Human Factors and Aerospace Safety Is an Important New Inter

8/7/2019 Human Factors and Aerospace Safety Is an Important New Inter

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Human Factors and Aerospace Safety Is an Important NewInternational Journal

DUBLIN, Ireland -- Research and Markets (http://www.researchandmarkets.com/reports/c51066) hasannounced the addition of "Human Factors and Aerospace Safety: An International Journal -Volume 6, Numbers 1-4" to their offering

Human Factors and Aerospace Safety is an important new international journal targeted specificallyat the study of the human element in the aerospace system, and its role in either avoiding orcontributing to accidents and incidents, and in promoting safe operations.

The journal contains both formal research and practitioner papers, describing new research in thearea of human factors and aerospace safety, and activities such as successful safety and regulatoryinitiatives or accident case studies. In every issue, there is also an invited position paper by aninternationally respected author, providing a critical overview of a particular area of human factorsand aerospace safety, with the aim of developing theory and setting a research agenda for thefuture. Other features of the journal include a critical incidents section describing recent aviationincidents with human factors root causes, a calendar of events, listing forthcoming internationalconferences, seminars and workshops of interest to the reader, and occasional book reviews.

With articles from both leading academic researchers and practitioners from the aviation industry,

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The bilateral security relationship: will "National" Missile Defense involve Canada

Introduction: Beyond the "End"

Four years ago, Joseph Jockel and I proclaimed the "end" of the Canada-U.S.defense relationship. (1) With the passing of the Cold War, its two central

elements--collaboration in the aerospace defense of North America through theNorth American Aerospace Defence Command (NORAD) and cooperation inEuropean security under the umbrella of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization(NATO)--were fading into geostrategic obscurity. Rather than regret the fraying ofsecurity ties built up over half a century, the two countries should welcome theprocess, for now residual and waning defense ties would be free of the frictionsthat had arisen in the always-unequal partnership of a small-to-middle power anda superpower, frictions that were mainly the result of Canadian sovereigntyconcerns. We suggested, however, that such frictions could arise again if "Ottawaitself chooses to become more heavily involved in American-led activities,whether in North America though an accelerated NORAD BMD (Ballistic Missile

Defense) role" or "in Europe though NATO actions in the East." (2)

In a certain sense, both these eventualities have now come to pass and, thus, thebilateral defense relationship has moved beyond the "end" and, in so doing, nowfinds itself beset with frictions, some familiar and some unprecedented. In Europe,Canada has indeed become heavily involved with the United States in the "new"NATO, including going to war alongside the Americans and a host of other allies inthe Kosovo campaign. While they made a respectable showing, the campaign hasraised questions about the capabilities of the Canadian Forces (CF) and rekindledthe old burden-sharing debate.

But the major issue concerns BMD and the future of NORAD in light ofWashington's National Missile Defense (NMD), endorsed by the United StatesCongress and awaiting a presidential decision following the DeploymentReadiness Review expected by the fall of 2000. Although the two governmentshave renewed the NORAD agreement for another five years, the question ofCanadian involvement in NMD remains open. Former U.S. Deputy Secretary ofDefense John Hamre has said that Washington would like Canada to participateonce the technology has been proved to work and a decision to deploy has beentaken. This means that several years from now it might be a Canadian generalwho is asked to give the order authorizing the interception of a North Koreanmissile headed for Los Angeles or another American city. No other U.S. ally would

ever be entrusted with such a responsibility.

Since 1957 the two countries have maintained the joint North AmericanAerospace Defense Command, whose operations center--shared with the U.S.Space Command-is located deep under Cheyenne Mountain, Colorado, and whosecentral functions are to warn of and assess an attack. A fanciful version of NORADwas featured in the popular 1983 movie, War Games. No Canadian air forceuniforms are to be seen in the movie version, unlike the real thing, wherenumerous posts, including NORAD's deputy commander-in-chief, are held by


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Canadians. During the Cold War it could well have been a Canadian on duty atNORAD who would have alerted U.S. authorities that a Soviet nuclear attack onthis continent was underway.

The U.S. is poised to place the National Missile Defense under NORAD's authority.But the U.S. does not need Canadian cooperation or support to deploy the system,

for neither Canadian territory nor airspace would be involved in its operation.Canadian officials are quite aware of what may happen if Canada declines theinvitation. The U.S. could very well move to dissolve NORAD, give its warning andassessment functions, along with responsibility for the National Missile Defense,to an all-U.S. command, and place the U.S. Canadian defense relationship on amuch looser footing.

Leaving Cheyenne Mountain would be costly for Canada. It would mean the end ofCanada's uniquely privileged military relationship with the United States in NorthAmerican defense. Much of the special Canadian access to U.S. intelligencesources and defense plans would dry up. Canada's standing in the Western

Alliance would also likely be damaged badly. While the Europeans have theirdoubts about U.S. missile defense plans, they still complain about Canada'sclosing its military bases in Europe almost a decade ago. The end of NORAD wouldsignal that the other long-standing pillar of Canada's contribution to collectivedefense was now also crumbling.

There are, nevertheless, pressures on Ottawa to say "no" to the U.S. invitation. Insmall part, this would be a matter of money. While Canadian defense spendinghas plunged, the Canadian military recently has been busier than ever overseas,including last year's strikes against Yugoslavia. The U.S. might not ask Canada tohelp pay for the new missile defense system. But it probably would expect

Canada to pay more of other NORAD-related costs, such as space surveillance.Not surprisingly, the Canadian military would like to be involved in NMD in orderto remain within NORAD, and it is hoping to develop space-based surveillancesystems that would enhance its contribution. But even with recent increases inthe defense budget, such development may be difficult given other priorities.

Above all, though, the issue goes right to the core of Canadian foreign policy andespecially its military and political relations with the United States. Ottawa hasbeen a strong supporter of arms control and especially of the 1972 Anti-BallisticMissile Treaty (ABM). So it worries that the defense system would undermine thetreaty, derail future negotiations with Russia, and give China an excuse to expand

its arsenal. Canada, like the U.S., is certainly concerned about the proliferation ofweapons of mass destruction. But the Canadian government, like critics in theU.S., is not entirely convinced that a limited missile defense system is the bestway to meet the threat posed by "rogue" states with potential intercontinentalballistic missile capabilities.

Thus, for no other American ally does the prospect of National Missile Defensehave the immediacy or the salience that it does for Canada. Indeed, there is likelyto be as vigorous--if not more vigorous--a debate over National Missile Defense in


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Canada than in the U.S., where the issue seems to have been decided. Inpreparation for a cabinet decision, the Department of Foreign Affairs andInternational Trade (DFAIT) and the Department of National Defence (DND) areworking on the issue for cabinet deliberation. And the Committee on NationalDefence and Veterans Affairs of the Canadian House of Commons has begunhearings on NMD and its implications for Canada. There are already voices being

raised in Canada warning that participation in a NORAD that includes missiledefense will only more deeply entangle Canada with the U.S. defenseestablishment, further undermining Canadian distinctiveness.

This paper will look at the present state of the bilateral defense relationship,focusing on the question of NMD. It will begin with a brief overview of the historyand character of the Canada-U.S. security relationship and then turn to adiscussion of the conflicting views concerning NMD in Canada and the difficultiesthese pose for the government. The paper will conclude with some suggestions asto how the Canadian and American governments might try to reconcile presentdifferences and difficulties over NMD in a way that will preserve what has been,

for both countries, a mutually beneficial security relationship, in hot wars andcold, for over sixty years.

Strategic Defense: The Essence of the Cold War Bilateral Security Relationship

Canada and the United States have been collaborating in the "strategic defense"of the North American continent since World War Two. Indeed, even before thewar, the then-leaders of the two countries exchanged declarations of mutualsupport. In 1938, at Kingston, Ontario, President Franklin Delano Rooseveltdeclared that: "The Dominion of Canada is a part of the sisterhood of the BritishEmpire: I give you an assurance that the people of the United States will not stand

idly by if domination of Canadian soil is threatened by any other Empire." A fewdays later, in response, Prime Minister William Lyon Mackenzie King stated thatCanada too had its obligations as a "good and friendly neighbour, and one ofthese is to see that, at our own instance, our country is made as immune fromattack or possible invasion as we can reasonably be expected to make it, andthat, should the occasion ever arise, enemy forces should not be able to pursuetheir way either by land, sea or air to the United States across Canadian territory."(3)

The two declarations reflected the growing apprehension of Ottawa andWashington about the deteriorating international situation and the potential

threat to both countries. They also bespoke the friendly feeling between the twocountries and, indeed, between the two leaders. But they also reflected differingstrategic perspectives based upon complementary but not identical nationalinterests. For the United States the problem was that Canadian weakness mightendanger American security. Canada could not become a strategic liability in thedefense of the U.S. homeland. For Canada the problem was satisfying thislegitimate concern without compromising, however benignly, its own nationalsovereignty. This could be accomplished by taking measures on its own to secureits territory, airspace, and maritime approaches. This remains the basis of the


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bilateral defense relationship. It is one grounded, to be sure, in the history of along, undefended border and bound by ties of friendship, shared approaches toglobal security, and common democratic values. But it is one, nevertheless, thatwas and is tested from time to time by divergent interpretations of nationalinterests.

