l41

SOUTH V~ETN.A:M

-The ,American aid! program bt,~an as a' part of· our: policy to' assist a .former colonia:!' dependency' to achieve il,.' via·ble,'nn:tiollt\:l .independence .in the'- f(lcs. of North,N1etnamese communlst 'subversiou, and ag·gresslon. The inability ·of other Westerni states to cOIitrlbute toward,iflhis goal in the pos1JiWorld War,II} Vietw

nam 'Was a' sen:otis problem In the"' ·furtherance of 'western ''()rienotJed political-goals lw!lSoutheast-' Asia. I'n.-'rtJhis post.war vacuum, the United States'- believes that it had an·obligation-'w re~establish its presence in· the'·aren in ,an, effort to' prow vltie"to:the, people of l8'outh Vietnam alternatives and· support 'for non-communist programs of',putional·d.eve:lopment.

Qu'esUon, 5. W-hat benelUs accrued· to the American ,public as it- result o( our aid pr'ograms? '

AnswerS. "f. j,1 ',',' AUSTRALIA.:.AND 'NEW",'Z1!ALAND' ')

The 'Ame'ric~n A-,id :vrog.ra,tii "en.Couraged the de~~lop~errt 'of;:s'trong and sub­stantial ecooo~.c £(n(l t~de ties between Australia and, New Zealand and the United IStates. In addition, sin~ the,bu~k of the U.'S. aid consisted of E'lVDS credits, the actual pUl'Chas~ 'Of U.'S.,.\,equlpment directly benefited the U.S."economy.

, ': :j'~ y; <

BUB:M;A

.,'I;lle; small aid prog~m'tO :u-upna sh~ws.the coo.,tlnued,'interest of the United states,in' the ~.uccessful development of nations not.necessarily aUgned with tis on all issues but nevertheless willing to cooperate on matters ,'()f interest to the United,'States. Bur,rna's positive re~;J)onse, to- our e:tfortS to curb illicit narcOtics traffic is a Caae in point w..h"ere-the spirit of cooperation supported through-the aid pvgr"m <llfect\y bene1ltsAllIertcansoclety.,· .. .

~H OAMBODIA

The eari, :..\merlca;Jf aid':prog'r~m~'were design'ild to eriable'the Ca,mbodian people to r~~ta&ltsh a Political fystem ,ofithe~r, own 'ch<x>:&lng. T~e: .beneti11l,oo the American"public'-wero a fulfillment of their obligation to help re-establish an environment ,where peaceful,: i'llde~~ndeJ;1,ti ,deyelopment could occur.

\" .

142

. J\ \roGUEA :1 '.'

The U.S. is obv:lo\lsly interested In the evolution and perpetuation of ,0, de~o­cratie, free enterprise, conpetit1ve Korea in the) world fam~ly of -nations. rr,he risk of conflict is eve't present on thelKorean peninsula, 'because 'of tbe,aggres­sl ve designs of N.orth,· Korea. Moneover the treaty commitments and. interests .of the Soviet Union, People's RepubUc of OWna, 'and, the United :States -inter­sect in this region. ;We domon wish. to become involved' again in a War .in ,Korea and we belieV8',this,can be avoided in large part by the development of an eco­nomically strong, milita'rily self-reliant Korea. Our assistance to, ,the RepubUc -of Korea has been tailored with the objecti-ve. in roind"'ef."helping·'to develop against a ,hostile North, a strong nation increasingly '"able' to stand on its own. We believe that such a posture offers the best hope fpr peace on the peninsula.

Economically ,our assistance has helped to develop Korea into, an impartant trading partner which benefits'the"American producer. The Republic of Korea is now the thlrteenth largest market for U.S. exports and aU indications are that it w111 becotne an even mO,re important market ~or U.S. eXl?orts.

LAOS' "

Laos has been a country whose efforts at moderriJzatlbn and self-development have been frustrated by the many yeats of war which have racked the Indo­.chinese peninsula. Our ,aid pro,gram benefits the American people by enhancing the peaceful dev:elopment prospects :tor this country arid by helping"to re(luce the threat of renewed and greater- confiict which might pOSi:'l problems for'the current progress of detene.

MALAYSIA

The small American aid programs,' to Malaysia, benefited the American pub .. lic by facilitating the development of good bilateral relations and by assisting

< t~ this strategically-Ioca:ted country to develop its own defense capabilities, thus i contributi.ng to the, stability of the region. CB)xcept, for, our P.eap~ Cprps and a

now ended PL-480 Title II program, we do not have 'nol': 'did we, ever have;R bi-, latel'al economlc assistance Pl'ogram for Malaysia). ,"-

PHILIPPIN~S

The Philippines _suffered greatly from the destruction genera,ted by World Wanl. Th ... e American Pla.n toahl this ~punt .• Y .to. fUIIIl\d.epe.J)den. ce~~. sgt~~tly han.dlcapPedbY'the mai\Slve. 'recons.trn.<!tIO.n lV11!Cb.. was· neede,! aft. e.·. ',th. .••. " 'war, American 'ald. ~t that time ·Wa. used tOll)tlet '£IJI/ qpl!gatloJi' 6f the Amedali/i p"o­pl~ •. to ••• l.ph. people of ~~. "Phmp!ll)le.~ ~ta~t ·.on tbe~9I!.d tow-\'rd ei!0ll0p,1lc recover . .Y an<1;.II\ .. d".pend. eJ),~'l."Tlie .• t.ro.n$.ec9Ilo. Jl11c "'lJo:JI.oJt.JI~~}or.le.nta.~? n Of. the Phll!ppill\!8 toward ;fhll}!rllitl'd ~tates bl\i!;beci1;:~elpi!i>rce4,:lMiii llDd.'.cored by the expresS!on of SUPIll>~~ that t)ie~mep~fllts'.d prdg~4m;;me¥il~otIf~ gov­ernmeJ:it'and pMple ,)jHhe'PhiUPplne.·, ' .. ' ..... '.,' ....'.... ',', "'" . . ' '-"t . ." ~ "'~, i,:' 'IL,' \ - .

'" 'SIN,GA~ORE

The .mall AmerIcan .ldP~o~r':ID:' to ~lngapore·I.· ali exp*-•• lon of tl)e'lnte,est 'of the people of the United' S,~Me.s in the'_slJ.,:t~tYt·welfll-l'e 'aha conti:rnied' economic development of the p~oPI.e ot.,.flln .. g.Japore, ... Thi •. ~.l/ ... 0 re.slon~eIP .• lwvet.h .•. ,way ... ,!or the development of favor.bl&;ecoilomlc and political ~.tlQns, whlc4 b\>llellt ,the AmeriCQ.npublicasawhole .. ,: .<,' - " , .

THAILAN'D . ,< , .\, 'J. -',

.' A .tableandfrlendiy Thallandha. been and colItlnues tobe.o! gritit 11'ripprl '-lance to, U'~S. interests iJ).,:tjhat area' of the'world. U.'S .. aasistanee rto,~~hallail(f over

_ the years ~as, ijoth:JJOntlli})uted to Thal1and's':stea!iY econom.ic _ ~"W'1;tl, find- en­hanCed ..... ,;mal"' .. IIJ)ng .. Ire ...• ,.. tocoQP. erate. wi. .thtl!.~. u. ,Il .. · .. , 011. p.~<W\lr.~Qg.!Qf endeayors. Two!ot:'the ma'i)Y.l<'amlile~ of.thedlre.t~erte~t~ wblch:.Ii'I1:'Y' •. allc!.'.\l.ed to the U,S. as a·rfSUI.t. Of1ll\I •.. cO.4'lleratlbtl.' a .. e tl)e t. relJl.".ngqus. oi\SVlllll$'.rO!!<.· )I$d tbl'ougii o\1r ..

. . acce •• :to·''l:hal base#'~.1iMng tJi~ C<mr .. 'of tI\l) :Q1db'CWnt\ war' ~nd Thai ereort.·.", ellmlna~athe productlion of and suppte •• tM'tralllc In IIllclt !lr~. In and t1irougl> Thallalid.:: ....

"r~:' I. -, \ SOl]'fH' Vlm'NAM· ' - '! ,

'Th~ 4me~t¢au p~O~I. thl'oU~hlt.g6Vel'Ilment as.~!liMan Importantobll!!,a, Uon to assist the peq.ple of Vietnam to resist the imposition -by for~e of'll coin~

143

munist 'govellnment. The 'aid program enables the ,American people to meet this obligatiQll,,4Jdnwas'fir necessa.ry (!oncomitant to U.S. miltJ.ta~y involvement; it Is all the m6re lle<:e$sary following U.S. miUtary disengagement, if South Vietnam is to remain illdel)endent and viable.

Que8tion. :6. :What benefits accrued to the' United 'StateH as a result of our' aid programs in that area ,of, the world, 'and wbat was tbe rationale for our baving started aid?

Ans,wer' 6., In his June 7 appearance before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations ISecretary ,of ·State Kissinger stated that: "Our economic assistance is' designed to ·reinforCe developing nations', efforts to bring a better life to their citizens, increasing their stake'in a cooperative ,global.e~onomy at a time when events threaten to. divide the world anew-between North and South, developed, and developing, c consume~', and producer. Our.' security ai$f;listance is (iesigned 'primarily to,-help others strengthen'the peace in areas wh~re it is threatened and to. provide Iii framework of eooperat1ion .that wlll prevent new tbreats from emerging. ,- : . .

From- this perspective it is possible to see these programs for what they are-not as Hdo good" prqJrams, but. as, the vital tODls thrQugh whiGh we help· to build an international climate condUCive to American interests." .

The Un,lted States as a' nation with 'global interests and responsib111ties must <leal with)'A.sia on the basis' of ' enlightened self-interest. '-In this raga'rd, the United States Government pursues two DUljor policy_goals for,the area. The~ 'are-to work toward improved relations, 'among the major powe.rs whose interests in~ tersect In'' the region and to encottt'$'ge among the smal~er' nations' of 'the region a condition of peaceful, evolutionary development.

, America b~ne:fttt'!'- from 'Il peaceful world where an fnternational spirit of_ de,· ;' __ tente epable!i:tideas, traditions, and products to:coD;1pe~, in _,ap. environment free

,.,:,~"'frO,m the, tp.J.'eljlt pi, ,:war ap.d deprivation .. ~e-"pmted,,~t~t((~' foretgn aid pro­gralU hI Asia .has· slgnlficantlY~ ·contrlbuted toward tl\!fti~nd· by deterring ag, 'gres,ston, . encouragtn~ self~help, and" 'aying the groundW:d'r~:,:ft.()r' economiC devel .. ()pmeut an'd' soci:til evolution .. As I have menti-oned in 'my' 'statemenJ; ,our "con­Y~tn_:(~~Mhl(,.stems :Ilrom its intrlnSla lmportanc~ tt~d -ability to ip·fluencerthe dh'ectitm 'cjf ,~orld 'events. Several times this cent:g.ry con:fU.cts· in ,Asia, hf\-y,e drawii the tlnlte<): States Into orbit. The U.S. pre.ence In .A'S!~ hiu!helpedre_

,'. <luce ,niilitary confrontation and has today helped bring a:bout,. the movement towa1"d;'l)f~'a:ce tor which w~ are, so hopeful. The reduction of the, American mIli­tary, presence ,in Asia- hafJ :q.ot 'n9,wever been. a disequiltbratingi force in the l'egion. Because of the cOl1tinua1,l~e of the ,security and ·economic. assi1't-ance pro­grp.ms and as ~ r,es1.1l't.of 'tne d~",elppments under the ,Nixon Doctrin.-e, .the con,n .. trie:~ of Aisia ti.:,ve 'ina1ntattte5Lthe .thru~t of their prO'gress to:~var~;.,se1,f~S11t1lcienCy and'.seit-help;-" , . ','; 'ii, " ' :,,>",:10:_. ':1 .- .'

.•.. Mr;.lIu.(irnt;,I do notJjavewith me t'lte £ullhisti>*,)i1l~l1fil1Uitrles 'Of alI't1i<i pilst alII to {l)UI.l'i' thecoUhtries ithheregioilJ\hthwhillhI;a;m

"O~~~~~.·¥erY well.' • . •.•.•. . ../\.t·. '. .;.. .... ':.' l\1:Ii', .HUMMEL. Would. Y()l1'H]reme,~ir, Jo· add.ress'~!1l\ie. gillt~rail

remarKS· about the j:)enelits·<'>£M.i!I~atherthllJl speaKing i)ahout par-ticularCQuntriesi.' . .. '" .. • . ... ,i.

Mr. Ntl<, I w'imld bepllli'ticu11i'fly pleased to have you do so:· ... "Mr. HpMM;EL. Mr.' Chairfu\l,If\. we soo foreign MlSistanoo, bOth eoo.

nomici@sistaj:J.ce and military !l<iSistance, as only a part 01' a much broad~r pictuv~ !l!nd I think OI)e hasto·go bac.kand~e$!lribeSome·<'>t., the ,bas!cg'o!t1sthtttJ thl!,k w~ean ttl! agree upon f~rthe goals and' aspIratIons fQr the (lC;)untl'les oHhe re~aon. 'Dne'world ISto6 .. ~itll now for. thereto be. serious' disparii~ b~tween:rkhcountriesn;tidpd('lr COUntries 'withoutit'he p!lss1bility of;ser~'ciusijonflict.· ." :"...; . ,T:\i~ pr@»le1b.~ oip'4J)!nr}lttjon and f~\l/'1.~re worIdwid~ pr.qbl~)ll,s thiJ,t w.¥ ffi. Ugt. ·l[,ve w.. '. t .. h .... , .. ~~.nd JI'i .. ~l. ~m.~ .. ,ph. !l!twf. ~11St.S. ha1'e, '.T.he .11peol1')~ .. Ili;'. proj:)l:.;m!l"M poj111tn9,n-)?9'11I.'l'tlono1' the E\nvll'onment andJlhe oootih~; It.fe t1'hh)'ll. .t .. l).tt.~,,~cp!ltVijt<:l'~ .... I.·nv. dliVed.'Wllih;. T~ .. ·ilfor. ellfl'l~~~;,i ... S nOJ1!li.," .... tlonal!fMtlj·!tf'i!f!liItis to"\ls"ljjll be m!l!de for wl'thdrawll1.gt. ~1U')8bfue

, ,< ~_ , ': :'" " ,<; -"" ~ " , "_ • -'., , ,.1' '

144

degree of responsibility and some degree @£assistlillce to nations that can impact on our own weJl,being even though they: seem faraway.

Since World War II, two very large conflicts have engll,ged the atteHtion OF American f",rees in the East Asian area,.,-hi Korea and .inltidochina; I don't think any American really would wish to see lis pUl:sue a)l isolationist policy of)lotbeing involved in the problems ti,lat I have juse'enunCiatedand other problems. Thequestioil,it seems to mel is -the degr!l'l.of in.volvem':l1t that the.Americlill CongreS8,t~e Am~rlCan peopJe, Iilld· the Amerlcan Government as a whole, feel IS required.· ( ,< ',' • .: '. (', ' ;,'

. We arepn.rS)lingtw,wolicies. We ar(\£ostering twob..s\c favQrable trends that hl),ve not yet had a chaBce t.<> mature but for wh;ichthere is comiiderable hope that they will produce a different kind ofsituation in the future ..... '-' .' . . ,. To restate in difl'eren~; somewhat brieM' form what I said in my opening statement,- these two factors are the atmqsphereof detente and the growing self-sufficiency of the countries in the area to hand.letheir own problems and, to have economic.'Rnd political progress. In both qf tllese' IIrea.S, we fcHtha:t significant 1I~'hiev:ements have been chalked up:' .. ' -' .

When I spe:aRC")IdeteJote, Uni~d !!T€,atno·weJ".

145

Korea, North Vietnam, both of which have the' capability to play highlydisruptivel'Oles. Indeed, North VietnamJisstilI playing Ii highly disruptive'''r"le in' South Vietnain in clear violation of the Paris kccords. In other words, ,I am suggesting that conllict and con' fl'Ontation and war are not out of the question at till; ,We feel that we hvelfubStantiaJlydiminished the, possibilities f@r such disasters. That, is a real and ta.ngible benefit, it seems to me, for the world and,fer the U.S. interests.' ,'", "

Mr. NIX. What ,particular interests of the United' States of AiliIerica was threatened at the time we decided to pursue this,courseof action j

Mr. HUMMEL. Mr. Chairma.n, moty I ask" are you considering the broad course of action of support for countries iIi East Asia against potential aggression @rare you thinking ora particular situation!

Mr. NIX. I am thinking first of 1111 no one dictated that we should take a course of action in this part of the world. We made that de­cision and I am trying to satisfy myself as to what are the factors which inlluenced a decision to begin these activities in that part of the world. " ,

:l\1:r; HUMMEL. Yes, sir. , . . ', I think I would have to go back and rec>],ll the events C!lf 1949'when

the Govermhent ofthePe1:>ple's RepubJicof Ohina took overcOntrol of the mainla.nd, when the overt~l'<lS that we made to that government were rebuffed and our people :$<$re harassed and jailed on the main­htnd of China, i'Ud then more- especially shortly after when,in 1950, North Korea ruttacked South Korea. and virtually'e:v.erran it. .'

" In those circumstances we perceived atehe time, and I think most American people saw it more "r less the.san,eway" that there was a very"powerfU!l Communist bloc composed' 'chielly 'of China ,and the Soviet Union and thl\t their aims we're expttnsionist .and needed to he contained,iWhatever the merits of. that, argument today it seemed very real at the tim. and it dictated then-it wasthep"l;cy of our' Government ip. the' early 1950's-a sense of strong .need'in American, interests to he Sure that lll,rge ilrea~' of the, w.odd ",,,uld not: be over,." rnn by It' uniJiled Conimunist,'liloc ,in ways that would eventuallyiln,

. pact very seriously on Ameritliin intere&ts, economic interests, political mterests, and the cause of world peace. , .. '" . This, I think, is the framework in which our involvement beo'an. but I want to emphasize that ,.these are not theconsiderations'.t'hat guide tis now; Let me say again we wish to nurture and to foster PM twin elements of d~tente and of self-sufficiency Tor countries, thllltare . becoming inCl1easingly·self'sujJicient. We have announcedthe,Jessen;;

." ing of our involvement in theil:.internal affairs and in their insurgencies in the Nixon doctrine. ""

We have carried out substantial withdrawals. of American Torces frojn the area. Weare serious IlIbout this and eu], goal is to foster the veryelemelits t4at,wiU make, for stability and Tor rational discourse il!lle/!otlatj9n 'Ahl?8g t~e dispt;tants in th,e area rather .than for 'con­iJIGt. So'Wlllllli?!1ll)'tT)i}ng to"make clear IS that the .ratlOnll'le. for the early, 19~i.iri i~PQn$~t\)yourqttestiou~ow ~ made these decisions, isiiotthe;rationale that)Ve have today nor do. I think should it be., '

Mr. NIx.l\1:r. Hamilton. .' ., co! ",.It" :':':' 1'rL~., HA:!f~ToN. Thank you, Mr. Chairinan.· , . ',/ Mi: kmJi1/iSsador, I ,wolrld~Jike to direct,:.'Y~JJratt~nti@ll:tclE:i>rea

for !t tew"thinutes:President Park bas decfared;,maartfal lavi\ there; I, , . ,-,' "

146

think in Octob~r1912. Resaid it ,was,goillg to be ,Mdnterimmeasure but my undentanding.i$.h~ is: prettyml\ch,ruling bi)'; \l~cJ;ee. still, and that there is. no indicatiOll that he is, gettingoif ,UlaJ;'t;allaw;i Do you have ;any indication at all thltt he is, going to cease the.maEtial Jaw and, get back to $qlUe ltindofdemocratic proceduves i ." . · Mt.iHuMMElL.Sir,,it is m:rUllderstaUding that tpe legal framework ,n@wisnot:oneofma1(tial,law inSouth Kor~a. . " . j " "

Mr. HAMILTON. He rules by decree, does he not i ," , Mr. HUMMEL. Yes, he does. ,"',," , . Mr; lL,\.MlLTQN .. Is there a.pa~liam.Mti . ", .",Mr. HUMMElL. Yes, sir; " ." " , 'c·Mr. HAMILTON/But it.isnot active, it,hasn@ voice!,.. .

Mr. HUMMEL~ Itisll'llowed tohaMe.onLy a Viery small voice. " Mr. HAMlILtON. He is pretty well calling alLthe shots,isn't he,! Mr; HU:MMEL. iYes, sir, andvery~ecentlyin"thel~t 6 month~ he

has:enunClated what he calls "emergency decrees" WhlCh have gIVen him special powers. I don't want to quibble, sir, but he, has not said this is martial law.

Mr, HAMILTON . Well, the essential point is that he isrunuiug the government'prebDy'muchbyhimself: ',"" .

Now what do wedO:in Q, situation like that! What specific steps does the UnitedStwl;es take to let him know,that we .Ii!on't like that i

Mr. H1ifMMEL; We have let him kn(!)IW in private through. diplomatic discourse '0£ "our concerns about precisely the events. that you have desGribed. We havetB,ken seriously the provision in the Foreign Assist, IlJIlce Actof last year,seGti(Jh82, I believe, which isa sense of Congress provision. We a~caHin~ to the ·attention.of the South Korean Gov­ernment the existence of,·this provision and that it would have the effect n@t of requiring the' exooutive branch but certainly of encourag­ing the executive branGh to pay ve'!:Y special attention to authoritarian

.' reglimes'and particularly those that ha,Vie politica],.prisoners. ;, .,' . The. liinitations. Qn our abiLity· to IWt though are very real .. This is · al;l"intemlLl rprahiem for the .• 'Koreans. It.is )'tot'something that we can disassocio:te ourselves from completely but heither is it s0inething that We in the1United States a,re,responsibte for: We certainly did not create it. "'" . . '<Mr. HAMILTON. I gl\eSB one of the things that bethers'IIle,.Mr. Am­bassador, is that at a tim~ when ":,,e ought. to· be s.endingsi~a!s of ~is­'IH,>proval we are' sharply lIlcreltslng.our aId to Korea. In foreIgn. IUlli­tarycredit Sltlesforfiscal1975 you are requesting $52 .million.That .is against $!44 milliolt'last year. Iu ,grant military assistance Y01l'are re­questing $161.5 million against $112 milliOI1'lastyear. The overall total,' is up $252.8 million this year when you include all features .of the as­sistance.If I were sitting in President Park's position, I would be say­ing to myself, "I don't.see that theiNusa,pproval that.they voice to us amoimts to much if they are ,giving me more:moneyi' i "

, ,.:\ .. ' .- <: I,; ,\.': , ;;~tl~).)-:,' ;;~h ,;-.;::

STATEMEN'X OF J'ONAT;g:AN, F.LADD, DI:ttEq;rO~;!SIllQltltITY' ASSISTANo.E. a'ND$!ALES;'DEP:ARTMEN~:iO:F'$!U:1Ut.· . 1

Mr. LADD. May IlLl,ldres~that, sir! · Mr. Nrx. Sure. , . . ."" "" .. ""

.My •. LADD. The ori:gina}.I~orettn pt<lgt'flIm was a re<l.u~,40r·$%63 v, m,llIon: ~orMAP, gWi\Jlt 'IlUhtary a!!SIatanC<i, and$2D mrlllOO!l~(jr for, , '

147

eign militlw:l",sa;I~~,iJily the time' ~h~, a,pprqpria,tions .w~ll'hth:rbugh it wasdQwn,MI'iYou'say, to$til2 mlH10n because we sImply ,a,dn't get the'moneywe.n.,d'aSkedfol\' ,<,' ", ,," ""."

Now this money in the'milita:t'\Y' assistanceprogramdS'l?rimll;rilyto, hClpsfw1l1i' bring to a, close a Korean milita,ry moderniza,tHilll pi'og'ram' that wlts'II1;d,~~rated ?r"worked. outwi'th tlte Kor<~a'lis in,~97.a and each year we hlwe,not reC81vredsuffimentmoneys to close, that thmg off: As of the present time the p'liOgram has about.$500'iriiHiollleftto go ,to modernizethearmy.What'Iamgetting'~ "., '" '

Mr. HAMILTON. Well, I understand the reasons for the money and I understand the 'mod'erni"ilti6n bUsineSs. My'qu¥<tiolll isla"~ political question. H.ere we,!tl'ev,e,:y unltapJ;!y.witlt thl:l dit:Wii\>n in., whicl~ Presi­dent Park IS JI1ov~ng. Th,S man has become a VIrtual dICtator m that' COUIltry in the lastcQupt()':"f years! ,We have pu€' enormous resources into that coontJ,Iy' with I ,thillk' justifiable; reasons over' it period of ~ears, but I ;"mdeei,Yly disturbedabthedlrection that, he is taking. He doos'not show th~'mW,ntioll lor ,the directions of a mall who wants a representative kind of 'government.: We may be ,slapping him on the WTist by telling him We don't like it,:but thel~ltct'\s!w{lal"e putting an awful lot more money intQ'his coUn~ry and,that kil\1l €>fsignw;s not th~ kind of signal that seemS to me We ou*ht to be; f;iv'inghim at this pOInt. ,'; YJ'. ' .. , .. ', ',v'" _,' .

