Human Rights, Democracy, And Development - Jack Donnelly

Human Rights, Democracy, and DevelopmentAuthor(s): Jack DonnellySource: Human Rights Quarterly, Vol. 21, No. 3 (Aug., 1999), pp. 608-632Published by: The Johns Hopkins University PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/762667 .

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HUMAN RIGHTS QUARTERLY

Human Rights, Democracy, and Development

Jack Donnelly*

I. INTRODUCTION

In the past decade, development, democracy, and human rights have become hegemonic political ideals. Regimes that do not at least claim to pursue rapid and sustained economic growth ("development"), popular political participation ("democracy"), and respect for the rights of their citizens ("human rights")' place their national and international legitimacy at risk.2 Without denying important practical and theoretical linkages, this article focuses on tensions between the logics of human rights, democracy, and development. In doing so, this article challenges the comfortable contemporary assumption that, as the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action (adopted by the 1993 World Conference on Human Rights) put it,

* Jack Donnelly is the Andrew W. Mellon Professor at the Graduate School of International Studies, University of Denver. He has published extensively on the theory and practice of international human rights, including Universal Human Rights in Theory and Practice (1989) and International Human Rights (2d ed. 1998). His most recent work is Realism and International Relations: A Critical Engagement, to be published by Cambridge University Press next year. 1. The contested nature of these terms receives considerable attention below. For now, it is

sufficient simply to adopt common, if controversial, usages. 2. See John F. Copper, Peking's Post-Tienanmen Foreign Policy: The Human Rights Factor,

in ISSUES AND STUDIES 49 (1994) (discussing China's party-state dictatorship that moved from denouncing human rights to arguing that the Tienanmen massacre and the ensuing crackdown were essential to guaranteeing human rights in the particular conditions of China). The exceptions that prove the rule are states, such as North Korea or Afghanistan, that advocate a counter-hegemonic revolutionary ideal-and which, not coincidentally, are to a considerable degree (self-consciously) isolated from an international society that tends to ostracize them. Consider, for example, the current debate within Iran in which openness to both human rights and international society are associated with forces of reform.



Jack Donnelly*

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Jack Donnelly*

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Jack Donnelly*

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Jack Donnelly*

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Jack Donnelly*

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Jack Donnelly*

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Human Rights Quarterly 21 (1999) 608-632 ? 1999 by The Johns Hopkins University Press Human Rights Quarterly 21 (1999) 608-632 ? 1999 by The Johns Hopkins University Press Human Rights Quarterly 21 (1999) 608-632 ? 1999 by The Johns Hopkins University Press Human Rights Quarterly 21 (1999) 608-632 ? 1999 by The Johns Hopkins University Press Human Rights Quarterly 21 (1999) 608-632 ? 1999 by The Johns Hopkins University Press Human Rights Quarterly 21 (1999) 608-632 ? 1999 by The Johns Hopkins University Press Human Rights Quarterly 21 (1999) 608-632 ? 1999 by The Johns Hopkins University Press



Human Rights, Democracy, and Development Human Rights, Democracy, and Development Human Rights, Democracy, and Development Human Rights, Democracy, and Development Human Rights, Democracy, and Development Human Rights, Democracy, and Development Human Rights, Democracy, and Development

"[d]emocracy, development and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms are interdependent and mutually reinforcing."3

II. THE CONTEMPORARY LANGUAGE OF LEGITIMACY

The link between a regime's ability to foster development (prosperity) and the public's perception of the regime's legitimacy is close to a universal, cross-cultural political law. Whatever a ruling regime's sociological and

ideological bases, its sustained or severe inability to deliver prosperity, however that may be understood locally, typically leads to serious political challenge.

The ability to ensure democracy has much less regularly been a ground for determining a regime's legitimacy. Most polities throughout history have rested authority on a divine grant, natural order, or tradition that legitimated hierarchical rule by those with superior virtue (defined by birth, age, wealth, skill, or power). For the past half century, however, most regimes have

appealed to bottom-up authorization from "the people" rather than a

"higher" source. The idea that a government's legitimacy is a function of the extent to

which it implements and defends the natural or human rights of its citizens received its first major international endorsement in the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights.4 Since the 1970s, human rights has been a

regular, if controversial, issue in bilateral and multilateral politics. In the

past decade, human rights has joined democracy and development to

complete a triumvirate of factors that indicate a government's legitimacy, or lack thereof.

Democracy, development, and human rights have important conceptual and practical affinities. Most obviously, international human rights norms

require democratic government. Article 21 of the Universal Declaration

3. Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, U.N. GAOR, World Conf. on Hum. Rts., 48th Sess., 22d plen. mtg., part I, 1 8, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.157/24 (1993), reprinted in 32 I.L.M. 1661 (1993), available on <http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu5/d/vienna.htm> [hereinafter Vienna Declaration]. See also Comprehensive Implementation of and Follow-up to the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, G.A. Res. 148, U.N. GAOR 3d Comm., 52d Sess., 70th plen. mtg., Agenda Item 112(d), ? 9, U.N. Doc. A/Res/52/148 (1998), available on <gopher://gopher.un.org:70/00/ga/recs/52/res52- en.148>; The Right to Development, C.H.R. Res. 1998/72, U.N. ESCOR, Comm'n on Hum. Rts., 54th Sess., 58th mtg., ? 4, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1998/72 (1998), available on <http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu4/chrres/1998.res/72.htm> (giving recent examples where sources repeat information from the Vienna Declaration).

4. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted 10 Dec. 1948, G.A. Res. 217A (III), U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess. (Resolutions, part 1), at 71, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948), reprinted in 43 AM. J. INT'L L. 127 (Supp. 1949) [hereinafter UDHR].



























































































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states that "[t]he will of the people shall be the basis of the authority of government."5 Democracy, although not strictly necessary for development, especially in the short and medium run, may restrict predatory misrule that undermines development. In addition, civil and political rights, by providing accountability and transparency, can help to channel economic growth into national development rather than private enrichment. The redistribu- tions required by economic and social rights similarly seek to assure that prosperity is diffused throughout society, rather than concentrated in a tiny elite. Conversely, those living on the economic edge or with no realistic prospect of a better life for their children are much less likely to be willing to accommodate the interests and rights of others.

Interdependence, even synergy, between human rights, democracy, and development is both possible and desirable. However, realizing such affinities is largely a contingent matter of context and institutional design; it is not automatic or inevitable. For example, the people often want to do extremely nasty things to (some of) their "fellow" citizens. Vast inequalities in countries such as Brazil and the United States underscore the central role of politics in translating "development" (aggregate national prosperity) into the enjoyment of internationally recognized economic and social rights. Countries such as South Korea and Taiwan, not to mention most of Western Europe in the nineteenth century, suggest that development can be sustained for decades despite the systematic denial of civil and political rights.

Twenty-five years ago, most states justified routine violations of human rights not only by appealing to national security (as opposed to personal security) and cultural relativism (as opposed to universal human rights) but also by appealing to the "higher" imperatives of development and democracy (as opposed to the interests of particular individuals and groups). By contrast, in post-Cold War international society, arguments of interdependence are the norm. For example, a recent United Nations Development Program (UNDP) policy statement asserts that "human rights and sustainable human development are interdependent and mutually reinforcing."6 Today, only a few states publicly justify systematic denials of internationally recognized human rights.7

5. Id. art. 21. 6. UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME, INTEGRATING HUMAN RIGHTS WITH SUSTAINABLE DEVELOP-

MENT: A UNDP POLICY DOCUMENT 2 (1998), available on <http://magnet.undp.org/Docs/ policy5.html> [hereinafter INTEGRATING HUMAN RIGHTS].