By the summer of 1940, with all of Western Europe under Nazi rule and with whatappeared to be the imminent fall of Great Britain, the threat to North Americabecame more immediate. Accordingly, President Roosevelt, whose country wasstill neutral, suggested to Prime Minister King that the two countries establish aPermanent Joint Board on Defense (PJBD). While North America remainedrelatively unscathed by the war, the close defense ties forged did in fact becomepermanent. As the Cold War developed, the militaries of the two countries lookedto the defense of the continent even as their governments took steps to secureallies on the periphery of the Soviet Union. Along with the United States, Canadasent forces to Korea and was instrumentally involved in the establishment of theNorth Atlantic Treaty Organization.

Although the focus was overseas, North America itself had lost the protectionafforded it by its ocean boundaries with the advent of nuclear weapons and long-range bombers. America could not hope to credibly extend its deterrent if the U.S.itself, and especially the deterrent, were vulnerable at home. Thus, strategic airdefense, cooperation between the Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF) and theUnited States Air Force (USAF), came to be the most important dimension of thebilateral defense relationship, although at sea--especially in the Atlantic--theRoyal Canadian Navy (RCN) and the United States Navy (USN) maintained closecollaboration in monitoring the maritime approaches to the continent. (4) Inessence, the Cold War brought about a situation wherein the North American

continent was to be regarded as a "strategic unity" for purposes of defense. Thismade Canada, as John Foster Dulles once put it, "a very important piece of realestate." (5)

Security cooperation between the two countries was extended into the area ofdefense economics and trade. Under a series of Defense Production andDevelopment-Sharing Agreements, Canadian producers were afforded specialaccess to the American market, partly exempting their products from the "buy-American" provisions of U.S. defense procurement projects. Over the years, theCanadian defense industry came to rely on access to the U.S. market, exporting awide range of specialized products. Most arms exports to and from Canada did not

require licenses.

Progressively closer collaboration between the two air forces culminated in thecreation of NORAD in 1958. The bilateral combined command brought thestrategic air defense assets of both countries, radar lines and interceptor aircraft,under the operational control of a single Commander-in-Chief, an Americangeneral responsible simultaneously (in theory) to both national governments.Predictions of a vast Soviet intercontinental bomber force were not fulfilled. Thisfact, combined with the offensive emphasis of the USAF, meant that NORAD's


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strategic defense role was, from the beginning, never a major element in theglobal calculus of American security policy. The real strategic defense of NorthAmerica lay with the nuclear offensive forces that constituted the deterrent.Indeed, NORAD's primary mission was less the defense of the North Americanhomelands than the defense of the deterrent, making sure that there would besufficient warning to launch a retaliatory blow.

Moreover, no sooner had NORAD been established than the "missile became themessage." With the advent of Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs) andSubmarine-Launched Ballistic Missiles (SLBMs), strategic air defense--and with itCanadian air space, radars, and interceptors--became progressively lessimportant. NORAD's main mission now became warning and assessment ofballistic missile attack. Later, space surveillance was added. "Aerospace" replaced"air" in the NORAD name. These were missions that the USAF could perform on itsown. There were no Ballistic Missile Early Warning Stations (BMEWS) on Canadiansoil. Nevertheless, a residual air defense role was retained and Canadianpersonnel assumed missile-warning tasks in Colorado Springs.

While, for critics in Canada, close ties with the American offensive nuclear postureraised the prospect of "annihilation without representation," the joint approach toNorth American defense on Canada's part was entirely consistent with its overalldefense policy in the Cold War. Canada was an active participant in Westerncollective defense. In the 1950s it sent ground and, especially, air forces tobolster NATO in Europe. Moreover, Ottawa understood and supported thecentrality of nuclear weapons to the West's collective posture. Indeed, in the early1960s, Canadian forces themselves, in both Europe and North America, acquiredtactical nuclear weapons from the United States under a two-key system. To theextent that NATO relied upon the deterrent power of the United States, and given

that NORAD's warning and attack assessment mission was integral to sustainingthe credibility of the deterrent, Canada's contributions to NORAD can be said tohave been yet another contribution to European security (although it was rarelyacknowledged as such, especially in Europe but also in Washington).

There was another important connection between Canada's NATO commitmentsand its close and exclusive bilateral defense ties with the United States. For theCanadian government the Alliance was seen as a counterweight to offset theasymmetry of the North American security relationship. As the distinguishedCanadian diplomat and scholar John Holmes put it, NATO "would give Canada amultilateral forum in which, by combining with other lesser powers, it could make

its weight be felt and so be relieved, at least psychologically, of the inhibitions oflife with one gigantic neighbour." (6)

But it is also important to note that, while Ottawa fully endorsed collectivedefense, it remained a strong supporter of collective security through the UnitedNations (UN) and other broad multilateral fora. Ottawa's early and sustainedinvolvement in UN peacekeeping was an example of this commitment. Anotherexample was its support of the UN's arms control efforts. This led Canada fromtime to time to adopt seemingly contradictory policies. On the one hand, Canada


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was fully enmeshed in nuclear deterrence and endorsed NATO's first-use policy.On the other hand, the Canadian government participated in efforts to control andreduce nuclear weapons. In part, the interest in arms control was a reflection ofOttawa's desire to adopt a more distinctive--indeed "un-American"--internationalpersona. Henry Kissinger once observed during the Cold War that Canadians wereoften pulled two ways. They showed what he called "an instinct in favor of the

common defense," hence their enduring commitment to the institutions ofwestern security, including NORAD. But they were also subject to "the temptationto stay above the battle as a kind of international arbiter," adopting from time totime policies that would distinguish Canada from the superpower to the south. (7)

In the mid-1980s, partly because of the deteriorating state of the air defenseassets and partly because of new fears about air and sea-launched cruise missiles(ALCMs and SLCMs), Canada and the United States undertook a modernization ofthe air defense assets. But with the ending of the Cold War, these plans werecurtailed and NORAD's air defense readiness posture was significantly scaledback.

Given that NORAD was already in the strategic defense business, with anessential warning and assessment function, it might be thought that, if ever aBallistic Missile Defense (BMD) system were developed, it would go to thecombined command. However, the United States did not press BMD in the earlyyears of the Cold War. And this suited Canada just fine. When, in the late 1960s,there was some movement toward BMD development and deployment, with theSAFEGUARD system eventually being deployed around a missile field in NorthDakota, the Canadian government made clear that it wanted no part of it. Ottawashared with many in the U.S. the view that BMD was inherently destabilizing, thatit would upset the delicate balance of power now based upon roughly equivalent

arsenals. Publicly, Canada endorsed the concept of Mutual Assured Destruction(MAD). Thus, when the NORAD agreement was renewed in 1968, Ottawa hadwritten into the text a clause stating that nothing in the agreement would obligeCanada to participate in BMD

Not surprisingly, Ottawa welcomed the conclusion of the ABM Treaty and came toview it as the bedrock of strategic nuclear arms control. Also not surprisingly,President Reagan's Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) resulted in consternation inOttawa. Was Canada going to be drawn into "Star Wars" via NORAD? If Canadadid not go along with SDI would the United States disestablish NORAD, thusdepriving Canada of its privileged position in the American strategic posture? The

Canadian military feared the latter, while arms control groups feared the former.Suspicion was bolstered when it was learned that the ABM clause was droppedfrom the NORAD agreement in an early 1980s renewal. Suspicion was furtheraroused when the United States established U.S. Space Command(USSPACECOM), whose Commander-in-Chief was dual-hatted as CINCNORAD.

Facing conflicting public pressures, the Canadian government of the day declinedto officially participate in SDI research, but did not oppose it and allowedCanadian private interests to be involved. This, however, left the important link


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between SDI and NORAD unresolved. Fortunately, the end of the Cold War and thefading of SDI meant that Ottawa did not have to make a choice between itscommitment to the ABM treaty and its abiding national interest in continuedparticipation in NORAD. Unfortunately for Ottawa, after the first post-Cold Wardecade the issue has reemerged with NMD.

