Hugh H. Benson, Meno, The Slave Boy and the Elenchos

7/30/2019 Hugh H. Benson, Meno, The Slave Boy and the Elenchos

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Meno, the Slave Boy and the Elenchos

HUGH H. BENSON

There is a view in Platonic scholarship according to which Socrates is a sort

of skeptic, whose skepticism is thought of as

a first step toward ridding oneselfof a false conceit ofknowledge, so that genuine

knowledge might, somehow, be put in its place. Plato ... went beyond Socrates in

developing a view about how such knowledge might be gained.'1

I believe that this view is essentially correct. It has, however, been attacked

on at least two fronts. First, a number of scholars have denied the dis-

tinction in the dialogues between Socrates and Plato upon which this view

depends.2 They argue that the dialogues present the same view through-out.3 The differences from one dialogue to another are a matter of empha-


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sis, not change. More recently, the view has come under attack from a new

quarter. These new critics maintain the distinction between Socrates and

Plato that the earlier critics had denied. They, however, deny that the

'Socrates' of this distinction is merely a destructive critic without a sub-

stantive view about how genuine knowledge might be put in the place of the

eliminated false conceit. For, according to the new critics, Socrates' under-

stood his elenchos not simply as a method of eliminating this conceit, but

also as a method for acquiring genuine knowledge to replace it. Thus, Plato

does not go beyond Socrates in the sense of providing a substantive view

about how knowledge is to be acquired, which Socrates previously failed to

have. Rather, he goes beyond Socrates only in the sense ofsubstituting one

substantive view about how knowledge is to be acquired with another.5 5

In the present essay I will argue that the Meno provides a rather strong

prima facie case against the new critics.6 A careful examination of the

structure of the Meno suggests that Plato takes himself to be going beyond

the Socratic method, not replacing or revising it.' The theory of recollection

(TR), first introduced in the Meno, is presented as a substantive view about

how knowledge is to be acquired once the Socratic elenchos has achieved its

aim8 i.e., once it has eliminated the interlocutor's false conceit.

First, I will show that (a) the beginning of the slave-boy conversation,

82b-84a, does no more than eliminate the slave-boy's false conceit of


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knowledge, (b) this part of the slave-boy conversation precisely parallels

the main conversation with Meno leading up to his famous paradox,

71a-79e, and (c) it is not until the second part of the slave-boy conversation,

84c-85b, that the substantive view of knowledge acquisition, the TR, is

illustrated.? 9

Second, I will argue that there is a very close resemblance between the

first part of the conversation with Meno and the conversations with the

interlocutors of the earlier dialogues: both the earlier conversations and the

first part of the conversation with Meno follow the same general steps in

order to achieve the same result. The repetition of the pattern of the early

dialogues found in this part of the Meno (71a-79e) provides excellent

grounds for the view that Plato understands the substantive theory of

knowledge acquisition which he introduces in the Meno as a progression

beyond the conversations of the earlier dialogues, not as a substitute for or

revision of those conversations.

Finally, I will respond to the interpretations of two ofthe most influential

new critics, Terence Irwin and Gregory Vlastos. For both Irwin and Vlas-

tos, by the time of the Meno Plato's attitude toward the elenchos has

undergone revision. In the case of Irwin, Plato no longer take the elenchos

to be unable to yield moral knowledge. In the case of Vlastos, Plato no

longer takes the elenchos to be 'the final arbiter of moral truth. "0 My

responses to these interpretations will be necessarily sketchy. Complete

responses would require a detailed analysis of the early dialogues inappro-

priate for an essay of this sort. 11 I intend only to raise enough questions

about these interpretations to enable the force of the Meno's innovation to

be felt. Plato's attitude toward the elenchos in the Meno has not changed.

Rather, the Meno suggests that Plato is simply advancing beyond it. He is

advancing beyond the Socratic/elenctic goal of eliminating false conceit to

provide for the first time a substantive view about how knowledge might

then be acquired.

The Conversation with the Slave-Boy and the Conversation with Meno.

Outline of the Slave-Boy Conversation. At 80d5 the conversation with Meno

concerning the nature of virtue has temporarily12 come to an end. Meno has


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described himself as numbed in both his mind and tongue as if by a

sting-ray, yet, Socrates enjoins Meno to continue the search into the nature

of virtue. This elicits Meno's paradox: 13

(Tl) M: In what way, Socrates, will you search for that thing which you do notknow at all what it is? What sort ofthing, of those things youdo not know will

you set up as the object ofyour search? Or even ifyou should happen uponit, how will you know that this is what you didn't know?

S: I know what you mean, Meno. Do you know how contentious an argu-ment you are introducing, that it ispossible for a person to search for neither

what he knows nor what he does not know? For, he could not search for whathe knows - for he knows it and there is no need to search for it - nor could he

search for what he does not know - for he does not know what to search for.

(80d5-e5)".

This brings the conversation with Meno concerning the nature ofvirtue to a

grinding halt. To respond to Meno's paradox Socrates introduces for the

first time in the dialogues the theory of recollection. And it is in order to

illustrate this theory to Meno that Socrates engages in the slave-boyconversation.

The conversation can be seen to fall into four main stages each followed

by 'a commentary to explain what Socrates is doing.'15 In the first stage

(82b4-e4), Socrates asks and explains the question which will occupy therest of the conversation:

(T2) Try to say to me what the length of each side of this figure will be. For the

length of the side ofthis one is two feet; what is the length of the side of that

double one? (82d8-e2)

And the slave-boy confidently answers:

(T3) It is clear, Socrates, that the length will be double. (82e2-3)

Socrates notes in the commentary which follows this stage that the slave-

boy at this point thinks that he knows the answer:


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(T4) And now [the slaveboy] thinks he knows what sort of line it is from which the

eight-foot square will come to be. (82e5-6)

In the second stage (82e14-84a2), Socrates refutes the slave-boy's initial

answers that the line will be four feet long and that it will be three-feet long

by eliciting from him propositions incompatible with those answers. 16 Upon

being asked to try again, the slave-boy responds:

(T5) But, by Zeus, Socrates, I do not know. (84al-2)

The false conceit which had been displayed in the previous stage has now

been eliminated. This is followed by a rather extensive commentary in

which Socrates explains the achievement of this stage (84a2-d2).