7. China is an example. In its initial responses to criticisms of the Tienanmen massacre, China largely rejected the language of international human rights. In recent years, however, China has argued that it has a distinctive human rights strategy appropriate to its special conditions. In other words, China accepts the authority of internationally recognized human rights in principle, as symbolized by its decision last year to become a party to the international Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. However, China justifies deviations from international norms by appealing to other parts of the same set of norms, namely those that validate cultural relativism.





































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The power of this new vision of international legitimacy is most evident in the surprisingly rapid demise of most of the standard regime types of the Cold War era. For example, peoples' democracies-which sacrificed the rights of class enemies and dissidents to a greater (party-specified) collective good-passed rapidly from the political scene wherever the people were offered a choice. Likewise, national security states-which sacrificed whatever and whomever they deemed necessary in the struggle against communism-have also become largely discredited. In addition, the fall of Kaunda in Zambia and Suharto in Indonesia are striking examples of the declining appeal of paternalism. Similarly, military rule is in decline even in Sub-Saharan Africa, where it has been the most common form of government since independence.

The power of the idea of human rights should not be overemphasized. Economic failure has been central to the collapse of these regimes. Popular demands for democracy and human rights have often been na've. Official policy statements are often disingenuous. Appeals to cultural relativism and national particularities have hardly disappeared from discussions of human rights. Nonetheless, the surprisingly strong endorsement of the universality of internationally recognized human rights at Vienna in 1993, despite the substantial efforts of China and its allies on behalf of a strong cultural relativism, illustrates the dramatic change in dominant international atti- tudes.8 Whatever the gap between theory and practice, most states today prominently feature appeals to human rights, democracy, and development in their efforts to establish national and international legitimacy.

It is a helpful oversimplification to say that this hegemonic international ideology rests on the success of Western liberal democratic (and social democratic) welfare states, especially the smaller, northern members of the European Union (EU). Although they are economically very well off, they remain deeply committed to an extensive, redistributive welfare state. Politically, northern members of the EU enjoy vigorous and open competi- tive electoral systems and an unusually strong consensus on basic political

8. The Vienna Declaration asserts that "the universal nature of these rights and freedoms is beyond question" and "reaffirms the importance of ensuring the universality, objectivity and non-selectivity of the consideration of human rights issues." Vienna Declaration, supra note 3, 1 32.

All human rights are universal, indivisible and interdependent and interrelated. The international community must treat human rights globally in a fair and equal manner, on the same footing, and with the same emphasis. While the significance of national and regional particularities and various historical, cultural and religious backgrounds must be borne in mind, it is the duty of States, regardless of their political, economic and cultural systems, to promote and protect all human rights and fundamental freedoms.

Id. I1] 1, 5. "The promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms at the national and international levels should be universal and conducted without conditions attached." Id. ? 8.





































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values and structures. Nowhere else has so much progress been made in assuring that almost the entire population enjoys most internationally recognized civil, political, economic, and social rights.

However, this article argues that the Western liberal democratic welfare states' fusion of development, democracy, and human rights reflects a distinctive and contingent balancing of markets (development), elections (democracy), and individual human rights. The struggle for human rights certainly has been fostered by an awareness that many Cold War era claims of conflicts between human rights, democracy, and development were misguided. Real conflicts between the logics of democracy, development, and human rights, however, are often overlooked today. Unless democracy and development are understood and pursued in very particular ways, they may place human rights at risk.

III. DEFINING HUMAN RIGHTS

Human rights are, literally, the rights that one has simply as a human being. As such they are equal rights, because we are all equally human beings. They are also inalienable rights, because no matter how inhumanely we act or are treated we cannot become other than human beings.

Where do such rights come from? How do we determine which particular human rights we have? Such philosophically vital questions are immensely contentious. For the purposes of contemporary international relations, however, we can take them as having been authoritatively answered.

In the fifty years since the United Nations General Assembly adopted the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, virtually all states have endorsed the Declaration, which has arguably acquired the status of customary international law.9 The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights currently has 144 parties.10 The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights has 141 parties.11 The Vienna

9. See THEODOR MERON, HUMAN RIGHTS AND HUMANITARIAN NORMS AS CUSTOMARY LAW 79 (1989); Bruno Simma & Philip Alston, The Sources of Human Rights Law: Custom, Jus Cogens, and General Principles, 12 AUSTL. Y.B. INT'L L. 82, 84 (1992); J.S. Watson, Legal Theory, Efficacy and Validity in the Development of Human Rights Norms in International Law, 3 U. ILL. L.F. 609 (1979) (giving a skeptical view of the UDHR as customary law).

10. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted 16 Dec. 1966, G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI), U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966), 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force 23 Mar. 1976) [hereinafter ICCPR].

11. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, adopted 16 Dec. 1966, G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI), U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966), 993 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force 3 Jan. 1976) [hereinafter ICESCR].



























































Declaration was adopted by consensus by the 171 states that participated in the 1993 World Conference.'2 For better or worse-and in most regards, for the better-these documents set the meaning of "human rights" in contemporary international society.

Internationally recognized human rights arise from the inherent (moral) nature of the human person. For example, Article 1 of the Universal Declaration begins, "[a]ll human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights."'3 Likewise, both Covenants assert that "these rights derive from the inherent dignity of the human person."'4 The Vienna Declaration uses almost the same language: "all human rights derive from the dignity and worth inherent in the human person."15

Every person, simply as a human being, is entitled to enjoy her human rights. Thus, although individuals are properly subject to a great array of social and political obligations, human rights specify an inalienable set of individual goods, services, and opportunities that the state and society are, in ordinary circumstances, required to respect or provide. Because these inherent rights of individuals have prima facie priority over the interests and desires of society and the state, human rights restrict the legitimate range of state action. Although this priority is rarely categorical,'6 rights ordinarily "trump" other legitimate claims17 of the state and society.

The legitimacy of a state, from a human rights perspective, is a function of the extent to which it respects, protects, and realizes the "natural" or

12. See Vienna Declaration, supra note 3. 13. UDHR, supra note 4, art. 1. 14. ICCPR, supra note 10, pmbl. SI 3; ICESCR, supra note 11, pmbl. S 3. 15. Vienna Declaration, supra note 3, pmbl. ?] 2. Regional instruments identify human rights

as deriving from similar sources. See American Convention on Human Rights, signed 22 Nov. 1969, O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, pmbl. ? 2, O.A.S. Off. Rec. OEA/Ser.L/V/11.23, doc. 21, rev. 6 (1979) (entered into force 18 July 1978), reprinted in 9 I.L.M. 673 (1970) (stating that "the essential rights of man . . . are based upon attributes of the human personality"); Additional Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights in the Area of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights ("Protocol of San Salvador"), approved 14 Nov. 1988, 28 I.L.M. 56 (1989) (basing human rights "on the recognition of the dignity of the human person"); African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, adopted 26 June 1981, O.A.U. Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3 Rev. 5 (entered into force 21 Oct. 1986), reprinted in 21 I.L.M. 58 (1982) (stating that "fundamental human rights stem from the attributes of human beings"); Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe: Final Act (Helsinki Accord), adopted 1 Aug. 1975, 73 Dep't State Bull. 323, reprinted in 14 I.L.M. 1292 (1975) (stating that human rights "derive from the inherent dignity of the human person").

16. See ICCPR, supra note 10, art. 4 (for derogations from selected obligations in times of declared public emergencies that threaten the life of the nation). See id. art. 22 for legal restrictions interpreted as "prescribed by law and which are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security or public safety, public order (ordre public), the protection of public health or morals or the protection of the rights and freedoms of others." Id.

17. RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY xi passim (1997).

















































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human rights of its citizens. Thus the Universal Declaration proclaims itself "a common standard of achievement for all peoples and all nations."18 The Vienna Declaration is unusually forthright, claiming in its very first operative paragraph that "human rights and fundamental freedoms are the birthright of all human beings; their protection and promotion is the first responsibility of Governments."19 In all regions of the world, other systems for regulating relations between individuals, states, and society have been the norm throughout most of history. Contemporary international society, however, has chosen to endorse human rights in the strongest possible terms.20

During the Cold War era, official rhetoric held that all human rights were "interdependent and indivisible." The existence of two separate Covenants, however, better reflected the reality of highly selective ap- proaches. In particular, socialist and most African and Asian states emphasized economic, social, and cultural rights to the exclusion of civil and political rights.21 In the United Nations, inordinate attention was given to self-determination and racial discrimination.

Today, however, such challenges to the interdependence and indivisibility of human rights have little of the resonance of twenty-five, or even ten, years ago. At Vienna it was agreed that "while development facilitates the enjoyment of all human rights, the lack of development may not be invoked to justify the abridgement of internationally recognized human rights."22 Likewise, the United Nations Commission on Human Rights has adopted a series of resolutions that have reaffirmed "the universality, indivisibility, interdependence and interrelationship of all human rights [and concluded that] promoting and protecting one category of rights should therefore never exempt or excuse States from the promotion and protection of other rights."23 Thus, in 1998, the year of the fiftieth anniversary of the Universal Declaration, the motto of the office of the High Commissioner for

18. UDHR, supra note 4, pmbl. 19. Vienna Declaration, supra note 3, Part I, EI 1. In much the same vein, the preamble

emphasizes "the responsibilities of all States ... to develop and encourage respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms for all" and calls upon "the peoples of the world and all States Members of the United Nations to rededicate themselves to the global task of promoting and protecting all human rights and fundamental freedoms so as to secure full and universal enjoyment of these rights." Id. pmbl.

20. See generally JACK DONNELLY, UNIVERSAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 49-87 (1989). 21. In the 1950s and 1960s, most Western states similarly over-emphasized civil and

political rights. By the 1970s, however, most Western states, in both their domestic practice and international pronouncements, gave extensive attention to both groups. In this regard, as in so many others in the field of human rights, the United States is a deviant outlier among Western states.

22. Vienna Declaration, supra note 3, Part I, 1[ 10. 23. See Question of the Realization in All Countries of the Economic, Social and Cultural

Rights Contained in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and in the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, and Study of Special Problems























































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Human Rights was: "all human rights for all."24 This article pursues some of the implications for democracy and development of this commitment to all human rights for all.

IV. DEFINING DEMOCRACY

"Democracy is based on the freely expressed will of the people to determine their own political, economic, social and cultural systems and their full participation in all aspects of their lives."25 This statement from the Vienna Declaration is as good a place as any to begin. Like all plausible definitions, the Vienna Declaration's account of democracy is rooted in the etymology of the term, the Greek demokratia which literally means rule or power (kratos) of the people (demos).

The demos for the Greeks, however, was not the whole population, but rather a particular social class, the masses: hoi polloi; literally, the many, but with the same social connotations as the transliterated term in Victorian England. Athenian democracy, even in its "Golden Age," was class rule by ordinary citizens, a class (of males) that excluded slaves and resident aliens. This class often saw their interests as opposed to their aristocratic (literally, rule of the best), oligarchic (rule of the few), or plutocratic (rule of the wealthy) "betters." Thus David Held begins Models of Democracy by defining democracy as "a form of government in which, in contradistinction to monarchies and aristocracies, the people rule."26

Throughout most of its history, the theory and practice of democracy

Which the Developing Countries Face in Their Efforts to Achieve These Human Rights, U.N. ESCOR, Comm'n on Hum. Rts., 54th Sess., 51st mtg., I 4(d), U.N. Doc. E/CN.41998/33 (1998), available on <http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu4/chrres/1 998.res/ 44.htm> [hereinafter 1998 Question]; Question of the Realization in All Countries of the Economic, Social and Cultural Rights Contained in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and in the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, and Study of Special Problems Which the Developing Countries Face in Their Efforts to Achieve These Human Rights, U.N. ESCOR, Comm'n on Hum. Rts., 53d Sess., 56th mtg., 1 3(c), U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1997/17 (1997), available on <http://www.unhchr.ch/ html/menu4/chrres/1 997.res/1 7.htm>; Question of the Realization in All Countries of the Economic, Social and Cultural Rights Contained in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and in the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, and Study of Special Problems Which the Developing Countries Face in Their Efforts to Achieve These Human Rights, U.N. ESCOR, Comm'n on Hum. Rts., 52d Sess., 35th mtg., preliminary ? 3, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1996/11 (1996), available on <http:// www.unhchr.ch/html/menu4/chrres/1996.res/11.htm>. See also Vienna Declaration, supra note 3, pmbl.

24. Mary Robinson, Message from the High Commissioner for Human Rights, in INTEGRATING HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 6, at vi, vii.

25. Vienna Declaration, supra note 3, Part I, S 8. 26. DAVID HELD, MODELS OF DEMOCRACY 2 (1987).

















































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has focused on opposing claims to authority by competing social classes. Democracy as a result has had, until relatively recently, a bad name, and not just because democrats until the late eighteenth century almost always lost. Consider, for example, the negative connotations even today of "demagogue," which literally means leader of the people. Unless we assume, as few societies have, that reason or virtue are more or less randomly distributed among citizens or subjects, the claims of ordinary citizens to rule rest on "mere numbers." Thus from Plato and Aristotle through Kant and Hegel, democracy was disparaged as incompatible with good rule.27 Even advocates of mixed or "republican" regimes, from Aristotle to Machiavelli to Madison and Kant, counterbalanced the interests and claims of the many by those of the few with superior wisdom or virtue.28 Only during the past two centuries have liberal, socialist, and anti-colonial struggles transformed dominant conceptions of "the people," and thus delegitimated non-democratic rule.29

What, though, does it mean for the people to rule? Held offers a partial list of common meanings:

1. That all should govern, in the sense that all should be involved in legislating, in deciding on general policy, in applying laws and in govern- mental administration.

2. That all should be personally involved in crucial decision making, that is to say in deciding general laws and matters of general policy.

3. That rulers should be accountable to the ruled; they should, in other words, be obliged to justify their actions to the ruled and be removable by the ruled.

27. Here, this article addresses only the Western tradition of political thought and practice. In some liberalizing and post-authoritarian regimes it has also been "defended" as a "default option," the lesser of two evils-or at least the one whose shortcomings have not been recently experienced. This limited scope is relatively unproblematic for the purposes of this article, however, because none of the "great" state-based civilizations of Asia, Africa, or the Americas developed a politically significant conception of direct popular rule prior to extensive Western penetration.

28. Democracy-especially electoral democracy-has also been advocated on instrumental grounds, for example, as a device to limit abuses of power or balance competing class interests. However, here this article is only interested in arguments that advance democracy as an intrinsically desirable form of rule.

29. Even the American revolution was more "republican" than "democratic." The leading political parties in the early republic were Republicans and Federalists; Democrats did not become a major force for forty years. Likewise, the strong democrats of the French Revolution were largely defeated: the term democracy did not gain widespread political currency in France until 1848. See Philip J. Costopoulos & Pierre Rosanvallon, The History of the Word "Democracy" in France, 6 J. DEMOCRACY, Oct. 1995, at 140 (1995); Stephen P. Marks, From the "Single Confused Page" to the "Decalogue for Five Billion Persons": The Roots of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in the French Revolution, 20 HUM. RTS. Q. 459 (1998); LYNN HUNT, FRENCH REVOLUTION AND HUMAN RIGHTS

(1996) (discussing the influence of the French Revolution). See also Peter N. Miller, Citizenship and Culture in Early Modern Europe, 57 J. HIST. IDEAS 725 (1996) (giving an interesting review of recent work on seventeenth and eighteenth century alternatives and precursors to democracy).



























































4. That rulers should be accountable to the representatives of the ruled. 5. That rulers should be chosen by the ruled. 6. That rulers should be chosen by the representatives of the ruled. 7. That rulers should act in the interests of the ruled.30

The last of these common meanings, namely that rulers act for the ruled, although often encountered, is not a defensible conception of democracy. For example, Bourbon kings, Chinese emperors, and Ottoman sultans all (contentiously yet plausibly) claimed to rule in the interests of the people. However, as these regimes illustrate, government forthe people may or may not be democratic. Therefore, democracy, if that term is to mean more than the absence of systematic misrule by a narrow segment of society, must be government of or by the people. Beyond benefitting from good governance, the people in a democracy must be the source of the government's authority to rule.