. Mr. HUMMEL. SiT,one oIthe elen:i'&ntsofthis'is,thltt rulthaugh the amounts being requested' this year'are larger' than ""eta actually g.iven last year, particular).y military assistance, the!amounts given last year represent a v<;1'y. Sharp shortfall' from the rumounts that PreSident Bark and the Korean Government had, reason to expect. Their expectations, wepe'part of the a~eement ,that We reached with thelll in 1971, and it 'was ltnnounced to the Oongress "t the time, for t,ltemoderni~ation program for their a11,IlBd forces d'*1igned to facili­tate its' ability to withstand a very .substantial attack from North Korea which theNorthJ{'ol'ean<haveacapabllity of d~liver1ng . . ·Tn.,\,thel" words)pltrt o~ oU17stirategy;hasbt\l)~,to get~heminto II p6sitlon' ,whete thllJcwn mlj:e careM ilie .. ownlli!ifensewlth the,leM­ening)'ikelihood tliatrour' mutual·.defense: tl'eilt:l\'i~ld be caqlJ:ed into effect' and lessenlri'g'tITerieed for American' .£dr_'lte 'be stltti~ned in,

, ICor~lt. This ,modernization program is already' a oouple' of years b",,· hind 'time rlght'l1,ow so,it is not: quite acculmte to pOlltray President, Bark,as beit\.~fully satisfied With, the ailiounts' of militltryassisronce that h~ ,is getting because we lire i!lW a very graves~?rt£all o£,whatwas OOmmltted before. ", .,", """" 'i.' ".. .

Mr. H,\MILT?N, I";ID not re!ercin-g to Ii!m that Wftl, let me aSSl):pe y<!fI1O' Pl'esrdenn I\i1Tk IS notgelllgM .. jJe satIsfied 'no matter 'how much you d'elivlll",'out there. They ,have"!l: country of 32miHion' people with 2.6milliont>eople UIlder ltrms. Wahavellhiountry o£ 210 million peopl!!' ll(I1df we 1haveroughly2.2 iliilHon proophi under· arms and we have 40,000 ~oopsjp, Koretk' .' . .', ',. I, . '. .

.. ,,"'INfl"Yit. s''e)nS)~i ll)ei19~!~. !Jim@'te~ si~aJs to go to Presid~nt Pa~k' . w~h"'ve~~expt(\$86Ilr!\,1nliapli>mes~~ndjI mean' strong's~gnrul$l1J.!l terms '6f~~l1ey, lldtj:US1(st~te.m~ittSj:anq;)n~l!I;lS of ou),' tro?pstJ:6I'lgth ~her\".rf~elY'!hftve g!'ltfll~lll,nQ0l!tr<i\:>psd~~e~dmgth~t'pemns1iltliw'th consl.d~rab1e't'r.S.ltSSIS~Ce Wh10h';I} \')IltSWINihg to'gliV'e them. Jt:sooms to msth1'),t they,ougl\lil.to he in pret~y ig6~shap~.· .... " .

148

Mr. HUMm:I,; The anea~ in which they are deficient thi)ugh are par­ticularly air <j.eienseand,other elements ,that my ooUeagu<JS can,testify to which do~ake them vulnerable to' the .potential thlLt th .. North Koreans have'on the ground and already avaIlable. " " , Mr. HAMILTON. Are there any discussions going on now' aoout a re­

<\uotion of. Amerioan troops i I remember Defense Seoret .. ry Schles­inger talking at one point about moving to Ii more mobile f()rce which wouhkbe: statjonooin Guam or Hawaii or something'of this sort.

Mr. HUMMEL. Take some 0'£ our troops out.

STATEMENT OF nOUGLAS SMITH, SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO VICE ADMIRAL PEET, nEPA~TMENT OF, nEFENSE

, Mr. SMITIj:. Yes."There are nO'present pljtns for further substantial reductions in addition to the ones that were roouooo, and in ftlot the Korean Government from th" military point of view is concerned about our completing the modernization program, and they have asked for assurances that our troops will not be reducoo and that the modern­ization program will go ,forward. I don't recall whether it was in this fnll. Mmmittee :hearing that Admiral ~eet addressed the point at \vhich'we couldta;ke 'a, subStantial reduction is wilen the m,oderniz)ttion progrltmiscompleted, and as has been mentioned particularly in'the extension'i>£i1ir 'defense they are , particularly defiolent. So you really have to get:lihejeb donebe£ore you can oonsider a substantial reduc-tion. I think that is theprinie concern. ,

Mr. HAMILTON.'Your judgment is that for next fiscal year you will come in here with a very sharply reduced~uest for military assist­ance! Almost all of the assistMlce y()U are givmg to Korea is military.

Mr, SMITH. I was going to add one further thought. ,. Mr. HAMILTON. Is it your judgment that it will be sharplyreduCjld

next year!. '. • " Mr. SMITH; Actually, on tM plan" yes, it would be roouced liext

year on thecompleti{)n of the plan. I can't say suh$ti1ntial, but I might add one footnotetp,at went by fast in theiliseussion'earliet. Actu8!lly, in an attempt to'6t\1l;y: lund .or fund more compIeteI)'the moiterniza­tioIvprDgram for this year 1974, we added $20 Il'rillihhofcreditjnlieu of grant funds which were not available so tMt'they actnally pickoo . up a bigger part on a purehase basis, and thatpoinJis i;(;)two things: One,. that. they are more willing as. they are .able to purchase more of the equipment and take a lesser amount on a grant baSIS. J

Mr. HAMIl,TON. But our grant. basis is moving up sharply this year compared to 'last year,. ,,,,. .. .'

Mr. ElM,":H. My first stateme~tw:as that in order to complete the InodernlzatlOn program, we .have attempted to koop the le\l',,1 up.

,; Mr. HAMILTON. May I make one Other observation, Mr. Ambllssl\Por, . about your statement. Several phrases bother me a little bit' .• in:ti\e statement. On page 3 you talk about "were such assistance to:be' cur, tailed dr~$tically," ands? forth;, 'lind ,onJ'J,~ge4 atthe~~totnpfthe Pllge, '. 'I.~')sm.y strong he.'h .. ef th.at redlJoo ... , d!Mi:lt(j):South,Y,.l~t.nam, ,Cam. bddia, and Laos would l1i\j)bring usclOi>Sert&~cl;>:tnplete,p!!llce." . •. Those statement.slllaYhe c0t'redJi, put whati:J;p.prllllSesjrie aboUtyou~ Ind.oohin!),Ptogram isth~t Y0uaw!,()~ askin~t? reduceaid,y,oil ~re aslung fortremendouslYlllcrea~¢dailllll Indochm,a. NoW'1 tqj>admm-

• ".. • 0,',

149

istration requeSt under Indochina reconstruction amounts, almost 'to $1 billion i it is $940 million. That compares with, as best I can make it, a comparIson not easy to do, but tha~ compares with 'about one-half billion dollars in appropriations for Indochma.reconstructioR in fiscal year 1974. '

S, 0 you are really asking the ,Congress this year for r,oughly do?ble the 'alnOmIt for Indochina'that' you got last; year, and that IS a tremendous jump. Do,you want to comment on that i

Mr. HUMMEL. That is correct, sir. I am sure we woUld not have any dispute about the need in the

Indochina countries, sir. The South Vietnamese economy 'particularly has deteriorated sharply. Theyha,!,e very bad inflation. They are, of course, faced with having to maintain a large defense establish­Inent, not bec~use they wish to do so but beco,use of the'pressures still exerted by North Vietn!J;m and very substanth.l continued infiltration of about 70,000 new men sent into South Vietnam since the armistice waS signed and alUhe,other factors you,are aware of. '

The' defense, 'est!J;blishmentis a ,considerable, burden to then\.' It is, a burden in two ways. Not only directly but indirectly, since the peo­ple in the armed servkes are out of production and the economy has realLy suffered quite:badly. What weltre looking fods an infusion of a substantial amount Of aId to really get the country back on its feet again. These people are extremely har:d working and industrious. The infrastructure Can be developed there. They have shown that they can produce under conditions6f great adversity.

Private investments are beginning, to flow in, but they are at a particularly low point now, and we' fe,el it.is quite important to have this large' amount of grant aid, particularly for South Vietnam. The needs in Laos and Cambodia are a different type, but we feel that they are very real. .

Mr. HAl)[ILTON. Thal)k you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. NIX. Mr. Frelinghuysen. ,. ',,, " Mr. FRELING;EIUYSEN. Thank you, Mr. Chaipnan. i " ' , '

It is a pleasure W welcome Amba~sadQriHummel to the committee. Leima begin, by sltying ~ thin), your statement is well,phrased,

carefully considererl,; and I think it does sum. up, in my mind ,ilJ"an admi!'ablaway our l:>.!lBkitMtestsinAsia. I think*he,aJ).&\V,,~s,tothe questIOns alsoha~e,boon exceHent. '" ':: ," :' y?~ ?esc!,ibe the: Ameri'ca~ role as an, active bal~cingr.ole'and a

stabIhzmg mflmmce, What cQncerns me IS the eX,tent to ,whI0hwe on the Hill are willil\p;f6 u",ders~andand .acce~t th~t de.fin!:Bon of our role. For example, 'I gOt In qUIte an actIve ,discusIOn w'Itb;:oneoI my cOllca" gues ,on t~e full c, ommittee, th"ism?xuing" MS., A" hZ,ugj' w" ho said we .should not gIY~ a p~n?y to the,,Presertt ~6;v~rnment of Sonth Viet; naIl).,:becaui!!'.she thJnkslt IS repres$we,totalItar1a~; ',: . ,

W,,' e he"a,'i, a, ' Mo, ft,",lk. a.b,,' 0, ,U"t, ',:th.eaIl.'OuD," R~;,wh,'Ch .ha,V, eheen ,spent, and you:,p,re:supposed 1jo provIde,!,!s wIth!t,.~ummary ,of the amounts ~.l1at hltve hoon spel)t;.;tt'seelrts,to.mll w~,lllfe l}yj,ng,to,a large ext.m.t II) theJilItSf. We hatv;~ ma<ile.;!tporll)olJseOffilll;tl)1~ntsfJll\l.d, the~e",ar<lls don't §ee?\ to be all th~t Qh~10us.The~a9tthat,what'wou(l,re.;;iJ;sk41g ,for "no"w "S~"IH'.le,SS :th~l1t.:w, ,'! ;were, s"p,.el\~",'l,;,Jl.g",:II, :yc!l-rs, ,,'aglrdp,~,,~,notseelrt '. ~o !l)a}re mU:(1np,PresslQrt ~ere.W.hat~\":)rrl~m~ a~~ thecollsequences If ,we spoul, deC1<ile.we w,sh to bllllome leSS a~tlYe,:abread.~, wonder

"

150

if we sh~itld'really take sp'e'blftc action to slash the 'aid reguestswhi!e perhaps ~rYokingonlya,t 'th:il"Ml1(!mnts,tlrat'were given In previous: years imdllecidingwe cannot aftlttd to do more. . . ...,. \

Now Mr. IHamllton' called attention: to'tiwose;ntel'lces in youl1l1$­marks that interested me. "Were such assistance to be curtailed dras­tically; £ut~Mra:dj'ustments in our )tolB--'particularlyin terms, of ,our military' pre'senc~ould not he made without affMtmg the peace. and stability of the area," It'!llarmsme to think that. will'quite possibly be the result. .' .. ,,"

Later your statement. Says, "'I sheuldadd that it is mystr,ong!belief that redu.ced. 'aid'to.Soutlh'VietIlam, Cambodia and Laos woiJJd,not bring us clo,sertli'lt cdlIipfeWpeMe."lt' would!seem,to'me th!1>t is,a good argument for noteutti'll~'d:~astioanYi' Yet is is precisely in the~ areas wMre. ram 'fearful we' may take 'some step which will, result in a slowing'dowu,'or even a rev~~sal; of what progress that ,has been ,made. ,,1\". )t"

I wonder if you:' would care to comment on ,the' consequences of what might Happeni£' wesho,l1ldsay, Let'ego more slowly. Let's woJ!1"y about rehabilitation in Viettlam after a year or two when the,fighting lessens 0.1' aJlt~r we see if C",mbodia can't get alongwithhal£ the amo.unt {If aid th!'t'is "~ing reql1estedr1""hat do ,You:foreseeas the consequences "f'that kmd ofactIon by Congress¥ '. ."',, ".' ' ,

Mr. H.UJ\1:MEII. I shil.reyi)uP'connernsl of course','Mr ,Fi'slinghuy8ell; and I think yo.u. have tl'aced'rlrelllver,Y,we11. 'Let me spe!1lk ~peciftcal.ly to., tho.se countrIes that' Me' 10! the dIrect c,mf'ronnatlOn !wIth h(1)shle dements or' indeed in war time <ionditi,ms such"as South Vietnam l'e(tying aside: for II moment thei)lssistance progtia,IlllsniO other co.un­tries ,tMt 'are l1aWd;irect!y lirrlvolved' or,ndt,imntediately' .thlreatened withhostliesituiLtions; '" 'if",1.'· ,;" ",," :",

• AJlOf o.ur exp~rience .makes us believe that the keythin~ is"to mfluence the deClslOnmakmg 'by the opponents;,by the people '{In the "ther, silie.It is no aceidentthat the VietnalU! peaceagraemel!t, fragile as it ,is, ,wasaCJrieved: otlly attertheN orth Vi~tnMnese 'discoverMthat

th. e.Y.'COiil. <'I. 11. 'b."ttak.e. (j.'.'.v.e. 1'.'b. Y1nili. '.f"',.r .. Y if .. r.J p .. 'c .. ~e .. '.T,th .. 1IJ.k ..... , •.. 1l0.o'. th .. e .. r~cls n. ot. hin .. g magic abo.uttihe'East >Asran;~\tu:att(\ni'llb inrgp~culia.r, i.Jnd' I think We m1ght put it in persl'llct!ive ):f'W~).atii.'1'Il. tito'draw<sothe'»aral.lels, de­fectiveasthey llliglltbe\With.,t\Veiltsi\li!,EuTo]lt' [('thlnk '~:ve~one ~lIJ.d~l".'tl'nds that we wish to. reduce tJti:e'T:tmericitn'm.li[iltl1ry' inv01ve. ment In 'We'stei'fi EUl'ol'le,; pa;rticula'I'ly.the 'Ame'tleanl troop. pres-

, ence,"'hut'tlie :w~Y' £'1'<1:6' thi\! 'is to nagdtiate Hi wlth"tne other 's~de, . nO.t te with"!I.it!tW. prilCiPi1iil. l1slt. a ... nd Unilll:te~a1l1 .. ,1[. 'TElfer '00." so1lie '0£

the conseq",lIitcj\s'there l'l1ight'hdh terms oH3o\,jeP perceptions'if we

.shOUld SI1. ,d.E!enlY'Withdr~w a.~~lV;I.· O'~1<i .. leS\!'pPo..rtf. Ol'NlA.f\2>,'~br. ,i. n. stq;. rlC<I. ,;No'W tltMe same .. '. co. Ii~ii'l~rall.tl'in:s~I1iP\).1Y'1lo. If». !lIimb .. er' i)~"sih\ati"'$i .. !J .. in East Asia; ,speciiicall:y litl:Kor,jikW$8;pptaud. t!)e;' !\lttenip~jH'iY, Sjlljth and: North J{oreatb'geiiJiilge'thl\r'ali\\.~~Al'll"/lJhouttheir p~0'bl~1Ii$' a:fi4'to re. duc. e .the iien.41. o:n ... B' '1ie11!\'." 1t\lJ!l t.lremselV'e,SiM.t' it.~ee. mS.'.'.tolm~, .. ,.t.,llJi .. $'ki)'ldof, result IS g(liIrg"tl) be., lt6~(!Ited olil;v' 'Wljili"seH1C@~~~'ll(jil;1f111"ur side ,

,,' '.it. i'\.doWy,. ,;'.~ht>.:fic.'~h~'.'.6t.lle't.,. $.,.ld'fh~~: d~~i1X~. d..:.t. h.','. ili. t'.J~ ... i !f8 ... ' ~~.:n. tl.'Jt itelHeve it.S "g'6als bYMIlit;WY£Q~ce.' i,," • j ""', .'''! :. ",.~:I: " , '" .'

"T.he.", .. ef .. '.6r.ll!'. 1'.:bQ1htlt .. I.S.:.W.l'.Q.''g., .. ilia .. ,.'.11 .. 'J:. ff,,!W~ .... t. J:\11i.H .. }.'~~ •. Z .. il.' .tit .. I:m!>te. w,:wea.I~ .. }. ness, te l\l1o'W ,*ett~nesS It\itGifg<cewutrms thlle !ttl! ~i:j,allr" ,ete'attack ?r poten,tial attMki'is!1i,otthew'1l.y>'t6 s(jlve the,probll1m,hatiil wliJk-

'~ng away :!';rom a proble:w rather than helping thecountr~~~to. solve it. ~ .' "">~j'},~ , ' ,....' -.-,,'

;_;i,~\';,,', . ·'-i i: ~:{'-~ .

1M

So to pllt itin:a sentience, we do believe eamestly,th~~ the waytowll;rd detente is to figure out ways to 1ll0difytJW percep,tlOlls of pol:.<l~tu~l aggressors so that ,they won't be ~gg~ess~rs" jtnd olie vyfJ-y surely .. ,~ to mfJ-mtain our support, to help I1\fJ-mt/lm. vraQIe ep()n,op:~w and )?O~ItICal <lntities so there won't be a temptation, for aggreSSIon, Th,s IS the philosophy to use, and tQ wtlilk awo;y au';!' so,yupt $lm?re fortI' couP.t.ry whose needs are weH kno.vh certltmly dlles not CQll~qbut\l t,q stabilItY. or to solrvin!\, the. problems ·that we see be£Qr~,us .. ,. , ."1' '" .' .•

Mr. FR!'lLINGHUYSEN. To some extent I think there are }(e/Ubers here who would like to forget I\bout Vietnam ollth" theory"t),ul,t ourre­sponsibility is over because our' direct mi;litary hw<;»v:el)lent.l;l,as been ended. It:ii; perhaps b,e.ause I was there It CQnple Qf m'lUt,hs ago .that I feel very strongly tha,t,ouD re~ons~bility ·continues .and"that .t.ml,lst be refie.clied in an.ecOl!t@micway alldthat th8i problem isa manlLgellble (Jne.Oillnfriendshave c0ll,\e:s>I<l»lgl way. ol1thei)) own without 'iul),qirect invohtetnent, but. ~heir probl<;ms' arei,veryrel\ll1jl,<H,hey are. crj:tielLlly dependent "',l us for.mo~al and Jjifllljl)aj~l.sup:port,,:~. hppe .w.~ ave~ot gomg to deCIde we sImply can't,!l;ffovllilt:,01\ that· th:\S ·j$"an.AndefillJte (Jbligation withoutanY'IJrospeptior alley,i(ltioh 0Ftellluin.ation. It, does notseemlto·lie'thalt}dnd·oiasituati@l\.atal].',\\ .0'·",.,· ',;, , I must: say 'til;t@,,0ther thing. that w"rries, me, ,is: thlill cO,Jllce~n tllat

Members),ane .QJ<)pressing.about. the, nature, of .thego;ve'l'!IUll.ents, that We aid. MSIJ.¢tbztig+,~or; ene, said 't. haiti she didn't. think·auy mHit.ar. y. ',Ipi! should be given to any country that was not democratic"Mv,Ji!allj.lton has reveailed' concern llbout· thepresBtit na,tuveilf, the':K;er,e.an $l.tu­ation, and we all share ,his concern. However" J;,thinkthec(m~fJ\'jlJenceS (J£ having aprohibitioI!0f any further aid bec/lotlse we don't like some­(Jne elsli'S,ltdVelfu'n':l))ht i'ttliit 1i!k1!'ly to.chahgertl:l~fg!)"j}l)n:men1:iPaltd:1lhat would apply to any cOlW-JWY, 19j1l'j.no~:gi\l'i~~.Korea as an example. I don't think we will bringabout'tlie objeCtl'Ves that we would like

~~ :::I~fl!i8:~ ~~[~~ :he ,:~sueb.y asudd~~ter~i~a:~on!)~ rtlilit~ry . f·' Mr"HiNMMoN!.f.[>.lie,gent!em.anamderstandaI w!ls:not adYooating a free prphibition ofiL:id;'., . '. ';;,: " :.. :' ,', :.,11

Mr. FIlELINGilfmrsJn>j,'r;iN:'\l, YOUjitre not .. but,lilel1a ,Ab:tu!\:'WaiSI .;;10 ~eems);to' me ,Mth :Y01)(llre'commehdaltiions· £Ol': ite,iIlil)amolli<ifi .1l1J] t'vad\i to Vi~l)ll:mal)\'l military aid to'anygovernment that is nli>i1d,einocraUiq woJJld beadisast~r;4 . ",' ,'i"">i.:;i;,, : ,. ''/1.' ./n:; II, . 'Mr.:H;A:MirL'l1ONi~'r, :just. ,doll't want 'ito: nswwrd.: .. h ihl1fa,r',1)eC)}'m'iatg

, ,J .

.'~,

152

· ·Mr. HUMMEL;. I was not· personalIy involved. I am not trying to avoid responsibility but I just was not involved.

All the documents I have read indicate to me that at the beginning of the involvement we had no idea of what the end result WIlS going to be, what the extent of our involvement was likely to bring.

:Mr. WOLFF. I mean what was the original raison d'etre our getting involved inlmy mQ.nner, shape or form in Vietnam j As I.understood it was to guarantee the freedom of the peoples of South Vietnam. Am I correct in this!

Mr. HUl\l:'IEL.Yes, and it was based upon an international agree­ment. We wanted to help preserve an international agreement, the Geneva Accords of 1954, that had set a framework for Vietnam and that was being violated by the North Vietnamese. · Mr. WOLFF. But basicillly onr purpose was to let these people enjoy fresdoJU of choice ahd the freedom that they were entitled to. Now I think the question was raised by Mr. Hamilton, or anyone else for that m",tter o~ fact, is areth~peopleenjoying the freedomsthat we spent our money and onr blood III order to preRerve!

Now, I ·don't ,disagree that we have to aid South Vietnam to pre­serve those freedoms. The point .that was made by Mr. Hamilton with re£eren<le to individual freedom, I think, is something that should be part of olir judgment in rendering aid and assistance to these nations.

What percentage today, for example, of Vietnam is now under government control!

Mr. HttMMEI. Perhaps Mr. Wenzel would like to answer that. :Mr.\¥'<?L:FF. In terms ,of geography, in terms of people.

, STATEMENT OF RO'BEltTH.WENZEL, EAST ASIAN 'BUREAU,

,DEPARTMENT OF STATt

Mr. W ENZEJ,. Something like 85 percent. Mr. WOLFF. Is that increasing or decreasing!

. ;:Mr. WENZEL. That has been quite stable since the cease-fire over tj1e last year anda half... .. '" . ."

. Mr. W0LFjj'. 'In other words" thenthesituatioHhltsfaJrlY''Yell stal;>i­lized' itaeHfrom the point oicontr(>l ,over'terntory. Are we; ta;lking

pe~'~?W;~:~~~jaretalkingabout people,Si~.i~>~;, ..... i,;\ .. Mr. WoriFF. AlIright. NOW<!)$: I underlita,nd"W; ower the years we

ha va, had something, called a c.ommodity il11liort J>fograJV. going to S~uth:Vie~n.tim:'Thi$: program ~tis,to »elpther~uth:Vietna~eSe main­talp It .,posihon of·()Ontrol ovel11IiflatlOn!,\'lild 'llPW wehave'111st heard that the inflation iriS.lluth Vietnam is horre,rtdMs: We 4a,:ve'c)lt that program as Iunde'r/ltlintl.itilllhd we, have put the program in u~r.w different name now;!S thl\:trlgl;Lt! ".' ':, • . ~...i · Mr.WJ:lN~Ep .. Itis .being~feil~nteli/Jto,.~he Con!!;ressin:ivdit1;,lIf!,nt

fofJU but It IS stIll baslCally ro::progtamwhich permltsthelll1p.ortat,on ' ot!l!'sential cOrrill:lod11iies. .. . '.' ',: ';{I., •

Mr. Wo~. Why'did you ()hangethe pame.! .. . ,,:;<' 11[1", WENlIEJ,; I believe tj1rot .thiS change in £ormat\;w:as.jAi~esj1oriseto

conltrjjilsion.al interest;,·,,:,,: ' .. , ••.. .~,f<'; ,i:,' , , .. '. .

W ~'haye,eliminat~d,thet~r~,~'EJommercial,;rll!!!!qpt.~ro.g~atl:J;!'·llhis ve~r.:duetlil.,the .. COllillstent Ill. ,.1S. ~lll~~~ta;M[n. g@f1ll.l~.~~~.,.'hJ,j1e,p~s.t.. 'Destiiue.oift' ,fr,equent 'explaJ\!lt10n!i:to the CQntllMiy, t~e genera:lpubhc

1'<' ",,';". '. , , ,,-,., tl<.o ' "

/i(,:' .'i<"

153

has tended to identify the CIP with the importation of honda,s or con­sumer goods, which It never was. Therefore, this year ,we have identi­fied the imports which we finance by ,the purposes for which they are being used. Thus, fertilizer, pesticides, and other imports required fOr the production oflood have been identified as "Foodl'nd Nutrition," as would be the. case in other aid-recipient countries. Industrial rltw materials such as yarns and fihers, chemical products, iron and steel, and wood pulp are being requested under the category called indus­trial productIOn, and those inputs needed to op~rate Vietnam's trallsportation system have been: solaheled. The control ,system devel­oped under the CIP in past years, including close U.S. review and auditing, will, however,be retained in order to assure that goods are ordered and used for their intended purposes.

'Mr. WOI.FF. The response to congreSsional interest was to cut tho program, it was not to change. the !jame .. As I understand it, there is disguised aid going to Vietnam in: the food for peace program. There are a number of other program~ that really are a methOd of subterfuge rather, than being a direct support for a,.program which you think is necessary. . ' .• .

