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Navigating Globalization: Immigration Policy in

Canada and Australia, 194520071

James Walsh2

Scholarship on immigration and globalization has failed to adequately analyze the nation-states

regulatory capacities, insisting instead that contemporary patterns of migration jeopardize

national sovereignty and territoriality. While recognized that states possess the legitimate

authority to control their territorial and membership boundaries, recent transformations of these

capacities remain largely unanalyzed. This articles historical analysis of Australia and Can-

adas postwar immigration policies demonstrates that the contours of state regulation are

intimately connected to the exigencies of state administration and nation building andin

contrast to the expectations of dominant theorieshave intensified and expanded within the

globalization context. The literatures inattention to the fundamentally political nature of

immigration has obscured the critical effects of national policies within both the migratory and

globalization process. Australias and Canadas contemporary policies constitute a unique model

of migration control and reflect attempts by both countries to strategically position their

societies within the global system and resolve a number of economic, political, cultural, and

demographic transitions associated with globalization.

KEY WORDS: Australia; Canada; globalization; immigration; nation-state; policy.

INTRODUCTION

Humans are not a sedentary species and regularly relocate across

national boundaries. With the dissolution of colonial and multiethnic

states, the globalization of economic activity and human rights doctrines,

and advances in communications and transport, the scope, intensity,

and consequences of such migrations have been drastically amplified.

1 This article has benefited greatly from the comments of Karen Cerulo and three anony-mous reviewers. I also thank Richard Appelbaum, Howard Winant, and, especially,

William I. Robinson for their intellectual guidance and suggestions on earlier versions ofthis article.

2 Department of Sociology, University of California Santa Barbara: Santa Barbara, Califor-nia, 93106-9430; e-mail: [email protected].

Sociological Forum, Vol. 23, No. 4, December 2008 ( 2008)

DOI: 10.1111/j.1573-7861.2008.00094.x

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Migrations present magnitude and complexity has rendered it a profound

force of local and global social transformation and an emergent research

field requiring further investigation. Since migration disturbs the nation-

states administrative borders and the purported linkage between territory,people, and identity, many scholars have argued that its current dynamics

jeopardize the modern nation-states sovereignty, territoriality, and cul-

tural significance and that national borders are uncontrollable. This article

refines these existing theoretical perspectives by examining the historical

development of immigration policy in Canada and Australia.

Left out of contemporary discussions of migration and globalization

is an appreciation of the impact of national regulations and migrations

political dimensions. Through the inclusion and exclusion of foreigners,

states exercise their territorial sovereignty and communal rights to self-determination. In proclaiming what national members should look like,

migration policies perpetuate dominant visions of society and nationhood.

Many authors have discussed these features (Brubaker, 1992; Torpey,

2000; Walzer, 1983; Zolberg, 2000) and several recent works have demon-

strated that state regulations and national borders remain relevant and

continue to have significant social consequences (Joppke, 1999; Newman,

2006; Waldinger and Fitzgerald, 2004; Walsh, 2008). None, however, have

linked the management of human flows to the unfolding exigencies of

statecraft and nation building and new programs of societal regulationfound under globalization. This article contributes to existing theories by

analyzing migration policies as institutional lenses that mirror and sensi-

tively reflect the shifting requirements and dynamics of social reproduc-

tion. Such policies thus provide a strategic research site through which

globalizations impact on state sovereignty becomes salient. Although no

state can claim to effectively control all migration, all states continues to

claim the legitimate authority to do so andas will be further eluci-

datedin the Canadian and Australian contexts this formal authority has

been matched by a deep level of substantive control.Taking these two settler societies as its cases for analysis, this article

compares shifts in immigration policies over the last 60 years given larger

transitions in national programs of social regulation. In both cases, poli-

cies of large-scale planned migration have served as vital forms of popula-

tion management or macro-social engineering and have been central to

national development. The particular focus is on the movement from

mass-industrial and Keynesian to postindustrial and neoliberal socio-

economic formations. As will be demonstrated, immigration policy played

a pivotal regulatory role in each period. Currently, attempts at orderingand modifying the national population through tightly controlled and

selective immigration policies exist as critical, yet neglected, elements in

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the positioning of both countries within the global system. The analysis

presented thereby provides a unique account of immigration policy under

intensified globalization and how it continues to enhance the nation-states

sovereignty and administrative reach over territory and population.Accepted orthodoxies that states are unable to effectively control migra-

tion fail to account for such experiences. As a caveat, the subsequent find-

ings are unique to the cases and cannot be generalized. However, this

studys mode of analysis or inquirythat migration policies are funda-

mentally political and are connected to statecraft and societal manage-

mentcould be fruitfully applied to a number of other contexts, a point

that will be further addressed in the conclusion.

This article is divided into two main sections. The first reviews cur-

rent theories of transnationalism and corrects the dominant view thatstates have been hamstrung by the forces of international migration and

globalization. The second investigates these issues empirically, analyzing

the postwar migration policies of Canada and Australia. Together they

seek to answer the following questions. (1) How do migratory regulations

render globalizations impact on national sovereignty and borders more

intelligible? (2) What substantive findings are established by examining the

cases of Canada and Australia and how do these contribute to a more

complex account of migration and its political regulation?

