Ikenberry Hegemony

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Getting Hegemony Right_G. John IkenberryIN MAY 1999 the Oxford Union

debated the proposition, "Resolved,the United States is a roguestate." The resolution was ultimatelydefeated, but around the world there isgrowing unease about a global orderdominated by American power-powerunprecedented, unrestrained and unpre-dictable. The unease is felt even byAmerica's closest allies. "The UnitedStates of America today predominates onthe economic level, the monetary level, onthe technological level, and in the culturalarea in the broadest sense of the word",French Foreign Minister Hubert Wdrineobserved in a speech in Paris in early 1999."It is not comparable, in terms of powerand influence, to anything known in mod-em history." European diplomats, follow-ing Wdrine's coining of the term, havebegun calling the United States a "hyper-power." During the Cold War, the SovietUnion and the United States kept eachother in check. Today the restraints areless evident, and this has made Americanpower increasingly controversial.

This is an unexpected turn of events.Just a little over a decade ago many pun-G. John Ikenberry is Peter F. Krogh Professor of

Global Justice at the School of Foreign Service,Georgetown University. His most recent book

dits argued that the central problemU.S. foreign policy was the graceful magement of the country's decline.Kennedy's famous book, The Rise andof the Great Powers, argued thatUnited States would go the way ogreat powers-down. Japan was onrise and Europe was awakening. Wpolitics after the Cold War, it was wiassumed, was to be profoundly multipoBut the distribution of world potook a dramatic turn in America's faThe sudden collapse of the Soviet Unthe decline in ideological rivalry, lageconomic fortunes in Japan and contintal Europe, growing disparities in miliand technological expenditure,America's booming economy all intefied power disparities during the 19Today it is not decline that the UnStates must manage but the fear, resment and instabilities created by a decof rising American power.A global backlash to U.S. power isinevitable, however, particularly ifUnited States remembers its own polihistory. Our leaders have the ideas, meand political institutions that can allowstable and cooperative order even inmidst of sharp and shifting asymmetof power. The United States facedproblem after World War II and solve


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e Dangersof SuccessHE UNITED STATES has aTegemony problem for a sim-ple reason: It started theof the 1990s as the world's onlyand then proceeded to have a

decade than any other power.in economic and militarybetween the United States and themajor states widened. Between

and 1998, U.S. economic growthpercent) was almost twice that of theUnion (15 percent) and threethat of Japan (9 percent).' The

of the euro since its launch isa result of these divergentand U.S. economic trends.an d Japan have struggledeconomic restructuring, America haswave of the "New Economy"d rising productivity. The United Statesreduced defense spending at a slowerafter the Cold War than the otherpowers, resulting in greater relative

capabilities by the end of theIn fact, it has come close in recent

to monopolizing military-relatedand development, spending80 percent of the world's total.2

developments have resulted in andistribution of world

The U.S. economy has slowed inbut the disparities increation remain.

While such brute material disparitiesnormally be hidden below the

recent developments have ren-them salient and provocative. The

NATO air campaign over1999 provided at times dra-to countries such as Chinadisturbing-evidence of

America had acquired a taste for domi-nance. Washington similarly bullied Japanduring the East Asian financial crisis,opposing Tokyo's plan for an AsianMonetary Fund and insisting onAmerican-approved remedies. Bipartisansupport for a national missile defense,despite the opposition of the other majorstates and its potentially unsettling conse-quences for world security relationships,is another source of resentment and suspi-cion. In the meantime, the expansion andintegration of world markets-unfoldingunder the banner of globalization-areseen by many as a Washington-directedphenomenon that spreads American valuesand disproportionately favors Americaninterests. For these and many other rea-sons, it is widely believed around the worldtoday that the global distribution of poweris dangerously out of balance.Realist thinkers argue that what ishappening is not surprising. Balance ofpower theory makes a clear prediction:Weaker states will resist and balanceagainst the predominant state. Accordingto realists, security-indeed survival-isthe fundamental goal of states, and,because states cannot ultimately rely onthe commitments or guarantees of otherstates to ensure their security, they will bevery sensitive to their relative power posi-tion. When powerful states emerge, sec-ondary states will seek protection in coun-tervailing coalitions of weaker states. Thealternative is to risk domination.3 A lead-ing scholar of balance of power theory,Kenneth Waltz, argues that with the endICalculated from OECD statistics (July 1999 web

edition). GDP measures are figured at 1990prices and exchange rates.