Mr. HUlIfMEL. Mr. 'Wolff, all of these programs' a.re, openly, an­nounced. ancl: reported to the Congress and to the public. There IS no subterfuge about having Public L"w.480programs come from a differ­ent part of the Federal budget than the AID program comes from. In many respects, you are quite right, but I don't think any intent has been or will be to mask the amount of the assistan"" that is going because it all has to be reported. . '

Mr. WOl.FF.Well, this is one of the problems that we have had, the £,act that some of the programs tho emselves have bee. n of questionable value, Mr. Ambassador. J. refer specifically to the AID program to South Vietnam w~ich has had very little in the way of development projects to put. these people into a v'ableeconomic. position and will be thereaso;n fOl:'i)urconstantl:y ~a vin,g: to render aid 0. this coun~ry,,~f it were tl).e fact thl\t;wewer.~glVmg aid to the South Vletnamese.lU order

. t? mail:ethemeconomicallyviable.tp.at would be one thing; but. a h.an. d,t(j-mouth o. perl),i;io.: n~u.ch,.I'S ~h .. i.s.cO .. mm. ,odity.import,.p. r.ogram, o. r "

,whatever'name,you ,glV<1 tp ,It, I!i;.,solllethmg WIth WhlGb, I wouJ,d , ·.sunongly ,qisagree. ,.. . .,. . .. ': ..

,.If you aretalldng.about • . in' .'. . . . Quslyhave ;not hearil '.. , Pllirt of the problem

lJll?p'ey that "~. uM'~~:~~i.@~~M~~;£~~6~~:~:~:;Ot _11U,d9'Gh\rtlt .• th,S has virtullilly d .. We heard a lon~ .. .' tha.t was in .. our.mllitary 0t'kea~t;~ !i::~ '''V"iet,nani!zed •.. ".-, .... tary Operation.". I sh'lu4!. • namiZ6,,·the Peace." Can

so ~,~~:~~~?~~.~~~ 1l.llll1"'y

154

"How" niucjlis. enough 1':' an'q another plLrtof :your question is,. f'How lo'li~¥" ;Regardmg th;e latter part, we. ar~ commItt~d, as· I amgure you kl),o;<V, sir, to' furmshmg a 5-year ,proJectIOn of estilnates for the three ]'II'dochlha: count'l!ie$.Theseestimatesj Secretary Kissinger said the other day, would be ava'ilable p'el'haps in early Augu'st, but I think we are golllg to beat that deadline by aconsiderableltmount. • . I know that a' number of people in the approprilttions and Ituthoriza­

tion process in the Congress want to look at those 5-yea1' projections of what we 'think we will be asking for ·and what we think we whll need for Government programs)n these three c'.lUnt!,ies. They want to look at those before they act on· some' of the legislatIOn nOw before you.

I camlOt honestly prejudge, I do not know even roughly the' content. of what those projectio!,s ar~going·to have in them. I can say. that the largest yearly amount IS gomg to be the one that we are askmg now.

NoW perhaps Mr. Wenzel, wlro iamore'familiar with the Indochina problem, cl\,ll add to what! have said. . · Mr: WENZEL. I would like to comment on one point. You spoke of uevelopment and funds for development as opposed to the funds for the commodity import program. · Mr. WOLFF. I am talking aboutAIDfund{S on this question, I am 'not referring to the commodity import program. Although it has been adisaster/The eommunity import program has been separate from the AID funds. .. ',·Mr. WENZEL. Yes. Well, the main reason for the 'high level of aid

requested ·this year is a very significant development component in that, $750 million figure-I don't know precisely what it is. And the purP<'>senfthis is to try to give South Vietnam aglieater thrust for-

· w!'l'd 'self'shfficiency in tp.is year, perh!,ps in the'neoct 2 years, which will' , , US then to begm toscitleoff RId. • ' , ' ,

'In, ,the entire Vietnam 'economicassistltnce pvogmm,c,iother . devot,ed todirMt relief and welfate is devoted to

,~~~~[~~~~be~Cfl!liS" the economi:¢' . to' achieve' is fONlelf-sustaining , of Construed on a'l):lore rialtTOW

$219 miHionfor and$~~O million in oo~ic fundin¥ <if these

. or .'

155

Mr. WOLFF. Mr., Chairman" I 'would like to ask two additional ,questions.

Mr. NIX. Yes. ' " " ,Mr., WOLFF. The qUestio)il of, Laos is one t4at interests me p~~·tic­ularly. I asked this qUes"tiOll of .previou,s wi,t,nesses, !W, to ww, the~~r not AID is going to'tl)IS new,.U?ver,:mel!-t@f Laos;i!!r wrether ,t,ls going to'other people, whether ~t IS gOlllg lIlto other ag<:nCles. A st,?ry 1Il the paper the other day was that the funds wer~ gomg to spoolfic organizatIOns that were identified with one ,part ,?f t~e g,?vernment. Do I understand that the funds that you are requestlllg lIlthls program will go to ~he Government,of Laos!, "

Mr. HUMMEL. Yes, sir, absolutely. The story that y(jU refer to was an unfortunate one from our point of view because it jUst did not corre­spond to the facts. The Royal Government in, ;Laos, the newly con­stituted giilv¢rnment, ,isoomposed largely ot the previ<')usly contending factions. The Pathet Lao is 110W included"RBa part, of the government and our assistance goes to that government. '

The story that you referred to WIloS something off the reyord and Mr. Ladd can answer that. , ',,'

Mr. LAilD. 0 11 the militaryassiBtance side al~hough $85 l1\Hlion, as you note properly, was requested for 1975, that was,done~()fore the provisional government, was actually organized and ,;v.;e didn't know what was,gOlng'to happen so' certain contmgencies, were built into that. Now the provisional government has,been form, ed and,it appears to be moving' along on a relatively efficient course.", '

The State Department feels that.,inthe proilections that will come to you, that Ambassador Hummel me.tlti(:lIled, and Mr. Kissinger prom­Ised the fuUcommittee chllirman,that th<;>85 will not appear as 85. We don't think that, we need that much now: ~ha-t we haw" h.~d several

, months of the new Government and we :feeVwe can cut that down. , I would like to:p'oint outtha-ton the,miHjlil.rysidt;\, in ~"'l~g~t to your 'ffi~,~te110£ f\ln, ds g"OIng to pel?ple,'all of the m,oneys t~at4l;re'/1;" R!Jl"g, c on,~h, e 'ffilhtary,sldego"mto ,Laos 1Il five ways. We buy rlOe, for llhe J,.ia.o1!ian, Army. We blty, ,£ex~il~san<;l certain clothing. We buy pet,<\1e1'\IIl,and lubrication produots. There is an'ai"i'ffiaintenance COl1kll~t ,for their veI'.\:'Hllnall air fQ~ce, to' keep ~tgoing. 1'he other c~~,,~,is all~ther O;oAhM" .C9~t for me,d,lOalsuE';P, l},eS; 0ll~:V~tlOnS and"'amtena'll:C~il'p~I!,': c, We p~O¥lde III goods;!hll\'lrJi;il1!1, n~e 1Il,moneYis. S(j on, thetmhtatw, side what the Laotians will: ,l;eceivefromllow on, is pJjmarily operll;,­tions of maintenance materials and funds that are tr!l!nSferI;ecr to them in an;y;waY. ' ' , ,", ",' • 'Mr.:HUl\IME!> X~tollleem,p~size.~.l1;in tha~tp.e ree~pleDt organs.Bpd

orllJan)Zfl;t)oll,!\ 1l\.i(;.,!tQs~h')Jt,a~e recelJt;lngtJi,t;\S~cIt1't;\P(\!lt ofthe cOlllitlOR ~ovel'll~ent, the, ~rovisi?iJ.lilgovernmeI'j~(,QJf Natiell!Ll Union, and not lmlt It }s~;J!l;&lle fa~tlPll,'?f ~t.'Dl'\is g0es,tIlT~hthecentralgovernment nl.eOhltlllSIlV,all.d 1S,8Ub]ootto,the centrl;tlg@vernmeut. " '

Mr. WOLlIF,,,;~t'e ~o:U;awllire that t,b:ere ,are seNeral'ffielllbers" ofth" Il,'lsemb+y who. have b'~en.charged with narcotics traffickimg •• l)-nd, wh@ have,Rotbe~nlncareer)l,tedW', ' .',,', " , Ml)'iaiE,'!IlJOt,· Yes:, s1l', I,ILlIl. " " " " " " ',','," ',,' , , ."N'1'; ." ,OLI"" Ate we d'ling, anYthiA~libOnt'that; Jl,t;all'M'ith thea-id'

, tn,~ '::~. '~~giving, o,~ ar~~e just go~1\g ~? give .the~iii, wi~~lI,t h,avilJ!\' ,i.

,.anythiln~.tbsay a~,i!!uf1!ha~at:aliH,)!!",),,<, ".,' ,";.1',,,', .":.,,,':'h, '" , Mi~.~Ull~llIrw;~!O)~,iOn9~~nwehl:\",.e !)f),He!ltl)iith:e lI4iteill~)5n'o~.'

;, '.~he)~~~ Qovern'2e~\~ur;¥Ql1cern about these l)la11ten;an4:ill??:tttA.~r-" .. (,k ' • .'

, [.'

156

cotics control in general. As you know considerruble steps have been taken, effective steps, in recent years in enacting new legislation to prosecute people for. narcotics. VIOlations and to control the gr.owing lind trafficking of narcotics materials. We have, as I say, made ou~views quite. well kno~ to th~ Goverrr!"ent of Laos. We are not disposed, f~r reasons .that were descrfbed earher, to threaten the cutoff of ald for thIS region.

Mr. HUMMEL. If those drugs finally entered the United States, we would not be permitted to do that 1

Mr. HUMMEL. Well, I know,. sir, you are familiar and may be more fa!"iliar than ~ as a result of y'0ur trips with the efforts that we are makmg not only m Laos but ThaIland--

Mr. WOLFF. I know about the efforts but the statement troubles me. Mr. HUMMEL. I am sorry. Mr. WOLFF. Because you say that concerning these drugs even if

they don't do 1lJlything 'about that we are not prepared to cut off aid to them. '.

Mr. HUMMEL. No, sir; I didn't say that.· .. Mr. WOLfF. I beg your pardon. . . . Mr. HUMMEL. You posed the problem of direct narcotics coming

from Laostbthe United StatesllJ1d you asked me whether we would do·.runything iuoout·thfit. As far as we are aware, Laos is not at this time one of the soufcesfor narcotics coming to the United States so the problem tliatyoupose has not yet arisen. I don't honestly know to what extent and how vig<'lJ!'ously we would react if that situation were to change, but I can assu!'e you we would react.

Mr. WOLFF. My final question relates to the reSolution that was passed in the Senate on the question of Formosa. They passed a resolu­tion or amendment resc111ding the Formosan agreement. How do you view that 1 ..•..

Mr.F.l'\l)l\l:MEL. We made our views known officially in response to written inri!.!triilS from theSenate andl;'erM;Ps also in .the House, I am not SQl'e"Wlth regard to the Formosa StraIts resolutIOn you referred t6;.:w~· neither advocated its· rescinding lloroppoSljd its rescinding. The. fact is that it was superseded by the mutual defense arrangement

. th,,;t< wenQ:w·have with the· Go:¥,ernment .of tlie RepUblic of ClliI\a;'@n Tal w!\l).:'cTl!e· resolutIOh wasllI'ili1.1ary.l9lJh IlJ1d the treaty W!\Ii',J\(l\rch ]955; S.o this would n.ot aflieottlite mutUl\lcde.:fiense trea;ty arl:aligement that we now ha;ve with the 'Republic of OhinO;; '. .'

. Mr.W.oLFF; Thank-you. Thank y.ou, Mr. Chairman. .: ',/ .Mr. NIX. Th!\l).k youyery mudh:, Mr; Ambassador,.for cQlningand

amjw~ring the question§' t.o, the lita,tements you .mAde.We·apPrMiate the presence.of y.our associaites.. '.' c. '. ' . I. . '," :.', . "

Unfortunately, we are ndj; petmitted';iit; this parlieulmrtilne to coli!; tinue the meeting. I must sa.y It.has been m.ostprqci(ucbi;ve. Iwoutd appreoiate the preilentati.on.ofthe ihfo;rutati.onthat ybu'$!lfdyCi>u. wouJd subrrlit£6rtherecord.,· "" ,,'

Mr. HUMMEL. We shall certainly do that;l1:r, Chairmruni. ··c.' . .. I appreciate the,opp.orturtity an,dllly ooIlea;gu;es ·apprecj,ate·the op-,portunity of appearing befor~ t\1is cOmmitt<!e atMtytime.~· .4\ ·,,'f>.'. I

, :"~frj,.,,J:fI~;rrhaJtk.You.!', :.,:, :,,;'0; :', _"-,.,,;,,.,': t_' ' ,~.~'fi~«_:':",'" :~:flJ ".'; 1'liJ,\\iuoooIIilliittee wiJlstandMjoufuedl;I,~;; ,·!.ir~+!, '. '.' ' !. ,';! ,;, .·wc.

" [~i\re;uponiat3:;4.lfp;m<the SUb{j()m,.mitt~e'adjl;~~;~d.l~>c.::S./ . ,<- -. ' \_, '>'; ,,' -.} , ,"~'~" ;(-::>, 'r.:,<\.' .,' ~0 ) '.~~:",:~

, i,"I:' ,f~t ",'-'.

" ".c_.

OUR COMMITMENTS IN ASIA

WEPNESDAY, OCTOBER 2, 1974

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES', COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,

SUBCOMMITTEE ON ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS, Wa8hington, D.O.

The subcomm~ttee m~t at, 2 p.m. in room H,;~36, the,' C~~itol, Hon. Robert N. C. NIX (chaIrman of the subcommIttee) preSIding; ,

Mt. NIX. The subconimittee will come to order." " We have been holding heltrings for some time, on the subject of '

bringing-Back at least half o:li our troops and military civilian em­ployees from advan<;!l bases in Aliia. I believe that we could save con­siderablealnounts of' 'lnoney by (j:oingso, ~speciall:y'ifwe.reduced the size of our military 'forbes byred\ICing' the misslim,we are willing to undertake around thewbrld. '" " ,"

The totallTIilitary and civilian per$Onn~l ir)volved' would come to 148,000 persons. The cost saving can be eStimated by multiplying this figure by" $10,000 sa."e, d per,. P er,s,o~ I,'!l'~alar:vand S,UPI'Qrt cos,ts,' whicH would reach approxlmately$l1f2 bIlhonsaved'per yMr: ,"'"

The fact that the United StateS provides a nuclear umbrella 'for non-Communist conntries'in Asia and the rest of the world'is a Inajor resp(jnsibility" Providinl\- In:a:n:powe~ at advanced bases in co~tnes such as ThaIland and South Korea IS anmm~ry burden III that' these nati(jnil are, capable of ti~pvldj'tig th'~~roW1i:~npower. ' , Wh~t~ver r~onsj.b~IH;ieSWem:.ii~havli inA'sia~eCause of our prior

commItments m' addItIon to pro'vlduiga nuclear umiJteJlacan 'be met bymaintMning the 7th, :r<:leet) operating f~omb~iIeS in, the mid-Pacific.' The <in:lY reason for keelH~ mfantry or aIr personn,el'in South Korea, £orexample, would be under a trip-wire theory irrwhich we agree by our presence to take immediate casualtitlS in ariy attaeks by North

, Korell; upon South Korea. , ,I.' ' ,

Our problem here ill the Congress is to answer th~ 'Luestion as to' how the support of the American 'poople is to bereta,i!le(j! for oirr £or­eign policy. As ~he ~ttention of our pellple i~ fwnea to ,QUr ov!ii]lfl,eds 1tere at home, th,S WIll become one o:f1dur mdst pressibg'problem's. "

At this meeting tddll,Y onr first witrieM' \s Stei'an: Leader, research analyst, 'Center for Defen!le Information." , ' "

I want to welcome you, Dr; Leader: His aplliasure, to have you. This is a subject that has plagued the, Members of the Congress (jver a period of years and I think it is a question that isol great mo\iient to the American peo!?le at this tilTI~' "., . , " ,

, You may proceed sir." "",,' , , 'C ,.. ' " "

, "" 1, " • ;1t'., ,,: I (1~7) '<I t'

41'C527-74- ,11 :f ,-., '

-i'

158

STATEMENT OF DR. STEFAN R. LEADER, STAFF ASSOCIATE, CENTER FOR DEFENSE INFORMATION

1:59

The U !l.dted States, ro1sohas, ,!lin, air, .<defense. \Wit, arm!\d. with. FIa w)r and Hercules misailes.n. Korea. ,[n .addition, there;s It tJfctical,miS$i.)e unit .with'lIonest: John 4tJ.dSel'geant' missiles. anda~ 'artille):yunit armed with 1M-millimeter and8,j,nch'guns, alI'capable of firing nuclear warheads·1atdN orih Karea. As, :y()U, kl;J;ow; there .are nuclellrrwarj1eads for these weapons stored in South, Korea, quite close. to the truce line.

We should also keep in mincl,here that the North.Korll{lJls,have no nuclerorweapons and there is no evidence.that there are any Soviet nuclear weapons in Korea. '. i i . '

. The~T.S. Air Force has a wing off-4 fighter-bombers and a squad-ro!l. Qf C--130transport. aircraft. " . . " . ,

,It: is the center's conclusion that all of these forces should be phased out,over the next 3 years and that ;the nuclear. weapons stored in Korea should be removed., . . '" ~T,S.forcesin Korea are topheavyand tailheavy with approxi­

mately 20 flag and. geneval officers, as w,)ll as headquarters and SUpp0rt units, Only 37'percent,p£, U.S. troops in Kore'l-'Itrecombat troops. The remainder. are suPPort, land headq.uarters, troops. Th~se headqua):ters, a,re)arg,e1 and,gr?:wing larger, I Corps headquarters grew by 42 percent.,qurmgt!).e.past,year. . '.,," ."n" .'".

Another unusual of the U.S. ;~'~~~ri!~i~:~i~~:%l(Qre'a. is .that pyerlalJ .$, .~Ol)l­

will mea,n:' jUore

160

'Several U.S. aircraft manufacturers" including Locl~heed, )\icDonnell Douglas Corp; and Northrop, have 'all had discussIons wIth Korean officials recently on the possibility of manufacturing a Korean fighter plan~. "j

Both of these sters will help the Republic of Korea in the"foreseeable future. And even If it were to occur, the South Koreans are capable of defending themselves. There is no'reason to think that the gradual withdrawal of U.S. ground forces from Korea would increase the like­lihood of attack.

The danger to South Korea posed by the Park regime's re,Pressive policies is m many ways more serious than thedan~er of mvasion from the North. Continuation of the repressive poliCies of the Park regime raises the danger that Park will undermme his own support so much that the North will be tempted to turn more vigorously to a policy of subversion. So long as Park retains the support of his people, the danger of a successful attack or suhversion is very small.

I think former Ambassador Reischauer put it very well ina recent alticle in the New York Times magazine:

Park is embarked on a policy that seems almost designed to' destroy popular support for bls regime and make the dlsMn:ction between the North and the South seem no longer very important. . \ .

U.S. troops are niiw hostll,geil of th~Park regime. The phased with­drawal of U.S. troops, we think, would end this dangerous sitnation.

According to the Secretary of Defense, the operltting and main­teance costs of U.S. forces in Korea were $525 million III fiscal year 1973 and $600 million in fiscal year 1974. This does not include the indirect costs of support from outside the country and does not include military construction and procurement. If you add the military assist­ance provided to the ROK,the yearly cost is nearly $1 billion; Gi'Ven current economic cbnditionsit becomes very difficult to def~nd ,these expenditures. ," " ','

LetmeturnnowtoU.S.f6rcesin Thailand. ' " There are presently 27,liOO o1l\cersand' men stationed!n Thailand.

The Pentagon apparently plans to maintain a permanent 'force of appro" x, imate, I, Y, 21,QO,O officers an, d, men, i,nThailil"nd, co, mm,ene,ing" next year. However, the Pentagon , has provided n6"reasonabl!1'mjlitary' justificatron'ior the prei;ent levell)f forc<)s in Thailand or maintahiing them th~rejnthe future. " ,. "., , , • , In tWa absen@ofany military justifililltionfork~eping U.S. f0r<l\ls ill Thaihlnd, it .would .st~engthen U.S. JV.i;l;itary I?ostlire and reduce mili­tary expendItures' if an tJ.8'. forceS/In ThaIland were removed.

Th,e Air Force makes lip 'the ITht~t part of tWs force. There are ~ppro:"imately.40 1'I"1'2's, in Thl'iland.and150 fighter-bombers oithe '7th AIr Force III Tha1'laJld. The·7th AIr Force was moved ifrom'Sonth Vietnam to Thailand after the American withdrawal from 'South Vietnam. '. ' " ,::

161

our allies with a fu.ll range of conventional forces against a Pe()ple'fI Republic of China attack provided we ar\! not fighting in Europe/' _ ,

None of these reasons make sense militarily. Moreover, the Pentag<;m nowhere shows that U.S. forces in Thailand contribute to the defense of the United States.

All of these rationalizations need to be examined with great care. U.S. forces first stationed in Thailand in large numbers in the late 1960's and were actively. involved in supporting the U.S. effort in Vietnam. .

Much has changed since then, as the members of the committee well know. U:S. forces are no Jonger ~ghting in Vietnam, ~hough t~e Penta­gon contmues to emphasIze the Importance of deterrmg a major North Vietnamese offensive by the threat of renewed bombing of North Vietnam. .

However, the Secretary of Defense recently pointed out,.."t1te South Vietnamese now appear capable of preventing a North, Vietnamese trukeover providing U.S. material support contiou.s.?!, :.,

The U.S. threattoresu.me bombing of NorthVieQnam.is,not very believabl", .given current political·conditions. TheN<I>rth Vietnamese hav@ hadlimple time to l'abuildand,e'XpaJnd their llIir defense system­olle,o£;the:lli@st sophdstiollited andext,msive in,the:worud even in,1972. 'IIhe· effeet:hvenessof this'·,air,8ed'lInse"system,:wotild hIruke , the .cO!iIt of ren~wed,air operations over,Noiith V.ietham higli Mld1extmm. ely hard

· to ;usti:liy to the Ameriean 'peopl" and, ito the Congress" . , The pdl'iticaL, problems ll$SOOiate<il ,with"aUl itttem]>ttO!'Tt>ne'w U:S,

a,iIi operatibnswould also be,substantial. TheWa,r Powers. Act would make it'lJ;Il' immediate ,imd loonnroversialpoliticltl .ssue and"any admin­istration would find it hard Ito ,ddfend. such action, especially In . light of the 'gr?Wing senti~ent'nitheOoi1gress ·for reduci;ngoul' pIieBent lev",l of 'rud,t@ the .'I'h,eu.,goverliHwmt;, ':' 'i . , "'o, ,',,'

',FJinally, while .. suchbombing would! ,un<il:0ubtedly result J1nkillil1g large numbers of, Vietnamei3eland ~eri<it\!)is\';t"s,np.tJJikely,Jto'1Je ~

:. mom effec.tive militarily than it,1;t~1 beenJin;,l>heiRo/i#" Se .. ". 'Elral'$ .. ~. udies " by the InstitUte, ,:fOr Defense ,l'\.nal:tsis:l1!i,ttd!!l' IW~d)!»)(th:e 'Ji,I"]iiM't-· ment of DefenSB; as well asby,independent grQIIPS;"~ itl0f<iar.that the bombiIig bf Nort1t, Vietna;m aChieved,(llo.»"lo:ftli~'I~ilils'for, w'h!ich it was-intended-., 'f:!: "t, . ':: '\-'.\:i,! " i!,' ,I ,,' f 'Ht,t If;)"i f j