Post Cold War Bilateral Security Relations I: "Over There" with Uncle Sam

For both Canada and the United States, the 1990s were years of high-tempooperations, as each sent forces to participate in a plethora of peacekeeping,peacemaking, and peace enforcement operations--from the Persian Gulf to theBalkans to Somalia to East Timor, under blue (UN) and, especially for the U.S.,green (NATO) helmets. Indeed, one of the noteworthy paradoxes of the post-ColdWar era is that the two countries have collaborated more closely overseas, in aperiod of declining threat to North America, than they did during the years of ColdWar containment and deterrence. For both countries, the issues at stake were notthose of vital national interests. Rather, both have dispatched forces overseas for

reasons of fostering regional security and humanitarian intervention.

In December 1997 the Globe and Mail had an article on Canada's "shrinkingpeacekeeping role." It noted that the 250 Canadian Forces (CF) soldiers currentlyserving on various United Nations (UN) operations were the fewest since LesterPearson won the Nobel Peace Prize forty years earlier. It also mentioned,parenthetically, that there were 1,300 Canadian troops in Bosnia. According to thearticle these forces did not count because they were "part of a NATO rather thanUN force." (8)

Since then, the imbalance between Canada's UN and NATO peace-keeping

commitments has become even more pronounced. As of 1 June 2000, there weresome 2,756 CF personnel on overseas operations. Of these, 1,596 were with theNATO Stabilization Force (SFOR) in Bosnia-Herzegovina and another 522 with theAlliance's Kosovo Force (KFOR). In support of NATO operations in the Balkans,Canada had 118 personnel with the allied air forces at Aviano, Italy. If the ship'scompany of the HMCS Fredericton (225) sailing with NATO's Standing Naval ForceAtlantic (STANAVFORLANT) is added, it means that 93 percent of all CF personneloverseas were deployed in support of NATO and its new peacekeeping operations,with the remainder, in small contingents, assigned to various UN activities. (9)The imbalance is even more noteworthy when it is considered that the CF hasdeployed its most advanced equipment to the NATO operations--the CF-18

aircraft, the Coyote Reconnaissance Vehicles, Leopard Main Battle Tank, and thePatrol Frigates. In comparison to NATO's other middle powers, such as Belgiumand Spain, Canada has a higher percentage of its available forces outside itsborders, 6 percent as opposed to an average of 2 percent. (10) While the PrimeMinister might declare that "Generally speaking, we are very reluctant to join anintervention that is not under the umbrella of the UN," (11) the reality isotherwise.


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As its contribution to the Kosovo operation, Ottawa dispatched a significantproportion of its available frontline fighters and backed it up with a grounddeployment of 1,300, along with capable armored vehicles. In the air campaign,"Canadian pilots flew 682 combat sorties, or nearly 10 percent of the missionsagainst fixed targets--and they led half the strike packages they took part in" andwere "among only five countries delivering precision guided munitions." (12)

The Kosovo operations also showed that, given sufficient warning, the Army canmove quickly overseas with vehicles and integrated helicopter units. TheEdmonton-based Lord Strathcona's Horse was the second NATO force to enterKosovo and the Pristina area after the British:

Less than 72 hours after rolling hundreds of military vehicles andcontainers off a freighter in Greece, the Strathconas were alreadyspying on Russian peacekeepers and Serbian armoured units aroundKosovo's only airport.... Some 24 hours after that, a U.S. MarineCorps Expeditionary Brigade that is supposed to specialize in quickdeployments arrived in country. (11)

Combined with the forces still in Bosnia, as well as ships rotating into the Adriatic,the Canadian military presence in Europe in 1999 was about the same as at theend of the Cold War--and it is actively engaged in dangerous missions. Recently,Ottawa has decided to pull out of Kosovo and consolidate Balkan operations inBosnia, where a Canadian Major General will assume command of theMultinational Division, Southwest. This region comprises 45 percent of the SFORarea. (14)The discrepancy between the UN "blue helmet" commitments and the UnitedStates-organized and led NATO "green helmet" commitment tells the whole storyof international peacekeeping in the 1990s and what has happened to thisquintessentially Canadian (and supposedly un-American) role for the CF. It also

tells the story of what has happened to Canada's relationship to NATO and theAmerican role in the Alliance. As a result of Washington's various initiatives,including expansion and NATO's Partnership for Peace (PfP) program, which hasbrought together the old NATO allies, former Warsaw Pact and Soviet Republics,and Europe's neutrals, the focus of the Alliance has shifted markedly eastward. Asa result, in the 1990s Canada has been "over there"--the classic "over there"--Europe--with Uncle Sam.

However, the tempo of Canadian involvement in NATO operations has broughtback the old burden-sharing complaint. In a speech last year on bilateral relations,the United States Ambassador to Canada urged Ottawa to continue to sustain "the

world's most unique security partnership." One of the requirements for thecontinuation of these ties is, in the U.S. view, increases in Canadian defensespending. (15) Noted American Canada watcher Joseph Jockel suggests thatdownsizing of Canadian army units from brigades to battle groups will make them"unfit for combat" alongside American allies. (16) British analyst, Richard Sharpe,editor of Jane's Fighting Ships, pointing to the 23-percent cut in defense spendingover the last four years and the fact that Canada now ranks 133rd of the 185United Nations countries in defense spending as a share of gross domesticproduct, has declared that Canada's military is "losing its heart because of severe


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underfunding and the 'political myopia' of the federal government." (17) Newlyappointed NATO Secretary General, Lord Robertson, used the occasion of themeeting of allied defense ministers in Toronto to admonish Ottawa for its poorrecord on defense spending, advising it to use its budgetary surplus for themilitary. (18)

The response of the Canadian military has been to stress the importance ofinteroperability with the United States--as the 1994 White Paper put it, Canadamust be prepared to fight with the best against the best. On the land, at sea, inthe air, and in space, the CF has been scrambling to find the funds for theequipment and training to meet this objective. In Shaping the Future of CanadianDefence: A Strategy for 2020, this is made explicit. The CF must strengthen its"military to military relationships with our principal allies ensuring interoperableforces, doctrine and C4I (command, control, communications, computers andintelligence)." In particular it calls for expansion of "the joint and combinedexercise program to include all environments and exchanges with U.S." (19) Giventhe history of the post-Cold War decade, which saw the CF deploy abroad along

with the U.S. and its principal allies in a host of UN and especially NATOoperations, this approach is the only one that makes sense for the CF.Interoperability is the direct military consequence of accepting unipolarity or atleast American dominance. Yet it is ironic that, ten years after the end of the ColdWar, cooperation with the U.S. in overseas operations has again become theguiding concept in Canadian force development.

Post-Cold War Security Relations II:

The Return of "Homeland" Defense

As noted above, in the early 1990s the end of the Cold War brought about amarked scaling back of NORAD activities. To be sure, neither Washington norOttawa was prepared to dismantle the radar lines and disband the interceptorsquadrons. Moreover, to the extent that NORAD's prime missions had becomewarning and assessment of missile attack and space surveillance, there was acontinued role for the combined command. Thus, the agreement was renewed in1991 and 1996. But the strategic value to the U.S. of Canadian airspace, whichhad steadily declined throughout the Cold War in any case, was greatlydiminished. Indeed, by the early 1990s, despite the NORAD renewals, there weresuggestions in the United States that NORAD be dismantled, with its missilewarning and attack assessment missions handed over to USSPACECOM or U.S.

Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM), and the residual air defense role be given tothe USAF Air Combat Command (ACC), a component command of the newlycreated United States Atlantic Command (USACOM) that had responsibility formost of the defense of the continental United States.

