatik A amp Libisova M (2004) Loss prevention in heavy industry risk assess-ment of large gasholders Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 17 271e278
Carson P Aamp MumfordC J (1995) Thesafehandlingof chemicalsin industry(2nded)New York USA Longman Scienti1047297c amp Technical
Chang M K Chang R R Shu C M amp Lin K N (2005) Application of risk basedinspection in re1047297nery and processing piping Journal of Loss Prevention in theProcess Industries 18 397e402
Chen C C Lin S Y Wu S H amp Shu C M (2006) Precautions against chemicalaccident in small and medium plant in Taiwan In The 18th annual conference for Chinese Institute of Environmental Engineering (pp 667) Taichung Taiwan ROCTunghai University
Chen K Y Wu S H Wang Y W amp Shu C M (2008) Runaway reaction andthermal hazards simulation of cumene hydroperoxide by DSC Journal of LossPrevention in the Process Industries 21 101e109
Crowl A amp Elwell I (2004) Identifying criteria to classify chemical mixtures ashighly hazardous due to chemical reactivity Journal of Loss Prevention in theProcess Industries 17 279e289
Guidelines for hazard evaluation procedures (2008) The American Institute of Chemical Engineers (3rd ed) New Jersey USA John Wiley amp Sons
Hirano T T (2004) Accidental explosions of semiconductor manufacturing gases in Japan Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 17 29e34
Kao C S amp Hu K H (2002) Acrylic reactor runaway and explosion accident
analysis Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 15 213e
222
C-C Chen et al Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 23 (2010) 531e538 537
8202019 HSE - Loss Prevention in the Petrochemical and Chemical-process High-tech Industries in Taiwan
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullhse-loss-prevention-in-the-petrochemical-and-chemical-process-high-tech-industries 88
Lin Y F Tseng J M Wu T C amp Shu C M (2008) Effects of acetone on methyl ethylketone peroxide runaway reaction Journalof Hazardous Materials 153 1071e1077
Meel A OrsquoNeill L Levin J Seider W Oktem U amp Keren N (2007) Operationalrisk assessment of chemical industries by exploiting accident databases Journalof Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 20 113e127
Muniz B Peon J amp Ordas C (2007) Safety management system developmentand validation of a multidimensional scale Journal of Loss Prevention in theProcess Industries 20 52e68
PohanishR Pamp Greene SA (2003)Wileyguide to chemical incompatibilities(2nded)New York USA John Wiley and Sons
Reyes J amp Beard N (2008) A systematic approach to managing safety Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 21 15e28
Rigas F Konstandinidou M Centola P amp Reggio G T (2003) Safety analysis andrisk assessment in a new pesticide production line Journal of Loss Prevention inthe Process Industries 16 103e109
Rotaru A Constantinescu C Rotaru P Moan A Dumitru M Socaciu M et al(2008) Thermal analysis and thin 1047297lms deposition by matrix-assisted pulsedlaser evaporation of a 4cn type azomonoether Journal of Thermal Analysis andCalorimetry 92 279e284
Shaluf M Ahmadun F amp Shariff A (2003) Technological disaster factors Journalof Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 16 513e521
Suardin J Mannan M amp Halwagi M (2007) The integration of Dow rsquos 1047297re andexplosion index (FampEI) into process design and optimization to achieve
inherently safer design Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 20 79e90
Taipei Times (2005) ASE issues positive outlook in wake of Chungli factory 1047297rehttpwwwtaipeitimescomNews
The annual reports on labor inspection (2004 2005 2006 amp 2007) Council of LaborAffairs Executive Yuan Taipei Taiwan ROC
The Center of Environmental Safety (2001) The explosion of Fu Guo ChemicalCompany httpwwwtsintedutwadminssafetyE5B7A5E5AE89E58DB1E5AEB3danger-1-1htm
The China Post (2005) ASE assesses damage caused by 1047297re at Chungli plant http
wwwchinapostcomtwbusiness2005050361901ASE-assesseshtm TheEpochTimes (2005) Aninvestigation of 1047297re accident of Advanced Semiconductor
Engineering Inc httpwwwepochtimescomb5551n907054htmThe Epoch Times (2010) The Nanpao Resin Company explosion on January 08
2010 httpepochtimescomb51019n2780991htmTseng J M Liu M Y Chang R H Su J L amp Shu C M (2008) Emergency response
plan of chlorine gas for process plants in Taiwan Journal of Loss Prevention in theProcess Industries 21 393e399
Urban P G (2006) (7th ed)Bretherickrsquo s handbook of reactive chemical hazards Vols1e 2 Burlington USA Academic Press
Wu S H Shyu M L Yet-Pole I Chi J H amp Shu C M (2009) Evaluation of runaway reaction for dicumyl peroxide in a batch reactor by DSC and VSP2
Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 22 721e727
C-C Chen et al Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 23 (2010) 531e538538
8202019 HSE - Loss Prevention in the Petrochemical and Chemical-process High-tech Industries in Taiwan
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullhse-loss-prevention-in-the-petrochemical-and-chemical-process-high-tech-industries 48
Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC) United Microelec-
tronics Corporation (UMC) China Petroleum Corporation (CPC)
Formosa Plastic Co (FPC) and AU Optronics (AUO) Corp) that have
established comprehensive safety systems the medium and small
indigenous chemical 1047297rms in Taiwan are still administered in tradi-
tional ways Although the manufacturing process is fast and the
product quality is well maintained safety issues are often neglected
or are lacking for a variety of reasons (Guidelines for Hazard
Evaluation Procedures 2008)
The CLA the authority of industrial and occupational safety in
Taiwan investigated labor safety and health counseling with
medium and small chemical plants from 2004 to 2006 In total 190
plants participated in this project which was categorized based on
the following safety issues
21 Process safety information
Most plants had basic protocols on accidents when they were
originally established However about half never updated the
information or reevaluated the potential hazards when process
parameters equipment or raw materials were altered This led to
two consequences
a Due to neglecting the safety issues associated with new tech-
niques and new reagents or insuf 1047297cient safety equipment in
plants and to a lack of professional analysis to completely
ascertain the risk during the process poor operation control or
improper storage was possible
b Although the equipment may have been regularly replaced the
piping and instrumentation diagrams (PampIDs) were not revised
on a regular basis This situation led to unforeseen risks for the
personnel engaged in the maintenance of equipment due to the
unknown equipment conditions
New knowledge from external safety information such as
recently launched laws and regulations emerging safety tech-
nology and updated chemical information among others has been
rapidly conveyed to each company through various means like
seminars assistance counseling and inspection because authori-
ties now pay much more attention to chemical hazards This
external safety information is accepted by most companies but the
practical act of carrying out the required actions varies depending
on the human resources and level of safety awareness in the plants
22 Process hazard analysis
Most medium and small companies considered the processhazard analysis as preliminary hazardrecognition Therefore safety
management emphasized the safety equipment in coping with
speci1047297c hazards Only a few companies systematically analyzed the
operating steps and safety procedures such as sequence 1047298ow
pressure temperature composition and facility breakdown for
accident prevention
Older plants unlike newer ones have not updated safety
requirements and lack subsidiary safety devices for temperature and
pressure control or monitoring devices to prevent overheating and
alarm devices to monitor maintain and control plant safety If the
systems have not experienced an accident for a long time they may
believe their plants are safe and that there is no problem with the
facility or the safety management system in place This complacency
is how many out of control accidents happen Therefore it isimportant to carry out systematic process safety analyses like
a hazard and operability study (HAZOP) or failure modes and effects
analysis (FMEA) to study how to protect the operating unit from
accidents with the current equipment (Bernatik amp Libisova 2004)
23 Operating procedures
Eighty percent of the plants have already formulated complete
standard operating procedures (SOPs) for their major processes
However in most cases they are not properly carried out The SOPs
for safety issues are usually only a formality for real tasks and are
not routinely updated in many plants Operators often perform
their assignments based on experience so that the SOPs are
different from real operating procedures Consequently newoperators or apprentices are often confused and this creates hidden
hazards (Meel et al 2007)
24 Management of process change
Management of process change is often the most neglected
aspect of process safety management in plants In Taiwan pro-
cessing research and development is of a high standard which
means that the process parameters and raw materials are contin-
uously tested and modi1047297ed in plants In addition unregulated
pipelines and devices are often replaced by established methods
but some management of process changes have not been
established
0
10
20
30
40
50
6
31
18
36
11
47
25
42
2006 200720052004
N u m b e r s o f f i r e a n
d e x p l o s i o n a c c i d e n t s
Year
All manufacturing sectors
Chemical process industries
Fig 4 Proportion of 1047297re and explosion disasters in chemical-process industries in
Taiwan between 2004 and 2007 (The annual reports on labor inspection 2004 2005
2006 amp 2007)
0
40
80
120
160
200
N u m b e r s o f h a r m f u l s u b s t a n c e s c o n t a
c t d i s a s t e r s
105
160
152
197
97
131
65
117
2006 200720052004
Year
All manufacturing sectors
Chemical process industries
Fig 5 Proportion of the harmful substance contact disasters in chemical-process
industries in Taiwan between 2004 and 2007 (The annual reports on labor inspection
2004 2005 2006 amp 2007)
C-C Chen et al Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 23 (2010) 531e538534
8202019 HSE - Loss Prevention in the Petrochemical and Chemical-process High-tech Industries in Taiwan
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullhse-loss-prevention-in-the-petrochemical-and-chemical-process-high-tech-industries 58
25 Training
Plants with potential risks and chemical hazards should plan