WITHER THE NATION-STATE? TRANSNATIONALISM AND

MIGRATION SCHOLARSHIP

In establishing global systems of labor supply and translocal social

formations, many scholars argue that migration now constitutes a core

transnational flow and instance of boundary transgression (Faist, 2000;

Potts, 1990). Contemporary patterns of migration and settlement thereby

augur the diminished relevance of the nation-state as both a territoriallybounded administrative, economic, and cultural container and domain for

generating a durable sense of identity and community (Basch et al., 1994).

In what follows I will briefly summarize existing theories of migrant and

institutional transnationalism and related claims that nation-states no

longer exert the capacity to control their borders. In conclusion, their

shortcomings will be addressed.

New theories of migrant transnationalism assert that globaliza-

tionaided by a series of disembedding technologieshas expanded

the capacity of migrants to construct regularized ties and facilitate densefinancial, symbolic, and informational exchanges between sending and

receiving societies. As a result, migration is now more circular and

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itinerant; it can no longer be understood as the unidirectional movement

and assimilation of individuals from one nation-state to another (Castles,

2002; Portes et al., 1999). Migrants are thereby allowed to situate them-

selves within spatially complex and alternative forms of affiliation andclaim making, whether transnational communities (Portes et al., 1999),

social spaces (Faist, 2000), or postnational (Appadurai, 1996; Soysal,

1994) forms of identity and membership.

Theories of institutional transnationalism cite the emergence of world-

level normative and institutional structures, whether universal human rights

or supra-national political and regulatory bodies, that purportedly govern

immigration and citizenship. In assuming that all individuals are endowed

with certain rights regardless of their nationality, human rights de-territo-

rialize forms of legal personhood and challenge the particularity of nationalmodels of membership (Sassen, 1996; Soysal, 1994). International agree-

ments and instruments, whether the United Nations 1991 Convention on

the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers, the Dublin and

Schengen Agreements of the European Union, or actions by the WTO to

ease political barriers governing the transfer of highly-skilled service

workers, all reflect attempts by the international community to develop

common norms, standards, and practices related to border controls and

labor migration (OECD, 2004; Sassen, 1998; Soysal, 1994).

Human rights and other global agreements lend credence to argu-ments of a world polity and corresponding institutional isomorphism

with the emergence of common normative, associational, and regulatory

complexes (Meyer et al., 1997). However, without a global state possessing

legitimate juridical and executive authority, human and migrant

rightscontra national citizenshiplack an identifiable guarantor and

remain loosely enforced (Brysk and Shafir, 2004). Additionally, the

nation-states sovereign control over who enters its territory or joins its

society is enshrined in these very same world-level institutions (Meyer

et al., 1997; Soysal, 1994). Institutional transnationalism is thereforede-facto; fragmented, incipient, and not fully captured at the most

formal levels of international public law nor in national representations

of the sovereign state (Sassen, 1998:6).

The dismissive stance of transnationalists toward national borders

and regulatory measures is unsurprising given that theories of migration

have traditionally ignored the agency of the state in the process. Causal

and explanatory privilege has instead been given to push and pull

generated by psychic, social, and economic factors, whether individual

motivations and desires, familial and communal networks, or segmentedlabor markets and a global division of labor (see, e.g., Borjas, 1989; Boyd,

1989; Piore, 1979; Sassen, 1988). These perspectives have ensured that



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political understandings of the process are at best fragmentary and

limited (Castles and Miller, 2003:95). Most contemporary discussions of

migration policy view the state as either a dependent variable constrained

by societal interests and pressures or as a passive unit that has lost controlof its borders given rising levels of legal and undocumented migration.

Analysis of the majority of advanced capitalist societiesbut particularly

the United Statesis instructive in these regards. On the one hand, plural-

ist or democratic theories of migration policy argue that the interaction

of societal interests and valueswhether ethnic and business lobbies or

liberal norms of nondiscrimination and public neutralityhave limited the

capacities of states to effectively regulate migration and implement restric-

tive controls (Freeman, 1995; Joppke, 2005; Massey, 1999). In the second

instance, it is observed that even as the majority of affluent states haveplaced increased emphasis on restriction and border security, levels of

undocumented migration have grown in tandem with globalization. This

has created a purported control gap in receiving societies, where the

gap between stated policy objectives and outcomes seems to be grow-

ing wider (Cornelius and Tsuda, 2004:5). Cases such as the United

States, in which a classical strong state with extensive military, adminis-

trative, and fiscal power is unable to effectively control its borders and

stem unwanted migration, are viewed as testaments to a more general

decline in the effective power and executive capacity of the modern state.Both perspectives raise a number of valid points, but when read

in isolation their central propositions are unsatisfactory and incomplete.

