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ii ENCLOSURE 1!. !.

14

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i PROPOSED CHANGES TO TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS ,

I (TVA BFNP TS 144)1 BROWNS FERRY NUCLEAR PLANT

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PROPOSED CHANGES

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Minimum No. TAELS 3.2.A (Centinued) ~ .

InstrumentChannels Operable

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per Trip Sys(1) Function Trip Level Setting Action (1) Remarks

2 (10) Instrument Channel - < 200 F B 1. Above trip setting initiates0*

Xain Steen Line Tunnel-

Mhin Steam Line ~ leakage alarmFtch Temperature

2 Instrument Channel - 160 - 180 F C 1. Above trip 9etting initiates0

Reactor Water Cleanup Isolation of Reactor WaterSysten Floor Drain High Cleanup Line from Reactor andTemperature Reactor Water Return Line.

2 Instrument Channel - 160 - 180 F C 1. Same as above0

Reactor Water Cleanup -

Syster. Space High' Temperaturegn

cn

1 Instrument Channel - < 100 nr/hr or downscale G 1. 1 upscale or 2 devnscale vill~Reactor Building Venti- *

Initiate SGTSa.lation High Radiation - b. Isolate reactor zone andReactor Zone *

a

refuleing floor.c. Close atmosphere control syste=.

1 Instrument Channel - < 100 mr/hr or downscale F 1. 1 upscale or 2 downscale vill~

Reactor Building Venti- a. Ini.tiate SGTS.lation High Radiation b. Isolate refueling floor.Refuleing Zone c. Close atmosphere control

,, systen. *

2 (T)(8) Instrument Channel Charcoal Heaters < 2000 H and 1. Belov 2000 erb, trip setting charcoalSGTS Flov - Train A cDn R. H. Heaters < 2000 (A or F) heaters vill turn on.

-,

! Heaters ern 2. Below 2000 cfm, trip setting R. H.heaters vill shut off..

2 (T)(8) Instrument Channel Charcoal Heaters < 2000 H and 1. Below 2000 cfm, trip sotting charcoal.

SGTS Flev - Train 3 ccn R.H. Heaters 7 2000 (A or F) heaters vill turn on.Heaters ef=

~

2. Belov 2000 cfm, trip setting R.H.heaters will shut off.

,2 (7)(8) Instrument Channel Charcoal Jfeaters< 2000 cfm H and 1. Below 2000 cnn, trip setting charcoal

SGTS Flov - Train C R.H. Heater < 2000 cfm (A or F) heaters vill turn on.Heaters -

2. Belov 2000 cfm, trip setting R.H.''

heatern vill shut off..

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TABLE 3.2.5 (Continued)

Minimus No.. Operable PerTrip Sys (1) Function Trip I.evei Setting Action Remarks*

4(4) Instrument Channel - _ 200*F. A 1. Above trip setting initiates<

RCIC Steam Line Space High leakage alarmTeeperature

'

2(2) Instrument Channel - < 583" above vessel zero. A 1. Above trip setting trips HPCI turbine.Reactor Ilith Water Level

1 Instrument Channel - _90 psi (7) A 1. Above trip setting isolates HPCI.systen<

HPCI Turbine Steam Line High and trips HPCI turbine.Flow

$ 4(4) Instrument Channel - _ 200*F. A 1. Above trip settin6 initiates<

HPCI Steam Line Space High leakage alarmTemperature

1 Core Spray System Logic N/A B 1. Includes testing auto initiationinhibit to Core Spray Systems inother units.

j 1 RCIC System (Initiating) N/A B 1. Includes Groun 7 valves. Refer toLoe,1c Table 3.7.A for list of valves,

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|3.2 BASES

and trips the recirculation, pumps. The low reactor water levelinstrumentation that j e, set to trip when reactor water level is 17.7"(378" above vessel zero) above the top of the active fuel (Table 3.2.8)initiates the LPCI, Core Sperg Pumps, contributes to ADS initiation and startsthe diesel generatoIu. jdids&'crip eetting levels were chosen to be highenough to prevent spurious actuation but low enough to initiate CSCS operationso that post accident cooling can be accomplished and the guidelines of 10CFR 100 will not be violated. For large breaks up to the completecircumferential break of a 28-inch recirculation line and with the tripsetting given above, CSCS initiation is initiated in time to meet the abovecriteria. ,

The high drywell pressure instrumentation is a diverse signal to the waterlevel instrumentation and in addition to initiating CSCS, it causes isolationof Groups 2 and 8 isolation valves. For the breaks discussed above, thisinstrumentation will initiate CSCS operation at about the same time as thelow water level instrumentation; thus the results given above are applicablehere also.

