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I. How do we know how we are performing in the context of our environment? What are the best indicators of our condition? What indeed are our objectives? II. Where are we headed? Can we rely on economic forecasts? Our own firm’s? What techniques are useful? Are there aids to optimizing our value creating abilities? Big picture vs focused picture: Economy-Industry-Firm-Family ? II. Where are we headed? Can we forecast these forces are headed? Economically? Industry-wise? Firm-wise?
George A. Overstreet, Jr.Walker Professor of Growth EnterprisesAssociate Dean of Research and Centers
MhcIntire School of CommerceUniversity of Virginia
Charlottesville, VA [email protected]
434 242 7063 mobile/UVa434 985 4188 farm
Enhancing Petroleum Marketer Performance: Value
Driven Analysis and Practice
Enhancing Petroleum Marketer Performance: Value
Driven Analysis and Practice
Key Private Firm Managerial “Must-do’s”
• Private Firms are different than public firms! Unfortunately, most managerial research has addressed public firms—family firms are more complex than partnerships!
• Lacking market based value signals, private firms can use value based management signals or metrics to substitute for market based signals (daily equity price changes).
• This, however, requires a disciplined & knowledgeable path. Also, serious study and what Geoff Colvin refers to as “deliberate practice”. It is not in the domain knowledge sphere of most accountants and CEOs but requires their buy-in!
Key Private Firm Managerial “Must-do’s”
I. Adopt value based management practices and systems based on the following principles: a. Establish accountability at each strategic value unit based on the value added principle that it must contribute positively to the firm’s value (yield a return on capital greater than its cost of capital (EBIT*(1-tax rate/(Debt + Equity) less Weighted Average Cost of Capital (% Debt*Cost of Debt*(1-tax rate) + (% Equity*Risk Adjusted Opportunity Cost of Equity)—naturally, this goes for new investments as well as existing ones.
Key Managerial “Must-do’s”
II. Develop a Business Council and Family Council—Study Groups can serve the former role if used appropriately. Study Generation to Generation.
III. Develop a living competitive market derived--value based–plan designed to identify, establish, and sustain competitive advantage for each Strategic Value Unit in your portfolio. Why competitive advantage? Returns on capital greater than the cost of capital are very rare without competitive advantages in highly competitive market economies. Discuss!
Key Managerial “Must-do’s”
IV. Establish a Value Coach to get over the learning curve and “Firm Council” or Small Advisory Board of Wise, Experienced, Proven, Diverse Advisors to serve as a Sounding Board
V. With your team, develop a living strategic, competitive market derived--value based–plan designed to identify, establish, and sustain competitive advantages for each Strategic Value Unit in your portfolio. Why competitive advantage? It is the source of returns on capital greater than the cost of capital in competitive markets. Make sure it is considers your family’s life cycle and the need for diversification! And the need for appropriate incentives.
Key Managerial “Must-do’s”
VI. Establish Separate SVUs for Real Estate and Operations for Company Ops and Dealer Ops, Etc. If you don’t have balance sheet for each, develop market based valuation alternatives to establish your opportunity costs and capital allocations
VII. Treat the business as a business and the family as a family with a council for each. Devote time to making sure each is “healthy” and “value” oriented
Suggested Readings/Study: Talent is Overrated: What really Separates World-Class Performers from Everybody Else, Geoff Colvin, 2008, 2010, Portfolio. Competition Demystified: A Radically Simplified Approach to Business Strategy, Bruce Greenwald and Judd Kahn, 2005, Portfolio. Valuation: Measuring and Managing the Value of Companies, Tim Koller, et al, McKinsey and Company, 2010, University Edition, Wiley; Generation to Generation: Life Cycles of the Family Business, Kelin E. Gersick, et al, Harvard Business School Press, 1997.
Strategic Value Management: A BALANCED APPROACH
I. COMPETITIVE MARKET ANALYSIS
•CUSTOMER VALUE CHAIN AND FIRM’S RELATIVE POSITION•RELATIVE STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES OF COMPETITORS, INCLUDING FIRM•ENVIRONMENTAL TRENDS AND MARKET EVOLUTION
II. STRATEGIC VALUE ASSESSMENT
•SOURCES OF COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE •ECONOMIC PROFIT/LOSS DYNAMICS•FINANCIAL METRICS AND PERFORMANCE•Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunites, Threats (Swot)•STATUS QUO VALUATION
IV. EXECUTION OF STRATEGIC INITIATIVES AND ESTABLISH MONITORING/INCENTIVE SYSTEMS
•ESTABLISH OWNERSHIP PROGRAMS AND OPTIMAL FIRM STRUCTURE•DETERMINE BEST PRACTICES AND STRETCH GOALS/MEASURES•CREATE AND IMPLEMENT VALUE SCORECARD AND INCENTIVE SYSTEM
III. FORMULATION AND Strategic Value Mgt. (SVM) RANKING OF STRATEGIES/TACTICS
•FORMULATE VALUE ADDED STRATEGIES•ASSESS CORPORATE VALUE ADDED (NET PRESENT VALUE) AND SENSITIVITY TO KEY VALUE DRIVERS
•PRIORITIZE CAPITAL INVESTMENTS
ValueBased
Management
Questionaire on Performance Monitoring & Planning, Page 11. Name: _____________________________________________________________2. Firm: _____________________________________________________________
1. Does your firm formally engage in planning that should impact performance on a regular basis? Yes/no If yes, how often? Man/woman hours last two years? _______________________
2. Has it been successful? Very 5………3 fair…….1 not at all 3. Do you follow national economic trends? Yes/No If yes, what sources do you use?
_________________________________________________________ _____________________________________________________________4. Regional and local economic trends? Yes/No If yes, what sources do you use?
