Bordering a New Middle EastFrontiers, weak states and the great imbalance of power

edited by

Roberto Menotti and Jessica Carter

Faisal J. Abbas, Francesca Borri, Doruk Ergun, John C. Hulsman, Lorenzo Kamel, Azzurra Meringolo,

Nicola Pedde, Bernard E. Selwan Khoury, Salim Tamani, Mattia Toaldo

Aspen Italia

VIEWS

Borders are a fundamental yet tricky issue in international poli-tics. Despite their seemingly static nature, shifting frontiers are at the heart of many historical changes, not just through war. The Middle East and North Africa are experiencing important transi-tions, some of which are traumatic. In the Middle East there is a “great imbalance”: power relationships are contested and far from clear and alliances, as well as the resilience of state institu-tions, are tested. Such a strategic outlook is especially conducive to violent conflict. One of the transitions currently underway has to do with state borders and their practical meaning.

The chapters of the book cover (individually or in conjunction with other countries) Algeria, Egypt, Iraq, Iran, Israel, Lebanon, Libya, Palestine, Saudi Arabia and the Gulf monarchies, Syria, Turkey.

Roberto Menotti is Editor-in-Chief of Aspenia online. He is also Deputy Editor of Aspenia print edition and Senior Advisor - International Activities at Aspen Institute Italia. Among his recent publications, Mondo Caos (Laterza, 2010).

Jessica Carter is co-creator and former Managing Editor of Aspenia online.

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An Aspenia online special2015

Bordering a New Middle EastFrontiers, weak states and the great imbalance of power

edited byRoberto Menotti and Jessica Carter

Faisal J. Abbas, Francesca Borri, Doruk Ergun, John C. Hulsman, Lorenzo Kamel, Azzurra Meringolo,

Nicola Pedde, Bernard E. Selwan Khoury, Salim Tamani, Mattia Toaldo

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© December 2015, Aspen Institute Italia

I edition

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All rights reserved. No part of this book shall be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted by any means – electronic, mechani-cal, photocopying, recording, or otherwise – without written permis-sion from the publisher. No patent liability is assumed with respect to the use of the information contained herein. Although every precaution has been taken in the preparation of this book, the publisher and au-thor assume no responsibility for errors or omissions. Neither is any liability assumed for damages resulting from the use of the information contained herein.

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Aspen Institute Italia

Aspen Institute Italia is a private, independent, international, nonpartisan and nonprofit association that encourages a free ex-change of opinions about knowledge, information and values.

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Aspen Italia Views

“Aspen Italia Views” is a series of studies and analyses on some of the major challenges facing contemporary societies. Pub-lished materials deal with topics ranging from culture, eco-nomics and technology, to politics and security, on both Italy and the international system. The series aims to offer analyti-cal tools for the main social phenomena, with special atten-tion to the business community.

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Table of content

I. Frontiers, weak states and the great imbalance of power 8 Roberto Menotti

II. Libya: is a non-state worse than an authoritarian regime? 20 Mattia Toaldo

Libya’s de facto partition 21 Libya’s external borders 23 Two potential silver linings 25 Time to reassess Western policy 28

III. Egypt between internal insecurity and regional ambition 28 Azzurra Meringolo

Sinai: the sand box yet to be tamed 30 Libya: the brewing threat of war by proxy on the border 34 Conclusions 37

IV. Algeria, the deep roots of a nation state 40 Salim Tamani

The burden of history 41 A large welfare state, political crisis and violence 42 National reconciliation, the assault on Islamism,

and social cohesion as defense doctrine 44 Before the Arab Spring, Qaddafi the “separatist” 46 After the Arab Spring 47

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V. Straddling Syria and Iraq: the ISIS epicenter 50 Francesca Borri

The ideal enemy 52 Centrifugal forces and the people’s desperation 55

VI. Turkey: a changing national identity in the regional storm 60 Doruk Ergun

Modern Turkey and the legacy of the Empire 61 Today’s identity politics 65 The lethal Kurdish issue, Syria, Iraq and refugees 68

