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John Brough's reflection on Husserl's definition for memory.
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HUSSERL ON MEMORY
Author(s): John B. BroughSource: The Monist, Vol. 59, No. 1, The Philosophy of Husserl (JANUARY, 1975), pp. 40-62Published by: Oxford University PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/27902403Accessed: 26-06-2015 08:40 UTC
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HUSSERL ON
MEMORY
"Time
is,
time
was,
time
is
past."
Memory
recaptures
time
past.
Edmund
Husserl devoted
some
of
his
most
interesting
and
challenging,
as
well
as
neglected, analyses to the
phenomenon
of memory. Husserl argued that
every
act
of
consciousness is
intentional,
that
is,
directed towards
an
object,
and
memory?the
consciousness of what is
past?is
no
exception
to
this
rule.
Our
main
concern
in
this
essay
will
be
with
Husserl's
understanding
of
memory's
"constitution":
specifically,
with
the
way
in which
memory
intends
its
object
and
with
the
manner
in which
its
object appears.
Husserl
devoted
no
single
work
to
memory.
The
fundamental elements
of
his
theory
are
found
scattered
throughout
Volume
X
in
the Husserliana
series
1
and
to
a
lesser
extent
in
Volume
XI,2
although
brief
references
to
memory
occur
in
most
of
his
writings.
Our
study
will
be
based
mainly
on
the
two
mentioned
texts,
especially
on
Volume
X.3
I.
Memory
and
Its
Object:
Preliminary
Considerations
Although
the
heart
of
Husserl's
theory
of
memory
is
his account of
the
constitution
or
structure
of
memory's
intentionality,
the
understanding
of
that
account
presupposes
some
appreciation
of
the
way
in
which
memory
and
its
object
are
situated with
respect
to
time.
We
therefore
briefly
trace
in
this
section, first,
the
main
outlines
of
Husserl's
description
of
the
temporal
determinations
of
memory
and
memory's
object
and
second,
memory's status as present experienced act.
A.
Memory,
Its
Object,
and
Temporal
Determinations
The
obvious feature
of
the
temporality
of
memory
and
its
object
is
a
difference
in
time-determination.
The
memory
I
am
now
living
through
is
present;
its
object
is
past.
".
.
.
In
memory
we
stand
in
the
Now,
in
the
object
of
memory
we
stand in
the
past
Now.
.
."
4
(202).
The
memory
I
now
have of
an
express
train
thundering
into the
station is
actually
present,
as
much
so
as
the
perception
I
now
enjoy
of
the
paper
in
front
of
me.
But the
train
thundering up
is
not
yet
another
inhabitant of
that
present.It
stands
forth
as
past.
Here
memory
and
perception
differ
fundamentally.
Perception
too
is
a
present
act,
but
its
object
is
present,
not
past:
"Percep
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HUSSERL ON MEMORY 41
t?on
gives
the
Now,
memory
the
past.
.
."
(185).
In terms
of
simultaneity,
perception
and
its
object
are
simultaneous while
"memory
and what
is
remembered
appear
as
not
simultaneous.
.
."
(288).
Even in those
passages
in
which
Husserl
may
speak
of
a
"Now"
or
"present"
given
in
memory,
this
present,
as
we
shall
see,
is
an
earlier
Now,
not
an
actual
Now
as
the
present
of
perception
is.
Memory,
then,
is
a
present
act
whose
object appears
as
past.
But
what
according
to
Husserl is
the
sense
of
this
"past"?
Its
most
elementary
in
gredient
is a certain conflictwith theNow. "A is
past
means
evidently,
it
is
not
now,
it
is
not
present"
(403).
Yet
while
present
and
past evidently
exclude
one
another,
they
just
as
clearly
are
bound
together
tightly
in
a
relationship
possessed
of
two
interconnected
aspects.
To
begin
with,
the
object
of
memory
appears
not
simply
as
past
but
as
having
been
present
(59).
Although
what
I
remember?the
past?is
not
an
actual
Now,
it
"was
a
Now"
(367).
Something
cannot
be
past
which
has
not
been
present.
What is
past,
therefore,
carries the
sense
of
what
is "no
longer
present"
(408),
the
sense
of
being
represented
"in
an
earlier Now"
(182).
But
in
relation
to
what is
this remembered Now
an
earlier one? With this
question
we
meet
the
second
aspect
of
the
relativity
of
past
and
present.
The
point
of
reference
is
the
actual
present
and what
is
remembered
appears
as
earlier
or as
shoved
back
in
relation
to
it
(180).
In
my
memory
the
blast
of
the
train's
horn,
once
perceptually
present,
is
given
a
more or
less
definite
position
"with
respect
to
the
actual
Now
and
the
sphere
of the
original
temporal
field,
to
which the
recollection
itself
belongs"
(51).
Another
dimension
of
the
sense
of
the
remembered
past,
then,
is
its
being
situated
or
sunk
back
in
relation
to
the
actual
present.
Husserl observes that the reference of
what
is
remembered
to
the
actual
Now has its analogue in the reference of what is perceived to an actual
here
(105). Just
as
the
external
object
is
always
perceived
from
the
"zero"
point
of
some
"here"
or
another,
so
the
remembered
object
is
viewed
from
the
perspective
of
my
actual
present.
While
Husserl
himself
does
not
ex
plicitly
make the
point,
it would
seem
that
memory
and
perception
as
oriented
forms of
consciousness
differ
in
that
memory's
point
of
orientation
ceaselessly
changes
while
perception's
may
or
may
not
vary.
The
reason
is
that the
actually
present
time "is
continually
in
flux"
and
thus
is
"always
oriented
from
a new
Now"
(108).
What is
Now
becomes
past
in the
next
moment,
and
what is
already past
becomes further
past.
The
re
membered
past,
which
necessarily appears
as
something
sunk
back
in rela
tion
to
the
Now,
also
reveals itself
as
something
which
"
'sinks further
and
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42 JOHN . BROUGH
further
into
the
past'
"
(313)
relative
to
the
always
new
Now.
The modes
of
the
past
in
which
the
remembered
object
appears
will therefore
change
continuously,
although
the
object
itself,
apart
from
the
changing
mode of
temporal
orientation,
will remain the
same
(25).
I
may
enjoy
many
memories
at
many
different times
of
the
conductor,
watch
in
hand,
shouting
"All
aboard ,"
and
in
each
of those
memories
the
same
object
will be
given
in
a
different
mode of
the
past
relative
to
the
protean
Now.5
That
past
and
present,
the remembered
object
and the actual
Now,
are related in the
ways
described accounts for one of the
presuppositions
of
memory,
which
may
be
summarized under
the
term
"distance."
The
elapsed
present
which
appears
in
memory,
Husserl
writes,
"has
a
distance
from the
present
of the actual Now"
(58).
If that distance
were
absent,
what
is
remembered
would be
given
as
Now,
and
memory
would
cease
to
be
itself
and
collapse
into
perception
(316).
Put
another
way,
if
relation
between
past
and
present
vanished
for
my
remembering
consciousness,
if
I
gave
myself
to
the
past
with
such abandon
that
I
forgot
the
present
entirely,
then,
Husserl
argues,
"this
would
no
longer
be
memory,
rather
an
(hallucinatory) perception
of what
is
past,
but
not
as
past " (182).
The
past
would
relinquish
its
sense,
and
memory
would become
impossible,
if
the tension between
past
and
present
were
relaxed
or
if their
relational
bonds
were
snapped.
We have discussed
Husserl's
contentions
that
memory
is
present
and
its
object
past,
that
the
object
appears
in
memory
as
having
been
present,
and
that
it is
past
in
relation
to
the
actual Now. None
of these claims
would
make
sense
if
memory
and
its
object
did
not
belong
to
the
same
unity
of time. To
take
one
case,
how
could
what
is
remembered
appear
as
set
in
relation
to
the
actual Now
if
the
two
were
not
equally
citizens of
a
common temporal world? And if Husserl claims thatNow and past ex
clude
one
another,
the
exclusiveness
would
imply
a
single
temporal
frame
work
in
which the
two
could
not
occupy
the
same
position
and still
be
themselves.
Accordingly,
Husserl
writes,
"there
is
no
reproduced
Now
that
could
be
posited
and would
not
have
actuality
in
the
unity
of
time
to
which
theactual
Now
belongs"
(302).
With
the theme
of the
reproduced
and
actual
Nows'
occupation
of
the
same
unity
of
time,
we uncover
still
another
condition of
memory's
possibility.
What is
remembered
was
once
present
in
the
same
unity
of
time
in
which the
memory
is
now
actual.6 To cast
the
matter
in
egological
form,
what is
remembered is
an
elapsed position
of
my
own
life,
recaptured
through
its
actually present
portion.