In the third stage (84d3-85b7), Socrates leads the slave-boy from his

recognition of ignorance to the true belief that the length of the side of the

double square is the length of the diagonal of the original square. The

fourth stage is not, properly speaking, a part of the slave-boy conversation.

Socrates describes this stage (85c10-d1), but does not illustrate it. It is the

stage in which the slave-boy would be led from true belief to knowledge

'concerning these things'.

The Achievement ofthe Second Stage. Let us now look more closely at whatPlato takes the slave-boy conversation to illustrate. First, in the com-

mentary following the second stage Plato is clear about what he thinks has

been achieved up to this point in the conversation - the elimination of the

slave-boy's false conceit of knowledge:

(T6) Do you recognize, Meno, what stage he has reached in the process of

recollection? At first he did not know what the length of the side of the

eight-foot square was,just as he does not know now, but then he thought he

knew what it was, and answeredconfidently

asknowing

and did not think he

was at a loss. But now he thinks that he is at a loss and thinks that he does not

know,just as in fact he does not. (84a3-bl)

There is no indication anywhere in the entire aside to Meno that Plato

thinks that the slave-boy now has any more information concerning the

answer to the question of (T2), whether in the form of true belief or


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knowledge, than he had when the conversation began. 17 In that sense, as far

as Plato is concerned, this stage has been wholly negative. The slave-boy is

no closer to the correct answer than he was at the beginning. Nevertheless,

there is another sense in which the results of this stage have been far from

wholly negative:

(T7) For now [the slave-boy]willgladly search for [the length of the side], as onenot knowing, whereas formerly he thought that he could speak well and

easily before many people and often concerning the double square that itmust have a side double in length... Do you thinkthat formerly he wouldhave tried to search for or learn this thing that he thought he knew though he

didn't, until realizing that he didn't know, he was reduced to being at a loss,and felt the need to know. (84bl0-c6)

Thus, as Plato sees the achievement of this stage of the slave-boy conversa-

tion, it is purely destructive in eliminating the slave-boy's false conceit of

knowledge, and yet is immensely important in the achievement of more

positive results.

This will strike most commentators as too strong. While most would

agree that Plato sees the achievement of the second stage to be the elim-

ination of the slave-boy's false conceit and that this is indeed not simply a

negative result, but an important first step in more positive results, fewwould agree that the slave-boy is no closer to the correct answer than he was

at the beginning. The slave-boy is closer to the correct answer by the end of

the second stage, it will be thought, at least in the sense of now knowingsome of the lengths the line is Thus, it is too strong to say that as far as

Plato is concerned the slave-boy has no more knowledge concerning the

answer to the question of (T2) at the end of the second stage than he had

when the conversation began. He now knows, and didn't earlier, that the

answers four-feet and three-feet are false.Such a view is eminently reasonable, but what is the evidence for it?

Socrates nowhere says that the slave-boy now recognizes that his answers


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are false, nor even does he say that they are false. All that he says is that the

slave-boy now no longer thinks that he knows. But ifthere is any dialogue in

which we ought to recognize that showing that one does not know does not

require showing falsehood it is the Meno, the dialogue in which the dis-

tinction between knowledge and true belief is most explicitly and forcefully

drawn. As far as I can tell the evidence that Plato takes the result of the

second stage to be the slave-boy's recognition that his answers are false is

that (1) the answers are false, and (2) the answer that the slave-boy

eventually comes up with at the end of the third stage is true and Socrates

remarks that it is. But these two features of the conversation can and should

be explained otherwise.

Recall that the slave-boy conversation is offered as an illustration of the

theory of recollection, which in turn is offered in response to Meno's

paradox. Further, Plato makes clear that he takes the essential challenge of

Meno's paradox to be to show that inquiry concerning what one fails to

know is worthwhile:

(T8) I would not confidently assert the other things said in defense of this account,but that we would be better and braver and less idle if we believe that one

ought to inquire concerning those things he fails to know than if one believes

it is not possible to discover nor necessary to inquire concerning those thingsone fails to know, I would fight for in both word and deed as far as I am able.

(86b6-c2)

But this is not all there is to the challenge of the paradox. Plato does not

merely need to show that inquiry concerning what one fails to know is

possible, but that it is possible even when all the parties to the inquiry fail to

know.19 Further, given the distinction between knowledge and true belief,

Plato must show not merely that one can come to have true belief, when one

fails to know, but that one can come to have knowledge. 20 Given these two


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additional features of the challenge there is a sense in which the best

example to offer by way of meeting this challenge is one in which the

interlocutor, initially ignorant, whether in the sense of having true or false

belief, comes to have knowledge, when all of the parties to the inquiry are

ignorant as well. But this is notoriously not the sort of example that Plato

offers. The slave-boy is not displayed as coming to have knowledge of

something he previously failed to know, but merely as coming to have true

belief. It is simply asserted without argument that this true belief can be

transformed into knowledge:

(T9) If someone asked him these same questions again and in a variety ofways,

you know that in the end he would know these things lessaccurately than no

one. (85c10-dl)

Further, the example which Plato offers does not exhibit an inquiry in which

all of the parties of the inquiry fail to have the relevant knowledge. Socrates

and Meno know the answer to the question asked in (T2). It is only the

slave-boy who does not. 21

That Plato does not offer an example which takes account of these two

features of the challenge is I believe fairly easy to understand. To do so

would require an interminably long digression. If Plato were to offer anexample of someone coming to have knowledge of something he formerly

failed to know, Plato would need to exhibit the slave-boy coming to have at

least a true belief that was stable. But this would seem to require the

exhibition of a number of unsuccessful attempts at persuading the slave-boy

that the square on the diagonal is not double the area. Further, if Plato were

to offer an example in which neither he nor Meno knew the correct answer,

he would need to explain how Meno who does not know could recognize

thatthe slave-boy does without begging

thequestion

of theparadox.

Remember that at least part of the point of the slave-boy conversation is to

convince Meno that inquiry concerning what one fails to know is worth-


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while and that part of the challenge of the paradox is to explain how one

who does not know something can recognize it should he happen upon it.

On the other hand, ifPlato provides an example in which the slave-boy

goes from beliefs concerning the answer to the question in (T2) that Meno

can recognize are false to a belief that Meno can recognize is true, he would

be able to satisfy some of the challenge of the paradox much more briefly.