VII. The Iranian nation state between internal evolution and external change 74

Nicola Pedde

A political model under generational stress 75 Iran’s path between relative stability and social change 78 Tehran’s regional political and security outlook 81

VIII. Saudi Arabia as the custodian of stability 88 Faisal J. Abbas

The Yemen case as a possible model 89 Securing the northern border 92 The cost of the status quo 93

IX. Israel and Palestine: mental and territorial borders 96 Lorenzo Kamel

One state versus two: misleading alternatives 97 The role of international consensus 100 The conflict’s original dimension 104 References 105

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X. Lebanon: a weak state and its complex national identity at risk 108

Bernard Selwan Khoury Identity and institutions 109 Multiple external influences and proxy wars 111 Federalism, divergent conceptions of the state and the weight

of Hezbollah 114 The problem of Israel, and Lebanon as hostage to the

region 116

XI. The ties that bind: an American perspective on Middle Eastern borders 120

John C. Hulsman American schools of thought and the Middle East 121 Conclusion: whatever works 126

XII. Short Biographies 128

I. Frontiers, weak states and the great imbalance

of power

Roberto Menotti

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Borders are a fundamental yet tricky issue in international politics. State borders are depicted on political maps as neat static lines, in rare case as dotted lines if officially contested; normally they do not move and in fact enshrine stability if not permanence. Yet, shifting frontiers are at the heart of many historical changes, not just through war – think of the German reunification in 1991. In some cases, even if the lines on maps are not redrawn or drawn in different colors, the meaning of borders changes quite radically – think of the process of Euro-pean integration since the 1950s.

The region of the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) is experiencing important transitions in several respects, some of which are traumatic. We may describe the overall state of play in the Middle East as a “great imbalance”, in the sense that power relationships are contested and far from clear; as a consequence, the credibility of commitments and alliances, as well as the very resilience of state institutions, are repeat-edly tested. Such a strategic outlook is especially conducive to violent conflict, given that stability is neither guaranteed by a well-understood balance of power (via deterrence, diplomacy backed by credible military commitments, etc.), or pursued through institutional arrangements (formal cooperative secu-rity treaties, international mediation, etc.).

In this unsettled context, one of the transitions currently under-way has to do with state borders and their practical meaning.

Most states in the region belong to the theoretical category of “weak states” – by which we can generically indicate those po-litical entities which, despite being internationally recognized, have a limited capacity to supply basic “political goods” of comparatively adequate quality (especially the rule of law). A good proxy of the amount and quality of political goods supplied by the state is the “Human Development Index” of the United Nations Development Program – a widely used standard that combines socio-economic, institutional, human

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rights and other indicators. As this and other similar indica-tors suggest, the weakness of a “weak state” is not necessarily external, but first and foremost internal, and it often equates with a lack of accountability. The problem is that an internally hollow structure will eventually fail to manage external pres-sures, despite typical efforts at centralization relying on the armed forces and the security apparatus.

Precisely because these states exhibit significant gaps in their capability to enforce the rule of law, poor or very uneven eco-nomic performance, and sometimes openly contested institu-tions, they now also face direct threats or challenges to their borders that they are ill-equipped to manage peacefully. In-deed, the custodians of state borders risk being overwhelmed by regional forces that were not nearly as powerful or pervasive just a few years ago.

In the MENA region, several governments currently in power are seen by their citizens (or by sizeable minorities among the population) as not fully legitimate and accountable; and members of the political establishment can often be described as “rentier elites”, given the sharp limits imposed on truly competitive politics as well as on the market economy. This situation has given rise to an apparent paradox: civil society (as opposed to state institutions) is mostly fragmented and unable to exert genuine popular sovereignty, but sectors of civ-il society are also restless and more mobilized than in the past – especially following the Arab revolts. Well-educated youths, in particular, have demonstrated the ability to organize them-selves as active civic “movements” (at least in the short term) and are to some extent “globalized”, i.e. open to influences coming from all over the world in real time and with little government interference. The ability to cultivate links with counterparts in other countries creates informal networks that may facilitate forms of contagion – for good and bad. In other words, the meaning of borders is changing in many ways.

