I: emporaryology Theont C Contemporary Theology I: ST503 Hegel to Death ... · Tillich: Doctrine of God Contemporary Theology I: Hegel to Death of God Theologies In my last lecture,

Contemporary Theology I:

Transcript - ST503 Contemporary Theology I: Hegel to Death of God Theologies© 2019 Our Daily Bread University. All rights reserved.

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LESSON 17 of 24ST503

Tillich: Doctrine of God

Contemporary Theology I:Hegel to Death of God Theologies

In my last lecture, at the very end I began to discuss with you Paul Tillich’s concept of God. We noticed that he begins that discussion with analyzing the question of being and then we saw that he claimed that God is the answer to the problem or the question of being. I want to pick up the discussion today with his understanding of God, but as usual we want to begin our time with a moment of prayer.

Father, we thank you so much for who you are and for what you mean to us. We thank you, Lord that you are there. We thank you that you are personal and that you have a personal interest in each one of us. We pray, Lord, that as we study Paul Tillich’s concept of God, we can learn not only what he thinks, but we can come to understand who You are better. So bless our time of study. For it’s in Christ’s name we pray it. Amen.

Well, as we were beginning to look at Tillich’s concept of God last time, we noted that he begins that discussion with an analysis of the question of being. And we set out for you his concepts of the basic ontological concepts and then noted that, as he sees it, the problem that man faces is that he’s finite, he’s not infinite, he’s estranged from the infinite, and he doesn’t really know how to handle that estrangement. Now because of that concern over nonbeing and finitude, there needs to be some answer to this dilemma which man faces and Tillich says that the answer to the question of being is God. And I want to pick up our discussion right at that point today.

Let me look with you first then at Tillich’s concept of the actuality of God. Now in this discussion, in this portion of his analysis, Tillich is giving us his doctrines as to what the term G-O-D refers to. So if you’re wondering what is the object in the universe or what is the thing in the universe to which the word G-O-D refers, this is what we’re looking at today. Now Tillich divides this discussion into several parts. He talks first of all about God as being, then he

John S. Feinberg, Ph.D.Experience: Professor of Biblical and

Systematic Theology, Trinity Evangelical Divinity School.

Transcript - ST503 Contemporary Theology I: Hegel to Death of God Theologies © 2019 Our Daily Bread University. All rights reserved.


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talks, secondly, about God as living, and then he relates his notion of God to the ontological elements. So that’s the order that I’m going to follow.

First of all, God as being—Tillich says that the being of God is being-itself. And he always hyphenates being-itself. Being hyphen itself. What Tillich means by saying this is that God is not “a being” alongside of other beings or even above other beings. He’s not even to be understood as the highest of all beings because, according to Tillich, even the highest of all beings is still only a specific being who is subject to the various categories of finitude, especially the categories of space and time. So, Tillich does not want to see God as “a being,” even as the highest being because that would subject Him to the categories of finiteness.

Well, the best way, according to Tillich, to keep from being confused in this whole discussion of God, is to realize that God Himself is not “a being,” but instead He is the ground of being. He is the power of being. He is being-itself as Tillich relates to it and refers to it. Well, with this conception of God as being-itself, Tillich says that it is wrong to speak of God as existing or as infinite. Now there’s a reason for this and it initially may sound strange to hear him say that you shouldn’t think of God as existing, but he’s not denying that there really is a God. He just has something very specific in mind.

Tillich’s point is that God is beyond those categories. The categories of existence, the categories of infinity, because those categories he believes are the categories of finitude. Now, at one point, Tillich even goes so far as to say that the phrase “God exists” is really a contradiction in terms and the reason that he believes this is that he says, “It’s hard to understand how one can speak about being-itself as existing because when you think of something that exists, you always reflect upon the possibility that that which exists might go out of existence.” And, of course, that’s not something that you could ever say of being-itself. Being-itself can never go out of existence, so it really doesn’t make any sense to speak of it as existing as though it might go in or out of existence.

On page 237 of volume 1 of The Systematic Theology Tillich explains for us what he means by saying that God isn’t subject to the categories of infinity and the category of existence. Let me pick it up actually on the bottom of page 236. Tillich here is explaining the thought of Thomas Aquinas about all of this



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and then he goes on to make further points after having made the explanation of his understanding of Aquinas. He says in regard to Aquinas, “What really has happened is that Thomas has had to unite two different traditions.” And that means in his understanding of God, he’s done that. The two traditions are as follows: The Augustinian, in which the divine existence is included in his essence and the Aristotelian, which derives the existence of God from the existence of the world and which then asserts in a second step that His existence is identical with His essence. Thus the question of the existence of God can be neither asked nor answered. If asked, it is a question about that which by its very nature is above existence and therefore the answer, rather negative or affirmative, explicitly denies the nature of God.