Although the defense of North America was on the decline in the early 1990s,another paradox of the present era is that American over seas operationscontributed to a revival of interest in missile defense, as part of a revived concernwith the defense of the American homeland, an interest that had not been seen


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since the early days of the Cold War. The new interest in missile defense wasinitially the result of the Gulf War, when attention was focused on Theater MissileDefense (TMD), the need to provide protection for deployed forces and regionalallies. In its 1994 White Paper on defense, the Canadian government seemed toalter its position on a possible BMD role for NORAD:

The Government will examine closely those areas which may requireupdating in accordance with evolving challenges to continentalsecurity. Canada will work towards an agreement that furthers outnational interests and meets our defence needs, now and into the21st century. (20)Canada's potential role in ballistic defence will not bedetermined in isolation, but in conjunction with the evolution ofNorth American and possibly NATO-wide aerospace defencearrangements. (21)

At this time, the thinking in Ottawa was that any BMD role for NORAD would beessentially in support of some kind of collective Alliance TMD effort, with thebilateral command placing its warning and assessment capabilities in the serviceof ABM-compliant systems. Accordingly, Canada took part in the Allied workshops

on TMD organized by the United States. In this sense BMD could be said to beconsistent with Canada's arms control policies and, more importantly, in supportof the expanded peacekeeping missions that the CF was undertaking, especiallythose under NATO's aegis.However, as Richard Betts observed, U.S. policies abroad may actually increasethe danger to the American homeland. "Today, as the only nation acting to policeareas outside its own region, the United States makes itself a target for states andgroups whose aspirations are frustrated by U.S. power." It is "U.S. military andcultural hegemony--the basic threats to radicals seeking to challenge the statusquo--that are directly linked to the imputation of American responsibility formaintaining world order. Playing Globocop feeds the urge to strike back." (22)This especially includes ballistic missile threats from so-called "rogue states." Anew concern with "homeland" defense was emerging in Canada's neighbor to thesouth, one not seen since the 1950s. Paradoxically again, these fears have arisenat a time when American military power has never been greater. The UnitedStates Commission on National Security in the 21st Century, the Hart-RudmanCommission, has noted that:America is becoming increasingly vulnerable to hostile attack on

our homeland--and our military superiority on the conventionalbattlefield will not entirely protect us. In fact there is aschool of thought that American military superiority on theconventional battlefield may push our adversaries towardsunconventional alternatives. This school further postulateswe are entering a period of "catastrophic terrorism," withterrorists gaining access to weapons of mass destruction includingnuclear devices, germ dispensers, poison gas and computer viruses.(23)

Yet another important indication of growing American concern with homelanddefense was the renaming of USACOM in October 1999 to United States JointForces Command (USJFCOM). In addition to its responsibility to prepare U.S. forcesfor overseas deployment, USJFCOM has responsibility for "homeland defense,"including "providing military assistance to civil authorities for consequence


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management of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) incidents within thecontinental United States, its territories and possessions." (24) It will also "supportthe WMD consequence management efforts of the other combatant commands"throughout the world. In setting up USJFCOM, Secretary of Defense William Cohenappointed an Army National Guard Brigadier General as the first commandinggeneral of Joint Task Force--Civil Support (JTF-CS). "The JTF-CS will ensure that

Department of Defense assets are prepared to respond to requests for supportfrom a lead Federal Agency such as the Federal Emergency ManagementAgency." (25) To this extent, USJFCOM may open up new avenues of bilateraldefense cooperation, as Canada cannot ignore American efforts in this regard andit, too, must be concerned about WMD threats arising out of overseas coalitionoperations.

Although fears about homeland defense are being pushed most forcefully byRepublicans in the Congress, Ottawa is aware that it is supported by publicopinion in the U.S. The most recent Chicago Council of Foreign Relations pollfound that while "Americans feel secure, prosperous and confident," with "fear of

armed threats from a rival superpower diminished," they are, "nevertheless ...alarmed by violence at home and abroad" and "support measures to thwartterrorists, prevent the spread of weapons of mass destruction, and keep defensestrong." The vast majority of Americans do not see vital threats to U.S. interestsabroad, but fully 84 percent regard "international terrorism" as the number one"critical threat" to American interests. (26) It is evident to Ottawa that therenewed American interest in BMD is grounded upon and part of these growingfears for the safety of the U.S. homeland.

This rising concern with homeland defense has directly impacted upon thebilateral defense relationship and, indeed, on the character of overall relations

between the two countries. As noted above, the American strategic interest inCanada is that it not become a strategic liability for the United States. In the ColdWar, with both countries accepting a shared threat, the strategic unity of thecontinent insured against this threat.

But now questions are arising within the U.S. about Canada's ability to secureitself against some of the threats to the U.S. In recent years, Ottawa has beenaccused of lax immigration procedures that may allow terrorists to make theirway to America through the very real, but very open and vast border withCanada. Only last December several individuals were caught allegedly trying tobring in bombs. Canada has also been called "hacker haven" because of computer

threats that originate there. Under pressure from Washington, Ottawa has beencompelled to address these matters. It remains to be seen whether such effortswill satisfy the U.S. or whether the world's longest undefended border (or whatsome wags call the world's longest undefended cliche) will soon become harder tocross than those of Europe. In addition, in April of 1999, because of "perceivedweakness in the Canadian arms export system," Secretary of State MadeleineAlbright endorsed revisions to the U.S. International Traffic in Arms ExportRegulations (ITAR). This had the effect of stripping Canada of its special status,"treating it like other allies." (27)


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On NMD, the situation is somewhat different. Here, Canada's military weakness isof little relevance. The U.S. does not need Canadian forces or territory to mountthe kind of limited BMD system now under consideration. The Deputy Commanderof USSPACECOM recently went so far as to suggest that, if the Canadiangovernment declined to endorse and participate in NMD, in the event of somefuture missile attack upon Canada, the United States might indeed "stand idly by"

and "do nothing if a Canadian city is attacked." (28) The Minister of Foreign Affairsand International Trade Axworthy has warned that Canada would not be"stampeded by the Pentagon" into endorsing an "unproven antimissile systemwithout considering the broader implications for arms control." (29) Americansmay well ask whether the basis of continental defense collaboration needs to beexamined anew. Overall, it would appear that questions are being raised on bothsides of the border as to where the American homeland begins? Can it continue tobe synonymous with the "North American homeland?"

The implications for the future of NORAD should NMD be deployed are veryspecific and profound. This is because, even without a BMD system, NORAD still

has the mission of warning of a nuclear attack on North America and "assessingits nature so that the appropriate response" can be taken by the president of theUnited States. "In NORAD parlance, this is 'integrated tactical warning and attackassessment' or ITW/AA." For this NORAD relies upon information drawn fromAmerican missile tracking and detection systems and from U.S. and Canadian airdefenses. Even though Canada makes no direct contribution to the detection andtracking of ballistic missiles and has reduced its air defenses, it "remains at thevery heart of NORAD operations as long as it remains part of the ITW/AA process."Canadian personnel help staff NORAD's operations center, which is shared withUSSPACECOM. (30)

The U.S. military wants to incorporate into NORAD's ITW/AA process "the decision-authority" to use any NMD. It only makes sense to link the systems that detectand assess missile attack with those that would launch interceptors. What thismeans is that Canadians could be at the very heart of the American "national"missile defense system if Canada elects to remain in a NORAD with a BMD role.The United States has indicated that it would like Canada to participate in NMDwithin NORAD. As noted, America does not need Canadian air space or territorynor, despite the great respect it has for the CF, does it need Canadian personnel.Washington is not looking to Canada to fund NMD. But it is likely that it would askOttawa to increase contributions to other aspects of North American aerospacedefense. (31) Canada has a record in space surveillance, although capabilities

have declined in recent years. The military is working on "an ambitious $(CDN)637 million project to give Canada a military presence in space" and, perhaps,with it a "foothold" in NMD. (32)

What the United States appears to want from Canada on NMD is not material orpersonnel contributions, but political endorsement to bolster Washington's casefor NMD and the revision to the ABM Treaty that this would require, with otherallies and with the Russians. As former U.S. Deputy Secretary of Defense JohnHamre said in a speech in Canada in February:


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I believe we are at an important pivot point in our relationship with each other. Unfortunately, Ithink that pivot point is going to revolve around the issue of national missile defense, and this iswhere we have to start having a very open and constructive dialogue with each other about whatit means and why we're doing it.... Canada needs to take the lead ... in helping to communicate tothe rest of the world why it is important to amend the ABM

Treaty. If we fail to do it, I promise we are not going to not protect the United States. We aregoing to go ahead once the President has decided the time is right. And we can do this, I hate tosay it, by ourselves. We'd rather not do it by ourselves. It is part of a much bigger world.... So, I

honestly and firmly believe it is Canada's unique opportunity, and I would say responsibility, tohelp us with our allies and to help us with the approach to understand it is in the world's interest toamend this treaty, so that we can proceed with a limited defense system that lets us protecteverybody against rogue actors and still rely on the underlying deterrence that is the groundingand underpinning of the larger strategic security posture that we have. So, it's my plea, my pleafor your help.... We have to work on this together.It's a shared responsibility. (33)

But it is precisely this kind of political endorsement for NMD that is now theproblem for the Canadian government. The government sympathizes with thethreat of weapons of mass destruction. Indeed, it is for this very reason thatOttawa has been so active on nonproliferation issues. And Ottawa understandsthat if America is to continue to play an active role in global affairs, includingwhen necessary intervening in regional crises, then it must not be deterred byfear of strikes against its homeland. But Canada is not entirely in accord withWashington as to the immediacy of the threat nor the efficacy and wisdom ofNMD as a solution. Minister Axworthy has recently been more forceful in hiscriticism of NMD. In April, after attending a UN arms control conference, he toldCanadian reporters that NMD offers no protection against a range of other threatsto North America, such as low-flying weapons and terrorist attack. Moreover,Washington "risks provoking a Russian nuclear build-up" if it deploys NMD. "Itinvolves participating in an arms race that could result in the expansion of nuclearweapons." (34)

There is also the concern that, after an initial limited deployment, the momentumwill be there for an expansion of the system--one that would indeed threaten theRussian deterrent. In addition, there is some speculation that future interceptorswill kill incoming weapons with nuclear charges rather than by simply hittingthem. If the attacking missiles are believed to carry chemical or biologicalwarheads this might be necessary. This in turn raises Canadian fears about wherethe deadly debris would fall.