He would be able to satisfy Meno that some progress at least is possible.

Thus, the facts that the slave-boy's initial answers are false and his last

answer is true are readily explained by the fact that in offering such an

example Plato can meet what he takes to be the essence of Meno's challenge

in a relatively short space.

Further, if it is primarily a consideration ofexpediency that leads Plato to

offer an example that has these two features, we should expect Plato to do

two things. First, he should downplay the fact that Meno, and especially

Socrates, know the answer to the question at (T2). For, if Plato's example is

to succeed in meeting the full-fledged challenge of the paradox, Meno's and

Socrates' knowledge must be only an expedient. It must not play an essen-

tial role in the slave-boy's progress. Second, Plato should disassociate the

achievement of the second stage from the progress of the third. For the

slave-boy's initial answer could have been true and yet he might still have

failed to have the knowledge that he thinks he has. Once again, that these

answers are false is only an expedient. It should not play an essential role in

the slave-boy's progress in the third stage. Both of these expectations,

however, are fulfilled.

First, it has been universally noted and frequently disparaged that So-

crates repeatedly denies having taught the slave-boy anything:

(T10) Do you see, Meno, that I am teaching him nothing, but am asking every-

thing. (82e4-5 ; see also 82b6-7, 84c11-d2,and 85d3-4)

These denials are necessary only because Socrates knows the answer to the

question under consideration in the particular example. Plato, however, is

concerned to make clear that the fact that Socrates does is playing no

essential role in the slave-boy's progress. Second, that Plato is also con-

cerned to disassociate the achievement of the second stage from the pro-

gress of the subsequent stages is testified to in two ways. First, all the

commentators areagreed

that Plato'slanguage

at thebeginning

of the third

stage indicates that he has drawn a new diagram to which the questions of

this stage are directed. This, however, indicates the independence of this

part of the conversation from what has preceded.23 Socrates and the slave-


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boy begin again from scratch. Second, it has reasonably been asked why

Plato should have chosen such a difficult problem to illustrate the TR, a

problem which is arithmetically insoluble . 4 There are I believe a number of

reasons why Plato might have chosen such an example, but if Plato were

concerned to disassociate the fact that the slave-boy's initial answers were

false from the progress of the third stage, he could have hardly chosen a

better example. Clearly the information that the answers four feet and

three feet are false will be of little help in arriving at the correct answer.

Thus, I see little reason to attribute to Plato the view that the second stageof the slave-boy conversation achieves anything more than the elimination

of the slave-boy's false conceit of knowledge. This is all that Socrates says

that it achieves in the commentary in which he is explicitly discussing its

achievement and the facts that the initial answers are false and the answer of

the third stage is true is readily explicable by the context of the conversa-

tion. If Plato does believe that the interlocutor has more information

concerning the answer to the governing question than he had at the begin-

ning, the evidence for this must come from elsewhere.

The Parallel with the First Part of the Conversation with Meno. The second

thing that should be noticed about the slave-boy conversation is that Plato

understands the first two stages of this conversation to be a precise parallelto the main conversation with Meno leading up to the introduction of the

paradox. First, just as the slave-boy conversation begins by asking and

explaining the question which will govern the rest of the conversation, so

does the conversation with Meno. At 71d5 Socrates asks Meno

(T11) What do you say virtue is?

which receives rather extensive explanation at 72a6-73c5 and again at74a7-76e9.25 Second, just as the slave-boy begins by confidently answeringthis question, so Meno's first answer is confident in the extreme:


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(T12) But, Socrates, it is not difficult to say ... so that one need not be at a loss to

say what virtue is. (71e1-72a2)zb

That Meno thinks that he knows the answer to thequestion

in(Tll), just

as

the slave-boy thinks that he knows the answer to the question in (T2), is

further suggested by the fact that Socrates encourages Meno to say what

virtue is so that he might be proved wrong in claiming never to have met

anyone who knows what virtue is Again, just as the slave-boy'sinitial answers to the question under consideration are all refuted by elic-

iting from him propositions incompatible with those answers, so Meno's

initial answers to the 'What is virtue?' question are refuted in the same way.

Finally, just as upon being encouraged to try again the slave-boy responds

by admitting his ignorance, so Meno, upon being asked to try again at

79e5-6 responds by admitting that he has been numbed in both his mind and

tongue (79e8-8Ob7). Meno's false conceit, like the slave-boy's, has been

eliminated. 21

It would seem, then, that we have found a rather close parallel between

the first two stages of the slave-boy conversation and the first part of the

main conversation with Meno. Lest we miss this parallel, however, Plato

makes it explicit in the commentary following the second stage. Socrates

describes the slave-boy as having been numbed by a sting-ray at 84b6-7 and

as having previously thought that he could 'speak well and easily and often

before many people concerning the double square' at 84bll-c2, both clearly

referring back to Meno's description of himself at 79e8-8Ob7. Again, at


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84a6-7 Socrates describes the slave-boy as having 'answered confidently

and not having thought that he was at a loss' (tharraleos apekrinet... kai

ouch' hegeito aporein), alluding to Meno's first answer to the 'What is

virtue?' question at (T12). Thus, as Plato sees it, by the end of the second

stage the slave-boy has reached the precise point Meno had reached prior to

the introduction of his paradox.

The Third Stage and the Theory of Recollection. Finally, we should notice

that it is not until the third stage of the slave-boy conversation that the

substantive theory ofknowledge acquisition, the TR, gets illustrated. I take

this to follow immediately from the parallel between the first two stages of

this conversation and the first part of the main conversation with Meno that

we have just examined. As we have seen, Meno's false conceit of knowl-

edge has been eliminated at 79e-80b. Socrates, thereupon, invites him to

join him in an inquiry into the nature of virtue. Meno questions the

possiblity ofsuch an inquiry given his and Socrates' ignorance, and Socrates

responds with the TR. Meno asks Socrates to teach him this theory and

Socrates does so by means of an example, the conversation with the

slave-boy. If the entire TR were illustrated in the first two stages of the

slave-boy conversation, there would be no need for Socrates to appeal tothis example. He could simply point to the preceding conversation with

Meno. Since, then, it is clear that at least part of the TR is illustrated in the

third stage, it is equally clear that ifany part ofthis conversation illustrates a

substantive theory of knowledge acquisition, it is the third and fourth

stages. For by the end of the second stage the slave-boy has progressed no

further than Meno had when he raised the question of the possibility of

further inquiry. Thus, if the slave-boy conversation is to represent the

possibility of such further inquiry it will have to be in the part of thatconversation not found in the preceding conversation with Meno. But, this,

we have seen, is the third and fourth stages.