______________________________________________________________
5. Do you analyze competitive trends in your marketplaces? Yes/No If yes, do you collect data? Yes/No If yes, what types? ________________________________________________________________
6. Do you feel that your firm has a competitive advantage? Yes/No If yes, describe__________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
7. If your firm has a competitive advantage, will it manifest itself in terms of performance? Yes/No If yes, describe how so? _______________________________________________________________
Questionaire on Performance Monitoring & Planning, Page 2
8. Do you periodically value your firm? Yes/No If yes, do you use an outside source or do it internally? Outside/internal/Both? Do you measure the value of the firm’s profit centers or parts? Yes/no? If yes, how do you assess value? A. Market comparables? Yes/No If yes, market “comps”, what “comparable” benchmark/s do you use? ________________________________________________. B. Discounted cash flow valuation Yes/No C. Liquidation Value of Assets and Liabilities Yes/no
9. What key financial measures does your firm formally use to assess how your firm is performing? A.__________________________B._____________________C.__________________________ D. _______________________________E.___________________________F. _______________________________
10. Were they used as an integral part of your valuation assessment? Yes/No 11. What key operating performance metrics do you use to assess unit
performance? A.__________________________B._____________________C.__________________________ D. _______________________________E.___________________________F. _______________________________
Questionaire on Performance Monitoring & Planning, Page 3
12. Let’s test your overall firm marketplace for competitive advantages: Does it exhibit market share stability? Yes/No/Unknown Does it exhibit low entries and exits? Yes/No/Unknown Does it exhibit high profitability? (return on capital employed over 10 percent after tax?) Yes/no/ unknown
13. Let’s test for competitive advantages? Does your firm have proprietary technology, supply contracts, or advantaged locations? Yes/no/unknownDoes your firm have customer captivity? Yes/no/unknown Does your firm have economies of scale and hence is a low cost producer? Yes/No/Unknown
Strategic Value Management
I. COMPETITIVE MARKET ANALYSIS
•CUSTOMER VALUE CHAIN AND FIRM’S RELATIVE POSITION•RELATIVE STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES OF COMPETITORS, INCLUDING FIRM•ENVIRONMENTAL TRENDS AND MARKET EVOLUTION (PORTER’S 5 FORCES, ETC.
II. STRATEGIC VALUE ASSESSMENT
•SOURCES OF COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE •ECONOMIC PROFIT/LOSS DYNAMICS•SWOT•LIFE CYCLE (PORTFOLIO ANALSIS)--MATRIX•STATUS QUO VALUATION
IV. EXECUTION OF STRATEGIC INITIATIVES AND ESTABLISH MONITORING/INCENTIVE SYSTEMS
•ESTABLISH OWNERSHIP PROGRAMS AND OPTIMAL FIRM STRUCTURE•DETERMINE BEST PRACTICES AND STRETCH GOALS/MEASURES•CREATE AND IMPLEMENT VALUE SCORECARD AND INCENTIVE SYSTEM
III. FORMULATION AND SVM RANKING OF STRATEGIES/TACTICS
•FORMULATE VALUE ADDED STRATEGIES•ASSESS CORPORATE VALUE ADDED (NET PRESENT VALUE) AND SENSITIVITY TO KEY VALUE DRIVERS
•PRIORITIZE CAPITAL INVESTMENTS, NTI, DEMOLISH/REBUILD, DIVESTMENTS
ValueBased
Management
I. The Playing Field
• How tough is the competitive state of our industry? Relative to “pure competition”?
• What does that suggest for our industry and its individual firm performances?
Ia. The Playing Field: How Tough is the Industry? PORTER’S FORCES GOVERNING COMPETITIVE POSITION
II. BARGAININGPOWER OFSUPPLIERS
III. BARGAININGPOWER OF
BUYERS
GOVERNMENTREGULATIONS
I. CURRENTCOMPETITORS
MARKET’SCOMPETITIVE
POSITION & PROFITABLITY
POTENTIALCOMPETITORS
IV. THREAT OF NEWENTRANTS
V. INDUSTRIES WITH PRODUCT
SUBSTITUTES
Entry Barriers
Exit Barriers
Low to Moderate barriers to entry Capital costs rising ($2.5 to $4 m.) new to industry units plus OH Low urban land availability with sprawl showing signs of slowing
Potential Entrants
Supplier Power
Substitutes
Buyer Power
Industry Competitors
Rivalry/Existing Firms
Very High Supplier Power Limited number of refineries hold lots of pricing power. Rising global demand & fixed Supply suggests potential long term price increases Moderate
High
Relevant Buyer Power Low switching costs due to public posting of gas prices leading to low switching costs; tired iron having hard time competing
Substitute Products Hyper marts & gas Drug store chains; grocery fresh movementElectric/hybrid vehicles
Ib. Porters Five Forces Model: C-Store IndustryFragmented Nature With Each Neighborhood Market Differing
Market fragmented with each being unique; consolidating with highly efficient price competitive chains on top of huge number of single store operators
Ic. Porters Five Forces Model Inputs Resulting Competitive Score
(3.5 being oligopoly and 5 being pure competition)Supplier Buyer Potential CompetitivePower Power Competitors Substitutes Entrants Score 3 to 5
C-Stores High High High High High 4.75
Dealer High High High Mod High 4.50
Space Heat Mod Mod High High Mod 4.25
Card locks High High High Mod Mod 4.25
Terminals Mod Low High Low Low 4.25
Transports Low High High Low High 4.75
* Force Level HighMod.
Assessing Competitive Advantage? Are Incumbent Advantages Identical to Barriers to Entry? Source: Competition Demystified, p. 56.
• If no, pursue operational efficiencies! If you are an ant, consider exiting!
• If yes, identify and manage competitive advantages.
1. Develop industry mapIdentify strategic value units having individual
market segmentsIdentify competitors in each segment
2. Test for existence of competitive advantages•Mkt-share stability, dominant firm, low entries & exits
•Sustained high profitability
3. Look for sources of competitive advantage•Proprietary technology
•Advantaged resources (locations)•Customer Captivity (Switching Costs)
•Economies of Scale•Government Intervention
Id. Barriers to Entry Model: Steps to Assessing the Competitive State of a Firm’s Markets—Generic Strategy Implications
• Step 1: Develop an Industry Map with segments and competitors for Each Value Center
• Step 2: Test for Existence of Competitive Advantage (Mkt. Share Stability, Dominant Firm, Low Entries and Exits, Sustained High Profitability)
• IF No, Pursue Operational Efficiency • IF No & Vulnerable, consider exiting to save assets • IF Yes, Identify and Manage Sources of Competitive
Advantage (Proprietary Technology, Cheap Resources, Economies of Scale, Barriers to Entry, Customer Captivity)
Ie. Barrier to Entry Model and Strategy Implications: Case Example
Market Dom.ShareStable?