In the first six months of 2000, it appeared that Washington was pressing evenmore strongly for the deployment of a limited system by 2005. Based upon new

assessments of intelligence, the ballistic missile threat to the American homelandis said to have become significantly more dangerous than previously thought. Inpart, this is said to be the result of clandestine transfers of missile technologiesfrom Russia and China to certain states, including Iraq and Iran. As a result, thesestates will be able to extend the range of their missiles. This is why the BallisticMissile Defense Office (BMDO) wants to press ahead with what it calls a"compressed high risk schedule," meaning that it wants to begin construction ofthe Alaska site without subjecting the program to the kind of rigorous and carefuldevelopment process that its critics say is necessary. This needs to be done if the


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system is to be operational by 2005, the year in which BMDO believes the dangerwill be significant. In order to meet this deadline, construction for the Xban radarsmust start in the summer of 2001 and, thus, a decision must be made in the fall of2000. This system would, however, only be able to deal with tens of missiles,mainly those that might be fired from North Korea.

While some in the American government, and in Canada's defense establishment,have been critical of Mr. Axworthy's comments, his concerns about the armscontrol implications of NMD can be heard in the U.S., including within Congress. Astudy by the Congressional Budget Office raised questions about the costestimates for NMD. According to one of the three senators who asked for thestudy, Democrat Frank Lautenberg of New Jersey, "The report confirms my fearsthat we are rushing into a decision on national missile defense without knowingeverything we should about the financial, technical and diplomatic implications."(35) Senator Joseph Biden of Delaware has questioned whether the threat fromrogue states is clear. These states would not risk a nuclear retaliatory strike fromthe United States. Echoing the views expressed by Minister Axworthy, Biden noted

that, "We are clearly more vulnerable to a terror attack with a weapon of massdestruction than we are from a missile coming out of the blue with a returnaddress on it." (36)

A recent article by the associate director of MIT's Security Studies program andtwo senior staff scientists at the Union of Concerned Scientists argued that NMD is"an indefensible system." Its technologies have not been conclusively proven andthe rush to deploy would open a "Pandora's silo" of arms control difficulties, notonly with Russia and China, but also with India, Pakistan, and potentialpoliferators.

In the medium to long run, the price of a national missile defensesystem deployed by the United States may well be a world with moreICBMs and weapons of mass destruction. Compared with these large andnearly certain security costs, the benefits the planned NMD systemwould provide are both too small and too uncertain to justify itsdeployment. (47)

Former U.S. Secretary of Defense Harold Brown, along with former CIA DirectorJohn Deutch and former Deputy Secretary of Defense John White, recently arguedagainst the planned deployment of a limited system by 2005. They suggest thatthe U.S. should initially meet the missile threat from rogue states by deployingABM-compliant TMD systems near these states, some of which could be based atsea.

This alternative provides greater flexibility to meet theater andnational ballistic threats as they evolve over time. The TMDproposals would be cheaper and technically less risky than the NMDsystem. Finally, it may prove more amenable to ABM treaty changesand less likely to prompt adverse responses from Russia, China orU.S. allies. (38)

Barry Rubin of Bar-Ilan University agrees with the need to counter the growingmissile threat with missile defenses. But, commenting on CIA Director GeorgeTenet's Congressional testimony he noted that, "In some way the threat is being


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over-blown. Unfortunately, these questions lend themselves to sensationalism. Itis easy to exaggerate the likelihood of countries using WMD, or to overstate thesize, effectiveness, and international linkages of terrorist groups." (39)Despite some criticisms, the U.S. has indicated it will proceed with NMD with orwithout a revision to the Treaty and, since Washington would like to place thesystem under NORAD, the future of bilateral aerospace cooperation remains very

much in question. This is mainly because if Canada does not want to participate inNMD "it cannot remain involved in the ITW/AA process, since the two will belinked." This would mean that Canada's role in North American defense would bediminished. It might be possible to maintain NORAD on a different basis--that is,without responsibility for missile warning, assessment, and defense--as asomewhat hollow and marginalized organization. But according to Joseph Jockel,"without Canadian involvement in ITW/AA, maintaining NORAD as a jointenterprise would have little to no point."In such a case the U.S. would move to dissolve NORAD and shift ITW/AA, alongwith the operations of the missile defense, to an all-U.S. command. It wouldremain of some importance to the U.S. to know what was occurring in Canadian

airspace, but that could be readily resolved through a fairly simple arrangementwith the Canadian air force that did not involve a joint command. (40)

The disestablishment of NORAD would not end all military cooperation betweenCanada and the United States. For example, maritime collaboration, which is quiteextensive but which takes place in the context of NATO's Atlantic Command andthrough a host of ad hoc bilateral arrangements, would continue. The twocountries could also maintain the close links that exist between their respectivearmies, especially as regards overseas operations within NATO. While somemembers of Congress might seek to punish Canada in the defense area, forexample by restricting Canadian exports of defense goods to the U.S., it is

unlikely that the administration would support such measures. Indeed, despite theongoing disagreement over NMD, Canada and the United States have reached anew agreement on defense economic cooperation, "resuming the special defenseindustrial relations they shared for more than 50 years." (41) And a Department ofDefense (DOD) official has recently urged that the U.S. should set up a "Canada-like" exemption to U.S. defense economic regulations "to speed up movement ofmunitions" with closest American allies such as the United Kingdom and Australia.(42)

Moreover, in the context of overall bilateral relations, defense collaboration isactually a relatively small dimension. This is the richest bilateral trading

relationship in the world, with over one billion dollars moving across the borderevery day. Each is the other's largest trading partner, with over 85 percent ofCanadian trade going to and from the United States. A complex web of relationsexists in almost every other dimension of civil society, from environmental issuesto those of culture. To be sure, Canada is the more dependent and, therefore,more vulnerable partner. But it is unlikely that the United States could or wouldseek to retaliate against Canada on nondefense-related matters.


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At the same time, a Canadian decision not to participate in NMD, which mightprecipitate the disestablishment of NORAD, would definitely cause concern in theU.S. and could stress the heretofore close defense relationship. It could encouragethose in the U.S. who, supportive of a greater overall unilateralism in securitypolicy, might no longer consider it necessary to make the compromises necessaryto sustain the bilateral defense relationship with Canada, especially given the

declining importance of Canadian territory and Canada's reduced ability tocontribute to collective defense. It is not that Washington would take deliberatemeasures to punish Canada. It would be that the Americans would no longer goout of their way to include Canada. For Canada this could mean exclusion fromparticipation--and the information and intelligence this affords--in the aerospacedefense of North America. For some in Canada, this would mean an erosion ofsovereignty.

Ironically, a Canadian decision to support NMD, despite misgivings over armscontrol, might also lead to disagreement with the U.S. and raise sovereigntyconcerns. This is because, if Canada agreed to make NMD a NORAD role, it would

want to participate sufficiently in the control, command and, perhaps, design ofthe system to assure itself that Ottawa was not simply turning over an aspect ofCanadian defense policy to the United States. The involvement of the CF wouldhave to be, and be seen to be, more than "window dressing." Yet, as Washingtonis primarily looking for Canadian endorsement of NMD, the continued participationof CF personnel in NORAD and, perhaps, some off-setting expenditures in otherareas, it seems unlikely that the U.S. could agree to a significant measure ofCanadian control over NMD development and deployment.