Further, that Plato takes the substantive theory ofknowledge acquisition

that the TR represents to be illustrated in the third and fourth stages is also

suggested by Socrates' pronouncements concerning it:

(T13) If someone asked him these same questions again and in a variety ofways,

you know that in the end he would know these things less accurately than no

one ... Without anyone teaching him, but only asking him questions he willcome to know, recovering himself this knowledge from himself ... And

recovering oneselfknowledge in oneself is recollection, isn't it? (85c10-d7)

(T14) True beliefs, as long as they remain, are a fine thing and produce a lot of

good things; but they do not want to remain long, but run awayfrom the soul


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of a person, so that they are not worth much, until someone ties them down

by working out the reason. And this, my dear Meno, we agreed before was

recollection (97e6-98a5)

In both these passages the suggestion is that recollection occurs in the

fourth stage, the stage in which the slave-boy goes from true belief to

knowledge. But this stage is not exhibited by the slave-boy conversation; it

is merely described. This leads Vlastos 1965 to write concerning these

passages that

[i]nneither of these passages does Socrates say that 'recollection' occurs only at the

second stage [our fourth stage] of the inquiry. This would have been quite absurd in

view of the fact that the first stage [our stages two and three] - the one the boy

traverses in our text - had been laid on specially so Meno could see the boyrecollecting. (p. 154)

Unfortunately, Vlastos fails to distinguish between our second and third

stages. It is not the second stage that 'has been laid on specially so Meno

could see the boy recollecting,' but the third. The second stage has been

'laid on' to assure Meno that the slave-boy is precisely at the point that the

possibility of further inquiry first became doubtful.

Nor is this contradicted by the fact that in at least two places Plato

suggests that it is the entire slave-boy conversation which constitutes recol-

lection. Immediately following his commentary on the first stage Socrates

says

(T15) Now watch him recollecting in order, as he ought to recollect (82el2-13)

and again, at the beginning of his commentary on the second stage stage,

(T16) Do you see, Meno, what point he has achieved on the road of recollection?

(84a3-4)

Plato does indeed take the entire process that the slave-boy goes through to

be the recollective process, and yet as (T13) and (T14) make clear he is also

inclined to vacillate. Sometimes he is willing to call the entire process

recollection. Sometimes he reserves this title to the part of the process that

the theory was introduced to explain. But that we have seen is the third and

fourth stages of the process, the stages in which one progresses from the

recognition of one's ignorance to knowledge.


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The First Part of the Meno Conversation and the Conversations with the

Interlocutors of the Early Dialogues.

Thus far we have found that Plato understands the first two stages of theslave-boy conversation and the corresponding part of the main conversa-

tion with Meno to achieve no more than the elimination of the interloc-

utor's false conceit. In this sense, the first part of the recollective process as

understood in the Meno is purely negative. Nevertheless, we have also

found that in eliminating the interlocutor's false conceit, these two stages

have had a positive consequence. They have prepared the interlocutor for

the inquiry which the TR was introduced to make possible. The interlocutor

is now willing, in a way he was not earlier, to join Socrates in the search forthe knowledge he failed to have. In the present section I will argue that this

primarily, although not wholly, negative part of the recollective processbears a very close resemblence to the conversations between Socrates and

his interlocutors in the earlier dialogues.The following four characteristics have been found to be displayed in

both the first two stages of the slave-boy conversation and the first part of

the conversation with Meno:

a. the establishment ofthe question which will govern the subsequent conversa-tion ;

b. the expression of the interlocutor's false conceit that he knows the answer;. c. the refutation of the interlocutor's answers by eliciting from him propositions

incompatible with those answers;d. the aporetic conclusionculminating in the elimination of the interlocutor's false

conceit.

All four of these characteristics will also be found in the conversations with

the interlocutors of the early dialogues.

The Governing Question. In six (Chm., Euthp., H. Ma., La., Lys., and

Rep. I) of the thirteen dialogues which precede the Meno, the question

which governs the subsequent conversation is Socrates' well-known 'What

is F-ness?' question.29 Thus, for example, in the Euthyprho, it is 'What is

piety?', in the Charmides, 'What is temperance?', and in the Lysis, 'What is

friendship?' In fact, in two of these six, we find explanations of these

questions analogous to the explanation in the first part of the conversation

with Meno. At Laches 192a-b, Socrates appeals to the question: What is

quickness?' in order to explain his 'What is courage?' question; and at


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Hippias Major 287d Socrates distinguishes between the questions 'What is

fine?' and 'What is the fine?' before Hippias offers his first answer that the

fine is a fine maiden.

Among those dialogues which do not explicitly raise the 'What is F-ness?'

question, the establishment of a question to govern the subsequent con-

versation is either explicit or implicit in every case but one. In the Crito,

Socrates spends considerable time establishing that the question that theyneed to ask is

(T17) whether or not it isjust for me to try to escape from here without theAthenians' discharging me? (48bll-cl)

In the Hippias Minor, the question is 'Whether Achilles or Odysseus isbetter and in what way?' (364b4-5), which leads to the philosophically more

interesting question 'Whether the one who voluntarily does evil is better

than the one who involuntarily does evil?' (cf. 376b). The Gorgias, Protag-

oras, Euthydemus, and Ion form a quartet in which the governing questionis 'What is the techne which the interlocutors of these dialogues possess?'30

The only one of these thirteen dialogues which does not establish a

question to govern the subsequent conversation is the Apology. But the

Apology, properly speaking, is not a dialogue. It is a speech, not a conversa-tion, and so we should not be surprised if it is disanalogous to the other

twelve early dialogues and the Meno. 31

The Interlocutor's False Conceit. The interlocutor's false conceit that he

knows the answer to the governing question is explicit or implicit in every

case but one. Consider, for example, Euthyphro's claim that he would be of

no use and no different from the many if he did not know accurately piety

and impiety at 4el-5a2 and Hippias' claim that his knowledge of the fine is asmall thing and not very important at 286d7-e6. One can hardly miss in

Meno's first answer at (T12) the verbal echo of Laches' first answer to the

'What is courage?' question:


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(T18) By Zeus, Socrates, it is not difficult to say; for ifsomeone remaining in theranks is willing to face the enemy and not flee, know well that he is

courageous (190e4-6;emphasis added)

Lysis, in the dialogue named for him, is the only clear exception. In his case,

however, Socrates explains that the point of their conversation is to pre-clude his acquiring such conceit (206a and 210d).

