Hunter-Killer Teams- Attacking Enemy Safe Havens

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J S O U R e p or t 1 0 -1

H un t er -K i l l er T e am s : A t t a c k i n g E n e

m y S af eH av en s

C el e s k i

Hunter-Killer Teams:

Attacking Enemy Safe Havens

Joseph D. Celeski

JSOU Report 10-1 January 2010



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Alvaro de Souza PinheiroMajor General, Brazilian Army, Ret. JSOU Associate Fellow

James F. Powers, Jr.Colonel, U.S. Army, Ret.Director o Homeland Security,

Commonwealth o Pennsylvania and JSOU Associate Fellow

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John B. AlexanderPh.D., Education, Te Apollinaire Groupand JSOU Senior Fellow

Roby C. Barrett, Ph.D., MiddleEastern & South Asian History Public Policy Center Middle East Instituteand JSOU Senior Fellow

Joseph D. CeleskiColonel, U.S. Army, Ret. JSOU Senior Fellow

Chuck CunninghamLieutenant General, U.S. Air Force, Ret.Proessor o Strategy, Joint Advanced Warghting School and JSOU Senior Fellow

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On the cover

ypical American rontiersmen garb worn by independent compa-

nies o Rangers when conducting hunter-killer operations.

Te gure shown here, on display at the Kings Mountain National

Military Park museum in South Carolina, has a homespun cotton

shirt, a large-brimmed hat to keep the rain and sun o, ringed

overcoat and leggings. Rangers also wore Indian-style leggings andwore and carried spare moccasins. Rangers were equipped with

knives, hatchets or tomahawks, and either intlock-red muskets

or ries using lead ball and black powder. Powder was kept dry

in a powder horn. A haversack was used to carry ood and orage

items.

All photographs are by Joseph D. Celeski.



JSOU Report 10-1

he JSOU Press

Hurlburt Field, Florida200

Hunter-Killer Teams: Attacking Enemy

Safe Havens

Joseph D. Celeski



Comments about this publication are invited and should be orwarded to Director,

Strategic Studies Department, Joint Special Operations University, 357 ully Street,

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Te views expressed in this publication are entirely those o the author

and do not necessarily reect the views, policy or position o the United

States Government, Department o Deense, United States Special

Operations Command, or the Joint Special Operations University.



Recent Publications of the JSOU Press

Intelligence in Denied Areas, December , Russell D. Howard

Is Leaving the Middle East a Viable Option, January ,Tomas H. Henriksen

Retaining a Precarious Value as Special Operations Go Mainstream,February , Jessica Glicken urnley

Disrupting Threat Finances, April , Wesley J.L. Anderson

USSOCOM Research Topics 2009

India’s Northeast: The Frontier in Ferment, September , Prakash Singh

What Really Happened in Northern Ireland’s Counterinsurgency,October , Tomas H. Henriksen

Guerrilla Counterintelligence: Insurgent Approaches to Neutralizing

Adversary Intelligence Operations, January , Graham H. urbiville, Jr.

Policing and Law Enforcement in COIN — the Thick Blue Line,February , Joseph D. Celeski

Contemporary Security Challenges: Irregular Warfare and Indirect

Approaches, February , Richard D. Newton, ravis L. Homiak,

Kelly H. Smith, Isaac J. Peltier, and D. Jonathan WhiteSpecial Operations Forces Interagency Counterterrorism Reference

Manual, March

The Arabian Gulf and Security Policy: The Past as Present, the

Present as Future, April , Roby C. Barrett

Africa: Irregular Warfare on the Dark Continent, May ,John B. Alexander

USSOCOM Research Topics 2010Report of Proceedings, 4th Annual Sovereign Challenge Conference

(16-19 March 2009)

Information Warfare: Assuring Digital Intelligence Collection,July , William G. Perry

Educating Special Forces Junior Leaders for a Complex Security Environ-

ment, July , Russell D. Howard

Manhunting: Counter-Network Operations for Irregular Warfare,September , George A. Craword

Irregular Warfare: Brazil’s Fight Against Criminal Urban Guerrillas,September , Alvaro de Souza Pinheiro

Pakistan’s Security Paradox: Countering and Fomenting Insurgencies,December , Haider A.H. Mullick



vii

Contents

Foreword ................................................................................ix

About the Author ....................................................................xi

1. Introduction ........................................................................ 1

2. Background, Denition and Doctrine ................................... 7

3. Safe Havens .......................................................................19

4. The American Historical Experiencein Hunter-Killer Operations .................................................25

5. Principles of Hunter-Killer Team Employmentduring Counter Safe Haven Operations ...............................51

6. Conclusion ........................................................................57

Appendix. Recommended Readings ....................................... 63

Endnotes ................................................................................67



ix

Foreword

The concept o hunter-killer operations deep within enemy territory

evokes a sense o excitement and adventure, especially or those

o us amiliar with the exploits o Robert Rogers’ Rangers o the

18th century or the operations o Special Forces and Rangers in Aghani-

stan today. In this monograph, Colonel Joseph D. Celeski (U.S. Army, Ret.),

argues that hunter-killer teams be routinely established as part o our

standing Special Operations Forces (SOF). He states that guidelines or their

employment should be included in counterinsurgency (COIN) doctrine, andCeleski urther advises that the use o such orces should be a routine part o

the overall COIN eort. Te idea is to aggressively pursue the enemy within

his own sanctuaries, disrupt his operations and sustainment, and neutralize

or destroy the adversary beore he can threaten a riendly host government

or project extremist operations onto the world stage.

Celeski’s operational concept or hunter-killer operations bolsters the

command vision o U.S. Special Operations Command, which seeks todevelop a orce capable o “distributed operations, within an environment

characterized by irregular warare and asymmetric challenges.” 1 Te hunter-

killer organization, with its strike units and teams, would be reinorced with

indigenous orces, much as we saw during the Vietnam War and the early

phases o the Aghanistan war. Tis kind o orce could contribute toward

achieving the U.S. SOF mission to act with “… speed, aggression, and lethal-

ity to achieve tactical through strategic eect.” 2

oday U.S. national security is threatened by violent extremist groupsoperating rom sanctuaries in hard to reach areas o Aghanistan, Pakistan,

Yemen, Somalia, and similar areas in the Pacic Rim and Latin America. It

seems probable that there will be a marked increase in our need to disrupt

and destroy enemy orces in multiple sanctuaries around the globe as we

proceed to march through the 21st century. Celeski’s paper provides a vision

o the uture SOF wherein hunter-killer teams could have a signicant role

to play in nding, disrupting, and destroying the enemy.

Kenneth H. Poole

Director, JSOU Strategic Studies Department



xi

About the Author

M r. Joe Celeski is a senior

ellow with the JSOU

Strategic Studies Depart-

ment. His current research ocuses

on irregular warare/unconventional

warare (IW/UW) with a specialty on

counterinsurgency (COIN), terrorism,

political warare, urban warare, jointSOF warighting, and senior leader

competencies. Retired rom active duty

with the U.S. Army as a Special Forces

colonel, he served in a variety o United

States Special Operations Command

(USSOCOM) and sta positions or over

20 years o his 30-year Army career. Prior to retirement, he commanded the3rd Special Forces Group (Airborne) at Fort Bragg, North Carolina (May

2002 to June 2004) and commanded coalition and joint SOF or two tours

in Aghanistan in support o Operation Enduring Freedom. He was a ully

qualied joint specialty ocer. Additionally, he is a Middle East area expert,

trained in the Arabic language, and has served throughout the Middle East

and the Horn o Arica regions. In his capacity as the chie o sta and deputy

commander or the U.S. Special Forces Command at Fort Bragg, Colonel

Celeski was the project ocer or orce modernization initiatives, develop-ment o the command’s Program Operating Memorandum input, and the

UW transormation initiatives. He was awarded the St. Philip Neri Bronze

Award rom the Special Forces community in 2002 or his career work.

Mr. Celeski is a graduate o the Deense Language Institute (Modern

Standard Arabic), the U.S. Army Command and Sta College, the U.S. Air

Force Command and Sta College, the Marine Amphibious Warare Course,

the Army Force Management School, and the U.S. Army War College. He

has a B.S. in Political Science rom Columbus College in Georgia, a Master

o Public Administration (MPA) rom Shippensburg University in Penn-

sylvania, and a Master o National Security Issues rom the U.S. Army War



xii

College in Carlisle, Pennsylvania. He will begin work toward his Ph.D. in

History rom the University o Georgia in the spring o 2010.

Mr. Celeski has published works on the Somalia conict and on the useo Special Forces in Joint Urban Operations in UW in the U.S. Army John

F. Kennedy Special Warare Center and School journal, Special Warare. He

has submitted his rst draf o “Special Forces History in Somalia Conict,

1992-1995” or inclusion into Army SOF in Somalia 1992-1995, a scal year

2010 proposed publication sponsored by the U.S. Army Special Operations

Command historian. In addition, Mr. Celeski has been a keynote speaker

at a variety o orums, including the Assistant Secretary o Deense or

Special Operations and Low Intensity Conict (ASD SO/LIC) sympo-sium, the Association o United States Army (AUSA), Royal Canadian

War College, the Naval War College, and the Joint Forces Sta College on

matters o leadership, urban operations, and UW. He has also lectured in

a variety o international orums to include the Polish National Deense

University regional SOF symposium, the Special Operations Command

Korea (SOCKOR) United Nations SOF symposium in Seoul, and in a variety

o JSOU-sponsored joint mobile education teams (JMEs) or combatingterrorism conducted in Chile, Jordan, and Croatia. His prior JSOU Press

publications are Operationalizing COIN in the 21st Century (September 2005)

and Policing and Law Enorcement in COIN —the Tick Blue Line (February

2009).



1

Hunter-Killer Teams:

Attacking Enemy Safe Havens

Introduction1.

Regular forces, indeed the most elite of highly professional regular

forces, Special Operations Forces (SOF), can wage war in an irregu-

lar, unconventional way. In fact, the history of warfare shows quite

clearly that if regulars are to prosper in campaigns against irregu-

lars, they are obliged to adopt at least some of the characteristics,

including the modus operandi, of the irregular enemy.3

— Colin S. Gray, Another Bloody Century: Future Warfare

During September 2008, public reporting in American and Paki-

stani press told o U.S. commandos purported conduct o large-

scale raids into the Pakistani border tribal region—presumably

authorized by the President o the United States—with unrestricted rules

o engagement not requiring U.S. regional command approval or acquies-

cence o the Pakistani government. Te intent o the raids, as reported, wasto penetrate into the previously inaccessible sae haven enjoyed by aliban

militants and Al Qaeda terrorists to destroy and disrupt their training bases

and to kill or capture their key leaders. U.S. military leaders and Aghan

President Karzai praised the action—that is, the solution to a long-standing

sae haven problem and to weak eorts heretoore on behal o the Pakistani

security orces. Unortunately, raids o this nature are o short duration and

not designed or persistent presence. Although they can be highly disruptive

to the enemy, they also can contribute to the adoption o a whack-a-moletactic to deny sae havens. Eventually, the enemy will adjust to this tactic

and make it harder or uture raids to achieve success. Te best counter sae



2

JSOU Report 10-1

haven line o operation involves a series o measures to achieve relentless

pressure; the line o eort has presence and persistence as attributes.

Te most challenging strategic and operational dilemma currently acingthe U.S. military in both Operations Enduring Freedom and in the Horn

o Arica region stems rom the enemy’s ease o withdrawal to inaccessible

areas, where he can operate rom established sae havens and create opera-

tional bases to reorm, ret, recruit, and relaunch attacks against coalition

orces. Adoption o counter sae haven measures should include the employ-

ment o hunter-killer teams as one o the options to challenge insurgent

perception o saety and invulnerability aorded by the inaccessibility sanc-

tuary oers them. When guerrillas or insurgents are challenged in theirown space, they are orced into a tempo o the riendly orces’ making and

ofen must abandon their base areas in order to survive. In addition, the

ear o U.S. hunter-killer teams persistently operating in and amongst one’s

perceived sae space provides its own psychological eect against one’s will

to continue the ght.

In any counterinsurgency (COIN) security line o operation, counterguer-

rilla activities are required as an oensive maneuver to throw o insurgentattempts to occupy space and create alternate governance. Among the rst

steps in any government response to an insurgency is holding and clear-

ing insurgent activities in the most vulnerable spots; this activity generally

requires the government to spread their resources in static holding posi-

tions, thus negating their reedom o maneuver to take on the insurgents

head-to-head. Simultaneously, it is at precisely the same time the govern-

ment is attempting to expand its security orces—military, paramilitary, and

police—to overmatch the insurgents and achieve a avorable ratio o orcesto reach a tipping point o security or its population. Conversely, insurgent

movements use this window o opportunity to tie down government orces,

thereby allowing time to build up their own armed action orces or build

orces or a move to the nal, conventional oensive that would overwhelm

the government response. Tus at the operational and strategic levels it

becomes a race between the contestants—where the side that can prevent the

growth o a measurable combat response on the part o their enemy, while

maintaining legitimacy and the will to ght, may ultimately win.

Te government response is ofen multidimensional—or example, hold-

ing and securing vulnerable portions o the country, maintaining legitimacy,

and solving grievances while simultaneously taking the oensive to the



3

Celeski: Hunter-Killer Teams—Attacking Enemy Safe Havens

guerrillas. In taking the ght to the enemy, COIN practitioners adopt coun-

terguerrilla operations (a security line o operation). Tis means taking the

ght to the guerrillas, wherever they may be ound, by raising the contactrate between government orces and the insurgents. Against the insurgent

political arm, counterorganization measures are conducted to eliminate

enemy leadership and political organization. Tis includes manhunting

techniques. At the tactical level, aggressive patrolling operations to search

out guerrillas still orm one o the best means or conventional orces.

Combined with raids, the enemy is kept o balance and denied the oppor-

tunity to choose the time and place o his engagements, spoiling his oppor-

tunities to protract or prolong the ght. Counterguerrilla patrols, however,may not reach into inaccessible areas where insurgents seek to build their

bases and establish sae havens. Although conventional maneuver orces

(normally at company and battalion level) can conduct operations deep into

enemy-occupied territory, these oen have a sweeping eect and conclude

aer a short duration.

Insurgents enjoy the most reedom o maneuver in their sae havens

(bases), along their lines o communication, and in strategic rear areas, rela-tively unhindered by the day-to-day activities o counterguerrilla operations.

It is within that shroud o security the guerrillas take the opportunity to

recruit, train, ret, and grow their orces, including developing the structure

or the establishment o a main orce army. Unhindered by government

security orces intererence, complacency about security and deense on

the part o the insurgent will begin

to set in, providing the opportunity

or specialized COIN orces to oper-ate. An outstanding reerence on

this aspect o irregular warare is the

2007 publication edited by Michael

Innes, Denial o Sanctuary: Understanding errorist Sae Haven. One proven

method o disrupting insurgents or terrorists enjoying sae haven has been

the employment o hunter-killer teams.

Te purpose o this monograph is to examine the characteristics and

attributes o sae havens, explore options or counter sae haven measures,

and then ocus the analysis on the historical and contemporary U.S. mili-

tary employment o one o those measures—hunter-killer team opera-

tions. Te monograph explores previous doctrinal attempts to describe the

One proven method of disrupting

insurgents or terrorists enjoying safe haven has been the employ-

ment of hunter-killer teams.