Held's six other meanings encompass an immense variety of political forms. For example, the second meaning, namely that all are involved in crucial decision making, requires extensive direct participation by citizens. In contrast, the fourth meaning, which calls for accountability of the ruler to the representatives of the ruled, and the sixth meaning, which states that rulers should be chosen by representatives of the ruled, may involve entirely representative government. All of Held's definitions are extremely open. What does it mean to "be involved" in decision-making? What are the mechanisms and measures of "accountable" government? How should the ruled "choose" their rulers?

According to the Vienna formulation, the trick is to determine "the freely expressed will of the people."31 Democratic theories often are distinguished by their reliance on "substantive" or "procedural" tests in making this determination. Rousseau provided a good illustration of the difference: one way to determine the will of the people is to consult them, directly or through representatives. Rousseau, however, disparaged this (procedural) "will of all," which often expresses only particular individual and group interests.32 Instead he advocated following "the general will," the reflective, rational interest of the whole people, which frequently is not the same as the aggregated preferences of individuals and groups.33

30. HELD, supra note 26, at 3 (drawing heavily on a list in JACK LIVELY, DEMOCRACY (1975)). 31. Vienna Declaration, supra note 3, Part I, I 8. 32. See JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT AND THE DISCOURSES 202 (G.D.H. Cole trans.,

1993). 33. Id. at 202, 271.

[While] it is not impossible for a [private] will to agree on some point with the general will, it is at least impossible for the agreement to be lasting and constant; for the [private] will tends, by its very nature, to partiality, while the general will tends to equality.

Id. at 199.






1993). 33. Id. at 202, 271.


Id. at 199.






1993). 33. Id. at 202, 271.


Id. at 199.






1993). 33. Id. at 202, 271.


Id. at 199.






1993). 33. Id. at 202, 271.


Id. at 199.






1993). 33. Id. at 202, 271.


Id. at 199.






1993). 33. Id. at 202, 271.


Id. at 199.

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Purely substantive conceptions, however, lose the link to the idea of the people ruling, rather than just benefitting. Thus the term "democratic" easily slides into an essentially superfluous synonym for "egalitarian." Substantive conceptions are also subject to a variety of practical problems and abuses, ranging from naYve overestimates of the goodness of real people to elitist

paternalism that sees the people as needing to be directed by those with the virtue or insight needed to know their interests.

Therefore, the tendency in recent discussions to stress procedural democracy is generally justified. Popular and policy discussions tend to

emphasize multiparty elections. In the theoretical literature, leading procedural conceptions also emphasize mechanisms to assure an open and unfettered electoral process. For example, Robert Dahl's ideal type of "polyarchy," a common reference point in scholarly discussions, requires not only free and fair elections based on an inclusive franchise but also extensive political freedom to assure truly open elections.34 This extensive

political freedom includes the right of all to run for office, freedom of expression, access to alternative sources of information, and freedom of association.

Elections, however, no matter how free and open, are merely mechanisms for ascertaining the will of the people. Pure procedural democracy can easily degenerate into non-democratic or even anti-democratic formal- ism. Substantive conceptions rightly insist that we not lose sight of the core values of popular authority and control over government.

While this discussion of forms and types of democracy could be extended to great lengths,35 this article shall bring it to a close by noting that when we discuss types of democracy, attention usually shifts from the noun, democracy, to the adjectives describing democracy, such as substantive, procedural, electoral, direct, representative, liberal, guided, and people's. This article will argue that the human rights work of most contemporary "democracies" is rooted in substantive adjectives such as "liberal." In

particular, this article suggests that electoral democracy, the leading con-

temporary procedural conception, falls far short of the demands of interna-

tionally recognized human rights.

34. See generally ROBERT DAHL, POLYARCHY (1971); ROBERT DAHL, DEMOCRACY AND ITS CRITICS (1989)

(discussing polyarchy more broadly). 35. See HELD, supra note 26, for a discussion on nine models, three of which have two major

variants. See also Philippe C. Schmitter & Terry Lynn Karl, What Democracy Is ... and Is Not, 2 J. DEMOCRACY, Summer 1991, at 75; David Collier & Steven Levitsky, Democracy with Adjectives: Conceptual Innovation in Comparative Research, 49 WORLD POL. 430 (1997) (pursuing a diversity of definitions, which is close to exhaustive with respect to recent procedural accounts).



















































































V. DEMOCRACY AND HUMAN RIGHTS

Democracy and human rights share a commitment to the ideal of equal political dignity for all. Furthermore, international human rights norms, as previously noted, require democratic government. The link, however, need not run in the other direction. Because rights of democratic participation are but a small set of internationally recognized human rights, the struggle for human rights is not only much more than the struggle for democracy, but also fundamentally different in character. Even where democracy and human rights are not in direct conflict, they often point in significantly different directions.

A. Empowerment of Whom? For What?

Democracy aims to empower the people in order to ensure that they, rather than some other group in society, rule. Although democracy allocates sovereign authority to the people, it requires little of the sovereign people in return. Because they are sovereign, the people are free, as the Vienna Declaration puts it, "to determine their own political, economic, social and cultural systems."36

Human rights, by contrast, aim to empower individuals, thus limiting rather than empowering the people and their government. By requiring that every person receive certain goods, services, and opportunities, the accept- able range of political, economic, social, and cultural systems and practices is severely restricted. Beyond who ought to rule-which is indeed given a democratic answer-human rights are concerned with how the people (or any other group) rules, and what they do in so ruling.

Democracies may have a better average human rights record than non- democratic regimes. Some non-democratic states, however, perform better on certain rights than some democratic states. Furthermore, human rights practices among democracies vary dramatically. The democratic principle of popular rule is at best only indirectly and contingently connected with respect for the full range of internationally recognized human rights. Only if a sovereign people wills respect for human rights, and thus constrains its own interests and actions, will democracy contribute to realizing human rights. In practice, however, the will of the people, no matter how it is ascertained, often diverges from the rights of individual citizens.37 Electoral

36. Vienna Declaration, supra note 3, Part I, I 8. 37. This is not exactly correct. One may stipulate that the people do not really will anything

inconsistent with internationally recognized human rights. For example, Rousseau

















































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democracies often serve the particular interests of key constituencies. Direct democracy, as Athens dramatically illustrated, can be remarkably intolerant.

Marxist "peoples' democracies" provide a particularly striking example of the differences in the political projects implied by "all human rights for all" and "all power to the people." The dictatorship of the proletariat, whatever the practical problems of real world Stalinist regimes, was rooted in the classical democratic ideal and was updated with a deeply egalitarian vision of the proletariat as a universal class.38 Those claiming human rights who insist on pursuing class (or other selfish) interests inconsistent with the interests of the people/proletariat are, in the name of democracy, to be coerced into compliance with the good of all. Any alternative would be, in an important sense, anti-democratic.

Human rights advocates would respond, "so much the worse for democracy." In fact, human rights are, in a significant sense, profoundly anti-democratic. For example, the US Supreme Court is, by design, 'anti- democratic,' because it regularly frustrates the will of the people. A central purpose of constitutional review is to assure that the people, through their elected representatives, do not exercise their sovereignty in ways that violate basic rights.