Venturis are provided in the main steam lines as a means of measuring steamflow and also limiting the loss of mass inventory from the vessel during asteam line break accident. The primary function of the instrumentation isto detect a break in the main steam line. For the worst case accident, mainsteam line break outside drywell, a trip setting of 140% of rated steam flowin conjunction with the flow limiters and main steam line valve closure,limits the mass inventory loss such that fuel is not uncovered, fuel claddinggtemperatures remain below 1000 F and release of radioactivity to the environsis well below 10 CFR 100 guidelines. Reference Section 14.6.5 FSAR.

Temperature monitoring instrumentation is provided in the main steam line_

tunnel to detect leaks in these areas. Trips are provided on thisinstrumentation and when exceeded, cause initiation of control room alarms.The setting of 200 F for the main steam line tunnel detector is low enouoghto detect leaks of the order of 15 gpm; thus it is capable of coveringthe entire spectrum of breaks.

High radiation monitors in the main steam line tunnel have been provided todetect gross fuel failure as in the control rod drop accident. With theestablished setting of 6 times normal background, and main steam lineisolation valve closure, fission product release is limited so that 10 CFR100 guidelines are not exceeded for this accident. Reference Section 14.6.2FSAR. An alarm, with a nominal set point of 3 x normal full power background,is provided also.

Pressure instrumentation is provided to close the main steam isolation valvesin Run Mode when the main steam line prescure drops below 825 psig.

112

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}.2 BASFS_

and temperature instrumentattun are provided to detectThe HPCI h1P.h flowa break in the HPCI steam piping. Tripping of high flow instinxmentation re-Tripping logic for the highsults in actuation of HPC1 isolation valves.1 out of 2 logic and all sensors are required to be operable.flow is a

in the vicinity of the HPCI equipment is sensed by 4. lligh temperatureacts of 4 biectallic temperature switches.

The NPCI t rip settings of 90 psi f or high flow er.d 20C*T for high ter.- i

core uncovery is prevented and fission productperature are such thatrelease la within 11=1ts.

instrumentation are arranged the samtThe RCIC high flow and temperatureas that for t.e HPCI. The trip setting of 450" H 0 for high flow andh y

200*P f or tenperature are based on the same criteria as the HPC1.

the Reactor Cleanuo Syst,ee floor drain could indicateliigh tenperature at When high teopercture occurs, the cleanup-

a break in the cleanup system.system is isolated.

The instrumentation which initiates CSCS action is arranced in a dualAs f or other vits1 instrumentation stranged in this f ashion,bus system. the ef f ectiveness of the systen cven duringthe Specification preserves An erecption toperiods when maintenance or testing is being perforned.this is when logic functional testina is being perforned.

The control rod block functions are provided to prevent excessive controlrod withdrawal so that HCPR does not decrease to 1.07. The trip logicfor this function is 1 out of n: c.g. , any t r ip on one of six APRM's,eight IRM's. or four SRM's will result in a rod block,

tinstrumenta-The minimum instrument channel requirenents assure sufficient

The minimum instru=enttion to assuie the single failure criteria is cet.channel requirements for the RSM may be reduced 'y one for maintenance,o

testing, or es11bration. This time period is only 3% of the operating timein a month and does not algnificantly increase the risk of preventing aninadvertent control rod withdrawal.

The APRM rod block function is flow biased and prevents a significant reduc- -

tion in HCPR , especially during operation at reduced flow. The APAN pro-vides gross core protection; i.e. limits the gross core power increase

Thef rom withdrawal of control rods in the normal withcrawal sequence..

trips are set so that MCFR is maintained greater than 1.07.