2See International Institute for Strategic Studies, The


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of the Cold War, relations between theUnited States and its allies will loosen andmove toward a more traditional balanceof power model. With the end of bipolar-ity, "the United States as the strongestpower will often find other states edgingaway from it: Germany moving towardEastern Europe and Russia, and Russiamoving toward Germany and Japan." 4According to this view, unipolarity is sim-ply not stable. Eventually, the anarchiccharacter of international politics willreassert itself: economic rivalry, securitydilemmas, alliance decay and balance ofpower politics among the major states.The driving forces of this expectedglobal reaction are the everyday frustra-tions and worries that are produced bysharp power disparities. Because of thesize of the United States, little shifts inU.S. policy can have huge consequencesfor other states. The Europeans willslowly expand their investments inautonomous military capabilities andincreasingly articulate an independentstrategic vision. Japan will expand itsdiplomatic engagement of East Asia, qui-etly launching independent security dia-logues with other states in the region. Atthe same time, there is little in America'senvironment to discipline the exercise ofWashington's power. It is hard for theworld to ignore or work around theUnited States regardless of the issue-trade, finance, security, proliferation orthe environment.But while the world worries aboutwhat America does next-or neglects todo-the United States needs to worryvery little about what the rest of the worlddoes. In such a benign and unchallengedenvironment, U.S. foreign policy tends tobe driven by domestic politics or the cur-rent policy tastes of its leaders. The sadfact is that in a world of unipolar power

about the vagaries of congressional cpaigns and the idiosyncratic prejudicecongressional committee chairmen.For those who see this world as inently unstable, the existing world owill change not in large, dramatic lbut in small steps. The great powerEurope and Asia will begin makminute adjustments to protect themsefrom the uncertainties of Ameripower. Even in more balanced times,ondary states have worried about theity of the United States simultaneouslrestrain and commit itself. As the poimbalance has grown more extreAmerica's willingness and ability to srestraint and make commitmentsincreasingly thrown into question.can only imagine the discussions thaon , for example, in diplomatic cabetween Paris and Berlin. Paris has nwanted to be a "junior partner inAmerican project", as one French offrecently observed. Worried statesmaking small adjustments, creating anatives to alliance with the United StThese small steps may not look importoday, but eventually the ground willand the U.S.-led postwar order will fment and disappear.

The Acceptable Face ofAmerican PowTHIS BLEAK vision of balash and strategic rivalrnot destiny. Indeed, the mstriking fact of international life indecade since the end of the Cold Wathat stable and cooperative relati3Fo r views along these lines, see Peter W. Rod

"The World's Resentment: Anti-Americaas a Global Phenomenon", The NatiInterest (Summer 2000); and SamHuntington, "The Lonely Superpow


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the democratic great powerslargely unabated. In some waysrelations have actually deepened,as with the creation of the WorldOrganization and the expansion ofworking groups undere auspices of the G-7. One reason foris simple enough: There is a broadof interests among theindustrial countries, all of whichdeeply held common commitmentseconomic openness, democracy andmanagement of global issues.he huge start-up costs of establishing anto the U.S.-centered systemprobably deter the other major states.A critical ingredient in stabilizingrelations in a world of radicaldisparities is the character ofitself. The United States isa global hegemon, but because ofdemocratic institutions and politicalit is-or can be-a relativelyone. Joseph Nye's arguments onof course come to mind here,d there is much to his point. But, inthere are other, more significantof the American way in foreignthat protect the United States frome consequences of its own greatness.When other major states considerto work with the United States

resist it, the fact that it is an open, sta-democracy matters. The outsidecan see American policymaking atand can even find opportunities toprocess and help shape how theorder operates. Paris, London,Moscow, Tokyo and even Beijing-each of these capitals officials can read-find reasons to conclude that anpolicy toward the Unitedwill be more effective than balanc-g against U.S. power.