4

JSOU Report 10-1

employment o U.S. military units conducting counter sae haven measures

to derive a proposed denition or COIN hunter-killer operations. It also

examines the American historical use o predominantly specialized, lightinantry employed as counterguerrillas with the mission to penetrate and

operate deep into enemy sae havens.

Te overarching lessons gleaned rom the American military employ-

ment o hunter-killer operations will orm the basis or principles required

or doctrinal employment o hunter-killer operations in COIN and other

irregular warare scenarios. Te research o the monograph concludes with

a proposed recommendation on the specic orming and use o hunter-killer

organizations as a viable measure or counter sae haven activities in any conict with irregular warare adversaries or doctrinal inclusion in uture

revisions o COIN or irregular warare literature. Additionally, the mono-

graph provides recommendations or the establishment o ormal hunter-

killer organizations, at least within the USSOCOM component capability,

under the operational art o unconventional warare (UW).

I seen as viable, the hunter-killer concept deserves inclusion into uture

revisions o irregular warare doctrine. Currently, doctrine is lacking on thespecic proscription o counter sae haven measures that can be conducted

by specialized orces in hunter-killer congurations (procedures on the

attack and harassment against adversary morale, their sustainment system

[war-making capabilities], and their source o strength and support—a

witting populace). Tese activities are important to the COIN orce because

they can contribute to the exhaustion and erosion o insurgent orces while

they are in their sae havens.

Te research thesis is to answer the question: Is the employment o hunter-killer operations, as a counter sae haven measure in COIN, a sound

doctrinal concept or the U.S. military? Te research did not explore oreign

concepts unless they were useul to the development o U.S. doctrine, nor

the concept o hunter-killer operations used by conventional orces against

conventional orce adversaries, although they may be unorthodox (such as

operations to detect German U-boats in World War II). Tis monograph

also does not include the common usage o technological hunter-killer oper-

ations—the so-called sensor-to-shooter concept (such as observer aircraf

hunting or enemy tanks, then directing the eorts o the killer)—in order

to ocus uniquely on COIN counter sae haven requirements.



5


Logic abounds in the annals o warare on the military dictum to take

the ght to the enemy. Irregular warare is no dierent. Its deensive compo-

nent—the use o irregulars as auxiliary—is used to augment the maneuvero conventional orce or provide economy-o-orce options. Its oensive

component resembles a variety o tools in a toolkit or irregular warare

employment: counterguerrilla operations, counterorganization operations,

counter sae haven operations, pseudo-operations, manhunting, and the

most eared by irregular warare adversaries, the employment o hunter-

killer teams.



7


Background, Defnition and Doctrine2.

In the guerrilla areas, the governing authorities should commencewhat we shall call a territorial offence. As in the cases of territorial

defence and consolidation, territorial offence will require assign-

ment of small military detachments to a large number of specic

zones. Although these detachments should establish local opera-

tional bases, they should not be garrisoned in posts. Rather, they

should continuously ‘nomad’, using ‘whirlwind’ (tourbillon) type

tactics—as the French describe them.4

— John J. McCuen, The Art of Counter-Revolutionary War

To be considered as military doctrine a warghting concept should

be accepted by military proessionals as an agreed upon means o

practical and common usage o employing military resources. Te

concept should generally solve a dilemma posed by the nature o war—

or example, oense to deeat a deense, amphibious operations to gainlodgment in enemy territory, and interdiction to deny the enemy lines o

communication. Finally, the intended action should be grounded in some

theoretical aspect o war that has stood the test o time (a belie).

An objective o this monograph is to explore why hunter-killer operations

against enemy sae havens have had little doctrinal capture, particularly as

the Department o Deense (DoD) shifs its military art in recognition o

the Irregular Warare Joint Operating Concept. As a ramework or this

discussion and afer conducting the research, the ollowing denition isproposed:

Hunter-killer operations are prolonged operations conducted in

irregular warare by a unique and specically organized orce, in

conjunction with an indigenous orce, against irregular warare

adversaries by operating behind the lines or in hostile, sae haven, or

semipermissive environments, employing unorthodox tactics, or the

sole purpose o achieving attrition and punitive actions predominantly against the personnel, leadership, and resources o the enemy.

Tis denition has as its base a UW solution to an unconventional prob-

lem. Te unconventional problem is the lack o access into insurgent sae



8

JSOU Report 10-1

havens due to political actors, military limitations, and/or geography (and

could also include seasonal weather).

Insurgency theorists (most notably Robert aber, War o the Flea) discussthe requirement on the part o the insurgent to juxtaposition one’s time,

space, and will—elements o strategic art—against the competing actions

o the government. For space, insurgents draw strength rom having bases

and sae areas to operate rom, essential to the building and development

o an action arm, a political process (alternate governance), and the ability

to hide rom security orces, thus contributing to the protraction o the

conict (and to ensure survival).

Protraction o conict has its roots in war o exhaustion and war o erosion theories, made amous by the writings o Mao. ime can be on the

side o the irregular warare adversary i used with other strategic initiatives.

Te body o conict theory is also clear that war is a clash o wills; at the

military level, using orce successully against the enemy’s orce becomes

one o the paths to achieve strategic objectives.

In most COIN theory, no one course o action chosen rom elemental

truths about the conduct o this type o irregular warare will guaranteesuccess; rather, the COIN leader becomes a virtuoso o applying contextually

agreed upon COIN measures, hopeully with the right mix and balance, to

achieve the political ends o the struggle. In the aggregate, these measures

historically (and doctrinally) include not only political and psychosocial

activities but also some orm o the oen mentioned clear, hold, build and

nd, x, destroy. o clear and hold in COIN requires a static orce (the

deensive). o nd and x, then destroy requires an active orce, basically

consisting o oensive components, which include counterguerrilla orcesand other specialized orces whose purpose is to help improve the contact

rate and raise the attrition level o the insurgent to buy time or other popu-

lace security and political solutions to work.

Insurgents ofen enjoy the ability to operate at “the time and place o

their choosing”; when they do, COIN orces now know where they are and

their capabilities. In these cases, casualty rates tend to avor the conven-

tional, government orces. Te larger challenge, i counterinsurgents are to

deeat or neutralize the action arm and to destroy the insurgent’s base o

support (bases and sae havens), is to take oensive actions to thwart insur-

gent moves to operate between the seams o a country’s vital inrastructure

and its population centers, while enjoying the ability to retreat to saety.



9


Properly conducted, the military line o operation in a COIN eort

becomes the blend o antimeasures, countermeasures, and oensive

measures. Tere is a range o measures available to the counterinsurgent;however, most o these measures remain at the tactic, technique, and proce-

dural level o handbooks rather than incorporated into our doctrinal knowl-

edge o irregular warare. able 1 shows a range o operations consistently

agreed upon and utilized during irregular warare—a belie o how COIN

orces approach attacking insurgent time, space, and will while simultane-

ously providing orce-on-orce options to attrit the enemy.

Table 1. Irregular Adversary Essential Strengths

Strength Friendly Forces Counter

Time (protractedness) Counterguerrilla operationsCOIN/FID/IDAD/UW *CounterterrorismOperation tempo

Space (e.g., sanctuary, bases) Countersanctuary (raid, interdiction)Community policingComputer network attack

Border interdictionHunter-killer operations

Will (ideology, endurance) CountermotivationCounterinfluence operationsCounterrecruitmentPSYOPsPropagandaCombat attrition

Legitimacy (alternate governance) Political warfareUnconventional operations

Counterorganization (manhunting)Countermobilization

Criminal business enterprise (support) Policing and law enforcementCounternarcoticsCounterfinancing

* FID Foreign Internal Defense

IDAD Internal Defense and Development

Insurgency theory posits the strategic balance o time, space, and will

arrayed against government strengths as a means to achieve a political

victory, all based on theories o war to exhaust or erode populace support

or the government. In the modern context, legitimate and criminal busi-

ness enterprise (or external support mechanisms that may replace lack o



10

JSOU Report 10-1

external state sponsorship) are also critical to the viability o any insurgency.

Friendly military options are a mix o anti, counter and oensive measures

to spoil these ve strengths. Tese can be used to keep the enemy o balancewhile the political and civil measures o an eective IDAD plan take time

to work.

Tis discussion rests on the oensive components o COIN and to some

extent broader applications in other irregular warare scenarios. Hunter-

killer operations are one o the options used by COIN orces to go on the

oensive against insurgents, particularly as a counter sae haven measure.

Because there are a variety o options that can be conused with pure hunter-

killer concepts, a brie discussion o their characteristics will distinguishthem rom the COIN hunter-killer term—a useul point or doctrinal distinc-

tion. Each option discussed below embodies a particular eect; hunter-killer

operations dier in that most o these eects can be combined to achieve a

synergy aimed toward one objective—cumulative activities over time that

contribute to the erosion or exhaustion o the insurgent:

Raida. is a tactical action conducted behind enemy lines (or in enemy-

controlled areas) by conventional inantry or elite or “shock” inantry with a specic purpose in mind. (Tese elite units are ofen considered

commandos.) Te raid may have tactical, operational, or strategic

value. Raids generally do not achieve coup-de-main status. Raids are

intended to be short duration missions whereby the raiding orce

immediately withdraws aer the operation back to its own riendly

lines; the survival o the raiding orce is ofen predicated on this

extraction beore enemy orces respond. Raiders can hold groundmomentarily, but ofen require a linking-up action by larger conven-

tional orces i the ground, or objective, is to be secured or riendly

orces. Larger, deep-penetration raids by conventional orces can also

be conducted as punitive operations.

Interdictionb. targets enemy lines o communication and support struc-

ture in order to deny war-making capability. Interdiction operations

include various targeting methodologies, combined with detailed

intelligence and conrming reconnaissance, to increase measures o success. Interdiction can be perormed with direct action, airpower,

or with stando capabilities. Sabotage o war materials is one o the

unconventional measures to conduct interdiction.



11


Manhunting c. is the specic targeting o leadership and key personnel

within an enemy organization. It is a counterorganization technique.

In military parlance, manhunting is characterized by all the activitiesto conduct high value target (HV) operations against individuals to

decapitate an organization. Manhunting techniques ofen resemble law

enorcement measures used to bring a criminal to justice. Manhunt-

ing is human-intelligence (HUMIN) intensive.

Counterorganizationd. is the means used to deeat the insurgent politi-

cal arm and its organizations. In insurgency, the enemy may attempt

to establish alternate governance with their political arm, rst as a

competing option to the populace’s loyalty, then as a mechanismto assume the trappings o state and secure power once victory is

achieved. In these cases, political and ront organizations are created

to counteract the legitimate symbols o state, at all levels. Te insurgent

political arm is also a necessary means to mobilize the populace. Insur-

gent politics may ultimately require the ability to handle diplomacy

at the international level. Counterorganization measures consist o

actions to identiy, penetrate, and neutralize insurgent political orga-nizations. Subversion, apprehension, or neutralization o members o

the enemy’s political arm, combined with a counterideology campaign,

are just some o the activities taken by a government threatened by

shadow governments. Many o the successul counterorganization

campaigns adopted the combination o military, intelligence, and

policing in joint task-orce organizations to achieve unied action

on this ront. Counterorganization should not be conused with

countermobilization (denying the orm o alternate governance) andcounterguerrilla actions (securing the populace and isolating them

rom the insurgents).

Pseudo-operationse. are most ofen paramilitary police operations

conducted to gain intelligence on the enemy. Pseudo-organizations

adopt the appearance o the guerrilla in order to gain access to the

enemy’s operational area. While combat may occur, this is not the

intended purpose o the operation. Te best pseudo-operations are

those that incorporate turned insurgents.

Te useulness o hunter-killer operations is they could achieve many o

these results within the objective o denying the enemy space and destroying



12

JSOU Report 10-1

his will through erosion and exhaustion. Hunter-killer operational utility

derives rom employing an eective economy-o-orce option, achieving

persistence by operating in the same space and conditions o the enemy,while achieving a military and psychological impact out o proportion to

its size (operational or strategic perormance is achieved).

U.S. irregular warare doctrine has never quite pinned down this concept

in detail. COIN doctrine and emerging irregular warare doctrine quite

adequately address the need to deny insurgents access to sae havens and

support (tacit/unwitting; internal/external) but lack in specics or prin-

ciples and application o the measures needed. Notwithstanding, good

counterinsurgents have always devised a means or attacking the enemy insae havens. Either these were on the spot, intuitive, individual decisions

or derived rom lessons passed rom earlier practitioners without adoption

into doctrinal literature, even though some doctrinal writings through-

out history have at least come close to describing the role o hunter-killer

teams.

Te earliest attempt to capture hunter-killer concepts evolved rom

Benjamin Church’s personal memoir o his ranging activities with specially ormed militia into hostile territory during King Philip’s War (1675 to 1676).

Tese written experiences were incorporated into techniques used by Robert

Rogers, who in the French and Indian War developed his now-amous rules

or the conduct o deep reconnaissance raids.

Much o what early counterinsurgents understood about oensive opera-

tions against irregulars in inaccessible territory may have been derived rom

reading Colonel C. E. Callwell’s monumental work Small Wars: Teir Prin-

ciples and Practices, which he published in nal, revised orm in 1899. Call-well described a “doctrinal” approach o ying columns (superior maneuver

and mobility to the irregular) and specied the purpose o raids in irregular

warare (“… kill them or to wound them, or at least to hunt them rom their

homes and then to destroy or carry o their belongings” 5), combined with

the need to match the enemy and adapt. However, U.S. irregular warare

experts largely relied on the personal experiences and accounts o previous

practitioners through the venue o lessons learned passed on generationally.

U.S. Army operations against the Southwest Indians, the exas Rangers

experiences against the Plains Indians, and the COIN experience rom the

Philippine War lost doctrinal capture and appeal in the shadow and subse-

quent deployment or World War I.



13


It took the cumulative experience o the U.S. Marine Corps, over many

years, to codiy military activities conducted deep in enemy territory in its

Small Wars Manual , published in 1940. Much o Callwell’s work appears tohave made its way into the Small Wars Manual , which also set the standard

or utilizing task-organized conventional orces to conduct these specialized

operations, such as deep raids. (Specially organized hunter-killer orces to

conduct this task were still ar in the uture.)

Te Small Wars Manual developed a variation on Callwell’s theme; there

would be a variety o means to challenge guerrillas on their tur: ying

columns, mobile columns, and roving patrols (all still comprised o conven-

tional orces). Te mobile column diered rom a ying column only in itsrange and reliance on a base o supply. O interest was the roving patrol

concept, the clearest capturing o doctrinal employment o hunter-killer

teams:

A roving patrol (at 5-21 in the manual) is a sel-sustaining detachmenta.

o more or less independent nature. It usually operates within an

assigned zone and as a rule has much reedom o action. As distin-

guished rom other patrols, it is capable o operating away rom itsbase or an indenite period o time. Missions generally assigned

include a relentless pursuit o guerilla groups continuing until their

disorganization is practically complete.

Tis method is particularly applicable when large bands are known tob.

exist and the locality o their depredations is approximately known.