At this point, or even perhaps several paragraphs earlier, a frustrated reader might respond that people today do not have in mind ancient Greece or theorists like Kant and Madison, let alone Marx. History and etymology inform but do not determine contemporary conceptions of democracy, which have as their referent governments like Britain, France, Germany, India, Japan, and the United States (or some other such list). Fair enough. But what form of government is this?

B. Liberal versus Electoral Democracy

The standard answer from comparative politics is "liberal democracy." Liberal democracy is a very specific kind of government in which the morally and politically prior rights of citizens and the requirement of the rule of law39 limit the range of democratic decision-making. Democracy and

claims that the general will is always perfect and incorruptible. See ROUSSEAU, supra note 32, at 202, 272. However, in such cases, either democracy or human rights becomes superfluous.

38. See Richard W. Miller, Democracy and Class Dictatorship, 3 Soc. PHIL. POL'Y 59 (1986) (providing a good, brief defense of Marx's democratic credentials).

39. It is perhaps worth noting explicitly that there is no necessary connection between democracy and the rule of law. The people may choose to rule through standing, neutral laws or through some other mechanism. Conversely, non-democratic regimes may (although they rarely do in practice) respect the rule of law.



























































human rights are not merely compatible but are mutually reinforcing in contemporary liberal democracies only because of a particular resolution of the competing claims of democracy and human rights that gives priority to human rights.

Popular empowerment-democracy with no adjective (or with most procedural adjectives)-will realize human rights only to the extent that the people choose to do so. However, in liberal democracies, some rights- abusive choices are denied to the people ("[c]ongress shall make no law..."), and some rights-protective choices are mandated ("[e]veryone has the right . . ."). The democratic logic of popular rule operates only within the constraints set by individual human rights. The liberal commitment to individual rights more than the democratic commitment to popular empowerment makes contemporary liberal democracies rights-protective. The adjective "liberal,"40 rather than the noun "democracy," does most of the human rights work.

The adjective also does the human rights work in consociational democracy. The consociational entrenchment of special rights for established social groups-for example, Catholics and Protestants in Holland, or Walloons and Flemish in Belgium-may facilitate the guaranteeing of human rights for all in plural societies.41 However, the democratic logic of empowering the people is once more subordinated to a substantive, rights- based logic that limits what the people or their representatives may legitimately do.42

The struggle for liberal democracy is a struggle for human rights-but only because the adjective has built human rights into the definition. The link between electoral democracy (or democracy without adjectives) and human rights is much more tenuous. (Electoral) democracy may remove violators of internationally recognized human rights; it need not take us very far toward implementing or enforcing many human rights. Establishing a secure electoral democracy in, say, Indonesia or Nigeria will only be a small

40. In contemporary discourse, especially in the United States, "liberal" is used in reference to the non-Marxist left (antonym: conservative), supporters of economic markets, and supporters of rights. The term "liberal" is used here only in this last sense. Below, this article will implicitly argue that it is more associated with the first sense-what might be called "old" liberals-than with the second, which is the doctrine of contemporary neo- liberals. Cf. RONALD DWORKIN, IN A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE 181-205 (1985).

41. See AREND LIJPHART, DEMOCRACY IN PLURAL SOCIETIES: A COMPARATIVE EXPLORATION (1975) (discussing the classic statement). See also DILEMMAS OF DEMOCRACY IN NIGERIA (Paul A. Beckett & Crawford Young eds., 1997); TIMOTHY D. SISK, DEMOCRATIZATION IN SOUTH AFRICA: THE ELUSIVE

SOCIAL CONTRACT (1995) (discussing proposed contemporary applications in Africa). 42. Much the same is true of corporatist regimes in which labor, residents of a particular

region, or other social groups are given special status in political decision making. See, e.g., PATTERNS OF CORPORATIST POLICY-MAKING (Gerhard Lehmbruch & Philippe C. Schmitter eds., 1982).

















































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(if valuable) step toward establishing a rights-protective regime. Many discussions of the late Cold War and early post-Cold War spread of (largely electoral) democracy have obscured these vital distinctions, especially in Latin America and Central and Eastern Europe. These "democratic revolu- tions" have undoubtedly benefitted human rights. However, even where anti-democratic forces have not reasserted themselves, many of these countries continue to systematically violate numerous internationally recognized human rights. Those not part of the majority-or whatever group exercises the power of the people-need the protection of human rights against the interests and will of the majority.

This is not a matter of "immature" (merely electoral) versus "mature" (liberal) democracies.43 Liberal democracy is tempered or constrained in particular ways, not simply a more fully developed electoral democracy. It may take longer to establish liberal democracies, but that is because they must meet certain substantive, not merely procedural, standards. Further- more, they must achieve a difficult balancing of democratic and human rights principles.44 Working for (electoral) democracy, no matter how hard or successful that struggle may be, is at best a partial first step to achieving the rights-protective regime envisioned by international human rights norms.

These distinctions are not of mere theoretical interest. The struggle for human rights can be subtly yet significantly eroded if merely electoral democracies are treated, even implicitly, as if they were a reasonable approximation to, or a step toward the more or less automatic achievement of, liberal democracy. This is an especially important caution for US foreign policy, which grossly overemphasizes the mechanism of elections.

VI. DEFINING DEVELOPMENT

Definitions of development are almost as diverse, and perhaps even more contentious, than definitions of democracy.45 This article will distinguish

43. See JUAN J. LINZ & ALFRED STEPAN, PROBLEMS OF DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION AND CONSOLIDATION: SOUTHERN

EUROPE, SOUTH AMERICA, AND POST-COMMUNIST EUROPE (1996) (discussing a powerful assessment of the recent theory and practice of democratic consolidation). See also Guillermo A. O'Donnell, Illusions About Consolidation, 7 J. DEMOCRACY, April 1996, at 34 (1996).

44. Similar difficulties beset efforts to characterize liberal democracy as thick, full, or robust, in contrast to a thin electoral democracy. The differences are qualitative, not quantita- tive. Rather than completing or realizing the full logic of popular rule, liberal democracy puts popular rule in its "proper" place, which is subordinate to human rights in most cases of conflict.

45. The literature is immense. See generally MICHAEL P. TODARO, ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, 67-99 (5th ed. 1994) (providing a standard textbook introduction); ANNA K. DICKSON, DEVELOPMENT AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: A CRITICAL INTRODUCTION 9-53 (1997) (serving as a useful starting point, even though it is a basic introductory undergraduate text). See also Myron Weiner,


























































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between conceptions that emphasize either economic development, understood largely in terms of growth in national productive capabilities, and those that stress human development, often very broadly understood.

Defining development in terms of growth in per capita gross domestic product (GDP),46 despite decades of criticism, continues to dominate the economic, political, and popular mainstreams. Level of industrialization (or post-industrialization), perhaps the second most popular measure, tends to be seen largely as an indicator of potential growth in GDP. The renaissance of market-oriented economic strategies in the past two decades has increased the reliance on growth conceptions of development: markets are social institutions tuned to maximize growth (aggregate output).