The RBH tod bloca function provides local protection of the core; i.e. ,in a local region of the core, for athe prevention of critical power

single rod withdrawal error from a limiting control rod pattern. .

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Amendment No. # , 47

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UNIT 3

PROPOSED CHANGES

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TADLE 3.2.A s

PRIMm comArmm Arm aEen wxLoI:4c Isourton InstnerATIonMinimum No.Instrumentg

Channels Operabice

g per Trip Sys(l) ru nct io, rrir Irvel set tin <r _ Action 111 Feiu r ksn

D 2 Instrument channel - 2 538= above vessel aero A or 1. Below trip setting does them

" meactor low water revel (6) (D and E) following:a. Initiates Peactor Duitsing*

V. Isolation.O b. Init lates Frimary Containrer.t

Isolation1 ra c. Initiates SCTS

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1 Instruzent Channel - 100 + 15 psig D 1. Above trip setti+ 1 1solates thesnutdown cooling su tson valves

Peactor fligh Pressure of the EUR system.

2 Instrument channel - ) 2 970 above vessel sero A 1. Below trip setting initiates ~.ain~i Steam Line Isolation

'peactor Iow water Ievel,

(LIS-3-56 A-D, SW 01) .

2 Instrument Channel - s 2.5 pses A or 1. Above * rip settir.9 soes the

High crywell Pressure (6) (D and E) following:Initiates Peactor Baildinga.

(P S- 6'6 - M A- D) Isolation

$ b. Init lates IT.ta rf ContaintientIsolation

c. Initi;.tes SGTS,

2 Instrument Channel - 5 3 times normal rated 3 1. Above trip setting initiates ruinSteam Line Isolation

Bigh Radiation Main Steam f ull power lackgrocrat. Line Tunnel (G)j

3 1. Below trip setting initiates Main2 Instrument channel - Steam ttne Isolation

Low Prescure Main Steam h825 psig (4)Line ,

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2 (3) Instru:nent Channel - $ 1401 of rated steam ficw B. 1. Above trip setting initiates Main;!

Steam Lane Isolation}

Uigh Flow Main Steam Line

2 (10) Instrument Channel - s 2co*r B 1 Above trip setting initiatesMain Stear Line- }cgkagg g } g g.mi

Main Steam Line Tunnel'

Righ Temperature

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Table 3.2.8INSTRUMENTATION TI!AT INITIATES OR CONTROLS T!!E CORE AND COVTAINMENT Ct>OLING SYSTIAS

l'inimua No.Operable Pernic_Sn_tJt runction Trip _rtvr1 ser e in, action Remarks

1 Core Spray Trip N/A C 1. Mcnitors availability of powerSysten bus to logic systems,power monitor

1 ADS Trip System bus N/A C 1. Monitors availability of powerpcwer monitor to logic systems and valves.

1 HirI Trip System bus IVA C 1. Monitors availability of powergewer monitor to logic systems.

1 RCIC Trip System bus pouer II/A C 1. !!cnitors availability of powermonitor to logic systems.

1(2) Instrument Channel - 2 Elev. 551' A 1. Below trip setting will openCondancate Storage Tank Low HPCI suction valves to theLevel (LS-73-56A & B) suppression chamber.

1(2) Instrument Channel - 57" above normal water A 1. Above trip settin; will openSuppression Chacher High level UPCI suction valves to theLevel suppa m ion chamber.

S2 (2) Instrument Channel - 5 583" above vessel zero A 1. Above trip setting trips RCIC

Reactor High Water Level turbine.

1 Instrument Channel - 5 450" B 0 (7) A 1. Above trip setting isolatesRCIC Turbine Steam Line RCIC system,and trips BCICUigh Flow turbine.