Firm? Low entryExit?
Roic > Wacc? Pursue ? Notes
C-Stores no no no no Op.Eff.
Dealer no no no no Op.Eff.
Space Heat yes yes yes yes CAdv
Card Locks yes no yes ??? CAdv
Terminals yes no yes yes CAdv
Transports no no no no Op Eff
Operational Efficiency = (Op. Eff.)Identify and pursue Competitive Advantage = (CAdv)
Implications of Structural Analysis Within the Petroleum Marketing
Industry
Analyzing the Competitive Landscape
What Return on Invested Capital Should We Expect for the Industry Given Its
Competitive Structure?
Ij. Long Term Industry Comparisons for ROIC After Tax40 Year Average through 2004, Koller, Valuation: Measurement and Management, Wylie, 2005, 141.
6.26.5
6.9
7.07.7
8.49.09.0
9.59.9
10.311.0
11.311.9
12.014.1
14.715.0
15.218.4
UtilitiesTelecommunications Services
Transportation
CSX Data 93- 06Energy
MaterialsRetailing
Total SampleConsumer Durables and Apparel
Automobiles and ComponentsTechnology Hardware and Equip.
Food, Beverage and TobaccoHealth Care Equipment and Services
Semiconductors and EquipmentTop Quartile, CSX Data 93-06
High Performing PM 01-07Media
Software and ServicesHousehold and Personal productsPharmaceuticals & Biotechnology
CSX Entire Corp. Sample ROIC averaged 6 percent from 1993 to 2006 and 7% (including owner’s salary) and 6 % (excluding owner’s salary)—note this is not the same sample of firms for each year. Top quartile ROIC averaged 12%.
If. The Playing Field
• How tough is our industry? Relative to “pure competition”? Close to pure competition; keep in mind there are huge differences market by market.
• What does that suggest for our industry and its individual firms’ performance? Low Return on Invested Capital versus Cost of Capital
• If so, how did we dodge the recession bullet?
Strategic Value Management (SVM) Has Three Key Functions Enhancing firm value is the ultimate financial
objective
Key Question: Will the proposal raise the firm’s market value? Is its return on capital greater than its cost of capital? Does it have positive Economic Profit and NPV?
Firms and their Strategic Value Units (SVUs) must identify and focus on the key drivers of value.
The firm’s management options (SVM) must integrate strategy, action plans, targets, performance measurement and incentives across the organization.
ROIC less Cost of Captial (EP) integrates performance measurement across key decisions
OperatingDecisions EBIT(1-t)
OperatingDecisions EBIT(1-t)
InvestmentDecisions(Capital)
InvestmentDecisions(Capital)
FinancingDecisions
(Cost of Capital)
FinancingDecisions
(Cost of Capital)
EP ($) or (%) = EBIT(1-t) - (Capital x Cost of Capital (%)
Ec. Profit = Return on Invested Capital – Weighted Average Cost of Capital
EP ($) or (%) = EBIT(1-t) - (Capital x Cost of Capital (%)
Ec. Profit = Return on Invested Capital – Weighted Average Cost of Capital
Ec. Profit (Value) Basics: What must management do to increase EP and create firm value? Also, Minimize Cost of Capital – Optimal Use of Leverage
EP ($) = NOPLAT
Capital
Cost ofCapital X Capital ($)
Operate - Improve the returnearned on existing Capital
Build - Invest as long as returns exceed the cost of capital
Harvest - Divest capital when returnsfail to achieve the cost of capital
[ ]
A Typical Financial Management System
PerformancePerformanceMeasurementMeasurement
PerformancePerformanceBenchmarkingBenchmarking
StrategicStrategicPlanningPlanning
CommunicateCommunicateResultsResults
CapitalCapitalBudgetingBudgeting
AcquisitionAcquisitionAnalysisAnalysis
GoalGoalSettingSetting
OperationalOperationalInitiativesInitiatives
IncentiveIncentiveCompensationCompensation
Earnings
Returns
MarginsBudgets
Cash Flow
Growth
?
The Financial Management System and Economic Profit
PerformancePerformanceMeasurementMeasurement
PerformancePerformanceBenchmarkingBenchmarking
StrategicStrategicPlanningPlanning
CommunicateCommunicateResultsResults
CapitalCapitalBudgetingBudgeting
AcquisitionAcquisitionAnalysisAnalysis
GoalGoalSettingSetting
OperationalOperationalInitiativesInitiatives
IncentiveIncentiveCompensationCompensation
ROIC less WACC = Ec. Profit
Decision-making(planning & resource allocation)
Return on Invested Capital less the Cost of Capital or Economic Profit is the key metric to for alignment and consistency in the organizational architecture
Performance Measurement
Accountability &Rewards
28
$0
$20,000,000
$40,000,000
$60,000,000
$80,000,000
$100,000,000
$120,000,000
$140,000,000
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Fixed Assets Cap Rents Working Cap
Case #1: Looks are deceiving—Growth in Invested Capital
What Stage is the Firm?
29
0.0000
0.1000
0.2000
0.3000
0.4000
0.5000
0.6000
0.7000
Working Cap 0.048 0.045 0.063 0.072 0.091 0.091 0.121 0.125
Cap Rents 0.204 0.256 0.24 0.219 0.207 0.208 0.211 0.241
Fixed Assets 0.142 0.18 0.168 0.148 0.169 0.196 0.225 0.222
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Invested Capital Per GallonTotal Company: Implications?
$25,000,000
$30,000,000
$35,000,000
$40,000,000
$45,000,000
$50,000,000
$55,000,000
$60,000,000
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Income Expense
Income and Expense GrowthTotal Company
31
Return on Invested Capital: Another Story
2.00%
4.00%
6.00%
8.00%
10.00%
12.00%
14.00%
16.00%
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Retu
rn %
C 1 Ind Avg Top Qrt CP 8 Yr Avg
Return on Invested CapitalStrategic Value Unit (SVU No. 1)
-6.00%-4.00%-2.00%0.00%2.00%4.00%6.00%8.00%
10.00%12.00%14.00%16.00%
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Retu
rn %
SVU Ind Avg Top Qrt
Return on Invested CapitalReturn on Invested CapitalSVU No. 1 and Comparable CompaniesSVU No. 1 and Comparable CompaniesDiscuss Recent Value Enhancing MovesDiscuss Recent Value Enhancing Moves
-6.00%-4.00%-2.00%0.00%2.00%4.00%6.00%8.00%
10.00%12.00%
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Retu
rn %
Case Firm Firm B Firm C Firm D
Case # 2. Composite, High Performing SegmentAgain Note Growth in Capital Invested for Composite, High Performing Case Here we
also see its blended cost of capital (WACC)?