/" ' ••

;' rrh~ NorthV,ietnamese havealsd had anl.pll' time,t,o. st!)(lli;p9ile large quiiNt\ties o£military supplies. Thus. evew Hnein'ewBd ,bolli.bill;g@f North Vietnam,ancHM Ho (Jhi,Minh Tl'ail'ciluid'swplthefl'QW of ~pp.lies something it waSneyerl1blert:(>db!e1f~ 8:ti~ts p~!,k, 'It nilght, ,.' faot.lr~nt:estlmat"1'!>lUg~I*ll1lg1tt,1!>e at

lJf, .was ,felton Jthe:~tt1li.fieldi .: ':! 1:~"Ilh, ,II., 'I

~~~;~~~~EI. :I~are ''Well' ,known. anil"",w}j:e I the'·Ailinerioon, 'Q>r~t'seem l'!ttU!"lr '. I ares!-,lt, V.S.' lAir 'Force~lin mll!!,~l~U;d, aTll"virtual~y

. Inso1'li1"as r~ewed, llltel':V,\jlilCfu.:Ii In' iV!etnMn IS . ,~':-, : .,,! I"'" ):\ .\'\;,) :". '. : I ,[;;>!>' . ,:': ,(: ,';: .. '

· oll 'China' inr~h'ntl1tl' 'nIn.d ,Jonl! row of domi)'l"es

o£',thBirl'suppos.,dtfplan' ror·""".rs' · ",ovId., ' . . lin'

162

;, Of, course, thllre was '110 threat hom China and there isnonll 'now. However, the American Em:b~y in Thailand continuM to view the 'I'hai insurgency mnch'as before. "", , ' '

Recent events, however, hl1Ve changed much. The key event was former President Nixon's trip to China and the Amerioan"Chinese detente. This has set in motion changes aU over Asia. A great many governments have followed the American lead and moved to improVe relations with Peking. Thailand is one of these.

Beginning in July and August of 1973, Thailand and the, PRC began the now familiar l,'rocess of athletic diplomacy-the exchanl;e of athletic teams. A Chinese table tennis team visited Thltiland 111 July and a Thai badminton team went to China in August. Thai "'Nd Chinese foreign ministry officials accompanied thei.. teams on these trips.

A series of other diplomatic initiatives followed; The Th",i Govern­mentannounced that it would lift regulations whichbanhedtrade with qhina since 1959. In .J anuary of '1974 an '?il pu!·chase.Rj;Teement waS SIgned by both governments and the'ThaI foreIgn m1l1Ister observed that improved political mlations usually ~ollow improved trade. '

The most significant development calnedn,FebruarY'iof this ye",r. At that time the Thai defense miniSter made a,ttil" to Peking whem he met and held talks with Chou'l<cu .. laL ,lAfter :returning hOm",he announced that he' had; reeei ved assuvances, from' the Chinese' that Chinese support for Thai rebels , lIVas a ,tiring 'of the past 'and ,that ' China hoostopped givingarms't<h Coimnunist ,cotuIt\'ies in: ,'the regron.

Chou expressed thedesite that the visit wQuldpave,the wax £<>1' lasting ,I;ood,relations 'bet~~ri the,.t~o'cou'!tdes; It, ~as'alsoagreed that Clima 'would sell addItIona\<oil"to '[,haIs~ '"" , '

All of thissugl;eSts thittthe 'FhaisnO' 10~ger'soolthe,PIK) -as a threat to Southeast ASIa. Peacefulaceommodatwn bEitweenthe, PRC I and otlier governments in Asia-even those like Thailand whichdolltlnue to'mainta!n diplo""aticrehttio~s."'ith the,Taiwah Government-is not only'p~rbie butIs,being'~Ively']I)Ursued." " ,ii" •.. "1 ',' ,,~,

Thl'i/!, It becomesincl'eaB1ngly clear that ,the U.S"ffil1itary presence in TliaHand iS1a'commitmenNin search',6t"acj;ustification,: '

There isa,emroll insurgency in rI'hMJaiJI(hitt present:' Ithink recent estimates place the number of insurgents in Thailand at between, 7,500 and 8,OOO'scattemd around seveuitl'different parts'oiithe countriY. ,By 'comparison, the Thai Armed Forces number 180,1])00 men, inclUding 125,000 in: the Thai Army. In,'additiohl the Thai! Air Foroo number\! approximately 160 combatail'craft.i Ii:,'" , ., '", ,"

The ,insurgency has gro",nin.rell(lritryears largely I as ," peSultof, the low priority given it by:the'Thai i\1overnment. 'tI'he,'Vliais seetI) to take a casual, almost indifferent, attitude toward it., What, the mho,isfuied most-better lead:ership and organii'lo,tlonJ...{Jannot be prov,ided by the United States but must be providM bytlie1Jhais,uhemseives.,,,, ,i

Finally, it should he pointed out that the insu~~ncyhas its roots andorigiris in ThailandT-iIl!lthe poverty,backwlli)'dnesf,'and' neglect whichcharacteri,ze ,several]larts or the c(mutry./£l4rts,' iIIlhiJe the, in­suO"gents )iavereceived" Rssistllhce from the outsitle,oonditions within the country hate,kep,tthe in$lrgeneygoing. " >"", :"ii" " ", ",' These are ciearly,matters, that the Thais"themseiVes, must deal:with and the U.S. military in Thailand can provide" no hell" there;

1163

The recent Ohinese CGmmitment·to stopia~ding the insnrgellts ,under­hnes the internal, nature of the ins~lrgen0y, I1U;d ,makes an indjgenous solution more manageable. .', . " ,,! ' Ii ",' ,

Of no small significance thesedayS.is the CQst of "maintaining U.S. military forces in il1hailand. The figure Ffovidedto this committee by the ,Department of Befense, $5511 million in annual operating costs, seems somewhat lQ,w. P(1yroll alone:!or, these forces amounts to aB­'proximately $830 million. We estimate the annual operating costs will be reduced tithese forces and their dependents are removed, and their return to the' United States will help the ,American balance of payments" ,'i.. . . I.': " .' i'

The large balance.of-paymentS'id~ficij;s ~n,recent )[¢ars have CGn­tnibuted sig1lificantlyto ;the weakenillgof!the Glpllar llibr,oad. In addi­tion, the U.S.commit/ilent to Thailand has C<lSl; ,some' lilt;S billion.in econGmic .and m.ilitar,v assista~ce ~etween 1~~{\ lin,d 19N. All these ,costs ,add to the Inflationary SPlrallJ)" the U mted,st!1otes.

" Mo.st im.portlLntly, I ,think, there, is growing. ~.IP. osition. inT. haila.nd ,to the, contitiued,presence of. U.S .. forces. The Thai. jJ'o,r.eign Minister recently emphasiz.ed that ,"i\mericlLn bases ltrejn Thailand only telJl­pora't'ily; ,not permanently." Re,has al~o argued, th!\t in ,the. Pltst,U;$,­Thill rell1(iio!1S:c'!lvere)nphasized milit\1ry coope~ation and. needs IIdjust, ment to create a more balanced relationship •.. ,''': " """', • F:ormerIPJ'imli,iMiniste'l; Thanat. Khomttllj the ·mlLn,'\Vho acquiesced to the stationillg,<!JfU,S.,£pr"'lsjl'l;',l'JIaill\,t:1Clin th(lfirst,place, recently said:, "l,.don~tj;htnk,!t helps;'llh1l!illl!)drin, IInyway ,t9r: have foreig!) ,forc~s. there. T tl<inltlsug;~j;thJl!t.Amer.ic~)l"tr.QGPs .he kiickedu»cere­mO!1lolJsly: out"Iif,pM"he.!l. gtadultlp~aslll!1',QutbUk1t ,shou~dbe, 1\ rea.-sonllihlyorderlYWlthdrlLwalthatcontmues., I" "', .'1:", ,,')1h0, J3angkG!<,DailYINews; ~ditQlIilL)ized ,recently that"the presence

,0,£, foreign tFQ!JP"'(ln!'l'hai .pil '~meal\s hUmiliatiQ!1, and d,isgraCjl in the.eyes.ofthfrworldno,," ';""'fl,'!,:I,i'!i,) i, >il)"l,r)\..- Ii'" ,,1 .,', .

. Ll)IJu.ly. :th. e'Thai,Gove.):,li\mellt'II~llest.· e~,~hllt ... th. e,Vllited .States end all recoMlJ;issltll/le flight21 oiVer' ,til!h'[ndiI),J:lIi0cl'lln. ,'rl).W\, the; milita~y ·valueofThai~seshasbeell'I:~duced.".,oi': (1' :i', ': "'''., 'Ii':,' , All of ~his\lilakes it clellr :that,.it lisl\\>~aq\ll1lilt!'lIlIl~;wp,e~her U.$:. ,~oJ;()eslshouldJ'Ij1y,e Thajll\!1d, bllt rath,e~ ;I)Ihe/l t4ey,,~i'1,l )jl~",e,I~Il~~m~ to" me" the SQone: I th!\~, leav!\I' ~\lB, ~oq\l~r ,tjle .1'hail'<il~Nerllm\\,n,li i<}l\n become .e.'s.e.lf-sulli. ~Ie~t a.nd b~g.m.s.ol.vl.n.g Its p. robl~mjl..:.qll !~.".~W,l1~.,:.j n"

In~'Umlll~ry, lit, IS '?lJ' vI~W~.hItt.V·$, 1;I\q,C<jS, 1\l;M1\L1.l\\'tid.,~,e'~<'ino ,llsef,ul, Pol,t,ipa.lo~lI\dit.ar. ill llW .. p.I?8e,., '.~. ,re,_'\X1S~Iy:" .. aw, jl;e!llln.t.~~JJ:>iY' ,t. he Thai~,"'nd <\~gh~i t9: hi) , w1it)).p~a wI}: in apllasep, ,piOg~!tm ov~t ,3:,years.

Th!~fin\,ll:llilmAgsmetoO~I);I,!Va.,: , d,',., : ", : ... ,r,,,,. ,T. he,Ulll.te.<I S. t~tesm. tlglf.!l,\ ... ll$ !}~,9.,QOl. \l1l\C~fiJ' .',.d,,l~W!).:O. 1l!9. I>I.B. !1J/w. ,.a,,~ ..

)ye)l. as 2,500 J)QDa~.d clr,V:ll1D,.employ,ees,,· .• $,)<\vce~ 01}' pWnl\'\Vlt consist of 18,000 Marmes of·1>he 3d Marine'. IVISIOIl atCttmn: ;autler,

,·.·I\~·.;weILa. s part Q~. a.lI:larjne .. aft w~.ng"i)p;Q. QO,~~.' ,I14l.rir.m. ,tiLY .. a .. ~ .. t .. ;w, .0 , 'I),/J! pa~es, Kadena l).nd N aha, ,7 ,OQO.,i!9 aIel'S. ,lind Il,QO!i'slLil9rs. 1:'~e, Air

l\1P1q~. ,.!l~ ... ~',atac. ti.C\¥~fig.l1t.~r.W.:in .. ~with.1tPP .... ro.X ... im .. !I'. t .. ~I.Y;'~.A'J!'.·.-;iI: .. !' .. <14i.' .. p'g. tee r.s" .1\;S~l1(t/tegJc recom;laISSI!r\lC.e ffilWlron o,f SR~I71 alrCrl\#.)IIli'~' H!ilf,,,liMi! ~ransports and an air reiuelulg s.quadron .<\£ KC-;~?:~~ro:,tw .er~. ,h.l\r~! l~"abo!1:PSY:QJ:S. Or ,psy;cljolog,lcal'Fadare gIlOUp.1"\i1ch:t under the

'.'. -.4.'. ir.,.e ... ct. iO~:<\f.:tj\ .. '.'.~J D.l '. ' ... $ ...... ,.~p1b. as.~l'd,O. ri.:n .S .... ,.eQul., :'I;h. ~rfl.'.'·\I. '.r. '.e, iii; additi.O\lil. a .r,il.;w,etYiI:()fl\rMll4;ltS;W1)t~; thn,t :Rf':'ylP,"jCOI[\m1Jnlc~tJ(l!,s,$I!PPO~~ arid, " ,;mte.lhgellr(· Se:¥.:V1P~~ , :;" .'":,,;_,' "t'It'- ), .. ", "" ,,-, , ", ' ,- . , ',', ,- ':, '>, ' ",' e_ l ' ' i. ", ,

164.

U.S. forces on Okinawa are combat elements intended for rapid intervention in Asia. Pentagon rationalizations emphasize the value of its support facilities for rapid response to contmgencies in Asia and as a training and staging area for war.

U.S. forces on Okinawa are closely tied to the presence of U.3. ' combat forces elsewhere in As;')'. However, U.S. foreign policy cllllls for Asian allies to provide thei'r'own ground forces for their own de., fense. This is consistent with the "Guam" or Nixon'd<i>ctrine outlined in November 1969, which asserted that short of a SoViet or Chinese attack (which DOD agrees are unlikely)" .. ' . we shall look to the nation directly threatened to assume the primary responsibility of providing themanpoweri'or its def~J;ise;" ; ", ,.,: , ,'Thus, ,as DiS. ground forces: elsewhere inA"ia are:,reduced,le,mc siste~t wi,t~ yhi~' poHc,)y<we 'sho,lild' als,o begin, "withdraw, ing the".2d Marme DritlslOn from Okmaw'a:' ''''" " ,',', ,r ' ','

The increashig'capaeity of'the' Japanese B'elf ' Defense Forces to de£en!,,'J apa)' '~glliinsHil1potentiale~emies provides furt1\~r basis for,' 'Atnerlban wlthd'rawal from both Okmawa and Japan. [lheJapanese have the economic "capabilities' to provide' for their 'own 'defense. ',Tapanat present devotes i]\iSS than 1 riereent \')f it!! GNP 'toward,its'own 'defense, compa1'ed ,to 'Ilit'least' 6' percent' for'th~ il)nited,Stateli:'.Tluiile iscertainlyr9omforin~rease. : " I:: ,'f :,<)"(:',,!; :!(}td' ':j,/'~ ", in',-::,j ,

, The' Japanese'iGovernment"seems1to: want, twotthings"-'-U.S: !nWval 'fotc(is in the' atea' lina aS~lllrahMil io£' auppoft lh' tli~' eveiit1@DIlI war 'or crisis;' The J aPltllese w<>uld i 00" h~]'!p:f to I SM the l(j'i8.grounI1' foroes ,vithtlrawn from Japan land Okinaw'lI'. Ftivth,wmorei'tlj(ireaN~lncrea:s­lng pressures in <]aildcsca:rceJllpan' ~oH,heUnlted'!S1iates to.ir~tllrn'to Japan some of its bases. ': . ';l(i"",jJ~I!' '-'l:'til(l)i'41'f,;1''''"q /,:';','!!i\ .

, ,Th.e :~rgu~ent' wi1srai~E1d ?.Yt i~~hind p.;~lI:,befot-e';bHis ~lnmittee that! It' '}s1mportailt fur ItiI11ntaltiJ11)'18. forces,mi J IIp~nl and' Oltma'Wa ,to prevent the Japanese £1'01'1 ~cqlliring nuclear weapon~(rThi,jargum,ent has rio 'basis iri'f~ckThe! \Japanese"Wave h<1t'acquired 'ilucloor,iwelllpl>ns liMa'11Se' they M;lid jljd~d lj;J!itWlt! \votHd'nO'lll1e:in tlJe'bljlltep!'S~,""'i :' ,! , A J!apan,ese threat to use nucleal>:'Welipon§;:dlleto'th\i'small size and high 'popu]atiQndehsltly 'of Jaipah,l'wtluldbe' suicide=~l1rthermore; no ,J apa;nilse El'dvellmhent, fhat!irtli'del thl>. d~ciAlt\n: to' bhHd'rticlleltr werupon's conld'1[<mg sutvi"e in ,thef1tcWofth~ilttense popularre'~tiorrithatsueh a move!:w6u:la,pr~,,"ok~:' 'I! r,11 ';'!llflP~ j. 01, ;,ill- '."·'.,',i,,· ',,', i:i-j',',

, ", The 'l:e~en't £ntOrovel'Iii',j''RVtin~sell\tuclear-p(\Wered frerghterll~lliklng radiilti<llY iscle1tJ' ;evide~c!l'(if'the 'ki'Itd 16'fiin:tllri~e'fuactiQntliatwot!ld.be provoked 'by a 'ITapiinei3\l"'debisioti ttl 'gil; \l.\i~l~a~:' It iS$tl.~1 wa,\ltdedulg around loqking for a port, tq,enter 'l;>'O'Ca1\'sk the J I1pil'ileB~'ate very un- ' ~~PP~,)~,bddt,'l\avjtig }t',I\roun,d, .} 'tlII,:nkllji,"' iJil»ld extl,'~ it sitnil~r; r~a~­~~~~l?~!§0~f rav.~n~~: ~~t,~, ,~? ;jh~~e',', ~(feC1Sio~ .'l6 ','~c,q~ire~u~~r~:

" Tnci;iriiiiUi:Wihk wilfhllrtlWal'Oj'U;8: lalid fOtdesfrom Asia ;1o'I$'il)1" P" O,Jtah',t, tll'kll'e, pc I,ll,' 'rn,ind'thittbY'do)'Hg,,' SO'th, e Utljt",~d',State, S, WO!J,I,dnli1,'t,' i~~ wi~h<lra ~in!\; ~o,n'lPliHHY 'ft'oJjl th~t;.piirt Of' the' ~~trdnor,w;ou~~'*(j f~hh\M;J~\:t~~l~~~~~~y~ct~!in, ,II~ ,def!;~s~,;tlf Itt,Jpqrtanf ;~te~~t~ ,

tr.S.'l'acifi,l"riaval f\')rceswouldii\ln'tlhue ~omaln'tain a po'll'6i1hl ;, ' American fotcelh the area' and ~orlhidable Atne'ridn airlit1;and !lea' ;,' lift capabilities ltive us the, caprubillty to rapidlY,resii)?plyou,r !(ll!i(is, ' ,'" and, ifnecessary,:movetroops'intot4~area. ..,:,_',":- '~" ' ':j ".ld'~::

165

The U.S. N Itvy in the Pacific; to which you alluded in your opening statement, Mr. Chairman, consists of a powerful force of 232 modern shirs. This force is composed of 8 attack aircraft carriers, 3 crmsers, 41 destroyers and frigates, 35 other ocean escorts, 11 nucle,ar­powered and nuclear"armed ballistic missile submarines, 34 attack sub­marines, 24 of them nuclear-powered, 34 amphibious ships, including 3 helicopter carriers, 2 patrol boats, and 6~ auxiliary and replenish_ mentshlps. '. .

Even after withdrawal of American lVound forces from -Asia these naval and marine forces would comprIse'a powerful U.S. military force in the area. ' .

By comparison, Soviet Pacific naval f:orces consist (as. of July 1, 1974) of .some 200 ships, including 6 conventional and·' missile cruisers, 24 destroyers and frigates, 28 other ocean escorts, and 48 mis­sile submarines, 3~ nuclear-powered, and .. 38 atta:iik submarines, 10 nuclear-powered, and' 55 amphibious and Bupportships. . .'

SubstantialU,S .. airlift . and sealift capability g1v~s the United Stabls the ability to rapidly reinforce allies and/or transport U.S,. military forces t(Hroubl" spots,'should the President IInd·the'Congress ,iecidethat this 'is ne<lessary:·The U:S. aimft force consists of 17 squadrons of C-141 and C-5A aircrlLft. This force did not exist rat· alL 1? 'y~ars ag.o. The'r~cen~ r:apid·t~sup:pb"o~]1srael provided ag'rltpJI.. '. Ie demonstratIOn of thlilaJrhft"'apabiht:Y.B~tween. Odtobe~ 13'l\<nd .N'ii-< "emb.e~ 14, 1973, t?e. ,U.S.' Air' .Force<.!poyedappr?!lIiIhately .2~,@OOto.hs of.r hlllitary sllppll!i~' 'and' eqlnpment' wjthout llslngaN '·II;va!l.,blll< 'Mr,

. erliTt. 0-5Aaireraft fleW'J'l"M missions' arid !lNi.rage'd 'apptoltiinately, '" 148;pOOpounds of payload per trip. C-141 aircraft fle'l'li;4~1'Ir!issr,:,hs< . wnil averagedap'pv6:i<unately )4'7,000' rpbUuds.o;f\pdyldad »lit trljl,' ,

One C-5A can carry SOffie 270 fully etjuipped .troops. Thus, if· only· theC-5A's were~arfying't'NJ<)Psit1ll,,1Jl\t~ed" States d(}uld Ihave: trllfls­pprted 'MmdS!: '40\@00mell:fu Jtl)e'Ml\'1:d;11\ Eji/lj;' in' It pliriodojl,i m0nth.: ..

Jru. 'weve. ,r'/for.'the ptit'pllSe of' C.llit~Ylti!(ti'oOj)S .... vhe Aii'. ,Fot<i!'JlisUJl!lly relies on the Civilian Re&erve Air Fleet (CRAF) ",'I:here are some'24ij .ircl'lIif~'iil theORAF' ('70'l"8,DO"8'8, 747

'" "iJd U$lL101s')'wVi"h Iltre

under cOhtraqt to' 'tljeDOD 'au~'inltllne6'fw(t~(ot!J~'fi\lWgericY"eanh~ actiy~ted bY'tM.DODto~a:ny 'tr(>t)~s 'llo. il:d:yl)r!hli1itQ,t'jk~~hi'pment .• iJJl adQltlOn, some 100 more'It'irc'raft"(gr9hl1 'f411"s) '1h!1:Y e66lf'jo!lt'(=:Ri,M·}i1.' ". Jflvll4ditidht<)·. ~l(istihl1lc ... a:(>8!Bi1i~iesl:tM' '.:A. ~.':t" Ill'. " dtt~,(]i'~.·· ft!eqtiesifed

. f~\:lSf?rseve~a]o~ew' pr~¥~r~$)f~ !l!crett~r~~ ca~~~ljjt~~~lt~~~~~~~ •....

• ,,'i' ,,' 8EALIFr F~~CES. '11'., ;.;d/.~~C}i:IJ:!;,~'_')~'J"j".::,:(~ i.'!'

. Since th~ ~arlyl!!l6P'~the ~]»\ted S~ateslia$buiLt~·fl<i~j;:of,62Jjl,otIe-",,p,i., fast !)JIlphlbnms' warfar"l.'sY!\:ps totallng"Sbm".8&. 11.0@0 ... tons., rjJhI8.~,.rnl· '. ~Il<' provides the capabiltityAar; massive' rapid Aimerioa®.t.'inte~~roll abroad. I~ addition, the' United .Sta:tes .wouldbo,Jal>leto,u'rj!i'l'li r~~etr chant marine and rosenve:fleet Srhips III tIme of war,' "'/"" .~"l.\l.(:.".:

" ".'", .,' .Ill' t":' ,!' , .. ' . ,. " L ;. -',' , .,·1 ., . ';". ,"~" "t'

NaVY. am ... ph)b.10US·"s.' ps??"-r-c'--C,-.,,c--,,-c-. ---.-,;H'T"C-+-77"-. ~~V.:·. ':i62, . Trodp-Clli~rtlnl!f oaptlOll\ty -.---__ ~~ ____ .4".".".'"c."_.;--•• ~ • .;~. :lI.!f1ooo

l\Ilerellailtmarine (U~S.:tlag)l:' '1_'( ", ,_ " ,,: .. '< .J,'{i' \~-'

. ~~;:~r;ei~~:==:~~~~==~£::~=;~~tE==~;==~==:j~E~1~:=~~i' ..... ~i!· : ',i-) ;

166

. The United States has approximately 400 freighters and tankers whioh ar'esuitable for long-range military sealift, compared to some 482, ships for the Soviet Union. Compa,rison in terms of numbers of ships is somewhat misleading, however; as U.S. ships a,re generally larger and this is directly t~anslatable into carrying ,capacity. '. Thus,while the Soviet merchant fleet is fifth in the world in num­bers of ships'; it is 'Oilly nil)th in, the ,world in total gross tonnage. The United States, On the other hand, is seventh in the world in total ton­mage. The U;S. advantage in aU1phibi01)s capability is also sub­stantiaL While ;the Soviets' ,amphibious force is capable of trltns­porting only about 9,500 troops at one time, the U.S. 9!1pacity is ,tour times ,thrut+--about 39,000 tnaops at:one t~~. . ,',"" C ' , I mIght pOIilt,out thatrjlCently, III a sImIlar exerCIse,;a full d,V,alon

was moved, by air to ,Korea,il4just 7 days" so Americancapacity;in this area"ofairli:tt,Qs v.erygreat." . ;.', ";,;.' '. ,; ,.

Mr. Chairman" l,think we are atone ,of those. 11ln/que.points in time when Ihany: se.pavate ev~nts cOme; toget/Ier t'\l;n:Hl,lfe pos~ible sigFl,ificant new' directioll.8' in, foreign 'policy. RjlCent; ;oMurrel,lces, 'current il}ter­national ;politica) ,conditions, .1'00no11;1ic cQndLtions, .as weU as pnblic opinion, both at home Mldabroad, all make, this. (In auspicious time for action .... :'/, .. ;; . " ",) 'j ,.', ".-' ,I, _'} ",' " ,"~",!:~,'.

'Wie. h.Qvel ,,<!lmeto l;tnde1!Stan(Uh{l hJl;l'dWI1F .tjIat.·!'ur power to.l.jlf!ul eno$. j>,Y~nts in,ma»Y.l'l'rts of HI~ ,,,;orldis no~,limitIess.We. ought ,U? tl1lfel'&d",antage ,of ,tIns ,undel'$t/tnd)l\g,/tnll, make our extEmsl vell)~el" nllitiolil!a!L .eQmmitment~ more ,~l>:nsi!j\;ent wMl;I, '1l}r,l4rlited reS9urpeSI1!I4, otherprfSsinglnati<lnlthneed~" The is)1gg~~lpn~,,"e ·na ve made wi)l jI'ltp, aelaieve~heseg0ail~.I'h'I';; n ) ;. ';"'1 ; .. , ,:. '1. ';., . 'J'';.

T/Iat IS ,the end 1 9£, JUiY! statement., I i'YO)1~d ,be :hI'PJlY "t,!"answ,~l' ~!l¥ "t'il ,;, .".... .'" . '." . . qNe.S 10 a.(ft", .i~!i( ;,,·t I J~J'! :,j" ~.,j <1_ 11," 'i),')' ,;," I";' .', • I,")

,Mr"Nl)l>,[,;halIk you,vel'\Y.,tnuCl;I,..p~.,,~ea4el"'I'" " "'(1 .. " ').'

. L ~Q,u.ldj!.'ke to. I1I!k:Y!'.J1'''' ... il;\(!I4jnf,!,)1wa~iM.·c;\.oesthe ,ll?lItell.~~.~v,far,WIt­tj,(Jn ;.Center 'have on t~e,,~tatlP.nlng. af I;lI,1C1~1'1', :J\'llI'B<)l\SII,l.i;\outh Kol'(ijl.:1".,,, , '-);';":! . ( I,',~I ,1 ",:'1: -; i -',"{'f';'< lli '1,::if>.I.:'· '~fTP ",., , :

" Mr,:{:.EAl}lORdWeU,i;J'::can; ,qn)yel!\bp~atl\,:prl~iY: !01I" ·the .cQlflw~nt~ '. AdmiraJ I.a· ,~!lpque .1Il~<.le Wecent\y ,\>efore, 11' eO!11m~tw~ p;f the ,Sel\at~. . Wie kuQw, :W!1l1pons are,~tati'i>I).~(l,j;4ere, bjIYa,\1$e, )Ve, kll'1w"tlmy; ",re ,e.ssen , .

. ti~H,Q'v"'riQ!,. ~"w. eapQ!lS s. y~tsm .. ~>it);ltiol1.~Iil). '~.O.'. !;ea." .. " f. "'J; , " "t,! ., b,l,Nluded.~\l m;)"stlltel1lent,tl)'.the ltQl\~.~t John :\L~.Serg~~nt mis¥,1es,

. '.1'),89 ,,I{l\wk and ;l;I\\rf\ule~iltii~~les"ffi4, tl:\~ ~~!J5rll),:tlhl)\,,~r an~,$.'m!lh artIllery guns. All of those are stored m Korea; some, as I salct;qUlt6 close to the truceline., ' ';i .' T I .1" .. "

J might mention a recent'report indicated ona nUIhberoHraining' .x.e,¥,ises ithosei.nuc)e!1r w"'r1teadsweHe'f\own"by"l/<eli~pten rr<'lllll);/Ieir ~1iJg;e' a:\leas up t\\"'fdr\V"D'hba~ w:eap<!p'$inear:the,<truG~;lhje" '{I '.' i "llllllirghtpointoutl'on.t vie'w,i. that that presents!a substan~i!l;l <lilinge!' .. HelieqJpter~ Iia'lle beti,l:(yJ.h<i>wn,to cr~sh; The'dillng.<lr oia inlclean. wea p.Qil accj,dent becomes very,serlousahld:a qiall;teH@:f·gnea6.concern" I.'

,,/l'h~~ehave been a number. of cases ~hereair!1r.l}ft fl!\n!J;~'g l)uclear "'ell.p,li'lilS 1),1Iv.e cra~l<';~, SOm,IiHl the Umted,Stl!it;eI!",:a, iI!1'lilll;y )l>'l\.?PS one ~as 1m ]!>,alam,os, S,Pam, .and al!-'lther I am, £8111111111' W:lth!'N)'O~~ti.nland ~here .~hecon~entlOna! expl":'lt~:.~et..)!lators of t4es~b0I!'Jiy'!li\'ploded, ~~atteI'liJ:1g l'adld\l~tlve pl!l~ol1llt~W?"erlarge areas.,cv,~atWg a.';t11lcleal' hazard t", 'tlios~ peoplell~' tlies~;t;rounpn~g area, Ane1tp}oslOll over Kor~acould bnng on an mternahonal lllCldent.' ,

, ' -4 ::, .

167

Admiral La Rocque mentioned tha,t· he thought there was danger that terrorists might overrun,. might cl1pjJure some of those weapons, or that terrorists crossing the trupe line might capture them. ' . . I can't addanythillg further .to his comments on that. He thinks it is serious" and his military expedence in that /hatter is a. great deal better than mine; . t.must acc~pt his ,j.)ldgment, 011 that. . , , Mr.NllX. In a. reeBlIt, llewsstol'y·'·to which our attention hits been·' directed, ,tilferen.c!J· was ,made. to, .positioning of nuclear weapon~ in close p1io!cimity·to·the S<>uth·North hordeI', protected only.,by. fenCing and normwl peacetime precautions; Do you have anything'to allthenti· cate the.substancB o£that storyl" : . ..: '.' ,,' '"

Mr. LllADER. Mr. Chairman, I would have to ask Admiral La Rocque when he r.etuFns ,to address :himself to that, question .. I thittk it is something he ,has gre!lter expertise on and we would be happy to pro· vide information :for the record, ," " '. ,., .

,Mr .. NIX. Now dOes our o,perationaLcQntrol over South Korean forces commit uS to. an immediate response h~ 'a· future Korean"wflr as. to g,rOlllld troops.? . , : ' . .' '" ..' " . . . . Mr .. J"EADEIl. I think the danger is American officers servillglvith Korean' grotmd units wQmId ,immediately becQ.ffio inv<i>lved .ill such hostilities aIid,.ey,en if the President 1111<1: Congr<jSs decidedi it Were. hot iJllthe,Alnerican,'i/1U}rest: lor, the U:nitEld, States to bilcome .invo],vecl.in sueh. ,hostilities, IWin. k they, wouldi not ,h!\ve thCli{Optionrof, s)Jaying out beffiuse ior.·tbJi:s., trelatiQl1shi Pl· that exists ibet .. een Koreanc<llpwanders a:ili.cl; U,SI" tpoops"Irll.is wouldevli/lttle,pnessure,s. fOI"; f,u.vther;,American involviemelilit.l it! ~)<n:rJJ-i-(;)r_ i, l'II,.t.'hn ':',': i\"IJ:'ll(1 ',\;'"d;J ,',):.;" :'.j:'-, . ,!think.' ,t.he'COliejjrll(.'I.!!.theoP.¢!l>i1~Of'llot. boo~.: mfrngjliiiM?Lv.od,* ... (iuld!be . prec!uded,il\nd: t]¥lII#) )S'ISOIDethmgcwl/intlunk: 'IS sen<msfandd~bmlld,)be' addllesseu:(llj;(1 ).'"'it,,,) ,:,: nl ;:IJ'IIII"::) ",,:{':' ~·I'." ';i" "'j'li:--~,idj "fi--'i-aii(!'.iili

Mr. NIX/bon 't you think, assuming-the placemelit ,of .theseiwI,e 1'""18 I\eae '.the, b<i>rder, b<iLwee;n,S<i>.litlwart4liN ottJ/I Km:eitj; don!t;:i\1ou;thinkithat woul~' ~rie· .aSi a'iW~1'IIMig')t<i> itlle,iN; 'lrti), .II"<i>r~ansl of, a,jm~njl danger and, if It, IS ·i!(j).,coI'E"dered, bij'"thelli\ ;Ishlt ,it 1l<iasonl'ble, itorl1.s$>a!ile.~h.y 'would take defensive actiono! some kind which· would pji,iiiltpiffite donflwt·~, ... ,t"(1L:l"''')li' ,i,_' ""/:".i~l: ':, ((;',(:i li:;)_!! f,,~.\.:l ')jllilil\;!;'O':(;(;)!I'{1

.. Mr. 'Ltll<DERI. Yes" Ji t~,'lis t:r ,urid~r$bW\;!.lwhil&,~ou;("l\~', saj<iI>g" I 't!tink,you ,a;r8l''89ggestihg'tllat tlw." rweaponil! l1)ll1ly,,~~~~IJ!lbe;pteYl\l)a· tIve. ") ,".". ' '.', .!:; •. ; i::J),'!'19:,~ I

'Mr. 'NIX. Yes. . 'r",)ri'~I;:jT ;}l.-ll!i,·,r .. :;(.,

"Mr.;;llEADER, I :would,lItgre,ethat';s· the,ease, It ;s,~.]I>e(jil!tu,.rerue: ,be­Ofj,use .the ,North. Korean8Idollot,~a:1te'thek "'.wa 'Iluolear'.w'eap~rhsi and; were I on the other ,side dfjt.lhaMlluoeIHhdffiltlthe.Norlll1,.,] ",,,ulc1vJe\y, those weapons with great.alarlh. and' 1 wouldlD'eaOlloerned, about: tJIislr presence. AM I thiukthe:p>oint is thoi.t tlrWr.pr,esQ!u(een$'m8Qlire.e'ofiMh· titming"tensidn, las ';SI .tHe' ,phl~ence lof, all',those'Amelii~llY: &lilrceWin", Kor~'o.j,) "''';~'!'() i;,~:;I,,~j"!"'J :~i::;'if),<)'iJH'~>' :l'~~<)' ."h''''-r:f'-:j~<?;f\:i.; ""'::

,Th~ .. ~ o~th Km:~WDSfl\'I\;,,~ mac!e, it!:Nllltrthut, t~eyi'Vlejiv!~!WtJi> res.e'nae . 'OT f<>relgn. forces. I. Il Sout.h .. K.'. orea. as .. ·.ave. ry. ."".' .. 8.,. er ... lOllSprOil' .. ,o.catJon, .an.d.· ... rtrmi!:\l ,be 'tilr!lJt ttM. \l!iw.l,eit'l'(l\v~li::fij\M.~d..iIfr~;Jlflll(Oes':r.ilJt$M~;·ID>r~, ,. '. are;jl~91'1:4ngltlr~r~aiogWSf~~!I~'tt1iIIll;,*q:'t'~YEfgO!l!g"'M'ibet:meW1tl(te . twogovennlIlents. . '" ,'; ." " , . ,~

Mr. NIX. Whatijustification hllllbMti ilffered.£Qrour MadJlllamjDhib •. ious· xorc!\$ .t]:u~~.a~e.on Okina",,,,Ln a ;forwlIord 1mstl!;)!lQsition ~ . Uo:they seek.~:tbr:1u8ti:6y'.ll!,j,'" l:, ': i;';" it..!:!" ,;;1 ,{" .'!;:~·Ii"'! l'·;,h~U·J.(','T/\i') '" I".!'~

Mr .. LEADER' 'Yes, as I.indicated· in mY"statenient, th:1!''P~rl:tait()n

168

emphasizes these forces are there to reinforce other Ameriean forward­based troops elsewhere in Asia. In other words, they are there to re­inforce other American troops in the event of hostilities. They are there to make possible rapid American intervention in other Asian countries, >tnd we think that one oLthe major problems of American foreign policy in recent years has been rather excessive reliance on force, and we think the temptation for rapid intervention Ihight be reduced and leaders of Congress and the executive branch, which have to make im­portant decisions about whether tb intervene in a particular crisis, might have more time to consider their responsibility if those forces were not so readily available and so poised for quick and immediate use. •

. Mr. NIX. I, for a long time, have listened to the justifications offered by our authoriti~s, people in control, and for the life of me I am unable to understand the reason for it, the threat faced, by 'this country that brought this activity into being. lam unableto understand the benefit to the Ameriean people that ensued as a result of these activities.

Now, perhaps because I am not of the military I could ,be pardoned. for lacking the wisdom to understand the complel<ity o~ their moves, but I find that I think as moSt Americans think it can be said that ,the majority of the American peopllPoand I 'place. myself among the. majority-are so uttetly stupid that we are meapableof understand­ing the wisdom o:tl.'their actions. But T can't understand; Nor,cah '[ nnd~rstan,d w~y thliproposails made by this subqd,mmittee\ th~rl~u8'" gestIOns for Withdrawal, 'are not twken 'and' acf!ed '"peN 'and<why,m other years those proposals have not been advanced by the'mi~ifury,

';J1,'know, oml, :thing, It· is becoming'i'!lbreasingly,diflicult to ",:,hvince tne, Corrgl'essthat,the funds n'e!)eSSM'Y' toc",l'ry! 6ut' the pillin:s' of the milit!tv'y in this area, increasinglydiflicult to h~vethe Congr.esscleciile t-o'Turrtlsh,thattnolley.' ';,.', ,;"_\fl::i;;!-,~'i ,il1'l:iH"i. 1: l".~j :ii'

And it' lis"mi,belief tha~ this' ",;q'1,ooitl:i'e;1npst.dif\\cult'y<lar;0~ la1l to~etthe @onp:ress'to Itgreel~~ wpifr0ri!lia~'.frtiI1).ds !or.these:pur\>bses, Now, thwu shOUld spur the Ill!Jhtary'to' P0f3ltlve 'actlOn such as we 'are' sugge.stiU'~. :; t'_:, -(,:)J'" <l't ';""'"k' ,'i,: 'IP J'-' 'd' i" J ,!IJ,\r-~,'_'

But the only.thing I get from them is answers to questions designed, , to pTolengthe' agony~ I d@n't'tn,ink it is going ~o be ,pl't!>longed.' If:, . Mr"Leadll1l;I'wo:tit to thankYGu ~y luuch for'amost,·constl.'uctiv6 presentation., II , ..

Mr. LEADER. Thank you. ",(. Mr. NIX . .rt~rtainly gives substance, greater'snbstance~tothe pro­

posal thissubconimittee and th .. ,Foreign ,Affairs GOtnlnittee for that matter, has been advancing over 'a' periQcltO£ time.' .,

; '(1hank you very much. " ; 'I ,,;,.;, ;., . ,.' "" ,

Mr.LEADER.·Thankyou,siT •. ,' .. ;','r': ;,' ",.;.".1

. Mr. NIX. Onr'nextwitness is Dr. Richard:Walker, director of the Institute oflnternational Studies of the University of So nth Cal!olil).Qi

Again I lWelcomeyou, Dr. Walker,and y~llmay,p1)<iceed, sir.i',.rr " ,,' _ -" .< 'In .. , . , "',." ,"

.. STATEMENT ,OF RICHl\RD.,;W>ALXD,. D'fREGTOl,t,lNSTITUTll< OF INTERNATIONAL 'S:rU;\)lES)UNlVERSITY"~F 'SOuTll:CAltOLINA

or', " ", .BIOGRA'PH.Y! ,,_ , .

Richard L:-v\Tallt€'ttJs the .ta:mes 'F. Byrtl€S"';Prof~ssor of Infurnaotlon~l'Relat1ons and the Director of:~.the' Institute of International StudieS, at"'tihe' University of South-, Carolina.