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HUSSERL ON MEMORY 43
Much remains
to
be said about
the
way
in
which
memory's
object
appears,
and
how
its
mode
of
givenness
differs
from
that of the
perceived
object.
The
express
train,
after
all,
is
not
given
to
me
in the
same
way
in
memory
and in
perception.
But the further discussion
of
these
matters
is better
postponed
until
more
has
been
said
about
memory's
intentionality
in
later
sections.
B.
Memoras
Status
as
Present
Experienced
Act
Through
memory,
a
present
act,
we are
conscious
of
something
as
past.
But
through
what
are we
conscious
of
the
memory
as
actually
present?
Surely
not
through
another
memory
or
through
external
perception.
The
answer
rests
in
Husserl's contention
that
memory
is
an
immanent
temporal
object,
a
unity
constituted
in immanent
time
through
what he
calls
"the
absolute
time-constituting
flow
of consciousness"
(73).
We will
examine
that
contention
briefly
in
this section.
Every
experience
{Erlebnis)
or
act
of
consciousness,
Husserl
insists,
is
consciousness
of
something,
"but
every
experience
is
itself
experienced
(erlebt), and thus also 'known' (betvusst)" (291). Husserl's point is that
consciousness
is
always
implicitly
self-consciousness:
while
perceiving
an
event
we
are aware
of
our
perceiving
it,
and
while
remembering
we
are
conscious
that
we
are
remembering.
To
be
sure,
in
ordinary
non-reflective
experience,
we
are
not
conscious
of
the act
and of its
object
in
the
same
way.
The
object,
e.g.,
the remembered
dining
car
on
the
train,
is
intended
in
the
"pregnant"
sense
of
the
term
(289),
that
is,
"posited" (gesetzt)
(126),
intended
thematically.
By
comparison,
the
awareness we
enjoy
of
the
act
is
implicit
and
marginal,
but
nonetheless
there.
The
acts
which
we
experience,
including
memory,
are
obviously
not
empirical
objects
inhabiting
the world of
dining
cars and
express
trains.
They
are
rather
immanent
to
consciousness
and
accordingly
Husserl calls
them "immanent"
objects (96)
or
"unities
of
inner
consciousness"
(51)
or
"'immanent'
temporal
unities"
(292).
They
are
legitimately
termed
"temporal"
because
they
possess
the
appropriate
characteristics:
they
have
a
duration
and
position
in
time,
and
run
off
in
a
succession
of
phases.
"Every
experience,"
Husserl
writes,
"is
given
as
something
enduring,
flowing,
changing
in
various
ways"
(127).
Time,
then,
is
the
"irreducible
form" of
both
immanent
and transcendent
realities
(274),
but
the
time in
which the
act
of
memory
is
experienced
as
present
is
inner
or
"immanent
time"
(292),
not
the
time of
transcendant
objects.
While the train
rushing
into the
station
was an
event
in
the
world's
objective
time,
the
memory
of
it is
a
unity
in
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44
JOHN
.
BROUGH
the immanent
time
of
consciousness. The
two
times and
their
objects
are
intentionally
related,
however.
Events
in
the
world's
time
are
brought
to
presence
through
the
intentional
experiences
which unfold in
inner time.7
To
complete
the
account
of
memory's
status
as
present
experienced
act
we
must
inquire
into the
consciousness?the
experiencing?through
which
memory
as
immanent
unity
is
constituted. Insofar
as
memory
makes
us
aware
of
the
past,
it
may
be
called
a
time-constituting
consciousness
(51).
But
insofar
as
memory
itself
is
experienced
as
present
in inner
time,
it
toowill be the correlate of a time-constituting consciousness. This conscious
ness?immanent
even
with
respect
to
the
immanent time and
objects
it
constitutes8?is
the
"absolute
time-constituting
flow
of
consciousness"
(73).
Without
exception,
Husserl
writes,
the
events
of conscious
life?sensations,
wishes,
perceptions,
memories,
and
so
on?belong
to
"the
layer
of
imma
nent
'contents',
whose constitution
is
the achievement of the
absolute
flow
of
consciousness"
(83).9
That the
act
of
memory
is
experienced
as
present
we
owe
to
this ultimate
stratum
of
time-consciousness.
Although
a
thorough
discussion
of
the
way
in
which the
absolute
con
sciousness
constitutes immanent unities
cannot
be
undertaken
here,
certain
important
features will be
mentioned,
especially
those which will
be
in
volved
in
the
later
discussion of
memory's
intentionality.
The ultimate
time-constituting
consciousness
may
be
viewed
as
a
flowing
succession
of
interrelated
phases
or
segments,
one
of which
will
be
actual
while others
will
have
elapsed
or
not
yet
arrived. Each
momentary
phase
will
have
a
threefold intentional
structure
through
which
an
extended
por
tion
of the
immanent
object,
in
our
case,
of
the
memory,
will
be
experienced
or
constituted.
The
way
in
which
this
constitution is
accomplished
may
be
illustrated
as
follows.
Assume
an
act
of
memory
has
begun
to
run
off
for
inner consciousness and has already partially elapsed. The memory will be
presented
to
consciousness
in
a
continuum
of
phases
with
the
"fundamental
temporal
distinctions:
Now,
past
(future)"
(211).
Specifically,
one
phase
of
the
memory
will
be
experienced
as
actually
Now,10
others
as
just
past,
still others
as
future
or
as
yet
to
come.
Correlated
with
the
phase
of the
memory
experienced
as
actually
Now
will
be
an
actual
phase
of the
absolute
consciousness.
That
phase
will
possess
an
intentional
moment
ordinarily
termed
by
Husserl
"primal
impression"
or
"primal
sensation,"
through
which
the
actual
Now
of the
memory
is
constituted.
The
same
phase
will
possess
a
second intentional
moment,
"primary
memory"
or
"retention,"
through
which
elapsed
phases
of the act are held in
grasp
and
experienced
as
just
past
with
respect
to
the actual Now.
Finally,
the
actual
phase
of the
ultimate
flow
will
possess
the
moment
of
"protention"
which
is
conscious
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HUSSERL ON MEMORY 45
in
an
open
way
of future
phases
of
the act. "In
each
primal
phase,
which
originally
constitutes
the
immanent
content,
we
have
retentions
of
preceding
and
protentions
of
coming
phases
of
precisely
this
content
. .
(84).
Finally,
since
memory
runs
of
in immanent
time,
in the
next
moment
the
whole
process
will
repeat
itself
:
through
a
new
actual
phase
of
the
absolute
flow
a new
phase
of
the
memory
will
be
experienced
as
Now
while
the
prior
phase
will
be
experienced
as
just
past,
and
so
on.
The
act
of
memory,
then,
is
a
unity
constituted
in
inner
time
through
the phases of the absolute time-constituting flow with their impressionai,
retentional,
and
protentional
moments.
1.
Retention
and
Secondary
Memory
This
essay
is
focused
on
what Husserl calls
"secondary
memory"
(sekun
d?re
Erinnerung)
or
more
frequently
simply
"memory" (Erinnerung).
In
the
last
section,
however,
we
met
"primary
memory"
(prim?re
Erinnerung)
or
"retention"
(Retention).
According
to
Husserl,
secondary
memory
and
retention
are
absolutely
distinct
modes of
consciousness
(35),
though
also
inseparable.
On
some
occasions,
Husserl
refers
to
secondary
memory
as
"memory
in
the
usual sense"
and
implies
that
it
intends
"something
further
past"
(179)
while
retention
is
conscious
of the
immediate
past,
usually
of
the
just
elapsed
phases
of
an
act
presently
running
off for
consciousness.
Although
this difference
ordinarily
holds,
Husserl
frequently speaks
of
the
possibility
of
actualizing
a
memory
of
what
is still retained
(367),
in which
case
what
is
retained and
what
is
remembered
would coincide
and
enjoy
the
same
distance from
the actual
Now.
Difference
in
temporal
position,
then,
would
not
by
itself
define
the
distinction
between
memory
and
retention.
Instead, the two are essentially distinct because they belong to different
dimensions
of
consciousness.
Retention
is
a
moment
of
the
absolute
time
constituting
flow
of
consciousness,
while
secondary
memory
is
a
unity
constituted
by
the
absolute
flow.
Retention differs
from
memory
as
what
is
constituting
differs
from
what
is constituted.
Furthermore,
memory
is
an
enduring
act in
immanent
time
and
can
therefore
stand
forth
as a
relatively
independent
unit.