Pluralist theories of migration policy reveal that states are never wholly

autonomous and are influenced and mediated by societal mobilization and

collective action. However, they ignore that states are also self-interested

entities and pursue objectives and programs meant to legitimate and extend

their sovereignty over territory and population. Pluralist perspectives also

lack a sufficient conceptualization of how state actions actively condition

state-society relations and capacities of political influence (Skocpol et al.,1985). The second set of claimswhich are more relevant for the discussion

at handcan also be critiqued. Claims that illegal migration represents a

widening control gap and provides an instance of policy failure belie the

complexity of the current situation. On the one hand, states may not be able

to prevent unauthorized entries, but they still exert the capacity to construct

and enforce categories of illegality,which have very real social conse-

quences. Additionally, equating such outcomes with policy failure ignores

two underlying issues: (1) policy goals and objectives are often ambiguous

andor unenforceable, in which case gaps are impossible to quantify, and(2) weak and ineffective enforcement may actually serve as a desired policy

outcome (Zolberg, 2000). In these regards, cases such as the United States

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may actually represent a policy success. In ensuring access to a surplus of

flexible labor with little or no political and legal rights, current policies are

vital for the functioning of the lower tiers of the service economy. The U.S.

experience therefore amount[s] to a purposefully weak regulatory systemthat allows a relatively stable informal guestworker program to stay in

place (Zolberg, 2000:76).

Most problematic, however, is that for both perspectives, analysis

centers on external constraints that undermine national regulation, with-

out ever commenting on contours of state regulation and their actual

impact on migratory patterns. Although such regulations are acknowl-

edged as contextual factors in the migration process, they remain under-

theorized. The administration of national boundaries is more than simply

background noise or a residual component, but is constitutive of theprocess itself (Torpey, 2000; Zolberg, 2000). International migration is

tightly linkedconceptually and historicallyto the nation-state as a

political community, institutional ensemble, and sociocultural complex. As

argued by Aristide Zolberg: International migration is an inherently

political process, which arises from the organization of the world in a con-

geries of mutually exclusive sovereign states, commonly referred to as the

Westphalian system (Zolberg, 2000:81).

Even when disjunctures exist between policy on the books and policy

in action, national borders and regulatory controls remain linked to theadministrative and symbolic dimensions of the nation-state. Since migra-

tion impacts the makeup of the national population, its regulation has

important demographic, social, and economic consequences, whether in

terms of population growth, economic accumulation, the division of labor

and taxation, or social expenditure. Additionally, all nation-states pro-

claim a specific political and historicalif not explicitly culturalidentity.

Migration policies often play a central role in perpetuating such identities.

In distinguishing between the political subject and the foreign other,

admission policies serve as institutional mechanisms for producing societaland communal boundaries. Noting this connection, political theorists have

argued that migration and naturalization are preeminent expressions of

national sovereignty and self-determination (Arendt, 1973; Isin and

Turner, 1999; Walzer, 1983). For these reasons, migration policies are

inevitably forms of social engineering and provide a window into the

internal life of the state as it determines the favored attributes of the

national population. Finally, admission policies not only delimit the social

order, but often seek to strategically incorporate foreigners in the interests

of reproducing that order. The aim of state policies is not to obstructhuman movement but, rather, to regulate it and define the conditions

under which it may legitimately occur. Instead of entryways that are either



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open or closed, borders are better conceived of as filters that welcome

those deemed culturally or economically desirable, while excluding those

classed as undesirable.

POST-1945 IMMIGRATION POLICIES OF CANADA

AND AUSTRALIA

So far my argument has remained conceptual and abstract, stressing

the linkage of immigration policies to the nation-states administrative and

communal dimensions. This section situates these dynamics historically.

With the transition to a postindustrial society, the Canadian and Austra-

lian states have revised and deepened their management of migrant intake.Utilizing skills-based points systems dedicated to targeting economic

migrants and gauging their human capital, both states have heightened

their recognition that immigration is a reality and that it should be con-

trolled and harnessed by the state. Canada and Australia may appear as

weak states and minor nodes within broader migratory networks; how-

ever, two features demonstrate their worth as cases for analysis: first, their

exceptional historical experiences as planned mass migration has remained

a key component of national development and, second, their reputation as

model countries whose policies are increasingly emulated under global-ization. In regard to the first, as classical countries of immigration, both

have been built, founded, and defined by mass migration. In place of

exclusionary policies meant to obstruct migration and settlement, both

governments have remained committed to carefully managing inflows on

their own terms and in line with programs of nation building. Most

importantly, since the 1970s, both have steadily expanded their efforts in

carefully selecting and managing the composition of incoming migrants.

In contrast to claims of a control gap, these outcomes indicate that in a

broad historical perspective this purported gap has narrowed rather thanwidened. Neither country is immune to illegal migration, nor unauthorized

entries, butdue to both policy choice and geographylevels of both are

rather low (Castles et al., 1998; Reitz, 2004). In Australia, it is estimated

that at present there are 50,000 undocumented migrants. Although no reli-

able statistics exists, estimates range from 60,000 to 200,000 persons for

Canada. Proportionally, these rates are significantly lower than most other

advanced capitalist societies and minute when compared to extreme cases

such as the United States and Greece (OECD, 2006). In fact, for both

states, the only major policy gap would be consistent shortfalls in theactual number of migrants admitted versus the target level set by each

government. If this is taken as a gap, it is the opposite of other countries

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where numerical targets tend to be lower than the actual immigration

flow (Reitz, 2004:103). Additionally, Canada and Australia exhibit two

of the highest rates of migration in the world as 18% and 25% of their

populations, respectively, are foreign born; Saudi Arabia is the only othermajor receiving society with equivalent levels (OECD, 2004). In a world

defined by restrictive policies and heightened border controls, commit-

ments to large-scale migration and settlementalbeit tightly regu-

latedare exceptional.