necessary staff training in basic safety knowledge The necessary
safety knowledge differs depending upon the characteristics of the
plant However all personnel must be well trained to understand
the hazardous character of the chemicals being used and the basic
concepts of preventing disasters and emergency response
According to our investigation over 60 percent of the training
done in chemical-process plants that have taken part in the assis-
tance project was disquali1047297ed This was because of less-than-
capable trainers the incorrectness of the training courses long
intervals between training sessions the lack of approval and testing
of trainees and the use of workers without proper training The
most common mistakes that could be averted by proper training
are unintentionally misusing protection equipment unknowingly
using non-1047298ameproof tools in a classi1047297ed 1047298ameproof area and
storing incompatible chemicals in the same location
26 Contractor management
Although most plants have some system for managing
contractors hazard awareness in satellite-af 1047297liated organizations isnot normally well managed The basic reason for contractor
management regulations is that the safety systems are not well
executed in over 50 percent of the plants An example of this would
be not conforming to speci1047297c regulations in the use of hot work
permits or the failure to use 1047298ameproof tools Therefore high risks
associated with improper contractor management are inevitable
27 Incident investigation
Incident investigation is very important for all levels of industry
According to the accident iceberg theory for each severe accident
many near misses and minor incidents with similar causes occur
The level of accident severity in small and medium chemical plants
is higher than in many other industries but the implementation of incident investigation in small and medium chemical plants is
typically inferior to other sectors Investigations were carried out
completely in only 56 percent of chemical plants involved in the
study To prevent severe accidents from happening again incident
investigations should be strengthened in plants in the process
industries (Basso et al 2004)
28 Hot work permit
Hot work permits have received much attention in chemical
plants that have a high risk for 1047297re andor chemical release Despite
this attention it has been shown that 8 percent of chemical plants
never controlled hot work whereas only 60 percent controlled it
completely Hot work was not governed completely in theremaining approximately 30 percent probably due to lack of
awareness of ignition sources such as uncontrolled vehicles
29 Mechanical integrity
The number of accidents that occur due to equipment break-
down or wear has increased yearly since 1994 This reveals that
due to lack of appropriate maintenance and repairs the equipment
is gradually deteriorating in manufacturing plants The common
mistakes are electrical equipment deterioration 1047298ameproof
equipment having lost its protection pipelines being broken safety
equipment being broken or malfunctioning safety relief valves not
functioning properly and maintenance records and documents
being neither veri1047297
ed nor current Although the authorities audit
and check these plants the 1047297xes are delayed to try to get the work
done hurriedly in order to make a pro1047297t This is a common
phenomenon in the small and medium chemical plants studied
Fig 6 is a radar chart that presents the proportion of the process
safety management implementations carried out by small and
medium chemical plants that joined this assistance project
3 Current status of loss prevention in chemical-process
high-tech plants in Taiwan
The chemical-process high-tech industry such as semi-
conductor TFT-LCD LED and photovoltaic fabrication is the
dominant economic lifeline in Taiwan Because the processes are
complicated and many of the chemicals used are toxic highly
1047298ammable or explosive (Tables 1e3 show the characteristics of
common chemicals and specialty gases in the high-tech industry)
high-tech manufacturing buildings are all built to the highest
standards of safety Moreover the newest regulations and safety
management methods are introduced to avoid accident occurrence
(Hirano 2004 Reyes amp Beard 2008) Yet even though the high-
tech industry has been developing for nearly three decades inci-
dent information and experience is lacking (Rotaru et al 2008)
Although every plant apparently has faultless safetyequipment andsafety management toxic gas and chemical leaks or 1047297re accidents
frequently occur in Taiwan The current status of loss prevention
programs in high-tech plants in Taiwan is described as follows
31 Process safety information
Due to suf 1047297cient human resources and complete safety systems
in high-tech plants the process safety information seems abun-
dant complete and impeccable All information such as material
safety data sheets (MSDS) equipment information and PampIDs is
intact and updated periodically However this new industry uses
a variety of toxic and exotic chemicals Therefore many chemical
characteristics are unknown or occasionally intentionally ignored
bringing imminent danger or long-term health threats to the workenvironment (Rigas Konstandinidou Centola amp Reggio 2003)
32 Process hazard analysis
Most high-tech plant buildings fall within the de1047297nition of
a dangerous workplace Because they use many kinds and large
Fig 6 Proportion of the implementations of the process safety management regula-
tions carried out by small- and medium-sized chemical plants in Taiwan (Chen Lin
Wu amp Shu 2006)
C-C Chen et al Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 23 (2010) 531e538 535
8202019 HSE - Loss Prevention in the Petrochemical and Chemical-process High-tech Industries in Taiwan
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullhse-loss-prevention-in-the-petrochemical-and-chemical-process-high-tech-industries 68
quantities of chemicals they must follow the regulations mandated
by the CLA in Taiwan to assess the process safety for a dangerous
workplace However these assessments are only for restricted
chemical processes and equipment so the regulations do not
encompass the entire process
Furthermore most of the high-tech plant buildings have
established occupational health and safety assessment systems
(OHSAS 18001) and they obey the requirement to carry out peri-
odic risk assessment The depth and width of the risk assessmenthowever depends on the experience and ability of the assessment
staff Moreover according to the trends of the high-tech industry in
Taiwan incident and minor loss information is treated as con1047297-
dential making accessing and learning from it very dif 1047297cult for
anyone in other plants
Proprietary processes and operating procedures are complex
and loss prevention information is exclusively shared within high-
tech plants so it is very important for the staff at a particular plant
to have the ability to conduct their own independent risk assess-
ment The hidden hazardthat failsto be identi1047297ed is always the key
to a subsequent accident (Suardin Mannan amp Halwagi 2007)
33 Operating procedures
To meet the request of international organizations for stan-
dardization (ISO) high-tech plants have all established required
SOPs However because the equipment is so precise and intricate
and the procedures are so minute and complex it is dif 1047297cult to
encompass all the safety procedures in the SOP Besides operators
do not always follow the guidelines and the SOPs are not always
suitable for their processes points which are usually ignored
leading to accidents in these plants
34 Management of change (MOC)
Parameters and processes for equipment maintenance are
changed frequently and procedures for MOC are not always
elaborated on in high-tech plants Therefore industrial safetystaff does not always know of the changes to the usual process
parameters Because the alterations are often too frequent and
complicated to be recorded it is not clearly de1047297ned what should
be announced or accessed for the hazard More than half of all
1047297re and chemical release accidents occur because the MOCs are
not well implemented
35 Emergency planning and response
The emergency response plan in high-tech plants is usually
developed for ideal conditions If a large-scale accident occurs it
becomes dif 1047297cult to address by the procedures and organization inthe emergency response plan Because the occurrence and evolu-
tion of an accident cannot be predicted the emergency response
plan should not put emphasis on the response 1047298ow but on the
principles of treatment of the victims of a disaster of evacuation of
the requirements for shutting down the gasliquid supply and of
the requirements for transferring the command in a timely manner
By instituting and training employees on well-developed plans
fatal accidents due to mistakes made by the staff during an emer-
gency response can be avoided One example of this type of acci-
dent was the 1047297re that resulted from a silane cylinder leak that
happened at one photovoltaic fabrication plant in Taiwan
36 Employee participation
Practically there may be up to a thousand employees in a single
high-tech plant and they likely have an educational background
that is higher than those in other industrial sectors Having
employees participate in safety work or risk-reducing safety
measures depends on the safety awareness of senior managers and
organizations (Shaluf Ahmadun amp Shariff 2003)
Whether or not the organization or upper management places
a strong emphasis on safety can often be discovered by checking
the relationship between plant production and the annual plans in
the plants The high-tech industry has a market cycle When plants
are operating at full capacity many shorten the duration of annual
shutdowns or prolong the period between shutdowns to catch up
with orders and all employees participate in the work to increase
production All of these circumstances can result in accidents
37 Training
High-tech plants should follow sound training protocols with
extraordinary diligence However because of the nature of the
high-tech profession some problems might occur such as
whether an instructor is competent whether teaching materials
are adequate and whether employees follow the program to
receive the training One common fault is that the training which
is supposed to be done by a knowledgeable engineer is instead
done by an apprentice or inexperienced engineer because the
advanced employee cannot leave their position for too long It is