In the late 1940s, in a pre-echo of today'ssituation, the United States was theworld's dominant state-constituting 45percent of world GNP, leading in militarypower, technology, finance and industry,and brimming with natural resources. ButAmerica nonetheless found itself buildingworld order around stable and bindingpartnerships. Its calling card was its offerof Cold War security protection. But theintensity of political an d economic coop-eration between the United States and itspartners went well beyond what was nec-essary to counter the Soviet threat. As thehistorian Geir Lundestad has observed,the expanding American political order inthe half century after World War II was inimportant respects an "empire by invita-tion."5 The remarkable global reach ofAmerican postwar hegemony has been atleast in part driven by the efforts ofEuropean and Asian governments toharness U.S. power, render that powermore predictable, and use it to overcometheir own regional insecurities. Theresult has been a vast system of America-centered economic and security partner-ships.Even though the United States lookslike a wayward power to many aroundthe world today, it nonetheless has anunusual ability to co-opt and reassure.Three elements matter most in makingU.S. power more stable, engaged andrestrained.First, America's mature political insti-tutions organized around the rule of lawhave made it a relatively predictable andcooperative hegemon. The pluralistic andregularized way in which U.S. foreign andsecurity policy is made reduces surprisesand allows other states to build long-term, mutually beneficial relations. Thegovernmental separation of powers cre-


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ates a shared decision-making system thatopens up the process and reduces the abil-ity of any one leader to make abrupt oraggressive moves toward other states. Anactive press and competitive party systemalso provide a service to outside states bygenerating information about U.S. policyand determining its seriousness of pur-pose. The messiness of a democracy can,indeed, frustrate American diplomats andconfuse foreign observers. But over thelong term, democratic institutions producemore consistent and credible policies-policies that do not reflect the capriciousand idiosyncratic whims of an autocrat.Think of the United States as a giantcorporation that seeks foreign investors. Itis more likely to attract investors if it candemonstrate that it operates according toaccepted accounting and fiduciary princi-ples. The rule of law and the institutionsof policymaking in a democracy are thepolitical equivalent of corporate trans-parency and accountability. Sharp shifts inpolicy must ultimately be vetted withinthe policy process and pass muster by anarray of investigatory and decision-makingbodies. Because it is a constitutional, rule-based democracy, outside states are morewilling to work with the United States-or, to return to the corporate metaphor, toinvest in ongoing partnerships.This open and decentralized politicalprocess works in a second way to reduceforeign worries about American power. Itcreates what might be called "voiceopportunities"-that is, opportunities forpolitical access and, with it, the means forforeign governments and groups to influ-ence the way Washington's power is exer-cised. In 1990 the political analyst PatChoate wrote a bestseller entitled Agentsof Influence, detailing the supposedly scan-dalous ways in which Japanese ministriesand corporations were manipulating the

of the American capital and undermithe pursuit of the U.S. national inteToday Washington is even more inuned by foreign diplomats and revolvdoor lobbyists working to ensure thainterests of America's partners areoverlooked. Looked at from the perstive of the stable functioning of Amerhegemonic order, Choate was actudescribing one of the brilliant aspecthe United States as a global powerproviding other states opportunitieplay the game in Washington, theydrawn into active, ongoing partnersthat serve the long-term strategic inests of the United States.A third and final element ofAmerican order that reduces worry apower asymmetries is the web of muleral institutions that mark the posworld. After World War II, the UnStates launched history's most ambitera of institution-building. The UN,World Bank, NATO, GATT and oinstitutions that emerged provided a mextensive rule-based structure for poliand economic relations than anythseen before. The United States haddeeply ambivalent about making pernent security commitments to other sand about allowing its political andnomic policies to be dictated by intergernmental bodies. The Soviet menacecritical in overcoming these douNetworks and political relationships wbuilt that-paradoxically-made Upower both more far-reachingdurable but also more predictablemalleable.In effect, the United States spuweb of institutions that connected ostates to an emerging American-domineconomic and security order. But in doso, these institutions also boundUnited States to other states