Second, when crafting their immigration policies, governments

frequently analyze and borrow from the policies of other countries. Aca-

demics and policymakers are often surprised to find that the policies of

Canada and Australia are watched with increasing interest by other states

(Cornelius and Tsuda, 2004). This is because both have been consistentlysuccessful in coordinating the admission and incorporation of large

migrant cohorts. Additionally, their current skills-based systems, which

allow states to allude to principles of both control and fairness, are

more palatable in a domestic and international context. Finally, and

perhaps most importantly, the increasing attention directed toward their

policies is due to the fact that as globalization expands, the questions

that face multinational and settler societiesprincipally, coordinating

the entrance and integration of foreign populationshave now become

the questions that face states that originally saw themselves as ethnicallyhomogenous (Isin and Turner, 1999:5) or immune to immigration. Coun-

tries that have either pursued or implemented models of selection based

on Canadas and Australias contemporary policies include the United

Kingdom, Germany, France, the Netherlands, the United States, New

Zealand, Singapore, Malaysia, Iceland, Italy, Finland, Ireland, and Japan

(Favell and Hansen, 2002; Isin and Turner, 1999; Ruddock, 2002).

Consolidating the Mass Society: Migration Policy During thePostwar Years

As settler colonies, immigration has been pivotal in Canadas and

Australias economic, cultural, and demographic development. However,

only since the conclusion of World War II has planned mass migration

been a continuous phenomenon and a significant component of social reg-

ulation. During this period, the economic and regulatory orders of mass

industrialization and Keynesianism ensured that both countries experi-

enced secular trends in economic growth, employment, and real wages.Migration policies, however, have been consistently left out of such discus-

sions. This is unfortunate as large-scale planned migration served as the



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centerpiece in both governments attempts at fulfilling the economic and

social objectives of self-sufficiency, growth, and full employment. Con-

trolled migration was intended to enlarge the population and stimulate

production and demand without sacrificing cultural homogeneity or thestatus of the domestic working class. Such policies impacts are demon-

strated on three levels: demographic, economic, and cultural.

The Australian government, recognizing the strategic importance of

migration, founded the Department of Immigration in 1945. Its first min-

ister, Aurthur Calwell, quickly proclaimed the need to populate or

perish and sought to increase Australias population by 1% per annum

without upsetting its racial and ethnic homogeneity (Jordens, 1997). In

1947, Canadian Prime Minister Mackenzie King advocated a major immi-

gration program, noting the danger that lies in a small populationattempting to hold so great a heritage as ours (quoted in Abu-Laban

and Gabriel, 2002:40) Immediately after World War II, intake was

expanded over tenfold in both countries (CIC, 2004; DIEA, 1981). The

quest for demographic expansion was underpinned primarily by economic

motives. During postwar reconstruction, the biggest economic dilemma

facing both countries was absolute labor shortages. Migrants were to alle-

viate bottlenecks in productive capacity and provide the necessary labor

for both countries emergent industrial economies (Castles and Miller,

2003; Pendakur, 2000). In place of agricultural and rural settlement,migrants were clustered in urban areas and unskilled industrial occupa-

tions. Native Canadians were twice as likely to work in higher-end service

occupations, while migrants were a third and two-thirds more likely to

work in manufacturing and construction, respectively (Pendakur, 2000).

In Australia, migrants were incorporated into the manufacturing sector

at double the rate of the native population, resulting in their labeling as

factory fodder (Jordens, 1997). Planned mass migration was to broker

economic growth in three ways: it would (1) help both countries fully

exploit their resources, (2) establish scale economies by expanding laborand consumer markets, and (3) establish a nationally aggregated economy

insulated from external factors and competition. As stated within the

Canadian governments 1966 White Paper on Immigration: A bigger

population means increased domestic markets [which] permits manufac-

turing firms to undertake longer, lower cost production runs, and broad-

ens the range of industry we can undertake economically improv[ing]

our competitive position in world markets (DMI, 1966:8). Like the

majority of advanced capitalist societies at the time, both Canada and

Australia recruited foreign workers to fuel industrial expansion. However,unlike the guestworker programs of Europe and the United States,

migrants were sought out as settlers rather than denizens or temporary

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residents. Migrants did not, therefore, represent an institutionally subordi-

nate segment of the working class. Both countries prioritized protecting

the status of the domestic working class and rejected temporary guest-

workers because by lowering the costs of production they would alsodisrupt aggregate levels of demand (DMI, 1966; Markus, 1994).