The Refutations of the Interlocutor's Answers. The method of refuting an

interlocutor's answers by eliciting from him propositions incompatible with

those answers is also evident in the early dialogues. As Vlastos has noted32

the elenchos of these dialogues is governed by the 'say what you believe'

constraint. Each interlocutor must reply to Socrates' questions by saying

only what he believes. Thus, for example, in the Gorgias (47le2-472c4),Socrates distinguishes between his elenchos and Polus' precisely on the

grounds that Polus' elenchos requires no such constraint. Polus thinks that

he has refuted Socrates' view that the just are better and the unjust worse by

establishing that nearly everyone - even if not Socrates - believes that

Archelaus was happy but unjust. Unlike Polus, however, Socrates thinks

that he has not refuted anyone unless the interlocutor himself believes the

proposition which refutes the original answer. The Socratic elenchos has

not succeeded, unless, as Socrates might put it, the interlocutor bears

witness against himself.

Indeed, even the new critics admit that Socrates' aim as he proceeds to

elicit beliefs from his interlocutor is to display an incompatibility between

these beliefs and the interlocutor's original answer. These critics claim,

however, that Socrates takes and is justified in taking the demonstrated

incompatibility as a constructive achievement. Explaining how this is pos-

sible isjust 'the problem of the elenchos' which Vlastos is so concerned to

solve.34 Thus, for example, at Laches 195a-199e Socrates refutes Nicias'

answer that courage is knowledge of what is to be feared and not feared by

eliciting from him beliefs incompatible with his answer, i.e. that ifcourageis knowledge of what is to be feared and not feared, then courage is the

whole of virtue and that courage is a part of virtue. It is, however, not

immediately clear how the revealed incompatibility in Nicias' views can be

construed as a positive contribution to answering the 'What is courage?'

question."


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The Aporetic Conclusion. Finally, that the conversations of these early

dialogues conclude aporetically, at least on the surface, is doubted by no

one.36 Consider, for example, the following passages from the conclusions

of the Protagoras and Laches:

(T19) 'How absurd you both are. You, Socrates, on the one hand, saying earlierthat virtue can't be taught, are insistingon the opposite, ... Protagoras, on

the other hand, having initially hypothesized that virtue could be taught,now seems to be insisting upon the opposite view...' Protagoras, when I see

all these things so utterly confused, I have an overwhelming desire that theybecome clear and I should like that, having come to this point, we would

consider what virtue is, and then again examine whether or not it is teach-

able...(361a5-c6)

(T20) Lysimachus, it would be terrible not to want to help someone to become

better. And if I had proven in the previous conversation to have knowledgeand these two not to have had it, it would be right to callupon me to performthis task, but we are all nowsimilarlyat a loss... Since this is the case, let me

offer you some advice... I say that it is necessary that all of us togethersearch for the best possible teacher, for ourselves - for we need one - and

also for the youths ... I do not advise that we remain as we are. (200el-

201a7)

Notice that in the former passage, insofar as Socrates has any substantive

advice concerning how to go on once one's false conceit has been eliminat-

ed, it is to take up the question 'What is virtue?', the very question which

generates the paradox in the Meno. In the Laches passage, on the other

hand, Socrates' sole suggestion is to seek someone who knows.3'


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Irwin and Vlastos

Thus far we have seen that there is a very close parallel between the

conversations in the earlier dialogues and the conversations with Meno upto 79e and wth the slave-boy up to 84a. Further, we have seen that Plato

takes the achievement of these last two conversations to be primarily,

although not wholly negative. They eliminate the interlocutors' false con-

ceit of knowledge and thereby prepare the way for the acquisition of the

knowledge they previously failed to have. Finally, we have seen that it is in

the third and fourth stages of the slave-boy conversation, the stages follow-

ing 84a, that Plato illustrates that part of the TR, first introduced in the

Meno, which responds directly toMeno's

paradox.That

is,it is in the third

and fourth stages that Plato illustrates that part of the TR which explains the

possibility of acquiring knowledge, once one's false conceit has been elim-

inated. All of this provides a rather strong prima facie case for the view that

Plato takes his introduction of the TR as providing for the first time a

substantive view concerning how knowledge can be acquired once the

Socratic/elenctic goal ofeliminating false conceit has been achieved. Never-

theless, both Irwin and Vlastos have offered interpretations of these Meno

conversations which have much in common with thepresent interpretation,and yet they deny, although in different ways, that the TR is introduced as

providing for the first time such a substantive view. It will be useful then to

conclude the prima facie case with a brief examination of these alternative

interpretations.

Irwin. According to Terence Irwin, the substantive view of knowledge

acquisition displayed in the slave-boy conversation, the TR, is merely the

fairly explicit explicationof the method

already practicedin the earlier

dialogues, the elenchos.38 Nevertheless, Irwin agrees that the TR is new to

the Meno. What is new about the TR, however, is not the method of

acquiring knowledge it recommends, but the claim that this method can

yield all knowledge. According to Irwin, in the earlier dialogues Plato took

the elenchos to be capable of yielding moral truths, but not moral knowl-

edge. Moral knowledge was taken to be analogous to craft knowledge and


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the elenchos 'looks altogether unsuitable for education in a craft.'39 What is

new about the TR introduced in the Meno is the claim that the true moral

beliefs that the elenchos has always been capable of yielding Could be

converted into moral knowledge by 'asking the same questions frequentlyand in a variety of ways' (85c10-11). That is, what is new about the view

expressed in the Meno is not the third and fourth stages of the slave-boy

conversation, but the claim that the fourth stage is applicable in the moral

domain. Thus, according to Irwin, the elenchos as practiced in the early

dialogues consists not only in the interlocutor's profession of knowledge

(the first stage of the slave-boy conversation) and the elimination of this

false conceit (the second stage of the slave-boy conversation), but also the

acquisition of true belief (the third stage of the slave-boy conversation).