Dr. ~alker is a specialist In, the history, politics, and D')-ilitary strategy of East Asia and has been connected wIth the affairs of that: areR since he first served there with U.S. Army '1ntell1gence during WQrld War II. He has travelled to' Asia 011 numerous occasions, both for the United States Government and in his capacity as a schOlarly resen·reher.

Born in Bellefonte, Pennsylvanta. he received his Bachelor of Arts degree from Dl'ew University, a Certlftcnte·in Cpinet;e Langnage and Ar~a:8tudles from the University of Pennsylvania; 'his 'MRster'of Arts Degree ~n Far Eastern and, Russial1 Studies and his Doctorate in International Relations (.1950) "f.rom Yale University. \

'Brofess91' "~alker has been associatecl with ,the U),dversity of 'SoU~h, Carolina since 1957 an4 was n~med to the, James F. 'Byrnes Chair (the first endowed chai'!' at the, UntversitY') in 1969. He was an Assistant Pl'()f~S$Or at YlJ,le (1950-1957),; visi.ting Asso~iate Professor, National TaiW'an ,University 195'~··~1955-),; ,visiting, Professor, 'univern1ty of "\\jashington ('1{)59 and 19(5);;, Profes$Ol' 9f Political Alfalrs,. N.atlonQl WaT College, Wa~hi!lgton, D,c, ,(1~1961); and visiting Researcb. Professor, Academic',Sinctcll (Academy of ',Sciences) , Taipei, Taiwan (1965-1966)', .,'" . . .":.

,Professor Walker is the author 'of-, ten' books; 'a contrf.butor to. tnor~l than thloi-ty .others, and has pubUshed numerous articles'"and-r reviews, ,'O;n ;{JChol~rly, ,and pOll~lar jom~ll!\ls, His books Include. phi'1":pn<ler OO'l''I'''ms'l'''l:1y1 F/ir~1 J;',ve Yea}" (1005), The OMua Danger. (~(l66.)" an<iffiost recen-tl~ I'rb8pect8i" 1M Paclfic (1972)·, " .'., , ,.. ' c,.,. . 'C': ':

Dr. -W'alker ifnvell known national1y'a.IM as a'iJecturer and"fOli··his apt>earan<!es .011 natioIia:lj,inedia .. 1111972, he 'was apP:9-iilted',as.~Visit1hg :LequuIW" &t the,D~­pll:;,tment o:f State'~, #,qre~gJ!1 ,~erv.tce, ~n~titu;te ·iJ} ,recogn,ition ~~: !'h1~', co~tt1~uH9!l tt;l ,the educat~on~~"pr.:p$ra~ ,~'d>,the D~n~'t;tm!"\~t., I:n 1970, he :w~s pres,nted the Air Univei.'Sity Awti-r,d' for 'lils 'i.ontstd-rtding .',c6ntt;1:butlons, to Aft Force profes-~lionaleduea1!ion.'f";"J ',I~'''''i'j~ ii' ,

,The U~lwers1ty,',ijt/S'o,uth 'Ca,-roUnal4l;VQf,*"so.r ~rveS"a.sj an aqvlsoJ:, a~d ,con­su.·.ltant,to"I\U. Ill .. ' s. rOpS.edUc.~uo~al and' .. p);o~. e.,. 10. n.1 o.rg~l)i .• at!ons. ,II. e IS .. ' Illem. ' ber .of t,he AC'9J1!DI~. A<lvl~9ry C9uli~Il'0~ blie',Q~nt~,f!5r' StrategiC ana lnte,· 'MUon.\' Studles"'6f G~ol'g.tQwn: unlverli!1:J>'l'of' ilr. 'Ii!ful'Jl~6fe""l.onaj. Oouncl/. fo.r International Security Affltirs of .,the National Strategy, Inform'Jtti{)ll ,Oenter'j,';of the Aa"'lsol1YBoard ,<if. theiJ'ohn'IIl\,K.wnt(dy,'Illi!.l/tnt~ for l\11l1tl>.rf,.,AsHjstance; an<I·I~. a. member of. ~Jie .. B.qar!1 Qflill ... ""C~1 )Ii~. ,of p .... U1l1etou8 national, orga.I1l •• tiq#." \vl,tIl interests in China "arid As'ia;J~ci ~lJlt':th~ ,~at1otial ~~m.m~#e~ ~n "q.,~'.­China, nelations. He serves as a Gov~~J 'm~pt c,onSov.ltant on'm:atters relatin,g"'to secnr-it:r :and int~:t1t1onal relatio'rts';il'1!-t11~1:P8:Clftb-'ftre;a~ < ',' , " -,' '1'. :.': 'f,';' \

Professor Walker, ·10 married to the, flil!lne~ ,C~liiM ;Ken)~;and. ~e!llde~ lit 700 Spring L!l~e R,oad'iq~N,~bl-a~.soVVl:t qafO'li~~{1< ", 'j,': , ':t.>?:'\ "~',;-,:,:; ., :" (\

Mr. WALKE\<, Th~nkyo,!, ¥r, Ohairman: ,. ' ,<:c~",. ,. '" r I, too, cOl'lslder ,t"o;. prlvilege to sho;Te: with, the.£ubcommlttee' on

Asian .and,lPlI.Cific :Affairs a few ,thoughts. ah!>u6Ainerica's .trans­;Pacific relartii<ins.These observations· are the ,result ef 11l0rethan ,a· year of travel, consultation, and residence in East and Sontheast Asia duro hig the past academic year, from' which I ·have ?ust retUl'lled, During that period r·had opportunity tdtalk with local lenders 'a,&,we:n as American representatives. ' . ..: 'i • lce;rtainly a~~<with yQ~, Mr:,Chairml\ill; on:the necessity for con­

scant mfomnatl0n: and <scrutinY on, the part,.of.our ,Congress as . to"the disposition of Our· forces and our commltmentsa)broad: '., .: " .".:

1:Il. yow i'ivi:l1; Mr; <Dhairman, : I 'na vB',made J:!lY"Tl!pIllIL'li!l sOmew h,at of a,geJllera;l ,ba"'!>gOOund ,nature· so .thiit we· clirlexplor~ Isem. a;tHhe, specific issues. ,! , ',',' !-,i, ,\d~',":)'

, ,llIJ seems to me ,our security structure 'was fashioned two,decade!l,ago in the wa;ke of a number of events ancLforceil'which'Calmei(l)1owding upon theVnited States inthe:immedi .. te post-World Wa~I.J I'stiod. The AmeriCan response to those events'alld fercesiwaB;prediCatednpon the assumption that our countvy's: eClimomic',,,nd Eltbtegic' future 'was going to be linked closely with the l'!tcificbasin and thl>t regionalsecu· rity andstllibility in the Western ~acific was essential to our national

.,)

1'10

:purpose. N othing tha~ .has happened in the inte~ve!,iIlg two d~cades has changed that pOSItIOn. In fact, we are ,lUore mtImat<}ly bound up with .the peoples across th!\,Pacific now thiinwe were two decades ago. Upon the stability and security of our allies and tI'ading partners ther.., the United States is increasingly dependent., , , '

By the tlii'n .of the decade, l\1r. ;(jhairman, four .of our largest trad­ing partllers-oalld weal''' the ,greatest trading nationccwill 'j:>ePacific powers. '

It is eaSy to forget the many factors which led to thesystemof alli­ances and mut)}1\1 8eC)lrity,ProgralUs whiCh wer<!iashi.oned. then.:rhe~·e was widespread Commumst-ixtspired,insurgency,Jn Eastlllld South: east Asia ; Mao Tse~tung's forcesiiaid justachieve<1 wictory ,in 'mainland China and had'joilled in 11)1 alliancewit4 Stalin's Ruasia ; overt aggres­sion in Korea,'where Commtiilistforceij'made an ill)pl'essive showing against the United Nations command,had revealed the weakeneil state of American c0nventional power,. ", ' , " ' ";"

I ititerruptf.ora minute,"lM'r.'Q~~,irman,to r(lmind ,}'6u'that many people argued in the late fal1 of 1949' and the 'early spring', of 1950Wat the North Korean fo~ces"would,'not ,attack, that the, foro,et\!,in South Korea were' strONg Ilrloug'k And"abthe time on June 25,']95Q, wil;m 'North K,' oreal,l,~lo.rc~,s: stru, e, 4:, ,~\l, ~!r;,th, ere wa81,lO,tyn~ Si1\g'I," ,comllfl1t­ready U.S. dWISlOn,m t4e \l9ntHl,~nta~ Vl,llte~,Sj;~pes andthere)V:as only one then on Okinawa, a Marme d,vrslOn, m tile W:eilt\\!;n PacIfic.

'l'he subsequent hearing'S <1ond\,c1led ,by ,the DiS. Congress bvoughtout ,ve,ry de,,,,rlg thatt~eW:i~hd5a'*lf~pf[tl:8'P6, )V~~1,',~, ,.Jl. j1t~~~'p'i~,O~¥/ll.M\l:er UI, the 2yel\rnJ)ef~f,~, l!),llq)laq., f1l4,e,e,<1,,'I:i~el},&n(il?~\'::~!Wf~atH\iI:, wW()J,1 hfl(d·.been <'tiilWn. ;' '.";"~':',' : .. ",~!,,'d t'( !<'Ii, 'f '\T'l;'irI ,1Ifl!T'~' -':,1,.; -. '-',:'

, "Oommunist' £orce6' ha;d'gal!,etr'alSignlffiaanlt 'Vic1\0'1'Y ,0;v'8r1;he French ih '~n'd!dcl\ih!t'" '3 apan stil'l ij, fOl'ffildreliIe 'pdte~ttiaHeader f1irmoderni-'lI~tioh \1\ ~he,d#~a,.wa~,,"\laJl: an:i\~~l?p~e<;l. , ' ,," :"", '.,' . ",

In the face 01 what wel'ethen Jl'4\ther ,pr,etllntiQus Qlaim~ and ,threats by the Si:n:o-$oviet leadership, _~eXpr8SSlldlhlleter)ninationto provide a structure for1:egional security: 'Flrst;'there"WasJlili.!l'negotiatron of a series of alliances and security treaties: With the Phmp,pdnes,signed on August ,30, 1951'; with Australia and New Zealand Si~0d,:onSeJ?tem­bert, 1951; with KGrea signed on October 1, ~953; Wlth'{fllpllrn SIgned March 8, 1954, and 'with the Republic of China on 'I1aiiiwan, signed December 2,,1954. '.' , , ' " '., ",

Second, the U.S.elIlbarked upon progtams of military assistttne."ior building the capacities of the~rallles to,uesisttlile type'ofttggreSsilm represented by Korea. ' " " ',i:'

Third, we organized our"own forces ,and baseg.;;.,as theonlyrea.lly strong non"Communist power in the arear-,-.s" that, we would not again be caught short. " ,,' . ,'" ' , lrourth, we initiated a program for training liJ.ltheUniMd State's of

alJiedoflicers,so that problems of langnage. aild :adaptation to the weal?'?ns systems we were usin$' could be in part overcome.

FIfth, we'came to realizewlth the'passing of time that some,of'the , very'militllrry forces and leaders We-were training could Iluovide'some of the necessary skills for economic de"elopment and modernization.

In pact; we have witnessed the coming to power of military govern­ments in the world, where not alone we, but where we ,have provided military ilssistance. '

171

Behind-the progl'amswhich thel.D;S., developed :weresomefrequently une,xamined assjlmptions: That the United States.would be able,to,sus­tain its commitment ,and th~'thrust necessary"for it; that the Commu­nist chl1llenge would:dontinue in th(i same:manner; that thegoVJ;rn­ments of what we called the free world, faced with a monolithic threat, were bound to cooperate;' and that suchco'operation could' be built among allies.' " ." "" . :' ,,:' . . .

For at least th" first decade ,our. additional assumption: thl!>t oUr allies would be each,othel"sl!>llies and that the United States,atthe center could create a'regional security system, Seems to, be borne onto Certainly these ToUr bilateral pacts and the .trilaterllil.ANZUS treaty seemed to prove a viable structur,,:durillg th""initial Btagesof the Wll;r in Vietnl!>m. The Philippines, ·Amstralia, amI Korel!> provided forc.es for the effort. American bases in .Japan, .Okinawa, ,Tll{iwan, and,the Philippines sustained our commitment over time. :And the general command and strategic. direction .was veste'];.jn:,the Anaerical1iil!j,S 'leaders of the a1liancestructure. 'I;.'",', ,,"

Today the situation has. changed dr8Sticl!>lly, and;there is;Il;,needto reexamine oUr: whole strategicpostu'Fe in'the WesterniPacifl",.:I cer­tainlyagree with yon on this score. .. " ' " "", "

,It hardly seems necessary to mention the dranmtic changes of the Paflt·decade, Speed of tralnspbrtancl. th,,:communications l1eNlution as weH as the ,dramatk:a;cl,vances .. in missileteohllology pl!>ll for. the elimination of . at. le!j,$t s01ne<dIlteUectual inertia ·in. strategic planning. The ihtensi.ts, 'oJ)rthe' Si!llo;.S?~iet?ispu~ 8II!lddt~spiU?veD interm$ oi, thellc<)mpetlt.1vel!hltente'l?",hc1es\<l>f' M~.caw and. ,Pekmg, havete!,dB!! to ma)tB,il;llled' boorr~ratlon seem less"for,thcommll".A generlJ,~101)W '~h!llhge·, colllbinedwith nelv;expressions;.o.I;nationahsm, has tendMtto make'region,,;l coopetlation seemless forthcoming., Reaotion, to, Vietnltm amohgsome ",f our allies as wellas within the United. States now ,rltises questi~ms I!>bout the desirability. ,ortlilecredibility o;fhthe AmeriMn commItment. ·,T-.!:." -' :.) .: !,.' ~ ~', ,Y_' _ ... ',: ;il:' ,_ -I'; :'_

An' examination, of conditions· in the Western .Pacific ,atpnesent c~ , ' leM' only to the conClusion that some imag\nativeinitiatives;politi9W as well as military, are called for in the immediate present. The follo;w.­ingpropositionsare advanCed as I!> BUmma:IJY of the ,current situation in an alliaMe structure'which 'Was,@LlCesofull of promise: '. . '

First, the United States,today holds, the resl'onsibility for dafenill' relations across the Pacific which none.oHtsalhes will 'allow t<il beiPut together for constructiveregiono:>l plannin~. i :... "",, ,,';

What I mean by this, Mr. Chl1irmo:>n, ,1S thl!>t the United States is responsible. I am not including in mystl!>tement the. matter of SEATO, or our relations with South Vietnam, or Thailand,· but ,we are resl'o,"" sible in a bill!>teral or trilateral alliance systemAor the fate p/;' six countriesorte.rritories~ _ . .' ',c,,;:,,;r .

.. Now, ihve e"l!>mine,we fincl. thl!>t the~e,can be practically noc()ll:pera­tion built hetween J I!>pan and Korel!>. The J apll;Ueseare sufficieli!,tl~ sensitive over their relations with Peking that .ther!!., is nO';Wl!>yof putting together cooperative plannin/\ betwoon: ,Jl!>pan and Taiwan, norindeed between Taiwan andthe Philipl'ines. """

Second, desp'ite thecontilnuing ~m1ll1tment by ,hoththe Soviet 'UnioniJ-ndtha !I?oople's:Republic of China to cadre training, destl>1:)il­izing policies, WI!>l'S, ofuQtionl!>l liberation, .. and p,0litical;QP~lItio.l\s

,I, ';'J j' :.~

172

there is less threat perception !1l1d,less .feeling of deference to the United States in mattel'S of defense. ! . .

. 'I:hird, American baseii, and the presel,ce of ~merican forces, have become issues of concern,in:everY country in the ofi'shore island chain inthe Western Pacific. . '.', . ". .

Fourth,' American p(l}licies of detente toward .Moscow and Peking have seriously ,u!'de.rcut the politi?al support .oft~ose ve.ry l~aders in .Japan, ,the Phillppmes, and particularly Au~traha, which IS one of the most s()bering situations in our trans-Pacific situation .. TheY have sustained their countries' alliances with the United States .. This is ~P"':iall~" .. trt(e, ;given 'w, hat is perceiv~. d. to betr~nilS'toward is, o. l!l'tio,:,­'I$m m t· . United States m. all ,allied countries. Many perceIVe m America . "weariness with Asia." The phrlUle, "No More. Vietnanjs" sounds lottd alld clearin allied lands. . • '. , ' ;, Given th~i history of the past 35 years, ~ven the growing impor­tance· oiKorea, Japan, Taiwan, the Philippines, and the ANZUS powers in the emerging Pacific community.of trade, .commerce" and culturalinteraction with the Unjted,~tates, given the as Yet unre89lved problems of divided cGuutries, the UlI>tedStates ueeds to reaffirm more than ever ite commitment to Tegionai cooperation in matters of defense. Given the parlous stateio£ our alliance system, this will requite indica­tiOns of new initiatives at tM'highest,levels of our Goverument .• ",,: , Mr: Chairman, jtseems to me 't~at, wecaJilllot ~al?idly di~l!g;agl':0ur­selves· from commitments made w>thout,undermllIJfigcCuedrb(h~Ylu ·an ,age where we h~ve opeJi~dU:I?'<Jommuni9Q11;iOl!liin'a Il1!lw,:w~y with,the ;People'si Republic <:>f Chllllll"tl11 an ;age Iwheue,we 'l'Jj~ worluug"toward 'd<ltenM"with Moscow. It is Ijnter<ishing W 1"ote th/)'t both.M(jIl<)!C".y,an~ Pekingr~~ize the stabililzing,pole<1lf a U.S,presence in.aW~stevn P,at\ific,th"t has become so viJllidly relil;ted fu OUlI'OWIl fu~ure. '... ..'

" Our presencewilVbene<lessary until'such(tinie'/)'s,th'We is 'a,h~is:for Ist)ni"meanin~l regiona;l cooperatiOJ:tiJidefensil.l, ", . .. .::,

The situatIOn in the People's Republic'of Chiua,''l'hich cel&hpated ,its 25th'birthooyyesterday,iil far from,SclJtled. And,1Jil"nian~.re~pects ·the contihUittion of'deten~e depends:,upah a contiuuatioll,oi ,th68ino-Saviet diSpuM. ' ""', . , " "L :',."

We need to pay nde'luateattention to the security.nnd needs oithe middle and smaller powers in,a11'itroo ofthe warM where there are still thr~e"destabilizing divided' countrie$j, 'The IU nited States is still the maj·6rforceiorstabilityin'the,area. ,I':" ',;.1 '," ,.

Precipitate action would most underniiJil" OUT cred]bilitYf The U.S. 'forces do ilustain our corilmitment., ", " ,": . . . , , Leaders that ,I: have talked to do ,heHeve thitt,oufground forces ,are a suo\l"SsfuI4rip-~i~" 'ina!, area oHh~ w0r!dthaUa still fraq~ht ,'wi!h

. ,danger; The orlgms'ofmsurgehcy mAsla do not necess"rlly, he m . poverty but lie in.the training of insurgent-leaders. . " """ '.''Iiitgtlee:with the statemento£ Mr. Leade:J!thatthe,time is ,at haJil,d'ror '\L!Jae.Wl,jook'atsome mWitary Uisp<lsLtionSi .£or,a, new look",tI tJl.1J.@rgani­"zruti0n ofoui dl,fense strU<lture,' Our commllinder in;chl.eMn,th'e Pacific, ,CINCPAC, sits:in'dIarge of 'an orga>ifillation'and look'sout:at,liuked forces which are not linked~rid really ,don't exist except as It'tmitex­:cepb'fol>#Jile:U:S. p.resence'inthat·part:ofmhe world. . .".: '. ,', " I w"ulaol:ie remiss: if ,I did, ho~ ~etum'ito'tl\eisSae ;/}~'K(:)rea;,a.mucIh Il!lisunderst. Ood'c(:)un~ry"and·'a corin'ttywhici\ sitg"inthevortex oHhe recentchnnges in the Northeast Asia-Northwest Pacific aroo.

173

The situation in ,the Republic of Korea is tense. This is no time to throw out the baby with the bath; though I join with "number of people who disagree with "nd deplore someaotions'of poli,tical oppres­sion, this does not justify and precipitate action which might eyen further destabilize the Korean area.

I recall a Stltte Department {lonference he1d. in· 0ctober1949 where the 'wort.J;' w'as ,about the oppressive regime in Korea and the urgi/lg wasthltt,the Americans get out, , , , ,

This was by one of America's leading, so-caUed, specialists or ex' pertson East Asia. The North Koreans read the mood in the United 'States, an~this obvi<:>l1s1y 'J:t!l\<l. sOlll~thing; to ,do with their ,,:<Jtions. ,,'

I hope m your dehberatlOnS,(Mr, Chltlrmllln, that you wIll contlhue to look at the relllltionship in the' longrun between the ovel'all credi­bility of the U.S, commitments and>hllw its loss might precipitatll ac­tions which could only lead to fiuith~r violence which our forces h,we sought to "void.',' , ,i '

Th"nk you, " , ',' ,'" , , Mr.,Nrx, Thank you, Dr. Walker, , N6~,itis going ~o benece~ry'forlile to recessth~subcommittee'!or

the purpose of votmg;,That Will mke less than lO'Imnutes, nut d\!Tlng the recessjic'IVould like you to considet.uhis,: ,,' ' ' ,:) ,", , . ":Obviously tire 'basis which supports or' dill su ppart out'<jonlmitwen~ has been seriously er.oded in those countries. It woulru'sM!llito m~,ob­v!iouslynecessary'!-ndlsh\>1,Ild h,,:ve been necessary' f~r@Qme~iin)e past, ';fb~ GUr Governmenn:to 'reexamme,ewH of the, cOmmItments ,,'11'(11"001<­iliinine'the situatioriit\s it, noW' exists ahd, havingdon.!'So; offer another !basis f"r ne/foti:aWms;and ¢o~~mim.t't~<th?se nati\>ns. ", , .', " , I would hlfuybuto!o:d"I"",:the;commltteeas toYi'lur thmkihg a~ to

what this Gove11lment'should ,do in. the way ofcpeating the climate for hew commi~ments; and when thatllhol1ldthe doh~. ' , " , I declare a recess,giving us' the opportunity to l\lake this vote.

, "Tha;nk you,verymuch," , " " , ' '. [Abriefrecesswasllli;]fen.] ,," '. ' ,'Mr.,Nix. The snbaomlllittee'will'cometo order,

You may proceed, Doctor. ',., , , ' Mr. WAiLKER. Thank you, Mr.Clhairn:ran: j, '" " I

, ," You asked ahoUt'the re'ex_in,ing ~)l"ourcommitrll<lhts. r tJiiinir6ur :conllllitmen~, as' regards, forc~ir'and 'tl\'~ projection,rond stationinlt of 'our :forces sh@uld be under consmrltPe'ex:alrtlnatiom' '" ", 'Ii'" ',' ',N "''IV' when. we negotiate away ;<l()mmltments that we'jliavem!td'e is!]' ,very t&i:tchy;avery sensitive Subj'eiltb<lllallsWij'tc()Ul<;l:1ead to,miscal­culation '<in the part of poten~iaf~PP'Qile\lts,Jpart~6t1laNy in divided countries where tensions rUlYv&y"!Ji:igh:Ahd''itcoIl1da:lso lead to an undermiriing<'I>,Naith i11<>ur hredipility. """', ,,' , ' ",N evettrreless, :the th1iust of my 'prepared, ~tatelileIlt;Mr: Cha,irlfitll1,1,', is that.the time is at hand for'!i'rethinkingof onr'dil:fehss cOlI)mit'n1¢'nts, rethin:king'ofollr force depli>yillen1iin such'l!! W\iyas~to eljCoutage, as is part o:iJ,the Guamdoctrlu<!'pqt in self-defensebtit hopei'lllly am:m'e meaningful re,giGmal cooperation.,', " ,'i' "" ,',,'

, It is very difficult to get any of our alIiestb ,think beyond theirhor­ders or think in region!\l terms or, think be;y-ond the' commitmehHhat the Unjted States bears for them, whichwe!\greedisa veri e!(pensi've 'commitment. : ",' ,I'll, ')

, ,-' - , 4i;i.~27~7~·L12 :,'

174

Mr. NIx. Dr.Wa,lImr, I get the impressiQn that every cQmmitment entered. into at any time by a sQvereign sta,t&'-and I am speaking Qf the United States Qf Amer;cafirst-ha,s,been'entered into with a view to. serving,the interests Qf the cQuntry committing itself. '

Now, I get theimpressiQn that countries.a,reca,liQused when it comes to. breaking commitmepts if those cQmmitments do'nQt serve their best interests.·,'", ," '( ,

The questiQn then is whether these commitments serve the best inter-ests Qf America, as theynQw e"ist ! "'" " ;' .

MI". WAI,KER.That' may I'll' may nQt,be the question, Mr .. Cha,il'man. The questiQn might better be whethl'i' a precipitant breaking Qf It CQm­mitment WQuld hur,t, the U.S. interesl;$,mal'e", . ;:,1 agree with. you , that the UnitBd States makes its cQmmitmentsin its own best interests and those. intenests do. change, hut there are many factQrs that have to be, weighed,M)d it seems,tQme,that the U.S. inter­ests are best served at this time by.m!1intaining a PQsture which Cl'ea,tes credibilities and trust in QUI' positiQn Qncte taken.' " "

N QW, this dQes not mean that it,@aJ1riM: b<inegQtil,teiL Qr changed. And ,I think. ,we ha,vedisplayed withha: the past several ~ear.8i'a 1'air am@unt,o:ttj,e"ibili~y,. "'. "',': ' ' .. ' , , '.'" .r", ""i'

I realiz"d a great J1umber o£;@u"mil>taryopPQ~ed the return of Okli,­~l\Mll~ t!il.J,~pa,n. We. ,ljave <!lolle thatluflflwe aIfe reducing base.eommit­m.enta m.,Japan, :,,' I ,';, , ", .', i",,' '. "'/' ,

, :th~i\questiQti that' really ' GQmBS up is at what, point .doesth~ with­dra,w~~ ·of 'JiI,S., deployme!1tsac~,the Pacific ,wh!lr" we, are intimatl>ry inv",1v,e~.,ltt wh~t'PQil\t, doeS it,pec,ome ,a destabillzhi~factor ,in imlit­mg mIlitary actlPn 'on the ;part'e£, ,th~lp,eoJi>lel ,Wh@l' like'the leader;<,f North Korea, lll;\ght. llQtalwa:ys, be.8ubjwt,tQ,rationa,1 dictates I, " I

Mr. N,X. I cMilt help, but think; .wQnder, ' rathel1j what effect the maintenance of these commitments 'WQuld'ha,,,e'Qn the,econQmy of , the United States because ,,£ th<>,c0st to the Al)lericallpeople to maintain. our commitments in the event Qr after study al)d,a~aminati"n w.fQund that the cost to the United States was nQt pX<lp<l>rtionate to the benefits accruing to. the United· States ·b.ca,use,of the. commitment, then, they" QUjl;ht to. be disbanded. I ," • ' ;'

Mr.WAIJUlR. Well, Mr. Cha:irma<l),l,sQme,.@£thesecostsandbenefits, are v"U' diftWu~t to measu;rei~Xhe, p~'!Ilence' of ,the. ,U.S.commitm.ent, the,. presen,ce Qeu.s. ,fQrces, i~.,l~hiiXl atJn the,long, periQd has,been in large part r-esPQnsiple if~r.the stlYPiJity whieh.has,lrta.a'l'possible'the .r apallese eCQJ10mic miraole, ,thereaJly I'llrnarka:pl., ,e(l911omiq,. pmgtess in South, RQrea, ' and the reallY' ,remarkable,developmentin,,1JaiwaJ1\ wjlich lchave observed il\01 three, c()untries sincethe~lld ,0£ :\Vorla War nQn many visits 'and residences the~e.

Now, hQW yQU cost aCCQunt this I gpn It k»ow" put, th@sethteecoull­tri~~ a,re,amQngth\, hest cllstome~s th~ .Ul)ited,States ,has ill the wQrld.

,Ja,panis QUI' 8illl/:le.be"t aver-seascustomer.' '"'' Now, if the haldingupofa military Mield has helped to make this

p~si\>le, :the,lll don't kl\QwhQW;yQU cost. aCCQunt ,tha,t a,gainst the yea,r-tQ-yea,rdefellse,cost,andlthmkithas... (,C, ,', , .. "

Mr, N,,,. Then I believ~,th'ltthe .department Qf GQVeImment having contrQl Qf these,commitroellts,whQ makes.these commitments, ought to be the Person to a,nSwer my questiQn., , ',"

It oCcur-s ta me that J a,pall brQught a miracle. It is said that they wan the war and by SOme standards, I suppose, that could be justified. But,

175

nevertheless, since the w .. r they got from uS a nuclear umbrella pro­tection. Their economy has just soared beyond belief. They are rich, secure and We are getting poorer and more insecure. . ' .

That is why they didn't win the, war in the sense that they lost any-thing at all, or at least! can't see that they did. " . What do you think ofthat,'sir! 'Mr. WALKER. Well, the factors behind the Japanese miracle involve

more than just the'creative'destruetion·of.the war, the bet that they C<'>uldstart with new'plants and not obsolete equipment. There is much hi theJ apaneiie ability to work, or organize, the fact that they are able and willing to uSe the seas which,'~on~M~and 'know that)and divides. . 'Most'of,us are !i0t :aware ofh?w, mtlm!ltfJly weare connected I:y way oHhe sea. It IS stlll'chllape'r'lntihll'year oTouy'Lord 1974 to ship tons of coaJ'in great,quantity from HllJII1pton RoI\di through tMPan­ama Canal than it is to ship it by rail'rba'd to Plttsbitrgh,Pa. '

So, there are many reilsons oohin<iL the Japanese economic miracle. 1tisti'Ue that they havelreen putting 'less th!ln'seven'tenths ofl per­cerrt into defense, and it is true thltt the United States has prOVided sMurity. But this is 'a,mutital thing'with theJ apanese. .",' " We have had bMe$·j"i'Japan llit relativeiy'ehoopcost and i~{most ~f 'these,d<lfe'(lSe" al'rahgeme!lts"aCfpS!1' the, PaCific there has been afalr 1lJi'n0)ii1t: of'jriutjlllili1iywl1ith' has1iei)?ed' to\{uiItj.llup to ",hat tWe. J aplt- '. ~ir. M'." ~.eferi!O".:Mfot.·~' tlie' .. gtea.' t ... i~rr(,.r~Y:.'crhntllii !I~. aF!lqific.· . iJb,Jrl.m. )in:l~,Y ... '.' l':f:U.S: ~Thittn"JJ.ts.'ltid l)';S'.ldeplo,YnientS 'i\.'a\l~Hellletj. .. h\'t1i,~ c'tea­a,tlOA 9fthIS"-anrl I heliev~ ~J' have over~hep~st'J.uarlerof ,ll oo~tury \\el,diip asbJ~1!l:~l!Uo~tsIH~L<;~all.d&~Y"lli~he.$ii~e\va~ we,.df4ll;!,l 'Mhal'i.C'<t. stru:c~Q;re lll"~urop~then tne Co!le r tlhrtk has be~JJ.' eml-

'!:elltIy .. ,,:, .. !1.rt.;.h itln.,,!.~. ,on. !.Y. inte. :~ .. s. of 0. u .. r 0l"'.n.'I sel.f-betterm .. err . .t"an. d'.lm .. '­p'rovement, but th~, coSt'has been worth'it'lrt ~erms of the growth of a whole l1ew vibrant arei\il'i.tne'Paci'fib:" '." .. .. . .'"

" Mr. NIlt~ .So hi ronclu~i,on, yo,ube~iew that'1lore time. and ~tlldy ~h. 0. rid, b8., gl.ve. ;nott>' '.· .. ~u .. rpte. ~e .. n. ~ com. 1pltnle~~s an.d no. specI.fic, ch.w;g.e " sM. !,:jd. V~ma~'uh~.,.fr 'th'ec~llIm .. . !t. _pee eva,lu'o,tjW.· Ii has .. b~en mll:dll,,1Lni;! the 1l1ls1il rorth'at'IIValu'atron IS 't\Iueterrlune WIlere the1est mterests of

. th'etrnit~4 StaWI¥.':.\\tl\ericiiltljgJ\.i:.Ji:ei' :', .... ",' " 'M'r. WALItER: :Wel:l,'¥r.~a~fu?;I\\l;; tl<jin),kthat st,!d18sshould' go

onoongtantly, all the til11e 0,£,al1 aspects oj! our d,ef~nse lIJ;ld our,deploy-men~s in .... ,.t,ilat ,ay.ea. '. W,'. e ,a,. en~v.e,r ... goir .. g.',t9. h.,!,V.~ iirre,com., pl. ete. . ljig S.t\ld.Y. I. thmk In.' '.l11\'.I1Y .r.,e~l;',ects, . SO.' ,me., ,.(j.t9l1,.r:f .. 9.\'.~. e .. Struct.J1\'e.s !,re obsol.e.t.~, ~?me of.tjie Fhmkillg 1~ not n~9,~Il:l'fJ,Y g&o,f.&( tr?\fe te:ram, alld ~hl\r2 IS ahya~s a chal1ce for economy' and ,effiCIency m" !lny IlUlllan organ12'1atlOn. '~_, " "". ""J'l ,c " ,,' _.' '

~ !,~v~ry .lVate~ul tha,t YQ1p: C!>i!lniitt,e~j~i~~/Q,llg intqthe p,r<Yb)em, I"\tl~mg, sOme~]lestlOnli' ,an4J,1i.\lpe th:,t~,gt'!l"'~rltmol,mt \lr,Sltvmg and gOOd Will co)lle out of what you are domg. . , .. ,.... ,

I hqpe,also, that recommendations will not come out of tlie cOm­mittee, or subcommittee, which will lead people to believe that the United States is moving back into an era of isolationism, that it is withdrawin!!"its forces and commitments, because I think that could be an open mvitationto destabilizing the Facific community that we have helped to huild. . . .

Mr .. .Nlx. I qui~agreewith you about the isolation.

176

In the world in which we live I don't ,think there iaany place for isolationism. I think it is foolhardy and we are not stupid people by any means. '

But I must say the least, disenchanted with, positions'taken by the p.8. Government in many, many areas of tbe world. And I agree that con,stan~ ~tud;v should be conducted" evaluations n;'ade and I don't bell eve ,tIsbelllg dOlle. ' " ,'.' ,

I don't think that it is up to date. I think they base their actions in ma,,~instances on stuC\ies made in, Qther years and I don'tthink,they have been pushed hard,' 'enough ,to rna, ke current the positions that th, ey now ,are taking in various parts of the' world. ' ,,' ,

Of ,course, there.is :Ililwa,ys ateude\l0y to stand with that which;}las served in the past, why bother, ~t, butl think it shQuld be constantly reexamined ' and that, of COUr&8,' is,Qneof ,tiw objectives that the com­mitteeh!l$in holding these he!,'Nngs., ",:" ' , ",

I want to express my ,deep apprMi!ttion;lWd th!'t of,the committee. I want to apologize be,cituse we;I'l";lllQt MVI\,t):w attelldance,tbat we usualJyhave. ",:' : 'hi ",',,', ,

That is because We hI' Ve OJ)! :the, floor ,t,o,d~;¥ )egislation ,that has to ?O 'l'it]:t :reforming ,QoI)-gr,e~.' A;nd when~:ver ,fha,t'l.uestion is raised lIl' ~4e(jongr~, you wlll!~lldthe,.'n~ll\bersh~p;,stijlklll~ ,v:~ry, close to ,tb~tr il\'a,ts. It.lg,'i\'t, ,b~(lal!se, th,ey,.';hsljl}e retaI'm at lall,)t, IS, Ollly t\lat .t!ley ,all~CQnsciQl!!!i/)f tbs ,ft:tc9t,tlil'tt\ll'rllj are di*er~nt: k,~llds of reform.

" Pile, ~m<),C9.q)iI J\e~orJ1il tbem'9Ijtibf,~.ffic~ ttll9-, they ,!la v~,po wisht<> be