The most forceful and influential critics of the 1970s and early 1980s emphasized dependency. Dependency theorists argued that underdevelopment, rather than a natural, pre-industrial state, is a condition of maldevelopment produced by incorporation of a less developed state into the capitalist world system in a position of structural subordination.47 Although moribund as a theory today, the dependency perspective usefully focused

The Goals of Development, in UNDERSTANDING POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT 3 (Myron Weiner & Samuel P. Huntington eds., 1987); ARTURO ESCOBAR, ENCOUNTERING DEVELOPMENT: THE MAKING AND UNMAKING OF THE THIRD WORLD (1995) (exemplifying a more heterodox text); THE DEVELOPMENT DICTIONARY: A GUIDE TO KNOWLEDGE AS POWER (Wolfgang Sachs ed., 1992); DISCOURSES OF DEVELOPMENT: ANTHROPOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES (R.D. Grillo & R.L. Stirrat eds., 1997); DOMINATING KNOWLEDGE: DEVELOPMENT, CULTURE, AND RESISTANCE (Frederique Apffel Marglin & Stephen A. Marglin eds., 1990); AN ANTHROPOLOGICAL CRITIQUE OF DEVELOPMENT: THE GROWTH OF IGNORANCE (Mark Hobart ed., 1993).

46. See WALT ROSTOW, THE STAGES OF ECONOMIC GROWTH (1 960); HOLLIS CHENERY & MOISES SYRQUIN, PATTERNS OF DEVELOPMENT, 1950-1 970 (1975); IAN ROXBOROUGH, THEORIES OF UNDERDEVELOPMENT (1979) (providing a standard critical overview). See also RICHARD A. HIGGOTT, POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT THEORY: THE CONTEMPORARY DEBATE (1 983) (discussing the parallel development of modernization theories in comparative politics).

47. For a representative sample of leading work within the dependency perspective, see ANDRE GUNDER FRANCK, CAPITALISM AND UNDERDEVELOPMENT IN LATIN AMERICA (1 967); Andre Gunder Franck, The Development of Underdevelopment, 18 MONTHLY REV. 17 (1976); Immanuel Wallerstein, The Rise and Future Demise of the World Capitalist System, 16 COMP. STUD. SOC'Y & HIST. 387 (1974); IMMANUEL WALLERSTEIN, THE MODERN WORLD-SYSTEM: CAPITALIST AGRICULTURE AND THE ORIGINS OF THE EUROPEAN WORLD-ECONOMY IN THE SIXTEENTH CENTURY

(1976); IMMANUEL WALLERSTEIN, THE MODERN WORLD-SYSTEM II: MERCANTILISM AND THE CONSOLIDA- TION OF THE EUROPEAN WORLD-ECONOMY, 1600-1 750 (1980); SAMIR AMIN, ACCUMULATION ON A WORLD SCALE (1 974); SAMIR AMIN, MALDEVELOPMENT: ANATOMY OF A GLOBAL FAILURE (1990); FERNANDO HENRIQUE CARDOSO & ENZO FALETTO, DEPENDENCY AND DEVELOPMENT IN LATIN AMERICA (1979) (providing a subtle and powerful version of dependency theory). See, e.g., Symposium, 17 LATIN AM. RES. REV. 115 (1982) (reviewing the symposium devoted to Cardoso and Faletto's work). See also Gabriel Palma, Dependency: A Formal Theory of Underdevelopment or a Methodology for the Analysis of Concrete Situations of Underdevelopment?, 6 WORLD DEV. 881 (1977) (presenting the best brief analytical overview). For a more extended discussion, see MAGNUS BLOMSTROM & BJORN HETTNE, DEVELOPMENT THEORY IN TRANSITION: THE DEPENDENCY DEBATE AND BEYOND (1984).














































attention on the dark distributional underside, both national and international, of standard growth strategies.48

One major mainstream response to concerns over blocked or distorted

development has been to emphasize long run or sustainable growth. In addition to a broader time frame, sustainable development perspectives also

give much greater attention to environmental and other "externalities" excluded from neoclassical accounts. The result is a richer and more holistic understanding of economic processes. Nonetheless, what is to be sustained is largely the capacity for autonomous increases in productive capability and, thus, per capita GDP.49

More radical alternatives to growth-based understandings of development have emphasized equity or social justice rather than narrowly "economic" processes. In the late 1960s and 1970s, the International Labor

Organization's World Employment Program stressed increasing employment not only for its own sake but as a mechanism to spread income, and thus the benefits of growth, more widely.50 The World Bank over the past two decades has given growing attention to issues of equitable growth.51 For instance, discussions of the role of women in development brought one set of distributional questions into the national, bilateral, and multilateral mainstream.52

UNDP's vision of "sustainable human development" provides the current culmination of the drive for a greatly expanded conception of development. Human development is defined as expanding the choices for all people in society:

There are five aspects to sustainable human development-all affecting the lives of the poor and vulnerable:

48. See Paul James, Postdependency? The Third World in an Era of Globalization and Late- Capitalism, 22 ALTERNATIVES 205 (1997) (providing a brief account of the demise that nonetheless acknowledges the continuing importance of dependency theory's underly- ing insights and motivations).

49. See, e.g., SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT: CONCEPTS, RATIONALITIES, AND STRATEGIES (Sylvie Faucheux et al. eds., 1998); SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT IN A DEVELOPING WORLD: INTEGRATING SOCIO-ECONOMIC

AND ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT (Colin Kirkpatrick & Norman Lee eds., 1997); LANCE TAYLOR & UTE PIEPER, RECONCILING ECONOMIC REFORM AND SUSTAINABLE HUMAN DEVELOPMENT (1996); SUSTAIN-

ABLE DEVELOPMENT IN THIRD WORLD COUNTRIES: APPLIED AND THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES (Valentine Udoh James ed., 1996); SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT: SCIENCE, ETHICS, AND PUBLIC POLICY (John Lemons & Donald A. Brown eds., 1995); DAVID REID, SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT: AN INTRODUCTORY GUIDE (1995). See also UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON ENVIRONMENT AND

DEVELOPMENT, AGENDA 21: PROGRAMME OF ACTION FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT (1992). 50. See generally EMPLOYMENT, GROWTH AND BASIC NEEDS: A ONE-WORLD PROBLEM, INTERNATIONAL

LABOUR OFFICE (1977). 51. See REDISTRIBUTION WITH GROWTH: POLICIES TO IMPROVE INCOME DISTRIBUTION IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES

IN THE CONTEXT OF ECONOMIC GROWTH (Hollis Chenery ed., 1974). 52. For an extensive illustration of the penetration of gender concerns, see the World Bank's

"Gender Net" at <http://www.worldbank.org/gender/index.htm>.





































































































Empowerment-The expansion of men and women's capabilities and choices increases their ability to exercise those choices free of hunger, want and deprivation. It also increases their opportunity to participate in, or endorse, decision-making affecting their lives.

Co-operation-With a sense of belonging important for personal fulfillment, well-being and a sense of purpose and meaning, human development is concerned with the ways in which people work together and interact.

Equity-The expansion of capabilities and opportunities means more than income-it also means equity, such as an educational system to which everybody should have access.

Sustainability-The needs of this generation must be met without compro- mising the right of future generations to be free of poverty and deprivation and to exercise their basic capabilities.

Security-Particularly the security of livelihood. People need to be freed from threats, such as disease or repression and from sudden harmful disruptions in their lives.53

Although the motives behind such efforts are admirable, they should be rejected on analytical grounds. "Human rights and sustainable human development are inextricably linked"54 only if development is defined to make this relationship tautological. "Sustainable human development" simply redefines human rights, along with democracy, peace, and justice, as subsets of development. Setting aside the fact that neither most ordinary people nor governments use the term in this way, such a definition fails to address the relationship between economic development and human rights. Tensions between these objectives cannot be evaded by stipulative definitions.

Less radical equity-oriented conceptions face similar problems. For example, "redistribution with growth" is indeed a desirable objective. However, this objective involves two processes, redistribution and growth, that sometimes support and sometimes conflict with one another. As with liberal democracy, two fundamentally different social and political logics are combined despite analytical and political reasons to draw attention to the differences between the logics of growth and redistribution.55

Thus for the purposes of this article, "development" means sustainable

53. UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME, GOVERNANCE FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT: A UNDP

POLICY DOCUMENT 2 (1997), available on <http://magnet.undp.org/policy/default.htm>. See also SUDHIR ANAND & AMARTYA K. SEN, SUSTAINABLE HUMAN DEVELOPMENT: CONCEPTS AND PRIORITIES

(1996); THE QUALITY OF LIFE (Martha Nussbaum & Amartya K. Sen eds., 1993). 54. INTEGRATING HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 6, at 3.