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Call it an institutional bargain.price for the United States was ain Washington's policy autono-, in that institutional rules and jointreduced U.S. unilateral-t capacities. But what Washington got inwas worth the price. America'salso had their autonomy con-but in return were able to oper-a world where U.S. power wasrestrained and reliable.Secretary of State Dean Rusk spelledt the terms of the bargain in testimony

the Senate Foreign Relationsin 1965:are every day, in one sense, acceptingcomplete freedom of

We have more than 4,300 treatiesinternational agreements, two-thirds ofhave been entered into in the past 25Each one of which at least limits

freedom of action. We exercise our sov-into these agreements.

ut Rusk argued that these agreementscreate a more stable environmentwhich the United States can pur-e its interests. "Law is a process bywe increase our range of freedom"d "we are constantly enlarging ourby being able to predict whatare going to do."6 The Uniteda more predictable environ-and more willing partners.There have been many momentsAsian and European allies haveabout the heavy-handednessU.S. foreign policy, but the open andcharacter of theorder has minimized the possi-of hegemonic excess over the longThe untoward implications of sharp

Renewing the InstitutionalBargainA MERICA's soaring power inthe 1990s has put this open

J Land rule-based postwar orderto the test. Over the last fifty years, theadvanced industrial states have been rela-tively confident that the institutionalfoundations of this order would guardagainst the worst abuses of U.S. unilater-alism and domination. The system hadcharacteristics of a stakeholder hegemonythat promoted stability and cooperation.Today, in various political circles aroundthe world, it is harder for some people tomake this judgment. Even the leader of amajor U.S. ally, German ChancellorGerhard Schroder, has raised concerns."That there is a danger of unilateralism,not by just anybody but by the UnitedStates, is undeniable." 7

The implication of my argument is thatthe more America's brute power capabilitiesemerge from behind mutually acceptablerules and institutions, the more that powerwill provoke reaction and resistance.American leaders are indeed ambivalentabout entangling the country in restraintsand commitments. In the past, however,these leaders have consistently concludedthat some restraint on U.S. autonomy wasa useful way to allay the worries of otherstates and bind them to America's postwarglobal political-economic order. As RobertZoellick, former undersecretary of stateand now U.S. Trade Representative in theBush administration, describes the operationof this postwar order:

The more powerful participants in thissystem-especially the United States-did6 Quoted in Edward C. Luck, Mixed Messages:

American Politicsand InternationalOrganization,


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not forswear all their advantages, but neitherdid they exercise their strength without sub-stantial restraint. Because the United Statesbelieved the Trilateral system was in itsinterest, it sacrificed some degree of nationalautonomy to promote it.8

What can America do to prevent theunraveling of this order? Three sugges-tions are offered here. First, U.S. officialsshould keep the country's current goodfortunes in historical perspective. Thismight induce a bit more modesty.America's long-time rival from outsidethe advanced democratic world-Russia-now has an economy about thesize of Denmark's. America's one-timerival from within the advanced democrat-ic world-Japan-has gone through tenyears of economic stagnation, with no endin sight. China is still a developing coun-try in terms of both economic and mili-tary capabilities, far from being able tochallenge the United States in eitherarena. Western Europe is stable andexpanding, but it is consumed with itsown union, embarked on a politically dif-ficult economic restructuring, and still isnot capable of projecting global power.This unusual-perhaps unique-set ofcircumstances gives the United States adefacto license to act as the world's managerand CEO. But U.S. officials shouldremember that the wheel of world powerdoes turn. Russia will not be down forev-er, nor will Japan. Europe will eventuallyget its house in order. The way Americatreats the other major states when theyare in decline will influence how thesestates treat America when-not if-theyrecover.Second, the United States needs torenew the postwar institutional bargain bymaking it more explicit and more encom-passing. This means that America must