dif 1047297cult to estimate the damage caused by these insuf 1047297ciently
trained personnel
Table 1
Characteristics of common corrosive chemicals utilized in high-tech companies
(Urban 2006)
Material Application TLV-TWA IDLH
HCl Etching 5 ppm e
H3PO4 Etching 1 mgm3 100 ppm
H2SO4 Etching 1 mgm3 80 ppm mgm3
HF Etching 3 ppm 20 ppm
HNO3 Etching 2 ppm 100 ppmTMAH Photo e e
TLV-TWA threshold limit valueetime weighted average
IDLH immediately dangerous to life and health
TMAH tetramethylammonium hydroxide
Table 2
Characteristics of common solvents used in high-tech companies (Pohanish amp
Greene 2003 Urban 2006)
Material Application TLV-TWA IDLH Explosive limits
Ac eton e Phot oet chi ng 750 ppm 20000 ppm 25e128
IPA Photoetching 400 ppm 20000 ppm 2e12
HMDS Photo e e 07e31
Photoresist Photo e e e
IPA isopropyl alcohol
HMDS hexamethyldisiloxane
Table 3
Characteristics of common specialty gases used in high-tech companies (Carson amp
Mumford 1995 Urban 2006)
Material Application TLV-TWA IDLH Explosive limits
AsH3 Implant 005 ppm 6 ppm 45e78
BF3 Implant 1 ppm 100 ppm e
B2H6 Deposition 01 ppm 40 ppm 08e88
SiCl2H2 Dif fusion 05 ppm e 41e99
PH3 Implant 03 ppm 200 ppm 16e
98BCl3 Implant e e e
SiH4 Depositio n 5 ppm e 14e96
SF6 Etching 1000 ppm e e
NF3 Etching 10 ppm 2000 ppm e
C-C Chen et al Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 23 (2010) 531e538536
8202019 HSE - Loss Prevention in the Petrochemical and Chemical-process High-tech Industries in Taiwan
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullhse-loss-prevention-in-the-petrochemical-and-chemical-process-high-tech-industries 78
38 Contractor management
Generally speaking the majority of high-tech companies in
Taiwan have good contractor management systems in which
various methods are employed to carefully screen contractors in
advance Nevertheless some serious accidents including 1047297re and
leakage have still occurred in high-tech companies due to reckless
operation by contractors For example an arsine leak in one plant
caused many operators to be hospitalized a silane leak in another
plant led to a con1047298agration and a 1047297lling error of water treatment
reagents resulted in a chlorine leak
39 Incident investigation
Incident investigations in high-tech plants are performed
cautiously and con1047297dentially Information regarding incident
investigations is closed not only between one business and
another but also between subsidiary companies in the same
business group The industrial safety staff often encounter the
problems of important questions being evaded and intentional
concealment when they investigate an incident or false alarm In
the case of an evacuation caused by a false 1047297re alarm althoughthe engineering department knew the whole story they were
unwilling or reluctant to share the true details which make
incident investigation dif 1047297cult However if a serious accident
occurred the regional labor safety department from CLA would
initiate a thorough investigation seeking out the root cause and
proposing prevention measures for future operation
310 Compliance audits
Each high-tech company has its own audit system for safety
management The industrial safety staff usually perform the
primary audit whereas a department manager generally does the
secondary audit The auditorrsquos experience and ability affectswhether a violation of a safety regulation or potential hazard can
be identi1047297ed However a high-tech company is comprised of
many different technologies and departments so most industrial
safety staff audits only the technology in which they specialize
The safety audits mostly focus on super1047297cial mistakes therefore
many serious mistakes such as equipment safety protections
being illegally bypassed are often not discovered
311 Pre-startup safety review
The equipment in high-tech companies usually goes through
a pre-startup safety inspection before being put into of 1047297cial regular
production The inspected items include supply systems safetymonitoring equipment pipelines vent systems and emergency
shutdowns However some plants still put the equipment into
production without a pre-startup safety inspection due to urgent
production demands
312 Hot work permit
A hot work permit receives signi1047297cant attention in high-tech
companies so very few plants have accidents because of poor
management of hot work permits These hot work permits however
should be expanded to 1047297re control (ie any chemicals that might
cause a 1047297re should be kept away from a 1047297re or external thermal
source)
313 Mechanical integrity
Unlike petrochemical plants general maintenance in high-tech
companies is conducted quite well and thus accidents are seldom
caused by equipment aging and pipeline corrosion
4 Conclusions
Most of the plants in the chemical industries that are small or
medium scale require counseling and assistance to effectively
improve loss prevention (Fig 6) The labor commission will be able
to provide personalizedassistance based on the actual conditions of
each plant if it categorizes and classi1047297es the data accumulated from
the 190 plants that accepted counseling and assistance For
example plants with suf 1047297cient manpower budget and certain
levels of safety management can be provided with thorough
assistance regarding safety management However those having
inferior safety management should be offered extraordinary
assistance on key subjects so that they can obtain the correct
knowledge and develop experience to further avoid serious risks
The best effect will be achieved if the plants are guided and assisted
on the basis of their individual needs
In Taiwan the hazards and risks of high-tech companies are
higher than in other industrial sectors Therefore a variety of safety
management methods and regulations appropriate for high-tech
companies have been generated and implemented However it
is crucial for managers and industrial safety specialists to think
carefully about how to completely identify understand and control
potential hazards associated with the manufacturing processes
Furthermore they need to determine and address uncertainties
that arise from any operational errors or incidents across the whole
range of stages in manufacturing
Acknowledgments
The authors are deeply grateful to Mr A MJaneshek of The Dow
Chemical Co Freeport Texas USA for his valuable assistance and
suggestions
References
Basso B Carpegna C Dibitonto C Gaido G Robotto A amp Zonato C (2004)Reviewing the safety management system by incident investigation andperformance indicators Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 17 225e231
Beatriz F M Manuel M P amp Camilo V O (2007) Safety management systemdevelopment and validation of a multidimensional scale Journal of LossPrevention in the Process Industries 20 52e68
Bernatik A amp Libisova M (2004) Loss prevention in heavy industry risk assess-ment of large gasholders Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 17 271e278
Carson P Aamp MumfordC J (1995) Thesafehandlingof chemicalsin industry(2nded)New York USA Longman Scienti1047297c amp Technical
Chang M K Chang R R Shu C M amp Lin K N (2005) Application of risk basedinspection in re1047297nery and processing piping Journal of Loss Prevention in theProcess Industries 18 397e402
Chen C C Lin S Y Wu S H amp Shu C M (2006) Precautions against chemicalaccident in small and medium plant in Taiwan In The 18th annual conference for Chinese Institute of Environmental Engineering (pp 667) Taichung Taiwan ROCTunghai University
Chen K Y Wu S H Wang Y W amp Shu C M (2008) Runaway reaction andthermal hazards simulation of cumene hydroperoxide by DSC Journal of LossPrevention in the Process Industries 21 101e109
Crowl A amp Elwell I (2004) Identifying criteria to classify chemical mixtures ashighly hazardous due to chemical reactivity Journal of Loss Prevention in theProcess Industries 17 279e289
Guidelines for hazard evaluation procedures (2008) The American Institute of Chemical Engineers (3rd ed) New Jersey USA John Wiley amp Sons
Hirano T T (2004) Accidental explosions of semiconductor manufacturing gases in Japan Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 17 29e34
Kao C S amp Hu K H (2002) Acrylic reactor runaway and explosion accident
analysis Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 15 213e
222
C-C Chen et al Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 23 (2010) 531e538 537
8202019 HSE - Loss Prevention in the Petrochemical and Chemical-process High-tech Industries in Taiwan
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullhse-loss-prevention-in-the-petrochemical-and-chemical-process-high-tech-industries 88
Lin Y F Tseng J M Wu T C amp Shu C M (2008) Effects of acetone on methyl ethylketone peroxide runaway reaction Journalof Hazardous Materials 153 1071e1077
Meel A OrsquoNeill L Levin J Seider W Oktem U amp Keren N (2007) Operationalrisk assessment of chemical industries by exploiting accident databases Journalof Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 20 113e127
Muniz B Peon J amp Ordas C (2007) Safety management system developmentand validation of a multidimensional scale Journal of Loss Prevention in theProcess Industries 20 52e68
PohanishR Pamp Greene SA (2003)Wileyguide to chemical incompatibilities(2nded)New York USA John Wiley and Sons
Reyes J amp Beard N (2008) A systematic approach to managing safety Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 21 15e28
Rigas F Konstandinidou M Centola P amp Reggio G T (2003) Safety analysis andrisk assessment in a new pesticide production line Journal of Loss Prevention inthe Process Industries 16 103e109
Rotaru A Constantinescu C Rotaru P Moan A Dumitru M Socaciu M et al(2008) Thermal analysis and thin 1047297lms deposition by matrix-assisted pulsedlaser evaporation of a 4cn type azomonoether Journal of Thermal Analysis andCalorimetry 92 279e284
Shaluf M Ahmadun F amp Shariff A (2003) Technological disaster factors Journalof Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 16 513e521
Suardin J Mannan M amp Halwagi M (2007) The integration of Dow rsquos 1047297re andexplosion index (FampEI) into process design and optimization to achieve
inherently safer design Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 20 79e90
Taipei Times (2005) ASE issues positive outlook in wake of Chungli factory 1047297rehttpwwwtaipeitimescomNews
The annual reports on labor inspection (2004 2005 2006 amp 2007) Council of LaborAffairs Executive Yuan Taipei Taiwan ROC
The Center of Environmental Safety (2001) The explosion of Fu Guo ChemicalCompany httpwwwtsintedutwadminssafetyE5B7A5E5AE89E58DB1E5AEB3danger-1-1htm