Migrants were also selected based on their closeness to the ideals of

the mass citizen embraced during the postwar years. Migrants were to

receive extensive government support for both travel and settlement,

assuming they were willing to engage in industrial labor and assimilate to

British political and cultural norms (Abu-Laban and Gabriel, 2002; Jupp,

2002). Forms of social citizenshipembodied in state-welfarismwere to

fuse the nation and establish a collective or generalized sense of reciproc-

ity. However, often ignored and equally important was maintaining themonocultural fabric of both societies. In addition to common material

conditions, shared cultural traits were viewed as necessary in supplanting

divisions of class, status, and region and maintaining a unified and cohe-

sive national society (Birrell, 1995; McBride and Shields, 1993). Reflecting

these concerns, migration policies were pursued with the intent of preserv-

ing both countries ethnic and cultural distinctiveness. Nationality was

given precedence in the selection process; British were preferred and

were actively recruited, Europeans were accepted, assuming they were will-

ing to assimilate, and non-Europeans were largely restricted (Hawkins,1988). These restrictions were justified by appeals to each countrys histor-

ical, ethnic, and cultural particularity. As Arthur Calwell stated in 1947,

I do not think that an Occidental mind can follow the mental processes

of an Oriental mind (Markus, 1994:168). In Canada, Prime Minister

King proclaimed, the people of Canada do not wish to make a funda-

mental alteration in the character of our population considerable

Oriental migration would give rise to social and economic problems

(Abu-Laban and Gabriel, 2002:40). Despite migrations links to macro-

economic expansion, ethnicity and nationality constituted the primaryaxes for excluding, ordering, and ranking foreign populations. Aside from

excluding unassimiable migrants, neither country implemented clear

mechanisms for screening or categorizing potential migrants.

BORDER CONTROL AND GLOBALIZATION: CONTEMPORARY

IMMIGRATION POLICIES

In light of a number of economic, political, and cultural develop-ments commonly associated with globalization, both countries found that

the dominant modes of government rationality and border control utilized



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during the early postwar years were anachronistic and required substantial

modification. In response, both countries began to stress neoliberal

models of migration policy and social regulation that emphasized the

ideals of enterprise, skills, autonomy, and flexibility. At the level of migra-tion policy, the primary result has been the adoption of point systems for

evaluating and enumerating the economic potential of individual migrants.

These systems constitute numerical indexes of desirability in which indi-

viduals are subjected to insurantial evaluations based on their risk and

probable contribution to society. The extensively managerial point systems

have been instrumental in allowing both countries to rigorously calculate

and control the effects of migration in line with their larger interests of

governance and legitimation. With their allocative and regulatory capaci-

ties deflated by neoliberal deregulation and market discipline, controlsover mobility and membership have become increasingly vital forms of

social regulation. In what follows, I trace the emergence and evolution

of the point systems and link their development to new state programs of

neoliberal regulation.

The Emergence of the Point Systems

Ethnicity and nationality constituted the central criteria of migrantselection for several decades. However, with the codification of human

rights regimes and increasing pressure from the international community,

both governments pledged to practice nondiscrimination by dismantling

their Eurocentric policies. Canada led the way with a number of policy

reforms in 1962, while Australia followed in 1973. Multiculturalism and

substantive commitments to liberal-democratic principles have generally

been touted by academics and policymakers as the official rationale

behind such shifts (Joppke, 2005; Kymlicka, 1995). Such perspectives

ignore that alongside the easing of ethnic and national restrictiveness wasthe institution of sophisticated mechanisms for sorting migrants based on

economic attributes. In this manner, instead of more open and inclusive,

over time, the dispersal of territorial access has, in certain respects,

become significantly more stringent. After ending their discriminatory

policies, both countries initially placed almost exclusive emphasis on

humanitarian migration and family reunification. However, this phase was

short lived (Hawkins, 1988). Recognizing the increasing importance of

advanced manufacturing and specialized services as critical economic sec-

tors, both governments began to emphasize the economic significance ofmigration policy, an emphasis that has expanded with parallel increases in

globalization. As stated within the Canadian governments 1966 White

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Paper on Immigration, Canada has become a highly complex industrial-

ized and urban society if [migrants] entering the workforce do not

have the training to do the kinds of jobs available, they will be burdens

rather than assets (DMI, 1966:78). Similar concerns were echoed inAustralia: Many [migrants] lack the skills to succeed in Australia. The

new approach to migrant selection will ensure that the migrant intake

remains consistent with Australias absorptive capacity and that those

accepted settle successfully (DIEA, 1978:56).

In 1967, the Canadian government established its first comprehen-

sive system of migrant selection, the point system. In 1979, Australia,

modeling the Canadian system, adopted its own version, titled the

Numerical Multifactor Assessment System (NUMAS) (Hawkins, 1988).