Retention,
on
the other
hand,
far
from
having
the
status
of
an
independent
act,
is
not
even
equivalent
to
an
individual
phase
of
the
ultimate
flow,
since
the
latter
also has
impressionai
and
protentional
moments.
Memory
and retention also
give
their
objects
in
fundamentally
different
ways.
Retention
is
"originary
(origin?r)
consciousness
of the
past"
(417),
in
the
sense
that
"only
in
primary
memory
do
we see
what is
past,
only
in
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46
JOHN
.
BROUGH
it
does
the
past
constitute
itself,
namely
not
representatively
but
presenta
tively
(pr?sentativ)" (41).
Of
course,
what
has
elapsed
is
no
longer
pre
sented
as
Now
in
retention,
but
it is
"still
present
as
just
past"
(212):
"its
being
past
is
a
Now,
is
something
present
itself
. .
."
(213).
But
memory,
as
we
shall
see
later,
precisely
does
not
present
the
past
but
only
represents
it.
Furthermore,
retention,
as
presentation
of the
past,
is conscious
of
a
past
phase
in
one
way
only:
as
just
past,
as
elapsing.
Memory,
on
the
other
hand,
as
a
form
of
^-presentation,
intends the
whole
elapsed
object
as if itwere running off once again for consciousness, and so represents a
past
phase
as
"Now"
(62),
and then
as
just
past.
What retention
can
only
intend
as
just
past,
memory
can
represent
as
Now
and let
run
off
again
in
the
mode
of
representation.11
Although
the
discussion
to
this
point
has stressed the
differences
between
memory
and
retention,
it
is
obvious
from what
has
been
said
that
retention
is
a
necessary
condition
of
memory
in
several
respects.
To
begin
with,
in
the
absence
of
retention
there would
be
nothing
to
remember
because
nothing
would be
originally
constituted.
In
addition,
without retention
the
act
of
memory
itself
could
not
be
experienced.
Retention is
an
intentional
moment of the absolute flow
through
which all immanent
objects,
including
memory,
are
constituted.
Bluntly
put,
memory
would
not
exist
without
retention,
for "to
be
and
to
be
consciously
constituted coincide
in
the
case
of
immanent
objects."
12
Finally,
retention constitutes
our
original
sense
of
the
past:
"Retention
and
protention
are
the
primitive,
the
first
forms
of the
establishment
of
past
and
future"
(326).
Following
Husserl,
we
must
now
examine
how
secondary
memory
assumes
and
elaborates
the
sense
of
the
past
it
inherits from
retention.
II.
Memory's
Constitution
Memory
shares with
all
other
intentional
experiences
the condition of
being
constituted
in inner
time-consciousness.
There
is
nothing
unique
about
memory
in this
respect.
Turning
from
this
common
ground,
however,
we
quickly
see
that
"memory
as
such
has
its
own
intentionality,
namely
that of
representation"
(96).
The
distinctive
character of
memory's
inten
tionality
is that it
represents
the
past.
If
we
ask
about
the
manner
in
which
the
representation
is
accomplished,
we
raise
the
issue of
memory's
constitu
tion,
which
we
will
explore
in
the
remainder
of
the
essay.
A. Memory as Direct Consciousness ofWhat Is Past
Interpretations
of
memory
in the
philosophical
tradition
have
frequently
represented
some
variation
of
what
might
be called the
"image
theory".
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HUSSERL
ON
MEMORY
47
According
to
this
point
of
view,
what is
immediately
and
directly
experienced
in
memory
is
a
present
image
or
replica
of
what
is
past,
not
what
is
past
itself. The
theory
rests
on
the
assumption
that
the
object
of
memory,
pre
cisely
because
it
is
past,
is
not
available
for
direct
apprehension.
Access
to
it
would
have
to
be
indirect?through
an
intermediary
which,
in
and
present
to
consciousness,
could
function
as an
image
of the
past.
Accordingly,
what
is
directly
known
in
memory
would
be
a
present
image.
Memory's
proper object?the
past
object
or
event?would
be
known
always
and
only
by indirection.
We
shall
see
shortly
hat
Husserl
explicitly
ejected
the
image
theory
of
memory.
But
did
he
perhaps
embrace
the
theory
himself
early
in his
career? In
the
following
section
we
review
evidence
that
suggests
he
did.
1. Husserl's
Implicit
Adherence
to
an
Image
Theory
of
Memory's
Con
stitution
.
Evidence
That
Husserl
Held
an
Image Theory
The
language
Husserl
employed
in
early
analyses
of
memory,
especially
those
written
prior
to
1905,
intimates that he
may
have
interpreted
memory
as
a
form
of
pictorial
consciousness.
In
a
sketch
dating
from
about
1901,
for
example,
Husserl
appears
to
understand
memory
in
terms
of
a
series
of
present
"representations"
(Vorstellungen)
which
"depict"
(abbilden)
a
past
event
(152).
In
other
texts
from the
period
the
terms
"image"
(Bild)
and
"memorial
image"
(Erinnerungsbild)
occur
with
considerable
frequency.
Thus
Husserl
will
speak
of
the
"memorial
images"
of
his
living
room
which
emerge,
endure for
awhile,
perhaps
change,
all
in the
present
(162).
In another
early
text,
Husserl
claims
that
in
memory
I
"grasp" (fassen)
an
object given in phantasy "as
an
image of
what
has been. E.g.,
I
have
the
emerging
tonal
image
and
grasp
it
...
as
the
melody
which
my
little
daughter
played
'a
short
time
ago'
on
the
piano"
(165).
There
are
also
a
few
direct
statements which
appear
to
leave
little
doubt
that
at
the
time
Husserl
accepted
some
kind
of
image
theory: "Ordinary
memory
is
pictorial
apperception
bildliche
Apperzeption),
just
like
expectation"
(173).13
Additional
evidence
may
be
derived
from
the
language
Husserl
used
in
comparing
secondary
memory
and
perception
or
primary
memory.
In
mem
ory,
he
writes,
"the
'image'
hovers
before
me
just
as
the
object
hovers
before
me
in
perception"
(164-165),
suggesting
that
what is
directly
ex
perienced
in
memory
is the
image,
not the
past
object. And in a sketch
from
1904,
Husserl
refers
to
primary
memory
as a
"
'direct*
. . .
conscious
ness
of
having
been
present,"
implying
that
by
comparison
"a
memorial
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48 JOHN . BROUGH
presentation
...
in
the
usual
sense,
a
pictorial
memory
{Bild-Er
inner
un
g)
.
.
."
is
an
indirect consciousness
(191).
Moreover,
in
some
early
texts
comparing
memory
and
perception, perception
is
spoken
of
as
giving
its
object
as
"there itself"
{selbst
da).
Husserl
probably
introduced such
lan
guage
specifically
in
order
to
convey
a
conviction that
memory,
as
opposed
to
perception,
is
built
on
images
and is
no
more
capable
of
presenting
its
object
as
"there itself" than
a
painting
is
of
presenting
a
living
Napoleon.
The
designation
of
primary
memory
as
"immediate
memory"
(165)
would
seem to
carry
the same
implication:
in
primary
memory
"the
past
object
as
such is
given
itself"
(173)
while
in
ordinary
memory
it is
presumably
given
indirectly,
through
intermediaries.
b.
Textual
Ambiguities
While
the hint
of
an
image
theory
in
certain
early
texts is
undeniably
strong,
ambiguities
remain.
Significantly,
Husserl
never
offers
a
developed
version
of the
theory
and
does
not
argue
for it
explicitly.
Furthermore,
the
term
"image"
and
its
derivatives
are
often
placed
in
quotation
marks when
they occur in discussions of memory.14 But of greater importance are indi
cations
in
a
few
early
texts
that
Husserl
became
aware
of
difficulties
associated
with
the
theory
even
while
he
may
have
remained
its adherent.
Husserl's earlier
and
later
reservations
about the
image
theory
are
grounded
in
part
on
his
rejection
of what
might
be
called
the
thesis of the
"pseudo-past":
i.e.,
that what
we
take
as
past
is
really
present.
Husserl
argues
on
the
contrary
that
"where
we
.
.
.
bestow
the
predicate
past,
or
apprehend
as
past,
there the
past
is
really
past"
(152).
This is another
expression
of
the rule that
memory
and
its
object
have
different
time
determinations.
Yet
the
image theory
may
violate
this
rule.
In
a
text
dating
from around 1901,15 Husserl appears to single out just such a transgression.
His
argument,
which
we
will
examine
briefly,
is of
interest
because
it
very
likely
paved
the
way
for
his
later
rejection
of
the
image theory.
According
to
the
theory,
the
present
memorial
image
represents
the
past
object
or
content.