It is as atheistic to affirm the existence of God as it is to deny it. God is being-itself, not “a being.” On this basis, a first step can be taken toward the solution of the problem which usually is discussed as the imminence and the transcendence of God. As the power of being, God transcends every being and also the totality of beings, the world. Being-itself is beyond finitude and infinity. Otherwise it would be conditioned by something other than itself. And the real power of being would lie beyond both it and that which conditioned it. Being-itself infinitely transcends every finite being. There is no proportion or gradation between the finite and the infinite. There is an absolute break; an infinite jump. On the other hand, everything finite participates in being-itself and in its infinity. Otherwise it would not have the power of being. It would be swallowed by nonbeing or it never would have emerged out of nonbeing. This double relation of all beings to being-itself gives being-itself a double characteristic. In calling it “creative” we point to the fact that everything participates in the infinite power of being. In calling it “abysmal,” we point to the fact that everything participates in the power of being in a finite way—that all beings are infinitely transcended by their creative ground.

Well, Tillich then goes on to suggest that to say that God is being-itself means that He is the structure of being, although God is not subject to that structure. And then Tillich makes a very interesting statement when he says that “As a matter of fact, this is really all that can be said about God in a non-symbolic way.” What he means by that is that the only thing you can say about God without it being a symbolic statement that really points beyond the words themselves, is that God is being-itself, He is the very structure of being. If you say anything else about God, if you say He’s loving,



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if you say that He is just, if you say that He’s Creator. All of these statements wind up being symbolic statements.

Now any statement then other than the claim that God is being-itself or that He is the structure of being is going to be a statement that points beyond itself to something in terms of the nature of God, but it’s something that we cannot represent in literal language that we have. On page 239 of volume 1 of The Systematics Tillich explains this point as follows: He says, “Theologians must make explicit what is implicit in religious thought and expression. And in order to do this, they must begin with the most abstract and completely unsymbolic statement which is possible. Namely, that God is being-itself or the absolute.” However, after this has been said, nothing else can be said about God as God which is not symbolic. As we have already seen, God as being-itself is the ground of the ontological structure of being without being subject to the structure Himself. He is the structure. That is, He has the power of determining the structure of everything that has being. Therefore, if anything beyond this bare assertion is said about God, it no longer is a direct and proper statement, no longer a concept. It is indirect and it points to something beyond itself. In a word, it is symbolic.

Well, if this is true, if Tillich is right about this, then most of the things that we say about God cannot be taken as literally true. They are all symbolic of something else, though we can’t state in non-symbolic terms what that something else is.

Well, Tillich not only talks about God as being. He also talks about Him as living. And so let me touch on that now. Tillich says that life is the process in which potential being becomes actual being. But now we’ve already seen to a certain extent, then now Tillich makes it even clearer, that in God as God, there is no distinction between potentiality and actuality. Therefore, Tillich says you really can’t speak of God as living unless you use that terminology in a symbolic way. It’s impossible to say that God is living in non-symbolic terms. If you think you can do that, then what you’re actually doing is you’re turning Him into a finite being again. Well, you can’t conceive of God as a finite being, so if we’re going to talk about God as living, we must realize that such language is symbolic.

But, of course, as Tillich says, every true symbol participates in the reality which it symbolizes. Well, having said that, he’s going to tell us what the symbolic meaning, then, of God as living is.



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And here’s what Tillich says. He says that “God lives insofar as He is the ground of life.” By that he means there couldn’t be any process of that which is potential becoming actual if there weren’t, in the first place, being-itself. And that what it really means to say that God is living. Not that He becomes something that He wasn’t. That would be nonsense to say in regard to being-itself, but rather that He is that which makes it possible for any specific being to move from potentiality to actuality. Well, that’s what Tillich has to say about God is living.

