Huth and Allee - Domestic Political Accountability and Intl Conflict

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DOI: 10.1177/0022002022379282002 46: 754Journal of Conflict Resolution

PAUL K. HUTH and TODD L. ALLEEDomestic Political Accountability and the Escalation and Settlement of International Disputes

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10.1177/002200202237928JOURNALOFCONFLICTRESOLUTIONHuth,Allee/DOMESTICPOLITICALACCOUNTABILITY

Domestic Political Accountabilityand the Escalation and Settlement

of International Disputes

PAUL K. HUTH

Center for Political Studies

Institute for Social Research, University of Michigan

TODD L. ALLEE

Department of Political Science

University of Michigan

A political accountability model is developed to explain how the accountability of incumbent demo-cratic leaders to domestic political opposition influences the diplomatic and military policies of govern-ments. The model is situated within the democratic peace literature and compared with existing theoreticalwork. Empirically, the hypotheses aretested on a new data setof 348territorialdisputes forthe periodfrom1919 to 1995. Each dispute is divided into three separate stages so that hypotheses about the initiation andoutcome of both negotiations and military confrontations, and opposing patterns of war and dispute settle-ment,can betested.Resultsprovidestrongsupportfor a number ofhypothesesconcerningthe importance ofelectoral cycles and thestrengthof oppositionparties in explaining patternsof bothconflictualand coopera-tive behavior by democratic states.

An extensive literature on the relationshipbetween democracyand internationalcon-

flict has developed over the past decade.

1

Nevertheless, several basic questions andpuzzles remainabout theexistence of, and explanation for, a democratic peace. In this

study, we present two main arguments. First, the theoretical literature on the demo-

cratic peace is underdeveloped with respect to explaining differences in the conflict

behaviorof democratic states. We present a seriesof hypotheses that relatevariation in

the political accountability of democratic leaders to differences in foreign policy

behavior. Second, the prevailing quantitative approach to testing hypothesesabout the

democratic peace based on dyad-years as theunits of observation suffers from several

limitations. We propose an alternative research design that focuses on the multiple

754

AUTHORSNOTE:We thank theNationalScienceFoundationand theU.S.Institute of Peacefor finan-cial support of our research. The comments and suggestions of Curt Signorino are especially appreciated.Thedatasetsusedin this article canbe foundat theJCR data site: http://www.yale.edu/unsy/jcr/jcrdata.htm.

JOURNAL OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION, Vol. 46 No. 6, December 2002 754-790

DOI: 10.1177/002200202237928

2002 Sage Publications

1. The literature is too large to cite fully here, but recent works of particular interest includeAuerswald (2000), Bueno de Mesquita et al. (1999), Cederman (2001), Elman (2000), Gartzke (1998,2000), Gowa (1999), Reiter and Stam (2002), Russett and Oneal (2001), Schultz (2001b), and Snyder(2000).

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stages through which international disputes progress and the diplomatic and military

policies adopted bystate leaders ateach of thesedifferentstages. Theresults ofoursta-tistical analyses provide strong evidence in support of the theoretical and empirical

approach we adopt for studying the democratic peace. In particular, we find that (a)

opposing patterns of accommodative as well as conflictual behavior by democratic

states can be explained by differences in the political accountability of democratic

leaders, and (b) the explanatory power of domestic- and international-level variables

varies in consistent ways across the different stages of a territorial dispute.

We divide this study into the following sections. First, we present a brief review of

the democratic peace literature and highlight the limitations that provide the rationale

forour theoretical andempirical work in this study. We then outline thedifferent stages

of territorialdisputes anddevelopa seriesof testablehypotheses that drawn onbroader

theoretical models. In thethirdsection,wedescribea seriesof statistical testsandpres-

ent theresults of such tests.Finally, we conclude by discussing the implications of our

findings for the literature on the democratic peace.

REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE

ON THE DEMOCRATIC PEACE

Although many scholars have argued that domestic political conditions play a cen-

tral role in explaining patterns of diplomatic and military conflict among states, those

employing a realist theoretical framework have challenged the claim that domestic-

level variables provide powerful findings andhave questioned theassertions of demo-

cratic peace proponents (e.g., Elman 1997; Gowa 1999; Layne 1995). The premise of

our theoretical analysis is that realist critics have failed to make a compelling logical

case that domestic-level variables should not be expected to shape the foreign policy

choices of state leaders. Thus, the starting point for our theory-building efforts is that

foreign policy leaders are attentive to the struggle within their country for political

power and influence. In our theoretical framework, then, state leaders attempt to pro-

tect andpromotenational security interestsabroad while seeking to ensuretheirtenure

and position of political power at home.

The focus of research on thedemocratic peace hasbeen directed largely at compar-

ing and explaining differences in theconflict behaviorof democratic versus nondemo-

craticstates. Nevertheless,oneof the theoretical puzzles of thedemocratic peace liter-

ature stems from the empirical findings that indicate substantial variation in the

conflict behavior of democratic states (e.g., Auerswald 2000; Elman 2000; Snyder

2000).We believe that an important subject of theoretical work, underdevelopedin the

current democratic peace literature, is the extent to which domestic political con-

straints and accountability vary in important ways for the leaders of democratic gov-ernments. As a result, a more systematic analysis of such differences among demo-

cratic regimes is required.

Finally, we believe that hypotheses about the democratic peace should be related

more directly to the unfolding of international disputes into different stages and the

choices made by state leaders at each stage of a dispute. The commonly employed

Huth, Allee / DOMESTIC POLITICAL ACCOUNTABILITY 755



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dyad-year research design has produced many important findings (e.g., Maoz 1997,

1998; Russett and Oneal 2001), yet such designs for empirical tests of the democraticpeace feature several limitations. First, these studies simply code whether two states

experience some conflict ina particular year butdo notidentifypatternsof militaryini-

tiation and response or patterns of conflict resolution. Second, these studies do not

capture that international disputes progress through a number of stages, namely, (1)

the emergence of a dispute, (2) attempts to settle the dispute through negotiations, (3)

the escalation of diplomatic conflict and the issuance of military threats, and (4) the

further escalation of these militarized crises to war. The democratic peace literature

addresses only those situations later in the dispute evolution process in which demo-

cratic institutions may prevent states from escalating a dispute. However, democratic

peacearguments arenotapplicable to situationswhere conflict is absent because states

are not involved in a dispute in the first place, and thus there is no reason for leaders to

consider using force (also see Gartzke 1998, 2000). Using a dyad-year design, how-

ever, statesthat donotget into disputes forreasons unrelatedto democratic institutions

may appear as cases in support of the democratic peace. Finally, when using dyads,

variables that areparticular to each state, such as the level of democracy or the relative

strengthof a leaders domesticpoliticalposition, mustbe combinedsomewhatunnatu-

rally into some type of joint or composite measure. As a result, it is difficult to draw

causal inferences about individual state-level behavior using dyads.

Our alternative approach for studying the democratic peace therefore includes the

following:

1. a focus on the behavior of individual states involved in international disputes,2. an attempt to explain how disputes progress through different stages of diplomatic and

military conflict, and3. an analysis of the diplomatic and military actions of challenger and target states at each

stage of a dispute, including an attempt to identify patterns of initiation and response inthe policy choices adopted by state leaders.

Our theoretical andempiricalanalyses of thedemocratic peace arebuilt around the

behavior of states involvedin territorial disputes. We assemble a data set consisting of

348 territorial disputes during the period from 1919 to 1995 and examine the diplo-

matic and military behavior of states seeking to change the territorial status quo and

those preferring to preserve it.2

We believe there are several advantages to analyzing a data set of territorial dis-

putes. First, by requiring that a territorial disagreement exists to begin with, we mini-

mize problems of irrelevant no-conflict observations. Our data set consists of cases

in which the use of diplomatic or military activity to advance ones claim is always a

possibility. A related benefit is that focusing on state behavior in territorial disputes

allows us todevelopand test more specifichypotheses about statebehavior. Inparticu-lar, we are able to examine the conditions under which states are likely to resolve dis-

putes through negotiations, reacha deadlock in talks,or seetheirdisputeescalateintoa

756 JOURNAL OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION

2. See Huth and Allee (2002) for a more detailed description of the coding rules used for identifyingcases of territorial disputes and summary descriptions of territorial disputes.