These systems sorted migrants into three distinct groups or classes: theindependent or skilled class, the family class, and the humanitarian

class. Familial and humanitarian migrants were granted entrance with-

out extensive government scrutiny. However, independent migrants were

subjected to this new administrative device. The point systems created a

numerical scale in which the presence of a number of different attri-

butes predetermined by the state, whether age, occupational demand,

education, work experience, language ability, or adaptability, would

produce a specific score for each migrant. If awarded a high enough

score, individuals would be assigned a pass mark and granted entryand potential citizenship. This established an algorithmic index of

admittance based on statistical modeling and risk minimization. In both

countries, the pass mark was initially set at 50or halfof the total

points possible.

Although eliminating overt discrimination and racial bias, the point

systems havemore significantlyexpanded government control and

placed greater emphasis on human capital. This shift has been informed

by the structural transformation of the global economy and institutional

capacities of both nation-states. Before examining exactly how these newpolicy regimes have pursued these objectives, it is first necessary to place

them within their larger structural and historical context.

From Keynesianism to Neoliberalism; Socioeconomic Transformation

By the early 1970s, mass industrialism and Keynesianism were no

longer effective at stabilizing economic crises and securing full employ-

ment within advanced capitalist societies. In response, new growth strate-gies emerged, founded on global economic integration, the dismantling of

social-welfarism, and the emergence of the new entrepreneurial or



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Schumpeterian workfare state (Jessop, 1994). With these transforma-

tions, firms and governments throughout the developed world entered into

a period of experimentation in which economic and regulatory strategies

were reorganized to render capital and economic activity more flexibleand competitive in a transnational context (Harvey, 1990). In their

attempt to reduce costs, firms in Canada and Australiaparticularly

within manufacturing and heavy industrybegan to offshore production,

underwent organizational restructuring, and introduced labor-saving tech-

nologies. As manufacturing was outsourced, both countries found their

economies increasingly reliant on international trade and investment,

knowledge-based production, and advanced producer, business, and finan-

cial services (McBride and Shields, 1993; Moran, 2005). Responding to

these deep economic changes, both countries adopted extensive neoliberalreforms in the 1980s. Pursuing policies of socioeconomic nonintervention,

both governments drastically lowered tariff and other trade barriers, de-

regulated capital and financial markets, implemented regressive tax struc-

tures, and, finally, withdrew their commitments toward public enterprise.

As the Canadian and Australian welfare states experienced crises related

to economic and demographic transitions, the principles of redistribution

and social collectivism were displaced by those of market rationalism and

individualism. In place of national institutions, the market was posited as

the most effective means of organizing societies and coordinating socialrelations. As a result, a number of social programs traditionally adminis-

tered at the national level, whether healthcare, education, unemployment

insurance, pensions, or public transportation, were eliminated or trans-

ferred to either regional or local governments, the private sphere, or civil

society (Anderson, 2001; Sears, 1999).

THE EXPANSION, INTENSIFICATION, AND MODIFICATION

OF THE POINT SYSTEMS

Reflecting the realignment of the capitalist world economy and new

national programs of regulation, both Canada and Australia further

refined their migration policies. New administrative techniques were

employed to (1) forestall the shrinking and graying of both countries

populations, (2) establish cross-national systems of labor circulation for

affluent and highly-skilled migrants, and (3) cohere to models of neoliberal

state management. Unable and unwilling to substantively regulate their

economies or provide for their societies, both countries employed theirmigration policies to manage their human infrastructures and maintain a

highly-qualified, competitive, and self-reliant population.

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Managing the Global Demographic Divide: Migration Policy as

Population Policy

With declines in fertility and increases in life expectancy, both coun-

tries have been defined by rapidly graying populations. In 1968 and

1972, Australia and Canada, respectively, saw birthrates fall below the

replacement level of 2.1 births per household (Castles et al., 1998; Stein,

2003). In combination with falling mortality rates and rising median ages,

these trends have threatened to amplify a number of societal contradic-

tions, including the shrinking of the labor force and tax base, increases in

social expenditure dedicated to the elderly, and declines in state legitimacy

given its inability to secure the necessary levels of social goods oreconomic growth.

Policies of large-scale planned migration have therefore remained crit-

ical strategies of state management. Within the last 20 years, migrants

have accounted for the majority of labor force and population growth

and may soon serve as the sole expansionary factor (Beaujot, 2003;

DIMIA, 2004b). Although demographic expansion has served as a contin-

uous policy objective, the dynamics of such practices have shifted from

generic to targeted forms of population growth. With the emergence of

postindustrial societies, economically selective measures have ensured thatthe quality, rather than quantity, of migrants became the primary focus of

state policy. Absolute population growth remains a concern of state plan-

ners, but has been integrated into a more tailored approach focused on

incorporating those of specific social and occupational backgrounds.