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Against this background, our analytical assumption is that some trends of contested political legitimacy are regional and cross-border, but other key dynamics are local and sub-national. The interplay of these diverse forces makes a single analysis impossible – and a simplistic analysis pointless, in fact misleading. There are indeed general and recurring trends, but these are not unifying trends: most states in the Middle East are challenged, but each is challenged in its own way.

Thus it is worth adopting national perspectives on the basis of the same set of problematic issues. A focus on local circumstanc-es will obviously provide different angles but also, ultimately, a better understanding of the cross-border dynamics at play.

The flows of migrants from the southern shore of the Mediter-ranean (origin or transit countries) to Europe have recently attracted enormous public attention, and rightly so in light of their manifold repercussions: humanitarian, social and eco-nomic, political, and of course in security terms. It should be noted that the current migration flows involve both desper-ate people fleeing extreme violence and poverty (mostly fall-ing in the “refugee” category and driven by a forceful “push factor”), but also individuals and families driven by the lack of any prospect of economic improvement and better living standards in their home countries (mostly falling in the “eco-nomic migrant” category and driven by a strong “pull factor”). These flows are largely a consequence of the very phenomena of state collapse or chronic unaccountability that we put un-der the spotlight in the following pages. Terrorism is of course the most acute, violent and tragic manifestation of protracted instability beyond Europe’s borders, but possibly not the most macroscopic as the political map of a whole region seems to be changing before our very eyes.

In choosing which national cases to include in this collection of short essays, we have omitted (among others) Tunisia and

Roberto Menotti

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Morocco, two countries that are indeed of great interest – but for different reasons than the rest of the lot: both have not ex-perienced the combination of threats to their borders and ex-treme weakness of legitimate governance institutions that are the core issue under investigation. In part, this somewhat ar-bitrary choice is also a simple sign of hope that policymakers as well as ordinary citizens in Tunisia and Morocco will have the capacity to continue on their narrow path toward peaceful change.

A few ambiguous or controversial cases (in the perspective of the “weak state” definition) have been included: Israel because of the inherent territorial overlap between its political future and that of the Palestinian territories, which remains a desta-bilizing influence; Turkey and Saudi Arabia because of their direct role in the redefinition of territorial relations in neigh-boring states, but also in light of the serious challenges to their domestic equilibrium. The chapter on the US is justified by the unique role played by the distant superpower as a key counter-part/partner/adversary for each and every state in the region: without at least an analysis of the American perspective the evolution of the Middle East would be even harder to interpret.

The same cannot – yet – be said of Europe, as there is no such thing as a single European view of the MENA region. An assess-ment of European interests, goals, and potential contributions to its reshaping would therefore require an in-depth study of the interplay between the various members of the EU and the practical meaning of the “C” letter in the CFSP (Common For-eign and Security Policy) acronym. It should be underlined, however, that about half of the authors in this collection are themselves European – so they inevitably bring an Old Conti-nent flavor to the analysis.

While all the countries under consideration share major con-cerns for the prevailing regional dynamics, they often disagree

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on how they assess positive and negative changes underway. Even a cursory glance can help us see why this is the case.

Libya is a de facto partitioned country – and a bad precedent for Western (UN-backed) intervention, regardless of the spe-cific motivations for the use of military force by a NATO-based Euro-American coalition in 2011. The key feature is the absence of genuine state institutions in the wake of the Qaddafi regime, and the need to come to terms with the key role of informal local groups and social networks (and customs) in order to re-establish some form of governance. Post-Qaddafi Libya clearly shows that historical legacies and the peculiar social struc-tures they produce cannot be ignored or wished away, but can only be leveraged – hoping to channel dissent and bargaining through peaceful politics. In any case, the current situation of near-anarchy has rightly been recognized as a real and present danger by Libya’s immediate neighbors and by the European countries on the opposite shore of the Mediterranean.

