Hurricane Katrina Paper

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Name

Professor Name

Course Name

29 April 2011

Title


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In 1651, Thomas Hobbes proposed in Leviathan that people may relinquish their

individual power to a state or governing entity in exchange for protection and rule of law.

This theory, termed the social contract, has also evolved to include the notion of

popular sovereignty, the idea that states exist to serve the will of the people. This theory

has in turn shaped the political birth of the United States government and continues to

influencepeoples perception about the roles and responsibilities ofthe government.

Upon reviewing the major events in modern American history, I believe that the

Hurricane Katrina disaster of 2005, as it affected New Orleans, represents a good

example of how the ideas of the social contract are still perpetuated by the peoples

expectations that the government should protect the welfare of its citizens. My goal in

this paper is to support the idea that people expect the government to have a pre-emptive

and active role in protecting its citizens welfare by analyzing the discrepancy between

government response at the federal, state, and local levels in response to Hurricane

Katrina with public expectations, as indicated by the media.

Hurricane Katrina and the subsequent flooding it caused devastated the city of

New Orleans. In its aftermath, more than 1300 lives were lost while thousands of others

were forced to seek refuge in public housing or neighboring states, often with minimal

means (Louisiana 1). Though Hurricane Katrina made landfall on the Louisiana coastline

on Monday, August 29th, government officials were given warnings as early as Thursday,

August 25th

by the National Hurricane Center (DeLoizer 1). The local, state, and federal

responses before, during, and after this period, along with their implications will be

discussed.

Locally, the city of New Orleans was under the stewardship of Mayor Ray Nagin


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during the time Hurricane Katrina struck. The media has criticized him for his seemingly

delayed and insufficient response to Katrina. For example, Mayor Nagin only issued a

voluntary evacuation announcement in the days preceding the storm even though the

director of the National Hurricane Center, Max Mayfield personally called and advised a

mandatory evacuation on the 27th

(DeLoizer 1). In addition, he was criticized for not

properly implementing The New Orleans Comprehensive Emergency Management Plan,

which was under his responsibility to be carried out (McCulley 34). The Plan, for

example, called for transportation to evacuate citizens out of the city and as NBCs Tim

Russert noted, hundreds of buses in New Orleans were left unutilized days before the

storm (McCulley 34). On the other hand Mayor Nagin did setup the Superdome and

other public facilities as shelters and last resort refuges, thus somewhat anticipating the

needs and welfare of his citizens (DeLoizer 1). These media accounts highlight two

publically perceived problems ofMayor Nagins response: inappropriate judgment of the

situation and insufficiency at utilizing resources.

Statewide, Louisiana Governor Kathleen Blanco and other official leaders have

been similarly criticized. Though the Governor did declare a State of Emergency for

Louisiana on the 27th

and was able to nominally contact President Bush, the Department

of Homeland Security, and the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) to

assist Louisiana, substantial aid, relief supplies, and troops did not reach or were not

stationed in New Orleans until September 2nd

(Warrick 3). For example, on August 29th

,

the day Katrina made landfall, only 150 National Guardsmen were stationed outside the

Superdome, which housed 25,000 refugees and an adequate numberdid not arrive until

September the 2nd (Warrick 3). National Public Radios Pam Fessleralso reported on this


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incident and raised the question of Governor Blancos responsibility in the matter by

recounting how the Governor refused White House offers to take over National Guard

operations in the state during the crises (Fessler 1). In sum, whether or not Governor

Blancos administrations inability to deliver timely assistance was due lack of

persistence or inadequate response is still a question of contention. Regardless, the

government at the state level in the end did not provide the level of aid and support

expected by many of the public.

On the federal level, the Army Corp of Engineers, FEMA, and President Bushs

administration have bared a large portion of fault for not preemptively preparing and not

adequately responding to a category 3 hurricane that Katrina was. Since the incident, The

Army Corp of Engineers, for instance, has been fined for gross negligence for

inadequately maintaining the Mississippi River-Gulf Outlet, a navigation channel that

resulted in levee breaches (Makosky 1). State and local officials have criticized FEMA

for its slow response for calls of help due to bureaucratic red tape and obstructive

interference in letting other sources assist in providing aid (Shane 5). News organizations

have documented numerous instances whereby FEMA officials turned down supplies

meant for New Orleans, such as trailers of water donated by Wal-mart, due to protocol

(Shane 5).

The responses of the local, state, and federal government to the crisis that

Hurricane Katrina caused showed that providing mere aid and assistance in the end was

not enough. The public, as indicated by numerous media accounts expected a pre-emptive

and active role by the government in protecting its citizens welfare. Thus, I believe that


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Katrina can be served as a reminder that our federal government exists to serve the

American people.


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Works Cited

DeLoizer, Elana. "Hurricane Katrina Timeline." The Brookings Institute, n.d. Web. 30

Apr 2011. .

Fessler, Pam. National Public Radio. Lawmakers Avoid Separation of FEMA, Homeland

Security. , 2005. Web. 30 Apr 2011.

Louisiana. Reports of Missing and Deceased. , 2006. Web. 30 Apr 2011.

.

Makosky, D. "Federal judge finds Army Corps of Engineers liable for Katrina damage."

University of Pittsburgh School of Law, 19 November 2009. Web. 30 Apr 2011.

.

McCulley, Russell. "New Orleans' Plan for the Next Hurricane: Leave." Time 2 May

2006: 34-36. Web. 30 Apr 2011.

.

.

Shane, Scott. "After Failures, Government Officials Play Blame Game." New York

Times 5 September 2005: N5. Print.

Warrick, J. "lanco Releases Katrina Records."Washington Post 4 December 2005: N3.

Print.

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Hurricane Katrina Paper