Then Tillich finally, in his discussion of the actuality of God, relates His understanding of God to the ontological elements. And here you’ll remember that there were three polarities that Tillich raised for us. There is the polarity of Individuality and Participation, the polarity of Form and Dynamics, and the polarity of Freedom and Destiny. These are the three basic ontological elements. Well, let me share with you now how God is said to relate, according to Tillich, to each of these ontological polarities. First of all, Individuality and Participation—Tillich says that God is personal and individual but, of course, you can’t understand that in any non-symbolic way. So that what Tillich means by that is that God is the ground of everything personal and that He carries within Himself the ontological power of personality. You can see that doesn’t mean that God is a person, but He’s the basis or the ground of it in other things.

On page 245 of volume 1 of The Systematics, Tillich explains in more detail for us what he means by a personal God and let me read that to you. He says, “The solution of the difficulties in the phrase ‘personal God’ follows from this. Personal God does not mean that God is ‘a person.’ It means that God is the ground of everything personal and that He carries within Himself the ontological power of personality. He is not ‘a person,’ but He is not less than personal. It should not be forgotten that classical theology employed the term ‘persona’ for the Trinitarian hypotheses, but not for God Himself. God became ‘a person’ only in the 19th century in connection with the Kantian separation of nature ruled by physical law from personality, ruled by moral law. Ordinary theism has made God a heavenly, completely perfect person who resides above the world and mankind. The protest of atheism against such a highest person is correct. There is no evidence for His existence nor is He a matter of ultimate concern. God is not God without universal participation. Personal God is a confusing symbol.” So God as personal, then, means that He is the ground of everything that is personal.



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But on the other hand, while God is individual and personal, He also participates in every life as its ground and its aim. Now Tillich is very, very careful in many places to say that this is not pantheism, it’s not the idea that God participates in everything that exists as the substance of everything that is. If he had said that, then that would be pantheism. And Tillich denies that his position is pantheism; however, when you hear what he’s saying, you wonder how it can entirely escape it. I think that it probably does escape it because Tillich isn’t saying that God is identical with every substance of being in the universe, but he surely is saying that God is in everything that has being, even if He’s not absolutely identical with it. This sounds not so much like pantheism, but perhaps something like panentheism, everything in God or all in God. But as we’re going to see later on in our studies of contemporary theology that label panentheism is reserved for a very specific kind of theology and that theology is different than Tillich’s. Well, at any rate, that’s his analysis of how God relates to Individuality and Participation.

Now, the second ontological element, the second polarity, is Form and Dynamics. And as we might suspect, Tillich tells us at the outset that we have to understand these terms symbolically in relation to God. We cannot understand them in some non-symbolic way. That’s exactly what we would expect, having heard what he says about symbolic and non-symbolic language in relation to God.

Well, all right then, what does Dynamics mean and what does Form mean? Well, he says Dynamics is to be understood as divine creativity. It refers to God’s participation in history. His outgoing character, if you will. It includes a “not yet” which, however, is always balanced by an “already” within the divine light. Tillich then turns to explain what he means by Form. Form, on the other hand, expresses the actualization of divine potentiality. “The divine life inescapably,” he says, “unites possibility with fulfillment.” So there is something that actually comes to be and that is reflective of Form, but Dynamics talks about the fact that even things that are in being and are specific beings might continue to change. They are an “already,” but they are also a “not yet.”

Well, then Tillich also relates God to the polarities of Freedom and Destiny. And again Tillich says that we have to understand these terms in relation to God in symbolic language or as symbolic language. Well then, what does Freedom mean as it relates to



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God? Well, Freedom, he says, means, in terms of God, freedom from anything prior to God or alongside of God. This speaks of God’s aseity or, if you will, His self-derived nature. And Tillich says that this means that what is man’s ultimate concern, and, of course, he’s define God as man’s ultimate concern, it means that what is man’s ultimate concern is in no way dependent on man or any finite being or on any finite concern. God is independent of all of this. He’s free in that sense.

As to Tillich’s understanding of Destiny, well, let me read you his own explanation of this on pages 248 and 249 of volume 1 of The Systematic Theology. Tillich says, “Is it possible to attribute Destiny to being-itself? It is possible, provided the connotation of a destiny-determining power above God is avoided and provided one adds that God is His own destiny and that in God Freedom and Destiny are one. It may be argued that this truth is more adequately expressed if Destiny is replaced by necessity, not mechanical necessity, but structural necessity, of course, or if God is spoken of as being His own law. Such phrases are important as interpretations, but they lack two elements of meaning which are present in the word ‘Destiny.’ They lack the mystery of that which precedes any structure and law, being-itself; and they lack the relation to history which is included in the term ‘Destiny.’ If we say that God is His own destiny, we point both to the infinite mystery of being and to the participation of God in becoming and in history.”