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war. A third advantage of this alternative research design is that by looking at the dif-

ferentstages of a territorial dispute, we cancapture theimpact of particular variables ateach stage. This helps us to address potential problems of selection bias (e.g., Fearon

1994a; Huth 1996; Reed 2000; Schultz 2001b;Smith 1995).A fourthandfinal advan-

tage of studying territorial disputes is that they are a central issue over which milita-

rized disputes and wars have erupted. As a result, the study of territorial disputes

should provide a demanding test for the impact of democratic institutions on the con-

flict behavior of foreign policy leaders. If democratic political institutions have the

capacity to discourage military conflict and promote peaceful resolution of disputes,

then territorial disputes will push that capacity to its limits.

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

We start by discussing how territorial disputes typicallymove through three differ-

ent stages. We then present a theoretical framework to explain the foreign policy

choices selectedbystate leaders ineach of these stages. Ourstartingpoint is a situation

in which twostateshavea disagreementover thecontrol of andsovereign rights to ter-

ritory. One state, the challenger, is seeking to alter the prevailing territorial status quo,

whereas a target state has rejected the challengers territorial claims.

In the challenge the status quo stage, we focus on the decision of the challenger

whether toactivelyseeka changein thestatus quoand, if so,by what diplomatic and/or

militarypolicies.The challengers policyoptions canbe grouped into three categories:

(1) no active challenge to the territorial status quo, (2) the pursuit of diplomatic initia-

tives and negotiations over disputed territory, and (3) a coercive policy of using mili-

tary force to compel a change in the status quo. The next stage in a territorial dispute

depends on what choice was initially selected by the challenger. If the challenger pur-

sues neither diplomatic nor military initiatives, the status quo persists.

However, we move to the negotiation stage in those cases in which the challenger

has proposednegotiations.Our theoretical analysis in thisnegotiatingphasecenterson

the extent of concessions made by both the challenger and target in a given round of

talks. A policy of no concessions represents an unyielding bargaining position in

which political leaders maintain all territorial claims. Alternatively, leaders may

pursue a more accommodative policy in which they offer limited or even extensive

concessions.

If thechallenger state initiateda military threat in an attempt to alter the status quo,

then a military escalation stage ensues. Thechallenger and target arenow in a military

confrontation, and each state must now decide whether to escalate a military confron-

tation and risk war. The challenger and target choices can be portrayed as falling into

one of two policycategories: (1) low escalation or (2) high escalation. A policyof lowescalation indicatesthata stateengages inatmost limited militarypreparationsand the

buildup of forces beyond initial military actions, even if the other party escalates to

higher levels of military preparedness. Escalation to high levels occurs when thechal-

lenger or target refuses to offer any territorial concessions and mobilizes for a large-




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scale attack or resorts to the large-scale use of force when the other party stands firm

and refuses concessions.Over the duration of a dispute, decision makers make numerous choices regarding

the maintenance of the status quo, strategies for negotiations and dispute settlement,

andthe useof coercivemilitarypressure.Thesechoices regarding diplomacy andmili-

tary forceand the resultingpathways to stalemate, dispute settlement, andwarare

the focus of our analysis in the remainderof this article. We present our hypotheses by

discussing theexpected impact of each independent variableon state behavior in each

of these three stages.

POLITICAL ACCOUNTABILITY MODEL

We beginour theoretical analysis at thedomestic level with a focus on theaccount-

ability of incumbent leaders to domestic political opposition. We provide only a sum-

mary description of themodelhere dueto space limitations (see Huth andAllee2002).

We firstdescribea numberof premises that provide thefoundation forourhypothesis-

building efforts and then move to the presentation of the hypotheses themselves.

THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS

Premise 1: The primacy of retaining office for incumbent leaders. A critical goal of incum-bent leaders is to maintain their position of political leadership and protect their hold onoffice from political opposition.

Building on this firstpremise, we expect politicalleaders tobestrategicin their pur-

suit of both domestic andforeign policies andto try to anticipate thedomesticpolitical

responses to various policies they might adopt. Leaders generally should not beexpectedto choose policies thatmight produce highpoliticalcosts; they should instead

prefer policies that will maintain, if not improve, their political standing.

Premise 2: The strategic behavior of political opposition. In all political systems, there arepolitical elites who seek to remove the current leadership from office and assume posi-tions of political power themselves. Opposition elites, however, are strategic in decidingwhen to challenge incumbents and seek their removal.

We expect that counterelites and political opposition will be more active in chal-

lenging incumbents when the latters foreign policy initiatives have failed or proven

controversial (e.g., Bueno de Mesquita and Siverson 1995; Goemans 2000). To help

understand what foreign policy actions by governments are likely to prove controver-

sial, we argue that the policy preferences of opposition elites and groups in territorialdisputes areoften characterized by what we term apragmatic nationalist bias. Thatis,

a policy of unilateral concessions by state leaders in a territorial dispute is a policy that

generally risks greater domestic political opposition than a policy of continued diplo-

matic stalemate. Furthermore,although the threator useof militaryforce in support of

territorial claims is likely to generate short-term domestic support, costly or failed




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attempts at militarycoercionwillalsomobilizedomesticopposition. Oppositionelites

and mass publics thereforedo not generallyhold more dovishdiplomatic andmilitarypolicy preferences than incumbent leaders. Instead, they simplyseek to punish leaders

who adopt controversial or failed foreign policies.3

Premise 3: Differences in domestic political institutions lead to varying levels of politicalaccountability. The accountability of state leaders varies across and within political sys-temsbecausedifferences in political institutionsaffect theabilityof oppositiongroups tocontest government policies.

We expand on this third premise with two specific claims. First, we believe that

democratic leaders are typically more accountable for their foreign policy choices.

This is because political opposition in democratic regimes is generally more capable

of derailing policy programs and removing leaders from power (Bienen and van de

Walle 1992; Gelpi and Grieco 2001; Bueno de Mesquita and Siverson 1995) due toinstitutions such as well-organized and independent political parties, regular competi-

tive elections, and independent legislatures. Second, the degree of political account-

ability among democratic leaders can vary depending on political conditions. In par-

ticular, we believe two factorselection cycles and differences in the strength of

opposition parties in legislaturesaffect the degree to which democratic leaders are

accountable at any point in time (e.g., Alt and King 1994; Lohmann and OHalloran

1994; Martin 2000; Milner 1997; Powell 2000).

Premise 4: The impact of political vulnerability on foreign policy. The greater the politicalvulnerability of leaders,the higher thepolitical costs to leaders forpursuingcontroversialor unsuccessful foreign policy actions.

We believe that this fourthpremise provides insights into bluffingand deception in

international disputes. Because bluffing is always a possibility in international dis-

putes, state leaders try to judge whether their adversary is in fact bluffing (e.g., Fearon

1994b). Leaders whoareless vulnerable topoliticalopposition shouldbe more willing

to bluff because the domestic political risks of retreating from a clear and firm diplo-

matic or military policy are less extensive.

HYPOTHESES ON COMPARISONS ACROSS POLITICAL SYSTEMS

We now turn to a series of hypotheses that draw on the theoretical framework we

have presented. In this first section, we focus on comparisons between democratic and

nondemocratic regimes.