WA
CC
$162 $174
$215
$281
$400
$543
$0
$100
$200
$300
$400
$500
$600
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Cap
ital
(in
Mil
lio
ns)
0.0%
1.0%
2.0%
3.0%
4.0%
5.0%
6.0%
7.0%
8.0%
9.0%
10.0%
11.0%
Equity Debt Total Capital WACC
Case #2: Wealth Creation & Composite High Performing Firm EVA TrendNow, for the quiz: What does this suggest for its Return on Invested Capital? Greater
than or Less than its Cost of Capital (WACC)?
$3
$7
$13
$30
$38
$46
$0
$10
$20
$30
$40
$50
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
EV
A $
's
(in
mil
lio
ns)
0%
1%
2%
3%
4%
5%
6%
7%
8%
9%
10%
11%
12%
EV
A %
EVA $'s EVA %
What about the firm’s matrix
position?
Case # 2. EVA Market Value Assuming Same Future Performance What is the EVA Based Value of Our Composite, High Performing Case Sector?
Moral: Growth plus Returns equal Huge Value Gains(Note: Enterprise Value equals Invested Capital & PV of EVA, with no growth)
Supported by market “comps”? Implication?
Tota
l V
alu
e
(in
Mill
ion
s)
$57 $66 $90
$381
$463
$508
$145 $199$254$105 $108 $125
$201
$288
$136$34 $91
$175
$0
$200
$400
$600
$800
$1,000
$1,200
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Equity Debt EVA
In summary, •We can profit from the financial discipline
that value based analysis and planning provides—it is a form of deliberate practice
similar to what Geoff Colvin describes in Talent is Overrated?
Let’s not forget we need to monitor our environment or “it’s all about the economy”
Now for the Big Picture—A. Economic Monitoring on the Cheap for Best Results—
Two Free, Proven Monitoring Sources B. Where are the Commercial Real Estate
Markets Headed? What do both suggest for our industry?
Business planning esp CRE is all about the Economy--Chicago Fed National Activity Index (3 Mo. Moving Average) Shows U.S. Economy Went into Recession in Q4 2007
BelowRec.Level
Above Inflationary Level
+0.7+0.7
So where are we now in the economic cycle? So where are we now in the economic cycle?
The Chicago Fed National Activity Index (CFNAI) is a monthly index designed to gauge overall economic activity and related inflationary pressure.
So where are we now in the economic cycle? CFNA-M3 So where are we now in the economic cycle? CFNA-M3
CFNAI recently in a state of flux
• The index’s three-month moving average, CFNAI-MA3, increased to .11 in February from .05 in January 2011. February 2011’s CFNAI-3 month moving average suggests that growth in national economic activity is approximately equal to its historical trend. With regard to inflation, the amount of economic slack reflected in the CFNAI-MA3 suggests subdued inflationary pressure from economic activity over the coming year.
• The index’s three-month moving average, CFAI-MA3 declined to -0.19 from -0.15 in April suggesting that the economy is below its historical trend. It remained negative for the second month reaching its lowest point since November 2010. Keep in mind it also suggests low inflation despite all the market pundits!
• On September 20, 2010, the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) determined that June 2009 marked the end of the recent recession. By comparison, the CFNAI indicated that the recession had ended in its October 26, 2009, release—almost a year earlier.
• Stay tuned to the Chicago Fed’s email alerts on the Chicago Fed’s National Activity Index! Best “free” economic condition data available at any price. Know where you are before establishing where headed! Note: To compare the success of the CFNAI in tracking the dating of recessions established by the NBER, see www.chicagofed.org/digital_assets/publications/cfnai/background/cfnai_background.pdf.
About the Ceridian-UCLA Pulse of Commerce Index™In conjunction with economists at UCLA Anderson School of Management and Charles River Associates, Ceridian has launched the groundbreaking Ceridian-UCLA Pulse of Commerce Index™ by UCLA Anderson School of Management. It is a first of its kind indicator of the state and possible future direction of the U.S. economy. The index is issued monthly and has been proven to track closely to the Federal Reserve’s Industrial Production number.The Ceridian-UCLA Pulse of Commerce Index (PCI) is based on real-time fuel consumption data for over the road trucking. By tracking the volume and location of diesel fuel being purchased, the index closely monitors the over the road movement of raw materials, goods-in-process and finished goods to U.S. factories, retailers and consumers.Compiling and Analyzing the DataEvery day across the United States, over the road trucks are fueling up with diesel as they move goods across the country, delivering everything from produce to raw materials to finished goods. Through Ceridian’s electronic card payment services for the transportation industry, Ceridian has been able to track this data and analyze the volume of fuel being used by these vehicles on a yearly, monthly, weekly and daily basis. Ceridian processes millions of these fuel transactions each year, and the data provides a compelling story about the status and direction of the U.S. economy.
At Long Last, Trucking Data Utilized! Important!At Long Last, Trucking Data Utilized! Important!
New Ceridian-UCLA Index: Trucking Based Ec. Index
Ceridian-UCLA Commerce Index and Industrial Production
Stalled Out?
Ceridian-UCLA Index: Longer View
Higher Fuel Prices Slowing the Economy? Higher Fuel Prices Slowing the Economy?
Unfortunately, economic forecasts are notoriously deficit so the best we know is where we are at a point in time. Thus, it pays to know the long term history. How bad was the credit crisis relative to other rough
times? “Below the Banking, Currency, Default, and Inflation Index (Rhinehart & Rhinehart, After the Fall,” 2010)
Rhinehart and Rhinehart, “After the Fall,” 2010
• More than ample evidence that the decade of relative prosperity prior to the fall was fueled by an expansion in credit and rising leverage spanning approximately a decade;
• This is followed, in turn, by a lengthy period of retrenchment that most often only begins after the crisis and lasts almost as long as the credit surge.