Well, that’s what Tillich has to say about God’s relation to the ontological elements and that concludes his discussion of the actuality of God. That is, what it is to which the term G-O-D refers.

Before I move on to the next item in Tillich, though, I’d like to just pause long enough to make a couple of comments about what he has said in terms of his understanding of the actuality of God. An initial thing that I would point out, and I’m sure you saw this as you were listening, is that this understanding of God and God’s being obviously depersonalizes God. God cannot be a person in the sense that we think of a person. He cannot have the personal qualities that Scripture gives Him. He can’t be loving; He can’t be just; He cannot be truthful. At least He cannot be all of those things in the way we would normally think about them. You see, according to Tillich’s view, those claims about God, whether Scripture makes them or whether we make them in our reflections upon God, have to be seen as symbolic. They have to be seen as anthropomorphisms—attempts to use human terminology and



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human qualities to somehow or other project what God is like.

Well, if in fact, that’s our understanding of God, He’s simply being-itself, but not a being. He is the ground of what’s personal, but He is not a person. He is the ground of everything that is alive, but He is not in fact alive itself, then it’s very, very clear that this is a very, very transcendent, depersonalized kind of God. Now there’s a sense in which He’s very imminent because He’s the ground of everything that is, but He’s transcendent in the sense that if you’re looking for a person to get to, if you’re looking for a someone who is out there, you’re going to be hard pressed to find that individual. This is a very, very depersonalized concept of God.

Now there’s one other thing that I’d like to say about what Tillich has said here as well. You remember that Tillich makes an awful lot of effort to convince us that we dare not think of God as “a being” because if we think of Him as “a being” then He’s just one among many. And if He is one being among many beings, then He shares in finitude and if that’s the case, then we really don’t have the ultimate being. We don’t have the ultimate for which we can be concerned. Well, all of that sounds good, but the problem, it seems to me, that faces Tillich with this sort of view is two-fold. He’s faced with a dilemma. Either on the one hand, being-itself must be seen as a totality and then it seems like it is a being, granted it’s a gigantic being, a gigantic thing, but then if that happens, if falls, according to Tillich’s logic, under the categories of finitude and it can’t really be God. So either you see all of being as one gigantic thing, that is all of being-itself as one gigantic being or if you say, Well, no I don’t want to think of the totality of being-itself or the ground of being as some specific being. If you don’t think of it that way, then it appears that you’re talking about a something which is a nothing. You see, Tillich demands that there is actually some object, some objective thing out there that is God. God is not a figment of the imagination. Well, I think with all of that we would be very happy to agree.

But then having said that, having granted that God has objective reality, Tillich wants to deny that He is a specific thing, a specific being. Now, I grant that being-itself or the power of being is not a being like you or I are or like a desk is or a microphone or a building, but indeed if you think of being-itself or the ground of being as a totality, doesn’t this turn out to be some gigantic, if I can use that terminology, gigantic type of being? And if it does, then it seems like you’ve got the same problem that Tillich has raised



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to begin with—that if God is a being, then He’s subject to finitude. If He is not a being, even some gigantic being, then He must be a nothing, but then that creates tremendous problems for Tillich because He said God isn’t a nothing. He is in fact, objectively real. Well, I’ll leave that matter for your further reflection, but it seems to me that when you look at what Tillich is actually saying about the actuality of God, he hasn’t entirely solved the problems that he’s trying to solve. He’s trying to get away from the idea that God is a specific being, but I’m not sure that he successfully does that. And if he were to successfully do that, I’m afraid that he would turn God into a something which is a nothing.

Well, let me turn from Tillich’s discussion of the actuality of God to his discussion of the concept of the meaning of God, that is, the meaning of the word G-O-D. And here we are not focusing on the item in the world to which the word G-O-D refers; we’re talking instead about the basic sense of the term G-O-D. When we use the term G-O-D, what do we even mean? Apart from the object to which we may be referring, how do we even define that word?