The China Post (2005) ASE assesses damage caused by 1047297re at Chungli plant http
wwwchinapostcomtwbusiness2005050361901ASE-assesseshtm TheEpochTimes (2005) Aninvestigation of 1047297re accident of Advanced Semiconductor
Engineering Inc httpwwwepochtimescomb5551n907054htmThe Epoch Times (2010) The Nanpao Resin Company explosion on January 08
2010 httpepochtimescomb51019n2780991htmTseng J M Liu M Y Chang R H Su J L amp Shu C M (2008) Emergency response
plan of chlorine gas for process plants in Taiwan Journal of Loss Prevention in theProcess Industries 21 393e399
Urban P G (2006) (7th ed)Bretherickrsquo s handbook of reactive chemical hazards Vols1e 2 Burlington USA Academic Press
Wu S H Shyu M L Yet-Pole I Chi J H amp Shu C M (2009) Evaluation of runaway reaction for dicumyl peroxide in a batch reactor by DSC and VSP2
Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 22 721e727
C-C Chen et al Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 23 (2010) 531e538538
8202019 HSE - Loss Prevention in the Petrochemical and Chemical-process High-tech Industries in Taiwan
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullhse-loss-prevention-in-the-petrochemical-and-chemical-process-high-tech-industries 58
25 Training
Plants with potential risks and chemical hazards should plan
necessary staff training in basic safety knowledge The necessary
safety knowledge differs depending upon the characteristics of the
plant However all personnel must be well trained to understand
the hazardous character of the chemicals being used and the basic
concepts of preventing disasters and emergency response
According to our investigation over 60 percent of the training
done in chemical-process plants that have taken part in the assis-
tance project was disquali1047297ed This was because of less-than-
capable trainers the incorrectness of the training courses long
intervals between training sessions the lack of approval and testing
of trainees and the use of workers without proper training The
most common mistakes that could be averted by proper training
are unintentionally misusing protection equipment unknowingly
using non-1047298ameproof tools in a classi1047297ed 1047298ameproof area and
storing incompatible chemicals in the same location
26 Contractor management
Although most plants have some system for managing
contractors hazard awareness in satellite-af 1047297liated organizations isnot normally well managed The basic reason for contractor
management regulations is that the safety systems are not well
executed in over 50 percent of the plants An example of this would
be not conforming to speci1047297c regulations in the use of hot work
permits or the failure to use 1047298ameproof tools Therefore high risks
associated with improper contractor management are inevitable
27 Incident investigation
Incident investigation is very important for all levels of industry
According to the accident iceberg theory for each severe accident
many near misses and minor incidents with similar causes occur
The level of accident severity in small and medium chemical plants
is higher than in many other industries but the implementation of incident investigation in small and medium chemical plants is
typically inferior to other sectors Investigations were carried out
completely in only 56 percent of chemical plants involved in the
study To prevent severe accidents from happening again incident
investigations should be strengthened in plants in the process
industries (Basso et al 2004)
28 Hot work permit
Hot work permits have received much attention in chemical
plants that have a high risk for 1047297re andor chemical release Despite
this attention it has been shown that 8 percent of chemical plants
never controlled hot work whereas only 60 percent controlled it
completely Hot work was not governed completely in theremaining approximately 30 percent probably due to lack of
awareness of ignition sources such as uncontrolled vehicles
29 Mechanical integrity
The number of accidents that occur due to equipment break-
down or wear has increased yearly since 1994 This reveals that
due to lack of appropriate maintenance and repairs the equipment
is gradually deteriorating in manufacturing plants The common
mistakes are electrical equipment deterioration 1047298ameproof
equipment having lost its protection pipelines being broken safety
equipment being broken or malfunctioning safety relief valves not
functioning properly and maintenance records and documents
being neither veri1047297
ed nor current Although the authorities audit
and check these plants the 1047297xes are delayed to try to get the work
done hurriedly in order to make a pro1047297t This is a common
phenomenon in the small and medium chemical plants studied
Fig 6 is a radar chart that presents the proportion of the process
safety management implementations carried out by small and
medium chemical plants that joined this assistance project
3 Current status of loss prevention in chemical-process
high-tech plants in Taiwan
The chemical-process high-tech industry such as semi-
conductor TFT-LCD LED and photovoltaic fabrication is the
dominant economic lifeline in Taiwan Because the processes are
complicated and many of the chemicals used are toxic highly
1047298ammable or explosive (Tables 1e3 show the characteristics of
common chemicals and specialty gases in the high-tech industry)
high-tech manufacturing buildings are all built to the highest
standards of safety Moreover the newest regulations and safety
management methods are introduced to avoid accident occurrence
(Hirano 2004 Reyes amp Beard 2008) Yet even though the high-
tech industry has been developing for nearly three decades inci-
dent information and experience is lacking (Rotaru et al 2008)
Although every plant apparently has faultless safetyequipment andsafety management toxic gas and chemical leaks or 1047297re accidents
frequently occur in Taiwan The current status of loss prevention
programs in high-tech plants in Taiwan is described as follows
31 Process safety information
Due to suf 1047297cient human resources and complete safety systems
in high-tech plants the process safety information seems abun-
dant complete and impeccable All information such as material
safety data sheets (MSDS) equipment information and PampIDs is
intact and updated periodically However this new industry uses
a variety of toxic and exotic chemicals Therefore many chemical
characteristics are unknown or occasionally intentionally ignored
bringing imminent danger or long-term health threats to the workenvironment (Rigas Konstandinidou Centola amp Reggio 2003)
32 Process hazard analysis
Most high-tech plant buildings fall within the de1047297nition of
a dangerous workplace Because they use many kinds and large
Fig 6 Proportion of the implementations of the process safety management regula-
tions carried out by small- and medium-sized chemical plants in Taiwan (Chen Lin
Wu amp Shu 2006)
C-C Chen et al Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 23 (2010) 531e538 535
8202019 HSE - Loss Prevention in the Petrochemical and Chemical-process High-tech Industries in Taiwan
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullhse-loss-prevention-in-the-petrochemical-and-chemical-process-high-tech-industries 68
quantities of chemicals they must follow the regulations mandated
by the CLA in Taiwan to assess the process safety for a dangerous
workplace However these assessments are only for restricted
chemical processes and equipment so the regulations do not
encompass the entire process
Furthermore most of the high-tech plant buildings have
established occupational health and safety assessment systems
(OHSAS 18001) and they obey the requirement to carry out peri-
odic risk assessment The depth and width of the risk assessmenthowever depends on the experience and ability of the assessment
staff Moreover according to the trends of the high-tech industry in
Taiwan incident and minor loss information is treated as con1047297-
dential making accessing and learning from it very dif 1047297cult for
anyone in other plants
Proprietary processes and operating procedures are complex
and loss prevention information is exclusively shared within high-
tech plants so it is very important for the staff at a particular plant
to have the ability to conduct their own independent risk assess-
ment The hidden hazardthat failsto be identi1047297ed is always the key
to a subsequent accident (Suardin Mannan amp Halwagi 2007)
33 Operating procedures
To meet the request of international organizations for stan-
dardization (ISO) high-tech plants have all established required
SOPs However because the equipment is so precise and intricate
and the procedures are so minute and complex it is dif 1047297cult to
encompass all the safety procedures in the SOP Besides operators
do not always follow the guidelines and the SOPs are not always
suitable for their processes points which are usually ignored
leading to accidents in these plants
34 Management of change (MOC)
Parameters and processes for equipment maintenance are
changed frequently and procedures for MOC are not always
elaborated on in high-tech plants Therefore industrial safetystaff does not always know of the changes to the usual process
parameters Because the alterations are often too frequent and
complicated to be recorded it is not clearly de1047297ned what should
be announced or accessed for the hazard More than half of all
1047297re and chemical release accidents occur because the MOCs are
not well implemented
35 Emergency planning and response
The emergency response plan in high-tech plants is usually
developed for ideal conditions If a large-scale accident occurs it
becomes dif 1047297cult to address by the procedures and organization inthe emergency response plan Because the occurrence and evolu-
tion of an accident cannot be predicted the emergency response
plan should not put emphasis on the response 1047298ow but on the
principles of treatment of the victims of a disaster of evacuation of
the requirements for shutting down the gasliquid supply and of
the requirements for transferring the command in a timely manner
By instituting and training employees on well-developed plans
fatal accidents due to mistakes made by the staff during an emer-
gency response can be avoided One example of this type of acci-
dent was the 1047297re that resulted from a silane cylinder leak that
happened at one photovoltaic fabrication plant in Taiwan
36 Employee participation
Practically there may be up to a thousand employees in a single
high-tech plant and they likely have an educational background
that is higher than those in other industrial sectors Having