It
might
be
argued
that if
it is
to
do
this with
absolute
fidelity,
hen the
present image,
which
by
hypothesis
s the
only
thing
immediately
experienced
in
memory,
would
have
to
contain
or
be the
remem
bered
content. Yet if
the remembered
content
were
resident in
or
identical
with
the
present
image,
it
would itself be
present.
Indeed,
the
content
would
be
past
and
present,
and
as
identical
with
the
representing present image
it
would
represent
itself.
But
as
Husserl
observes,
"the
same
content
which
is
now
cannot
at
the
same
time
cease
and
persist,
namely
as
repr?sentant
of
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HUSSERL ON MEMORY 49
itself
(159).
This view
effectively
reduces
the
past
to
a
pseudo-past
and
cancels the
difference
in
temporal
determination
between
memory
and
remembered
object:
"the
remembered
content
and the
past
Now
would
at
the
same
time
be
present,
specifically
in
the
sense
of
the
actual
Now"
(159,
note
2).
Yet
Husserl
apparently
does
not
surrender the
image theory
at
this
point,
for he
writes
after
outlining
the
objection
we
have
described:
"The
remembered
content
is
'the same'
as
the
perceived,
but
it is
its
image"
( 160).
For a
time,
then,
Husserl
probably
accepted
some version of the
image
theory.
It
was,
after
all,
a
traditional
view and
in
the
atmosphere
at
the
time. But
already
in
the earliest
texts
seeds
of discontent
are
detectable,
and
so
it
is
not
surprising
that
Husserl
comes
to
reject
explicitly
the
image
theory
of
memory's
constitution.
2.
Husserl's
Explicit
Rejection
of
the
Image
Theory
Memory
is
not
pictorial
consciousness
(?ildbew?sstsein)
but
something
totally
different
(316).
We know that the
'past'
in
memory's
case does notmean that in the
present
act
of
remembering
we
make
ourselves
an
image
of what existed earlier
.
.
.
(309).
By
1904
or
1905,16
Husserl
has
clearly
and
explicitly
rejected
the
inter
pretation
of
memory
as
pictorial
consciousness. But what
are
the
ingredients
of
the
theory
he
rejects,
and
what
are the
arguments
he musters?
17
The
following
contentions
appear
to
comprise
the
theory
which Husserl
criticizes.
(1)
Something
must
be
immediately
and
directly
experienced
in
memory,
and
appear
as
present. (2)
What is
directly
experienced
functions
as an image of something else, the past which is never directly
experienced
and which
never
appears
as
present. (3)
What
is
present
in
the
memory
functions
as
an
image
because
it
is similar
to
or
in
some
way
an
analogue
of
what
it
depicts.
(4)
The
person
remembering
is
aware
that what
he
immediately
experiences
functions
as
an
image
of
something
else.
The
image
and
the
imaged
appear
as
different.
Our
discussion
of
Husserl's
critique
of the
image
theory
will
be
developed
against
the
background
of
these
characteristics.
A
possible
subordinate
expression
of
the
theory?a
variant
of which
we
met
in
the
last
section
and
which
Husserl criticizes
implicitly?would
root
itself
chiefly
in the
first
contention.
Grounded
on
the
assumption
that
what is
past,
because
it is
past,
is
absolutely
inaccessible,
the
interpretation
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50 JOHN . BROUGH
in
question
would hold that
the
object
of
memory
is
the
present
image.
This
claim,
however,
contravenes
the
very
sense
of
the
remembered
object,
which is
"by
all
means
not
given
as
Now"
(316).
If
it
were
asserted
in
reply
that
although
the
image
as
a
real
component
of
the
memory
is
indeed
actually
Now,
it
is nonetheless
experienced
as
past,
HusserTs
rejoinder
would
be,
as we
have
seen,
that what
we
apprehend
as
past
is
really
past
(152)
and that "the
Now
cannot
stand forth
as
not
Now
.
.
."
(322). Memory's
sense
precludes
the identification
of
remembered
object
and
present image.The defender of the
image
theory
who
yields
to
the
argument
that
the
proper object
of
memory
cannot
be the
present image
will
probably
turn
to
the
more
complicated position
embracing
all
the
contentions
men
tioned
above.
But
while
this
position
may
escape
the
obvious
failings
of
its
predecessor,
it
has
its
own?and
equally
fatal?difficulties.
The
backbone
of
Husserl's
critique
of
the
image
theory
is
that it
cannot
explain
memory
as
a
direct
consciousness of what
is
past.
The
theory
is
constructed
on
themodel
of
the sort
of
pictorial
representation
accomplished
in
photographs
(180),
or
historical
paintings
or
statues
(183).
In
such
cases, something is perceived as present which also serves as an image or
repr?sentant
of
something
which
is
not
present.
The
representative
function
is
realized insofar
as
what
is
perceived
is
similar
or
analogous
to
what
is
depicted
(184).
A
painting
of the
storming
of
the
Bastile,
although
a
different
object
from
the
historical
event
of
1789,
functions
and
is
known
to
function
as an
image
of that
event
through
a
certain
relation of
similarity.
Representation
does indeed
occur
through
pictorial
objects
of
this
sort,
but
?and this
is
the
telling
point?"not
with
the
consciousness
of the
object
itself
(Selbst)99
( 183).
What
is
given
"itself"
in
these
cases
is
the
present
pictorial
object,
the
image,
and
not
what it
depicts.
Now in memory, Husserl insists, "this is not the case"
(184).
And
the
moment
the
image
theory
attempts
to
import
this
model
of
pictorial
representation
into
memory's
domain,
it
runs
afoul
of
what
we
actually
experience
in
memory.
Suppose,
for
example,
instead of
looking
at
a
on
the
page
of
a
history
ook,
I
recall the
brightly
lluminated heater
attended
last
night.
The
lighted
theater
which
I
immediately
experience
in the
memory
"does
not
pretend
to
be
a
more or
less
analogous image"
(184);
intended
in the
memory
"is
not
something
similar to
what
appears
there,
intended
is
what
appears
itself,
the
appearing
theater
.
.
(184).
Furthermore,
what thus
appears, because it is the past object itself and not
a
present
image,
is "not
now
present...
it
is
^presented"
(vergegenw?rtigt)
(184).
Excision
of
an
intermediary
between
present
memory
and
past
object
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HUSSERL ON MEMORY 51
does
not
suppress
the
temporal
distance
between
the
two.
In
memory,
then,
we
do
not
directly
experience
something
as
present
which
is then
taken
as
an
image
of
something
past
on
the basis of
a
supposed
similarity
between
the
two.
If
that
were
the
case,
memory
would
never
be
more
than
an
indirect
consciousness of the
past,
and
what
appears
immediately
in
memory
would
never
be
its
proper
object.
A reflective
scrutiny
of
the
phenomenon
of
memory
discloses
that
"it
is
the theater itself
which
hovers before
me,
not
a
mere
image,
that
is,
at
bottom
a
different
object,
only
similar
to
the
object
itself,
to the theater"
(184).
The
sort
of
consciousness
achieved
in
memory
is therefore
representation
"through
identity"
and
not
"through
mere
pictorial
similarity
(Bildahnlich
keit)"
(184).
The
object
of
memory
and
what
immediately
appears
in
the
act
of
memory
are
identical.
The
lighted
theater,
given immediately
to
the
remembering subject,
is
the
past
object
and
not
an
image
or
replica
of
it.
The
arguments
discussed
to
this
point
have
been
descriptive
in character:
reflection
reveals that the
act
of
memory
is
not
experienced
as
an
instance
of
pictorial
consciousness.
There
are
also certain
logical
difficulties
in which
an
image theory of memory (or of perception, for thatmatter) may find
itself,
and Husserl
was
aware
of these.
The cardinal
objection
from
this
perspective
is
that
the
image
theory,
far
from
explaining
memory's
consciousness
of the
past,
would
preclude
our
having
any
idea
of
the
past
at
all.
The
theory
rests
on
the
assumption
that
we
have
no
direct
access
to
the
past.
It
asserts
that the direct and
immediate
"object"
of
experience
in
memory
is
always
and
only
a.
present
image
in
consciousness.
Only
the
present,
never
the
past,
is
directly
experi
enced. If
this
is
the
case,
then
the
question
Husserl
addresses
to
Brentano's
theory
of
primary
memory
as
an
instance
of
pictorial
consciousness
applies
equally to secondary memory: ". . .How do we know, then, that an A has
been
earlier,
even
before
the
existence
of this
present
A
[i.e.,
an
image]?
Whence
do
we
have
the
idea
of
the
past?"