~~~~~,\lla~~~ ,~,~a;; 'tJ !ii;t!dil;~~,tha~X!I!;;;~b,Qv~,th9.~ tears,'that' 1$ , ol),e, of Jpe reltsons:IV hy Ii!l,m gomg to I'dJourlj the 'P"e!ill) g ~nd $et bapk the~~'i' " 'I'" , , ',' ,," ""!'

,80, itgain, :r.tlHlllk path or you geptleI\1en, ~r. ,r.:eader 'and, Ilr. Walker, for bemg here today and:)Inl;lk,ing,a,cqntr,bljtlOn to the eff!'J;t ,tbat we have under WilY., ",,' ' " ' ,:, !!" ' " " ,twas glad to hear, Dr. W!'lker;,that yq\l, are~~;'tl>" Uiiiversity!)! SOUth""C"a,rolina,. +s,l"S,'l't9ltR,y»lje~r)Wr, ,J'Ii;d.E1, '~~,I'l~l,nSO,,", uth, 'Ca,;o,I,i,.n,,(I, I, had IV,letter frw;n theJ~l!tfl.'I\,n"at ,the TJ\,-'xtJi'lli~yotiSouth Caro!wa a,,' few, "d, , a, y, S"llgo s,o, 'r,have,t, leS wl~h, t4e», jl\~~yai) p,r,l\,lilr, ~,'tly",te, Reb, ',ng. " Mr. WALK~R. MT' ~~\,~~,\,-a,'n,ra'l', ve1Wg,~att~11hto,:knQw,,~ha,t 'you \II're representIlJ,gmy h,oIlle, StateQt P~1lIl~y!jyanil'.,' '!', ' " ""

'Mr. Nlx.Tha k ou:".' " !,"", '" " "" ",

,J, 'B.y th~ way,~)ia~ lllig~t~ell,,1"',;tr1!,eh~lt})i~. ,Solith (j~~oljnaj:lele­gat!~'l d,d !lletheh0'l0~"Q~ ~~mg, n;t,~ to Wm Wl,tji th~ lIliIlJ,aklllg a ~~A~l:itE~:~~tpffl:n,aId:,J:"l;ttlY~,r~i}nd ~Ij SQ\.)t)iGarolIl)a. I felt

, 'fk~~,~6~~iJriiif~1~htet~~~,'~~, 81>,',' je,' G~It'o, ",tlll"c,:n,' it ofti.1~!¢,ti.aj"r. .. rWlier~'uj:!6n;<a~ '3':17"p.fu:; . 'e' sdll6'6mri!itteewas tie-cessed,'sl.lbjeet ..

to the call of the Chair.J ,,",,1.,\.,) ,"',' .,' ,'. 'i'! ,f'''', ", h.".c:'l (.,,'1, "" ~::(, '". "'1" ~".' ~;h,~',! , '::!. )-~,~, .'

-,-if! .