employees participate in safety work or risk-reducing safety
measures depends on the safety awareness of senior managers and
organizations (Shaluf Ahmadun amp Shariff 2003)
Whether or not the organization or upper management places
a strong emphasis on safety can often be discovered by checking
the relationship between plant production and the annual plans in
the plants The high-tech industry has a market cycle When plants
are operating at full capacity many shorten the duration of annual
shutdowns or prolong the period between shutdowns to catch up
with orders and all employees participate in the work to increase
production All of these circumstances can result in accidents
37 Training
High-tech plants should follow sound training protocols with
extraordinary diligence However because of the nature of the
high-tech profession some problems might occur such as
whether an instructor is competent whether teaching materials
are adequate and whether employees follow the program to
receive the training One common fault is that the training which
is supposed to be done by a knowledgeable engineer is instead
done by an apprentice or inexperienced engineer because the
advanced employee cannot leave their position for too long It is
dif 1047297cult to estimate the damage caused by these insuf 1047297ciently
trained personnel
Table 1
Characteristics of common corrosive chemicals utilized in high-tech companies
(Urban 2006)
Material Application TLV-TWA IDLH
HCl Etching 5 ppm e
H3PO4 Etching 1 mgm3 100 ppm
H2SO4 Etching 1 mgm3 80 ppm mgm3
HF Etching 3 ppm 20 ppm
HNO3 Etching 2 ppm 100 ppmTMAH Photo e e
TLV-TWA threshold limit valueetime weighted average
IDLH immediately dangerous to life and health
TMAH tetramethylammonium hydroxide
Table 2
Characteristics of common solvents used in high-tech companies (Pohanish amp
Greene 2003 Urban 2006)
Material Application TLV-TWA IDLH Explosive limits
Ac eton e Phot oet chi ng 750 ppm 20000 ppm 25e128
IPA Photoetching 400 ppm 20000 ppm 2e12
HMDS Photo e e 07e31
Photoresist Photo e e e
IPA isopropyl alcohol
HMDS hexamethyldisiloxane
Table 3
Characteristics of common specialty gases used in high-tech companies (Carson amp
Mumford 1995 Urban 2006)
Material Application TLV-TWA IDLH Explosive limits
AsH3 Implant 005 ppm 6 ppm 45e78
BF3 Implant 1 ppm 100 ppm e
B2H6 Deposition 01 ppm 40 ppm 08e88
SiCl2H2 Dif fusion 05 ppm e 41e99
PH3 Implant 03 ppm 200 ppm 16e
98BCl3 Implant e e e
SiH4 Depositio n 5 ppm e 14e96
SF6 Etching 1000 ppm e e
NF3 Etching 10 ppm 2000 ppm e
C-C Chen et al Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 23 (2010) 531e538536
8202019 HSE - Loss Prevention in the Petrochemical and Chemical-process High-tech Industries in Taiwan
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullhse-loss-prevention-in-the-petrochemical-and-chemical-process-high-tech-industries 78
38 Contractor management
Generally speaking the majority of high-tech companies in
Taiwan have good contractor management systems in which
various methods are employed to carefully screen contractors in
advance Nevertheless some serious accidents including 1047297re and
leakage have still occurred in high-tech companies due to reckless
operation by contractors For example an arsine leak in one plant
caused many operators to be hospitalized a silane leak in another
plant led to a con1047298agration and a 1047297lling error of water treatment
reagents resulted in a chlorine leak
39 Incident investigation
Incident investigations in high-tech plants are performed
cautiously and con1047297dentially Information regarding incident
investigations is closed not only between one business and
another but also between subsidiary companies in the same
business group The industrial safety staff often encounter the
problems of important questions being evaded and intentional
concealment when they investigate an incident or false alarm In
the case of an evacuation caused by a false 1047297re alarm althoughthe engineering department knew the whole story they were
unwilling or reluctant to share the true details which make
incident investigation dif 1047297cult However if a serious accident
occurred the regional labor safety department from CLA would
initiate a thorough investigation seeking out the root cause and
proposing prevention measures for future operation
310 Compliance audits
Each high-tech company has its own audit system for safety
management The industrial safety staff usually perform the
primary audit whereas a department manager generally does the
secondary audit The auditorrsquos experience and ability affectswhether a violation of a safety regulation or potential hazard can
be identi1047297ed However a high-tech company is comprised of
many different technologies and departments so most industrial
safety staff audits only the technology in which they specialize
The safety audits mostly focus on super1047297cial mistakes therefore
many serious mistakes such as equipment safety protections
being illegally bypassed are often not discovered
311 Pre-startup safety review
The equipment in high-tech companies usually goes through
a pre-startup safety inspection before being put into of 1047297cial regular
production The inspected items include supply systems safetymonitoring equipment pipelines vent systems and emergency
shutdowns However some plants still put the equipment into
production without a pre-startup safety inspection due to urgent
production demands
312 Hot work permit
A hot work permit receives signi1047297cant attention in high-tech
companies so very few plants have accidents because of poor
management of hot work permits These hot work permits however
should be expanded to 1047297re control (ie any chemicals that might
cause a 1047297re should be kept away from a 1047297re or external thermal
source)
313 Mechanical integrity
Unlike petrochemical plants general maintenance in high-tech
companies is conducted quite well and thus accidents are seldom
caused by equipment aging and pipeline corrosion
4 Conclusions
Most of the plants in the chemical industries that are small or
medium scale require counseling and assistance to effectively
improve loss prevention (Fig 6) The labor commission will be able
to provide personalizedassistance based on the actual conditions of
each plant if it categorizes and classi1047297es the data accumulated from
the 190 plants that accepted counseling and assistance For
example plants with suf 1047297cient manpower budget and certain
levels of safety management can be provided with thorough
assistance regarding safety management However those having
inferior safety management should be offered extraordinary
assistance on key subjects so that they can obtain the correct
knowledge and develop experience to further avoid serious risks
The best effect will be achieved if the plants are guided and assisted
on the basis of their individual needs
In Taiwan the hazards and risks of high-tech companies are
higher than in other industrial sectors Therefore a variety of safety
management methods and regulations appropriate for high-tech
companies have been generated and implemented However it
is crucial for managers and industrial safety specialists to think
carefully about how to completely identify understand and control
potential hazards associated with the manufacturing processes
Furthermore they need to determine and address uncertainties
that arise from any operational errors or incidents across the whole
range of stages in manufacturing
Acknowledgments
The authors are deeply grateful to Mr A MJaneshek of The Dow
Chemical Co Freeport Texas USA for his valuable assistance and
suggestions
References
Basso B Carpegna C Dibitonto C Gaido G Robotto A amp Zonato C (2004)Reviewing the safety management system by incident investigation andperformance indicators Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 17 225e231
Beatriz F M Manuel M P amp Camilo V O (2007) Safety management systemdevelopment and validation of a multidimensional scale Journal of LossPrevention in the Process Industries 20 52e68
Bernatik A amp Libisova M (2004) Loss prevention in heavy industry risk assess-ment of large gasholders Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 17 271e278
Carson P Aamp MumfordC J (1995) Thesafehandlingof chemicalsin industry(2nded)New York USA Longman Scienti1047297c amp Technical
Chang M K Chang R R Shu C M amp Lin K N (2005) Application of risk basedinspection in re1047297nery and processing piping Journal of Loss Prevention in theProcess Industries 18 397e402
Chen C C Lin S Y Wu S H amp Shu C M (2006) Precautions against chemicalaccident in small and medium plant in Taiwan In The 18th annual conference for Chinese Institute of Environmental Engineering (pp 667) Taichung Taiwan ROCTunghai University
Chen K Y Wu S H Wang Y W amp Shu C M (2008) Runaway reaction andthermal hazards simulation of cumene hydroperoxide by DSC Journal of LossPrevention in the Process Industries 21 101e109
Crowl A amp Elwell I (2004) Identifying criteria to classify chemical mixtures ashighly hazardous due to chemical reactivity Journal of Loss Prevention in theProcess Industries 17 279e289
Guidelines for hazard evaluation procedures (2008) The American Institute of Chemical Engineers (3rd ed) New Jersey USA John Wiley amp Sons
Hirano T T (2004) Accidental explosions of semiconductor manufacturing gases in Japan Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 17 29e34
Kao C S amp Hu K H (2002) Acrylic reactor runaway and explosion accident
analysis Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 15 213e
222
C-C Chen et al Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 23 (2010) 531e538 537
8202019 HSE - Loss Prevention in the Petrochemical and Chemical-process High-tech Industries in Taiwan
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullhse-loss-prevention-in-the-petrochemical-and-chemical-process-high-tech-industries 88
Lin Y F Tseng J M Wu T C amp Shu C M (2008) Effects of acetone on methyl ethylketone peroxide runaway reaction Journalof Hazardous Materials 153 1071e1077
Meel A OrsquoNeill L Levin J Seider W Oktem U amp Keren N (2007) Operationalrisk assessment of chemical industries by exploiting accident databases Journalof Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 20 113e127
Muniz B Peon J amp Ordas C (2007) Safety management system developmentand validation of a multidimensional scale Journal of Loss Prevention in theProcess Industries 20 52e68
PohanishR Pamp Greene SA (2003)Wileyguide to chemical incompatibilities(2nded)New York USA John Wiley and Sons
Reyes J amp Beard N (2008) A systematic approach to managing safety Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 21 15e28