(18)?[material
in
brackets
added].
The
difficulty
is
not
simply
that
no
sense
of the
past
could
appear
directly?though
that
would
be
true?but
that
no sense
of the
past
could
appear
at
all. In the
moment the
image
theory
forbids
us
to
possess
the
past
directly,
it
destroys
our
access
to
it
altogether.
And
in
so
doing,
it
collapses
of
its
own
illogical
weight.
If,
however,
we
assumed
for
a
moment
the
theory's
general
validity,
we
would
still be
faced
with
difficulties, specifically
those associated
with
relating
the
particular
image
to
a
past
object.
The
theory
implies
that
in
order
to
determine
whether
the
present
memorial
image really
does
recall
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52 JOHN . BROUGH
something
past,
or
does
so
accurately,
I
must
compare
it
with what
it
sup
posedly
depicts.
But
by
hypothesis
what is
past
is
no
longer
and
can
be
known
only
through
the
present
image.
It
is
therefore
not
available
for
comparison
or
matching,
and there would be
no
way
to
determine
whether
the
present
image
truly
does
represent
something
past.
Husserl
claims,
while
developing
the
above
objection,
that it would be
"fundamentally
absurd"
to
argue
this
way?not
because
the
argument
is
anemic
or
has
no
force
against
the
image
theory
(it
does)
but
because
the
image theory
is a
misinterpretation
of
memory.
"A
comparing
of what is
no
longer
perceived
and
merely
remembered
with
something
outside
itself
makes
no
sense"
(316).
No
opaque
image
stands
between
the
present
memory
and the
past
object
and
no
impossible
comparison
is
demanded,
for
memory
is
a
direct
consciousness
of
what
is
past
(316).
This,
incident
ally,
makes
possible
the
comparisons
which
do
occur
in
legitimate
cases
of
pictorial representation.
A
present
melody
may
pictorialize
or
lead
me
to
think of
a
past
melody.
"But this
already
presupposes
another
presentation
(Vorstellung)
of
the
past.
The intuition
of the
past
cannot
itself
be
a
pic
torialization" (311). I can compare past and present objects only because
I
have
an
independent
consciousness
of the
past.
Husserl
rejects
the
image theory
because
it
does
not account
for
memory
as we
experience
it and
because
it
effectively
seals
us
off from the
past.
Husserl's
claim
is
rather
that
memory,
properly
understood,
is
a
direct
consciousness
of the
past
in
which
"the
appearing
object
itself is
meant,
just
as
it
appears"
(184).18
3.
The
Remembered
Object's
Mode
of
Givenness
The
image
theory
is
based
on
the
implicit assumption
that
only
what is
present can be directly known. In a sense, it assumes that every form of
consciousness
must
be,
or
be
built
upon,
a
perception,
and that
any
getting
beyond
what
is
given
perceptually
must
be
by
indirection.
Husserl
snaps
the
spine
of the
image
theory
by
denying
the
assumption.
Perception
is
a
direct
consciousness of its
object,
but
so
too
is
memory,
and
its
object
is
past.
Per
ception
does
present
the
object
itself,
but
"in
memory
the
object
also
appears
itself"
(185).19
The
point
is
that
memory,
providing
direct
access
to
the
past,
is
a
mode
of
consciousness
sui
generis
and
is
irreducible
to
any
other
kind
of
experience. "Reproduction,"
Husserl
writes,
"is
not,
as
Hume
and
the
sensualistic
psychologists
since
Hume
think, something
on
the order
of
a
poor
imitation of
perception
or
a
weaker echo
of
it,
but
precisely
a
fundamentally
new
mode of
consciousness.
.
.
."
20
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HUSSERL ON MEMORY 53
Although
perception
and
memory
both
give
their
objects
directly,
they
do
so
in
essentially
different
ways.
Only
in
perception
is
the
object
given
as
"present
itself"
(Selbst
gegenw?rtig)
(185).
The
remembered
object,
whose
sense
precludes
its
being
given
as
present,
is
instead
"represented"
(vergegen
w?rtigt), though
still
given
itself.
Reproductions,
Husserl
writes,
"have
the
character
of
itself-representation"
(Selbstvergegenw?rtigung)
and
"memory
is
itself-representation
in
the
sense
of
the
past"
(59).
Representation
as
memory's
mode of
givenness literally
means
a re
presentation,
though
not in the sense that a
play
might
be
restaged
or a crime
reenacted. Rather the
same
event,
given
perceptually
in
an
earlier
Now,
runs
off
once
again
for
consciousness,
but
as
past?1
What
is
remembered
is
thus
not
there
to
be
touched
or
smelled
or
actually
seen;
it is
given
in
a
unique
modification
which,
Husserl
implies,
is
ultimately
indefinable.
He
does
attempt,
however,
to
communicate
something
of
the
sense
of this modifica
tion,
and
his endeavors throw
light
on
the
difference
between
the
presenta
tional
and
representational
modes
of
givenness.
For
example,
a
temporal
object
"hovers
before
me"
(vorschwebt)
in
memory
"as
something
that
has been and at the same time is quasi-running off
. .
." (298). The term
"vorschweben"
means
to
"have
a
recollection,"
but
also
to
"float
or
hover
before,"
and
Husserl
seems
to
play
on
both
meanings.
The
object
of
memory,
while
not
exactly
ghostlike
in its
apparition,
lacks
the
"bodily"
presence
characteristic
of the
object
of
perception.22
In
the
same
vein,
Husserl
claims
that
the
represented
object
appears
as
"quasi-running
off"
and
elsewhere
writes
that the
object
stands
forth in
memory
"not
as
present
itself,
rather
as
quasi-present"
(290).
Husserl's
point
is
that
memory
regenerates
a
for
gotten
object
such
that
it stands
before
us
"as
if"
(gleichsam)
it
were
engendering
itself
anew
(360).
It
does
not
actually
run
off,
of
course,
because it is past. Thus in thememory of the lighted theater, "the theater
comes
to
givenness
'as
if now'
(gleichsam
jetzt)'*
(59).
The memorial
modification
should
not
be
confused with
the
retentional
modification
to
which
every
temporal
object,
whether
remembered
or
not,
is
subject.
In
being
constituted
originally,
the
object
undergoes
a
modifica
tion
from
the
full
clarity
f
the
Now
to
the
just
past,
gradually
growing
more
obscure,
contracting,
and
finally
disappearing
(26).
This
universal
alteration
is
present
in
originary (origin?r)
consciousness and
then
given
again
in
memory,
"which
represents
the earlier
originary
appearing
and
therewith
at
the
same
time
the
originary sinking
back
. .
."
(368).
As
a
mel
ody
runs
off for
memory,
therefore,
not
only
the
past
and
passing
Now
phases
are
recalled
but
the
past
"just
past" phases
as
well
(51).
But
the
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54 JOHN . BROUGH
modification
which
is
there remembered?the
vivid
Now
slipping
into the
past
and
becoming
obscure?is
not
equivalent
to
the memorial
modification,
which has
its
own
obscurity
to
contribute:
".
. .
still other 'obscurities'
con
front
us
there,
that
is,
what
is 'clear' in
the first
sense
stands
already
as
if
seen
through
a
veil
...
to
be
sure,
more or
less
obscurely"
(48).
The
veil
which
memory
drops
between
present
and
past
is
not
opaque
?the
past
remains visible
through
it?but
it
does
cast
its shadow
unfailingly.
B. Memory as Representation of Earlier Perception
Husserl
stresses
that
memory
is
a
direct consciousness
of the
past
which
gives
its
object
in
a
unique
manner
irreducible
to
pictorial
or
perceptual
modes.
But
he also
argues
that
memory
and
perception
are
intimately
related.
And the relation involves
more
than the truism
that
if
we
perceived
nothing
we
would have
nothing
to
remember,
for Husserl
claims
that
"memory
. .
.
actually
implies
a
reproduction
of
earlier
perception"
(58).
It
will
be
recalled from the first section
of
this
paper
that
what
is
re
membered
appears
as
having
been
present.
Since
perception
is
the
act
which constitutes the present (182), to appear as having been present means
to
appear
as
having
been
perceived.
Accordingly,
"it
belongs
primarily
to
the
nature
of
memory
that
it
is
consciousness of
having-been-perceived
(Wahrgenommen
getv
e
s
n-s
ein)"
(57).
Now
if
memory
intends its
object
as
having
been
perceived,
it
will
carry
an
implicit
reference
to
the
act
of
perception
through
which
the
object
was
originally
presented.
The
present
which
is
given
again
in
memory,
re-presented,
is
therefore "constituted in
. . .
a
'representation
of
earlier
perception'
..."