• Clearly, not what one wants to hear on the morning news!
Rhinehart and Rhinehart, “After the Fall,” 2010
• Paper examines 66 countries from 1900-2010 for 15 post WWII financial crises as well as the great depression, the 1973 oil shock and the current crisis;
• "After the Fall" predicts likely scenarios a decade after the crisis year of 2007;
• Their findings suggest a 90% probability that real house prices will be below 2006 prices in 2018;
• The chart illustrates that the “great recession” was not up to WWI hyperinflation, the great depression and WWII. So, things could be worse. Still, according to Peter Linneman’s comparative analysis—clearly the worst post WW II recession to date.
Rhinehart and Rhinehart, Findings
• Rhinehart and Rhinehart go on to demonstrate that real per capita GDP growth rates are significantly lower during the decade that follows severe financial crises, particularly those characterized by synchronous world-wide shocks.
• Importantly, the median post-financial crisis GDP increased growth decline in advanced economies is approximately one percent.
• So, if the normal growth of the economy was 4—then 3; if 3.5—then 2.5 etc.
Rhinehart and Rhinehart, Findings
• And, as we would also expect, during the decade following severe financial crises, unemployment rates are significantly higher than in the decade that preceded the crisis.
• The rise in unemployment is most marked for the five advanced economies studied, where the median unemployment rate was about five percent higher.
• In ten of the fifteen post-crisis episodes studied, unemployment never fell back to its pre-crisis level within the following decade.
• Clear implication—the recession has run true to form and will have a longer impact than a “normal” one with higher unemployment and lower economic growth! So, why is the press so surprised?
Summary of Economy Concerns: Jim Clayton, Cornerstone Real Estate Advisors, Feb. 13, 2001
U.S. Debt Shrinking SlowlyU.S. Debt Shrinking Slowly
1x. Toward a More Balanced Global Economy
Challenge for China and Other
Asian Nations: Re-orient Growth Away from
Exports to Domestic Demand
The Coming Decade – Macro Outlook
56
US recovery from “Great Recession” is in flux, but its impact will be evident throughout the forecast period with slower growth & higher unemployment: – US & Europe’s weak economies threaten global recovery – Robust private sector growth is not yet occurring– Structural changes are occurring in the federal budget; mandatory and interest
expenses are increasing faster than revenue
The Federal budget is on an unsustainable path The Federal budget is on an unsustainable path – US Comptroller General– US Comptroller GeneralThe Federal budget is on an unsustainable path The Federal budget is on an unsustainable path – US Comptroller General– US Comptroller General
Congressional Budget Office (CBO) projects deficits never under $700B through FY20–FY11 deficit is 9% of GDP & in 5% range through FY20 –Deficits decline till FY14, then rise to $1.25 trillion by FY20–Public debt will reach 90% of GDP by 2020–Persistently high debt will constrain discretionary spending
CBO estimates interest expense, $200B in FY10, reaches $900B by FY20, becoming an additional major budget driver
Growing Budget Competition from Mandatory & Interest
FY 2011 Request$3.8 Trillion
Social SecuritySocial Security19%19%
$730B$730B
Social SecuritySocial Security19%19%
$730B$730B
Non-security14%
$520B
Security23%
$895B
Interest7%
$254B
Social Security21%
$1,201B
Social Security21%
$1,201B
Interest15%
$845B
Non-security9%
$529B
Security17%
$955B
FY 2020 Projection$5.7 Trillion
Outlays in Current Dollars
Chart Sizes are proportional to total dollars
Source: OMB, Budget of the U.S. Government, Fiscal Year 2011
Note: New “Security” category groups DoD, DoE Nuclear Wpns, DHS, VA, some of DoS and other security assistance programs
Structural changes to interest and mandatory spending squeeze discretionaryStructural changes to interest and mandatory spending squeeze discretionaryStructural changes to interest and mandatory spending squeeze discretionaryStructural changes to interest and mandatory spending squeeze discretionary57
Public Debt Increasing Far Above Normal
1958 – 2008 Average= 38%
58
Sources: OMB, Congressional Budget Office, March 2010Note: FY10 – FY20 per CBO March 2010 Estimate of FY11 PB
Future debt rises to levels not seen since the end of World War IIFuture debt rises to levels not seen since the end of World War IIFuture debt rises to levels not seen since the end of World War IIFuture debt rises to levels not seen since the end of World War II
US General Government Gross Debt Projected To Exceed GDP by 2015
59
US General Government Gross Debt is Projected to:
Double between 2000 and 2015, exceeding 100% of GDP
Surpass European countries such as UK, France, and Germany, and rival that of Greece and Italy
Large public debt is slowing GDP growth in Japan and Euro-zone; could slow growth in US
Japan’s GDP growth slowed in the ‘90s, averaging only 1.7%
IMF reports GDP in Euro-zone countries will grow ~ 1% in 2010-2011
UK to cut defense by up to 20%General Government Gross Debt Source: IMF Fiscal Monitor,
“Navigating the Fiscal Challenges Ahead”, May 14, 2010, Statistical Table 6, p. 85
General Government Gross Debt as a Percent of GDP
General Government Gross Debt as a Percent of GDP
Chronic federal deficits are putting US on a path to reach Chronic federal deficits are putting US on a path to reach European–style debt levels and slower economic growth European–style debt levels and slower economic growth Chronic federal deficits are putting US on a path to reach Chronic federal deficits are putting US on a path to reach
European–style debt levels and slower economic growth European–style debt levels and slower economic growth
Fiscal Restraint Already Evident in Non-Defense Discretionary Outlays
60
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
700Historical Actuals FY11-15 Plan
Non-Defense Discretionary SpendingFY 1962 – FY 2015
Real CAGRs:
60’s: 4.6%70’s: 6.1%80’s: -1.6%90’s: 1.5%00-08: 2.9%09-10: 18.1%11-15: -3.5%
62-15: 2.5%
Real CAGRs:
60’s: 4.6%70’s: 6.1%80’s: -1.6%90’s: 1.5%00-08: 2.9%09-10: 18.1%11-15: -3.5%
62-15: 2.5% Out
lays
in F
Y05
$B
Source: OMB Historical Tables, FY 2011 Budget, Table 8-8. Non-defense is all discretionary except budget function 050.