Egypt is a pivotal country, to some extent due to its geogra-phy (in addition to its sheer demographic size) as it borders Libya to the West and Gaza to the East (through the troubled Sinai province). The Suez Canal and the recently discovered gas reserves off its coast also offer Cairo economic opportuni-ties that might, under certain political conditions, bring sig-nificant growth and social development to the country, and even to the wider region. But exactly because of its pivotal role and recent history of secular/military comeback, Egypt is seen by many hostile forces as a prime target. Meanwhile, the po-litical and economic system under the leadership of former General Abdel Fattah al-Sisi displays most of the weaknesses of the Mubarak era.

Roberto Menotti

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Algeria epitomizes the close connection between the attempt-ed consolidation of a modern, post-colonial, nation-state and secular authoritarian rule, as well as the risks of a religious-political backlash (which took the form of a bloody and pro-longed civil war in the 1990s). The country’s vast endowment of energy resources also allowed Algerian governments to sus-tain a large welfare apparatus, entrenching an economic sys-tem that has gradually become, in many ways, a problem for the further modernization of Algeria.

Syria (or more precisely the Syria-Iraq complex) is now viewed by nearly everyone as the epicenter of a macro-regional crisis that has produced and nurtured – along with a huge num-ber of refugees spilling over into many neighboring countries – the ISIS phenomenon. In a region of many contradictions, there is also a Syrian paradox: for all their tragic practical ef-fects on the country and beyond, the ISIS fighters, as well as Assad, have also become a sort of pretext used by external actors to wage a proxy war for influence. Syria is hostage to overlapping enmities and disputes – some recent and tactical, some historical and truly strategic for the future of the whole region. As Syria is ripped apart as a territorial entity, most of its people are exhausted by the deadly conflict and at some point will probably come to accept almost any peaceful settlement as a better alternative than the current disaster. In this, and in the belated recognition by several outside powers of the costs of the disaster even for themselves, may be a glimmer of hope.

Turkey is truly a unique case and in many respects an “outli-er”. Its gradual – and to many observers worrisome - domestic transformation in the past decade has coincided with a growth of its foreign policy ambitions, which eventually (by choice or by mistake) contributed to the bloody stalemate in Syria. Of course, Turkey cannot be held responsible for causing the re-gional conflicts on its southern borders: in fact, it has been hit hard by the fallout of the US invasion of Iraq in 2003 and then

I. Frontiers, weak states and the great imbalance of power

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of the Syrian war (not just in terms of massive refugee flows), to the point that its own domestic arrangement may now be upset and become a victim of “identity politics”. The Kurdish issue, in its new unpredictable form following the emergence of semi-autonomous enclaves in both Syria and Iraq, may prove to be the most poisonous.

The other outlier in the regional “imbalance of power” is Iran – not just as a non-Arab country in a predominantly Arab re-gion, but even more importantly as a “post-revolutionary” po-litical system. As such, the “Islamic Republic” has managed to largely institutionalize (thus to some extent contain) the ideological zeal of the revolutionary forces, while consolidat-ing a rather sophisticated political system. This does not make Iran a democracy, of course, but it probably does make it a nation state in a modern sense, despite the very specific – and to many outsiders antiquated – features of what officially re-mains a theocracy. Such a hybrid domestic outlook has clearly affected the country’s external behavior, also when the time has come to exploit the unexpected opportunities offered by the collapse of the old Iraq in 2003 and of the old Syria in 2011. The reaction to the “Arab revolts” has equally been dic-tated by intertwined domestic and regional, pragmatic and ideological considerations.

Saudi Arabia is the undisputed custodian of the Muslim Holy Sites, and has built its reputation as a guarantor of stability largely on this basis in combination with its oil wealth. How-ever, its claim to a regional leading role in diplomatic terms and as a “security provider” is much more controversial, and in recent years has pitted the Saudi monarchy directly against the Iranian regime in a dangerous contest for influence. On one hand, the very nature of the Saudi state (named after the ruling dynasty and ruled on the basis of a very specific inter-pretation of political Islam) may contribute to a worrisome transformation of regional politics: from inevitable interest-

Roberto Menotti

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based competition to an ideological clash between factions and confessions. On the other hand, Riyadh is a necessary component of any regional order also involving Tehran and Ankara as constructive players in the effort to rethink the meaning of borders.