Well, Tillich has a number of things to say here. And he begins by discussing what he refers to, a phenomenological description of God, and then he turns in the second place to talk about typological considerations as one reflects upon the meaning of the term G-O-D. Let me, first of all, give you what he has to say in his discussion of the phenomenological description. Tillich, first of all, discusses God and man’s ultimate concern. And Tillich says that, “The word G-O-D is the name that we use for that which concerns man ultimately.” On page 211 of volume one of The Systematic Theology, he explains this point as follows: He says, “‘God’” (and God here is in quotes so that we know that he’s referring to the term “God”) “‘God’ is the answer to the question implied in man’s finitude. He is the name for that which concerns man ultimately. This does not mean that first there is a being called God and then the demand that man should be ultimately concerned about Him. It means that whatever concerns a man ultimately becomes God for him, and conversely it means that a man can be concerned ultimately only about that which is God for him.” Well, God then, the term “God” stands for that which is a matter of ultimate concern. And, as we’ve seen, Tillich says that ultimate concern, whatever is ultimate for you, must transcend every preliminary, finite, and concrete concern. It must then transcend the whole realm of finitude in order for it to be the answer to the question that is implied in finitude.



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Well, Tillich then says that the gods are projections of finite, natural human elements. But they are projections on to something. Namely, they are projections on to the realm of ultimate concern. Now in terms of the actuality of God, they are projections, if you will, onto or against being-itself.

Now on page 214, of volume 1 of The Systematics, Tillich explains his understanding of how the various gods that people have dreamed up throughout history or have taken to be god, how they relate to the matter of ultimate concern. Tillich says, “We have discussed the meaning of ‘god’ in terms of man’s relation to the divine, and we have taken this relationship into the phenomenological description of the nature of the gods. This underlines the fact that the gods are not objects within the context of the universe. They are expressions of the ultimate concern which transcends the cleavage between subjectivity and objectivity. It remains to be emphasized that an ultimate concern is not subjective. Ultimacy stands against everything which can be derived from mere subjectivity, nor can the unconditional be found within the entire catalog of finite objects which are conditioned by each other. If the word ‘existential’ points to a participation which transcends both subjectivity and objectivity, then man’s relation to the gods is rightly called existential. Man cannot speak of the gods in detachment.”

In other words, there really does have to be a concern here and, as Tillich says, it has to be something of ultimate concern, it can’t be something that is preliminary or prior to that which is ultimate.

Well, let me turn to discuss now what Tillich has to say about typological considerations. He’s given us his phenomenological description of what the word G-O-D means. Now he turns to typological considerations. And under this section of The Systematics, Tillich talks about types of polytheism, on the one hand, and then he talks about types of monotheism.

First of all, types of polytheism—Tillich defines polytheism not as the belief in a plurality of gods, but rather the lack of a uniting and transcending ultimate which determines its character. So each of the polytheistic divine powers, according to Tillich, claims ultimacy in the concrete situation in which it appears. Now there are three types of polytheism that Tillich discusses. In the first place, he discusses what he calls Universalistic Polytheism. And here he says that in this kind of polytheism, the special divine beings like divinities of places and realms, numinous forces in



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things and persons, these divine beings, he says, are embodiments of a universal, all-pervading sacred power which is hidden behind all things and yet at the same time is manifest through them. Now, some forms of pantheism, Tillich says, would be an example of Universalistic Polytheism.

Tillich then moves to discuss Mythological Polytheism. And here he describes it as follows, he says, “Divine power in this sort of concept of God is concentrated in individual deities of a relatively fixed character who represent broad realms of being and value.” Well, then finally he talks about Dualistic Polytheism and Tillich says this notion of God is based on the ambiguity in the concept of the holy and also on a conflict between divine and demonic holiness. And he gives us an example of this type of polytheism, Zoroastrianism, a religion in which there is a kind of dualistic tension between good and evil. And both good and evil are elevated to divine power.

Well, not only are there different types of polytheism according to Tillich, but there are also different types of monotheism. Tillich says that in all types of polytheism the concrete element in the idea of God prevails over the element of ultimacy. In monotheism, on the other hand, just the opposite happens. The divine powers of polytheism are subjected to a highest divine power, an ultimate divine power in monotheism. Now as with the case of polytheism, Tillich delineates several different types of monotheism. He talks about Monarchic Monotheism and then Mystical Monotheism, and then Exclusive Monotheism. Let me explain what he means by each one.

First of all, Monarchic Monotheism—now this particular understanding of God, this form of theism, Tillich says, really lies on the boundary line between polytheism and monotheism. The God Monarch, according to this particular understanding of theism, rules over a hierarchy of inferior gods and god-like beings. And Tillich says an example here of this type of theism would be the Greco-Roman pantheon of gods. There were a number of gods, but there was one God who was supreme over all of them. You can see why he says that on the one hand this sounds a bit like monotheism, on the other hand it’s not unlike polytheism.