Hypothesis 1a: The leaders of democratic states should be less willing to rely on militaryforce to achieve territorial goals. As a result, democratic leaders should be


3. We are not convinced that mass opinions are consistently anchored at dovish policy positions, nordo we accept the claim that the foreign policy preferences in the mass public are consistently more dovishthan the preferences of incumbent political elites (e.g., Gaubatz 1995; Holsti 1996; Nincic 1992, chap. 2;Page and Shapiro 1992).



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(a) less likely to initiate military threats as opposed to accepting the status quo, but more

likely to challenge the territorial status quo with a call for negotiations rather than athreat of military force,

(b) more likely to make concessions in negotiations,

(c) less likely to resort to higher levels of escalation in military confrontations.

Because we argue that political opposition in authoritarian systems is less capable

of effectively contesting state policies (see our discussion of premise 3), we expect

political leaders from such countriesto be more willing to adopt more conflictual poli-

cies inan attempt to overturn theterritorialstatus quoby coercive threats andpressure.

Such leaders are not only more willing to escalate the level of force, but they can also

back awayfrom threats with fewerdomesticpolitical costs if thetarget standsfirm(see

our discussion of premise 4). Therefore, we should expect more frequent bluffs and

military probes by nondemocratic leaders to test theresolve of targets, includingmore

frequent threats of force to bolster their bargaining position in negotiations. In con-trast, democratic leaders should bemorecautious aboutinitiating suchmilitaryactions

because limitedmilitaryprobes andbluffs should carry a greater likelihood of political

opponents charging the government with irresolution and a foreign policy setback.

Democratic leaders generally prefer a nonviolent settlement through negotiations

because they view any possible military conflict as potentially more costly than their

nondemocratic counterparts. As a result, although we do believe that territorial con-

cessions canbe politically costly fordemocratic leaders, thegenerallyhigher expected

political costs of threatening and using military force should induce democratic lead-

ers to rely more frequently on offering limited concessions as part of a negotiating

strategy designed to achieve an agreement based on reciprocal compromise.

Hypothesis 1b: The greater domestic audience costs of retreating in the face of diplomatic

and military pressure can provide a bargaining advantage to democratic states. As aresult, we expect leaders to be

(a) less likely to challenge the status quo with military threats against democratic target

states,

(b)morelikelyto offer concessionsinnegotiations when democraticadversariesstrongly

signal their resolve to stand firm,

(c) less likely to escalate to higher levels in military confrontations when democratic

adversaries strongly signal their resolve to use military force.

The logic of hypothesis 1b is that if adversaries know that democratic leaders are

constrained by domestic audience costs to avoid foreign policy retreats under diplo-

matic or military pressure, then they should prefer to target nondemocratic leaders,

who have greater domestic political flexibility to back down in the face of military

threats andprobes. Furthermore, thegreater costs of backing down shouldhelp demo-

cratic leaders to send more credible signals of resolve in rounds of negotiations or in

militaryconfrontations.As a result, if democraticleadersclearly andpubliclycommu-

nicate their intention to stand firm in talks or to use force in a military confrontation,

then their adversaries should believe that they face a resolved opponent and should

adopt less confrontational policies (see Fearon 1994b; Schultz 2001a, 2001b).




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The next two hypotheses build on the general logic supporting hypothesis 1a, but

now we focus on the unwillingness of democratic leaders to offer concessions whendomestic political costs are expected to be high.

Hypothesis2a: Thebargainingstrategies of nondemocratic leaders in responseto stalematesshould be more variable and difficult to predict. In contrast, democratic leaders shouldpursue more consistent policies of

(a) responding to a deadlock in talks by continuing to seek further talks as opposed to

turning to military coercion, but

(b) avoiding a sharpreversal of policy in subsequent negotiations, in which intransigence

is followed by concessions.

In nondemocracies, the limited ability of political opposition to challenge incum-

bent leaders lessens thepolitical costs forsuch leaders of eithermakingconcessions or

turning to military coercion. Thus, nondemocratic leaders should display more diver-gent patterns of diplomatic andmilitary behaviorin decidinghow to respond toa situa-

tionof deadlockednegotiations.Democratic counterparts,however, have less flexibil-

ity in their bargaining position because unilateral or high levels of concessions are

potentially quite costly once negotiations have already ended in deadlock. This is

because we expect both parties to publicly blame the other side for the prior deadlock

in talks. As a result, negotiations in context of continued stalemate become a much

more salient issue domestically for democratic leaders, and opposition elites and seg-

ments of publicopinion are likely to be very critical of offeringconcessions to a trucu-

lent adversary (see our discussion of the pragmatic nationalist bias associated with

premise 2). Threats of military force and coercive bluffing are also potentially more

costly fordemocratic leaders. Therefore, we expect such leaders to be wary of turning

to military threats or offering concessions as way to break a stalemate.

The next hypothesis argues that the greater accountability of democratic leadersunder certain conditions can inducesuch leaders to adopt more conflictual diplomatic

and military policies.

Hypothesis2b: When ethnic conationalspopulatedisputed territory, democratic leaderswillface stronger domestic pressures to adopt hard-line policies than their nondemocraticcounterparts. As a result, democratic leaders should be

(a) more likely to challenge the status quo with calls for talks and military threats and

especially likely to favor military threats over a reliance on negotiations,

(b) less likely to make concessions in negotiations,

(c) more likely to escalate military confrontations to high levels.

On thebasis of earlier findings by Huth (1996) andSaideman (2001), we generally

expect incumbent leaders in all political systems to secure domestic support for back-

ing demands of greater political self-determination when ethnic conationals are

located across international borders in disputed territory. However, we argue further

that democratic leaders will face particularly strong pressures from domestic opposi-

tion groups and public opinion to take forceful initiatives to challenge the status quo

and support their ethnic conationals. We expect the defense of principles of political




10/38

self-determinationtohave a highlevel of legitimacy indemocraticsystems.Therefore,

opposition elites and mass publics will take advantage of their greater ability to applypoliticalpressureto push forsupporting thepolitical rightsof ethnicconationalsin dis-

puted territory. For democratic leaders, the domestic political costs of diplomatic and

military inaction in such circumstances are greater, and thus they are actually more

likely to consider initiating and escalating military threats and to adopt unyielding

positions in negotiations.

HYPOTHESES ON COMPARISONS WITHIN DEMOCRATIC POLITICAL SYSTEMS

In thissection,we present hypothesesthat focuson comparisons amongdemocratic

regimes. Our primary argument is that varying levels of political accountability are

linked to electoral cycles and differences in the strength of opposition parties in legis-

latures and parliaments.

Hypothesis 3a: The presence of strong political opposition forces in legislatures and parlia-ments generallyinduces moreconservativeforeignpolicychoicesby democratic leaders.On the other hand, the stronger the ruling governments position in the legislature, themore likely political leaders are

(a) tochallenge theterritorialstatusquowith calls fortalks andthreatsof force, especially

through the use of threats of military force;

(b) to make concessions in negotiations;

(c) to resort to higher levels of escalation in military confrontations.Hypothesis 3b: As the strength of the ruling governments position in the legislature of a

democratic adversary increases, leaders are

(a) less likely to challenge the territorial status quo with threats of military force and

instead to favor negotiations,

(b) more likely to make concessions in negotiations,

(c) less likely to resort to higher levels of escalation in military confrontations.

Weak party support (e.g., divided government or minority government) should

push democratic leaders away from an active foreign policy and toward the mainte-

nanceof thestatus quo. This is because thelackof a cohesivemajorityin thelegislature

should make a president or prime minister wary of diplomatic or military initiatives.