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4 (t) Instrument Channel - $200*r. A 1. Above trip settin9 initiatesRCIC Steam Line SpaceHigh Terperature leakage alarm

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Table 3.2.BINSTRUMENTATION TtiAT INITIATES OR CO*.TROLS THE CORE AND CONTAINMENT COOLIPM SYSTEMS

Minimun No.Operable PerTrip Sys ill Punct ion Trip Level set t ing Act ion Reharks

2 (2) Instrument channel - 5583a above vessel zero. A 1. Atove trip setting trips HPCIturbine.Reactor High Water Level

1 Instrument Channel - 5 90' psi (7) A 1. Above trip settini isolates HPCI'

system and trips HPCI turbine.BPCI Turbine Steam LineBigh Flow

s te) Instrument Channel - s200*r. A 1. Above trip setting initiatesBPCI Steam Line Space leakage alarm

- High Temperature

1 Core Spray System Logic N/A B 1. Includes testing autoinitiation inhibit to CoreSpray Systems in other units.

1 RCIC System (Initiating) N/A B 1. Includes Group 7 valves.Refer to Table 3.7.A forLogic list of valves.

i

o 1 RCIC System (Isolation) N/A B 1. I'ncludes Group 5 valves.Refer to Table 3.7.A forLogiclist of valves.

1(16) ADS Logic N/A A.

1 RHR (LPCI) System N/A B

(Initiation)

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anl HPCI,andtrips tne recirculation pumps. The low reactor water levelinstrumentation that is set to trip when reactor water level is

17.7" (376" above vessel zero) above the top of the active fuel(Table 3. 2. E) initiates the LPCI, Core Spray Pumps, contributesto ADS initiation and starts the diesel generators. These tripsetting levels were chosen to be high enough to prevent spuriousactuation but low enough to initiate CSCS operation so that postaccident cooling can be accomplished and the guidelines of 10 CFR100 will not te violated. For large breaks up to the completecircumferential break of a 28-inch recirculation line and withthe trip setting given above, CSCS initiation is initiated intime to meet the above criteria.

The high drywell pressure instrumentation is a diverse signal tothe water level instrumentation and in addition to initiatingCSCS, it causes isolation of Groups 2 and 8 isolation valves.For the break; di scussed above, this instrumentation willinitiate CSCS operation at about the same time as the low waterlevel instrumentation; thus the results given above areapplicalbe nere also.

Venturis are provided in the main steam lines as a means ofmeasuring steam flow and also limiting the loss of mass inventoryf rom the vess el during a steam line break accident. The primaryfunction of the instrumentatica is to detect a break in the mainsteam line. For the worst case accident, main stean line breakoutside the drywell, a trip setting of 140% of rated steam flowin conjunction with the flow limiters and main steam line valveclosure, limits the mass inventory loss such that fuel is notuncovered, fuel cladding temperatures remain below 10000F andrelease of radioactivity to the environs is well below 10 CFR 100quidelines. Reference Section 14.6.5 FSAR.

.

Temperature monitoring instrumentation is provided in the mainsteam line tunnel to detect leaks in these areas. Trips areprovided on this instrumentation and when exceeded, cause initiation ofcontrol room alarns. The setting of 2000F for the main steamline tunnel detector is low enough to detect leaks of the orderof 15 qpm; tnus, it is capable of covering the entire spectrum ofbreaks.

High radiation mcnitors in the main steam line tunnel have beenprovided to detect gross fuel failure as in the control rod drop| accident. With the established setting of 6 times normalbackground, and main steam line isolation valve closure, fissionproduct release is limited so that 10 CFR 100 quidelines are notexceeded for this accident. Reference Section 14. 6. 2 FSAR. An| a la rm, with a nominal set point of 3 x normal full powerbackground, is provided also. .

_

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Pressure instrumentation is provided to close the main steamisolation valves in Run Mode when the main steam line pressured ro p e, below E25 psig.

The IIPCI high flus and temperature instrumentation are providedto detect a break in the llPCI ste.im piping. Tripping of the high flowin s t r umarat a t ion results in actuation of HPCI isolution valves.Tri ppi nq logic for the high flow is a 1 out of 2 logic, and allsensor s are reguired to be operable.

High tei,perature in the vicinity of the HPCI equipment is sensedby 4 sets of 4 bimetallic temperature switches.