Irwin's view has been sharply criticised from a number of quarters,40 and

it is not my purpose here to examine the merits and demerits of these

criticisms.41 Rather, I want to focus on a difficulty for his view which is

directly relevant to the prima facie case being presented in this essay. The

difficulty I want to focus on is the difficulty of finding the corresponding

third stages in the conversations with the interlocutors of the earlier

dialogues.

As Paul Woodruff has pointed out, many of Socrates' interlocutors, farfrom having their false conceit eliminated, respond to the Socratic elenchos

'by attacking him or his way of questioning' (e.g. Laches, Callicles, and

Hippias), while others are merely evasive (e.g. Euthyphro, Protagoras, and

Cephalus).42 Thus, we should not expect to find the third stage of the

slave-boy conversation, the stage leading from the interlocutor's recog-

nition of ignorance to true belief, in the conversations with these in-

terlocutors.43 Their conversations have failed to achieve the goal of the

second stage.


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Furthermore, insofar as an interlocutor can plausibly be thought to have

his false conceit eliminated in the early dialogues, the elimination of this

conceit invariably occurs at the end of the conversation with the interloc-

utor. Thus, for example, if Laches can be plausibly thought to recognize his

ignorance anywhere in the Laches, it will be at 193d-194b. But it is precisely

at this point in the dialogue that the conversation with Laches comes to an

end and the conversation with Nicias begins. Again, if Nicias is thought to

recognize his ignorance in the Laches, it will be at 200a-d, immediately

preceeding the conclusion of that dialogue. In fact, the best two candidates

for interlocutors who do have their false conceit eliminated are Charmides

and Ion in the dialogues which bear their names, but again in both cases the

admission, if not genuine recognition, of ignorance occurs just as their

respective dialogues are coming to an end. In the case of Ion it occurs at

541el-542b2, while in the case of Charmides it explicitly occurs at 176a6-

bl. 44Thus, contrary to Irwin's claim that the slave-boy conversation consti-

tutes a 'demonstration-example' of the Socratic elenchos, the elenchos

always comes to an end either prior to or precisely at the conclusion of the

second stage. As a result, any view about how to go on once this stage is

completed is prima facie found for the first time in the Meno.45

Vlastos. Finally, Gregory Vlastos has suggested yet another reading of

these Meno conversations.' Vlastos, like Irwin, agrees that the TR is new


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to the Meno,4' and, unlike Irwin, agrees that only the first two stages of the

slave-boy conversation are to be found in the earlier dialogues.48 Never-

theless, Vlastos would deny that in introducing the TR in the Meno Plato is

for the first time providing a substantive theory of knowledge acquisition.

According to Vlastos, the dialogues which precede the Meno contain at

least implicitly a substantive theory ofknowledge acquisition of their own .4

What is new about the TR is not the fact that it provides such a substantive

theory, but the fact that it provides a different substantive theory. A

different substantive theory is necessary, according to Vlastos, because,

while the first two stages of the slave-boy conversation and the correspond-

ing part of the conversation with Meno are similar to the conversations in

the earlier dialogues, there is an important disanalogy.50 In the Meno

conversations, there is the commitment to the Priority ofDefinition Princi-

ple,51 according to which if a person fails to know what virtue is, for

example, then he or she fails to know anything about virtue:

(T21) I am so far from knowing whether virtue is teachable or not that I do notknow at allwhat virtue itself is ... not knowing what a thing is, how would I

know what sort a thing it is? Or do you think that it is possible for someone

who does not know at all who Meno is to know whether he is beautiful or

wealthy or well-bom or the opposite of these? (71a5-b7)

In the conversations of the earlier dialogues, there is no such commitment.

This is an essential difference because it is the commitment to the Priorityof Definition Principle that generates Meno's paradox. 12 A commitment to


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this principle generates a problem so severe concerning knowledge-acquisi-

tion that a theory as radical as recollection is needed to resolve it. Accord-

ing to Vlastos, prior to the adoption of this principle, Socrates and his

interlocutors could appeal to their knowledge of instances and properties of

virtue, for example, in order to acquire the knowledge of what virtue is that

they had lacked. Thus, for example, Socrates and Laches can appeal to

their knowledge that the Spartans were courageous at Plataea in order to

come to know what courage is. With the introduction of the Priority of

Definition Principle in the Meno, however, this epistemological foundation

is destroyed.53 Any knowledge concerning courage is unavailable to one

who does not yet know, but is attempting to come to know what courage is.

Thus, on Vlastos' view, Plato does not go beyond Socrates in the sense of

providing for the first time a substantive view about how knowledge is to be

acquired once one's conceit has been eliminated. Rather, he goes beyond


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Socrates in the sense ofadopting a principle which leads to a problem which

calls for a new view about how such knowledge is be acquired.

The question which obviously needs to be raised at this point is 'Why is it

that Plato comes to adopt the Priority of Definition Principle at just this

point in his philosophical career, especially in light of the severe epistem-

ological problems he immediately sees that it raises?' He obviously cannot

have always thought that it was unavoidable. For, on Vlastos' view, he had

spent the first part of his career writing dialogues depicting Socrates doing

quite well without it.

Vlastos, to his credit, has an answer. In a recent essay, he has usefully

drawn our attention to a number ofpassages in what he calls 'the transition-

al dialogues' which display familiarity with a mathematics of a higher order

than can be found in the dialogues which precede them. These passages

Vlastos takes as strong indirect evidence for his hypothesis that prior to

writing these dialogues

Plato himselfhas taken that deep, long plunge into mathematical studies he will be

requiring of all philosophers when he comes to write Book VII of the Republic

(1988, p. 374).