Such patrols are oen employed in conjunction with other methods

o operations.O course, World War II diminished the ascination with small wars. By

World War II, the American militia and independent volunteer system was

gone (which eliminated the U.S. pool o outdoorsmen adept at ranging ) to

be replaced by National Guard and Reserve structures tailored or conven-

tional war (because armies were required to ght armies). World War II also

shifed the emphasis o elite and specialized military unit employment rom

ranging to one o reconnaissance, shock inantry, and raiding (e.g., Rang-

ers, U.S. Marine Corps Raiders, and 1st Special Service Force). Finally, the

American military was not conronted with an irregular warare enemy in

World War II, so it came out o the experience with an overall penchant or



14

JSOU Report 10-1

conventional warare, even though much had been learned by the Oce o

Strategic Services (OSS) conducting guerrilla warare activities.

Prior to the Vietnam War, it was the doctrine o other nations thatexpounded on oensive activities to challenge insurgent space. While not

American doctrinal solutions, these examples did provide some ramework

or urther U.S. military doctrinal approaches to COIN techniques. Roger

rinquier’s treatise, Modern Warare: A French View o Counterinsurgency,

Sir Robert Tompson’s work, Deeating Communist Insurgency, and David

Galula’s Counterinsurgency Warare: Teory and Practice contain examples

or oensive actions within insurgent territory to attack bases and attrit the

enemy (e.g., intervention units, some orm o pursuit commandos, pseudo-organizations, and Ranger-type organizations).

One o the rst uniquely American-derived doctrinal approaches to

antiguerrilla activities afer World War II involving hunter-killer opera-

tions was oered by Lt Col Edward G. Lansdale during the early 1950s,

when he served as an UW liaison ocer to Ramon Magsaysay, the Philip-

pine Secretary o National Deense. Lansdale assisted in COIN eorts to

deeat the communist-inspired Hukbalahap insurgency. From observationsand ront-line experience, Lansdale consolidated his thoughts on eective,

antiguerrilla operations. While the document, “Operations Against Guer-

rilla Forces” (undated), was supported by the Military Assistance Advisory

Group (MAAG) chie o the U.S. embassy in Manila, its restricted nature

prevented widespread sharing among military proessional and doctrinal

institutions. Tus its tenets or oensive COIN, by orming specialized anti-

guerrilla units, did not become mainstream. Lansdale called or the creation

o special antiguerrilla units to penetrate and destroy insurgent personneland inrastructure, arguing or small-unit, broadly scoped missions and

specically warned o the need to maintain and support special antiguer-

rilla units to increase their viability or extended operations (the caveat was

against retasking conventional inantry or this purpose).6

COIN doctrine developed by the U.S. during and afer the Vietnam War

still did not address oensive actions into enemy sanctuaries as anything

other than pursuit, reconnaissance, interdiction, or raids (e.g., the actions

o Special Operations Group and the U.S. Special Forces B52 organization).

However, it was still apparent to counterinsurgents that denial o sae havens

(the term sanctuary was used in most military literature o that day) was

a key component o COIN success. Te Department o the Army released



15


Field Manual (FM) 3-07.22 Counterinsurgency Operations on 1 October 2004.

Perhaps a limiting political actor in modern COIN may have unintention-

ally aected doctrinal approaches, then and now: the diplomatic repercus-sions o violating the sovereignty o another country.

Te one clear approach or taking the ght to enemy-dominated territory

emanated rom UW approaches developed by the U.S. Army Special Forces.

Still not explicitly stating a unique role or hunter-killer operations, FM 31-21,

Guerrilla Warare and Special Forces Operations (Headquarters, Depart-

ment o the Army, September 1961) came close in its page 130 discussion

o attrition measures and interdiction operations conducted by irregular,

indigenous orces:

Section III. Interdiction. 117. General

UWa. orces use interdiction as the primary means o accomplish-

ing operational objectives. Interdiction is designed to prevent or

hinder, by any means, enemy use o an area or route. Interdiction

is the cumulative eect o numerous smaller oensive operations

such as raids, ambushes, mining, and sniping. Enemy areas or

routes that oer the most vulnerable and lucrative targets or

interdiction are industrial acilities, military installations, and

lines o communication.

Te results o planned interdiction programs are.b.

Eective intererence with the movement o personnel, supplies,•

equipment, and raw material

Destruction o storage and production acilities•

Destruction o military installations; or positive results, attacks•

are directed against the primary and alternate critical elements

o each target system.

Protable secondary results can be obtained rom interdictionc.

operations i they are conducted over a wide area; when the UW

orce employs units in rapid attacks in dierent and widely spaced

places, it

Makes it dicult or the enemy to accurately locate guerrilla•

bases by analyzing guerrilla operationsCauses the enemy to overestimate the strength and support o •

the guerrilla orce

May tend to demoralize him and lessen his will to ght.•



16

JSOU Report 10-1

Although UW doctrine was specically developed to employ Special

Forces in consort with an indigenous resistance movement, the U.S. Special

Forces during the Vietnam War adapted this doctrine or use in security orce assistance operations and created Mobile Guerrilla Forces (auxiliary)

to take the ght to the Viet Cong in their base areas. Between this approach,

borrowing o oreign doctrine, and the earlier thoughts o the U.S. Marine

Corps on roving patrols, the elements or development o hunter-killer

operations in irregular warare doctrine could have been ramed.

COIN’s resurgence in doctrinal appeal came to the oreront with

the involvement o U.S. orces afer 9/11 in the two insurgencies in Iraq

and Aghanistan. (We can also add Operation Enduring Freedom in thePhilippines.)

Te U.S. collective doctrinal approach to COIN is now embodied in

FM 3-24, Counterinsurgency. Chapter 1 clearly describes not only the benets

that sanctuary (now reerred to as sae haven) provides insurgents but also

the doctrinal prescription: “Eective COIN operations work to eliminate

sanctuaries.”7 Further in the chapter (section I-98), the ollowing is oered:

“imely, resolute counterinsurgent actions to exploit poor enemy base loca-tions and eliminate or disrupt good ones can signicantly weaken an insur-

gency.” Te eld manual is also quite clear that the preerred method to

achieve this disruption is through the oensive actions o land orces and

an eective targeting system. However, there exists little discussion on the

role o employing hunter-killer teams or indigenous hunter-killer teams as

part o these disruptive options. Even less are any works on the analysis and

appreciation o the ramework and characteristics o sae havens.

o achieve the level o doctrinal acceptance or hunter-killer operations,the concept must be recognized as an American way o war; it certainly has

its historical antecedents. Tere must be a set o uniying principles or its

employment, and key to doctrine, an agreed upon denition o its nature;

this monograph supports that requirement. A thorough understanding o

the characteristics and attributes o sae havens and their impact on riendly

orces is necessary to develop counter sae haven measures; see chapter 3.

o rene this thesis, a review o the American historical approaches in the

employment o hunter-killer operations is warranted, primarily to ascertain

their advantages and disadvantages, utility and to dene the boundaries or

the development o operating principles. Tis work examines the American

historical approaches on the use o hunter-killer methodologies during its



17


wars by the analysis conducted in chapter 4; consolidating these examples

into derived principles is covered in chapter 5.



19


Safe Havens4.

…. it’s very clear to us that Al Qaeda has been able over the past18 months or so to establish a safe haven along the Afghanistan-

Pakistan border areas that they have not enjoyed before, that they

are bringing operatives into that region for training, operatives

that wouldn’t attract your attention if they were going through the

Customs line at Dulles with you when you’re coming back from

overseas.

— LTG Michael Hayden, CIA director, 30 March 2008

The ability o terrorists and other irregular warare adversaries to

conduct operations rom a sanctuary—hereafer reerred to in more

common usage as sae haven—increases the potential success o the

insurgent or terrorist in their struggles against government orces. Deny-

ing sae haven, thereore, is an essential part o any counterstrategy. For

instance, the use o Pakistan’s tribal areas as a sae haven by the alibanand Al Qaeda present allied orces with a large strategic dilemma i not

addressed (the protraction o the war and the weakening o the government

will to prosecute the campaign). Te most imposing uture security threat

may not be rogue or strong states, but rather the emergence o weak and

ailing states that can ultimately be used as sae havens by our enemies—

such as we are now seeing in the Horn o Arica region, Somalia and Yemen.

Worse, the linking together o multiple sae havens creates a network o

imposing challenges to security orces charged with protection o nationalsovereignty.

Current methodologies or the creation o campaign plans have now

recognized the need or a commander’s appreciation to rame the problem

prior to any sta entering the military decision-making process to develop

the architecture o the campaign plan. Tis chapter provides a way o looking

at the problem o enemy sae havens when conducting initial assessments.

The Role of Safe Havens

Tis aspect o the generational challenge—persistent conict against violent

extremism—posed by transnational threats operating rom sae havens was

clearly identied in the ndings o Te 9/11 Commission Report :



20

JSOU Report 10-1

A complex international terrorist operation aimed at launching a

catastrophic attack cannot be mounted by just anyone in any place.

Such operations appear to require the ollowing:ime, space, and ability to perorm competent planning and sta a.

work

A command structure able to make necessary decisions andb.

possessing the authority and contacts to assemble needed people,

money, and materials

Opportunity and space to recruit, train, and select operativesc.

with the needed skills and dedication, providing the time and

structure required to socialize them into the terrorist cause, judge

their trustworthiness, and hone their skills

A logistics network able to securely manage the travel o opera-d.

tives, move money, and transport resources (like explosives) where

they need to go

Access, in the case o certain weapons, to the special materialse.

needed or a nuclear, chemical, radiological, or biological attack

Reliable communications between coordinators and operatives.Opportunity to test the workability o the plan.g. 8

Afer Te 9/11 Commission Report , the U.S. Department o State (DoS)

conducted a rened study o the desired attributes that may or may not

make a place a sae haven in order to ormulate a working denition o sae

havens. Tat denition would be useul or the conduct o diplomacy when

considering threats to national sovereignty. Te DoS denition additionally

highlighted places where the enemy could operate in relative security andperorm the unctions noted above. Regardless o the denitional sources

on the sae haven phenomenon, the ollowing denition oered by the

Interagency Intelligence Community on errorism (IIC) serves best or

the purpose o this monograph (and expanding the denition to include

insurgents):

A sae haven is ‘… an area where terrorists are able to gather in rela-

tive security and in sucient numbers to engage in activities that

constitute a threat to U.S. national security. Such activities include

attack preparations, training, undraising, and recruitment ofen

conducted in unsecured or undergoverned geographic areas.’9



21


Features of Safe Havens

What are the desired eatures making a location attractive as a sae haven

or a potential uture sae haven? One o the key, critical vulnerabilities o

insurgent and terrorist organizations is the need or secrecy and security in

order to operate. Counter sae haven operations are ofen aimed at exposing

or dislodging irregular warare adversaries in these two areas—secrecy and

security—to create a third vulnerability—movement. Another important

vulnerability is the enemy’s need or the support o the populace, making

isolating the populace rom the enemy an ofen-considered COIN and

combating terrorism tool. Tus, preerred eatures o the sae haven mustinclude the ability to hide in plain sight (even better i the position is near

the area o operations), to be located where it is physically nonaccessible by

government security orces, and with the ability or the enemy to operate

in a secure manner—ree rom police, intelligence operatives, and legal

systems.

A supporting populace is also highly desirable in order to provide venues

or recruitment as well as needed logistical and nancial support. However,

the enemy can still operate in a sae haven without popular support; a popu-lation can be terrorized and intimidated into acquiescing to the demands o

the enemy or at least not turning the enemy over to government orces.

Another desired eature is the ability to get into and out o the sae

haven to conduct operations, requiring nonrestrictive transit routes and

transportation assets. Tis eature is urther enhanced by establishing the

sae haven near porous borders and along illicit rat lines already in use or

smuggling and other criminal activities where the participants are adept atevading law enorcement and customs agents. A nal highly desired eature

would be having connectivity to cyber systems.

Framing the Environment

Prior to consideration o any counter sae haven operation, the sae haven

area should be thoroughly analyzed with regard to its composition. Is it an

ungoverned or undergoverned area? Is it truly a sae haven that provides

sanctuary, or is it merely a base o operations? Is the area an ethnic, sepa-ratist region or is it part o the country-wide insurgency? Or like the FARC

operations in Columbia, is it an area or a criminal business enterprise?

Clear understanding o the environmental makeup o the sae haven and



22

JSOU Report 10-1

the motivations o its actors will assist in the shaping o the counter sae

haven plan.

Sae havens can also be categorized by unction and by geography. Func-tional sae havens include reugee camps, prisons, diasporas, academia,

and ideology (a supportive, cultural anity to support the terrorists or

insurgents). Geographical types (physical spaces) o sae havens include

urban, rural, and virtual.

During their analysis, counterterrorists and counterinsurgent planners

identiy issues that may place restrictions and limitations on their ability to

conduct counter sae haven operations. Imposing physical terrain and issues

o sovereignty can limit operations to only the ringes o the sae havenarea. Security orces may be nonindigenous to the area and even urther

hampered by rules o engagement. Te skills and capabilities o the security

orces require review to ascertain the correct ways and means to achieve the

ends. As an example, brute orce and repression can be used to clear a sae

haven i the security orces do not have nesse; the second and third order

eect, however, may result in huge reugee populations and a devastated

area now requiring an expensive rebuild. Clearing a sae haven could endup as a protracted operation—the government must have the will and time

needed to outlast the enemy and see the operation to its conclusion.10

Counter Safe Haven Approaches

Te ollowing approaches to denying or countering adversaries operating

in sae havens were derived rom historical examples o irregular warare

conicts since the end o World War II. One may wish or the case where

the indigenous population within the sae haven rises up against the terror-ists or insurgents, but this rarely happens. Te raming o the sae haven

environment during assessment and analysis will ofen dictate the approach

considered. Te ollowing are common approaches that can be used as a line

o eort within campaign plans (individually, or in the aggregate):

Isolate, manage, and contain the sae haven (includes bordera.

interdiction)

A policing, law enorcement, and intelligence approachb.Brute orce intervention (invasion, interdiction, sweeping)c.

International diplomacy to put pressure on the supporting country d.

Unconventional warare.e.



23


Te best approach, historically, is one in which the host nation with the

problem solves it without external assistance.

Counter Safe Haven Techniques for Security Forces

Te ollowing measures should be considered or development o a counter

sae haven plan. Te plan will be multidisciplinary, with the combination

o several o the measures applied in consort with one another:

Enhance border control, customs, and immigration services.a.

Prepare human terrain databases and social-cultural mapping, apply b.

additional population control measures (e.g., control o resources,biometrics, and identication cards), and co-opt the local populace

and solve grievances to isolate population rom the enemy.

Conduct counterorganization, counterrecruitment, and countermo-c.

tivation operations in the sae haven.

Simultaneously attack any criminal business enterprises.d.

Develop and employ specially trained orces (e.g., border interdiction,e.

hunter-killer teams, and pseudo-operations teams).

Employ an interdiction and targeting plan throughout the sae.haven.

Consider adoption o additional laws and legal measures to enhanceg.

security orce and law enorcement operations.

Engage in regional initiatives or combating terrorism and law enorce-h.

ment enhancements.

