I’d Rather Mix than Peel Onions: Anonymity for Paymentsin Decentralized Systems

Stefanie RoosDistributed Systems

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(Technical) Blockchain Issues

Scalability

Privacy

(Anonymity)

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(Technical) Blockchain Issues

Scalability

Privacy

(Anonymity)

Stanford MIT San Diego Berlin

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(Technical) Blockchain Issues

Scalability

Privacy

(Anonymity)

Stanford MIT San Diego Berlin

Transaction content

Metadata (IP address of origin)

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Network Layer Anonymity

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Network Layer Anonymity

Low latency(<= 2s)

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Problem

Anonymity Protocol Attack Effectiveness

None (Standard) Internal attacker 30%

Low Latency (Tor) Timing analysis 25%

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Mixing

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Mix Networks

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Problem

Anonymity Protocol Attack Effectiveness

None (Standard) Internal attacker 30%

Low Latency (Tor) Timing analysis 25%

Mixes Any attack as long as not all mixes are malicious

0%

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Research Challenges

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Research Challenges

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Research Challenges

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Research Challenges

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Research Challenges

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Research Challenges