All of these conflicting pressures place Canada in a policy position with regard toNMD unlike any other American ally. To be sure, some European allies have

expressed concern over the arms control implications of NMD and they worry thatit could lead to a "fortress North America," thereby undermining the sense ofshared threat which kept collective defense collective. But the Europeans alsowant TMD, which can protect them without violating the ABM Treaty. Canada is onrecord as supporting TMD systems that would protect Europe from threatsoriginating from "rogue states." As a country that has placed thousands of itstroops overseas, especially in Europe, Canada is also concerned about providingprotection for deployed forces. Yet, as a North American nation it cannot simplyignore American concerns about homeland defense. If North America isconsidered a region, why should it be any less worthy of missile defense simplybecause the distances that missiles must travel to reach it are greater than those

of the potential missile threats to Europe?

Canada, in addition to concerns about overall strategic stability, has to worryabout whether its current doubts about NMD will result in a "for tress America"from which it will be excluded. The government of Canada may well find supportfor its arms control objections to NMD amongst the European allies, but Canadaalone will pay the price if this opposition leads to a deterioration in the bilateraldefense relationship with the United States. Thus, Ottawa needs to be wary aboutgetting out in front of any concerted NATO effort to oppose NMD. It would,


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moreover, be very embarrassing for Canada were it to lead such an effort, only tofind that its NATO allies were willing to compromise in order to secure continuedAmerican involvement in European security.

The Benefits of Bilateral Procrastination

With the Canadian military and others urging Ottawa not to forfeit the privilegedposition Canada has long enjoyed in its defense relations with the U.S., and theMinister of Foreign Affairs and arms control interest groups stressing the need toremain faithful to the country's arms control traditions, the Prime Minister seemsto be facing a tough decision. How will he respond? It is said that Americans solveproblems, Britains try and muddle through, and Canadians hope they will goaway. In this case, it may be said that Ottawa's preference would be for theNMDNORAD dilemma to go away, even temporarily. This could happen ifPresident Clinton decided to let the next president make a decision ondeployment or if there were to be a breakthrough in talks with the Russians overrevisions to the ABM Treaty. If such an agreement can be reached, then the

conditions would be very favorable for a Canadian decision to eventually supportNMD and make it a NORAD role. According to Henry Kissinger, the Clintonadministration "is highly uncomfortable with missile defense. If unavoidable fordomestic reasons, it prefers to squeeze it into a framework where it is confined tosuch rogue states as North Korea," while being useful against China. Kissingerwarns, though, that a strategic defense against China that omits Russia "implies adefinition of national security that will profoundly affect all other internationalrelationships ... a 'lame-duck President should not attempt a definite break-through on so controversial an issue." (43) Prior to the 8 July 2000 test, onecommentator noted that, "It would make President Clinton's life a lot easier if thedamned thing would just miss." (44) It did miss. And the "political fallout" from the

failure of the test may well mean the postponement of a presidential decision.(45) At the same time, a Republican president and Congress would likely pressahead with NMD, thus bringing the issue back, much to Ottawa's discomfort.

One factor which the CF and the Department of National Defence may be able tocount on is that, overall, the Canadian public is favorably disposed to continuedmilitary cooperation with the United States. Indeed--and this is another paradox--the end of the Cold War has provided the government with a relatively permissivepublic opinion climate in this regard. This may be the result of the fact that, in the1990s, Canada joined the U.S. in what can only be described as a series ofpopular humanitarian interventions under the broad banner of peacekeeping.

There was, for example, overwhelming public support for the action in Kosovo.Apart from arms control interest groups, the general public opinion in Canadaseems to be either indifferent to or positive about missile defense for NorthAmerica.

Tough talk from some members of the American military and Department ofDefense officials in Washington notwithstanding, it would appear that the Clintonadministration, although not pleased with Canada's response to NMD to date, is atleast sympathetic to the dilemmas Ottawa faces and anxious to find a way to


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sustain the bilateral defense relationship--a desire it knows Ottawa shares.Moreover, Canada itself is still viewed extremely positively by the Americanpeople and their leaders. The Chicago Council of Foreign Relations poll notedabove found that 69 percent of the public and 89 percent of the leaders felt thatthe United States has a "vital interest in Canada." And Canada continues to rankfirst (74 percent) amongst the countries of the world, including all other allies,

when Americans are asked which countries they have a "warm feeling" towards.(46)

In narrow military terms Canada may no longer be considered a very importantpiece of real estate and its military weakness no longer a potential strategicliability. And Canada does not have the resources to keep pace with the UnitedStates in aerospace defense technologies. Yet as the President of the U.S. ArmyWar College recently admonished, "Trust, not technology, sustains coalitions."(47) Even in a unipolar world a rupture of the bilateral relationship would notreflect well upon the United States and its continued leadership of collectiveWestern security. Samuel Huntington has cautioned that the United States may

become the "lonely superpower" if it continues some of its unilateralist ways. (48)Forcing the issue of NMD on the Canadian government at this time could leaveAmerica alone in terms of North American aerospace defense, something it iscapable of doing, but not something which would be altogether in the nationalinterest. Other U.S. allies may not be overly concerned about the impact onCanada. However, the willingness of Washington to allow such a long-standingdefense relationship to deteriorate might well raise questions about their securityties with America. It may simply not be in the American interest to make a bigissue of current disagreements with Canada over NMD.

Thus, Canada may have some leeway and some leverage yet, at least in terms of

not having to make an immediate decision on NMD. The government does notnow have to accept the view of some in the CF and others that NORAD and,indeed, the entire bilateral defense relationship are in jeopardy because ofOttawa's misgivings over NMD. Nor does it have to accept the warnings of somein DFAIT and the arms control interest groups in Canada that the entire structureof arms control now hinges on NMD.

Despite the current disagreement over NMD, Canada and the United States have(quietly) renewed the NORAD agreement a year early, with no reference beingmade to NMD. To be sure, this may have simply put off a Canadian decision, butthis has the advantage of providing Ottawa with some breathing room. Even if the

president should decide to proceed with NMD, full deployment would take severalyears, thus leaving time for further negotiation. It would appear that this decisionreflects the desire of both governments not to press the issue at this time, thehope being that something can be worked out with the Russians. If the end ofCold War and the decade that came after teach us anything, it is that anythingcan happen in international strategic affairs. For both countries there are benefitsto be gained from a measure of bilateral procrastination on this seeminglyinsoluble issue.


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9. "Current Operations," www.dnd.ca/menu/Operations/index_e.htm. (9 June2000).

10. David Haglund and Alen Sens, "Smaller NATO Members: Belgium, CanadaPortugal and Spain," unpublished paper.

11. Kevin Ward, "Canadian Troops Could Help EU Army," The KingstonWhigStandard (27 June 2000): 12.

12. Canada, Department of National Defence, Speaking Notes for the HonourableArt Eggleton, Minister of National Defence, "Canadian Lessons from the KosovoCrisis," Harvard University, 30 September 1999.

13. Mathew Fisher, "Allies in Kosovo Envy Canada's Hi-tech Weaponry," The MapleLeaf (14 July 1999): 16.

14. "Operations Update,"

www.dnd.ca/menu/weeklybrief/jun00/01NwsConf_m_e.htm (1 June 2000).

15. "The Challenges of Shared Security," Remarks to the Canadian Club ofMontreal, the Honorable Gordon Giffen, Montreal, 11 January 1999. (Text suppliedby the Embassy of the United States, Ottawa)

16. Stewart Bell, "Military May Be Soon Unfit for Combat," National Post 8 (18October 1999), at www.nationpost.com. See Joseph T. Jockel, The CanadianForces: Hard Choices, Soft Power (Toronto: Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies,1999).

17. As quoted in Peter McLaughin, "Funding Crunch Stealing Navy's Heart, ReportSays." The Daily News (8 June 1999), at www.hfxnews.southam.ca/story4.hmtl.See also David Puglise, "Lightly Armed and Not So Dangerous," The Kingston WhigStandard (10 May 1999). 8.

18. Jeff Salot, "NATO Head Hits Canada on Defence Spending," The Globe and Mail(31 October 1999): A3.

19. Canada, Department of National Defence. Shaping the Future of CanadianDefence: A Strategy for 2020 (Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services, 1999), 10.