(58).
If
the
lighted
theater,
for
example,
appears
in
memory
"as
if
Now,"
this
occurs
because
the
elapsed
perceptual
act
through
which
the theater
was
originally
given
as
Now
is
represented in thememory (58).23
Memory,
then,
has
a
double
intentionality.
Unlike
perception,
which
intends
only
the
present
external
object,
memory
intends
both
a
past
act
and
the
object
of
that
act.
Furthermore,
the
two
intentionalities
are
inseparably
united. To remember
an
elapsed
object
is
to
remember
the
act
through
which
it
was
earlier
given;
to
remember
an
elapsed
act
is
to
remember
the
object
originally
correlated
with
it.24
Husserl offers
a
formula
to
express
this
"essential
law"
(128)
:
R
(P0)
=
R0,
where
"R
(P0)"
is
the
reproduction
(R)
of the
perception
(P)
of
an
external
object
(o)
and
"R0"
is
the
representationR)
of the external
object (o).
It
should
be
stressed
that
Husserl
never
claims
that
the
past
object,
the
theater,
e.g.,
and
the
past
perception
are
intended
in
the
same
way.
The
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HUSSERL ON MEMORY 55
perception,
while
necessarily
recalled,
is
known
only
implicitly:
"the
per
ception
is
not meant
(gemeint)
and
posited
(gesetzt)
in
the
memory,
rather its
object
is
meant
and
posited
..."
(58).
A
reflective
memory
could
be
brought
to
bear
on
the
act,
of
course,
and
then it
would be
thema
tized and
its
object
only
implicitly
ntended.
We
have
already
pointed
to
the
basic
reason
why
memory
is
always
memory
of earlier
perception.
Husserl
develops
his
explanation
of
this
feature
of
memory's
constitution
in
other
interesting
and
significant
ways.
For
example,
a remembered external
process
such as a
performance
occurring
on
the
stage
of
a
theater
"is
given
in
a
determinate mode
of
appearance"
(57).
That
is,
the
stage
I
recall
is
given
to
me as
seen
from
a
certain
per
spective,
perhaps
from
the back
row
of
the second
tier,
and under certain
conditions,
as
bathed
in
pink
light,
for
example.
This
means
that "an
ex
ternal
appearing
must
be
reproduced"
(57)
because
it is
only
through
such
an
"appearing"
(an
act
of
perceiving)
that
something
is
given
in
a
definite
mode
of
appearance.
I
can
recall the
object
clothed
with the
unique
deter
minations
it
possessed
when
I
originally
experienced
it
only by
representing
the original experience itself. This formulation suggests still another ap
proach
to
the
issue,
one
which takes
us
to
the
heart
of what
memory
accomplishes.
The
past
object
is remembered
as
having
been
perceived,
"but
not
just
anywhere
and
at
any
time and
not
by just
anyone
. .
."
(191).
Memory
intends
an
object
which
I
perceived
at
a
certain
place
and time.
The
object
is
remembered
in
terms
of the
way
it
entered
into
my
life,
became involved
with
me
as
the
object
of
my
experience.
To
remember
something
is
essen
tially
to
remember
an
episode
in
my
own
history.
Memory,
then,
as
memory
of
earlier
perception,
recaptures
an
elapsed portion
of
my
own
stream
of
consciousness. In the
"present
representation
of the
past
consciousness, spe
cifically
as
my
consciousness"
I
am aware
that "at that
time
I
had
the
per
ception"
(195).
Husserl
accordingly
describes
memory
as
"a
part
of
present
experience
in which
a
concrete
part
from
the
stream
of
the
past
experience
of the
same
subject
is
represented."
25
It
pertains
to
the
very
nature
of
an
act
of
consciousness
that,
once
past,
it
can
never
again
be
given
originally.
Without
memory
the
elapsed
experience
would
be
irretrievably
lost
and
so
too its
object,
and
I
would
be
trapped
forever in
the
immediate
present.
The
sense
of
the self
and
of
objectivity
would
never
fully
develop.26
But
through my present
memories
I
can
reach
back
to
the
I
which
perceived
the
theater
last
night,
which
enjoyed
the
sights
and
sounds
of
the railroad
station
years ago,
which
cheered
at
a
football
game
last
fall.
And
this
I,
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56 JOHN . BROUGH
Husserl
writes,
"is
continuously
identical
throughout
all these
reproductions,
identically
my
I,
and in its
past
reality
known
to
me
in
the
present
memory
with
a
steady
certainty."
27
We
must
now
examine
certain
further
implications
of Husserl*
s
claim
that
memory
is
always
representation
of earlier
perception.
C. Remembered
Horizon
and
Memory's
Fulfillment
Husserl,
on some
occasions,
distinguishes
two
inseparable aspects
of
memory's
intentionality,
both
of
which
are
related
to
memory
as
representa
tion of earlier
perception.
Through
one
of
these
intentional
moments
the
object
is remembered
with
respect
to
its
enduring
content
(53).
Thus
I
recall
the
freight
train
passing
slowly
through
the
station. If the
memory
represents
the
object
unintuitively,
perhaps
merely
verbally
or
symbolically,
the memorial
inten
tion
is
described
as
empty.
The
fulfillment of
the
intention
would consist
in
the intuitive
representation
of
the
object.
If
the
past
event
is in fact
to
stand
before
me
in
intuitive
"full
dress,"
fulfilling
the
empty
intention,
I must explicitly actualize "the reproduction of the consciousness in which
the
past enduring
object
was
given,
that
is,
perceived
or
in
general originally
constituted.
.
."
(54).
When
the
object
was
originally
given
in
a
perception,
it
was
given intuitively;
if the
object
is
to
be
given
intuitively
once
again
in
the
memorial
mode,
that
perception
must
be
recalled.
Memory's
second
intentional
moment,
always
present
with
the
first,
is
directed towards
the
temporal
context
or
location of the
enduring
content
(
302
).
We
indicated
earlier
that
it is
part
of
the
sense
of
the remembered
object
to
be
set
in
relation
to
the
Now,
specifically,
to
be
apprehended
"as
lying
back
in
relation
to
the actual
present
.
.
."
(58).
Reproducing
some
thing
entails
locating
itmore or less
definitely
with
respect
to the
living
Now.
This
aspect
of
memory's
intentionality
also
has
its
own
manner
of
fulfillment,
which
consists
in the
"production
of
fulfilled
interconnections
up
to
the
actual
present"
(54).
Husserl
means
that
the
intention is
fulfilled
insofar
as we
actualize
memories
which
carry
us
"along
the
chain of
time"
(437)
from the
past
event
to
the
living
present:
"The
only
possible
ful
fillment
...
is
in
a
chain
or
continuity
of
actual
representations
up
to
the
Now,
that
is,
right
into the
present
temporal
field"
(437).
By
Husserl's
own
admission,
understanding
the
possibility
of this
mode
of fulfillment is
no
easy task (196). A consideration of what makes it
possible,
however,
will
considerably
deepen
our
comprehension
of what
memory
achieves.
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HUSSERL ON MEMORY 57
The
assumption
underlying
HusserTs claim is that the
fulfilling
repre
sentations
only
make
explicit
or
thematize
what
was
there all
along.
And
what
was
there
from the
beginning
in
memory
was
a
consciousness,
empty
to
be
sure,
of the
temporal
interval
stretching
between
the
present
memory
and
its
object:
".
. .
The
whole
is
reproduced,
not
only
the then conscious
present
with
its
flow,
rather
*
im
pli
cite* the
whole
stream
of
consciousness
up
to
the
living
present"
(54).
This
contention,
at
first
glance
surprising,
is
quite
in
keeping
with
Husserl's
understanding
of
the
sense
of
the
remem
bered
past.
If we
experience
the
past
object
as no
longer
present,
as more
or
less
distant
from
the
actual
Now,
some
awareness
of
that
distance
itself
is
implied,
awareness
which
simply
would
be the
implicit reproduction
of
the
segment
of
the
stream
of
consciousness
bridging past
and
present.
But this
observation
does
not
by
itself
explain
the
possibility,
in
principle,
of
a
fulfillment
which
"requires
series
of
memories which
empty
into the
actual Now"
(105).
That
explanation
turns
once
again
on
memory's
nature
as
representation
of
earlier
perception.
Husserl claims
that
memory's
intuitive
intention directed
specifically
towards the enduring object is accompanied by other intentions, unintuitive,
which
refer
back
to
what
precedes
the
remembered
event
and
refer forward
to
the
living
Now
(305).
Focusing
on
the
forward-directed intentional
moment,
Husserl
asserts
that recollection
"has
a
horizon
directed
towards
the
future,
specifically
towards the
future of what
is recollected"
(53).