APPENDIX

SUPPLEMENTARY INQUIllIES FORWARD TO.DEPARTMEN'r OF STATE BY CHAIRMAN ROBERT N. C. NIX ON JUNE 11, 1974

I. THE NIXON DOCTRINE

Que8tion'1. D6es no~ the Nlxo'n J)o~h.1J;le ,mean that 'Asians must,assume mUi· tary roles in their own, countries ra~e,r than d,epend on the presence of United States troops? "'" _,,' _ ,

1).U/illVer. According to t;t,te' Nixon t>.(>ctrtne precept ;of _\lqrden sharing" the U. S,. has ,soUght to shitt (rom a primary to a sUPPOrtive rol~ in the defehse, of ..,A.eian nation~~ W~ hav;e attemp,ted tq.lncreqse the'.se~f-defense capacity ot.pur friends, and allies in the region, and, as that is achieved, to :r~duc~,the level"of ol,lr own forces committed to· local d,~fEms~ roles. ',rbe n~Jlons of ~ast Asla have responded impressively tothe challtDg,e pr~seJlt~d, b~: th~B~,a_speqt ot the Nixon Doctrine. They, have ~n ,tact; assumed a"l8.:l'ger, fiI;iul.re."Qt ;~he :r.esponsibilitles, for their de­

,fep.f;!:e, 'and P,$,tro'op levels have;,q~lined lJ~)a"res\llt, The InOl"lt notnble:example Q~l this, wp,s ,tn ,Elouth,','yietnnm wl).~re:",1.ll,der the VjetnaJ;lll~atioll- pl,.'ogram a US miUtfl;ry'fQtc,~ of;,oNeV;:500;OOQ men,WRs;tQta;lly w.ithUl'aw:n ,m ~$:-tha,n four years.

Q,u,G~tiQn' 2 ... :\}T,hy dO'M"e ha-ve lJlQre Sfl;l'vicemen in. ASia:,and'Jhe Western Pacific than, -we .did Pt10r to'the Viet-Nam War, or at least as of Ma-rcb 1,: 19:74? ,It we do no~" bow :ni~ny, 1$8s' ,servicemenl than ,the: pre~:Viet-N:am,', totak are stationed there,? " (:'U,' d": ,r', i''')' I'

"Answel'.'.In Septembel\1964 the:tota-I J1umber,of U.S. milita;vy personnel:JRshore andqafloat in ,Asia' and,',the' W,estern ,Pacific was-- ,approximately : 250.00J);: '('~6jOO.o in ~Y-iet-Nam). AS'jot, Dece~be\,,_&Lj 1M3, :the numbev>lwas' approximately-181,OOO ashore and afloat, or about 59,000 less than t1!-e, 1964 figure.'i'Ma;t!:oh '1974 ::figures al'e ,doWrfirto 167,000;.or about ;88,000,18,s2' than: in'il9.64.,:'

Q,'Ilestian; ,3." Wha't'".pei:tcentage' olll,th6Lftota'I, ·null1!ber of !Allleriean,/!serYicemen stationed,-U;t South Kolfea,'!Oklnnwa,,'n,rtd :ThaUand, lhave' been retlutned to 'AtJ;leri-can lter-Di,tolW' frOlllJJo)'ahu-ftlry: l',l'119't3't.p'l'oughfIDeceniber :31:1",1978,'1 ' '" , .answ-er."','iL"he' authorl.zed,.troop: ceUthg fov'\l\iorea r 'dld"n6t :chahge in; ,Clilendar

year 1973\ However, as'~f December,3l, 1978, actual troop,stl'ength-t'n'E:oreR':w-as about 4;000 'below" bhe ,tlUt)iolljoOtIi 10.e\.' !ihlrlnj( that ·y •• 'r the authorized: 'Ievel forj,~hRUand dropped ,5;0001(# -a.ll10nt t12%.'For(!e iJ:eV'et'ir,t>n, Okinawa' did not 'change J:lignificantly. "I)'::r"'-,, --",,' '>I",j:,,:I'[": ")::;!' '",', ,,;:~,_:; ",_(1,'

Que:stton '4. 'What Iwerellthe p6l1:ti'cal' 'justiftcationS! 'for -keepi-ng' .A:filerlc-an serv­i~enlen in Thailand; _South ,Kol'fI,a,and 'Okinawll:'aslof"~'Pril)il, l'974?f'" ," ',' r,' A!nsw'el' .. The ,p~enc~-;o'tfJt:l'I St1tO'rcef!tlln' 1,1!hOS~I;countries is, R tangIble' manifes­tation 'of the United' Stntes· ""tillliitmen~'~o"s •• urltylatid stkbllitJi'tn· '~M'regl()n.· In I!l0re specific terms, U.S. Ai'r JII'orce'J,tl't'litil:)'1l\HTiidllfl'lld- are an- earnest nf our intentioh, to seek -full'Unpleme1'ftatlol1'io.f'lllie '~~I1Sj'~greement on ,Viet-Nnm; we and the: -Thai'- goverrll'nJmt' ;are" agree'd' l tl1tit ,·,redutlt1l')ns; in.' 'those:' :forceS' should" be, closely ~elated' to ,~Ondl\tions"irt :tOdochi'l1tl:' (1rtdtlIlit (!o$,ection, 'Qn"M'arch' 29 o.ur two. govE;lrmn'ents, jOint:ly announced -that U.S", :tnrc~ In ,,~hanand WOUld" be

,reduced by 8,000 (ltJ~lng th:~ course of thls-calend~rl',ye~r~ Tile:flrst:,';Vithdra.w.~l,s ha.:ve al~ea'dy ta~~n -J?~a~~;)-, In S~uth _Kotea, the l>i'eSe~e Of'tJ'~' l,or~es de,mon~ strate. our readi1jess to support tne ttOK'in the ev~nt ot armed .. Mtack and thereby, serves as a ,re~tr(linlnkfnll~em~e1u~on. the, North, thus flI-cUltitUng, rather'

' .. tli{ifi'hinde.".lng, t.he. gr. adu.al .. w98~~SO .. f.,).'~.,OlitiCal accr .. m .. !h. !>datlon 0)), the peninsula . .. 1Jti.1\ .. e. d S(ate." forces.ln.O.k. Inawa'. se.r.~e. es"entlal~y ·two (. relat. e. oJ political pur­

, ;::;'lWs~~,~; ,on the. o~e ha~d 'they 'i?~o;~1de an rlllpo~4t1J~.':el~ment of sU:bsta:-nce in our " ~~u~ity :eomllli~lllent',to Japan', and Jm the .()t),1,et~ they constitute a' deterrent

,~, pOs~i,ble, ag~reB,s16n,}l:rro~ghou~: Northeast .N~4l'~.~lping to main-taill a rough poUtlco-mllital'y equil,iln;lum in; ~h~t region." ",\';' ',.: ~::,' " ,

" . (177)

178

Question 5. What are the military considerations for stationing these men in these three places?

Allf;wer. :'[l'he .military' justification for our forces in these countries is of cO,urse closely ·related to the political considerations outlined above. Air Force units in Thailand, which Hanoi knows to be a highly credible force, are a military deterrent, and as such strengthen prospects that Hanoi will opt for a political rat/:ler than military solution, to. t1{~ IndoqNna CO. ntlict. By the same tolmn, our forces in Korea are a stabilizing eletb.ent"·on the peninsula because they are a credible military force. The same considerations bold true with respect to United States forces on Okinawa----.6nly because they are Imown by potential ndverM

saries to, be an ,eff,e9~~ve co:pl:bl),t fOI;cq-:dQ;they ,qontrlbute to the miUtan: and political'equiUbrium'@ftheregion., " ", ", , , ' '

Qu,r,::8tion 6. COUld 'not Un1t$d States militaf:v edtrlmitme'Uts to the ent1r~ urea be fulfilled by maintaining mobile, U,S. fOJ.:ces 'in the mld·Pacific, especially tt those forces had a long-range capablUty?" ','./ l,' .', ,

Ans~er, p'nfortunat'e~~, n~~., Wpj~e w~ Il.t:~ increasi~gly, able to ~~'oject n,lilitll,ry force over l~~~ dlsta:rlC~$/1t :w~u~db,e't;~t~em'ely tl11l1cult if ',Ifot'i!ll'tldssIble ~9bl'ing effectlve'l'orce to 'bear'fn' ')j)ast' AiSili;lu' ''CirltE#1y'fashlon; fr6Ii1 'bases 'as far l''i'IDoved as the Wid-pn ... CIfiC. Thus,_ .tulfillmenf Of. botb:;!.-!t -he mUjtary and D01i.ti.C~l obj'e'ctives (if ohr'!fQree'_pre'sence:l1t''liJaictt ':Asi'a:,'W-otlld b~'l:uhdermine'd~ In pR\~lctilar, the- ~h1ue <>f our ~ori'eqla.'.ta:bil!zl\\g'eWmeJ\ls 'in thit'tiW in!ist eritical 'pbten.t!al ii~e'~. of <'onfton tirtll;nlc...Kbrea' .ti~' ~l\d6chltrll""'woillir M'~,jnsl d~fabl:Y 'd!mlhished I~' <tho.e fore9s\Vere,rl:ot'Close'a:tlla1'1:d. ! ,!I"·''it(·:"" : 11':1!,"!,.':' , ,~:,- ,,-' ,. -'<" ,.'

'. Que8tidn'7, If tli.ycalliioher~~'oIlT cOinm!tllletlt~ why are we t.tkilig two-thirdS of:tlie Isl~lId:.of T1ti!an1n tll~'fuld,'j!\h~lft~ fdr'snclf'pi1!'lfO'ses?"'i : '

':Answer. 'i'While, mob1!le'lif(')1tceSI nlbne''-;cal1llot:'nteet' our requirellients, theyi,'are nev'erth-ele-s's I 'all iinportatlt p~rt' "of· OUr: overall; ,~efehse 1J()Stute, t1lt, the P~clfl'C. However;,·:'ftn:tt-l pr6~rIit1i, 'de'Veloptnent ; \\!il'd' 'C6bstructtve~ ,pHtnnlng;: lnn'st - in r' Rli'y case 'awalt' the-ion-tcethe '(it tlIe';cu'il.reni!' U~goti't\t!1{)llS' \Vi!illl 'the' MarlaliRlf Fdltticttl S fa bn s: Comm:1Sslotl !fbr: !land' aetj 111~ ti'ah' 'and,' J()f 'Murse, 'tbe( 'cni1gj.'essio:nat~ llit\):):ro­prla.tilonspro~SSir:", i"~ ',-',.:' :{, "" .:,-; :,-,:/ .'- -," I .')i"': 14'\:' , :(-,_j',:, ,

QUC8U-on 81~H:oWim'IIJ.'C111Oligel"lWnl:'W'e' ket'!plgervi~~1nen -onl 6the1Hthani t.tIltlhtng'-or ·embas~y,duty in South Korea, Okinawa 01' Thailand, 5_years, 10 years, or longer'?

, ,Aln&:W,bllJ ,H.S.'\fOI!l1e8 ,in 'Thailftind',serve'.prl,marHy, as"hI .deterrent' to' N-O'l'thc,VietM•

NIltri.! :.',l'ltt't:ltand, and 'ilie 'lJ;S'.r,Gover-nment:have"a~tl~d 'that reduction In! the !nU:n11; }jbl'~ ,of. 1] .$~' mtJ.ft~ry:'personnel,'wi1lllbe "ba~d -on ;devel:o,ments-, ,In South :Viet~Nam; anda'djacertt,dountJrielk>:::i' . ,,!t>'J!!," ,~dl '""!~', :,1)1/.",': lU .. --", 'I", '.' !; ')'~"L_",

We expect to 'maintain ,a mtltJthlry~pr.e8ene~ on,Ok1nawR;-~ndellnilely. :}lIo\-ve.ver;' ha.s:e consol1QRlbbm,a1!'Jl80me1ooeCiluetf!on, iil~:tlr.Q9P· sbength'~is'1)rMen1lly_ undeuwR\V.' ; An~ changestdm" th,e"numbel':'ofr;llhS:rmtUtlivYflpersonne)j,1H South J;K,orea,;wUI

depend llpon the' seC:Ut'lty'''~i:ttuab1(m_ 'on"ltiire:{:,l{'Oreanl'ljjeninsula'" \ROK; limiUtrury , 'QilpabU:ltdesj:''aud:;Our !DwIt',mqubeD1ents. mUet-e)'R'Jll!tnO /prettentllplanS'"Jfor 'changes in:U.2'j.totce'1ev,e~!lnKoJlea\, :'\11''''-;,;;-;'''' ';':,'l-n!IU')'-,IU 'In'!--.i; :1.,',", ~: ,':i';~ (1("-'_

,Qu,eft,i1tJnt 9;: It, -our! foroes '.oan lUaluWn ,oUDI p,olt-t:{y, ;~J:ilfthe ,Indian OcaWnav14l»~ n:. h\isa,illleh as II! ego, Garcl a,< "'\>Y ,qanno!' we,ma!ut",l\Jl; illli\ <lrom"'twl!\E!,of lJo1ll1t)l1tll\~n' In, the West~.rn Paclflc'wtth1the same ,type of base syaten,r? , i: .'J i 1,;,I:":hili;~: ,

,:' .answer; 'I Q~~: btu~e· '1'e,quJre.D)~nts;J" (tb.et W-eate;rur,pau11lc; 11'rei,Jm1l'eh" ~m.op:e; ;e,.~t\jm­sive than ,th,QS8)1.·71 Ph<Q,Jl"Q~aul.o., Qf'!l\-Jl. \' l:fU.'~rl /,1'1) I', ... tf:J.I-.'f}fIIJ,;,'it''ttI.()f''';, ;-.J\If.';:1 I' " lJ"i j.f"!'I"'f",~ ·.<;\t;l\~~w~.gnt tlmeia n;(</r,,,,,.an ,Ialall~ ~unm~~jfM\I!tN.$11Q\>'as that<,p""posed fq. ,!ill ego ,Ga,c!1\ ~ollld 1\~\, b~, it.'Ilt,.ade~plj,ie'y, 'i\l)",v~.o,l1~ln. tional d.fells.needs and supportqllJ'.e.cur!ty~qmllll~~Pta,~@,I).lI':lln'~1! \'" '.".P<" <. "''''''

Que'/lon. )Q, J)o~ •. the"U),l'cdef"o;t ,AiJIlql1lq'm !'I.~al:,nffl~e~ •. , on: the Sub!e ,):\a", 1'e .. s.ervat. ;o.ur. "18e.'.;\)1" ,spec .. t.n.<.FI,.a. fr.Wt ..... "·.;.~'!~lli!iJlor, pO.l/:tim. l.l>l1'P.OS. es .,RY'llnsU1'gent .novemeIlP~"at)n.tRlI~t\Qn~1fl1Wjl., clRMR ,tq,J9r~ar.d",~~a'll! ,A;.ln?lf~qt.,.w~

J\ .•. ~ A.q .. ¥~~ft~' .. I ijfu.'.~' .. 'In'.' '.' Cl!1'~.ii'i~;r:,w.!:.I.!IiiJ,)i. i', 'i'i'~~@< .\J:~,.!. 'iliA.' .. '. VY.'. di»g~. r~)j~~~~liMl. ~<l .. :<.0<." .A.P.i\\ 1~tll,w~U.<~4J\P'I!'ljins; w ,Ill\. a l\ew P,IN'. et.r.,~o.'\\ I't, !'\le ,~p\>k,l,l'Yi/;~&e; IssHl" . . \1",4e~.lqr.§t\\!I);i\lpp' ~;¥. :. lpp1,ne aubMr 1.,.,;, n,q"u.~ctsliaywlJe~n· Ca1\g1>t ,~i)d .<'llP. t\y.e.:,b~ .. <J) ... $.<i)~ltli~ ,.)i.J)l.n.~ •. ".nre. th. US,#!. 11l'!'.<l1D.'\I&j11 '.i'r' . .. ~.' 'W:~.I \) ..•. '~ ... ~ ... ".< .6.1'11 .. ",<tUa . .t t.h .•.. X~ are'.Mlj~g<l\\tig~. ups ~P.r/l,~!l!g,!n sO'l\~IA~.as!~I:.:W • .lmY •. b •• es.!n.tb.~,!.'\l,\VP, pines. f and< <tv . ,aUand, We, i'Il>:lWt see, 11I,! •. ,!n f,(lem ,as ,v.!~J1jI\, the, ,.p.q\.r'lp~.

p. (lli. tlca .. ll.Y . .Inhl r ... ". d VIO.1".II. c ... ~'.I· .. ,\.n81. fll .• ll1b,~r •. G'r.f. <qqr .D!lUta~y .. t. Q. ~c.e •... , .. ijt.t.ldh"\\,.Jn. '.'.' tl\Os~;;coIlIitde~,;'.we simp})', ~' pt ,lmolY :t\\~ <jngtivati0l'< li.ehWd.ti)t.\dll\p~,.Q~< tll"'!" .. Q.!!f.' cers.:,'1Y:.heth. e.r It W.' l! <' § .... jle. by ).1) .• ]l~g.n . .\~, WI .. lth 'I'Ol~. t!c3,lAllUt\Y .••. S'Q.~, .. . ~.y, uS<1.t1atter~" oft<r:eservation pr-o . ~~' who, w~r.e \ie;lng dt~,I)~w~ed by the butl,aJnl!f:o~ the new 'l'oad -~l" by others, with otll'1»' motives, remains unclear. ,

, ' ' :' " -" 1'~~

179

n.' '1"HE PEOPLE'S REPUnLIC OF CHINA

Q,u88tion.l. Is it Jlot true that. the basic reasQu·fol'- the formation of SEA'l'O and thEH;tationing of t.roops in forward Asia ar,eas was the containment of the PRO'} . ,A'nswer. -In,,tlle context'-of, the_,early·.1OOO!s the containm.ent of communist IlggJ.'ession" W~S· viewed iu blioader terms than just the P~ople's ~public of China. [n that pedQ'.lit appeared- tha'.t,commuuism was a mono~ithic threat which would @J,ltinue t;tfOI:ts to e~pand in ~sill. North ~o1,'ea during the Korean war rel'eived v.a~t amQllnt~H)f ~mate+1al IlsfJ\/rtnnce froU!;. the Soviet Union as well as troop sup­PP1't from CJlln,1l ';. ano. cp~mQ..hist insurgent~ w~re ,operating in the Philippines, Malaya, Vl~t·Nam and Lao~'l. . ,_, ;' "

'1'0. encounter the threat. ,o~ SinoMSpviet e~panalo;n in!.;;ia, the U.-S. negot~rfted 'bllate:t;al roUitary ,pacts witp,JU!pan, Korea, the ~P.\lbl1Cf'O~ China and the Phtlip~

, piu(I"s. IJ.,nd ,a roultilatel'~l treaty., ,wa~ stgp.ed with. A.l.lstrIj.Ua .~nd Ne\y. Z€l'ft1anq. 1).'0 complete the linkage of bilateral an:d'multilateral arrangements, the M.anH~

S:O~~~:Sl;~:l~~s to 'lI,ct aS,a deterrent qgfl..inst in mai'nl:a~d

180

Answer. '1'11e Soviets have never .been very clear on this question. At times, they have suggested that all pending projects must be negotiated as a package; at other tImes they' have shown R'wilUngness to discuss each project separately. In the case of the recent agreement fol' the joint development. of coking coal and timber resources 'in Yakutsk, the Soviets did not insist that Japanese creqits'to finance facilities for the transport of Tyumen oil :be discussed at' the 'same time. We View this as a tactical rather than a basic policy shift on the Soviet side.

The entire question of Japanese participation in the 'l'yumen oil project haS been altered by the recent proposal' that the' .Tapanese help finance a second SiberHm trunk railway rather than a 'pipeline to transport the Oil. The Japanese" have not flatly rejected this ,proposal, but their reaction has been decidedly cool.

QU'6stion 2. Isn't it true tha.t the Japanese willingness to sign an agreement as to coke without the pa'rticipaUon of the United States, is a large step toward the agreement of both-'cou~tries' tn jointly develop Siberian resources including' Siberhin .oil? , '

Answer.- ,The Japanese 'have never sought U.S. participation in the coking coal and timber projects. 'l'hey have inststed, however, that their participation in oil and natural gas projects Is' contingent upnn, ,'jOint U.S. 'Participation., ':.rhe agreement signed' On April '22 whic'4 provides for .Th»ahel!!e' credits f6r the ex­ploration phase ot'the Ya'kutsk 'natural ,g~s project -w:ll,s inade'"conditional upon parallel "and equal_credits ,fl'cnn the U.S: Exlm or 'Pr1v$.t~ American 'ba't'lks. 'The Japanese'have sh()'wn; no slgns'bf aIter1:q'g,thelr t,Jasi'c'-pollCY Ul::this- reltard.

'Question 3. Isn'f1f-true'that the'Japa~ese Wll11ng;hess'tn bargain nu·-the joint develnpment 6f Sib~rinn resources without ·th~ 'settlement 'of 'their dispute with the SO\riet Union ,(,ver the Kunle Isliihds increase the 'U'kel1hbod Of joint' de-velnprin:~i1tof Sibertiihoip ,;" "',' ".,

Answer:·It is, of COlUse' true' t4at~t:he, fact that t;he' J)ipariese :·_are 'nnt:'lnslstbig 01\ the return .of the_ IS"orthern- Terrttbries"-as' a',»recontl,ltton 'fQr' partit!ipQtton' 1n th~I,!de\'elo.tJment Of'Siberian. ' resnu,rc~s, i"n'crertses the' Uk. eUhQ"Od"of ,jnint '.deVeIQp.­~'ent of S~berian 011:' While the Jlapo.nese ha1e'~la"inied~'the' entire' Kurtle' elitLiti .. ,. tl)ey jrav~ not gIV!l"l\' itV thefr chilrii: to the four ISl'8l\'~s"(Ha!ioniI11, IShlkotrth/ Runashli'l. aM Etdtofu ) . l"hic1> , are"IIli1I)~dWtel~ nottl) 'Qf' lIoItI<~ldo, ' J apjin"has lMtcirted that' !lJij""eturn of '.tM 'f6ur' i~1lIlld8' ctiiiljllll.lhg" tIl:e' NortMrIl;T~Hl­toN~s'reril. aln.l;np~el'~4'U!SIW for"rtle j;UriCl\i'.I~\l. ,".ot:".iili>e.l!~q. ~ea.tf e.'nding• th~ technM~I'.tate i!f. war whleh 'ha~"exlstea 'MtWeen".'fl!'illm,a't\d' 'the USS'R since' World War II, . . ... , . .,.." " ... :

Q. U. <i.won. 'I, ia.#'!. fnrl\e',~h;it .. If. Slpe.rlaW'0111i1'~eV •. loped; ".iid PIP. 'eun .. ".". btillt t!t:ililthe 'inlll!a:rY \I~Tue bf'.'the 'Sovf.~; Nav«rlfitW!!' tit"VlildlVbstok'wm lncrilli~e?' WIll not sdch' a ~esu\t liicrease 1M' ablllty·"6f"the.; So"let' 1'1hlo'n' N'·suPporf: a· lar~eSnvietfleetintheP.a~ltlc? , " ,')'_:":"-")"'j ,! / .

'. 'Answer~' Xes; It' I,r'l:tlle, 'llhou,ll"the Sovl~t tltilM' ·d&ci'd.e' ~(/trl>n.pdrh' ~he" bu, Ii)' Vralflvost6k,. this 'i!\\foulil' ''''"It'IIY Rn,Ii~~~aW l\t,,j"~n.ble pl¥ lu',V\kI1lvo.tt\l<:' . HoweYei', the Soviet tilon pr.iserlH~ hiis 'snlljcmht'6ll'stocks' ln'the 'stlJei'l\ln~re,"' to suppo<t Its currentmllitary~eployment.,in Aslac'It 'als«'i/!,reMY"lIils· tlre" cap. limIt to ship additional o1hfr!"ksvla 'tlW'T~an.'SI~ti\Jn 1:tal1~d~.<l,.'.ShOilld . the' Soviet :U~loh' decide 'to .lnot'Ii" 'fIie"~Ii!<l'Jb11tll. ·i't 'at iMIDe thn~.\jJ the' fUllir".,. a 'Pi.i>!l ... I.lneHWli.Wli terfu1rl';te. II. ~lh.'vt.· •• tltlll%~tb')l"W .... ilYd',. :.\>. ro",lil"' a'llo. til. ; h. N, 1I. 1 sOtif"e of· 611 't6 s""voil', ra~Uif'il@t'illid"wl\Wtl· md1t\t\~' "Inci'l!a~e t[j~ ·."6urliY' onollitary O'\1'su Iy by Jjt' Vlhln ".Ir,\'€dt)'l/dan'i!:V In!Jt\ p., ·Ill;erlia:': ':'!l,:L,,·,' :'"

. qU/f8UO"'.·. 5f:r'~I(iftli .. 1oll.j .• et!.~.'fliij. ~:. tlfe.'.U~I.t . ..tl'~t!I! illi .. '.'1\11 .. "m.' . ..rn. tfi.'11l1ti~·pr. 9. ~''P' In Ibe J'aP)ln ~rea the !l"C1Ir1iy of rr~~iill ~ri r.laddn W * .possl!i!e 'So'C1li! '~~at1, Would.'thla objective be. lil(idl\\.d'['~Y '11 grbwlll~!'c(jmm~rcfA\':!al1laltce MfWeell Japanandthe'SoViet1fition? ,I' "" ,.' ,,·d?:-J',-) :,' l' ,~) , .. ; ',~; .. ',r':'_I"I' .