Own and control the narrative and inormation operations in the saei.

haven; counter cyber threats and capabilities o the enemy.Border barriers and ences in conjunction with interdiction measures j.

(kinetic).

During the Algerian War, the French recognized the insurgent use o

sanctuary across the borders in unisia and Morocco. Te French applied

various techniques to isolate the National Liberation Army (ALN) inside the

sae havens through the building o an eective barrier system: the Morice

Line along the unisian border and the Pedron Line along the Moroccan

border. Te barriers—barrages—consisted o wire ences augmented with

lights and mineelds and were eventually very eective in stopping enemy

inltration with a kill rate o over 85 percent. Over 40,000 troops were

assigned to static posts along these barriers supplemented with mobile



24

JSOU Report 10-1

columns to react to penetrations. In consort with the border barrages,

French naval orces implemented a campaign o coastal surveillance and

high seas interdiction to close down arms smuggling. Tese measurestaken collectively orced the ALN to continue only with guerrilla opera-

tions while thwarting attempts to conduct more aggressive, mobile warare

operations.

Summary

Countering an adversary sae haven is a multidimensional problem, oen

with no single solution. Correctly raming the problem o sae haven (its

characteristics and environment) helps to identiy the approaches and tech-niques required to eectively achieve its elimination or at best, denial to

enemy orces. Some o the key vulnerabilities o terrorists and insurgents

who operate within sae havens are organizational security, physical secu-

rity, and ofen the need or a supporting populace. Government legitimacy,

eective security orces, and countermobilization o the population to sepa-

rate them rom the threat are among the most eective tools in eliminating

or denying sae haven creation.A wide variety o military, policing, and law enorcement measures are

available to the counterterrorist and counterinsurgent to achieve the desired

eects on adversary sae havens. One o those measures discussed here is

the employment o hunter-killer teams within the sae haven. Historically,

the U.S. military has employed some orm o this technique based on the

demands o the irregular warare environment and yet ailed to adequately

codiy this approach in doctrine. Chapter 4 reviews American military

employment o hunter-killer type ormations throughout U.S. history toderive the advantages and disadvantages o their use, to capture key lessons

learned about their operations, and to synthesize the best practices observed

and employed to capture hunter-killer team employment principles (chapter

5). An understanding o these principles will support the ormulation o

uture COIN and counterterrorism doctrinal input on this subject, particu-

larly in the wider area o counter sae haven operations.



25


The American Historical Experience in4.

Hunter-Killer OperationsScouts without a peer, superb in woodcraft, the Indians fought

the total warfare of the barbarian hordes of the past and of the

‘civilized’ nations of the futures. Such was the military legacy of

the Indians to the garrison of Fort Stanwix, as to their forefathers

before them and to the soldiers who would come after them, an

invaluable bequest for all our later wars through Korea. The art of

using cover, of inltration, of ambush, and sudden surprise attack,of mobility…. Ranger companies before and during the Revolution

practiced Indian tactics to the hilt, as would their counterparts on

into the twentieth century. In no small measure the Indian Wars

made the American Army the effective ghting force it became.11

— Fairfax Downey, Indian Wars of the U.S. Army 1776–1865

Doctrine can be inormed by historical experience. In most scenar-ios where the American military was aced with an irregular

warare adversary, some orm o ranging or hunter-killer units

were employed as a response to take the ght deep into enemy territory. A

review o those experiences in various irregular wars ought by America can

establish the acceptance and utility o employing hunter-killer operations

as part o any American way o irregular warare.

Te U.S. military hunter-killer team employment and counter sae havenexperiences can be divided or study between the preindustrial period o

colonial and early American era to post-World War II and beyond. Some

reasons or the break and the dierences between the two periods ollow:

Rules o engagement became more restrictive and humane to limita.

harm against noncombatants (unorthodox and brutal tactics in irregu-

lar warare begin to become scorned by more proessional military

leaders).

Irregular warare engagements by theb. U.S. dwindled.

Te militia and volunteer system or the American military wasc.

replaced by the Reserve and National Guard systems, drying up

the pool o independent volunteers with the necessary independent



26

JSOU Report 10-1

attributes to range and conduct hunter-killer activities as ad hoc

ormations.

O most consequence, World War II changed the role o irregular rang-

ing skills o elite light-inantry units to creation o special raider and

commando-style units patterned upon European doctrine (even though

the U.S. Army still retained Ranger-type ormations). Unortunately, the

ranging skill o the light inantryman (independent units adopting enemy

tactics and operating or extended periods in nonpermissive areas) becomes

lost in the conventional nature o the war as they soon become shock inan-

try, raiders, and long-range reconnaissance units.

Colonial and Early American Period of Hunter-Killer Operations

Te American military experience with hunter-killer operations in enemy

sae havens began in a world in which we nd ourselves today. It was during

a clash o civilizations throughout the 1600s and 1700s where expanding,

oreign imperialism crashed into indigenous populations and culture; indig-

enous cultures were manipulated by contending states to provide irregular

warriors or the ght. It was a conict between liberally governed soci-eties, ruled under a sense o recognized legitimacy, against substate and

tribal warriors. Competing ideologies o rened culture versus savagery

and barbarism ormed the backdrop o warare amongst combatants and

noncombatants alike. Whole populations lived in terror o massacre, behead-

ings, torture, wretched imprisonment i captured, and the destruction o

homelands and economies.

Tese conditions created a unique way o early-American war on therontier and ostered the employment o ranging tactics as hunter-killer

operations against irregulars in their sae havens. Te operational style o

ranging initially consisted o patrolling between rontier orts (to detect

enemy activities) as well as scouting and raiding i warranted. Tus the

name or these early hunter-killer type militia units: Rangers. Te ollow-

ing examples illustrate various roles and missions o the early Rangers and

the pros and cons o their employment as hunter-killer units. Te most

comprehensive work on this way o war and a complement to any library on irregular warare is John Grenier’s book, Te First Way o War: Ameri-

can War Making on the Frontier . Hunter-killer methods became the most

eective mode o early American irregular warare military art. Tose tasks



27


required long-range penetration into enemy territory and a laundry list

o destructive measures to accomplish once there, all contributing to the

attritional nature o wars o exhaustion against irregular warriors.

Attacking and destroying Indian noncombatant populations

remained the American, particularly rontiersmen, preerred way

o waging war rom the early sixteenth through early nineteenth

centuries, even aer the ormation o the regular American Army

and its attempts to move toward the eighteenth century European

norm o limited war.12

King Philip’s War, 1675 to 1676. Te expanding land desires o the early settlers in southern New England (Massachusetts Bay Colony, Swansea,

Plymouth Colony, Rhode Island, Connecticut), combined with growing

disdain on the part o colonists or the incompatibility with European

culture and values o the various indigenous Indian tribes populating the

region, led to the rst outbreak o ormal military operations. It reached

campaign scale during King Philip’s War, ought between 1675 and 1676,

against the backdrop o Europe’s 30 Years War.King Philip (with the Wampanoag Indian name o Metacom) led the

eastern American Indian tribes o the Wampanoag, Narragansett, Nipmuc,

and others in an attack against the colonists in June 1675, in the southern

border region o the Plymouth Colony. Beore the war ended, thousands o

towns, settlements, and homes o American settlers were destroyed, over

800 lives lost amongst the settlers and approximately 3,000 losses amongst

the Native American populace (resulting in the decimation o the eastern-

American Indian tribes).13 Early colonial military deense consisted o a basic sel-reliance on an

armed populace and the establishment o a mutually supporting colonial

militia system, all backed up with a series o ortied houses and blockhouses

stretching across the rontier. I attacked, the citizenry would rally into the

ortied positions and allow the militia to patrol and roam between them

in an attempt to clear away the Indians. American militias were trained in

accordance with European military tactics involving lines o inantrymen

delivering volley re. Te Indians used guerrilla-like tactics, rst raiding,

then disappearing into orests and swamps as reuge and sanctuary.

As in all insurgency-like conicts, the enemy’s elusiveness plagued

eorts to bring on decisive military battle. In recognition o the need to



28

JSOU Report 10-1

take the ght to the Indian warriors, Governor Winslow (Plymouth Colony)

appointed Benjamin Church as the commander o the rst ull-time, inde-

pendent company o Ranger militia. Comprised o both expert rontiers-men and Indian volunteers (initially about 60 Englishmen and 140 Indian

irregulars), Benjamin Church employed his unit as the rst ocially sanc-

tioned American ranging unit with a clear mandate or a hunter-killer type

o operation:

… a orce specially designed to search out the remnants o the enemy

wherever they may lurk and beat them at their own tricks o orest

warare.14

Captain Church was well known—a amous Indian ghter—and had a

vast knowledge o the rontier territory. His unorthodox leadership style,

with a air or the dramatic, made him a perect leader or an autonomous

hunter-killer unit. Benjamin Church employed ranging tactics to conduct

a variety o oensive strikes against enemy sae havens. Benjamin Church

took the ranging concept to the next level, employing his Rangers deep

into enemy territory or long periods (over weeks o time) with the expressmission o destroying the hostiles and their sae haven support system. Te

Rangers ought by copying the style o Indian orest ghting and swamp-

ghting tactics.

Church’s unit almost single-handedly turned around the war eort with

a string o successes against the hostiles. His unit accounted or the death o

King Philip; the capture o Philip’s supporter, Annawon; and a devastating

winter raid (conducted as a combined operation with other colonial militia

units on 19 December 1675) against a ortied camp o Narragansett nearpresent-day South Kingston, Rhode Island. Dubbed the Great Swamp Fight,

this action eliminated any urther serious involvement o the Narragansett

Indians during the remainder o the war.

Benjamin Church used mixed militia and indigenous orces to his advan-

tage along with the rontiersmen knowledge o the outdoors, adoption o

Indian skulking tactics, and well-armed units to overmatch his adversaries.

He adapted to the enemy by learning the intricacies o swamp warare in

order to expand his operations into that sae haven. His disadvantages were

limited mobility (same as his adversary—oot) and lack o means to sustain

his orces during bad weather.



29


Church derived early principles rom his warare exploits utilizing

hunter-killer methodologies. His written experiences in hunter-killer types

o operations were passed on and incorporated into the style o ranging

and hunter-killer operations made amous by Robert Rogers during the

French and Indian War. Although Rogers’ exploits orm the lore o modern

Ranger history, Benjamin Church should rightly have the title o the athero the rst American military operations employing Rangers as unorthodox

military.

French and Indian War, Rogers’ Rangers. Major Robert Rogers began his

ranging career as a 14-year-old Indian ghter and went on to become the

most amous, although certainly not the rst, Ranger o the American ron-

tier. Rogers perected the art o oensive ranging with his hunter-killer units

by conducting deep penetration raids and reconnaissance missions or theBritish orces stationed along the upper state waterways o New York during

the French and Indian Wars. Rogers capitalized on integrating indigenous

orces into his units. Tey served as scouts, knowing the land well. He raised

Figure 1. Rhode Island State historical marker near the location of the Great Swamp Fight where Colonel Church and his Rangers par-

ticipated in a decisive winter raid against the sanctuary of the Nar-ragansett Indians (near present-day South Kingston, Rhode Island)



30

JSOU Report 10-1

volunteers who were physically hardy and superb outdoorsmen, and adopted

unorthodox ghting techniques similar to the hostile Indians. With these

units he led missions into enemy territory—harassing French and Indianlines, gathering intelligence, and capturing prisoners.

His most notable hunter-killer type operation was the raid against the

Abneki village on 4 October 1759, located at St. François in the St. Lawrence

River valley. raveling over 150 miles with 142 Rangers and indigenous

Indian irregulars, the village was ruthlessly attacked. Many o the Abnecki

warriors and noncombatants were killed or scattered, and then the whole

village was burned.15

Rogers would go on to command a Ranger contingent during the Revo-lutionary War, unortunately on the side o the British. He is most remem-

bered or his Rules or Ranging , promulgated as a result o his experiences.

Rogers’ expedition typied the rst derived and applied principles o hunter-

killer and ranging operations to ensure success. His men were handpicked,

including the Mohican scouts. Te rangers wore sturdy, rontier clothing

to protect them rom the elements and to blend in with indigenous popula-

tions ound in his operating area. Te Rangers were armed well enough tomatch or overmatch their adversaries. Weapons skill and care o weapons

were enorced constantly.

Te Rangers traveled ast and light (carrying extra moccasins or long-

range patrols) and ofen used canoes or boats to increase their mobility.

During winter, skates were used to rapidly transit rozen lakes and rivers,

and snowshoes were used to negotiate the eects o snow on the trails.

Combined with a cultural and geographical knowledge o their area o oper-

ations and the ability to live o the land and travel long distances behindenemy lines, the Rangers became the most eective, specialized orce in

the northeast.

Conversely, the ailing attribute o Rogers’ operational style was that he

was not constrained by rules o engagement when conducting his opera-

tions against combatants and noncombatants alike; i prisoners impeded

his movement, they were usually killed. Noncombatants were killed along

with warriors. Tis tactic was scorned by the conventional British Army

regulars, and Rogers was later rebuked or this operation. Te British had

made great propaganda against the French when they employed these tactics

with their Indian irregulars; the high moral ground was lost and the French

continued to allow their indigenous allies to commit atrocities.



31


Operational Maneuver, Strategic Efect: Te Battle o Kings Mountain

1780. Tere are very ew examples o early American military operations

involving hunter-killer teams in achieving a strategic eect based on theoperational maneuver o its irregular orces; most hunter-killer operations

are tactical engagements. Tis eect might only be accomplished i the

hunter-killer operations are employed as the main element o a war-o-

exhaustion strategy; by the prolonged operations o hunter-killer teams to

wear down enemy insurgents; or the insurgent orce is so decimated that

victory is achieved.

Te Battle o Kings Mountain in 1780 pitted the irregular orces o the

back-country colonists—the Overmountain Men rom ennessee and militiarom the western districts in North Carolina—against the proxy, provincial

irregular orces o Loyalists commanded by Major Patrick Ferguson.16

Afer stalemate in the North against Washington’s orces during the

Revolutionary War, British strategy shied to reliance on a perceived loyal

ory population in the southern states to deeat the Americans. Te English

war cabinet, in consort with its generals, believed it would be possible to

subdue the rebels in North Carolina, South Carolina, and Georgia usingirregulars provided rom the Loyalists. Afer the attack on Savannah, British

orces overran Georgia, and then captured Charleston on 12 May 1780. From

this position o strength, British orces spread military detachments to the

countryside to consolidate their gains. In response, the American General

Gates reacted in August o that year—maneuvering with the Continental

orces at Camden, South Carolina—and was heavily deeated. With the

absence o an American Army to thwart British gains, American patriots

turned to partisan and guerrilla warare operations to continually harassthe British.

Ferguson commanded a large, irregular orce o about 1,100 Loyalists

(which included Rangers). He was ordered by the British command into

western South Carolina (to the ort named “96,” a star, earthen-work orti-

cation guarding a trade route), prepositioned to continue operations against

American Partisans in North Carolina. He soon moved his orces north,

scattering the Partisans in his wake, with the intention o linking up with

British orces in Charlotte. Ferguson believed the back country area would

provide him with a loyal populace, provisions, and terrain to support his

maneuver—sae haven characteristics.