The Israeli-Palestinian dispute is still seen, after so many dec-ades of failed negotiated plans and “peace initiatives”, as a source of regional instability, but admittedly to a lesser degree than in the past. In practice, as other flash points have inten-sified and multiplied, the grievances of the Palestinians and even the feared military superiority of Israel have receded in the priority ranking of the neighbors – and of the outside pow-ers. Even the bid for a sort of “fuller statehood” at the United Nations General Assembly (with a flag raising ceremony in September 2015 that could not substantially change the status of “nonmember observer state”) does not seem to have funda-mentally altered the equation of Israeli-Palestinian relations.

The experience of Lebanon and its current precarious situation – squeezed between the internal anomaly of Hezbollah, the Syrian disaster, and a cohesive nation state such as Israel to its south – reminds us of the power of regional forces in upsetting a delicate internal balance. We can at least take some comfort in the very persistence of Lebanon as a state in the face of these pressures, given its distinctive institutional model of multicul-tural/sectarian coexistence: a far from perfect model, and yet much more peaceful than most of the alternatives developed in the neighborhood.

The United States remains – despite a redefined regional expo-sure and various policy oscillations – a very relevant actor in the Middle East, more an external balancer than a dominant power. In this, the Obama presidency may have just brought about the explicit recognition of a known fact: the US no long-er has the will to sustain long-term military commitments on

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the ground. But, even more importantly, the American foreign policy establishment (probably not just Obama’s team) also wants to set itself free from inflexible alliance relationships in which it has often ceded a sort of veto power to problematic partners – such as Saudi Arabia and Israel, or to a lesser ex-tent Egypt. The current approach is thus based on a more flex-ible and selective choice of alignments, including the option of simply abstaining from a direct commitment – be it mili-tary, diplomatic, financial. Inevitably, this has created political space for other actors (states as well as non-state entities) to exercise their influence on regional dynamics: it is a price to be paid for the American priority of not bringing unnecessary risks upon itself. As borders are redefined in the Middle East and the power balance shifts rapidly in unknown directions, Washington is considering its options on an ad hoc basis. But a pragmatic approach must also come to terms with another inconvenient reality: that current state borders may not be vi-able. This would imply a fundamental conceptual shift for the US as the external power that has been the guarantor of the status quo (however loosely defined) for several decades.

Against this very diverse backdrop and power relation in flux, Europe must be humble and pragmatic but certainly cannot remain indifferent or passive. Having put on hold over-ambi-tious projects of the “macro-regional” type, the EU has a ma-jor stake in the evolution of governments, societies, states and borders on the Mediterranean’s southern shore and beyond. A key question is where it will have the right mix of direct col-lective interests, strong political will, and adequate capabili-ties (diplomatic, economic, military, even cultural). This mix seems to be present in at least two cases, i.e. Libya and Tunisia, despite the profound differences between the two. The Europe-ans have the means to make a real difference – provided they get their act together. They can do so by supporting inclusive politics and economic recovery, although of course in Libya

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this can only be attempted once a modicum of security and governance is reestablished. Clearly we cannot afford to sim-ply ignore the other countries in the region, but success stories (even relative and partial) are of great importance when one is trying to set up a virtuous cycle and gain credibility. Syria and Iraq will remain a huge problem for years to come, but there Europe – even assuming, as by now we cannot do, that it will act cohesively – can only be one among several contributors to a multi-pronged effort. Europeans however, have a rich his-tory of managing difficult borders, and in fact have invented borders in their modern connotation. Being well aware of that complicated – and unfinished – history will be useful as we move, for better or worse, toward a new Middle East.

I. Frontiers, weak states and the great imbalance of power