55. Perhaps the most sophisticated effort along this line is UNDP's annual Human Development Report, which uses a measure that combines per capita GDP with life expectancy and literacy. The resulting measure does tell us more about national conditions of life than GDP alone. But it fails to address the relationship between the social and economic indicators of "human development," which reflect very different political logics.









































































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growth of per capita GDP. This definition is in some ways stipulative, and perhaps even morally problematic. Nevertheless it treats the relationship between human rights and "development" as an empirical, rather than a definitional, question. Given that most states show at least as much vigor in their pursuit of growth as their pursuit of human rights, any bias in favor of drawing attention toward tensions between human rights and development seems well justified.56

VII. DEVELOPMENT AND HUMAN RIGHTS57

In the early 1980s, most analysts saw a fundamental conflict, at least in the short and medium run, between development and human rights.58 The author of this article identified two commonly asserted tradeoffs: the equity tradeoff (sacrifice of distributional equity in favor of rapid capital accumulation, and thus growth) and the liberty tradeoff (sacrifice of civil and political rights in the name of efficiency or a concerted national war on underdevelopment). These tradeoffs, which often were presented as necessary, could be, and in some cases had been, largely avoided, especially the equity

56. The Declaration on the Right to Development, adopted 4 Dec. 1986, G.A. Res. 41/128, U.N. GAOR, 41st Sess., at 3, Annex, U.N. Doc. A/Res/41/128/Annex (1987), proclaims that "The right to development is an inalienable human right by virtue of which every human person and all peoples are entitled to participate in, contribute to, and enjoy economic, social, cultural and political development, in which all human rights and fundamental freedoms can be fully realized." Id. The conception of development here is about as broad as "sustainable human development," and poses similar analytical drawbacks. See Jack Donnelly, In Search of the Unicorn: The Jurisprudence of the Right to Development, 15 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 473 (1985) (arguing against the moral, political, legal, and analytical wisdom of recognizing such a human right); Jack Donnelly, Third Generation Rights, in PEOPLES AND MINORITIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 119 (Catherine Brolmann et al. eds., 1993). Here, this article simply notes that recognizing a separate human right to development still leaves unaddressed the relationship between economic development and the human rights specified in the Universal Declaration and the Covenants.

57. See generally Symposium, Economic Reform and Democracy, 6 J. DEMOCRACY, Apr. 1995, at 102-56; Symposium, Economic Reform and Democracy, 5 J. DEMOCRACY, Oct. 1994, at 5-118. See also Jagdish Bhagwati, The New Thinking on Development, 6 J. DEMOCRACY, Oct. 1995, at 50 (1995) (for a recent argument emphasizing the compatibility of democracy and economic development, by an author who had earlier argued for the necessity of a tradeoff). Compare Adam Przeworski & Fernando Limongi, Moderniza- tion: Theories and Facts, 49 WORLD POL. 155 (1997) (showing, through cross-national analysis, that economic development does not facilitate transitions to democracy, but rather that it strengthens established democracies) with John Benedict Londregan & Keith T. Poole, Does High Income Promote Democracy?, 49 WORLD POL. 1 (1996) (finding a more generally positive relationship between development and democracy).

58. Jack Donnelly, Human Rights and Development: Complementary or Competing Con- cerns?, 36 WORLD POL. 255 (1984).









































tradeoff.59 Here this article will continue to emphasize the contingency of the relations between human rights and development, but against the background of a somewhat different dominant mainstream.

A. Development and Civil and Political Rights

Simple assertions of the interdependence of development and civil and political rights60 certainly go too far. Some highly repressive regimes have achieved sustainable industrial growth. For example, South Korea, Taiwan, and Singapore in the 1970s and 1980s, and China in the 1990s replicated the earlier experience of Western Europe.

Most developmental dictatorships, however, have been dismal failures. In Sub-Saharan Africa, even short-term growth often was not achieved. In socialist party-state dictatorships, along with most Latin American and Asian military dictatorships and civilian oligarchies, short and medium run growth proved unsustainable. Those forced to sacrifice personal rights and liberties usually have not received development (sustainable growth) in return.

Largely because of this experience, blanket advocacy of the liberty tradeoff-a staple of the 1960s and 1970s-is rarely encountered today.61 "Soft" authoritarianism still receives some respect, especially when, as in Singapore, promised economic goods are in fact delivered. However, there is a growing tendency to emphasize compatibilities between civil and political rights and development. For example, international financial institutions in the 1990s have increasingly emphasized the economic contributions of "good governance." Although far short of advocating the full range of internationally recognized civil and political rights, an emphasis on transparency, accountability, and the rule of law does characteristically lead to advocacy of electoral democracy and a considerable range of civil liberties.62

59. See id. 60. Most recently, see 1998 Question, supra note 23. 61. China is the major exception that proves the rule. When the rhetoric is repeated in

places like North Korea, Burma, and Belarus, few take it seriously, either inside or outside the country.

62. See WORLD BANK, GOVERNANCE AND DEVELOPMENT (1992) (providing an important multilateral statement). See also MATTHIA STIEFEL & MARSHALL WOLFE, A VOICE FOR THE EXCLUDED: POPULAR PARTICIPATION IN DEVELOPMENT (1994); SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT AND GOOD GOVERNANCE (Konrad Ginther et al. eds., 1995). For recent regional applications, see AFRICAN RECKONING: A QUEST FOR GOOD GOVERNANCE (Francis M. Deng & Terrence Lyons eds., 1998); UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME, THE SHRINKING STATE: GOVERNANCE AND HUMAN DEVELOPMENT IN EASTERN EUROPE AND THE COMMONWEALTH OF INDEPENDENT STATES (1997).

















































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In any case, even in the relatively rare cases where sustained economic development has been achieved by highly repressive regimes, there is little evidence that repression has been necessary for, rather than compatible with, development. Therefore, because the liberty tradeoff has never been seen as intrinsically desirable, an emphasis on the compatibility between civil and political rights and economic development is entirely appropriate.63

B. Markets and Economic and Social Rights

The relationship between development and economic and social rights, however, is more complex, especially when we consider the role of markets. Markets are social institutions designed to produce economic efficiency. Smoothly functioning market systems of production and distribution characteristically produce a greater output of goods and services with a given quantity of resources than alternative schemes. There is thus an almost tautological relationship between markets and rapid growth. This is important for the purposes of this article because growth (and thus markets) seems to be substantively linked to economic and social rights. Countries such as Cuba and Sri Lanka achieved short and medium run success but long run failure under development plans that emphasized state-based (re-)distribution over market-based growth. Their experiences suggest that a considerable degree of economic efficiency (and thus market mechanisms) is necessary for sustainable progress in implementing economic and social rights.

Nonetheless, what is at times an almost uncontainable contemporary enthusiasm for markets is extremely problematic from a human rights perspective.64 Like (pure) democracy, (free) markets are justified by arguments of collective good and aggregate benefit, not individual rights (other than, perhaps, the right to economic accumulation). Markets foster efficiency, not social equity or the enjoyment of individual rights for all. Rather than ensure that every person is treated with concern and respect, markets systematically deprive some individuals in order to achieve the collective benefits of efficiency.

63. Cf. Amartya Sen, Human Rights and Economic Achievements, in THE EAST ASIAN CHALLENGE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS 88 (Joanne R. Bauer & Daniel A. Bell eds., 1999) (discussing the relationship between civil and political rights and development in the context of recent "Asian values" debates).