It is this immersion in mathematical studies which can explain the change inthe dialogues which generates the paradox. It is Plato's new-found interest

in mathematics which leads him to adopt the Priority of Definition Princi-

ple. For, it is not unreasonable to suppose that this principle is a presupposi-

tion of some sort of axiomatic Greek mathematics. One cannot know that

the square of the hypotenuse is equal to the sum of the squares of the other

sides unless one can prove it. But, one cannot prove it unless one knows the

definition of hypotenuse, triangle, etc. - unless, that is one knows what a

hypotenuse is,what a

triangle is, etc. 54The difficulty with this sort of answer is that it does not square very well

with the way in which the Priority of Definition Principle is introduced in

the Meno. Consider Meno's response to Socrates' introduction of the

principle at (T21):

(T22) No, I do not. But do you really not know what virtue is, Socrates? Am I to

report this about you back at home? (71b9-c2)

Meno does not hesitate in the least to agree that it is impossible to know

what sort of thing a thing is without knowing what it is. He simply can't

believe that Socrates does not know what virtue is. Meno agrees to the


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principle as if it were a commonplace, not as if it were a specialized doctrine

confined, at least until Plato got hold of it, to mathematics. Are we to

suppose that Meno accepts it so easily because he too has recently been

immersed in mathematical studies ?56 Since the principle is going to play a

critical role in the subsequent argument, leading it to Meno's paradox, if

Vlastos is right in thinking that the principle is a specialized doctrine, then

we should expect some sort ofdefense of it in the dialogue. But it gets none.

It is simply introduced as a commonplace.

Second, on Vlastos' approach, those passages in the earlier dialogues

which can be read as instances of the Priority of Definition Principle must

simply be a matter of coincidence. Thus, for example, consider the follow-

ing passage from the Laches:

(T23) Then isn't this necessary for us to begin, to know what virtue is? For if we do

not know at all what virtue happens to be, how would we know how it mightbest be obtained? (190b7-c2)

Vlastos is correct that this passage alone is not sufficiently general to take

the Laches to be committed to the Priority of Definition Principle.5' It only

requires something like the following principle:

IfA fails to know what virtue is, than A fails to know how to obtain it.

Although this principle is a consequence of the Priority of Definition

Principle, Vlastos apparently sees the relationship as merely coincidental.

As he might correctly point out, from the fact that there are a number of

passages in the early dialogues which display principles that are conse-

quences ofprinciples which Plato clearly holds in later dialogues it does not

follow that Plato must have been committed to the earlier principles be-

cause of his commitment to the more general ones. They may simply have


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sprung from distinct sources. But, we may ask, is it really plausible to think

that there is no relation between the earlier and later passages? Must we not

at the very least take the earlier passages as crude approximations of a

principle that does not get completely fleshed out until later?

Finally, let me respond to Vlastos' interpretation of the following passagefrom the Hippias Major which he cites as evidence for his view:

(T24) He will ask me if I am not ashamed to dare speakof the fine when elenctic

refutation makes it so evident that I do not even know what on earth the fine

itself is. "How willyou know," he will say, "if someone has produced a fine

speech or any other fine action whatever, when you don't know the fine?And ifthis be your condition, do you think that you are better off alive than

dead? (304d5-e3; Vlastos trans. See Vlastos 1985b, pp. 24-25.)

According to Vlastos we here see the chilling consequences of the Priorityof Definition Principle, before it is supplemented by the TR in the Meno:

once one recognizes one's ignorance, one would be better off dead. Given

the Priority of Definition Principle (unsupplemented by the TR), there is

no way to rectify one's situation. Once ignorant, always ignorant. And yetfor Socrates, as well as for Plato, according to Vlastos, a life in which one

fails to know whether or not performing a particular action is virtuous, or

fine, or good is not worth living.

To read the Hippias Major passage as Vlastos does, as being a message of

the futility of the quest for knowledge is, I think, to seriously misread it.

(T24) is of a piece with those passages in which Socrates testifies to the value

of eliminating one's conceit. It is just another passage in which Socrates

exhorts others toward philosophy. Once one recognizes one' ignorance,

one must recognize that a life in such a state is not worth living. One must

make it one's chief concern to seek out 'truth and knowledge and the best

possible state of one's soul.' When faced with the choice between a life in

perpetual ignorance or a life in the pursuit of knowledge, the life of

philosophy (see Lysis 218), Socrates' answer in the Apology was clear: a life

of the former kind is not worth living. The difficulty, of course, if there is

one, is that in the early dialogues Socrates puts forth no substantive view

about how such knowledge is to be acquired. His contribution is limited to

seeking out those who profess to care about these things, questioning them,

examining them, and testing them, learning from them if they know (un-

fortunately no one he meets does), and persuading them of their ignoranceif and when they do not. Socrates had the support ofthe Delphic oracle (and

perhaps even of his daimon) to sustain his faith that this was enough. Plato

did not. In fact Vlastos' important discovery of a familiarity with higher

mathematics in the Euthydemus, Hippias Major, and Meno that had been


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absent earlier suggests that Plato may have found a different support. It was

not until Plato had become deeply immersed in mathematical studies that

Plato could confidently assert the Priority of Definition Principle which he

had inherited from Socrates in full generality. For it was not until he had

experienced the success of Greek axiomatic mathematics that he became

assured that epistemological progress in light of such a principle was

possible.

Conclusion

We have seen then that, as Plato sees it, the first two stages of the slave-boy

conversation and the first part of the conversation with Meno achieve no

more than the elimination of false conceit. But we have also seen that these

initial portions of the conversations precisely parallel the conversations in

the earlier dialogues. We found no difference between the earlier conversa-

tions and the Meno conversations which could explain why Plato mighthave thought that the former could, while the latter coult not, achieve more

than the elimination of false conceit. It would seem, then, that in the Meno

Plato puts forth his theory of recollection not to displace some earlier

theory, but to supplement such a theory. He takes himself to be providing inthe Meno for the first time in the dialogues a substantive view about how

genuine knowledge is to be acquired - once false conceit has been

eliminated.

University of Oklahoma

Appendix

The prima facie case that I am presenting here can be considerably strengthenedwhen combined with an examination of the second part of the slave-boyconversation and the conversation with Meno renewed at 86c. I believe that

such an examination will yield the following two theses. First, the second part of

the slave-boy conversation at least partially parallels the conversation with

Meno renewed at 86c. They both illustrate methods of acquiring knowledgeonce one's false conceit has been eliminated, although not necessarily the same

method in both cases.Second,

the method or methods illustrated in these

passages are importantly different from the elenchos.