20. Canada, Department of National Defence, 1994 Defence White Paper (Ottawa:Minister of Supply and Services, 1994), 23.

21. Ibid., 25.

22. Richard Betts, "The New Threat of Mass Destruction," Foreign Affairs 77(January/February 1998): 28, 41.
http://www.dnd.ca/menu/Operations/index_e.htmhttp://www.dnd.ca/menu/weeklybrief/jun00/01NwsConf_m_e.htmhttp://www.nationpost.com/http://www.hfxnews.southam.ca/story4.hmtlhttp://www.dnd.ca/menu/Operations/index_e.htmhttp://www.dnd.ca/menu/weeklybrief/jun00/01NwsConf_m_e.htmhttp://www.nationpost.com/http://www.hfxnews.southam.ca/story4.hmtl


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23. Lawrence F. Skibbie, "Hart-Rudman Study Emphasizes Immediacy ofHomeland Threats," National Defense 84 (November 1999): 2.

24. USACom Redesignated to U.S. Joint Forces Command," Marine Corps Gazette83 (November 1999): 8.

25. "Guard General to Command Joint Civil Support Task Force," National Guard53 (November 1999): 12.

26. John E. Rielly, "Americans and the World: A Survey at Century's End," ForeignPolicy 114 (Spring 1999): 97, 99.

27. Colin Clark, "U.S., Canada Agree on Cross-Border Arms Trade," Defense News8 (May 2000): 4.

28. Jeff Salot, "Support Missile Project or Else, Ottawa Warned," The Globe andMail (3 May 2000): A1, A14.

29. Jeff Salot, "Don't Push Missile Defence on Canada, Axworthy Says," The Globeand Mail (17 March 2000): A5.

30. Jockel, The Canadian Forces, 104, 105.

31. Ibid., 107.

32. David Puglise, "Canadian Forces Back Missile Shield Project. Military to Spend$637 Million to Extend Presence in Space," The Ottawa Citizen (13 March 2000).(Online edition).

33. Remarks as delivered by Deputy Secretary of Defense John J. Hamre, Calgary,Alberta, Canada, Friday, 18 February 2000,www.defemselink.mil/speeches/2000/s200218-depsecdefl.html.>

34. Paul Knox, "Axworthy Takes on U.S. over Missile Defence, "The Globe and Mail(26 April 2000). (Online edition).

35. Copal Ratnam, "Higher NMD Cost Estimate Further Polarizes Debate," DefenseNews (8 May 2000): 4.

36. Paul Koring, "Political Fallout Widespread from U.S. Missile Test Failure," TheGlobe and Mail (10 July 2000): A8.

37. George Lewis, Lisbeth Gronlund, and David Wright, "National Missile Defense:An Indefensible System," Foreign Policy 117 (Winter 1999-2000): 136.

38. John Deutch, Harold Brown, and John P. White, "National Missile Defense: IsThere Another Way?" Foreign Policy 119 (Summer 2000): 99.
http://www.defemselink.mil/speeches/2000/s200218-depsecdefl.html.%3C/phttp://www.defemselink.mil/speeches/2000/s200218-depsecdefl.html.%3C/p


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39. Barry Rubin, "Weapons of Mass Destruction: A New Dimension in U.S. MiddleEast Policy," Middle East Journal of International Affairs 4 (2 June 2000). (Onlineedition).

40. Jockel, The Canadian Forces, 106.

41. Clark, 4.

42. "DOD Memo Urges 'Canada-like' Export Exemption for Closest Allies," InsideU.S. Trade (19 May 2000). (Online edition).

43. Henry Kissinger, "Head to Head in Moscow," National Post (1 June 2000): A17.

44. Tony Katon, "It's Missile Test Time, "CNN Interactive (7 July 2000),http://www.cnn.com/2000/ALLPOLITICS/stories/07/07/missile7_7.a.tm/index.html

45. Koring, A8.

46. Rielly, 103, 109.

47. Robert H. Scales, Jr., "Trust, Not Technology, Sustains Coalitions," Parameters28 (Winter 1998-99): 4.

48. Samuel P. Huntington, "The Lonely Superpower," Foreign Affairs 78(March/April 1999).

COPYRIGHT 2000 Association for Canadian Studies in the United States

COPYRIGHT 2008 Gale, Cengage Learning

Joel J. Sokolsky "The bilateral security relationship: will "National" Missile Defenseinvolve Canada?". American Review of Canadian Studies. FindArticles.com. 21Nov, 2009. http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_hb009/is_2_30/ai_n28817074/

Abstract

Since the inception of the concept of flight by the Wright Brothers, mankind has

come a long way from the bamboo and steel tube planes to professional air travel

and commercial space travel development.

The transformation of this visionary journey from flight to a more serious

business called aerospace or defense and civil aviation is a capsule of time

interwoven with human effort which offers many insights to the global efforts on

aerospace development as well as achieving the ever elusive air dominance role

in defense terms. How do countries do it? What are their commercial

considerations to develop this sector and their achievements in this field?
http://www.cnn.com/2000/ALLPOLITICS/stories/07/07/missile7_7.a.tm/index.htmlhttp://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_hb009/is_2_30/ai_n28817074/http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_hb009/is_2_30/ai_n28817074/http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_hb009/is_2_30/ai_n28817074/http://www.cnn.com/2000/ALLPOLITICS/stories/07/07/missile7_7.a.tm/index.htmlhttp://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_hb009/is_2_30/ai_n28817074/http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_hb009/is_2_30/ai_n28817074/http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_hb009/is_2_30/ai_n28817074/


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Aruvian Research' s report Analyzing the Global Aerospace and Defense Industry

presents an understanding of the aerospace industry and draws distinction

between defense and civil participants in the global aerospace and aviation

marketplace. In order to understand the overall competitive quotients in this

complex marketplace the report explains the factors of influence in this industry

which determine the overall resource positioning in aviation sector for potential

entrants. The entry and exit of global players from key or profitable aviation &

aerospace market segments details the overall competitive forces at play which

are interspersed with mergers and acquisitions, and consolidations in the aviation

industry. Some players complete entire product cycles whereas others prefer to

weigh their financial capabilities against the risk benefit equations in aviation

sector. An important variable presented in this report is the global supply chain in

aerospace aviation sector which will result in the players obtaining manufacturing

efficiency as a competitive advantage in aerospace aviation industry. These

factors help us draw a market forecast of the aviation aerospace industry.

The report covers the role of aerospace industry suppliers and their comparative

role in the automotive sector is an important factor to underline their supply

trends, their movement in this sector. The role of aerospace aviation suppliers is

critical to the objectives of aerospace manufacturers to chase the goal of lean

manufacturing in aerospace aviation sector which will contribute to the bottom-line with meeting the demands of global consumers of aerospace aviation faster

and with more cost effectiveness.

An important development in this area has been the steady shift of component

outsourcing solutions to China keeping cost as well as quality parameters in focus

by the industry majors. The role of China in global aerospace aviation market is a

force to be reckoned with keeping an eye on the shift of global cost effectiveness

drive.

Defense aerospace requirements have fuelled growth in the global civil aerospace

sector where in the economic activity in civil aerospace aviation has brought

about a boom in international traffic; much of global traffic has seen growth in

the Asia Pacific civil aerospace aviation sector aided by the emergence of a new

and vibrant Asian civil aviation consumer base. One of the major challenges in

these growth initiatives in Asia Pacific civil aviation is the regulatory framework in


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place with various governments along with the constant environmental watch of

effects of sudden aviation growth in the Asia Pacific. However, as an emerging

base, the opportunities for aerospace contractors in Asia Pacific civil aerospace

are bound to increase presenting a positive future outlook. Aruvian' s report takes

you through the aerospace and defense industry in this fast upcoming region,

presenting the actual circumstances in operation in the industry.

In the Global Aerospace & Defense Industry, no analysis can be complete without

an understanding or a firsthand experience of the competitive rivalry between

Airbus Industries and Boeing Corporation. With both trying for more market share

in the amount of aviation purchase orders generated worldwide particularly in the

Asia Pacific, the report explores the rivalry between the two companies in-depth.

The recent concurrent launches of the A 380 and the Boeing 777(ER) series is a

case in point. An understanding on the commercial moves of these two global

majors gives a clearer insight for companies where to put their money.

With increasing investment in aerospace and defense comes the demand for

increased aerospace security safety standards which have to ensure the safety of

consumers particularly in the Asia Pacific and United States. This has seen the

flow of investment in aerospace security products and manufacturers like

Argenbright, International Total, ICTS, etc., across continents as the global

awareness about aviation security increases. Aviation Security Products likebiometric access control systems or facial recognition up linking to ground

stations are ground breaking aviation security technologies which have come in to

prominence as explained by this report.