32

JSOU Report 10-1

In response, militia commanders Colonels Isaac Shelby and John Sevier

mustered the largest hunter-killer operation in early American history at

Sycamore Shoals (near modern Elizabethton, ennessee) on 22 September1780. With the addition o 200 Virginians under Colonels William and

Arthur Campbell, the orce o militia and irregulars let loose rom the Shelv-

ing Rock rendezvous point as a ying column to search out and destroy

Ferguson. Te column split at Catawba in order to gather more Partisans

and grew to approximately 1,400 men (later dubbed in olklore as the “Ghost

Legion”).

Ferguson soon had word rom local spies o this irregular orce hunting

or him and stopped at Kings Mountain to gather more reinorcements.Kings Mountain was a poor choice or a deensive position being isolated

and with very little water. Unbeknownst to Ferguson, none o his messages

calling or reinorcements were getting past the hostile population.

Te American hunter-killer orce slowed to the pace o its oot soldiers.

In rustration at the pace o movement, the orce was reorganized into a

mounted column, leaving the oot soldiers at Cowpens, and pushed ahead

to Kings Mountain with about 900 horsemen on 6 October. Local oriescaptured along the way provided intelligence, and much o the population

provided provisions or the orce as it pushed orward (to include the draw-

ing o maps).

Ferguson was soon surrounded. Te Americans, using Indian tactics,

were repulsed rom the top o the mountain several times. Soon, Loyalist

muskets could not compete with the accuracy and killing rate o American

ries; they were deeated aer Ferguson was killed. American losses were

about 30; the Loyalist orce o approximately 1,100 was decimated (about150 killed, commensurate number wounded, and over 800 taken prisoner).

Te American victory ensured the British would never operate in orce

again across the southern back country. Te victory also dampened the

enthusiasm or Loyalist support or England or the remainder o the war—a

strategic victory.17

Te attributes o the hunter-killer operation lending to the success o

American irregulars came rom their superior repower (rie technology

vs. musket), superior mobility on horseback, knowledge o the terrain and

populace, the innate ability o the American irregular to live o the land, the

hardiness o the physical condition o the irregulars, and the reckless, brave,

charismatic and audacious leadership provided by the militia colonels, most



33


with warghting experience. Te rules o engagement were unrestrictive, but

American irregulars spared the wounded, treated them as best they could,

and moved the hundreds o prisoners to places o captivity. (Te rules o

engagement allowed or the abuse and capture o noncombatants given the

American sentiments against the Loyalist actions o the population andabuses on the British side.) Detractors were the ad hoc, inexperienced level

o the various irregular militia units, who had never conducted coordinated

operations with one another (although this did not limit their eective-

ness when nally orming or battle). Although slowed by the speed o oot

inantry, the hunter-killer orce adapted the ying column to horseback and

prevailed in reaching Ferguson’s orce beore he could maneuver away.

Te ranging tradition spread to other states, and a variety o Ranger mili-

tia units continued to conduct hunter-killer operations or the remainder o

the 18th century. Afer the creation o a standing U.S. Army, most operations

into the irregular’s sae havens and homelands consisted o conventional

military eorts o long-range penetration under the design o a punitive

Figure 2. Ferguson’s men defended from the top of the terrain, and the

American irregulars and volunteer militia surrounded the heights andfought uphill to defeat the British Loyalists



34

JSOU Report 10-1

expedition or as limited long-range patrols (e.g., Indian Wars in the West,

exas Rangers, and Philippine COIN campaign). During the Civil War, a

variety o colorul units were ormed to track down the elusive Conederateirregulars o Mosby and Quantrill, but these suered in eectiveness rom

being ormed ad hoc out o conventional cavalry units, who were not much

better in the tactics, arms, and skills o their counterparts.

Te tradition o conventional punitive columns culminated in General

Pershing’s expedition to Mexico in the early 20th century. Although specic,

small-unit hunter-killer operations (e.g., Ranger units) were no longer the

norm, the small-wars era continued afer World War I and did at least

continue to provide hunter-killer-like skills and experiences to the U.S. military as a COIN technique. Tis would improve American hunter-killer

operations in the uture: the use o indigenous orces, increased mobility

platorms to travel urther in rougher terrain, modern and over-matching

weaponry, and technology enhancements (the advent o the airplane and

the radio).

World War II and Beyond

World War II irregular warare experiences did not expand the American

way o war in the realm o COIN techniques, primarily because the U.S. did

not ace an Axis insurgent or guerrilla threat. (Te U.S. conducted guer-

rilla and partisan warare against conventional Axis orces.) It was in this

adversary realm o irregular warare—actually participating as sponsors and

enablers or guerrilla warare (e.g., Yugoslavia and the Philippines) —where

much o American doctrinal approaches to UW were ormed. Either by

necessity as stay behind orces, or through British tutelage under the SpecialOperations Executive, Americans perormed capably as insurgents and

guerrillas in their own right. Other SOF were created or the purpose o

raiding or or use as elite inantry, inuenced by the European military

design o commandos. Unortunately, the ranging and hunter-killer ethos

o the American inantry would be transormed when Army Rangers were

employed as shock inantry, tactical raiders, and battleeld reconnaissance

assets.

World War II. Several specialized inantry ormations were created during

World War II. For the Army, it was the combined U.S.-Canadian 1st Special

Service Forces and the U.S. Army Rangers, neither o which were used to



35


their ull potential to conduct hunter-killer operations. In the Pacic, the

U.S. Marine Corps sponsored the ormation o the amous raider regiments,

which became renowned or their exploits while conducting raids on Japa-nese-held islands.

Te 1st Special Services Force conducted a series o operations rom

Alaska to Italy and nally southern France, but it was used primarily as a

conventional, light-inantry maneuver regiment. Te Rangers were misuti-

lized as vanguard, shock-inantry in Italy where they were all but destroyed.

Te long-tradition o ranging behind enemy lines could not be accomplished

in the large, conventional and linear battles ought throughout the war in

Europe.wo contributions to the art o hunter-killer operations against irregular

adversaries did occur, however, as a result o the war:

Te rst was in technological leaps, which would enable uture hunter-a.

killer operations.

Te second was in German antipartisan operational experience, whereb.

hunter-killer teams were used both against the Soviet partisans and

against the Partisans in the Balkans.

In technology, long-range naval and aviation assets now provided plat-

orms or insertion o hunter-killer teams deep into enemy territory, as

well as their extraction. Supplies allowing hunter-killer teams to remain

behind the lines could now be parachute delivered or delivered over the

shore by stealthy submarines and small water craf. Te o-road, all-terrain

capabilities o motorized vehicles also enabled hunter-killer teams to navi-

gate in previously inaccessible areas. Ecient and smaller machine guns,mortars, and antitank weapons ensured uture hunter-killer teams could

take on irregulars with staying power, precluding the need or extraction or

rescue by larger orces. But it was the long-range radio that by ar enabled

specialized orces to remain much longer in enemy territory. No longer

were mobile or ying columns limited to what they could carry; with the

radio, a reach-back capability existed to call or more orces, weapons, or

logistics as the situation demanded. With the radio also came access to

higher intelligence on the activities o adversaries as well as a capability to

achieve eective and coordinated operations with larger conventional orces

conducting antiguerrilla operations.



36

JSOU Report 10-1

Te second contribution or uture hunter-killer operations was a result

o extensive study by the U.S. Army o German antiguerrilla techniques to

learn and synthesize military requirements or counterguerrilla doctrine:

Inspired by the German Army’s World War II jagdkommando anti-

partisan doctrine, the U.S. Army’s 1951 FM 31-20, Operations Against

Guerrilla Forces, prescribed the organization, training, and unctions

or a prototypical indigenous counterguerrilla unit o platoon size.

Intended to operate independently or prolonged periods, specialized

antiguerrilla units were to be armed with light automatic weapons

and radios or night operations such as raids and ambushes. Tismanual also recommended that antiguerrilla units should consider

masquerading as guerrillas to deceive irregular adversaries.18

Earlier German experiences with antipartisan measures were based on

the requirement to protect rear area assets rom partisan sabotage attacks

and were primarily designed as limited tactical operations o small-unit

patrolling as a deensive measure. As partisan activities grew rom small

attacks by disaggregate bands to heavier, well-organized attacks by compa-nies and battalions, new measures were needed. Te German high command

issued a directive or all units to build hunter-killer teams, jagdkommandos,

with enough repower and endurance to move into guerrilla areas and

destroy them. Partisans operating against the German orces, like all smart

guerrillas, avoided set piece battles and were extremely adept at eluding

German orces’ attempts to surround them; their intimate knowledge o

the battleeld allowed them to escape into rough terrain or melt into the

population, time aer time.As in earlier French and British colonial experience against irregulars,

German orces adopted the use o mobile columns to penetrate into guerrilla-

held territory. Mobile, heavily armed, and operating at the company size,

German jagdkommandos consisted o specially trained orces, drawn rom

existing manpower o elite units who eschewed the need or a long logistics

tail (they lived o the land) and oen dressed and equipped themselves to

look like the very guerrillas they were attempting to destroy. Te jagdkom-

mandos also used indigenous personnel as scouts and guides and included

in their ranks soldiers who could speak local languages and dialects.

Te primary role or the jagdkommando was to seek out and destroy

guerrilla bases. Tese units by 1943 became very eective at oensive



37


antiguerrilla operations, particularly in the Balkans. Te German army

even created an antipartisan badge, the highest award in gold, which became

competitively sought afer by members o these organizations. In his book,Hold the Balkans, Robert M. Kennedy briey described their role:

A highly eective oensive weapon was ound in the Jagdkommando

(ranger detachment), designed to seek out and destroy guerrilla

bands. Personnel o the detachments were usually young and combat-

wise veterans o German campaigns on other ronts. Physically hardy

and trained to live in the open or extended periods o time, they

depended little on supply columns and could pursue the guerrillas,ofen burdened down with wounded, amilies, and impedimenta, into

the most inaccessible areas. When the situation required, the rangers

would put on civilian clothing, disguising themselves as Chetniks

or Partisans, to work their way closer to their wary enemy. In the

event they came upon major guerrilla orces, the ranger detachments,

seldom more than a company in strength, would keep them under

observation and inorm battalion or higher headquarters. While

awaiting reinorcements, they would attempt to gather additional

inormation on the guerrilla strength and dispositions. As success-

ul as they were in many small-scale operations, however, the ranger

detachments were not numerous enough to aect decisively the

outcome o the antiguerrilla campaign.19

Advantageous lessons learned were in the need or mobility to outma-

neuver the partisans, how to overmatch their repower, how to eectively

blend with the insurgents through altered appearances, and using localsor intelligence. Airpower increased the longevity o the orce by provid-

ing resupply, close air support, and MEDEVAC. Decentralized command

and missions o broad scope were the norm. Te jagdkommando concept

distracter was common to totalitarian militaries: loose rules o engagement

resulted in brutality and repression o noncombatants as well as severe treat-

ment or captured insurgents. Tese activities nullied local population

support or the Germans.

Post-World War II Era. Afer World War II the American military had

limited experiences in COIN or promulgating doctrinal approaches to

counterguerrilla and counter sae haven methodologies, specically hunter-



38

JSOU Report 10-1

killer employment. For operational art on the subject, they were mostly

reliant on the experiences o other nations. Te post-World War II irregular

warare era was characterized by revolutionary, anticolonialist nationalmovements, and communist people’s war. U.S. knowledge o COIN tech-

niques under these types o war was gleaned rom British and French COIN

operational art—now changed in character with the advent o a new tech-

nology: increased mobility via helicopters.

In the Korean War, Americans once again aced no threat rom Chinese

or North Korean guerrillas to a sucient extent; thus, they had little impetus

to urther rene and develop U.S. COIN techniques, preerring to conduct

specialized operations much like their World War II experiences—employ-ing unconventional orces as guerrillas and espionage operatives against

the enemy. While they could have developed skills relevant to hunter-killer

operations, Rangers were once again used predominantly as light inantry,

mostly as tactical reconnaissance units, capable o small raids, and deep

battleeld scouting units (intelligence gathering) under the Army Corps

structure.

Te U.S. involvement to assist Greece against their internal communistinsurgency immediately aer World War II could have urthered evolve-

ment o U.S. COIN doctrine, but in the mainstream was security assistance,

within the parameters o a host-nation IDAD plan. No major COIN orces

were deployed during this advisory eort. Te American military would

not conduct hunter-killer type operations until its involvement in the Viet-

nam War.

Vietnam War. Te American way o war in COIN was heavily inuencedby its involvement in the Vietnam War, challenging the doctrinal approach

to ghting irregular warare adversaries at a scale not seen in American

military history. Every possible approach to ghting irregulars and a main-

stream, revolutionary people’s army was attempted during the conict. Te

Vietnam War was also the impetus or transcending the nature o how the

American military viewed special operations. Te SOF heritage is a long

historical one o ad hoc experiences gained throughout the nation’s wars,

but today’s SOF owes much o its operating style and mission sets to WorldWar II and the Vietnam War, dening the strategic utility o SOF, and to

the relevance o its tactical operations in achieving operational goals and

objectives.



39


In World War II, the U.S. military came away with some limited expe-

rience in UW, commando-style raiding techniques, and guerrilla warare.

In Vietnam, specialized warare grew to include unique COIN skills orFID, prisoner o war rescue, long-range and strategic reconnaissance, direct

action with specialized assets, and oreign advisory and assistance skills.

Without a doubt the most transcendent act was the creation o Green Berets

(the Army Special Forces) in the early 1950s, later supported by President

Kennedy as a means to answer irregular adversaries with America’s own

version o guerrillas.

In Vietnam, hunter-killer techniques were adopted by both the conven-

tional Army and within the Army Special Forces. Although having a longtradition o historical use o Rangers to conduct ranging operations deep

into enemy territory in the early colonial era, the Rangers once again were

used in the role o long-range reconnaissance assets to support conventional

unit tactical intelligence-gathering operations (similar to their role in World

War II). Other specialized units, like the Special Operations Group (SOG)

ormations, again ound roles in conducting strategic reconnaissance opera-

tions deep into enemy territory as their primary mission. Tis is not to say that Ranger operations and SOG operations did not achieve eects desired

in creating mayhem in enemy-held territory while contributing to counter-

organization successes. It is rather to highlight that they were specically

ormed as intelligence-gathering and reconnaissance assets, not hunter-

killer units or long-duration operations in enemy sae havens.

O the attempts to employ hunter-killer teams, two are noted here:

one was the U.S. Army retailoring its conventional inantry, and the other

was Special Forces specically mission-purposed. Te conventional orcesattempt to employ hunter-killer teams in the Vietnam War COIN environ-

ment illustrates a lesson not learned in the Army’s earlier attempts to employ

hunter-killer teams during the Civil War: the ailure rate when adapting

conventional ormations to this requirement was high.