For one, the executive is likely to lack bargaining flexibility in international negotia-

tions, and therefore stalemate is more likely because a settlement is unlikely to be

based only on the other states unilateral concessions. The same logic applies to deci-

sions to initiatemilitarizeddisputes.The politicalcostsof a militarysetback or thefail-

ure to achieve diplomatic gains as a result of coercive pressure (military probes and

bluffs) arehigher because opposition parties arein a stronger position in thelegislature

or parliament to criticizefailedgovernment policies andmore credibly threaten a vote

of no confidence (for prime ministers). However, if these constrained leaders do chal-

lenge thestatusquoby initiating negotiationsor military threats, then they will seek to

avoid the high politicalcosts associatedwith either accommodative policies (substan-

tial concessions in negotiations) or war (military setback following escalation to high

levels).




11/38

Incontrast,when theexecutives party commands a majority position in thelegisla-

ture, then opposition parties should be in a much weaker position to (a) veto the termsof internationalagreements theydislike, (b)ensure criticismthrough legislative debate

and hearings, and (c) threaten removal in the event of a diplomatic or military retreat.

As a result, democratic leaders with greater politicalsecurityshould bemore willing to

pursue controversial policies such as making concessions in negotiations or initiating

and escalating military confrontations.

In hypothesis 3b, we argue that secure democratic governments are more likely to

be the targets of calls for talks based on theexpectation that they canofferconcessions

andstill securedomesticratification. It follows, then, that adversaries will view secure

democratic governments as more politically capable partners for trying to achieve a

negotiated settlement. The important task for a countrys leaders is to calculate the

most opportune time to put offers of concessions on the negotiating table that will be

reciprocated by their negotiating partner. Political leaders do not want to incur the

political heat at home for offering concessions unless they believe their negotiating

partner can withstand the same type of domestic political pressure in their battle for

ratification andapproval of any agreement. If leaders expect a negotiated agreementto

unravel due to domestic opposition in theother country, then they have few incentives

to expose themselves politically to charges of selling out from their own domestic

opposition.

Because of the greater political flexibility of secure democratic leaders, one might

argue that such leaders aremore likelyto be targets of threats andhigher levels of esca-

lation. The argument would be that if opponents know that secure democratic leaders

are better able to fight off domestic opposition following a military retreat, then these

opponents should be more willing to probe, bluff, and even escalate. Although this

logic is plausible, we emphasize the military risks associated with gambling that a

secure leadership in another country will back down under militarypressure or accept

a limited military defeat. We would only expect risk-acceptant states to gamble by

challenging secure adversaries, yet we do not think that most states are consistently

risk acceptant in this way.

The next set of hypotheses considers the effects of elections on foreign policy

choices.

Hypothesis 4a: The more recently national elections have been held, the more likely areincumbent leaders to

(a) challenge the territorial status quo, especially through a threat of military action;

(b) make concessions in negotiations;

(c) resort to higher levels of escalation in military confrontations.Hypothesis4b: Themore recentlynational elections have beenheld ina democratic state, the

more likely are adversaries of that democratic state to

(a) challenge the territorial status quo with calls for talks instead of threats of militaryaction,

(b) make concessions in negotiations,

(c) avoid higher levels of escalation in military confrontations.




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Competitive elections and the threat of electoral defeat can be powerful sources of

political accountability for democratic leaders. Opposition parties and elites can beexpected to draw on controversial issues and setbacks in foreign policy to try to con-

vincevoters that incumbentsshould be removed. International agreements containing

territorial concessions or failed military initiatives to change the territorial status quo

arethe types of foreign policy issues that opposition groupsshouldseizeon inan effort

to discredit incumbents. Because leaders are aware of the electoral risks associated

with such policies, we should expect a pattern to emerge between the timing of elec-

tionsand thediplomatic andmilitarypoliciespursued by leaders in territorial disputes.

In hypothesis 4a, the logic is that the accountability induced by elections should be

greater when democratic leaders expect to face elections relatively soon.4 In contrast,

when elections are not expected for some time, then the threat of electoral defeat

should have weaker political effects (e.g., Gaubatz 1999; Milner and Rosendorff

1997). Therefore, the more recently national elections have been held, the more will-

ing incumbents shouldbe to adopt an active foreign policy in which they seek negotia-

tions or threaten the use of force in an attempt to change the status quo. Furthermore,

democratic leaders should be more willing to make concessions in negotiations and

resort to higher levels of escalation in military confrontations in the periods shortly

after national elections.

Preciselybecause democratic leaders are lessconstrained in theperiod shortly after

elections and more capable of withstanding the political fallout of more accommoda-

tive policies, we argue in hypothesis 4b that other states will recognize this and judge

this to be a favorable time to seek a negotiated agreement based on the logic we devel-

oped in support of hypothesis 3b. As a result, it makes political sense for state leaders

to offer concessions to democratic negotiators when theybelieve thatdemocratic lead-

ers are less constrained by the political risks of concession making (i.e., elections are

not expected to be held soon). Conversely, when democratic leaders face upcoming

elections, they shouldshyaway from territorial concessions in negotiations. Knowing

this, adversaries should be less willing to offer concessions themselves.

When we consider the effects of recent elections in a democratic adversary on the

choices of state leaders to initiateor escalate theuse of military force,we encounterthe

same opposing arguments about what to expect as discussed above for hypothesis 3b.

Again,although it is possible that other statesmight be tempted to initiate andescalate

military challenges against democratic governments that have recently held elections

in an attempt to pressure secure leaders into makingterritorial concessions by military

bluffs or theuse of force,we believe this is a quite riskystrategy. Instead, we argue that

adversaries would be less likely to initiate and escalate military confrontations

because they areworried that politically securedemocratic leaders aremore willing to

risk a military conflict to defend their territorial claims.


4. Of course, in presidential systems, the time period between elections is fixed and thus known inadvance. In parliamentary systems, electionsmust be held withina certain periodof time, but exactly whenthey will be held is likely to be a function of a range of political conditions. Despite the greater uncertaintyfacing leaders in sucha situation, thegeneral logic of theargumentstill holds. Onceelections have occurred,they are unlikely to be held again within a short period of time.



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HYPOTHESES ON COMPARISONS AMONG DYADS

In this last section, the hypotheses focus on the political institutions of both chal-

lenger and target and how they influence patterns of strategic interaction.

Hypothesis5: Lower levelsof diplomatic andmilitaryconflictare expected in territorial dis-putes between two democratic states. As a result, state leaders in democratic dyadsshould be

(a) less likely to initiate military challenges and more likely to seek negotiations,

(b) more likely to make concessions in negotiations over disputed territory,

(c) less likely to resort to higher levels of escalation in military conflicts over disputed

territory.

The logic of hypothesis 5 extends the reasoning presented in support of hypothesis

1a by considering the effects of high levels of political accountability in both chal-

lengerandtarget states. When foreign policy leaders in both states face politicaloppo-sition forces that are in relatively strong positions to hold them responsible for pursu-

ing policies in territorial disputes that prove controversial or fail, we should expect

decision makers to be particularly wary of the political costs associated with active

military policies. As a result, democratic leaders should be worried about thepolitical

dangers that crises and the large-scale use of military force entail (i.e., the audience

costs to be borne for backing down or suffering high losses in a war), and each side

shouldbe less inclined to initiate military threats. Instead of relying on military threats

and coercion, democratic leaders should turn to negotiations more frequently. Never-

theless, the political costs of conceding territory should compel democratic negotia-

tors to avoid unilateral concessions and instead to favor mutual compromise as a way

to secure domestic support for a territorial settlement despite criticism by political

opponents who reject any territorial concessions.

The next hypothesis considers diplomatic and military interactions in territorial

disputes between mixed dyads (i.e., disputes between a democratic and an authoritar-

ian state).

Hypothesis6a: In mixeddyads, militaryconfrontationsgenerally result fromnondemocraticchallengers threatening democratic targets.

Hypothesis6b: In mixeddyads, the resortto high levels ofescalation ina militaryconfronta-tion is most likely by nondemocratic leaders against democratic adversaries.