In addition to Monarchic Monotheism, there is also Mystical Monotheism, according to Tillich. And according to this view, God transcends all realms of being and value and their divine representatives in favor of the divine ground and abyss from



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which they come and in which they disappear. Now in this sort of religion or in this sort of theism, if you will, the ultimate is referred to as the One (the word One is capitalized) or the Ultimate (the word Ultimate is capitalized), so this sort of monotheism has only one God, but it’s a God who totally transcends everything that is concrete, everything that is finite in any way.

Well, then finally Tillich talks about Exclusive Monotheism. Now this sort of monotheism is created by the elevation of a concrete god to ultimacy and universality without the loss of his concreteness and without asserting some sort of demonic power about this god. As examples of this kind of monotheism, Tillich points to Christianity and Judaism. Now he says that the God of exclusive monotheism tends to lose the concrete element in the concept of God. But, of course, there is a need for some expression of the concrete element in man’s ultimate concern. And Tillich says this posits or raises for us the Trinitarian problem. But now Trinitarianism, according to Tillich, isn’t just a matter of the number three. As a matter of fact, he explains on page 228 what Trinitarianism involves and why it comes up and how it is to be incorporated into a monotheistic, an exclusive monotheistic system. Here’s what he says. This is on page 228 of volume 1 of The Systematics. He says, “Trinitarian Monotheism is not a matter of the number three. It is a qualitative and not a quantitative characterization of God. It is an attempt to speak of the living God, the God in whom the ultimate and the concrete are united. The number three has no specific significance in itself, although it comes nearest to an adequate description of life processes. The Trinitarian problem has nothing to do with the trick question how one can be three and three be one, the answer to this question is given in every life process. The Trinitarian problem is the problem of the unity between ultimacy and concreteness in the living God. Trinitarian Monotheism is concrete monotheism, the affirmation of the living God.”

Now on pages 229 and 230 he gives a further explanation of the role of the Trinity in Exclusive Monotheism. And let me end this session, this lecture with quoting from this portion of Tillich. He says, “In Exclusive Monotheism an abstract transcendence of the divine develops. It is not the transcendence of the infinite abyss in which everything concrete disappears, as in Mystical Monotheism. Rather it is the transcendence of the absolute command which empties all concrete manifestations of the divine. But since the concrete element demands its rights, mediating powers of a three-fold character appear and posit the Trinitarian problem.

Transcript - ST503 Contemporary Theology I: Hegel to Death of God Theologies© 2019 Our Daily Bread University. All rights reserved.

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The first group of these mediators is made up of hypostasized divine qualities like Wisdom, Word, Glory (and each of those words Wisdom, Word, and Glory are capitalized). The second group is the angels, the divine messengers who represent special divine function. The third is the divine human figure through whom God works the fulfillment of history, the Messiah. In all these, the God who had become absolutely transcendent and unapproachable now becomes concrete and present in time and space. The significance of these mediators grows as the distance between God and man increases. And to the degree to which they become more significant, the Trinitarian problem becomes more acute, more urgent. When early Christianity calls Jesus of Nazareth the Messiah and identifies Him with the divine logos, the Trinitarian problem becomes the central problem of religious existence. The basic motive and the different forms of Trinitarian Monotheism become effective in the Trinitarian dogma of the Christian church. But the Christian solution is founded on the paradox that the Messiah, the Mediator between God and man is identical with a personal human life, the name of which is Jesus of Nazareth. With this assertion, the Trinitarian problem becomes a part of the Christological problem.”

Well, as you can see, this is a different concept of Trinity than we are used to in Orthodoxy. It stems from a need to take a single God who is abstract, who is transcendent and have some sort of concrete relationship with the world between that God and it’s done, according to Tillich, through some sort of mediator. And, of course, Tillich sees that that’s really what’s at work in the concept of the Trinity, there’s an attempt to have someone in the Trinity who can mediate between the transcendent, the ultimate God, and that which is concrete in the world.

Well, that completes my discussion of Tillich’s concept of God. In our next lecture I want to turn to look at Tillich’s Christology.

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I: emporaryology Theont C Contemporary Theology I: ST503 Hegel to Death ... · Tillich: Doctrine of God Contemporary Theology I: Hegel to Death of God Theologies In my last lecture,