In November 1965, the then Major David Hackworth was instrumental

in creating an organization, guerrilla-like in nature, to ght the Viet Cong. It

was a derived, personal philosophy based on his wartime experience. Within

the 101st Division, the new iger Force hunter-killer concept was adopted

to create platoon-sized units rom hand-picked soldiers across the divi-

sion. One became a hunter killer, based on attributes gleaned in command

interviews: months o combat experience, psychological propensity to have



40

JSOU Report 10-1

hunter-killer instincts, and o course, audacity. Once picked, the soldier

joined the elite iger Force and was issued a set o tiger-striped atigues to

distinguish him rom normal inantry units.Te iger Force units conducted small-unit actions and were designed to

operate in the eld or weeks and take the ght into the jungle to hunt and

kill Viet Cong, based on the member’s ability to conduct eective jungle

warare. During population resource and control operations, the iger

mission was to look or Viet Cong and ood caches, then destroy them. Te

iger Force hunter-killer concept was used throughout 1967 in operations

near Dak o, Duc Pho, and Chu Lai, in the Central Highlands campaign.

Most o the iger Force became reconnaissance platoons at the brigadelevel and never achieved the goal o conducting deep, long-duration opera-

tions against the enemy. Nor were they aorded the assets or independent

authorities required to be eective hunter killers.

Over a period o time the units were looked on with distrust. Senior

ocers elt their operations caused too many riendly casualties (they were

almost wiped out in June 1966 while pursuing North Vietnamese Army

main-orce regiments), and the unit was soon accused o committing atroci-ties during their operations. Te unit was disbanded aer claiming almost

300 enemy kills, some o a suspect nature.

Although adopting enemy tactics, selecting hand-picked personnel, and

providing aggressive and audacious leadership, the concept ailed rom

lack o discipline, hierarchal command and control mechanisms, and little

autonomy to conduct eective operations. Te unit was ad hoc in orm-

ing and was an attempt to convert conventional inantry into specialized

irregulars.Te use o an organized hunter-killer ormation came with the orma-

tion o the Mobile Guerrilla Force trained and led by U.S. Army Special

Forces or the purpose o complementing indigenous Vietnamese tribal

mobile strike orce units (MIKE Force). Responding to the need or quick

reaction orces or the various U.S. Special Forces base camps involved in

the Civilian Irregular Deense Group (CIDG) program, Green Berets soon

became adept at conducting counterguerrilla operations with indigenous

orces who were not placed under the control o the South Vietnamese

Army—in essence, their own autonomous maneuver orce. Unortunately,

this autonomy also created isolation and distrust rom conventional units



41


when it came time to seek their reinorcement during battle. (o resolve

the issue, the Green Berets created the mobile strike ormations to quickly

back up beleaguered CIDG outposts.) aking the concept one step urther,the Green Berets realized sitting in base camps awaiting enemy attack was

not a creative use o indigenous orces. o become more oensive in nature,

the Green Berets created company-sized Mobile Guerrilla Forces to take the

ght to the enemy in his sanctuaries and sae havens. Tus the rst, and

maybe the only, proessional hunter-killer unit in Vietnam was created.

Te Mobile Guerrilla Force concept was developed in late 1966 by Colo-

nel Francis J. Kelly. He envisioned his concept as orming COIN hunter-

killer teams using clandestine counterguerrilla techniques to inltrateinto guerrilla areas o operation or the purpose o engaging enemy orces,

destroying their logistics, interdicting their lines o communication, and

creating a psychological climate o ear within the enemy’s mind as to his

saety while operating within his base areas. Tis action would also orce

the enemy to deend his bases and logistical centers, allowing the hunter

killers to control the pace and tempo o the operation. Tese company-sized

units were intended to conduct 30-to-60-day operations and were led by aU.S. Special Forces team.20

Te creation o the Mobile Guerrilla Force in October 1966 provided an

active measure to seek out and destroy Viet Cong and North Vietnamese

Army (NVA) regulars enjoying sae haven and sanctuary in the III Corps

actical Zone. Named War Zone D, (and the Forbidden Zone by the enemy)

this territory was used by Viet Cong and NVA orces to establish base camps

and logistics areas within South Vietnam at the terminus o the Ho Chi

Minh trail; since this area was almost devoid o riendly orce control, theenemy could preposition and prepare or urther attacks into South Viet-

nam. Without sucient American and South Vietnamese orces to counter

this buildup, the concept to employ U.S. Army Special Forces and their

indigenous assets rom static base camps (along with light counterguerrilla

security patrolling) into a guerrilla orce easily won avor with General

Westmoreland.

Initially, Cambodian CIDG soldiers o Khmer Serei ethnicity were

recruited to orm the company under the command o Captain James “Bo”

Gritz. In his rst meeting on the concept, Colonel Kelly described what he

desired:



42

JSOU Report 10-1

… a company-sized orce capable o conducting guerrilla operations

in War Zone D or periods ranging rom 30 to 60 days. Tis light

inantry company would have to operate without artillery support orchance o reinorcement. Te unit’s sole support would consist o a

single orward air control aircraf, tactical air strikes, and parachute

drops o ood, supplies, and ammunition every 4 days.21

Te Mobile Guerrilla Force consisted o about 160 to 170 men, orga-

nized into a headquarters platoon, reconnaissance platoon, and three or

our maneuver platoons, depending on the tactical operation. Te orce was

equipped with the standard U.S. equipment or weaponry and radios. Aferinitial training at the Ho Ngoc ao Special Forces camp (home o project

SIGMA—Special Forces and indigenous long-range Corps reconnaissance

teams), the ready company deployed to the Special Forces camp at Duc

Phong to begin missions in War Zone D.

Te Mobile Guerrilla Force conducted numerous operations in War

Zone D against the Viet Cong 9th Division and other NVA main orce regi-

ments. Tese missions were labeled “Blackjack” (Colonel Kelly’s nickname)

ollowed by a two-number designation denoting the Corps, then the mission

Figure 3. A Vietnam War era AC-47 gunship on display at the historicalAir Park, Hurlburt Field, Florida. These aircraft, along with other modelsof gunships, provided the long-range interdiction and close air sup-port res for teams operating without artillery support at long distanceswithin enemy safe havens and base areas.



43


sequence (e.g., Blackjack 31 and Blackjack 32). Teir missions ocused on

the destruction o the enemy orces, his base camps, and enemy logistics

throughout the zone while also providing updated intelligence to the 1stInantry Division and other riendly conventional orces.

Te employment o the Mobile Guerrilla Force lasted until late 1967 when

the unit’s manpower was rolled into the larger mobile strike orce units

and the reconnaissance projects SIGMA and OMEGA. Te Mobile Guer-

rilla Force project represented one o the American military’s best attempts

to employ hunter-killer teams in a COIN environment. It also served as a

model or the contemporary evolution o COIN hunter-killer teams. Te

doctrine rom these hunter-killer operations, combined with increasinglevels o modern transport and technology to enhance these operations,

would orm the basis o uture success by SOF hunter-killer teams when

Operation Enduring Freedom changed rom a guerrilla warare scenario

into a COIN eort.

Te guarantee o the Mobile Guerrilla Force success in hunter-killer oper-

ations was in adhering to the ollowing principles o their employment:

Use o indigenous anda. SOF small units as a purpose-built organizationKnowledge o the terrainb.

Te role unconventional and audacious leadership plays in the usec.

o the hunter-killer team

Increased mobility with the use o helicoptersd.

Wide latitude to conduct independent operationse.

Modern resupply methods and a logistic system to support the unit.

Overmatch in repower (with the inclusion o close air support assets) tog. compensate or the unit’s lack o heavy weapons

A supportive quick reaction orce to reinorce beleaguered units.h.

Conversely, this COIN hunter-killer concept suered the historical ate o

diferent units—not enough o them, not everywhere, and not long enough—

to have made an appreciable dierence at the operational level o war.

Post-Vietnam War, the 1980s and 1990s. Although the post-Vietnam War

period was rie with insurgencies around the world, the American military distanced itsel rom any uture entanglements in COIN environments,

losing much o the operational art and COIN acumen amassed rom the

Vietnam War. As the conventional military repaired and rebuilt itsel to



44

JSOU Report 10-1

once again handle the major war spectrum, much o the necessary skills

needed to ght in irregular warare devolved to the special operations

community.Soon a more imposing threat entered the world scene: terrorism. o

remain viable, special operations began a narrow ocus o mission sets to

conduct counterterrorism operations. However, with ew deployments into

this irregular warare playing eld as a result o political constraint and

public reluctance, Special Forces returned to FID and security assistance

activities. Tis shi reinorced a notion amongst Green Berets that i you

cannot ght wars, get involved in teaching other people how to ght wars

in order to sustain your skills.While a ew brush wars occurred during this period (e.g., Grenada and

Panama) along with the major conventional war Operation Desert Shield/

Desert Storm, America was not challenged with an irregular warare adver-

sary requiring the employment o U.S. orces to conduct COIN mission

sets. At best, U.S. Army Special Forces trainers were able to maintain COIN

hunter-killer knowledge when used as advisors in Venezuela, specically

in the training o cazadores (hunter-killer) battalions and training hunter-killer battalions in the El Salvadoran Army.

One other initiative during this period, although not originally conceived

as a hunter-killer concept, was more than prescient in ensuring America

would have purpose-built hunter-killer teams when the need eventually

arose. In 1984, Colonel James Guest—commander o the 5th Special Forces

Group (Airborne)—hereinaer reerred to as “the Group”—transerred an

experimental Special Forces company known as B-500 to Fort Bliss, exas

to develop the tactics, equipment, and operating principles or a desert,long-range, and mobile Special Forces capability.

B-500, Purpose-Built Hunter-Killer Team. B-500 was established in the

early 1980s by Colonel Guest to address the needs and requirements o the

Group or conducting desert warare in accordance with their war plans in

the United States Central Command (USCENCOM) region. Te overall

program or execution was named the Desert Mobility System, comprised

o weapons, soldier equipment, and mobility platorms (to include highaltitude parachutes) needed by the Special Forces soldiers or conducting

long-range, long-duration missions in a desert environment. In essence,

B-500 was a test-bed unit or the Group.



45


Te mobility platorm requirement was based on uture combat scenar-

ios, which required the Group to conduct a variety o missions involving

extreme inltration/exltration ranges. Te desire or a vehicular inltration

method was based on the shortage o airlif and special operations aviation

assets at the time, which could eectively hamper the employment o the

Group assets in a major war. Tus the parameter or 500 miles in and 500

miles out without resupply (and be able to operate up to 10 days) becamethe standard or a vehicular-mounted Green Beret team (the Special Forces

Operational Detachment–Alpha, the “ODA”).

By January 1985, B-500 moved rom Fort Huachuca to Biggs Army Air

Field in El Paso, exas with the ollowing tasks:

Build a mounted capability or an entire B-team with the 1,000-milea.

range without resupply, as the goal; serve as a test bed or experimental

vehicles, which could be utilized in long-range desert operationsDevelop tactics, techniques, and procedures and manuals or theb.

conduct o mounted operations to serve as the basis or eventual

adoption as doctrine in the Special Forces

Figure 4. B-500 on a long-range mounted patrol in the desert near FortBliss, Texas



46

JSOU Report 10-1

est a variety o weapons, communication gear, personal clothingc.

and tentage, parachutes, and so on or their useulness to conduct

operations in a desert environment under extended duration.

Te unit discarded the previous mobility platorms o one-quarter ton

jeeps or modied M880 trucks and added homemade trailers to carry the

logistics and motorcycles required to conduct long-range desert operations.

Later the unit adopted the Army HMMWV variant as the preerred mobility

platorm and conducted a series o 1,000-mile missions to gain experience.

Tese early trips provided an abundance o lessons learned or mounted

movement, and the unit wrote its rst mounted handbook to pass on oruse to other members o the Group. Along with the vehicle tests, the unit

also experimented or the rst time with satellite communications and navi-

gation (SACOM and SANAV) systems. Te Mk-19 and the .50-caliber

machine gun were also used in testing.

As a result o the positive eedback rom team members, the HMMWV

was chosen as the vehicle o choice or mounted teams. Initially each team

was equipped with two M1025s (clamshell with ring mount and winch) and

two M998s (cargo version). During the testing period a great partnershipand association with the border patrol developed, and the border patrol

transerred some trucks and about 15 dirt bikes (350cc) to the unit (these

were contraband seized rom drug raids and considered ederal property).

When the entire Group was relocated to Fort Campbell, Kentucky the

B-500 unit reverted back to A Company, 1/5th and returned home to the

Group. Much o what B-500 accomplished would contribute to Special

Forces hunter-killer capability aer 9/11 as a orce in being .Operation Enduring Freedom. In the summer o 2002, the reemergence o

the aliban as insurgents dictated a COIN response rom allied and coalition

orces. However, the expected war with Iraq meant continuing operations

in Aghanistan would be as an economy o orce, which ceded vast portions

o Aghan rural areas to the insurgents. Aghan security orces were scarce.

Counterguerrilla techniques used by the coalition were limited to close

proximity security patrolling; occupation o key, orward-operating bases

to maintain a presence; and battalion sweep operations conducted by the

various allied and U.S. conventional inantry orces. Te predominance o

SOF assets, both U.S. and coalition, ocused on counterorganization missions

to hunt down remaining Al Qaeda and senior aliban leadership while



47


simultaneously utilizing indigenous security orces to protect key pockets

o the population and interdict enemy eorts.

While hunter-killer concepts cannot work in isolation rom the myriado counterguerrilla techniques used by COIN orces, this situation provided

the exact environment or the employment o U.S. Special Forces mounted

teams to conduct hunter-killer missions as part o the eort to erode and

exhaust the aliban during 2002 and aer.

U.S. and coalition SOF, particularly those units with sel-contained

mobility and repower, were used on a variety o missions to roam in semi-

permissive and nonpermissive areas o Aghanistan. Te purpose was to

harass the enemy or nd, x and destroy the enemy either with organicrepower and close air support or in conjunction with larger conventional

reaction orces.

Based on intelligence, local inormation, and terrain analysis, Special

Forces mounted teams were employed across vast areas o “gridded” terrain

to ascertain enemy activities and strength within each grid. I successul,

enemy caches were destroyed, enemy sae houses cleared, and sanctuary

areas (sae havens) were put at risk or aliban occupation. Most clashes withaliban orces were successul in eliminating or capturing enemy ghters.

Hunter-killer teams remained highly mobile with organically tailored

vehicles. All patrols were designed or long-range operations in suspected

enemy territory, and although scarce resources in helicopters or these

unique operations could have limited the duration o hunter-killer team

deployment, a system o bundle and cargo drops or resupply guaranteed

increased time o the teams in the eld. Mission durations ranged rom a

couple o weeks to a 6-week operation by a coalition SOF contingent. Closeair support (CAS), either with xed-wing or rotary-wing assets, provided

long-range, heavy repower because artillery was not prevalent in the rst

years o the COIN period. Maneuvering with all terrain, heavy bed vehi-

cles aorded increased weapons platorms (.50-caliber, light machine gun,

A-4s, and MK-19 grenade launchers) to give the hunter-killer team’s re-

power overmatch against the aliban.

Just as in the Vietnam Mobile Guerrilla Force concept, hunter-killer

teams were optimized with indigenous, irregular orces in company

strength. Teir vast knowledge o tribal aairs, local language, combined

with their intimate knowledge o the terrain, contributed to the overall

success o many o these patrols.