64. In addition to the consequences for economic and social rights, the economic chiropractic of structural adjustment frequently brings governments into popular disre- pute, which often weakens democracy and encourages violations of civil and political rights.









































Markets distribute growth without regard for individual needs and rights (other than property rights) necessarily and by design. Market distributions are based on contribution to economic value added, which varies sharply and systematically across social groups (as well as between individuals). The poor tend to be "less efficient": as a class, they have fewer of the skills valued highly by markets. Therefore, they are systematically disadvantaged. Their plight is exacerbated when economic and political disadvantage interact in a vicious rights-abusive cycle.

Market advocates typically argue that, in return for such short-run disadvantages for the few, everyone benefits from the greater supply of goods and services made available through growth. "Everyone," however, does not mean each and every person. Rather the referent is the average "individual," an abstract collective entity. Even "he" is assured significant gain only in the future. In the here and now, and well into the future, many real, flesh and blood, individual human beings and families suffer.

Efficient markets improve the lot of some-ideally the many-only at the (relative and perhaps even absolute) cost of suffering by others. That suffering is concentrated among society's most vulnerable elements. Even worse, markets distribute the benefits of growth without regard to short-term deprivations. Those who suffer "adjustment costs," such as lost jobs, higher food prices, or inferior health care or education, acquire no special claim to a share of the collective benefits that efficient markets produce. One's "fair share" is a function solely of efficiency, of monetary value added. The human value of suffering, the human costs of deprivation, and the claims they justify are excluded from the accounting of markets.

C. The Welfare State

All existing liberal democracies compensate (some of) those who fare less well in the market through the welfare state (which, despite cutbacks, remains a powerful force in all existing liberal democratic regimes and a central source of their legitimacy). Individuals who are harmed by the operation of social institutions that benefit the whole-in this case, markets and private property rights-are recognized as having a right to a fair share of the social product their participation helped to produce. The collectivity that benefits in the aggregate has an obligation to look after individual members who are disadvantaged in, or harmed by, markets. The welfare state guarantees all individuals certain economic and social goods, services, and opportunities irrespective of the market value of their labor.

Assuaging short-term suffering and assuring long-term recompense are the work of the (welfare) state, not the market. These are matters of justice, rights, and obligations, not efficiency. Markets simply cannot address them





































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because they are not designed to do so. Without denying the contributions to economic and social rights that can flow from efficiency, we must not lose sight of the no less profound human rights defects of markets.

Free markets are an economic analog to a political system of majority rule without minority rights. The welfare state, from this perspective, is a device to assure that a minority that is disadvantaged in, or deprived by, markets is treated with minimum economic concern and respect. Because this minority is shifting and indeterminate-much like the minority that would engage in unpopular political speech or be subject to arbitrary arrest-these "minority rights" are actually individual rights for all.

Human rights are required to civilize both democracy and markets by restricting their operation to a limited, rights-defined domain. Free markets, like pure democracy, sacrifice individuals and their rights to a "higher" collective good. Only when the pursuit of prosperity is tamed by economic and social rights, such as when markets are embedded in a welfare state, does a political economy merit our respect.

VIII. THE LIBERAL DEMOCRATIC WELFARE STATE

The liberal democratic welfare states of Western Europe, Japan, and North America are attractive models for much of the rest of the world because of the particular balance they have struck between the competing demands of democratic participation, market efficiency, and internationally recognized human rights. This particular, contingent conjunction of democracy, development, and human rights gives the liberal democratic welfare state its hegemonic appeal. Separately, each objective is much less attractive. In particular, this article has emphasized the shortcomings of both democratic decision making and market-led growth in the absence of a prior commitment to the full range of internationally recognized human rights.

Democracy, development, and human rights may be pursued in ways that are mutually reinforcing (as well as mutually limiting). However, they need not be. In the post-Cold War era of democratic and market triumphalism, it is especially important to keep human rights at the center of our attention.

Markets and elections-"market democracy" in the language of Clinton administration foreign policy-are of largely instrumental value from a human rights perspective. Without market efficiencies and democratic electoral politics, internationally recognized human rights are indeed at grave risk. However, markets and democracy alone do not even try to realize all human rights for all.

Democracy is certainly preferable to authoritarian rule. Liberal democracy, however, is preferable to electoral democracy. Markets certainly are preferable to command economies. Welfare states, however, are preferable





















































to free markets. In both cases, a logic of universal individual rights constrains an essentially collectivist and utilitarian logic of aggregate benefits in order to assure that the common good or good of all is pursued in ways consistent with the rights of everyone.

All actual liberal democratic welfare states fall short of realizing all human rights even for their own nationals. Nonetheless, only such states are systematically committed to the full range of internationally recognized human rights. Only in such states do robust markets and democracies operate within systematic limits set by human rights. In addition, only (or at least primarily) because of such limits are these states' markets and democracies worthy of emulation. Only the particular combination of democracy, development, and human rights achieved in the liberal democratic welfare state is worthy of our highest praise and sustained effort.

IX. CONCLUSION

One might respond that the preceding argument could be addressed simply by defining "democracy" (or "development") "properly." Although in principle this is possibly correct, in practice, especially in international policy contexts, the crucial adjectives that would need to be incorporated into such definitions would probably slip quickly out of the discussion. And as they did, the core objective of human rights would move away from the center of the discussion.

If the deepest and broadest attractions of the regimes we most admire arise from their commitment and contribution to human rights, we need to keep human rights in the forefront of the language by which we speak of them. If we are really interested in regimes that protect the full range of internationally recognized human rights-which is what most well-meaning Western advocates of "democracy" seem to have in mind-why not just say that? Why take the risk of being misread, or glossing over the crucial qualifying adjectives, by talking about democracy? The argument of this article thus might be reformulated as a plea for a focus on the creation of rights-protective regimes, as defined by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

Those regimes will be democratic. They are desirable, however, not primarily because they empower the people, but because we think that we have good reason to believe that empowering the people is the best political mechanism we have yet devised to secure all human rights for all. Rights- protective regimes will also pursue economic development. But development is desirable as much for the resources it makes available to provide economic and social rights for members of disadvantaged groups as for the intrinsic values of the goods produced.



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Countless people over hundreds of years have struggled and suffered for democracy and development. But they have usually seen democracy and development not as ends but as means to a life of dignity. Contemporary international society has in substantial measure defined such a life of dignity in terms of respect for internationally recognized human rights. This article can thus be read as a plea to keep human rights, and thus the substantive commitment to human dignity, explicitly central in our political language.

This article also speaks clearly, if sometimes implicitly, to contemporary US foreign policy. Over the past decade, we have seen a shift from even the Bush administration's characteristic talk of market democracy. This elision of human rights has been subtle and by no means complete. Today, however, impassioned talk of human rights is largely reserved for the sorts of crude violations of the rights to life, personal security, and basic civil liberties that in the initial post-Cold War euphoria many had hoped were behind us. When it comes to broader positive ideals, official US policy has come to prefer the language of markets and democracy. Human rights still make a regular appearance in every important speech. But the real passion (and resources) usually are saved for markets and democracy.

In (almost certainly over-) emphasizing tensions between human rights and democracy and development, this article has tried to underscore the dangers of confusing means (markets and elections) with ends (human rights). More positively, it has tried to refocus attention on strengthening national and international practices that foster a particular range of (contingent) complementarities between democracy, development, and human rights that are possible when the overriding goal is all human rights for all. Exactly what such policies are is well beyond the scope of this article. It is clear, however, that if we do not keep human rights explicitly at the center of the discussion we risk placing needless conceptual and practical hurdles in the way of pursuing democracy and development in ways that contribute fully to the overriding objective of creating truly and fully rights-protective regimes.






















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Human Rights, Democracy, And Development - Jack Donnelly