Rigas F Konstandinidou M Centola P amp Reggio G T (2003) Safety analysis andrisk assessment in a new pesticide production line Journal of Loss Prevention inthe Process Industries 16 103e109
Rotaru A Constantinescu C Rotaru P Moan A Dumitru M Socaciu M et al(2008) Thermal analysis and thin 1047297lms deposition by matrix-assisted pulsedlaser evaporation of a 4cn type azomonoether Journal of Thermal Analysis andCalorimetry 92 279e284
Shaluf M Ahmadun F amp Shariff A (2003) Technological disaster factors Journalof Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 16 513e521
Suardin J Mannan M amp Halwagi M (2007) The integration of Dow rsquos 1047297re andexplosion index (FampEI) into process design and optimization to achieve
inherently safer design Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 20 79e90
Taipei Times (2005) ASE issues positive outlook in wake of Chungli factory 1047297rehttpwwwtaipeitimescomNews
The annual reports on labor inspection (2004 2005 2006 amp 2007) Council of LaborAffairs Executive Yuan Taipei Taiwan ROC
The Center of Environmental Safety (2001) The explosion of Fu Guo ChemicalCompany httpwwwtsintedutwadminssafetyE5B7A5E5AE89E58DB1E5AEB3danger-1-1htm
The China Post (2005) ASE assesses damage caused by 1047297re at Chungli plant http
wwwchinapostcomtwbusiness2005050361901ASE-assesseshtm TheEpochTimes (2005) Aninvestigation of 1047297re accident of Advanced Semiconductor
Engineering Inc httpwwwepochtimescomb5551n907054htmThe Epoch Times (2010) The Nanpao Resin Company explosion on January 08
2010 httpepochtimescomb51019n2780991htmTseng J M Liu M Y Chang R H Su J L amp Shu C M (2008) Emergency response
plan of chlorine gas for process plants in Taiwan Journal of Loss Prevention in theProcess Industries 21 393e399
Urban P G (2006) (7th ed)Bretherickrsquo s handbook of reactive chemical hazards Vols1e 2 Burlington USA Academic Press
Wu S H Shyu M L Yet-Pole I Chi J H amp Shu C M (2009) Evaluation of runaway reaction for dicumyl peroxide in a batch reactor by DSC and VSP2
Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 22 721e727
C-C Chen et al Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 23 (2010) 531e538538
8202019 HSE - Loss Prevention in the Petrochemical and Chemical-process High-tech Industries in Taiwan
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullhse-loss-prevention-in-the-petrochemical-and-chemical-process-high-tech-industries 68
quantities of chemicals they must follow the regulations mandated
by the CLA in Taiwan to assess the process safety for a dangerous
workplace However these assessments are only for restricted
chemical processes and equipment so the regulations do not
encompass the entire process
Furthermore most of the high-tech plant buildings have
established occupational health and safety assessment systems
(OHSAS 18001) and they obey the requirement to carry out peri-
odic risk assessment The depth and width of the risk assessmenthowever depends on the experience and ability of the assessment
staff Moreover according to the trends of the high-tech industry in
Taiwan incident and minor loss information is treated as con1047297-
dential making accessing and learning from it very dif 1047297cult for
anyone in other plants
Proprietary processes and operating procedures are complex
and loss prevention information is exclusively shared within high-
tech plants so it is very important for the staff at a particular plant
to have the ability to conduct their own independent risk assess-
ment The hidden hazardthat failsto be identi1047297ed is always the key
to a subsequent accident (Suardin Mannan amp Halwagi 2007)
33 Operating procedures
To meet the request of international organizations for stan-
dardization (ISO) high-tech plants have all established required
SOPs However because the equipment is so precise and intricate
and the procedures are so minute and complex it is dif 1047297cult to
encompass all the safety procedures in the SOP Besides operators
do not always follow the guidelines and the SOPs are not always
suitable for their processes points which are usually ignored
leading to accidents in these plants
34 Management of change (MOC)
Parameters and processes for equipment maintenance are
changed frequently and procedures for MOC are not always
elaborated on in high-tech plants Therefore industrial safetystaff does not always know of the changes to the usual process
parameters Because the alterations are often too frequent and
complicated to be recorded it is not clearly de1047297ned what should
be announced or accessed for the hazard More than half of all
1047297re and chemical release accidents occur because the MOCs are
not well implemented
35 Emergency planning and response
The emergency response plan in high-tech plants is usually
developed for ideal conditions If a large-scale accident occurs it
becomes dif 1047297cult to address by the procedures and organization inthe emergency response plan Because the occurrence and evolu-
tion of an accident cannot be predicted the emergency response
plan should not put emphasis on the response 1047298ow but on the
principles of treatment of the victims of a disaster of evacuation of
the requirements for shutting down the gasliquid supply and of
the requirements for transferring the command in a timely manner
By instituting and training employees on well-developed plans
fatal accidents due to mistakes made by the staff during an emer-
gency response can be avoided One example of this type of acci-
dent was the 1047297re that resulted from a silane cylinder leak that
happened at one photovoltaic fabrication plant in Taiwan
36 Employee participation
Practically there may be up to a thousand employees in a single
high-tech plant and they likely have an educational background
that is higher than those in other industrial sectors Having
employees participate in safety work or risk-reducing safety
measures depends on the safety awareness of senior managers and
organizations (Shaluf Ahmadun amp Shariff 2003)
Whether or not the organization or upper management places
a strong emphasis on safety can often be discovered by checking
the relationship between plant production and the annual plans in
the plants The high-tech industry has a market cycle When plants
are operating at full capacity many shorten the duration of annual
shutdowns or prolong the period between shutdowns to catch up
with orders and all employees participate in the work to increase
production All of these circumstances can result in accidents
37 Training
High-tech plants should follow sound training protocols with
extraordinary diligence However because of the nature of the
high-tech profession some problems might occur such as
whether an instructor is competent whether teaching materials
are adequate and whether employees follow the program to
receive the training One common fault is that the training which
is supposed to be done by a knowledgeable engineer is instead
done by an apprentice or inexperienced engineer because the
advanced employee cannot leave their position for too long It is
dif 1047297cult to estimate the damage caused by these insuf 1047297ciently
trained personnel
Table 1
Characteristics of common corrosive chemicals utilized in high-tech companies
(Urban 2006)
Material Application TLV-TWA IDLH
HCl Etching 5 ppm e
H3PO4 Etching 1 mgm3 100 ppm
H2SO4 Etching 1 mgm3 80 ppm mgm3
HF Etching 3 ppm 20 ppm
HNO3 Etching 2 ppm 100 ppmTMAH Photo e e
TLV-TWA threshold limit valueetime weighted average
IDLH immediately dangerous to life and health
TMAH tetramethylammonium hydroxide
Table 2
Characteristics of common solvents used in high-tech companies (Pohanish amp
Greene 2003 Urban 2006)
Material Application TLV-TWA IDLH Explosive limits
Ac eton e Phot oet chi ng 750 ppm 20000 ppm 25e128
IPA Photoetching 400 ppm 20000 ppm 2e12
HMDS Photo e e 07e31
Photoresist Photo e e e
IPA isopropyl alcohol
HMDS hexamethyldisiloxane
Table 3
Characteristics of common specialty gases used in high-tech companies (Carson amp
Mumford 1995 Urban 2006)
Material Application TLV-TWA IDLH Explosive limits
AsH3 Implant 005 ppm 6 ppm 45e78
BF3 Implant 1 ppm 100 ppm e
B2H6 Deposition 01 ppm 40 ppm 08e88
SiCl2H2 Dif fusion 05 ppm e 41e99
PH3 Implant 03 ppm 200 ppm 16e
98BCl3 Implant e e e
SiH4 Depositio n 5 ppm e 14e96
SF6 Etching 1000 ppm e e
NF3 Etching 10 ppm 2000 ppm e
C-C Chen et al Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 23 (2010) 531e538536
8202019 HSE - Loss Prevention in the Petrochemical and Chemical-process High-tech Industries in Taiwan
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullhse-loss-prevention-in-the-petrochemical-and-chemical-process-high-tech-industries 78
38 Contractor management
Generally speaking the majority of high-tech companies in
Taiwan have good contractor management systems in which
various methods are employed to carefully screen contractors in
advance Nevertheless some serious accidents including 1047297re and
leakage have still occurred in high-tech companies due to reckless
operation by contractors For example an arsine leak in one plant
caused many operators to be hospitalized a silane leak in another
plant led to a con1047298agration and a 1047297lling error of water treatment
reagents resulted in a chlorine leak
39 Incident investigation
Incident investigations in high-tech plants are performed
cautiously and con1047297dentially Information regarding incident
investigations is closed not only between one business and
another but also between subsidiary companies in the same
business group The industrial safety staff often encounter the
problems of important questions being evaded and intentional
concealment when they investigate an incident or false alarm In
the case of an evacuation caused by a false 1047297re alarm althoughthe engineering department knew the whole story they were
unwilling or reluctant to share the true details which make
incident investigation dif 1047297cult However if a serious accident
occurred the regional labor safety department from CLA would
initiate a thorough investigation seeking out the root cause and
proposing prevention measures for future operation
310 Compliance audits
Each high-tech company has its own audit system for safety
management The industrial safety staff usually perform the
primary audit whereas a department manager generally does the
secondary audit The auditorrsquos experience and ability affectswhether a violation of a safety regulation or potential hazard can
be identi1047297ed However a high-tech company is comprised of
many different technologies and departments so most industrial