48

JSOU Report 10-1

An operation in one o the central provinces during the summer o

2003 illustrated the eectiveness o the hunter-killer concept. During their

earlier war with the Soviets, the Aghan mujahideen made much use o themountain ranges near Kandahar as an inner sae haven and stronghold

to train, recruit, resupply, and ret. Tis area is comprised o harsh, high

desert mountains with very narrow valleys and small, isolated villages. A

variety o indicators by the late summer o 2003 showed that the aliban

were regrouping in this area by the hundreds, presumably to aect the

upcoming all elections scheduled throughout Aghanistan.

Te Combined Joint Special Operations ask Force - Aghanistan directed

coalition and U.S. hunter-killer teams to conduct a probe into the area inorder to ascertain the extent o the aliban’s activity. Afer one contact

between a coalition SOF patrol and suspected guerrilla orce occurred,

a robust U.S. Special Forces hunter-killer unit was deployed along with

approximately 150 irregular orces provided by the governor o Kandahar,

Figure 5. Hunter-killer teams in Afghanistan employed the SOF groundmobility vehicle (modied HMMWV) to conduct long-duration and long-range counter safe haven and interdiction operations against Taliban forces



49


in anticipation o combat operations. As they drove deeper and deeper into

the mountain sanctuary, many o the villagers warned them o a large pres-

ence o enemy. Contact soon occurred by enemy ambush, which surprisingly was proessionally executed by the aliban and included the use o mortars

and snipers.

Tree days o ghting ensued; the hunter-killer unit was reinorced by

a Quick Reaction Force rom the Kandahar-based Special Forces battalion,

while conventional orces readied or insertion to create a classic hammer-

and-anvil maneuver. As the ght progressed, hundreds o aliban were

either killed or captured as air support assets were added to the battle.

Sensing deeat, the remaining aliban elements attempted to exltrate thearea, but most were destroyed in continued engagements by AC-130 aircraf.

Estimates o enemy strength hovered around 500 insurgents. Te enemy

was deeated, the sanctuary denied, and the all elections were successully

conducted without the intererence o the aliban. It serves as one o the

21st century’s most successul hunter-killer operations on the part o U.S.

orces to date.

Tis overall achievement was due to operating within the principles o hunter-killer operations, employing special purpose units, and leveraging

both technological enablers and the use o local, irregular orces in a COIN

environment. Te hunter-killer unit was a standing organization, specially

trained or the task. Te ground commander enjoyed broad scope in the

mission to conduct autonomous operations. As the battle grew, repower

overmatch was achieved. Resupply was immediate via rotary-wing assets

or xed-wing bundle drops.

Summary

While U.S. orces also ought irregulars and insurgents in Iraq, that insur-

gency is predominantly urban in nature and requires manhunting and

counterorganization skills to counter the enemy. Few situations during the

war in Iraq have aorded American orces the need to conduct hunter-killer

operations into enemy sae havens on the scale as they have in Aghanistan

(although the isolation, containment, and reduction o enemy orces in the

Fallujah urban sae haven provide valuable lessons).

Whether in the horse-and-musket period or in the period o contempo-

rary irregular wars, hunter-killer operations are one o the options to present

the enemy a series o dilemmas during counterguerrilla operations. As is



50

JSOU Report 10-1

evident in the historical experiences, Americans have eectively employed

some orm o hunter-killer operations when aced with irregular warare

adversaries. From this body o knowledge we can derive uniying themesand principles or doctrinal adoption.



51


Principles of Hunter-Killer Team Employment5.during Counter Safe Haven OperationsWhenever you are ordered out to the enemy forts or frontiers for

discoveries, if your number be small, march in a single le, keep-

ing at such a distance from each other as to prevent one shot from

killing two men, sending one man or more forward and the like

on each side at the distance of 20 yards from the main body, if the

ground you march over will admit of it, to give the signal to the

ofcer of the approach of an enemy, and of their number....22

— Robert Rogers’ Rules or Plan of Discipline

In principle, hunter-killer operations aord sound tactics to create havoc

against irregular warare adversaries by operating in their space or

sabotaging and destroying their war-making assets and killing their

action arms—the guerrilla orces and auxiliary orces—in order to create

a loss o enemy combatants, lowering o morale, and sowing o dissensionand weariness. Counter sae haven hunter-killer operations are conducted

by small unit, specialized organizations who adopt the enemy’s style and

tactics in order to operate as eective counter-guerrillas. In that respect, U.S.

hunter-killer teams allow the COIN orces to deny the enemy the chance to

continue protracting the conict.

Hunter-killer operations are one o the active measures in COIN to attack

enemy organizations as part o the war o exhaustion and contribute to the

attrition o enemy combat power. A byproduct o hunter-killer operations isrst-hand inormation and intelligence-gathering capability while operating

in enemy territory.

Hunter-killer operations can vary in length, area o operations, and by

type unit conducting hunter-killer activities against irregulars, but its main

operating principle is its purpose and aim: attrition o the irregular warare

enemy. Tis requires a second operating principle to be considered or any

COIN-derived hunter-killer operation: they are conducted by penetrating

insurgent sae haven space, whether the space is denied or semipermissive

territory.

Hunter-killer operations have been conducted in combination with puni-

tive expeditions, but i employed in this manner, can quickly degrade into



52

JSOU Report 10-1

using the hunter-killer orce or security o anks or or the conduct o

reconnaissance missions or the larger conventional orce. General Persh-

ing’s expedition into Mexico against Pancho Villa’s irregulars illustratesthis approach.

Hunter-killer orces should never be ormed as a result o converting

conventional inantry orces, as the historical examples rom the Civil War

and the Vietnam War illustrated. Hunter-killer orces are not line inantry

nor shock or raiding inantry. Rather they are uniquely tailored special

inantry. Specialized inantry ormed as hunter-killer units generally cannot

achieve decisive blows, tactically or operationally, when employed or short

duration raiding purposes. Tey are also not pseudo-organizations, norcounterorganization units, although eects achieved in these two types o

operations can be a byproduct o hunter-killer employment. More impor-

tant, however, hunter-killer operations should contribute to the attainment

o strategic and operational objectives.

Additional principles o employment derived rom the historical analysis

o the use o hunter-killer operations by the American military are helpul

to review or ormulating doctrine and include:Environmenta. . Hunter-killer teams are best employed during irregular

warare environments where the adversary conronting the U.S. and

its allies consists o insurgent orces o sucient size to eld a guerrilla

action arm, a supporting auxiliary, and a perceived sae haven or sanc-

tuary believed to be ree o riendly orces. Te ground commander

has made the conscious decision to conduct territorial oense type

operations or achieving desired counter sae haven eects.Command and controlb. . Hunter-killer operations require independent

maneuver in enemy territory; measures to deconict ratricide issues

are paramount when they are ongoing riendly operations. Graphic

control measures, such as unconventional warare operational areas

(UWOAs), and Blue Force tracker technology will assist in limiting

ratricide. Consideration should be given to the creation o ree-re

zones or orbidden zones in order to increase the exibility o the

hunter-killer orce. Unique passage-o-lines techniques are requiredi the hunter-killer orce resembles enemy insurgents. ailored rules

o engagement should be considered to give the hunter-killer orce

the widest latitude to take on enemy orces. Command and control



53


is attened and decentralized to the commander o the hunter-killer

orce. As an operating concept, hunter-killer orces should be under

the operational control o a special operations headquarters reportingdirectly to the joint orce commander.

Composition of the hunter-killer forcec. . Hunter-killer orces should

not be ormed ad hoc; standing, specialized orces with the inherent

characteristics or conducting hunter-killer operations are requisite or

success in the irregular warare environment. Hunter-killer organiza-

tions will be one o nontraditional organization and task organized

based on the context o the insurgency and irregular warare environ-

ment. Care should be taken to ensure the higher command supportsand sponsors its nontraditional employment. Hunter-killer units

should not be organized as commando or raiding orces. In orming

hunter-killer units, a small ootprint is desired. Individuals chosen

to man hunter-killer units should be specially selected, sel-reliant,

and capable o adaptation to the environment and to the enemy’s

tactics and style. Tey must be independent in thinking, masters

o the ambush, and have a psychological make-up or operationsthat can be ruthless and lethal. Cultural and language skills or the

operational area are highly desired. Tey must have a natural ability

to work with indigenous orces as part o the organizational structure.

Hunter-killer organizations will be amoeba-like with sel-organizing

traits to maintain their adaptability. Due to the high endurance opera-

tions, the orce must be in superior physical shape and be skilled in

living o the land.

Irregulars and indigenous orcesd. . Hunter-killer operations canachieve increased perormance when they incorporate indigenous

orces into their organization (as in General Crook’s use o Indian

scouts during his southwestern U.S. campaign against hostile Indians).

Tis may be through the use o turned enemy combatants (ormer

adversaries who now work or riendly orces to nd insurgents),

inormants, local scouts, or larger auxiliary orces. O most utility

would be the training and equipping o oreign and indigenous hunter-

killer units to enhance partner capability; these orces could even be

employed as partner or proxy paramilitaries when U.S. involvement

is not desired or must be discrete (covert and clandestine).



54

JSOU Report 10-1

Leadershipe. . Leadership above the hunter-killer organization’s level

o command must be highly supportive to ensure the survivability

o an unorthodox and unconventional organization within the U.S. military structure. Specialized units enjoying a limited amount o

control, wide latitude or independent operations, and a high reedom

o maneuver very oen risk the ire o traditional, ormal militaries;

they are ofen perceived as outliers with lack o discipline. Within the

hunter-killer organization, the leadership must be chosen or their

vast knowledge o unconventional operations (understanding o the

employment o unorthodox operations), audacity, and the ability to

be independent and decisive. Leaders must be proven as capable o conducting innovative and nonconventional tactics. Successul lead-

ers o hunter-killer operations have tended to be highly charismatic

and aggressive.

Specialized training . . Hunter-killer units require specialized training

in enemy tactics and weaponry, long-range endurance operations,

inltration and exltration techniques, and combat techniques most

useul to the irregular warare ght. Advanced training in subversionand sabotage techniques, along with how to conduct psychological

action measures, will be required. Because hunter-killer operations

will be extended operations, sucient cross training o combat skills

is required in order to maximize the skill sets o each person, consid-

ering that personnel replacement opportunities may be limited. All

training should be done to the realistic conditions the hunter-killer

unit may expect to encounter.

Mobility g. . Te hunter-killer orce requires equal or superior maneu- verability and mobility to the enemy in order to succeed. Te orce

will require speed to outmaneuver the enemy in his territory and i

required, speed to escape any counter attempts to destroy the hunter-

killer orce. Te highly preerred method is to mount the orce in

all-terrain vehicles that allow or increased range, can carry sucient

supplies or long duration, and provide platorms or additional re-

power. Aviation mobility is a key hunter-killer enabler; consideration

should be given to a direct support relationship between aviation units

and the hunter-killer unit or matters such as transport, resupply,

medical evacuation, and liaison.



55


Firepowerh. . Along with organic repower, with necessary overmatch

to any known insurgent capability in order to achieve local superiority,

the hunter-killer unit will require the integration o reinorcing resi the eects o combat with the enemy begin to severely endanger or

attrit the hunter-killer orce. Long-range artillery (although this may

have some limitations at deeper ranges), CAS, or res rom persis-

tent, armed unmanned aerial vehicle/system (UAV/UAS) platorms

are programmed as part o the hunter-killer operation. Larger quick

reaction orces, notably with a raiding capability, orm part o the

backup or can reinorce escalation o orce as needed during planned

hunter-killer operations.Technology enablementi. . Hunter-killer units should be provided the

latest in technology to improve their combat perormance, endurance,

and orce protection. Hunter-killer doctrine or employment should

change as technology changes to maintain the ecacy o the nd-

x-destroy combat template. Tis will require an equipping process

to take advantage o rapidly emerging technologies. Additionally,

hunter-killer orces should be equipped with the latest sensor/coun-tersensor capability to expand their operational reach or to allow

them to conduct economy-o-orce operations.

Intelligence j. . Hunter-killer operations will require an unusually high

amount o intelligence on the enemy and the geography o the oper-

ating area. Dedicated platorms and intelligence support, combined

with the intelligence-gathering capacity o the hunter-killer opera-

tion, can help to achieve intelligence dominance within insurgent

sae havens.Sustainmentk. . Hunter-killer operations must be capable o tailored

long-range, long-duration missions, ofen outside the scope o riendly

lines o communication. Limitations on combat service support must

be actored into the planning. In earlier periods o irregular warare,

this involved knowledge o living o the land and having the ability

to be sel-sustaining (oraging or capturing enemy supplies). While

these eorts are still viable, technology-enabled hunter-killer teams

equipped with mobility platorms will require a logistics system to

support uniquely American gear i the orce is not totally equipped

to look like the enemy. Air support is the most important resupply

capability or hunter-killer operations, whether it comes rom manned



56

JSOU Report 10-1

or unmanned aerial resupply vehicles. Te hunter-killer organiza-

tion will also require innovative unding to conduct operations in

enemy territory (e.g., enemy script, gold, and barter materials) aswell as reliable unding mechanisms to support their organization.

A dedicated maintenance capability or the myriad o small arms,

vehicles, and radios can provide a reach-back capability once the unit

is employed. Te hunter-killer organization needs an organic rapid

equipping capability or o-the-shel items and procurement o the

latest logistics assets to enhance the ght.

Tese principles capture uniying concepts to provide a ramework orthe doctrinal employment o hunter-killer operations. As irregular warare

operations continue around the world, the experiences and growing knowl-

edge o hunter-killer activities will add to COIN and irregular warare litera-

ture. For instance, how do we conduct hunter-killer operations on a hybrid

war battleeld? How should we conduct hunter-killer operations in an urban

environment?

Te American way o war in irregular warare includes hunter-killer

operations to varying eect—they are the asymmetric version o searchand destroy behind enemy lines or in their sae havens. It should be a clear

concept embodied in U.S. COIN manuals. However, to date there is little

doctrinal capture o hunter-killer units in COIN doctrine and a correspond-

ing absence o guidelines on how to employ them.



57


Conclusion6.

But now the need for the other kind of right stuff—the hunter’seye and ear—was making itself indispensable…. This was a war

in which everyone realized that enemy headquarters might at any

moment be visited, and not by noisy frontal formations making

themselves heard 10 miles away but by silently delivered, soot-face

marauders or by hunter-killer teams ying out of the sun or step -

ping from suburban hedgerows. Just as the wholesale slaughter of

civilians reasserted itself in war, professional courtesy was breaking

down into a practice of targeting individuals—by ‘band of chosenand picked young men … sworn to stick together’—that might as

well have come out of Utopia, or at least the Dark Ages.23

— Derek Leebaert, To Dare and To Conquer

A

ll eective COIN and counterterrorism security operations are

an orchestration o oensive and deensive measures to thwartthe insurgent action arm’s or the terrorist organization’s ability to

choose the time and the place o violence against the state. Oensive actions

allow riendly orces to control the operations tempo o the ght, throwing

the insurgent orce o balance and preventing the protraction o the conict.

Oensive actions allow counterinsurgents and counterterrorists the ability

to get inside the enemy’s decision cycle. Oensive actions necessitate plans

that consider denying irregular warare adversaries their base areas, support

systems, and sae havens and erode or exhaust their will and manpower.Tese are enemy strengths, but they also have associated vulnerabilities.