us. The U.S. government should bonce and for all legislation such as S301 and the Helms-Burton Act, wgive the president authority to act unerally to protect narrow economic inests. Such exercises of U.S. power crmore problems than they solve.United States should also expandcapacity to consult with other govments throughout the policymakprocess. Washington is not just the caof the country or even of "the West";also-at least for a few more decadthe capital of a larger global order. Tforeign stakeholders must be broumore fully into our policy procIncreasing opportunities to voice opincan be achieved informally in the daday willingness of U.S. officials to conwith other governments. IfWashington risks an ultimate shift towsome other form of global order.

President George W Bush seemeacknowledge the dangers of an oweening foreign policy-and cthumping about America as the "inpensable nation"-during one ofpresidential debates, when he calledmore modesty as America operaround the world. The Bush teamalso made "listening to our allies" atral theme of its foreign policy. Whethis is more than hollow camparhetoric will depend on how theadministration acts on such issues asparticipation in peacekeeping operatinational missile defense, and a varietproposed multilateral political and eronmental accords.Preserving the existing systhrough the redoubling of rule-barelationships will also require Amerelites to elevate the domestic debate8 Zoellick, "The United States", in Zoellick e


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commitments and institu-The old canard that building inter-rules and authority threatenssovereignty is still too temptingmany politicians on the Left and Right.argument that many-if not most-the existing multilateral institutions areby U.S. leadership and advancecountry's goals needs to be madeconvincing to the American people.are more likely to stress thecosts to the United States inof lost policy autonomy or sover-

than the gains in building anorder that serve long-terminterests.Finally, the United States needs tomore ways to pursue its economicgoals through joint or multi-decision-making exercises. A goodof such intergovernmentalthat create stakeholder coopera-is the 1999 Perry commission onKorea. Responding to a congres-request for a reassessment of U.S.toward North Korea, the Clintoncharged former SecretaryDefense William Perry with the task ofreview. The deliberations eventual-involved extensive talks with Japan andKorea. In a de facto way, the com-became multilateral, and Japanese

d South Korean officials were integrat-into the process and ultimately helpedits content. The Perry reportclarify U.S. policy toward North

Korea, but the process by which it wasgenerated also helped build consensus inthe region on how to deal with that state.It also made American involvement in theregion more consistent with the goals ofpartner states. The G-8 process-whichin recent years has launched ongoingintergovernmental working groups topursue common approaches to issues suchas transnational organized crime andenvironmental policy-is also a placewhere coordinated policymaking can beexpanded.

America's unipolar moment need notend in antagonistic disarray. But theUnited States needs to rediscover thesolutions that it has brought to the prob-lem of unequal power in the past. Thesesolutions are celebrated in our nationalpolitical tradition. The rule of law, consti-tutional principles and inclusive institu-tions of political participation ensure thatgovernance is not simply a product ofwealth or power. The wealthy and thepowerful must operate within principledinstitutional parameters. Because a rule-based order generates more stable andcooperative relations within the country,even the wealthy and powerful gain byavoiding social upheaval, which putseveryone's interests at risk. America canonce again take this old domestic insightand use it to shape post-Cold War inter-national relations. And it is time to do sonow, when America's relative power maybe at its peak. E

Clarityat Last?.Are we all clear that we want to build something that can aspire to be a world power?In other words, no t just a trading bloc but a political entity. Do we realize that ournation-states, taken individually, would find it fa r more difficult to assert their existence


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TITLE: Getting hegemony right

SOURCE: National Interest no63 Spr 2001

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