Answer : The pl'ren"". ot: UJ:S:· aI~)lijjd,i1!l.~al 'hi11 lalh .J~ pilli: 'lllc1h\Hij~;.()ldnaW.,

ls.pr. ed.lc.ated 11.1 p ... o,."t.I.I." ". Q.·.Jl.~I.'~. t .. l.b!),.~:.' .. lYe .. a.~ ... llmi! tor . .t .. lie<le.f~n .. 'c.e O.'f:.Jiiplin.· '.i. ~the.! U,S.-Japati. MutuR SOl!lfflti ''t'r.dty'li~ aerVe~'M" ·deterrent toliggre"abm from ~h,a.tever ,I:h~ill .. ce'~.~ritl·to '~9; ~~~~/itp6:~:,dul' 'un'~k _.nf;1commuri,lcationl: 1;'he' mRipte. n~nce. 'of Swbliltrand pMCe'trt'Asla I. a n¥.~i)! U!~, goaL~.l?a,n';lff.n'e"'lreJ,helY l~portant ally -in Asia and j'the matntenanc~'!of the t1rllted Bta:tes-J"apan 'Mutual" Security'Tr,eaty is consider~d vetal to the .attainment of ,our bastc -objecUve ,of peace and siablllty In Asia,: A gioWl!lJl coruinerC1al'aiilanc'ebetwe\\n' Japfrl1 alid the Snviet Union cou~d. ',tend to, red)l~~ ,tl1e post;libiUtv .of $oyiet: aggressinn; how" ever, th~,~ . .co'PlDer.elal. tlesd,o,not' illDllnlan the Soviet mllita~ ,c~l!~6l\ltles, C~mseq,u,et)tLvl ,~e qq :~()t, antIcJpaJ~; tha,t.tl!-ese exchanges ,will, ~apse. any: clu,tnge l~ .the ne~easltYfpr:U.~, p~e"encel,b,~apanp.f.;forthe contlnuatiqp"of t\lel\'!]liu~l, S~curlty ~reaty o .. r th~,l\e"t several Year~, ~ather, :wesee t1\e:p.e~ent"1J,S';,

," .. ::' <, ,

181

Japan security reJaUonshw as providlng the basis for Japan, to feel sufficientlY.' s~cure to seek broader ties with the Soviet Union.

IV. SEATO

and what would be the under the terms of the treaty 'I

~:.~~~~;:~~~~~~~[g~:;~~~{l~f~~ .ltat~l~zhl,g role in this period of ~~~~~~~:~:~~\~'~~:~~~~~~~~:~'~~Fi. are growing 'progl'es-relationships with the the region, ·has no other ot an alternativ.e security

~~,r~~:~~;~:~:t~:~~;~::~ future, we ,Hhould -s,t~er a . gr!''lllatiIY and respoll_slbilit.ies of seeurlty Manila ~,pact as part of the

~t~~i~~1ro~r;;'~';tnQ;W1thdraW from the: Manila growl~lg with wbicb ~halland and other relations -witl;l 'their COUl­

their .own, secu"lty. the,smgo,t)J

"\' Is daptmdent,.Upon agreements benweoll

limitsl sftt :b;V COllllI'f'SSI. Th'er.e<,a?!A-"'MA-~ GJ"

the Pli!j!pplneS a,j'd. ~alland,~he as:'f.!> 'not"~ntall Unlt~d States ,inypivelllent, '

182

, di·rect· or advisory~. in :Philippiull1 militalfY- 'oombat: operations. -At the present -time there are no U.S. military,'personnei training Thai troops in Thailand. There continue to be, however, U.S. military personnel assigned to elements ot the Thai Armed Forces in an advisory capacity under the terms of the 1000 Military, ,Assistal}ce Agreement.

',f. ',1,\,., t;';'

183

6."Ques-tion,_ Is' it or is it not trile, that 'when' Ambassador Graham Martin was .Nnibassador to'l'ha11Ilud, that-'he took th~'position that-'1'hailand"should not be iJs'ed 'as 'R sta'girig ~rea ibr -an 'extensive A;merican,-fuilital'Y' missiori ih ThaHand '/ In ahy case bds not the restrUlnt 'shown 'bt the lJnHed States in- establishing a niiittary presence In -·Thail'ahd;;~with· tile' :excepti6n' of- alI'baSeS,- p-roven 'success­f~l? ,If so, wouldn,ot the reIllovul of U1e.a~rbase13 be. an -additional contr1~ution to ene same happy ,r~plt? " -':c', _ . ':' 1- ", " '. :

.. Answ~r, During ~m.ba'.~ador MartJ.n!s.tour of duty in'l'lla\land (1003 t019~7) tr.~., policy sou~h(t:O 'ensll~e, that _th~:1J.S. wilitary 'pr~se;p:ce. in Thailand w.p.s llQ larger than the<req.ui;rem,~l}ts of .its ~issio.Q. dl~tflted., ~9netheless, beclj-use ,of

" direct ,tJ:S .. involvemeri"G j)r, the ,11ldDchtna. WllL:,. eft!O;l1t" til,€!' ~vinJ)er of .AJ:Il~ricau servicemen in 'l'hailand had- almost ,reached its peak, of, 4:~jQO() .bY, the time ..\'nibas~ aadDr Martin departed lJ.'hailand in mid~1967. ~11hia occurred, Df CO,urse, with the approval and full cooperatiDn of the Royal lJ.'1hai Government (R'l'G).

The vast, majotity, Df Dur troDpS in 'l'hailand 'have been U.S. Air Force per~ sonnel ",ho' wer~','stat1ijnedut'-T~1l1 'alr~a'ses. Consistently; the primary mission Df tllese ?,,?opS. has: be,en i:liredly-' :relnted tp Qur j mtl1tary' efforts ,in IndQchina, ~peci~~al~y'tot»:ealrWll;r. '::, ,.'"',,",, ,I , : "" "

As So~tb VIet11atn~se,.",!.lIi~.,.,ry cav.a\>J.)hl.e~ 1n\.!p.rOY~d:·ltw.aS ... PO .. '~lble to beg. i~. reducing the number,of U.S~,serviceIA~:q, In~~u<.lu)~ tliose'itl-Th~llatid~ whd',theJ;e~ tofore ~ad b~~,ill:vo~-v:e,d ip the; war ;e1for~.':~l,l,.s,epteml~'r 19~. liffer"po~sultat~oh with theRTG, .we began ,W witbdraw,unita;(rom Th.ailand and by lDid.197~ t1jr.re 'remained,-only. 32,000_ U.S. ,miUtary_,pers.oJ;lnel in that cQJlnt,ry,,· ", , ' Unfoituna\~ly,the North Vle,tnamese'. sp~lng oden~ive in ~o\l1;hYiemam 'In 1972

re,quire4, th~, ,r,ei;ntrou~ction ot, sowe unitf$: il.1tQ,Thaila,IJ,9- ;al),~h'our ,'tll!utp!ry, pres­epce gDew Olljle,agaio to ,appro)<IQjately ,#j,!lO\l, 'Ple JIlllI.i~nslj.owll,·~y,·~he aUg· lDente(l Alr.}.'Qr,Ce"lIuits in ,'l'llaj,l~\ld,: flllPport"" .by.pthe;,se\'Vlce el~lJl~pt:$" helpell bring about' tbe ceaseftre of'1973, While complete ,PeM,9 .1108.00t. yet "etlwpedt9 Indochina, tbe ,~~el of hostilities Ms· abil.tsd ,con~iderably, In acc<>rda'ice"with these, changed, clVoull:lstat;tQ.eIil, we are Qn~'Again );eQticjpg, our- mil1tJl-1\V :pfeStm~ in Thailand •. Thi.',ia,be!ng done In close.c~!l.ultat\Qn.wlth tbe,RTG : agreement was recently reach,ed to reUuce,_, our, forces- in 1J.1hailand to 27,000 by year end. 'Both ;we, and tl),e',tinwl' exptRlul to,'cDntinue "tp.eS9 J;C(\uo1JiQns~; dependent, ,of cou~e, oD'flutrtre developments In;Indoeh-lna.~,,· , , : '. H' ,'- r " ""1:, ," ".11;1'1;:,' ""

184

Question .. 4. IDwe we: now: or in the recent, past adopted R position that def~~se in Asia will be a matt_er of specializa·tion'} If this is the case, are we not, C9m,. mUted to, an immediate oompa,t. role ~n. the outbrea~ O;f fighting since no. o:ther ;orce could fulfill the speCialized-role \,\;e"have adopted for ourselves? Are these lJOUtica) ,reasons for adopting .~uch a po~ture., and wbat are they if, such Is, the (!ase.? ',' ,,' , ' Answer~ There is no. "specialized role" for U.S. forces in the defense of th~

Republic of Korea. Planners recogni~e that in the event o(hostiliUes the most immediate significant contribution the United States could make.'would be that· of air power., an area in Which North Korea ts, presetltly stronger, However; the operative -paragraph ot the: ~~54' Mutual Defense 'Treaty specifies that in the ~vent,or an armed fiitack eWcfi pltrty <!would -act to meet the COmmon dulJlger in •

. accdrl:1anee'with its, (!onstittt:ti011al :processes." , .,',

;,."

185

of war reserve' munitions require forward deployments relatively ,near the area of potential use so theY,can respond rapidly when necessary. To approxi· mate current response times with redl,lced forward deployments would require significantly increased use of mobility ,forces and hence higher costs.' In addition, there would -be significant costs, involved in replacing at potential mid-Pacific sites, the installations and facilities currently in Japan, includIng Okinawa. In summary, oUr . bases- -tn Japan cannot be replaced. witbout 'seriously degrading OUl'- present capab~Uty and the deterrent value of our forces.

Mr. Fred Branfmnn of the Indochina Resource Center in his testimony to the Subcommitt~~ on May 1'st responded 'to a question. Mr", Nix posed about what were the considerations' that moved the government of the United States to enter the Viet-Na-~ conflict 'in the ,beginning, (page 52, line 8 of the hearings transcript). Mr. Branfman's J'esp,onse a\luded to ,cert,aill ~col)omi~ considera­tions (page 53, 'line_:,_6). Mr. Nix.'s'staff asked informally' that 'we address this point. )j'or th~ rec(iid" we would,;llke to aubmit the following, 'comment ':

Allegations that,trnlted, States _po1.i,cies'for Indochina are based,.on economic or commercial criteria :would s~in, to :J,'EHlect a ,p~,rH~ular' 'ideologic'al versuasion rather than a ~actuar ap.alysil:h," The ,tact Is 'thAt- th~: alleged, commercial and ~onolntc IntereSts are virtually n\J~~e:¥isteJ}t. Xf;Ui,e'presen,t tltne, UI:lited states ·trad~ With the are.a Is, rillatlvely \ii~ig~iftcal\t a~1I fh~t .w\llch does take place Is la~ge~y the,.result o~ our Ilss~st#-p,ce 'program~ i and,':tber~; ~'little inve§tment ~~ ptivate U.S. d.~m~. .. ',,'. . . .. : . . .. . .... }n. 1!l .. ~31 th. e ,vah.l ~l,.o.f., ,li .. ROdS lwvortetl,-into .t1Je. Ulllted States from th~. ,three !ndochlna countries totallea less than one mill/on IWlars: , .

More generally, we would note_ thtlt ccnnmerCiai ,enterprise,1s not ',attrllcted b,~t~~pell~d bYmUitary action ~)ld·lnsecllt.!ty. ,... . ...,.

J"

A' "

" , .

QUES'rIONS AND ANSWERSI.F-ROM' DEPARTMENT OF,S~A1'1l RELA1'ED TO VIE'1'NAM At[) 'PndPOSALSiJULY 30; 1974

. '. , • "', -,,-', 'i

Question l:.:What is :the 'pe\;~~ntage o.f, fpcl'ett'~e,'in<-AID to South Viet~Nnlll in,. tne President's Me~sage oy-'~t. ,and a\)Q:y~ tlie inost 'r'E!!:cently ~uacte'~\'fol'elg~ aid legl!:11atiop., ,~h.at, qQeSi.the incr~ase .a~ouh,t t? in dolltirs ~~l.<,l, what' is the, total figure aSl><!d ... ~o~!ri .. 11<e )'.reSldeu.· t:s M. ~.s. ~!lge fonhe PublIc of'Slmt!l Viet-Nom?

. Answ~r,:t;~~,.FY~74 AIDprdgram figure f,or south Vlet-~~m tot.l. $897 mll­liOll,'",We ll,e,}~e~fl)e!3ting" '7!J~';,U1mibn fQr. ~Y:"'75. ~his al}iqunts to. a dHllul' Inqz:~a.se. f?~ ~$,~5;3 rpilltQJl, w~~~h ,is an it~:c~ease, ,of aprrox~~~t~ly 89 percent.

QUBStW1'l'. 2. J¥ .It tqe ptirpo~e.\.pf}he, President's A,ID lne~sage. as. to Son~~ Vie!t~Naro to. ,ht,we .autllQrized! ,~tttHcJent !uIlds for, South, Viet-Nam 10.' acllieve ec, oijo .. m.' '. tc .. ·.i>r~g. res;' '~l.mli~r.",.','.to, ~Ml". ".W"iI\\!t.'.,,~~· ii,\h;n'ore,.a, o. n. ".:'. i.tV'!: m.n.' ".11).' to llllllrtft1n our col!ectl,;e :~~)!ttty 1it~~i\~.I\l~ t~,. 'is we Q~ ve . 1)\ Jhe, r,ast?' ,

Answer. The intent o.f t'lle reqnesL"i,s td 10. t'ain a leVet ofl:fiih4s~_!thn..t"woUld ena,ble. ' ps ~f) .,Ple,et (m.r lQ~wun., i'tru'itJ".n. '.'-Il.I} fl.,' ,e~~.,np.~l.c" ~~a~.i,u;z.,'MM1r "O~jeJiftY. e~'! 'ltl South ~let-N.m and to ha~~ 'mUm?\~ht. ~eso,ht~~~ to ~)1i!".1"1't Mu,th' Yte\'N~.m:. Jlr?4.tl~tlye"cap~c!t~, Jhus ,~l~<;, 19 )\.er., on l.t.h,." P, dlh.' .. I.d.,.· .s.,If.-.s, uS.tal.n.\'nU.r01\'th', as wasthec'asein-Tu'Iwa'nand-'So iliKort;'l~ h' . :,'" ),' ,'.", ,I."'," ,.

Question 3. DDes ,SDuth Viet-Nam's haturaI te~bitrces,' iitdud'i'ng ribs-peets £0'1' majDr o.il discoveries, give it the possibilities Df achIevIng an economic miraole similar to that;- in South KDrea and T~iwan? (Paraphrase of language used by RDbert H. NOQter of AID, statement 'to. Full CDmmittee, June 13th,_1974, p. 4) ,

Answer. Yes. South Viet~Nam has good natural resources, being particularly well' 'endow:eq' with agricultural reSDurCes as well as an intelligent, industrious population. ,Given favorable .circumstances, sbe is fully capa,ble Df- achieving the econDmic rnir.ac}e, wrought by SDuth,~KDrea and'Taiwan. It is dIfficult to aSl'mss

'" with any-- certai'nty the prDspects fQt ~major oU discDveries. The, first wells are ," expected to ,be d'rt,lled in the coming weeks. If petrDleum Dr natural gas should be

fDUp-d in cDmmercial quantities, then the prospects',for rapid econDmic developmtmt wDuld be further enhanced."

Question 4:. Ip 'tin agricultural country such ,l'1s: :South, 'Viet·Nam why is there unemplDyment O~\UP, to' 1 milliDn ,persons, unlesRtlle' Repl.lblic of, SQuth Viet-NaIll cannot return peDple to the land Dr will not ci6 SD? ' -

Answer. SDutb_Viet~Nam suffers 'from 'a distol'teq wartime:-econDniy.' He),'_, cities are-'swollen with, 'refugees frDm insecure countrysiqe' areas RQd. with rural peDple who were attrllcted to the weH·paying jobs, that" were a:yaU':lble in urban arens. Wit:J;l.the departure of U.S. mil1t,I,l'L'Y 'forces ,und the substantial. reduction in U.S .

. cont;ractDrs, the job marltet has' been .. aubst~ji,tia.lly rediJced~ The fuli"effects Df this coht~ctiDn Dnly nDW ttre being felt '_and- fullY,:JleaUzed ,b\y"the urh~n popUlation, wl;lich':has stayed in the>¢ties in tpe hope ''(It itlllkl{lg'-,an, ade:q1,la.~,~ adjustment to' t1,l,e,new circumstan.ceS~~:lJnfQrtun-atelYj J~iv(en th.e"_().ont~. nued'. Jtftl.itary hD.S-tilitieS in' parts of ,the cDuntryside, SOme 'areas -Df SDuth,i\. Viet-Naiji_ t~riU-lJn il1;secure,' particularly- the mDre remote, less pDpulated areas. ,'.Chis lithits th~.amoun't· of ,land that Is '~vaHable for distributiDn to ,urban settlers .. In addition, land fo).':, tesettle- . "I,

ment must be Identlfie.d as unowned Ql),d, detevmined, tQfll.~ f,luitable,·:!rDm the-stand­pDint 'Df, water availability -and $Dil fertUity. This is it',Ji~,e and ,effort-Qon~umlng', proces~~:}dDreq:v.~~, _fundS,Jnust be ~ade, a.-yalla;ble tol,"sustaiu-,the, resettl~rs pr~Dr

',I \",'to .)i.,arve~t." as '.W .. ell. as, fOll .. '.h .. o .. using, land 'CI.e". Ding, 'Planttng. qf·:,:cr.DP~;,.· .. 'etc;. Gi~e:p -the ,toregoing" problem!:!, it-1!-,ills nDt been an, erray ,task to', resettle tlie urban' poor in, .,tural: a;r,e~S. ,S.-OI:ne have"iet\lr)ted to the"lahd,,:wlthD'pt ,enrolling, In' an' Otn~inl.gov~ ermn-en~'~prDgrllth .. [lD,,:.~n~1tu.Va'ge lllany IDolfe" to _b~~oriiel'f~r~ets agabi'l-".'we,_ have:" hroi!..o$ed the clty-to;far,nl:'!>lIllirain;whlch would provIde funds for.,Jj(n<!.J~);rlng, sust .. 9.nan~e 'pa~ent.s",_~p,.OU~.l.)1.,g co. a .. ,t~ ... P1ll:nttil. g.:':J!o.,._sts; et.~., .t?r .. ·./~n. 411.' .l.tial " .90;°.°0'- , urb'alJ':poor (60;OOOfaIill11e.)~ Thls.'llrogra\lllla.rh~ ful!baol!ll\g'of the Vie . am~se .

,i, Go:yetnllient;"~' ,,_',,:,"'\'-;"""', _ ;'''' "{"','" ::,:£'~y;:k.}~'\.->:' ,"', 'i.':; " i '",'}"_:/ ",' .

,Q,lIeStilJ1i. §,.':'.I.",Ii!il:e .. li.' li~re .. ~S~.1h~ri:i.:.'j!.e.qu. e~t~~:;.:l:> ·a:.~.d In ... l .. arg.e.'.m .. e. a •. ~.re,.on. '/t'greall;Y:;:",0, .. ~anded,pUO&W!ill\.i'(jf" CilP~. tal). ,n~e'lment~.I"I!!bhat cOlllltr~t.lf'SO,. 'flint tYPes bt,~, Industry aefe be!~g~on.~dere«Qr,.ucl)i:lhV~.l!!i(jl)t? " "";"1' I; c.'··

, .., "~t'; ',' "'(~)," ,II'

':.

187

Answer;,Y'eBjithe incteased fundtng,tequest Is: based in part on increased capital investment,and in. part ,on 'much gi;eatlel"cOmmodity"costs .. The-increased capital In.veetmentLwlll be for ,such: things as,'dredges; salt~water,l'lltrusi'on.;contl·nl dU{e$ aud gates hlthe _constru«tioIi ,of fentliUzer and agro--business proClessing plants"; industrial parks; and export processing zones. I.'

Question,B" Does South VietwNam an'ag-rlcultt1!ral country have to dep~lld on the impol't ot food, and on the-maximum. use 'of:cfi'emical fe'rtiUzers? Will tli~ Repuhlic of South':Vlet-Nam become an -expel!ter of· food b1. the future "as lt wa~dn,the -past '} "Answer. '-South Viet~Nam has: been a -food· importing' cotuit!';: only because of

war devastatio:ri,"insecurity in' the' 'food4producing'countryside\ and wal;~relil:ted economiC 'dislocation. :Gi'\l'en a 'Pel'lod o.f peace 'there is'l1o. reason why South' -Viet~ N am shOUld 'not be a f-ood '~:XPo.rter~ , -, , With ,reB'Vect"to.' fertil1¥er, utilizatio.n; :'tbere -:is no way .. that- ,South Vlet~Nam

clin contirroe 'to;'tliaintain"li'ud''i'llcrease,' its lagJ.1icultUI'al pl!odlt'ctlon withOllt the ~:xten'sl'v~'·use' oflUhenil~lil fe'tUtUZers,i,}!,Ol', eXlimplei,'lippr'O'xlmately 40 ,per ceht"of South ,"Mt-Narn1s'rlce producttot1~ 'Whleh is:estihrated-'fl:t:o'Ver se~n million metl!ic tonS'ifor the: last'ctop )renr; nO,;w'c'0l11es ftom ne-w,-;"bigh~Y'tel'd 'Vatie1!ies that'reqtill'e Substnhtialfe1'til1zerinput~.' ;;, ',,' ""',J/'Ij', ""Ii· ,t', ~ "," " ,

. Qttestidni,7; Whj}t ·has ~eri ,the llunibe11 bf fatnlitl'es suffered ih South Yiet~Nam sincethetrtit~e of,'241/Jai-l'iiar~"197~ 'duE(W'ccntillaf? _ ,\ ',' " .', '

Answer. 'A:pproX'illtately !16,ooo."hl,tlU~! tQtal!,' a'bout 3,000 were civilia-ns j 16,000 were So.uth"'Yietmim'es'e GdV"ern'l1lenlf!ll1iIitary'pel'sonnel ;"arid f57,OOO, Were Oom~ nrunist perS(:nln·el.- . ,;' ,.~ i_ ,'I,n;.,' ','/ "_,,, .', -,"." '.

j"Que-;gUon B.' On what'basls-does the'·.wdminl'1ltr.at~o1,:t 'e¥pe.ct'an' et!(jt1omi~ niiracle .tn SQuth Viet-Nam, when 180,000 foreign troops {Hoe 'ih South' VU~'t'hatii"equipped in Part with up to. 700 Soviet tanks?

:\Yith the military situatiQn in mind, the failur(~ to establish a stand still truce, how can economic aid .bring abQut a large -economic expansion to the extent of making the RapubUc of South Viet-Naro so. self-reliant that further aid from the United States will nQt be necessary? .

Since these qUestiQns are similar, I believe they can best be addressed in a single answer.

IAnswer, We recQgnize, that the path: to. eeQnoml~' self~suftlciency in South Viet-Nam will nQt be easy, and, that achlevement'of tb-is goal will require imagina:­tion, diUgence, and persl'stence on. the part of the South Vietnamese. Neverthe­less, we believe there is SQlid 'grQund :for QUI' expectation that South Viet-Naill

, : will indeed make rapid eCQnomic progress if we provi,de sufficient assistance I;lIQng the \i,lies of the si:X-Y9ar projeCtiQn ~ecretary Kissinger has already sub­,mUted to' the interested OOligresalQnal OOlJ;lmittees, with partic'Ularly sUbstantial

, :lnputs, oV,er the next '-t~o yeflrfS.l ,'rJIe eVidence for tp.is expectation inCludes the fo)lowlng :. , . ., .:,

'~'-" IFigbtlng has subsided sin,ce -the January,' ~1:'" tJrr~; Agreement. Measured In terms of cRsu,alties, it' has drQPped 00 about one--th,t~d' tb;e level of the years 'Prior to the Agreement. MQlfeOVer, most of the cont1nu~d' :ilghtiq~ has,'been in remote, sparsely populated 'areas, Almost all 'economically sigruflcant "areas remain secure. "

The SQuth Vietnamese armed fQrces have clearly demonstrated'the ability to defend "their country and secure important installatlo.Us, at least to the point where development' projects can proce,ed 'with reasQnable pll'ospects :for' suco~s. ' In fact, the' success of the Vl¢tnamlzation:,&rogram in ',tbe zWlftary field ls a hopeful indicator that a similarly. cOnceived pJfQgram can su..cce~~n the ecottQptic sphe_ne', _: " .-'".'- _ :"',_'" ":",,,-,,_~-\, ~"",,:.

,W~' ~~e n~t co~~t1ng 011 U,"S, ,:ald al~ii,tQ- ~Qve'"f1,o~th, V,~~ lim' rllptdl~_Jqward seIt-sufficiency, Other important elem~nts in the p1cture',anclude:

, (a)' The ,demonstrated_~resill~nce, abiUtY""and determillation';:Of ::the South Viet~ namesa people--a human reSQurce 6f"con'sJderll'ple ,'qilJ;lensioJl'i '},:' "

(b) South, Viet~Nam's ab~~ant natural re.spurCesy_, including ilia' ,prQspect Qf slgnificant.6il.'discoveries;' , ',' :_, .. t",,; "'_ ,/~, ':<. < .. '-" c',"

(0) Thee~pectat!Qn"of substant/at,~ddltloitar,a!d fr,O.ln,'tJ>iml coUlltrl"", inter, ,~~atiQ~al ()r,~antzatiQns 'and 'pr1vat~';'vo1untary tgencies,;~1Uch will be ennanced bythe InltlaJly higher U. S. aid levels we ha V'~l>v(il.ected; "l!d·" .,..., ..

'(dL Ov.e~' the' lorl'a'er tel1Il, tp.e evrilUtioll tQw:~d peac61't'll' aecQmmtlrtation' ftl1:d ~~ reQ(jhCnl.t!~n\Vblch wlllibepQSs!ble, .. 'i.' ., "r't' ."""..:":

In:$W'!"""lt\iln.thene"t.~WQ t0tl\r."y •• rs w.'wo,!loi:ll~@ to .... phe bsgtnrll~gi:,t, of ~;~~v .. erslble. Dr.O. o~... .' wb.l~h Wlll .lead.,.rI!.'Pf41t ... ,J.p., ... "., .:.~1i1l9.m .. )c,.:.§. e.lf .• "Q!clen .... c .. Y' .. '~ . an~'~,t,'~~n)~,WWa.1!'d a ~table ,p~ac-e-1n SQ,uth Vl~t~~-fftpy":c -',»: --::'&\, i~/';',:;, -l', '<;, " :1;-),f,:

;_ ":~':::-"~~~~ ,!n-"", '; >:,' '<, >'-'" ,'?';",: ".j,:i _ :', . ,,",,;,,,_" -,;~,:,_~ ,;, ;<f ";l1,"-'

',;/ " /'~ "