The argument of hypotheses 6a and 6b is that in territorial disputes between demo-

cratic andnondemocratic states, it is thedecisions of nondemocratic leaders that typi-

cally lead to military confrontations andhigher levels of military escalation. The logic

centers on themore limited politicalcoststhatnondemocratic leaders faceboth in initi-

ating military probes and bluffs and resorting to the large-scale use of force (see ourdiscussion of premises 3 and 4). As a result, if military conflict is frequent within

mixed dyads, theprimary explanation is not that democratic statesoften adopt aggres-

sive policies or that democratic states are targeted because they are vulnerable to




14/38

coercive pressure. Rather, military conflict occurs because nondemocratic states are

less constrained in initiating and escalating the use of force.

ESTIMATION AND RESULTS

Now we examine theperformanceof thepolitical accountabilitymodel as an expla-

nation for the behavior of states during the various stages of territorial disputes. We

should note that when we test each variant of the political accountability model, we

also include in thestatistical model a numberof commoncontrol variables that attempt

to capture the international strategic environment in which states interact. These vari-

ables include measures of commonsecurity ties, thevalueof thedisputed territory, the

military balance between the two states, and each states involvement in other milita-

rized disputes.5

Once again, we are interested in three decisions: (1) the decision of challenger

states regarding whether and how to challenge the territorial status quo, (2) the deci-

sions of both challengers and targets to offer concessions during rounds of talks over

thedisputed territory, and(3) thedecisions of challengers andtargets to escalate initial

military confrontations by resorting to higher levels of force. We investigate these dif-

ferent stages and test our hypotheses through a series of quantitative tests using our

data set on 348 territorial disputes that span the period from 1919 to 1995.

It is useful to begin by describing a few features of our data. First, we pinpoint the

outcomes and dates of all rounds of talks and all military confrontations between the

challenger andtarget ineach dispute,andthenwe measure allsuchactions on a month-

specific basis. Instead of using an annual observation to summarize the outcomes of

anytalksor military confrontations that might have taken place duringthat year,we let

the actual rounds of negotiations and military confrontations serve as the units of

observation. This allows us to identify and code multiple foreign policy actions over

disputed territory that take place within a given year.6

Because the actual episodes

themselves serveas theunit of analysis,we areable tomore easilyaccommodatesitua-

tions in which a given round of negotiations or military confrontation spills over into

the next year (see Bennett and Stam 2000). Furthermore, nearly all explanatory vari-

ables in our data set are also measured in a month-specific manner. This allows us to

more accurately capture the timingof important events, such as any foreign policy ini-

tiativesconcerning thedisputedterritory. We canalso pinpoint more preciselythe tim-

ing of important domestic political shiftssuch as elections, changes in domestic

coalitions, or broader changes in regime typethat take place withina given year. The


5. See Huth and Allee (2002, chap. 3) for a more detailed description of these international political

and military variables.6. In our data set, there are 211 instances in which multiple foreign policy initiatives concerning dis-

puted territoryare initiated within thesame year. Forexample, two statesmightholdtalks twice in1 year,ora pair of states might engage in negotiations over disputed territory in March, only to see the challengermobilize troops against the target in October.



15/38

month-specific natureof our data also ensures that the sequencing of importantevents

is captured accurately.Although we employ a different statistical model for the status quo stage as

opposed to the negotiation and military escalation stages, several model estimation

features are common across the three stages. First, for each stage, we estimate three

separate statistical models to test the various hypotheses from the political account-

ability model. These three models mirror the distinctions between accountability-

based arguments we made in the earlier theoretical section. We estimate an across-

regimes model, a within-regimes model, and then a dyadic model. Dividing the

estimation in this manner makes themost sense conceptuallyand is themost effective

way to test such a wide range of arguments. When estimating each model, we also

include the set of international political-military variables described at the beginning

of this section. Furthermore, due to the nonlinear nature of all of our models, we also

present a series of predictedprobability results to provide a more substantive interpre-

tation of variable effects (see Tables 4, 8, and 12). We estimate the impact of discrete

changes in particular variables on the predicted probability of certain outcomes by

holding all other variables constant. Although the coefficient results for each econo-

metric model generally provide a basic sense of the estimated direction and signifi-

canceof hypothesized relationships, these predictedprobability results are often more

substantively meaningful. Finally, we estimate all models using Huber or robust

standard errors due to concerns with possible contemporaneous correlation and

nonconstant variances across the units of observation.7

ESTIMATION OF THE CHALLENGE THE STATUS QUO STAGE

Ourfirst questionconcerns thedecisionof challenger statesto initiatediplomatic or

military actions in pursuit of their countrys claims to disputed territory. There are

three distinct options available to the leaders of challenger states: (1) refrain from any

initiatives and maintain the status quo, (2) propose talks and rely on negotiations in an

attempt the alter the status quo, and (3) resort to threats of military force in support of

territorial claims. Because these three choices are not clearly ordered, we require a

model that treats outcomes as nominal instead of ordinal (Long 1997, chap. 6). As a

result, we estimate a series of multinomial logit models to explain the decisions of

leaders in the challenge the status quo stage. The primary drawback of multinomial

logit is the fairly restrictive independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) assumption.

However, we employthe twobest-known tests for the IIAassumption andfind no evi-

dence to reject IIA in any of our models.8


7. Because theobservations inour data setspandifferentnumbersof months, we areespeciallysensi-tive to concerns with heteroscedasticity.

8. The independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) assumption is met when an individuals prefer-ences among alternatives remain consistent regardless of which choices are or are not available (seeMcFadden 1981). We employ both the Hausman and the Small-Hsiao tests to examine the IIA assumption(HausmanandMcFadden1984;Small andHsiao 1985). Inallcases, we performthetests afterfirsteliminat-ing theoptionof negotiationsandthen theoptionof militaryforce. At times, we obtain a negative chi-squarestatistic, which Hausman and McFadden (1984, 1226) claim should be interpreted as evidence that IIA hasnot been violated.



16/38

We endup with 6,542 observationsfor thechallenge the status quostage. There are

1,782 cases in which a challenger initiates a round of talks and 390 cases in which achallenger initiates the use of force. For operational purposes, information on inde-

pendent variables for the challenge the status quo stage is drawn from the month in

which the challenger initiates a militarized confrontation or a round of talks begins.

Cases in which the challenger does not challenge the status quo are more difficult to

conceptualize and operationalize. We use a 12-month rule, which holds that if 12

months have elapsed since a challenger state has threatened force or called for talks,

then it is considered to have done nothing during that period of time. That period is

then included in the data set as a case in which no challenge was made.9Each succes-

sive12monthsof activityis treated in thesamewayuntilthe stateonce againcalls fora

new round of talks or threatens force.10

Finally, the temporal structure of the data also

raises some concerns about serial correlation. In the spirit of Beck, Katz, and Tucker

(1998), we include a variable to count the number of months since the challenger last

undertook some activitywhether it was a call for talks or threat of force (see also

Beck 1998). This variable serves primarily as a control for the impact of time and past

history on decisions to challenge the status quo.

RESULTS FOR THE CHALLENGE THE STATUS QUO STAGE

The multinomial logit results are presented in Tables 1 through 3. In each of these

models, we set the choice to accept the status quo as the baseline category, which gen-

erates results that compare theoptions of doing nothing versus both pursuing negotia-

tions and initiating force. However, because we also care about the choice between

challenging through talks versus force, we also present results for this direct compari-

son.11

Tables1 through 3 contain threecolumns of coefficientresults that compare each

choice to the remaining two options. The impact of discrete changes in hypothesized

variables on theprobabilityof calls fornegotiations andthreats of force is summarized

in Table 4.