The fulfillment
of
these
expectational
intentions
leads
to
the
present
(52).
Memory
is
endowed with
this
intentional horizon
not
through
some
inexplicable
property
of
memory
itself,
but because
the
elapsed
perception
which
it
represents
was
originally
constituted
with
a
temporal
halo. "Fore
ground,"
Husserl
writes,
"is
nothing
without
background"
(304).
The
perceptual act and its object occupy the
temporal
foreground. In addition
"every
perception
has its
retentional
and
protentional
halo"
(105)
comprised
of intentions
which,
radiating
from the
perception,
implicitly
intend
its
temporal
background:
the
acts
and
objects
which
are
past
and
future
with
respect
to
the intuitive
present.
Since
memory
is
always
modification
or
representation
of earlier
perception,
and since
perception
is
never
without
its
halo,
"the
modification of
perception
must
also?in
modified
fashion?
contain
this
double
halo
. .
."
(105). Memory possesses
intentions directed
towards
the
past
and future of
what it
recalls
only
because these
intentions
are
already
embedded
in the remembered
act.
This,
incidentally,
explains
why
memory
intends
its
object
as
occupying
a
position
relative
to
the
actual
present.
The
reproduced
past already
bears
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58 JOHN . BROUGH
"an
indefinite intention
towards
a
certain
temporal
location
with
respect
to
the
Now"
(54).
Memory
does
not
arbitrarily assign
a
location
to
its
object;
rather
the
object,
thanks
to
its
own
intention,
locates
itself. And
although
the location
may
be
fairly
indefinite,
it is
unlikely
that
someone
recalling
his
wedding
reception,
given
its
temporal
horizon,
will
situate
it
further
from
the actual
Now
than the
day
he entered
grammar
school.
We
are now
in
a
position
to
explain
the
possibility
of
the fulfillment
of
the
memorial intention
directed
towards
the
temporal
location.
We
have
established that when the
elapsed
act is
recalled,
its intention directed
towards
the
future
is
also renewed
memorially.
The
object
of
this
intention
is
"the
objective
temporal
series of
events,"
which is
given
emptily
or
un
intuitively
in the
original
memory
and
is therefore
described
by
Husserl
as
"the
dark
surroundings
(Umgebung)
of
what
is
actually
remembered"
(54).
Now
although
we
ordinarily
recall
the
perception's
horizon
in
an
empty
manner,
"the
possibility
exists
of
unfolding
its
temporal
halo"
by
making
each
point
into the
object
of
a
memory
(436).
Let
us
assume
that
we
actualize
an
explicit
memory
of
what
is
implicitly
intended
as
future
in
the remembered perceptual act. If we are successful, we will be intuitively
conscious
of
a
determinate
act
and
its
object,
intentionally
related
to
what
was
originally
recalled
but
closer
to
the
actual
Now.28 The
new
object
of
memory
will
of
course
possess
its
own
halo of
intentions,
including
an
intention directed towards
future
acts
and
objects,
which
may
also
be
ex
plicitly
remembered,
and
so
on.
As the
recollecting
process
advances
along
the
chain of
interlocking
intentions,
the
temporal
horizon
of
what
is
re
membered "is
continually
opened
anew
and
becomes
richer
and
more
vital"
(53).
The
unfolding activity
of
memory
constitutes
a
progressive
fulfilling
of
the
emptily
intended
horizons,
ultimately
culminating
in
the
living
present.
Through the advancing recollection I realize "the objective
possibility
of
establishing
the
succession:
at
that
time that
was,
then
came
that,
up
to
the
Now"
29
(301),
of
following,
for
example,
"what I
have
perceived step
by-step,
up
to
the
Now
.
. .
(
197)
"
30
If
the
process
of fulfillment
advances
harmoniously,
then
the
temporal
location
of
the
object
is confirmed
(437).
The
possibility
lways
remains
open,
of
course,
that what
I have located in the
past
does
not
belong
there,
or
belongs
in
a
different
position.
Memorial renewal
of the
elapsed
course
of
experience
will reveal
whether
this
is
the
case.
It
may
be
discovered,
for
example,
that of
two
conflicting
memories
only
one
will
fit
into the
context
of
the
past
stream of consciousness. Such
a
determination is
always
available
in
principle,
for
"a
person
now
has
a
past,
a
determinate
one"
and
"there
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HUSSERL ON MEMORY 59
fore
a
context
of
non-conflicting
memory
certainly
exists,
as
possible"
(437).
We
have
only
to
actualize that
context
memorially
to
make
the
determination.
D.
Memory
and
the
Absolute
Flow
of
Consciousness
To
complete
our
sketch
of
memory's
constitution
we
must
raise
one more
question.
We
discussed
earlier Husserl's claim
that
memory
is
an
immanent
unity
constituted
in inner
time-consciousness.
We
have also
traced
Husserl's
argument
that
memory
of an
elapsed
object
implies representation
of the
perception
through
which
the
object
was
originally
intended.
Now
the
elapsed
perception
is also
an
immanent
object originally
constituted
or
experienced
in inner
time-consciousness.
A
reasonable
question
would
then
be:
must
memory,
in
recalling
the
past
perception,
also
reproduce
the
elapsed
portion
of
the
absolute
time-constituting
flow in
which
the
perception
was
originally
experienced?
If
the
answer
is
in
the
affirmative,
then
memory
would
have
a
triple
intentionality,
recalling
at
once
(though
not
in
a
thema
tizing
way
in each
case)
a
past
segment
of
the ultimate
time-consciousness,
the act once experienced asNow in that segment, and the object originally
perceived
in
the act.
Husserl's
texts,
however,
are
not
clear
on
the issue.
For
example,
in
dis
cussing
the
"inner
reproduction
of
external
perception,"
Husserl
speaks
of
"representation
of
the
inner
consciousness"
(128),
suggesting
that
memory
of the ultimate
flow
is indeed
involved in
memory
of earlier
per
ception.
But
in the
same
passage
the
manner
in
which he
symbolizes
the
representation
of the
perception
omits
any
reference
to
the
past
experiencing.
The
act
when
originally
experienced
as
present
may
be
symbolized
as
Ii
(P0)>
where
"
/'
is
the
impressionai
inner
consciousness
of
the
perception
of
an
external object "P0." The reproduction of the
perception
is symbolized as
Ri
(P0),
where
Ri
is
the "inner
reproduction"
of
the
elapsed
perception.
However,
if the
representation
also
intended
the
elapsed
inner
consciousness,
we
would
expect
the
formula:
Ri[Ii(P0)],
which
Husserl
does
not
in
fact
supply.
Other
texts,
however,
intimate
that
past
inner
consciousness
is
reproduced
in
memory.
Thus Husserl
appears
to
distinguish
between
the
representational
consciousness
of
a
past
immanent
object
and
the
"
'reproduction'
...
of
the
earlier
primal
sensation"
(79)
("primal
sensation"
is
a
synonym
for
"primal impression,"
the
moment
of
the
ultimate flow
through
which
a
phase
of the
immanent
object
is
experienced
as
Now).
Elsewhere
he
refers
to
"the
representational
consciousness
of
the
immanent
tone
(which
in
an
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60 JOHN . BROUGH
appropriately
modified
sense
is
representational
consciousness
of
the
inner
consciousness
of the
tone)
.
.
."
(96).
But
if
the
textual evidence is
ambiguous,
the
logic
of Husserl's
position
would
seem
to
be decisive.
Just
as
we
cannot
recall
a
past
external
event
without
representing
the
perception
through
which
it
was
originally
given,
so
we
cannot
recall
the
past
perception
without
representing
the
elapsed
inner consciousness
through
which
it
was
originally
experienced.
When
I
remember
a
past
transcendent
object,
I
remember it
as
having
been
perceived.
When
I
recall
a
past
act,
I
recall
it
as
having
been
experienced,
that
is,
as
having
been constituted
in
inner
time.
If
I
am
to return
memorially
to
the
same
act
I
once
experienced
as
Now,
then
I
must
implicitly
represent
that
segment
of the
ultimate time-consciousness in
which
the
act
was
first
con
stituted.
Furthermore,
the
past
act
will
be recalled
as
located
at
a
certain
position
"in
the
elapsing
series of
my
experiences"
(307).
Since
it is
the
absolute
flow
with its retentions
and
protentions
which
originally
orders
the
act
in
inner
time,
recalling
the
act's location would entail
representing
the
inner
consciousness which first located it.
Finally,
I recall
an
elapsed
act as having been experienced byme, specifically, as having been constituted
in the
same
stream
of
consciousness
to
which
my
present
act
of
memory
belongs.