While a variety o deensive counterguerrilla options aord COIN orces

time to neutralize, isolate, contain, or even manage areas ceded to the insur-

gents, the most eective measure is to take the oense to the enemy using

some application o the nd-x-destroy model. Hunter-killer operations are

oensive in nature and one o the means to nd, x, and destroy.

Hunter-killer operations, combined with other counter sae haven

measures, are the most eared by insurgents. Hunter-killer operations invade

insurgent space and destroy the myth o inaccessibility and security. Fight-

ing the enemy on his own tur disrupts his attempts to recover and ret, and

i handled eectively, can isolate supporting populations rom the irregular



58

JSOU Report 10-1

warare adversary. Conducting operations at a riendly time and place o

choosing creates a psychological eect o ear within the insurgents, who

never know i they are sae. Hunter-killer operations also erode and exhaustthe enemy through attrition, raising the contact rate between riendly orces

and the enemy.

Irregular warare history is consistently illustrative o the employment o

some type o hunter-killer unit to interdict, harass, and track down insur-

gents in their territory. Since the colonial militia era in America, hunter-

killer operations have been included in personal writings, recommended

rules or tactical operations, or in U.S. doctrine, although the exact term

escapes capture. Te early military legacy on this subject was ormed inthe ranging experiences o independent Ranger companies. Te small-wars

period introduced mobile columns, ying columns, punitive expeditionary

columns, and long-duration roving patrols. Aer World War II, as Ameri-

can experience in contemporary insurgency grew, these counterguerrilla

activities became raids, special operations, unconventional operations, and

interdiction tasks. Finally, in Operation Enduring Freedom, U.S. and coali-

tion SOF once again employed ormal hunter-killer operations to nd-x-destroy aliban insurgents. Tese operations were a morphing o ranging

and deep penetration raid techniques.

Employing hunter-killer operations is a doctrinally sound COIN tech-

nique proved by historical experience and also ound in some orm over the

years within our irregular warare doctrine, although not in any compre-

hensive manner. Te set o uniying principles or hunter-killer operations

derived in this paper may serve as a useul ramework to develop uture

doctrinal approaches on the employment o hunter-killer teams as a viablecounter sae haven measure.

In 2008 the Joint Chies o Sta sponsored a utures war game with a

hybrid war scenario pitting the U.S. and its allies against technologically

enhanced irregulars. One o the options the participants chose to disrupt

enemy space was a orm o U.S. hunter-killer teams. It is time to include the

employment o hunter-killer operations into American irregular warare

doctrine and clearly in the next revision o the COIN eld manual.

What would a hunter-killer unit look like? O course it must be designed

within the context and requirements o the irregular warare scenario, but

the Figure 6 organizational chart is proposed merely as a point o departure

or urther discussion and development, based on the past experiences o



59


U.S. hunter-killer operations. Inherent in this organization is the organic

mobility platorms o the strike teams to inltrate, operate or long duration,

and exltrate rom the operational area. Strike teams include a reconnais-sance and heavy weapons element. Indigenous orces are attached to the

strike teams to provide linguists, scouts, or ghters, based on the nature

o the hunter-killer operation. When required, conventional units can be

placed under the operational or tactical control o the hunter-killer unit

commander to acilitate task orce and joint operations.

Results o this study suggest that the SOF community should:

Continue to capture tactics, techniques, and procedures o ongoinga.

U.S. hunter-killer operations or updates to doctrine and continue

to expand our understanding o the eatures and attributes o sae

havens. We can broaden our knowledge on this subject through a

larger, comprehensive study o oreign hunter-killer practices in enemy sae havens to identiy best practices the U.S. military could put into

use. Te analysis derived rom these measures should orm the basis

Figure 6. Provisional Hunter-Killer Organization



60

JSOU Report 10-1

o additions to the next doctrinal revision o COIN and irregular

warare publications.

Explore the easibility or the establishment o ormal hunter-killerb.organizations within the U.S. military. Currently, the U.S. Special Forces

perorm this role as a result o specialized training and its organic

long-range mobility teams. Historically, eective hunter-killer units

ail when they are organized in an ad-hoc manner or task-organized

on the spot. Tey also are ineective when they are merely converted

conventional units. Hunter-killer units require specialized training,

equipment, autonomy, unconventional leadership, and reedom o

action supported by the senior maneuver commander. One measurecould be to enhance the ranging concept in our Ranger ormations;

another measure might include the development o hunter-killer

teams within the U.S. Marine Corps’ Special Operations Command

units. A third measure could include the designation o selected light

inantry units to perorm hunter-killer operations. Te success o

any o these additional measures relies on adherence to the derived

principles in the previous chapter.Ascertain the impact o new technology enablers in aviation andc.

unmanned aerial vehicle systems, remote logistics, repower, commu-

nications, and sensor and surveillance systems that would enhance

the capabilities o hunter-killer units and extend their endurance,

persistence, and presence.

As part o the shifing strategy to enable partners’ capability andd.

capacity, doctrine and procedures should be developed or provisions

in Security Force Assistance to create, build, equip, and employ oreignand indigenous hunter-killer units.

Explore the dynamics o employing hunter-killer operations in consorte.

with human inuence operations in order to implement psychological

action activities and to achieve desired behavioral eects on indig-

enous populations, enemy leadership, and external or tacit supporters

o any insurgency.

Hunter-killer operations are an oensive component o irregular warare.Employing hunter-killer units in a doctrinally sound manner, with adher-

ence to relevant operational principles, allows irregular warare orces

a means to strike the deep, strategic rear o insurgent bases. Hardcore



61


insurgents, ideologically driven, do not go away because they have been

separated rom the populace. Successul insurgent strategy allows or them

to revert to a reconsolidation phase in an area sae or their operation. COIN oensive orces—the hunter-killer teams—will still be needed to range deep

into the enemy’s domain to disrupt and destroy him.



63


Appendix. Recommended Readings

Alderman, Pat. Te Overmountain Men. Johnson City, N: Te Overmountain Press,.

Birtle, Andrew J. U.S. Army Counterinsurgency and Contingency Operations Doctrine860–4. Washington, D.C.: Center o Military History, U.S. Army, .

Brumwell, Stephen. White Devil: A rue Story o War, Savagery, and Vengeance in Colo-nial America. Cambridge, MA: DeCapo Press, .

Cassidy, Robert M. Counterinsurgency and the Global War on error: Military Cultureand Irregular Warare. Westport, C: Praeger Security International, .

Cline, Lawrence E. “Pseudo Operations and Counterinsurgency: Lessons rom OtherCountries.” Strategic Studies Institute Monograph. Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army WarCollege, June .

Cuneo, John R. Robert Rogers o the Rangers. New York: Oxord University Press, .

Downey, Fairax. Indian Wars o the U.S. Army 776–65. Garden City, NY: Doubleday & Co., Inc., .

Drake, James D. King Philip’s War: Civil War in New England 675–676 . Amherst, MA:Te University o Massachusetts Press, .

Dunkerly, Robert M. Kings Mountain Walking our Guide. Pittsburgh, PA: DorrancePublishing Co., Inc., .

Dunkerly, Robert M. Te Battle o Kings Mountain: Eyewitness Accounts. Charleston, SC:Charleston History Press, .

Dykeman, Wilma. With Fire and Sword: Te Battle o Kings Mountain 780. Wash-ington, D.C.: National Park Service, U.S. Department o the Interior, undatedpamphlet.

Eckert, Allan W. Tat Dark and Bloody River . New York: Bantam Books, .

Erickson, Don and John L. Rotundo. Charlie Rangers. New York: Ballantine Books,

.

Grenier, John. Te First Way o War: American War Making on the Frontier, 607-84 New York: Cambridge University Press, .

Hackworth, David H. (COL, U.S. Army, Ret.). About Face: Te Odyssey o an AmericanWarrior . New York: Simon and Schuster, .

Hatley, Allen G. Early exas Indian Wars 822–835. Honolulu, HI: alei Publisher’s,Inc., .

Hewitt, Peter. Kenya Cowboy: A Police Ofcer’s Account o the Mau Mau Emergency.

London: Avon Books, .Innes, Michael A. (ed.). Denial o Sanctuary: Understanding errorist Sae Havens. West-

port, C: Praeger Security International, .

Joes, Anthony James. Urban Guerrilla Warare. Lexington, KY: Te University Press o Kentucky, .



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Knowles, Tomas W. Tey Rode or the Lone Star: Te Saga o the exas Rangers. Dallas,X: aylor Publishing Co., .

Leach, Douglas E. Flintlock and omahawk: New England in King Philip’s War . New York:W. W. Norton & Company, .

Leebaert, Derek. o Dare & o Conquer: Special Operations and the Destiny o Nations, rom Achilles to Al Qaeda . New York: Little, Brown and Company, .

Linn, Brian McAllister. Te Philippine War 8–02. Lawrence, KS: University Presso Kansas, .

Linn, Brian McAllister. Te U.S. Army and Counterinsurgency in the Philippine War 8–02. Chapel Hill, NC: University o North Carolina Press, .

Marston, Daniel. Te French-Indian War 754-760. Oxord, England: Osprey Publish-

ing Ltd, .

Moyar, Mark. Phoenix and the Birds o Prey: Te CIA’s Secret Campaign to Destroy theViet Cong . Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, .

O’Neill, Bard. Insurgency & errorism: Inside Modern Revolutionary Warare. Washing-ton D.C.: Brassey’s, Inc., .

Plaster, John L. SOG: A Photo History o the Secret Wars. Boulder, CO: Paladin Press,

.

Plaster, John L. SOG: Te Secret Wars o America’s Commandos in Vietnam . New York:

Simon & Schuster, .Robinson III, Charles M. Te Men Who Wear the Star: Te Story o the exas Rangers .

New York: Random House, .

Ross, John F. War on the Run: Te Epic Story o Robert Rogers and the Conquest o America’s First Frontier . New York: Bantam Books, .

Sallah, Michael and Mitch Weiss. iger Force. New York: Little, Brown and Company,.

Scoggins, Michael C. Te Day It Rained Militia. Charleston, SC: Te History Press,.

Silby, David J. A War o Frontier and Empire: the Philippine-American War, 8-02 ,New York: Hill and Wang, .

Stanton, Shelby L. Rangers at War: Combat Recon in Vietnam. New York: Orion Books,.

abor, Robert. War o the Flea: Te Classic Study o Guerrilla Warare. Washington D.C.:Brassey’s, Inc., .

Tompson, Leroy. Ragged War: Te Story o Unconventional and Counter-RevolutionaryWarare. London: Arms and Armour Press, .

Tompson, Robert. Deeating Communist Insurgency. St. Petersburg, FL: Hailer Publish-ing, .

Valeriano, Napoleon D. and Charles . R. Bohannan. Counter-Guerrilla Operations: TePhilippine Experience. Westport, C: Praeger Security International, .



65


Webb, Walter Prescott. Te Story o the exas Rangers. New York: Grosset & DunlapPublishers, .

Webb, Walter Prescott. Te exas Rangers: A Century o Frontier Deense. HoughtonMifin Co., Cambridge, MA: Te Riverside Press, .

Wilson, David K. Te Southern Strategy: Britain’s Conquest o South Carolina and Geor- gia, 775-780. Columbia, SC: University o South Carolina Press, .



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Endnotes

. Eric . Olson, Admiral, U.S. Navy. U.S. Special Operations Command Strategy200 (ampa: U.S. Special Operations Command, November ), p. .

. Ibid., p. .

. Colin S. Gray, Another Bloody Century: Future Warare (London, U.K.: PhoenixPress, ), p. .

. John J. McCuen, Te Art o Counter-Revolutionary War (St. Petersburg, FL: HailerPublishing, ), p. .

. C. E. Calwell (Colonel), Small Wars: Teir Principle & Practice, Bison Books

Edition (Lincoln, NE: University o Nebraska Press, ), p. .. A copy o Lt Col Landsdale’s paper can be ound in the Research Library at the

Air University, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama.

. FM -, Counterinsurgency Field Manual , Department o the Army and MarineCorps Headquarters, Washington, D.C., December , section I-.

. Te 9/ Commission Report: Final Report o the National Commission on errorist Attacks upon the United States , section . (New York: W.W. Norton & Company,), pp. -.

. Tis denition was orwarded during an irregular warare challenges sympo-sium held in the Washington D.C. area during the spring o to members

o a working group and constitutes a consensus on the characteristics o a saehaven. Original slide handout is in author’s Counter Sae Haven and Hunter-Killer Operations research les.

. For another approach to analyzing sae havens, reer to “Ungoverned Areasand Treats rom Sae Havens , Final Report o the Ungoverned Areas Project,”prepared or the Oce o the Under Secretary o Deense or Policy by Robert D.Lamb, Oce o the Deputy Assistant Secretary o Deense or Policy Planning,available rom www.cissm.umd.edu/papers/les/ugash_report_nal; accessed November .

. Fairax Downey, Indian Wars o the U.S. Army 776-865 (Garden City, NY:Doubleday & Co., Inc., ), p. .

. John Grenier, Te First Way o War: American War Making on the Frontier (NewYork: Cambridge University Press, ), p. .

. Eric B. Schultz and Michael J. ougias, King Philip’s War: Te History and Legacyo America’s Forgotten Confict (Woodstock, V: Te Countrymen Press, ),pp. -.

. Douglas Edward Leach, Flintlock and omahawk: New England in King Philip’sWar (New York: Te Norton Library, W. W. Norton & Company, ), p. .

. John Grenier, Te First Way o War: American War Making on the Frontier (NewYork: Cambridge University Press, ), pp. -.



JSOU Report 10-1

. Major Ferguson’s brevet rank o lieutenant colonel was en route rom Englandwhen he died; thereore, he is ofen cited by historians and on some history markers with his title as Colonel Ferguson.

. Pat Alderman, Te Overmountain Men (Johnson City, N: Te Overmountain

Press, ), pp. -.

. Robert M. Cassidy (LC, U.S. Army), “Indigenous Forces and Sanctuary Denial:Enduring Counterinsurgency Imperatives,” Small Wars Journal , p. , available

at http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog///indigenous-orces-and-sanctuar/;accessed October .

. Robert M. Kennedy, Hold the Balkans! German Antiguerrilla Operations in theBalkans, 4-44 (Shippensburg, PA: White Main Books, ), p. .

. Gordon L. Rottman, Mobile Strike Forces in Vietnam 66-70 (Oxord, U.K.:Osprey Publishing [Battle Orders ], ). p. .

. James C. Donahue, Blackjack 33: With Special Forces in the Viet Cong ForbiddenZone (New York: Ballantine Books, ), p. xiii.

. Henry Bouquet (Esq.), Warare on the Colonial Frontier: Te Journals o Major Robert Rogers (Bargersville, IN: Dresslar Publishing, ), p. . Reprinted roman original edition.

. Derek Leebaert, o Dare & o Conquer: Special Operations and the Destiny o Nations, rom Achilles to Al Qaeda (New York: Little, Brown and Company, ),

pp. -.

Documents

Hunter-Killer Teams- Attacking Enemy Safe Havens