We first examine the results of the political accountability model hypotheses (see

Tables 1-3). In sum, thevery clear overall conclusion we draw is that democratic lead-

ersare much less likelyto turn to threats of force inattempt tochangethe territorial sta-

tus quoand areconsiderablymore likely to challenge the territorial status quo by call-

ing for negotiations. These results hold in both the monadic and dyadic contexts and


9. Inthiscase,we randomlysample oneof themonthsduring thisperiod ofno challengeand includeit as an observation in the operational challenge the status quo stage data set.

10. We also consider and employ a number of additional specifications for the decision not to chal-lenge. Oneoptionis touse a modifiedversionof the12-month rule, inwhichcasethe 12-monthruleis usedforup to5 yearsaftersomeaction and3 orfewer yearsbefore some observable action. Thelogic isthatstatesare onlylikelyto activelyconsidercontesting territorywhen the territorial issueis salient as opposed to dor-

mant. Yet another strategy is to randomly sample periods of inactivity from the months in which no actionwas taken. We include varying numbers of random no-challenge cases and find only negligible differ-encesbased on thenumberof random observationsincluded. As a result,we find theresultsfor thechallengethe status quo stage to be remarkably stable regardless of the coding rule we employ for including observa-tions in which no challenge was made.

11. The comparison of talks versus force is a straightforward transformation of the same model (seeLiao 1994).



17/38

suggest that democracies arenotmore passive; they simplychoose theroute of negoti-

ations to pursue their territorial claims. We also see that democracies tend to propose

negotiations right after elections have been held in either state, and in some scenarios,

democratic leaders actually become more likely to turn to force when there may bedomestic political benefits for doing so.

First, we find strong support for the broad democratic peace argument that democ-

racies are less likely touse force (hypotheses 1a and 5). In our model, democracies are

less likelyto turn to force than toacceptthe statusquoor call fortalks. Thecoefficients

comparing force with other options are negative and statistically significant for both


TABLE 1

Multinomial Logit Model of Challenger Decisions to Challenge the Status Quo:Political Accountability ModelComparing Differences across Regimes

Talks vs. Force vs.

No Action No Action Force vs. Talks

Political accountability across-regimes variables

Challenger democracy level .018

.056

.074

(.006) (.012) (.013)

Target democracy level .002 .005 .003

(.004) (.008) (.008)

Challenger Democracy Stalemate .003 .014 .011

(.010) (.018) (.018)

Control for recent stalemate .450*** .332

.119

(.127) (.209) (.216)

Challenger Democracy Ethnic Ties .015 .049 .034(.008) (.016) (.016)

Control for ethnic ties .144

.258

.114

(.099) (.169) (.180)

International politics variables

Common security ties .050 .431

.381

(.063) (.130) (.135)

Strategic value of territory .196

.365

.168

(.067) (.119) (.125)

Challenger involved in other dispute .101

.503*** .603***

(.074) (.126) (.133)

Target involved in other dispute .020 .322

.342

(.068) (.129) (.135)

Military balance .012 1.48

1.49

(.125) (.218) (.230)

Months since last challenge .006

.016

.009***(.001) (.003) (.003)

Constant .755*** 3.22*** 2.47***

(.088) (.199) (.205)

NOTE: Robuststandarderrors inparentheses.N= 6,542. Loglikelihood= 4796.27. Hausman testfor inde-pendenceof irrelevant alternatives(IIA): droptalks:

2=7.88(df=13),p = .85, donot rejectIIA;dropforce:

2

= .22(df= 13), donot rejectIIA.Small-Hsiaotestfor IIA: drop talks:2

= 11.08 (df= 13),p =.61,donotreject IIA; drop force:

2= 13.32 (df= 13),p = .42, do not reject IIA.

***p < .01, two-tailed.p < .10, one-tailed.

p < .05, one-tailed.




18/38

democratic challengers (see Table 1) and democratic challengers in democratic dyads

(seeTable3).12

Thesubstantivedifferencesacross regimesarestriking.Verynondemo-

cratic challengers are more than three times more likely to issue threats of force than

very democratic challengers (see Table 4). Similarly, challengers in nondemocraticdyads are more than two-and-a-half times as likely to issue threats of force to pursue

territorial claims than arechallengersin democratic dyads (see Table 4).Thesegeneral


TABLE 2

Multinomial Logit Model of Challenger Decisions to Contestthe Territorial Status Quo: Political Accountability Model

Comparing Differences within Democratic Regimes

Talks vs. Force vs.


Political accountability within-regimes variables

Strength of challenger ruling coalition .001 .010 .011

(.003) (.010) (.010)

Strength of target ruling coalition .001 .004 .005

(.002) (.005) (.006)

Months since elections in challenger .008

.011

.002

(.003) (.007) (.007)

Recent elections in target .219

.002 .221

(.092) (.194) (.202)

Control for challenger democracy .670*** .949* 1.62***

(.204) (.624) (.632)

Control for target democracy .075 .155 .229

(.168) (.363) (.378)


Common security ties .101 .528

.428

(.063) (.126) (.132)

Strategic value of territory .157

.315

.158

(.066) (.116) (.122)


.480*** .589***

(.074) (.125) (.133)


.410

(.067) (.129) (.136)


1.32

(.124) (.214) (.228)Months since last challenge .007

.017

.010***

(.001) (.003) (.003)

Constant .581*** 2.35*** 1.77***

(.080) (.157) (.164)

NOTE: Robuststandarderrors inparentheses.N= 6,542. Loglikelihood= 4830.15. Hausman testfor inde-pendenceof irrelevant alternatives(IIA): droptalks:

2=6.49(df=13),p = .93, donot rejectIIA;dropforce:

2

= .13(df= 13), donot rejectIIA.Small-Hsiaotestfor IIA: drop talks:2

= 18.98 (df= 13),p =.12,donotreject IIA; drop force:


*p < .10, two-tailed. ***p < .01, two-tailed.p < .10, one-tailed.


12. These results for monadic and dyadic democracy remain strong under a variety of model specifi-cations, including when we omit the various interaction terms that include a democracy component.



19/38

patterns also apply to mixed dyads (hypothesis 6a). A nondemocratic challenger in a

mixed dyad is more than 65%more likely to turn to force than a democratic challenger

in a mixed dyad (see Table 4).

However, democracies in general aremuch more likely to turn to negotiations in an

attempt tochangethe territorial statusquo (hypotheses 1aand5). This resultalsoholds

across both themonadic anddyadic specifications. The coefficients thatcompare talks

both with accepting the status quo and threatening force are in the predicted direction

and statistically significant (seeTables1 and 3).Substantively, democratic challengers

are nearly 35% more likely to call for negotiations than nondemocratic challengers,and challengers in democratic dyads are more than 41% more likely to issue calls for

negotiations than challengers in nondemocratic dyads (see Table 4).

Oneinteresting resultfrom theacross-regimes model (see Table 1) is that democra-

ciesare infact willing to turnto force whenthey share ethnictieswith those who popu-

late the disputed territory (hypothesis 2b). When the disputed territory is populated


TABLE 3

Multinomial Logit Model of Challenger Decisions to Contest the Territorial StatusQuo: Political Accountability ModelComparing Differences across Dyads

Talks vs. Force vs.


Political accountability dyadic variables

Democratic dyads .477

.876

1.35

(.094) (.246) (.251)

Nondemocratic state in mixed dyad .304*** .426

.730

(.104) (.215) (.224)

Control for mixed dyad .322*** .467** .789***

(.092) (.186) (.193)


Common security ties .105

.550

.445

(.062) (.126) (.132)Strategic value of territory .162

.328

.166

(.066) (.116) (.122)


.479*** .590***

(.074) (.124) (.132)


.408

(.068) (.129) (.136)


1.33

(.124) (.214) (.227)

Months since last challenge .007

.017

.010***

(.001) (.003) (.003)

Constant .563*** 2.37*** 1.81***

(.081) (.157) (.164)

NOTE: Robuststandarderrors inparentheses.N= 6,542. Loglikelihood= 4830.15. Hausman testfor inde-pendence for irrelevant alternatives (IIA): drop talks:

2= 5.97 (df= 10),p = .82, do not reject IIA; drop

force:2 = .19(df= 10), donot rejectIIA.Small-Hsiaotestfor IIA: drop talks:2 =11.53(df= 10),p = .32,do not reject IIA; drop force:


**p < .05,two-tailed.***p < .01,two-tailed.p < .10,one-tailed.

p < .05,one-tailed.

p < .01,one-tailed.