safety staff audits only the technology in which they specialize
The safety audits mostly focus on super1047297cial mistakes therefore
many serious mistakes such as equipment safety protections
being illegally bypassed are often not discovered
311 Pre-startup safety review
The equipment in high-tech companies usually goes through
a pre-startup safety inspection before being put into of 1047297cial regular
production The inspected items include supply systems safetymonitoring equipment pipelines vent systems and emergency
shutdowns However some plants still put the equipment into
production without a pre-startup safety inspection due to urgent
production demands
312 Hot work permit
A hot work permit receives signi1047297cant attention in high-tech
companies so very few plants have accidents because of poor
management of hot work permits These hot work permits however
should be expanded to 1047297re control (ie any chemicals that might
cause a 1047297re should be kept away from a 1047297re or external thermal
source)
313 Mechanical integrity
Unlike petrochemical plants general maintenance in high-tech
companies is conducted quite well and thus accidents are seldom
caused by equipment aging and pipeline corrosion
4 Conclusions
Most of the plants in the chemical industries that are small or
medium scale require counseling and assistance to effectively
improve loss prevention (Fig 6) The labor commission will be able
to provide personalizedassistance based on the actual conditions of
each plant if it categorizes and classi1047297es the data accumulated from
the 190 plants that accepted counseling and assistance For
example plants with suf 1047297cient manpower budget and certain
levels of safety management can be provided with thorough
assistance regarding safety management However those having
inferior safety management should be offered extraordinary
assistance on key subjects so that they can obtain the correct
knowledge and develop experience to further avoid serious risks
The best effect will be achieved if the plants are guided and assisted
on the basis of their individual needs
In Taiwan the hazards and risks of high-tech companies are
higher than in other industrial sectors Therefore a variety of safety
management methods and regulations appropriate for high-tech
companies have been generated and implemented However it
is crucial for managers and industrial safety specialists to think
carefully about how to completely identify understand and control
potential hazards associated with the manufacturing processes
Furthermore they need to determine and address uncertainties
that arise from any operational errors or incidents across the whole
range of stages in manufacturing
Acknowledgments
The authors are deeply grateful to Mr A MJaneshek of The Dow
Chemical Co Freeport Texas USA for his valuable assistance and
suggestions
References
Basso B Carpegna C Dibitonto C Gaido G Robotto A amp Zonato C (2004)Reviewing the safety management system by incident investigation andperformance indicators Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 17 225e231
Beatriz F M Manuel M P amp Camilo V O (2007) Safety management systemdevelopment and validation of a multidimensional scale Journal of LossPrevention in the Process Industries 20 52e68
Bernatik A amp Libisova M (2004) Loss prevention in heavy industry risk assess-ment of large gasholders Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 17 271e278
Carson P Aamp MumfordC J (1995) Thesafehandlingof chemicalsin industry(2nded)New York USA Longman Scienti1047297c amp Technical
Chang M K Chang R R Shu C M amp Lin K N (2005) Application of risk basedinspection in re1047297nery and processing piping Journal of Loss Prevention in theProcess Industries 18 397e402
Chen C C Lin S Y Wu S H amp Shu C M (2006) Precautions against chemicalaccident in small and medium plant in Taiwan In The 18th annual conference for Chinese Institute of Environmental Engineering (pp 667) Taichung Taiwan ROCTunghai University
Chen K Y Wu S H Wang Y W amp Shu C M (2008) Runaway reaction andthermal hazards simulation of cumene hydroperoxide by DSC Journal of LossPrevention in the Process Industries 21 101e109
Crowl A amp Elwell I (2004) Identifying criteria to classify chemical mixtures ashighly hazardous due to chemical reactivity Journal of Loss Prevention in theProcess Industries 17 279e289
Guidelines for hazard evaluation procedures (2008) The American Institute of Chemical Engineers (3rd ed) New Jersey USA John Wiley amp Sons
Hirano T T (2004) Accidental explosions of semiconductor manufacturing gases in Japan Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 17 29e34
Kao C S amp Hu K H (2002) Acrylic reactor runaway and explosion accident
analysis Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 15 213e
222
C-C Chen et al Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 23 (2010) 531e538 537
8202019 HSE - Loss Prevention in the Petrochemical and Chemical-process High-tech Industries in Taiwan
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullhse-loss-prevention-in-the-petrochemical-and-chemical-process-high-tech-industries 88
Lin Y F Tseng J M Wu T C amp Shu C M (2008) Effects of acetone on methyl ethylketone peroxide runaway reaction Journalof Hazardous Materials 153 1071e1077
Meel A OrsquoNeill L Levin J Seider W Oktem U amp Keren N (2007) Operationalrisk assessment of chemical industries by exploiting accident databases Journalof Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 20 113e127
Muniz B Peon J amp Ordas C (2007) Safety management system developmentand validation of a multidimensional scale Journal of Loss Prevention in theProcess Industries 20 52e68
PohanishR Pamp Greene SA (2003)Wileyguide to chemical incompatibilities(2nded)New York USA John Wiley and Sons
Reyes J amp Beard N (2008) A systematic approach to managing safety Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 21 15e28
Rigas F Konstandinidou M Centola P amp Reggio G T (2003) Safety analysis andrisk assessment in a new pesticide production line Journal of Loss Prevention inthe Process Industries 16 103e109
Rotaru A Constantinescu C Rotaru P Moan A Dumitru M Socaciu M et al(2008) Thermal analysis and thin 1047297lms deposition by matrix-assisted pulsedlaser evaporation of a 4cn type azomonoether Journal of Thermal Analysis andCalorimetry 92 279e284
Shaluf M Ahmadun F amp Shariff A (2003) Technological disaster factors Journalof Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 16 513e521
Suardin J Mannan M amp Halwagi M (2007) The integration of Dow rsquos 1047297re andexplosion index (FampEI) into process design and optimization to achieve
inherently safer design Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 20 79e90
Taipei Times (2005) ASE issues positive outlook in wake of Chungli factory 1047297rehttpwwwtaipeitimescomNews
The annual reports on labor inspection (2004 2005 2006 amp 2007) Council of LaborAffairs Executive Yuan Taipei Taiwan ROC
The Center of Environmental Safety (2001) The explosion of Fu Guo ChemicalCompany httpwwwtsintedutwadminssafetyE5B7A5E5AE89E58DB1E5AEB3danger-1-1htm
The China Post (2005) ASE assesses damage caused by 1047297re at Chungli plant http
wwwchinapostcomtwbusiness2005050361901ASE-assesseshtm TheEpochTimes (2005) Aninvestigation of 1047297re accident of Advanced Semiconductor
Engineering Inc httpwwwepochtimescomb5551n907054htmThe Epoch Times (2010) The Nanpao Resin Company explosion on January 08
2010 httpepochtimescomb51019n2780991htmTseng J M Liu M Y Chang R H Su J L amp Shu C M (2008) Emergency response
plan of chlorine gas for process plants in Taiwan Journal of Loss Prevention in theProcess Industries 21 393e399
Urban P G (2006) (7th ed)Bretherickrsquo s handbook of reactive chemical hazards Vols1e 2 Burlington USA Academic Press
Wu S H Shyu M L Yet-Pole I Chi J H amp Shu C M (2009) Evaluation of runaway reaction for dicumyl peroxide in a batch reactor by DSC and VSP2
Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 22 721e727
C-C Chen et al Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 23 (2010) 531e538538
8202019 HSE - Loss Prevention in the Petrochemical and Chemical-process High-tech Industries in Taiwan
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullhse-loss-prevention-in-the-petrochemical-and-chemical-process-high-tech-industries 78
38 Contractor management
Generally speaking the majority of high-tech companies in
Taiwan have good contractor management systems in which
various methods are employed to carefully screen contractors in
advance Nevertheless some serious accidents including 1047297re and
leakage have still occurred in high-tech companies due to reckless
operation by contractors For example an arsine leak in one plant
caused many operators to be hospitalized a silane leak in another
plant led to a con1047298agration and a 1047297lling error of water treatment
reagents resulted in a chlorine leak
39 Incident investigation
Incident investigations in high-tech plants are performed
cautiously and con1047297dentially Information regarding incident
investigations is closed not only between one business and
another but also between subsidiary companies in the same
business group The industrial safety staff often encounter the
problems of important questions being evaded and intentional
concealment when they investigate an incident or false alarm In
the case of an evacuation caused by a false 1047297re alarm althoughthe engineering department knew the whole story they were
unwilling or reluctant to share the true details which make
incident investigation dif 1047297cult However if a serious accident
occurred the regional labor safety department from CLA would
initiate a thorough investigation seeking out the root cause and
proposing prevention measures for future operation
310 Compliance audits
Each high-tech company has its own audit system for safety
management The industrial safety staff usually perform the
primary audit whereas a department manager generally does the
secondary audit The auditorrsquos experience and ability affectswhether a violation of a safety regulation or potential hazard can
be identi1047297ed However a high-tech company is comprised of
many different technologies and departments so most industrial
safety staff audits only the technology in which they specialize
The safety audits mostly focus on super1047297cial mistakes therefore
many serious mistakes such as equipment safety protections
being illegally bypassed are often not discovered
311 Pre-startup safety review
The equipment in high-tech companies usually goes through
a pre-startup safety inspection before being put into of 1047297cial regular