In their attempts at achieving these objectives, both governments have

expanded, intensified, and modified the point systems: expanded, as an addi-

tional point system has been added for attracting the nomadic members of

an emergent transnational investor and capitalist class; intensified, as the

proportion of skilled migrants has increased dramatically at the expense ofnoneconomic migrants; and modified, as migration policy has been pursued

under a user-pay model in which government expenditure is offset by

significantly increasing fees for migrants. All three developments have

ensured that economic utility has become the primary criterion of selection

and that migration policy occupies an elevated position within neoliberal

models of governmental regulation. Multiculturalism and diversity have

continued to contribute to policy discourse but have been integrated into

a more economically rationalist agenda. The current diversity of migrant

origins has been viewed by both countries as providing the culturaland economic links necessary for facilitating cross-national flows of

trade, investment, and capital. As stated by the Canadian government:



15/28

Our multilingual, multiethnic workforce provides us with a distinct

comparative advantage in the global marketplace (CIC, 2000:2). Addition-

ally, Australia has pursued multicultural policies with the full realization of

the benefits they contribute to Australias increasingly global economy(DIMIA, 2004a:25). It is therefore of little surprise that in the present post-

industrial period, alongside ethnic lobbies and migrant advocacy groups,

business has been a consistent supporter of expansive and nondiscrimina-

tory migration policies (Collins, 1995; Reitz, 2004; Skeldon, 1995).

Expanding the Point Systems: The Addition of the Business Class

One of the initial indicators of the transition to an economicallyguided policy was the creation of the investor or business class as a

subset of the larger skilled category. In 1986, Canada created a

separateand significantly more lenientpoint system for entrepreneurs

and investors (Ley, 2003). These actions were driven by the governments

desire to attract affluent migrants leaving Hong Kong and to bring

more millionaires to Canada (Harrison, 1996:13). Currently, migrants

falling in the businessinvestor stream are required to have owned or

operated a business prior to migrating, demonstrate assets totaling C$1

million, and, finally, invest more than C$500,000 for 5 years in a Cana-dian business that preserves domestic jobs (OECD, 2004). During the

early 1990s, the business stream contributed close to 15% of all migra-

tory inflows (Ley, 2003). In the late 1980s, Australia followed suit,

implementing special fast tracks to attract wealthy professionals

and entrepreneurs. Those admitted under Australias business-skills

program are given provisional visas and, after demonstrating sufficient

business and investment activity, are granted permanent residence and

citizenship (DIMIA, 2004a).

Intensifying the Importance of Economic Migration

Alongside the addition of the business class, both governments have

intensified the selectivity of their policies on two fronts: first, the point

systems were made more restrictive and, second, the ratio of skilled to

familyhumanitarian migrants was inverted. Over time, both countries

increased the number of points necessary to secure entry from one-half to

two-thirds of the total. Additionally, greater importance was attached tohuman capital and work experience, while noneconomic criteria, whether

the presence of relatives or the intended geographic location of settlement,

800 Walsh


16/28

were either removed or relaxed in their impact. These actions were

undertaken to ensure that migrants would be employable and easily

absorbed into the labor market (Richardson and Lester, 2004) (see

Table I).In addition to altering the criteria of selection, Canada and Australia

also reformulated their intake ceilings. Prior to 1996, the majority of

migrants entered through the family and refugee classes, which together

Table I. Points Systems: Australia and Canada, 2004

Maximum Points Percent

Australiaa

Skill 60 34Age 30 17English Language Proficiency 20 11Specific Work Experience 10 6Occupational DemandJob Offer 15 9Australian Qualifications 15 9Regional AustraliaLow Population 5 3Spouse Skills 5 3Relationship wan Australian Citizen 15 9Total* 175 100Pass Mark 115 66Canadab

Education 25 25Age 10 10Language Ability 24 24Work Experience 21 21Arranged Employment 10 10Adaptability 10 10Total** 100 100Pass Mark 67 67

aRegional AustraliaLow Population refers to points awarded for the desire to settle to ruralor semi-urban areas. In addition to securing an adequate number of points, the primaryapplicant must also meet the following requirements: (1) have postsecondary qualifications

or substantial work experiences in some exceptional cases, (2) must have some knowledge ofvocational English, (3) must be under 45 years old when applying, (4) must have recent workexperience, requirements vary based on occupation, (5) must nominate an occupation thatfits the applicants skills, and (6) have their skills assessed by the relevant authorities.bFor Education points range from 5 for the completion of a secondary education to 25 for thecompletion of a Masters degree or Ph.D. For age maximum points are awarded for those 2149, points are lost for each year outside of this range. Language ability refers to proficiency ineither French or English. Adaptability includes education and skill level of the applicantsspouse and the ability for skills to be broadly applied throughout the labor market.*Five bonus points are available for possessing any of the following three attributes; capitalinvestment in Australia, Australian skilled work experience, and fluency in a trading lan-guage (other than English).

**In addition to receiving a pass mark, applicants must also meet minimum work experiencerequirements and prove that they have the funds to support their family 6 months after arri-val.Source: Richardson and Lester (2004).



17/28

accounted for upward of 60%, and at times above 75%, of the total

entrants. After 1996, responding to growing ethnonationalist sentiments,

burgeoning non-European populations, and the increased importance of

skills-based policies for national regulatory programs, both governmentsinverted the ceilings governing admittance and made the skilled or inde-

pendent class the primary component of entry.