Spike due toFY09 Stimulus
After decades long growth, expect a contraction in non-defense spendingAfter decades long growth, expect a contraction in non-defense spendingAfter decades long growth, expect a contraction in non-defense spendingAfter decades long growth, expect a contraction in non-defense spending
Afghanistan and Iraq Wars
Vietnam War Reagan Build-up
DoD Budget 1945-2015: Threat Driven, but Debt Constrained DoD Budget 1945-2015: Threat Driven, but Debt Constrained
61
Large debt levels will impair future US ability to increase Large debt levels will impair future US ability to increase defense spending as quickly as in the past defense spending as quickly as in the past
Large debt levels will impair future US ability to increase Large debt levels will impair future US ability to increase defense spending as quickly as in the past defense spending as quickly as in the past
Korean War
WW II
Missile GapCuban Missile Crisis
Pub
lic
Deb
t%
of G
DP
DoD
Bud
get
in C
onst
ant F
Y11
$B
Historic Budget Constraint Zone: Public Debt > 40% GDP
44% Decline 31% Decline19% Decline
Deficit Forecast: Bleak Without Major Entitlement Reforms or Revenue Growth
62
Fiscal Year
Percent of GDP
OMB February ’10OMB February ’10OMB February ’10OMB February ’10
CBO Mar ’10 Assessment of CBO Mar ’10 Assessment of FY11 BudgetFY11 Budget
CBO Mar ’10 Assessment of CBO Mar ’10 Assessment of FY11 BudgetFY11 Budget
TechAmerica ForecastTechAmerica Forecast
Changes from Mar 10 CBO:Changes from Mar 10 CBO:• Adjustments for DoD base Adjustments for DoD base
budget and OCO forecastsbudget and OCO forecasts• Higher assumption for health Higher assumption for health
care reform costscare reform costs• Reduced international affairs Reduced international affairs
spendingspending• Risk of higher interest ratesRisk of higher interest rates
TechAmerica ForecastTechAmerica Forecast
Changes from Mar 10 CBO:Changes from Mar 10 CBO:• Adjustments for DoD base Adjustments for DoD base
budget and OCO forecastsbudget and OCO forecasts• Higher assumption for health Higher assumption for health
care reform costscare reform costs• Reduced international affairs Reduced international affairs
spendingspending• Risk of higher interest ratesRisk of higher interest rates
Deficits stay above 4% through the forecast period; Deficits stay above 4% through the forecast period; the trend is toward larger, not smaller, deficits from FY14 through FY21 the trend is toward larger, not smaller, deficits from FY14 through FY21
Deficits stay above 4% through the forecast period; Deficits stay above 4% through the forecast period; the trend is toward larger, not smaller, deficits from FY14 through FY21 the trend is toward larger, not smaller, deficits from FY14 through FY21
OMB February ’09OMB February ’09OMB February ’09OMB February ’09Actual FY10 deficit is approximately 10% of GDP. CBO projects $1.3T deficit, $20.3T debt in 2020. Actual FY10 deficit is approximately 10% of GDP. CBO projects $1.3T deficit, $20.3T debt in 2020.
External Environment Summary
63
• Long-term growth of Social Security, Medicare and Medicaid has put the country on an “unsustainable fiscal path”– Rapidly growing health care costs are the most significant problem
• Huge deficits, growing national debt and an uncertain global economy will constrain the discretionary budget– Deficits of historic proportions projected for foreseeable future – Annual interest on debt projected to exceed DoD base budget by 2017;
and earlier if interest rates rise
• The only practical way to reduce deficits & debt is via a combination of strong economic growth, increased revenues, and reduced spending – President froze non-security discretionary spending for FY11-13– Subsequently OMB directed non-security agencies to cut 5% in FY12– Presidential Commission reported recommendations in December
2010; but Congress must ultimately make the decisions—now in deadlock!
““The biggest threat we have to our national security is our debt.” The biggest threat we have to our national security is our debt.” Adm. Michael Mullen, Chairman of the JCS, June 2010Adm. Michael Mullen, Chairman of the JCS, June 2010
““The biggest threat we have to our national security is our debt.” The biggest threat we have to our national security is our debt.” Adm. Michael Mullen, Chairman of the JCS, June 2010Adm. Michael Mullen, Chairman of the JCS, June 2010
New World, Old Rules?
As Financial Markets Rallied & Global Economy Moved into Recovery
Credit Crisis Revealed Many Mistaken Assumptions on How the World Operates
Economies Cannot Grow Beyond Their Means in Perpetuity
Reasonable Probability of Reorienting Global Growth Away from US Consumer to Emerging Market Demand Uncertainty focused on two key factors:
1. Fortunately, Developed World Growth Did Not Collapse 2. Developing Nations Must Not Rely on Growing US Consumption
CRE Cycle Roller Derby: Development, Space, and Capital
Sept. 08, space mkts. turn negative
Aug. 07Trends + to -
Source: RCA
Here We Show “Core” CRE Price Changes Broken Out Between Income (Space Markets) and Cap Rate (Capital Markets) Effects
$0
$20
$40
$60
$80
$100
$120
$140
$160
'01 '02 '03 '04 '05 '06 '07 '08 '09 '10
CRE Sales CRE Prices
sources:CRE Sales: Real Capital Analytics, office, industrial, retail, multi-family properties $5mil+CRE Prices: Moody's/REAL CPPI National Aggregate Index
Capital Markets: The Big Picture• Transaction activity has only recently revived• Prices starting to firm as credit crunch eases, but improvements selective
Quarterly Commercial Real Estate Investment
CRE PricesDown 42%Peak to Trough
Private CRE Appreciation Decomposed—Two Market Downturns Last Year’s Overstreet Scenario Going Forward (2009-2010)
1991—1993• NCREIF Price Index -23.5%• NOI Effect - 3.2%• Cap Rate Effect -21.0%• Interaction Effect + 0.7%
2002—2004• NCREIF Price Index 12.4%• NOI Effect -16.4%• Cap Rate Effect +34.4%• Interaction Effect -5.6%
2007/2010
• NCREIF Price Index -- 40.0% •NOI Effect -- 15.0%•Cap Rate Effect -- 25.0%•Interaction Effect Ignore
2007/2010 C-Store Ostreet SWAG
• Pet Mkt. Price Index -- 20.0% •NOI Effect +5.0%•Cap Rate Effect -- 25.0% •Interaction Effect Ignore
Not over the Maturing CRE Mortgage Debt “hump” Yet!