production The inspected items include supply systems safetymonitoring equipment pipelines vent systems and emergency
shutdowns However some plants still put the equipment into
production without a pre-startup safety inspection due to urgent
production demands
312 Hot work permit
A hot work permit receives signi1047297cant attention in high-tech
companies so very few plants have accidents because of poor
management of hot work permits These hot work permits however
should be expanded to 1047297re control (ie any chemicals that might
cause a 1047297re should be kept away from a 1047297re or external thermal
source)
313 Mechanical integrity
Unlike petrochemical plants general maintenance in high-tech
companies is conducted quite well and thus accidents are seldom
caused by equipment aging and pipeline corrosion
4 Conclusions
Most of the plants in the chemical industries that are small or
medium scale require counseling and assistance to effectively
improve loss prevention (Fig 6) The labor commission will be able
to provide personalizedassistance based on the actual conditions of
each plant if it categorizes and classi1047297es the data accumulated from
the 190 plants that accepted counseling and assistance For
example plants with suf 1047297cient manpower budget and certain
levels of safety management can be provided with thorough
assistance regarding safety management However those having
inferior safety management should be offered extraordinary
assistance on key subjects so that they can obtain the correct
knowledge and develop experience to further avoid serious risks
The best effect will be achieved if the plants are guided and assisted
on the basis of their individual needs
In Taiwan the hazards and risks of high-tech companies are
higher than in other industrial sectors Therefore a variety of safety
management methods and regulations appropriate for high-tech
companies have been generated and implemented However it
is crucial for managers and industrial safety specialists to think
carefully about how to completely identify understand and control
potential hazards associated with the manufacturing processes
Furthermore they need to determine and address uncertainties
that arise from any operational errors or incidents across the whole
range of stages in manufacturing
Acknowledgments
The authors are deeply grateful to Mr A MJaneshek of The Dow
Chemical Co Freeport Texas USA for his valuable assistance and
suggestions
References
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Beatriz F M Manuel M P amp Camilo V O (2007) Safety management systemdevelopment and validation of a multidimensional scale Journal of LossPrevention in the Process Industries 20 52e68
Bernatik A amp Libisova M (2004) Loss prevention in heavy industry risk assess-ment of large gasholders Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 17 271e278
Carson P Aamp MumfordC J (1995) Thesafehandlingof chemicalsin industry(2nded)New York USA Longman Scienti1047297c amp Technical
Chang M K Chang R R Shu C M amp Lin K N (2005) Application of risk basedinspection in re1047297nery and processing piping Journal of Loss Prevention in theProcess Industries 18 397e402
Chen C C Lin S Y Wu S H amp Shu C M (2006) Precautions against chemicalaccident in small and medium plant in Taiwan In The 18th annual conference for Chinese Institute of Environmental Engineering (pp 667) Taichung Taiwan ROCTunghai University
Chen K Y Wu S H Wang Y W amp Shu C M (2008) Runaway reaction andthermal hazards simulation of cumene hydroperoxide by DSC Journal of LossPrevention in the Process Industries 21 101e109
Crowl A amp Elwell I (2004) Identifying criteria to classify chemical mixtures ashighly hazardous due to chemical reactivity Journal of Loss Prevention in theProcess Industries 17 279e289
Guidelines for hazard evaluation procedures (2008) The American Institute of Chemical Engineers (3rd ed) New Jersey USA John Wiley amp Sons
Hirano T T (2004) Accidental explosions of semiconductor manufacturing gases in Japan Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 17 29e34
Kao C S amp Hu K H (2002) Acrylic reactor runaway and explosion accident
analysis Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 15 213e
222
C-C Chen et al Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 23 (2010) 531e538 537
8202019 HSE - Loss Prevention in the Petrochemical and Chemical-process High-tech Industries in Taiwan
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Lin Y F Tseng J M Wu T C amp Shu C M (2008) Effects of acetone on methyl ethylketone peroxide runaway reaction Journalof Hazardous Materials 153 1071e1077
Meel A OrsquoNeill L Levin J Seider W Oktem U amp Keren N (2007) Operationalrisk assessment of chemical industries by exploiting accident databases Journalof Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 20 113e127
Muniz B Peon J amp Ordas C (2007) Safety management system developmentand validation of a multidimensional scale Journal of Loss Prevention in theProcess Industries 20 52e68
PohanishR Pamp Greene SA (2003)Wileyguide to chemical incompatibilities(2nded)New York USA John Wiley and Sons
Reyes J amp Beard N (2008) A systematic approach to managing safety Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 21 15e28
Rigas F Konstandinidou M Centola P amp Reggio G T (2003) Safety analysis andrisk assessment in a new pesticide production line Journal of Loss Prevention inthe Process Industries 16 103e109
Rotaru A Constantinescu C Rotaru P Moan A Dumitru M Socaciu M et al(2008) Thermal analysis and thin 1047297lms deposition by matrix-assisted pulsedlaser evaporation of a 4cn type azomonoether Journal of Thermal Analysis andCalorimetry 92 279e284
Shaluf M Ahmadun F amp Shariff A (2003) Technological disaster factors Journalof Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 16 513e521
Suardin J Mannan M amp Halwagi M (2007) The integration of Dow rsquos 1047297re andexplosion index (FampEI) into process design and optimization to achieve
inherently safer design Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 20 79e90
Taipei Times (2005) ASE issues positive outlook in wake of Chungli factory 1047297rehttpwwwtaipeitimescomNews
The annual reports on labor inspection (2004 2005 2006 amp 2007) Council of LaborAffairs Executive Yuan Taipei Taiwan ROC
The Center of Environmental Safety (2001) The explosion of Fu Guo ChemicalCompany httpwwwtsintedutwadminssafetyE5B7A5E5AE89E58DB1E5AEB3danger-1-1htm
The China Post (2005) ASE assesses damage caused by 1047297re at Chungli plant http
wwwchinapostcomtwbusiness2005050361901ASE-assesseshtm TheEpochTimes (2005) Aninvestigation of 1047297re accident of Advanced Semiconductor
Engineering Inc httpwwwepochtimescomb5551n907054htmThe Epoch Times (2010) The Nanpao Resin Company explosion on January 08
2010 httpepochtimescomb51019n2780991htmTseng J M Liu M Y Chang R H Su J L amp Shu C M (2008) Emergency response
plan of chlorine gas for process plants in Taiwan Journal of Loss Prevention in theProcess Industries 21 393e399
Urban P G (2006) (7th ed)Bretherickrsquo s handbook of reactive chemical hazards Vols1e 2 Burlington USA Academic Press
Wu S H Shyu M L Yet-Pole I Chi J H amp Shu C M (2009) Evaluation of runaway reaction for dicumyl peroxide in a batch reactor by DSC and VSP2
Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 22 721e727
C-C Chen et al Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 23 (2010) 531e538538
8202019 HSE - Loss Prevention in the Petrochemical and Chemical-process High-tech Industries in Taiwan
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullhse-loss-prevention-in-the-petrochemical-and-chemical-process-high-tech-industries 88
Lin Y F Tseng J M Wu T C amp Shu C M (2008) Effects of acetone on methyl ethylketone peroxide runaway reaction Journalof Hazardous Materials 153 1071e1077
Meel A OrsquoNeill L Levin J Seider W Oktem U amp Keren N (2007) Operationalrisk assessment of chemical industries by exploiting accident databases Journalof Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 20 113e127
Muniz B Peon J amp Ordas C (2007) Safety management system developmentand validation of a multidimensional scale Journal of Loss Prevention in theProcess Industries 20 52e68
PohanishR Pamp Greene SA (2003)Wileyguide to chemical incompatibilities(2nded)New York USA John Wiley and Sons
Reyes J amp Beard N (2008) A systematic approach to managing safety Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 21 15e28
Rigas F Konstandinidou M Centola P amp Reggio G T (2003) Safety analysis andrisk assessment in a new pesticide production line Journal of Loss Prevention inthe Process Industries 16 103e109
Rotaru A Constantinescu C Rotaru P Moan A Dumitru M Socaciu M et al(2008) Thermal analysis and thin 1047297lms deposition by matrix-assisted pulsedlaser evaporation of a 4cn type azomonoether Journal of Thermal Analysis andCalorimetry 92 279e284
Shaluf M Ahmadun F amp Shariff A (2003) Technological disaster factors Journalof Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 16 513e521
Suardin J Mannan M amp Halwagi M (2007) The integration of Dow rsquos 1047297re andexplosion index (FampEI) into process design and optimization to achieve
inherently safer design Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 20 79e90
Taipei Times (2005) ASE issues positive outlook in wake of Chungli factory 1047297rehttpwwwtaipeitimescomNews
The annual reports on labor inspection (2004 2005 2006 amp 2007) Council of LaborAffairs Executive Yuan Taipei Taiwan ROC
The Center of Environmental Safety (2001) The explosion of Fu Guo ChemicalCompany httpwwwtsintedutwadminssafetyE5B7A5E5AE89E58DB1E5AEB3danger-1-1htm
The China Post (2005) ASE assesses damage caused by 1047297re at Chungli plant http
wwwchinapostcomtwbusiness2005050361901ASE-assesseshtm TheEpochTimes (2005) Aninvestigation of 1047297re accident of Advanced Semiconductor
Engineering Inc httpwwwepochtimescomb5551n907054htmThe Epoch Times (2010) The Nanpao Resin Company explosion on January 08
2010 httpepochtimescomb51019n2780991htmTseng J M Liu M Y Chang R H Su J L amp Shu C M (2008) Emergency response
plan of chlorine gas for process plants in Taiwan Journal of Loss Prevention in theProcess Industries 21 393e399
Urban P G (2006) (7th ed)Bretherickrsquo s handbook of reactive chemical hazards Vols1e 2 Burlington USA Academic Press
Wu S H Shyu M L Yet-Pole I Chi J H amp Shu C M (2009) Evaluation of runaway reaction for dicumyl peroxide in a batch reactor by DSC and VSP2
Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 22 721e727
C-C Chen et al Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 23 (2010) 531e538538