20/38

withethnic conationals, democratic challengers nowbecome morethantwiceas likely

to threaten force compared with nondemocratic challengers (see Table 4). According

toourdata,democratic leaders insuch scenariosstanda 14.4% probabilityof threaten-

ing force,whereas nondemocratic leaders arepredicted to threaten force only 6.5% ofthe time.

13


TABLE 4

The Impact of Selected Significant Variables on Challenger Decisions to Contestthe Status Quo through Calls for Negotiations or Threats of Force (in percentages)

Initial Postchange Change in % Change in

Probability Probability Probabilities Probabilities

Probability of calls for negotiations

Challenger democracy (very

nondemocratic very democratic) 26.7 36.0 +9.3 +34.8

Challenger Democracy Ethnic Ties

(very nondemocratic very democratic) 27.0 30.2 +3.2 +11.9

Time since elections in challenger

(elections 6 months ago elections

4 years ago) 42.5 34.7 7.8 18.4

Recent election in target (no yes) 28.7 33.3 +4.6 +16.0

Democratic dyad (nondemocratic dyad democratic dyad) 29.4 41.6 +12.2 +41.5

Strategic value of territory (no yes) 26.9 30.4 +3.5 +13.0

Probability of threats of force

Challenger democracy (very

nondemocratic very democratic) 8.1 2.5 5.6 69.1

Challenger Democracy Ethnic Ties (very

nondemocratic very democratic) 6.5 14.4 +7.9 +121.5

Time since elections in challenger

(elections 6 months ago elections

4 years ago) 3.5 2.6 0.9 25.7

Democratic dyad (change from a

nondemocratic dyad) 6.5 2.4 4.1 63.1

Nondemocratic challenger in mixed dyad

(change from a democratic challenger

in mixed dyad) 3.8 6.3 +2.5 +65.8Strategic value of territory (no yes) 3.8 5.1 +1.3 +34.2

Security ties (no common TD opponent

common TD opponent) 5.1 3.4 1.7 33.3

Military balance (1 to 10 disadvantage

10 to 1 advantage) 3.3 10.3 +7.0 +212.1

NOTE: Unless specifiedotherwise, the territoryis consideredto be of strategicvalue to bothstates, themili-tary balance is 3:2 in favor of the target, anddemocratic governmentsare assumed to hold a 55%legislativemajority andto have wonan election 2 years ago. Allother variables are setto medianvalues.TD = territo-rial dispute.

13. These probabilities representthe impactof democracyonly in thepresence of ethnicties,remov-ing the impact of democracy in anyother way. All otherdemocracy-basedinteraction term probabilities areexamined in a similar manner.



21/38

Among democratic states, electoralcycles (hypotheses 4a and4b)also help explain

whenchallengers are likely to challenge the territorial status quo,especially by turningto negotiations (see Table 2).Many of thehypothesizedrelationships about the impact

of election timing are significant and in the predicted direction. As challenger states

begin to approach elections, they become more conservative and less likely to issue

any form of territorial challenge. Democratic leaders in challenger states are nearly

20% less likely to call for negotiations near the end of an electoral cycle and 25% less

likely to threaten force to pursue territorial claimswhen they face upcoming elections.

Similarly, the electoral cycle in target states also affects the challengers calculations.

Challengers are16% more likely to pursue talks right after the target has recently held

an election as opposed to when the target is nearing a general election.

We now turn to the results for the control variables relating to international

political-military conditions. The impact of these variables is robust across the three

different specifications of the political accountability model (see Tables 1-3).14

On the

whole, these variables provide a strong explanation for decisions by challengers to

employ threats of force to pursue their territorial claims, yet they say very little about

challenger decisions to use negotiations to address territorial claims. Four of the five

variablesregarding threats of militaryforcereceive strong support. Ingeneral,military

threats to the territorial status quo are more likely when the territory has strategic

value, themilitary balance favors thechallenger,and the target is currently involved in

another militarized dispute. For example, challengers are 34% more likely to turn to

military force in at attempt to acquire strategically valuable territory. In addition,chal-

lengers are more than three times as likely to threaten force to acquire disputed terri-

tory when they have a sizable military advantage compared with situations in which

they are at a significant military disadvantage (see Table 4). On the other hand, chal-

lengers are less likely to issues coercive challenges to the territorial status quo when

they share common security ties with the target. In fact, the likelihood of a military

challengedrops by one-thirdwhen the two statesare in other territorial disputes with a

common opponent (see Table 4).

ESTIMATION OF THE NEGOTIATION AND ESCALATION STAGES

If thechallenger decides to challenge thestatusquoeither through a call fornegoti-

ations or a threat of force, our analysis shifts to examining the outcomes of these

rounds of talks and military confrontations, respectively. Unlike thechallenge the sta-

tus quo stage, here we consider decisions made by both the challenger and the target.

However, we do not analyze rounds of talks and militarized disputes dyadically or

attempt to code or explain a joint outcome for a pair of states. Instead, we code a

separate outcome (either degree of concessions or level of escalation) for both the

challenger and target. This allows us to understand how particular variables affect the


14. As a general rule, for purposes of consistency, we use the estimated results from the across-regimes version of the political accountability model to interpret the significance of the internationalpolitical-militaryvariables and calculate the impact of changes in thesevariableson the predictedprobabil-ity of the various outcomes of interest.



22/38

decision-making calculus of each state. The difficult task, however, is to find a way to

consider challenger and target decisions separately, yet to incorporate the fact that thetwo states decisions are related (Signorino 1999; Smith 1999).

15

We believe that a seemingly unrelatedbivariate probitmodel provides a usefulway

to estimate the separate but interrelated decisions of two states in a dispute.16

In fact,

this versionof thebivariate probitmodelprovides a uniqueset of estimates forboth the

challenger and target, yet it incorporates the correlation between the disturbances of

the two states equations and provides an estimate of the magnitude of this relation-

ship.17

Therefore, we estimatea seriesof bivariateprobitmodels to examine thebehav-

ior of both challengers and targets during rounds of talks or militarized disputes.

We should notea fewadditional issues regardingtheoperationalizationand estima-

tion of the negotiation and escalation stages. Because conditions may change during

the course of a lengthy round of negotiations or a protracted military conflict, the data

for the observations used in the estimation of these two stages are drawn from the last

month of each episode.18 This serves to update changes in the data from the beginning

of the episode. In addition, the number of observations for the negotiation and escala-

tion stagesis slightly lowerthan thecorrespondingnumberof calls fortalksand threats

of force found in the challenge the status quo stage. This can be attributed to the fact

that in some disputes, both states have territorial claims, and both can be considered

challengers.In a handful of statusquo stage cases, it is notpossibleto determinewhich

state initiated the round of talks or military action, and therefore both states are coded

as having challenged the territorial statusquo. Forthe negotiation andescalation stage

analysis, then, oneof these two observations is randomly dropped from thedata set. A

final point is that theanalysis of outcomes of talks and militarized disputes raises pos-

sible concerns with selectionbias because a challengers decision to offerconcessions

or escalate force could be linked to its initial choice in the challenge the status quo

stage.As a result, wealso estimatea Heckman orcensored probitmodelfor thechal-

lenger to examine whether factors that affect a challengers decision to call for talks or

threaten force are also related to its subsequent decision regarding whether to make

concessions in talks or escalate force (Heckman1979).In nearlyall cases,thereis little

evidence of selection effects biasing our results. Nevertheless, we do note a few

instances in which the impact of particular variables on challenger concession and

escalation decisions is affectedsomewhat once we account for theimpact of such vari-

ables on the selection equation.