Vacancy Trends, 1991 to 2010—Office, Industrial Retail Historically Weak, Apt. solid
Vacancy Trends, 1991 to 2010—Office, Industrial Retail Historically Weak, Apt. solid
REITs: A Leading Indicator--Good Omen?
Key Take-awayMonitor REITs in general and industry examplesGetty (gty) (hpt) (nnn)
Key Take-awayMonitor REITs in general and industry examplesGetty (gty) (hpt) (nnn)
73
Treasury and corporate bond yields are monthly through February 2011. Real estate cap rate is quarterly through 4Q10 and represents equally weighted average cap rates from institutional core property transactions.
Sources: Cornerstone Research, NCREIF, and Federal Reserve Board.
Core Property and Bond Pricing Relationship Linked
2%
3%
4%
5%
6%
7%
8%
9%
10%
2002.01 2003.01 2004.01 2005.01 2006.01 2007.01 2008.01 2009.01 2010:1
10 Year Treasury Baa Corporate Bond Real Estate (Cap Rate )
73
Feb. 2011
Feb. 2011
4Q10
Recently, Cap Rate Decline Has Lagged Bond Market Rally
Reading the Cap Rate “Tea Leaves”
1. Cap rates on core real estate tend to be highly correlated with Baa corporate bond rates
2. Cap rates on core real estate tend to be slightly higher than Baa corporate bond rates Why? Less Liquid? Riskier?
3. Relationship “flipped” in 2006 as property prices hit new highs—then back to “normal” in 2009-- but with a too robust a spread (back to chart)
4. Suggests future drop in cap rates and rise in property prices—which has been in process the past two quarters
But…..make sure we look at all the evidence
• Yes, at the aggregate level, cap rates spreads to corporate bond and treasury rates remain relatively high by historical standards;
• Yet “spreads” for high quality properties in select markets (DC, SF, and NYC for example) are much skinnier!
• Indeed, fierce competition for core properties in such markets has led to 6 percent and below cap rates on a number of transactions—a bifurcated to trifurcated market situation! It is the old “flight to quality” routine!
Com. Mortgage Interest Rates and Difference (Spread) to Risk Free Rate Has Normalized!
Com. Mortgage Interest Rates and Difference (Spread) to Risk Free Rate Has Normalized!
**Interest rate data based on properties and portfolios valued at $2.5 million or greater and on loans with terms between 7 and 13 years.
* CRE Industrial, Office, and Retail - 6 month average
Post Bubble Cap Rate Spread Expansion
Conclusion: Highly likely that CRE has bottomed out! But each local market is different which presents a Demand/supply puzzle. Analyze!
• Spreads to treasuries remain high which coincides with continued economic and property sector weakness—hence, risk and higher cap rate spreads
• Yet, historically, these same metric conditions have coincided with property value rises over a three to five year period.
• Chances are good that our “cap rate tea leaves” are pointing to a similar outcome this time around.
Time to buy—Time to Sell?
Robert White (CEO, Real Capital Analytics) recently put forward the following thesis?
Core asset (office, retail, industrial, apt.) prices in major markets up strongly in 2010 (approximately 30 percent); Distressed assets still priced relatively well with lenders ready to deal; If you own stabilized properties or can manage to stabilize one quickly—arbitrage opportunity exists to sell high and buy low; Buyers are paying up for high quality, well leased properties while the vast majority are discounted significantly; Risk takers will rarely have a better situation.
Bob White, RCA CEO, Market CRE ThesisContinued
• Time is NOW as distressed opportunities will evaporate within next two years
• Spike in major markets and assets driven by buyer demand as much as the return of debt markets;
• As CMBS conduits continue to expand and buyer pool deepens, they will be forced to expand into other markets—driving the markets up;
• Fundamentals improvement also factors in—with example of apartments last year up 30 percent.
Looking Back: Rich Rewards for Early Movers
Change in Investment Orientation, ’10 – ‘11
Bob White, RCA CEO, Market CRE ThesisContinued—Concerns and Comforts?
• Rising interest rates? Oil prices? Japanese Disaster? Tax increases (capital gain or real estate specific)?
• Commercial real estate is still a relatively new asset class for institutional investors and allocations are not optimal from a percentage basis and, hence, should rise;
• Sell high—buy low or buy low and sell high—it appears to be a great time to do either!
• What do you think? How does the Convenience store product fit into this thesis? Discussion?
Other Pundits: Prudential Real Estate Advisors positive at turn of year
•After a long period of fits and starts, conditions now seem ripe for an extended recovery in CRE;
•Firmly established in multi-family and hotel;
•Office, retail, and industrial starting to turn after hitting near-record vacancies;
•Caution required given that the turn is dependent on what they view as a still “fragile” recovery
•After a long period of fits and starts, conditions now seem ripe for an extended recovery in CRE;
•Firmly established in multi-family and hotel;
•Office, retail, and industrial starting to turn after hitting near-record vacancies;
•Caution required given that the turn is dependent on what they view as a still “fragile” recovery
RREEF’s Take on Retail—note for smaller and high growth metros—extreme selectivity! Does it apply to C-stores?
•Capital slow to return—distressed situation! Changing now as surviving retailers stronger with store closings, etc.
•Consumers modestly increasing their wayward ways!•Investors returning! Yields compressing here also;
•Prefer top quality although older properties with exceptional locations if low-rent anchors are nearing the end of lease renewal options
•Top investable properties found in a broad array of metro situations but beware of smaller and high-growth, low barrier metros!
•Capital slow to return—distressed situation! Changing now as surviving retailers stronger with store closings, etc.
•Consumers modestly increasing their wayward ways!•Investors returning! Yields compressing here also;
•Prefer top quality although older properties with exceptional locations if low-rent anchors are nearing the end of lease renewal options
•Top investable properties found in a broad array of metro situations but beware of smaller and high-growth, low barrier metros!