The HPCI trip settings of 90 psi for high flow and 2000F for hightenperature are such that core uncovery is prevented and fission -

product release is within li mit s .

The BCIC hiqh flow and temoerature instrumentation are arrangedthe same as th.st for the HPCI. Tne trip betting cf 450" waterfor high flow and 2000F for temperature are based on the samecriteria as the HFCI.

High temperature at the Reactor Cleanup System floor drain couldindicate a break in the cleanup system. When high temperatureoccurs, the cleanup system is isolated.

The instrumentation which initiates CSCS action is arranged in adual bus system. As for other vital instrumentation arranged inthis fashion, the Specification preserves the ef fectiveness ofthe system even during periods when naintenance or testing isbeing performed. An exception to this is when logic functionaltesting i s being performed.

The control red block functions are provided to prevent excessivecontrol rod withdrawal so t> at MCPR does not decrease to 1.07Th3 trip logic for this f unction is 1 out of n: e.g., any tripon one of six APRM's, eight IRM's, or four SRM's will result in arod block.

The minimun instrument channel requirements assure sufficientinstrumentation to assure the single failure criteria is met. Two h3Mchannels are provided and only one of these may be bypassed frem the console, formaintenance and/or testing provided that this condition does not last longer tl.an2L hours in any thirty day pericd. This time period is only 3% of the operatingtine in a racnth and does net significantly increase the risk of preventing an.inadvertent control rod withdrawal. _ _ _

The APRM ro'i block function is flow biased and prevents asiqnificant reduct ion in MCPR, especially dur inq operation atreduced flow. The Al'RM provides gross core protection; i.e.,lini t s the gross core pnser incr eau f rom withdrawal of control

110

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5

ENCLOSURE 2

JUSTIFICATION(TVA BFNP TS 144)

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Units 1 and 2, pages 56,157,112, and 113

Unit 3, pages 57, 69 (Intr. Channel - RCIC Steam Line Space HighTemperature), 70, 109, and 110

Steam line space high temperature isolations are used to detectsmall line breaks. Breaks in these systems of sufficient size toendanger. fuel claddig integrity (small break LOCA size) are detectedby both high flow and low pressure trips in the steam lines. Theconsequences of isolation from the steam line space high temperaturelanction would cause nonconservative reactor water levelfluctuations.

In the event of a steam space high temperature alarm on the HPCI,RCIC, or main steam system, the operator will be directed, throughoperating instructions, to verify the validity of the alarm by:

a. Other instrumentation such as steam flows, pressure,and radiation monitors, or

b. Direct observation of the area involved.

In addition, other instrumentation is available which can provideisolation in the event of a steam line break. These incitde lowreactor water level, high steam flow and low turbine steam pressure.

The high temperature alarms are both audio and visual. They arelocated in the main control room on a front annunciator panel.

Unit 3, page 69 (Instrument Channel - Suppression Chamber HighLevel)

Units 1 and 2 technical specification Tahle 3.2.B states that forthe Suppression Chamber High Level function the mini =um number ofoperable instrument channels is one, while the unit 3 specificationlists the minimum number as two. This function is the same for allthrae units. The Browns Ferry FSAR, pages 7.4-8 and 7.4-9 indicates i

that only one channel is required to initiate the appropriate

control action. This revision is needed to make the unit 3technical specifications consistent with units 1 and ?.

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ENCLOSURE 3

REFERENCE TO PREVIOUS CHANGESTO TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS

(TVA BFNP TS 144)

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Unit 1, page 56 and Unit 3, page 57

The change to the heading of the first column of Table 3 2.Aand addition of the footnote (10) to the Main steam Line TunnelHigh Temperature was proposed in requested change TVA BFNPTS 133 dated December 5, 1979

Unit 1, page 112 and Unit 2, page 109

The change to the trip and alarm setpoints for the main steamline tunnel high radiation monitors from 3.to 6 times and from1.5 to 3 times background respectively, was proposed inrequested change TVA BFNP TS 123 dated June 29, 1979, andsupplement dated January 14, 1980.

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