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The first thesis has been denied by a number of commentators on the groundsthat in the conversation with Meno following the slave-boy interlude the search

for the nature of virtue has been abandoned. Frequently, this abandonment has

been blamed on Meno's unwillingness to consider first things first. He insistsupon attempting to answer whether virtue can be taught before answering what

virtue is, contrary to Socrates' advice. (See 86d8-el and 100b4-6.)Brown 1967 has argued that rather than destroying the parallel with the

slave-boy conversation, this reinforces the parallel. For, according to Brown,

the third stage of the conversation with the slave-boy also abandons what

Brown calls 'the ti-question' and takes up what he calls 'the poion-question'.Brown's view has not been generally accepted, despite its obvious and deserved

influence, 59 and is, I believe, subject to a number of difficulties.' Most impor-

tantly for our purposes it is far from clear that the question being asked in thefirst two stages of the slave-boy conversation is a ti-question and the question

being asked in the third stage of the same conversation is a poion-question.The question of the first two stages is first put at (T2). Let me repeat it with

the Greek:

(T2) Try to say to me what the length ofeach side of this figure willbe (pelike tis

estaiekeinou he grammehekaste). For the length of the side of this one is two

feet; what is the length of the side of the double one (ti de he ekeinou tou

diplasiou)? (82d8-e2)

The question is repeated near the end of the second stage:

(T25) Try to say what length you say this is (peliken tina ... auten einai). (83el)

According to Brown this question corresponds to the ti-half of the tilpoiondistinction required by Socrates' commitment to the Priority of Definition

Principle." But it is not at all obvious that the ti-question presupposed by the

Priority ofDefinition Principle is anything like the question 'What is the lengthofthis side?' It would seem that the appropriate ti-question in the context of the

slave-boy conversation would be more like 'What is this?', or probably better,


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'What is length?' or 'What is a triangle?', not 'What is the length of this line?'

Further, it is far from clear that Socrates regards the question being asked in

(T2) as the ti-question, as opposed to the poion-question, given his comment

following the slave-boy's initial answer:

(T4) And now [the slaveboy] thinks he knows what sort of line (hopoia estin) it is

from which the eight-foot square will come to be. (82e5-6)62

Finally, Brown cites the following passage as evidence that the question under

consideration in the third stage of the slave-boy conversation is the

poion-question:

(T27) From what sort of line (apo poias) [does the eight-foot square come to be]?

Try to tell us clearly; ifyou don't want to count, show us from what sort of

line (apo poias) it comes to be. (83el l-84al )

But if the argument of the present essay has been successful citing (T27) as

evidence for the question under consideration in the third stage of the slave-boyconversation will not do. (T27) clearly precedes the Socrates' commentary on

the second stage, and what is more important for us it even precedes the

slave-boy's confession of ignorance, (T5). I have argued, however, that the

second stage of the recollective process and hence the third stage of the

slave-boy conversation cannot take place until the interlocutor's recognition of

ignorance is secured. Thus, rather than testifying to the question under consid-eration in the third stage, (T27) reinforces the evidence of (T4) and my com-

ments concerning the Priority of Definition Principle that the question under

consideration in the first two stages is the poion-question.63More recently, Bedu-Addo 1983 has offered what seems to me to be a

promising line of argument against those who take the 'What is virtue?' ques-tion to be abandoned in the main conversation with Meno following the

slave-boy interlude. In general the argument depends upon noticing that giventhe close parallel between the first two stages of the slave-boy conversation and

the main conversation with Meno leading up to it, as well as the fact that the TRand the slave-boy conversation are introduced precisely in order to avoid the

necessity of abandoning the search for the nature of virtue, it is prima facie

implausible to think that immediately following the introduction of this reme-

dy, Socrates should go ahead and abandon the search anyway. (To explain the

abandonment by appealing to Meno's stubbornness will not do. It only pushesthe question further back: Why should Plato have chosen such a stubborn


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character?) Unfortunately, Bedu-Addo takes the method ofhypothesis (MH)found in the second half of the main conversation with Meno to be essentially a

subterfuge (1983, p. 237). It is introduced only as a ruse to get Meno to consider

the 'What is virtue?' question in spite of his desire to consider first the 'Is virtueteachable?' question. It results for Bedu-Addo, then, that the method employ-ed in the third stage and the second half of the main conversation with Meno is

essentially the same as the method employed in the first two stages of the

slave-boy conversation and the first half of the main conversation. This is to

deny the second thesis mentioned above.

Vlastos 1988 has even more recently pointed out that the MH, which he

correctly takes to be seriously introduced for the first time here in the Meno,abandons one of the constitutive features of the Socratic elenchos:

[A ]dherence to the [MH] would entail systematic violation of the "say what youbelieve" rule, which forbids debating an unasserted premise, while "investigatingfrom a hypothesis," requires it. (p. 380)

He has also suggested that in the third stage of the slave-boy conversation

another of the constitutive features of the Socratic elenchos has been aban-

doned : Socrates has shed his adversative role (p. 375). Thus, according to

Vlastos, the methods employed in the third stage of the slave-boy conversation

and in the conversation with Meno following that conversation are importantly

different from the Socratic elenchos. If, then, we combine Vlastos' claimsconcerning the methods of these conversations with Bedu-Addo's general

argument sketched above once again the suggestion is that according to Plato

the Socratic elenchos can do no more than eliminate false conceit. In order to

proceed from such an elimination of conceit Plato feels compelled to introduce

new methods.

What is needed, ofcourse, is a careful examination of the second part of the

conversation with Meno as well as of the MH. To attempt such an examination

here would divert us, however, from the primary thesis of this essay. It should

be recognized, however, that the thesis of this essay can be sustained even if themethod of the third stage of the slave-boy conversation and of the second part of

the main conversation with Meno is not importantly different from the method

employed in the earlier sections. My argument has been that, as Plato sees it,

the Socratic elenchos, unsupplemented with the TR, does and can do no more

than eliminate the false conceit of the interlocutors. IfPlato thinks that essen-

tially the same method when supplemented by the TR can do more than this,

that is of little consequence. The Meno will continue to provide rather strongevidence that, as Plato sees it, Socrates, who does not subscribe to the TR, can

do, and appropriately does, no more than eliminate the false conceit of hisinterlocutors. 64


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Documents

Hugh H. Benson, Meno, The Slave Boy and the Elenchos