But
to
recall
the
elapsed
act
without
representing
the
flow
through
which
I
first
experienced
it,
would
be
tantamount to
recalling
an
act
which
belonged
to
no
one.
The
claim
that in
remembering
an
elapsed
act
we
also
recall
the
absolute
time-constituting
flow
does
not
mean
that
we ever
represent
the
flow
by
itself. The
ultimate flow
simply
is
the
experiencing
of
immanent
temporal
objects.
The inner
consciousness
of the
act
is
inseparable
(though distinct)
from
what
it
constitutes.
That
relationship
is
not
severed when
the
act
elapses,
and it is renewed when the act is remembered.
Recalling
a
past
act
always
implies
recalling
the
elapsed
portion
of the
ultimate
time-constitut
ing
flow
in
which the
act
was
originally
experienced,
and
remembering
a
past
segment
of
the flow
always
entails
remembering
the
immanent
object
it
constituted.
Our
sketch
of
memory's
constitution
is
now
complete.
Although
we
have
been
able
to
catch
only
the
broad
outlines of
Husserl's
theory,
we
have
at
least
glimpsed
the
fundamental
role
memory
plays
in
conscious
life.
Consciousness
is
steeped
in
time
and
none
of its flowing phases
can
be
arrested
and
kept
in
living actuality.
From
the
perspective
of
the
living
present,
the
main
portion
of
our
experience
has
receded
into the
past
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husserl on memory 61
and
into
forgetfulness.
Without
memory
we
would
have
no
access
to
what
has
been
the
length
and
breadth
of
our
lives.
That
time's
flow
does
not
imprison
the
self
in
a
present
without
windows
to
the
past,
we
owe
to
memory.
John
B.
Brough
Georgetown
University
NOTES
1. Edmund Husserl, Zur Ph?nomenologie des Inneren Zeitbewusstseins (1893
1917),
ed.
Rudolf
Boehm,
Husserliana,
Band
X
(The
Hague:
Martinus
Nijhoff,
1966).
2.
Edmund
Husserl,
Analysen
zur
Passiven
Synthesis,
ed.
Margot
Fleischer,
Hus
serliana,
Band
XI
(The
Hague:
Martinus
Nijhoff,
1966).
3.
Since
most
of
our
references
will
be
to
Husserliana,
Volume
X
(Zeitbewusst
sein),
page
numbers
of
texts
cited
or
directly
quoted
from
this
volume
will be
given
in
parentheses
immediately
following
the
reference
or
quotation.
4. I
capitalize
the term
"Now" whenever
it is
a
translation
for
"das
Jetzt"
because
the
English
lower
case
"now"
may
fail
to
draw the
reader's attention
to
Husserl's
technical
use
of
the
term.
5.
Memory
is
only
one
among
several
forms of
representation
(Vergegenw?rti
gung) which have a relation to the actual Now. Expectation intends its object as
future
with
respect
to
the
Now. There
is
also
a
representation
of
something
con
temporaneous
with
the
Now
but
not
perceived
(60).
And
"mere
phantasy"
is
disting
uished
from
memory
because the
formerhas
no
reference
to
the actual
Now
(105).
6. Husserl
does
distinguish,
as we
will
see,
between
an
immanent
time
of
con
sciousness
and the
transcendent
time
of external
objects.
The
two
are
related,
how
ever,
in
that
the
latter
is
given
through
the
fomer.
The
immanent act
of
perception,
for
example,
is
simultaneous
with the
perceived
transcendent
object.
7.
The
"world's
time" here is
not
"clock
time"
but
simply
the
appearing
time
of
perceived
or
remembered
transcendent
objects.
8.
Husserl
therefore
distinguishes
two
dimensions
of
immanence,
two
dimensions
within
consciousness
itself,
and
claims that
within
one
the
consciousness of the other
is
constituted. Husserl
begins
to
advance
this
distinction
in
about
1907.
See
the
present
writer's
"The
Emergence
of
an
Absolute
Consciousness
in
Husserl's
Early
Writings
on
Time
Consciousness,"
Man and
World,
5,
no.
3
(August
1972):
307fT.
9.
.
.
Representation,
even
the
most
primitive
immanent
representation,
is
already secondary
consciousness
presupposing
primary
consciousness in
which
it
is
know
impressionally"
(90).
10.
"The
representation
is
itself
an
event
of
inner
consciousness:
//
it
ensues,
then
it
has
its
actual
Now,
its
running-off
modes,
etc.
.
.
."
(316).
11.
Husserl
observes
that
there
are
limits
to
what
we
can
retain
(193).
But
even
if
everything
could
be
retained,
memory
would remain
vitally
important.
For
memory
enables
us
to
relive
our
experiences
representationally,
while
retention
passively
"watches" them recede. Further, ifwe could not remember as well as retain we could
not
reflect,
that
is,
attentively
run
through
an
experience
again,
and
phenomenology
itself
would be
impossible.
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62
JOHN
.
BROUGH
12.
Husserl,
Passiven
Synthesis,
.
292.
13.
Robert
Sokolowski
cites
this
statement
in
support
of his contention that
Husserl
once
held
an
image
theory.
Robert
Sokolowski,
Husserlian
Meditations
(Evans
ton:
Northwestern
University
Press,
1974),
p.
147,
note
12.
Sokolowski
would
appear
to be
correct
in
his
contention.
Textual
ambiguities concerning
the
matter
are
con
siderable,
however,
as
we
will
point
out
in the
next
section.
14.
See,
e.g.,
(62),
(164), (166).
15. Nr.
7,
pp.
158-160.
The
text
is
probably
concerned
with
primary
memory,
but
the
implied
criticism
of
an
image
theory
would
apply
to
the
case
of
secondary
memory
as
well.
16. Explicit critcismfirst appears inNr. 18,which Boehm, the editor of Hus
serliana
X,
dates
around
1901.
But
both
the
language
and
the
content
of
the
sketch
suggest
that it
was
written somewhat
later.
On
Nr.
18,
see
Sokolowski,
Husserlian
Meditations,
p.
147,
note
12
and
p.
149,
note
14.
17. Some of
the
arguments
appear
in
Nr.
18,
others
in
later
texts,
especially
Nr.
47,
which
probably
dates from
1907-1909.
18.
We
relied
chiefly
on
Zeithbewusstsein for
Husserl's
arguments
against
the
image
theory.
A
strong
and
clear
(but
brief)
rejection
is
found
in
Passiven
Synthesis,
p.
305.
19.
"Memory,
however,
does
not
contain
in itself
the
perception
of
one
object
in
which
a
second is
consciously
analogized."
Husserl,
Passiven
Synthesis,
p.
305.
20.
Ibid., p. 325.
21.
".
.
.
There
are
not
two
kinds
of
houses,
perceived
houses
and
imagined
or
remembered
houses
.
.
(289).
The
same
house is
represented
as was
earlier
perceived.
22.
Husserl,
Passiven
Synthesis,
p.
96.
23.
Because
the
remembered
perception
of
an
external
object
is
itself
an
im
manent
object,
Husserl claims
that
"every
memory
is
.
. .
also
memory
of
what
is
immanent"
(96).
24. "...
A
representational
modification of
a
perception
is
at
the
same
time
representation
of
the
perceived object
. .
."
(89).
25.
Husserl,
Passiven
Synthesis,
p.
353.
26.
According
to
Husserl,
it
pertains
to
the
sense
of
the
fully
constituted
object
that it can be repeated as the same in diverse acts, and this requiresmemory. See
Passiven
Synthesis,
pp.
326-27.
27.
Husserl,
Passiven
Synthesis,
p.
310.
28. When
an
act
is
originally
experienced,
intentions
or
protentions
directed
to
wards
the
future
are
empty
and
open.
But
the
elapsed
protentions
which
we
recall
"have been
fulfilled,
nd
we are
aware
of
this
in
the
recollection"
(52).
In
recalling
the
past
protentions
I
recall
what
originally
fulfilled
them.
29.
We
have stressed
memory's
forward
movement
along
the trail
of
interlocking
intentions
towards
the
Now.
Husserl
suggests
that
one
can
also
move
backwards
from
the
horizon of
what
is
actually
present
towards
what is
remembered
(70).
In
either
case
we
move across
overlapping
temporal
fields
which
are
united into
a
single
field
through
their intentional
horizons
(70).
30.
Husserl
acknowledges
that
there
are
limitations
to what
we
can
remember
and
that
a
completely
fulfilled
memory
is
an
ideal
limit
case.
Husserl,
Passiven
Synthesis,
p.
82.