Time to buy—Time to Sell? C’stores?
Here We Show “Core” CRE Price Changes Broken Out Between Income (Space Markets) and Cap Rate (Capital Markets) Effects
Industrial Still Struggling
Office Also Struggling
Multi-Family On a Different Track
Retail Still Struggling But Down Less than Office
CRE All About S&D and Retail Has an Issue!
0
50
100
150
200
250
30019941
19951
19961
19971
19981
19991
20001
20011
20021
20031
20041
20051
20061
20071
20081
20091
20101
Dem
1994Q
1=100, S
up
set t
o =
avg
level
yyyyq
Retail Demand (Constant-Liquidity) & Supply Indexes
Demand
Supply
Description 2010 Tax Ass. Mgr. Est. Value Appraisal App. Vs Ass. App. Vs. Mgr. Est. App./Ass App/Est
% %
Car Wash $410,700 $600,000 $460,000 $49,300 -$140,000 112% 77%
Service Station $575,000 $750,000 $551,000 -$24,000 -$199,000 96% 73%
Office $154,100 $250,000 $210,000 $55,900 -$40,000 136% 84%
Warehouse $159,600 $200,000 $206,000 $46,400 $6,000 129% 103%
C-store $378,776 $450,000 $419,500 $40,724 -$30,500 111% 93%
C-store $409,900 $300,000 $499,000 $89,100 $199,000 122% 166%
C-store $300,000 $250,000 $325,000 $25,000 $75,000 108% 130%
Service Station $336,364 $350,000 $438,000 $101,636 $88,000 130% 125%
C-Store $362,903 $350,000 $521,500 $158,597 $171,500 144% 149%
C-store and Garage $653,968 $1,000,000 $750,000 $96,032 -$250,000 115% 75%
Building Lot $25,700 $50,000 $53,000 $27,300 $3,000 206% 106%
C-store $987,037 $1,050,000 $817,000 -$170,037 -$233,000 83% 78%
C-store $1,582,090 $2,250,000 $930,000 -$652,090 -$1,320,000 59% 41%
Total $6,336,138 $7,850,000 $6,180,000 -$156,138 -$1,670,000 98% 79%
Good Case Example: Appraisal vs. Mgr. Est. & Tax Assess. Values
Good Case Example: Appraisal vs. Mgr. Est. & Tax Assess. Values
Lessons Implied for Petroleum Distribution CRE
95
• Nourishing traditional banking relationships will pay large dividends in tough periods but should require keen assessment of the bank’s risk posture, etc.
• Securitization and CMBS are not dead and they are beginning to recover—it has not been rapid—does continued scarce and pricier debt suggest liquidity build-up for petroleum marketing firms? What are the long term implications? Discuss!
• Alignment with equity & debt sources crucial to success during and post crisis; a great moment for creative partnering.
• Operational excellence necessary for turnaround opportunities! Operational excellence is Rare! It is worth the price! Buy or lease A properties with B performance and turn into A properties.
Lessons Implied for Petroleum Distribution CRE
96
• Study history! These real estate banking crisis cycles are predictable although history repeats but never the same way. Banks are key element not because they create credit but because fractional reserves and mortgage based lending—a violent combination!
• History suggests strongly that these banking based expansions and subsequent real estate (asset) bubble crashes are slightly less than two decades in duration (14 +/- years of build-up with a mid-term slow down followed by 4 +/- years of tough sledding)—Avoid the winner’s curse period (last 2+/- years of upturn); Don’t try to pick the top—be conservative! Sell in the 13th if you don’t ride it out! Never buy early in a falling market at the end of the cycle—they last years!
• Value based strategic plans for real estate intensive firms should be based on this long cycle reality—fractional reserve banking systems and land inflation over a cycle lead to severe corrections!
• Optimal long-term value route requires identifying the economic turning points—extreme points in the long term real estate cycle—and doing the opposite of the “herd” at these key points!
• Extremes take years to develop & new technology will not alter this!
Lessons relative to BEST PRACTICES
Essential Elements of Great CRE Investor/Managers have not changed: Confront the Brutal Facts; Get the right people on the bus and the wrong ones off; run the business as a business & the family as a family
1. Know Yourself, Your Firm, Its Parts, and Its Risk Tolerance Moreover, How Each Relates to Owner/s Personal Risk
Tolerances and Financial Objectives—Analyze Deeply 2. Determine Whether Each Unit is Adding Value: Analyze your firm’s portfolio of products, units, and strategic value parts with the best techniques available—Economic Value Added/Life Cycle Analysis (BCG matrix) 2. Know Your Real Estate Markets—Establish a Information Network that Assures Your Team of Asymmetric Information
Treat this as a necessary CRE business activity
Lessons relative to BEST PRACTICES Cont.
3. Understand subtleties of unit & firm value drivers--formally analyze the market demand and supply characteristics and build these assumptions into your financial projections and discounted cash flow analyses
• If you don’t practice DCF, review a value based analysis and see why not? Warren Buffet’s academic mentor can’t be wrong!
4. Understand the benefit/costs of leverage and build this into your modeling effortsROE = ROIC + (ROIC less Cost of Debt) X D/E
Moral: Unless you are making solid returns on invested capital (Debt + Equity), financial leverage won’t help & it can HURT
Manage toward ROIC for each Value Center
Lessons relative to Best Practices Cont.
5. Structure your real estate portfolio separately from your operating business and account and manage it optimally using best practice techniques to cull, revitalize, and add new to industry units! Strategically establish fortress CRE positions!6. Realize that managerial time and talent is your most critical resource; capital can be creatively raised even in credit constrained environments .7. Management requires the focus achieved through applying value based principles—unfortunately still not well understood and used where needed most—in our private firm environments. Return on Invested Capital less the Weighted Average Cost of Capital =s Economic Profit ; Present Value of Economic Profit =s Corporate Value Added! Grow Accordingly!
Lessons Confirmed by Credit Crisis
• Debt contains a largely ignored risk (refinancing)• 20 plus percent IRRs far easier to generate in spread sheets
than in reality• Worst-case analyses rarely come close to potential worse
cases and normally are too extreme—thanks to the limitations of our ability to forecast complex outcomes
• Cheap and easy money portends expensive and scarce money in the future!