15. The use of directed dyads is one way to analyze the behavior of two disputants, yet the twodirectional observations are not independent, and the disturbances across the two observations are likely tobe correlated.

16. SeeGreene (1997,906-11)for a general discussion ofbivariateprobitand Smith(1999) fora spe-cific discussion of bivariate models and the interrelatedness of state decisions.

17. Bivariate probit is sometimes used as a method for estimating two potentially interrelated deci-sions of thesame actor (see Reed 2000).Yet bivariate probitis also an appropriate methodfor modeling therelated actions of two separate actors (see Zorn 2002).

18. Recallthatthe data used toexplainchallenger decisionsto challengethe statusquoare taken fromthebeginningmonth of theroundof talks ormilitarizeddispute,when theactual challengewas first made.



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RESULTS FOR THE NEGOTIATION STAGE

We now examine the decisions of challenger and target states to offer concessions

in negotiations over disputed territory. In total, there are 1,528 rounds of negotiations

in ourdata set. Concessions areofferedby challengers in 37%of thecases (568/1,528)

andby targets in just under 36%of cases (545/1,528).Because theprevailing policy is

to refrain from offering concessions, we are particularly interested to see when states

actually become willing to offer concessions. Once again, we estimate three variants

of the political accountability model. Our general conclusion is that control variables

for international political-military conditions provide little explanation for the deci-

sions that states make regarding negotiations over disputed territory. To understand

why states make concessions during talks over disputed territory, we must examine

leaders domestic political motivations for making concessions. In fact, many of the

accountability-based hypotheses that focus on differences both across regimes and

within democratic regimes receive considerable support as explanations for negotia-tion behavior. There is also considerable support for the use of the bivariate probit

models. Eachof the threeaccountability-based models produces a statistically signifi-

cant rhoof approximately .85, which indicatesthat thechallenger andtarget escalation

decisions are highly correlated.19

Furthermore, the three Heckman probit equations

generate small and statistically insignificant estimates of rho, which allays our con-

cerns with possible selection bias.20

In fact, none of the statistically significant esti-

mated relationships from thebivariateprobitmodels arecalled into questionby coeffi-

cient estimates from the Heckman selection models.

We present thechallenger results from the three bivariate probitmodels in Tables 5

through 7. Table 8 contains predicted probability estimates of the impact of discrete

changes in hypothesized independent variables.

The hypothesis that democracies are typically more likely to make concessions

(hypothesis 1a) receives some support. The coefficient on democracy level (in the tar-get concession equation) is positive and statistically significant (see Table 5). In fact,

strongly democratic targets are more than 67% more likely to make concessions in

talks over disputed territory than are strongly nondemocratic targets (see Table 8).

There is some suggestive evidence that democratic challengers also are more likely to

make concessions, although the coefficient on level of democracy in the challenger

equation is not statistically significant. Nevertheless, the impact of challenger democ-

racy does appear positive and statistically significant when we estimate a Heckman

probit model for the challenger to check for the existence of any selection effects.21


19. Formally, the large and statistically significant rho indicates thatvariables omitted fromthe equa-tionto predict challengerconcessionsare highlycorrelatedwiththose variablesomittedfromtheequationtopredict target concessions.

20. The estimated rho for the across, within, and dyadic models ranges from .16 to .21. None of thethree Wald tests for dependence between the status quo stage disturbances and the negotiation stage distur-bances are statistically significant.

21. In fact, in the Heckman model, the coefficient for the impact of challenger democracy on chal-lenger concessions is positive, and thep value is .04. We are hesitant to place too much emphasis on thisresult because it does not account for challenger and target interdependence in any way, yet the finding issuggestive when placed in a broader context.



24/38

We also find solid support for the idea that democratic leaders becomeless likely to

offer concessions when issues at stake are politically salient or when making conces-

sions might be quite controversial domestically (hypotheses 2a and 2b). Both demo-

cratic challengers and targets are less likely to make concessions when they share eth-

nic ties with the population in the disputed territory (see Table 5). Democratic leadersin challenger states are 25% less likely to offer concessions when politically salient

concerns with ethnic conationals are present. Democratic targets are nearly 30% less

likely than their nondemocratic counterparts to make concessions under similar cir-

cumstances (see Table 8).There is also some support forthe idea that democratic lead-


TABLE 5

Results from Bivariate Probit Model of Challenger and TargetDecisions to Offer Concessions in Negotiations over Disputed Territory:

Political Accountability ModelComparing Differences across Regimes

Challenger Decision Target Decision

to Offer Concessions to Offer Concessions

Political accountability across-regimes variables

Democracy level .003 .023

(.005) (.005)

Democracy Level Stalemate .004 .014

(.007) (.007)

Democracy Level Ethnic Ties .014

.013

(.007) (.007)

Target Democracy Signal of Resolve .014

(.007)

Control for recent stalemate .095

.013

(.067) (.070)

Control for ethnic ties .096

.036

(.057) (.058)

Control for signal of resolve .017

(.079)



.189

(.081) (.083)

Strategic value of territory .049 .053

(.063) (.062)

Challenger involved in other dispute .074 .039

(.086) (.085)


(.078) (.078)Military balance .805*** .728

(.140) (.141)

Constant .613*** .016

(.105) (.102)

NOTE: Robust standard errors in parentheses. = .864. Wald test of:p = .00. Number of observations =1,528. Log likelihood = 1629.04.

***p < .01, two-tailed.p < .10, one-tailed.





25/38

ers find it more difficult to break stalemates by offering concessions. Compared to

nondemocratic targets,democratic targets are30% less likelyto make concessions ina

current round of talks when there has been a stalemate in talks within the past 2 years

(see Table 8). The corresponding relationship for challengers is also negative yet not

statistically significant. However, the estimated result for a Heckman model once

again bolsters support for this hypothesis.22

The idea that democratic signals of intran-

sigence are particularly credible receives strong support (hypothesis 1b). Challengersaremore likelyto make concessions when a democratic targetsignals an initial unwill-

ingness to make concessions compared to when a similar signal is sent by a very non-


TABLE 6

Results from Bivariate Probit Model of Challenger and TargetDecisions to Offer Concessions in Negotiations over Disputed Territory:

Political Accountability ModelComparing Differences within Regimes

Challenger Decision Target Decision

to Offer Concessions to Offer Concessions

Political accountability within-regimes variables

Strength of challenger ruling government .012

.010

(.004) (.004)

Strength of target ruling government .001 .000

(.003) (.003)

Time since elections in challenger .008

.002

(.004) (.003)

Time since elections in target .005

.003

(.003) (.003)

Control for challenger democracy .584** .547**

(.246) (.237)

Control for target democracy .433

.313

(.190) (.192)



.190

(.082) (.082)

Strategic value of territory .032 .034

(.064) (.062)

Challenger involved in other dispute .074 .029

(.087) (.086)


(.079) (.078)

Military balance .849*** .718

(.143) (.143)Constant .744*** .083

(.088) (.101)

NOTE: Robust standard errors in parentheses. = .854. Wald test of:p = .00. Number of observations =1,528. Log likelihood = 1628.47.

**p < .05,two-tailed.***p < .01,two-tailed.p < .10,one-tailed.

p < .05,one-tailed.

p < .01,one-tailed.

22. Thecoefficientfor Challenger DemocracyRecent Stalemateis negative, withap valueof .10fora Heckman model of challenger concessions that accounts for the selection into the negotiation stage.

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