The report also focuses on the achievement of bigger objectives like defense air

dominance and the role of United States in this sector. Since the defense industry

is directed more by political will and mindset, the export considerations are often

tightly bound and limited. This has forced many manufacturers to come up with

alternative strategies of survival in global defense industry. The role of other

countries also brings a bearing on the cost implications for this sector. This report

also outlines the major developments in current defense air dominance programs

worldwide.

A vital area is Information Management in the Global Aerospace & Defense sector

which assumes strategic as well as commercial importance for the industry.


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In Section 2, this report details the role of United States, Europe, and other

countries in the defense aerospace sector, as well as the key issues and

challenges faced by them on a global basis. In understanding the US aerospace

industry, this report also emphasizes the effect of the War on Terrorism policy on

the US aviation aerospace sector. A framework of PEST analysis of the United

States aerospace and defense industry has also been established in the report.

The contribution of the United States civil aviation sector is detailed with the

market overview, the various segments and the products of the industry along

with a forecast for the industry.

The study of this report also brings out the movement of competitive stance in

the European Aerospace and Defense sector from defense to civilian purposes

with export focus and the likely emergence of Trans Atlantic deals to this effect.

The relationship between the emergence of budget airlines and their impact on

the European Aerospace Industry is provided in this report. Budget Airlines as a

growing phenomenon worldwide has forced global majors to sit up and take

notice to their overall growth potential.

This report also presents a business case for the concept of Budget Airlines and

tracks the growth of budget airlines industry in Europe. Some of the major

players in this market like the Virgin Express, Easy Jet, face pertinent issues and

challenges of being a part of budget airlines industry. The cost analysis of budgetairlines industry is important from understanding the competitive space in this

industry driven by tight budgets and operational cost management.

The report further details the country wise analysis of the aerospace aviation

sector:

France Aerospace and Defense Industry

Germany Aerospace and Defense Industry

United Kingdom Aerospace and Defense Industry

Russia Aerospace and Defense Industry

Denmark Aerospace and Defense Industry

Hungary Aerospace and Defense Industry

Poland Aerospace and Defense Industry

Spain Aerospace and Defense Industry


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Sweden Aerospace and Defense Industry

Ukraine Aerospace and Defense Industry

Further to the growth of investment in the aerospace and defense in Asia Pacific

warrants a deeper analysis of the emerging markets and the older players like

Australia in the Asia Pacific Aerospace and Defense sector. The role of technology

intensive economies like Taiwan, South Korea, Japan in the aerospace and

defense sector in Asia Pacific is of particular interest for manufacturers to

understand their expansion priorities.

The report also entails the development of the aerospace and defense sector in

the emerging component production as well as aviation manpower supplier

markets such as Argentina, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Mexico, and South Africa.

Keeping in line with the renewed focus on the aerospace and defense industry,this report outlines the leading players in the global defense aerospace industry.

This report presents a ground breaking study of the application of the Porter' sc

Five Forces Strategy analysis to the country-wise Aerospace and Defense

Industry.

A. Executive Summary

Section 1: Global Aerospace & Defense Industry

B. Introduction

B.1 Industry Definition

B.2 Overview of the Global Aerospace and Defense Industry

o B.2.1 Global Scope of the Industry

o B.2.2 High Technology Requirement

o B.2.3 Long Lived Business Cycleso B.2.4 Cyclical Demand

o B.2.5 Long Cash Flow Cycle

o B.2.6 Fluctuations in Working Capital

B.3 Market Segments

B.4 Competition in the Industry


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B.5 Mergers and Acquisitions

B.6 Risks in the Aerospace and Defense Industry

o B.6.1. Financial Availability

o B.6.2. Consolidation Activity

B.7 Global Supply Chain B.8 Looking at Manufacturing Efficiency

C. Market Forecast

D. Role of Suppliers in the Global Aerospace Industry

D.1 Introduction

D.2 Similarities with the Automobile Sector

D.3 Changing Role of Suppliers

D.4 Supplier Trends

o D.4.1 Globalization

o D.4.2 Consolidation

o D.4.3 Supply Chain Integration

o D.4.4 Lean Manufacturing

D.5 Conclusion

E. Outsourcing to China

F. Looking at Civil Aerospace

F.1 Market Overview

F.2 Economic Activity Driving Air Traffic Demand

F.3 Boom in International Traffic

F.4 Regulatory Framework

F.5 Growing Open Air Transport Market

F.6 Challenges

F.7 Major Business Factors of the Future

o F.7.1 Growth in Travel to Asia-Pacific

o F.7.2 Emergence of a New Customer Base

o F.7.3 Growth in Regional Carriers


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o F.7.4 Determining the Environmental Impact of Aviation

F.8 Future for Aerospace Contractors

F.9 Future Outlook

G. Looking at the Airbus - Boeing Rivalry

H. Global Aviation Security Products & Services

H.1 Introduction

H.2 Looking at Demand for Private Aviation Security

H.3 Major Demand Areas

o H.3.1 Asia Pacific

o H.3.2 Western Europe

o H.3.3 United States

H.4 Aviation Security Products

o H.4.1 Access Controls & Biometrics

o H.4.2 Automated EDS

o H.4.3 Biometric Access

o H.4.4 Burglar & Fire Alarm

o H.4.5 Card & Key

o H.4.6 Closed Circuit Television (CCTV)

o H.4.7 Contraband Detection

o H.4.8 Facial Recognition Biometrics

o H.4.9 Trace Detection

o H.4.10 Traditional X-Ray & Metal Detection

H.5 Issues & Challenges

H.6 Market Forecast

H.7 Global Leading Playerso H.7.1 Argenbright Security

o H.7.2 Cash Technologies

o H.7.3 Command Security Corporation

o H.7.4 Fraport AG Frankfurt Airport Services Worldwide

o H.7.5 Grupo Aeroportuario del Sureste, S.A. de C.V.


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o H.7.6 ICTS International N.V

o H.7.7 International Total Services

o H.7.8 InVision Technologies

o H.7.9 L-3 Communications Holdings

o H.7.10 Savi Technology

I. Restructuring in the Global Defense Industry

I.1 Globalization & Consolidation of the Industry

I.2 Revolution in the US Defense Doctrine

I.3 Increase in Costs

I.4 Privatization & Commercialization of Services

I.5 The Export Situation I.6 Dominance of the United States

I.7 Situation in Europe

I.8 Other Countries

I.9 Strategies for Survival in the Emerging Defense Industry

I.10 Political Implications in the Defense Industry

I.11 Conclusion

J. Managing Information in the Aerospace Industry

Section 2: Country Analysis

K. Aerospace & Defense in United States

K.1 Market Segments

K.2 Market Overview

K.3 Consolidation in the Industry

K.4 Effect of the War on Terrorism

K.5 Export Controls

K.6 Issues & Challenges

K.7 Looking at Industry Trends

K.8 Competition in the Industry

K.9 Analyzing the Industry in PEST Framework


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K.10 Role of the Government

K.11 Funding for R&D and Trends

K.12 Market Forecast

K.13 Case Studies - Marketplace Overview

o K.13.1 Texas

L. Civil Aircraft Industry in United States

L.1 Market Overview

L.2 Market Segments

L.3 Market Structure

L.4 Export/Import Situation

L.5 Products of the Industry

L.6 Market Forecast

M. Aerospace & Defense in Europe

M.1 Market Overview

M.2 Market Segments

M.3 Competition in the Industry

M.4 How New EU Members Are Helping the Industry Grow

o M.4.1 Development of New Links

o M.4.2 Increased Investments in the Industry

o M.4.3 The Importance of Poland & the Czech Republic

o M.4.4 Importance of Further EU Expansion

M.5 Issues & Challenges

o M.5.1 Decreasing Performance in Relative Efficiency

o M.5.2 Problems with Europe' s Space Industry

o M.5.3 Problems in Defense Sector

M.6 Market Statistics

o M.6.1 Maintenance Services

o M.6.2 Domestic & Export Figures

o M.6.3 Comparison to the Global Market

o M.6.4 Import/Export Situation


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o M.6.5. Contribution to the EU Trade Balance

o M.6.6 Research & Developments

M.7 Consolidation of European Defense Sectors

o M.7.1 Defense Budget Cuts

o

M.7.2 Likely Emergence of Trans-European Dealso M.7.3 Likely Emergence of Trans-Atlantic Deals

o M.7.4 Conclusion

M.8 Market Forecast

N. The Emergence of Budget Airlines & the Impact on the European Aerospace

Industry

N.1 Introduction N.2 The Global Budget Airline Industry

N.3 The Business Case of Budget Airlines

N.4 A Growing Industr

Documents

Human Factors and Aerospace Safety Is an Important New Inter