By the mid-1990s, nativist and ethnonationalist sentiments began to

grow in both societies. Many citizensparticularly white working-class

males displaced with the transition to globalizationfeared that increasing

numbers of non-European migrants would corrupt their cultural heritage

and became disenchanted with expansive migration policies and multicul-

tural initiatives. It was argued that struggles for cultural recognition atten-

uated national cohesion, identity, and created a society of disparate andconflictive parts (Moran, 2005). Additionally, the presence, albeit small in

number, of refugees and illegal migrantsparticularly boat people from

Asiabecame a contentious political issue. Proclaiming such migrants to

be public charges and abusers of generous asylum laws, Canadian and

Australian politicians and members of the general public began to call for

more restrictive migration policies (Jupp, 2002; Reitz, 2004). Immigration

has been an especially divisive issue in Australian politics as key political

figures ranging from Prime Minister John Howard to One Nations

Pauline Hanson have openly lamented the Asianization of Australia(Jupp, 2002). Although less politically salient, over time, public percep-

tions of immigration in Canada have become increasingly negative (Reitz,

2004). The growing predominance of ethnonationalism has not, however,

resulted in the renewal of ethnically restrictive migration policies. In both

countries, nativist sentiments have been balanced by countervailing politi-

cal coalitions. Asian migrantswho actually constitute a major conserva-

tive bloc in many urban areas ranging from Vancouver to Sydneywere

quick to voice their objections against this new restrictionist push (Collins,

1995; Skeldon, 1995). Additionally, arguing that restriction and discrimi-nation contradicted each countrys commitment to regional political and

economic enmeshment, business interests also mobilized in opposition

(Reitz, 2004; Skeldon, 1995). Finally, since Quebecs quiet revolution in

the late 1960s and the growing recognition that Canadas identity is bi- if

not multinational, Canadian policymakers have feared that any perceived

retreat from multicultural platforms could have disastrous political conse-

quences (Cairns, 1999; Kaufman, 2007a,b; Wimmer, 2007).

These conflicting societal tensions influenced both governments ulti-

mate decision to place greater emphasis on skilled migration. Acknowledg-ing that cultural and ethnic homogeneity were no longer critical referents

of national identity, but still attempting to respond to nativist segments of

802 Walsh


18/28

society, both countries remained committed to nondiscriminatory policies

while limiting entrance from the most contentious categories of entrance:

the familial and humanitarian classes. Since 1996, independent migrants

have surpassed the previously dominant familial class, regularly account-ing for the majority of both countries total intake (CIC, 2004; DIMIA,

2005) (see Figs. 1 and 2). In doing so, both governments were able to

maintain relatively high levels of public consent. Without origins quotas,

their policies could still be framed as open and universal. However, by

ensuring that the majority of entrants would be subject to evaluation

under the point systems, both governments were also able to cite greater

control, precision, and economic benefits.

Fig. 1. Canada: permanent residents by intake category, 19802004.Source: CIC (2005).

Fig. 2. Australia: distribution of migrant classes, 19902005.Source: DIMIA (2002, 2004, 2005).



19/28

These transitions have not only been politically expedient but have

also served as adaptive strategies for both governments within the global

system. With the recalibration of their selection policies, both states have

sought to expand those economic sectors favored by globalization, partic-ularly information technology and advanced business and producer ser-

vices. In Canada, globalization has been cited as the most significant

trend affecting immigration [policy] today (CIC, 1998:1) and that skilled

migration is an essential part of maintaining its competitive position in a

knowledge-based and service oriented world economy (CIC, 2000:6).

Arguments for the economic benefits of migration were also mobilized by

the Australian government: Emphasis on attracting highly-skilled

migrants reflects the importance of having the right skills available

at the right time if Australia is to increase its competitiveness within theglobal marketplace (DIMIA, 2004a:iii).

Instead of a distinct segment of the working class subordinate to the

larger population, both countries managerial policies have ensured that

migrant labor is a superordinate strata. Migrants are significantly more

skilled and educated than the domestic workforce and are increasingly

from affluent and middle-class backgrounds (CIC, 2005; DIMIA, 2004a).

These outcomes directly contradict the dominant depictions of migrant

labor as the structural equivalent of the offshore proletariat (Sassen,

2001:322). Instead of harnessing and incorporating the necessary reservearmy of labor from abroad, both countries have sought to attract the

itinerant and highly-valued members of an emergent transnational mana-

gerial and professional class. In place of agricultural, infrastructural, and

industrial occupations, migrants now enter with intended occupations in

specialized services and knowledge-based production, whether computer

programmers, engineers, accountants, or managers and other professionals

(CIC, 2003, 2005; DIMIA, 2004a,b, 2005) (see Tables II and III). Not all

migrants have occupied favorable positions within the labor market. Non-

English-speaking migrants from the humanitarian and family classesremain overrepresented in manufacturing and the service sectors lower

rungs (Castles et al., 1998; Reitz, 2004). However, both countries policies

have ensured that such instancesin contrast to the majority of receiving

societiesare the exception rather than the norm.

Modifying the Point Systems: The Neoliberal Administration of

Migration Policy

In line with economic deregulation and the rollback of state-welfarism,

both states have administered their migration policies in novel ways.

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TableII.

A

ustralianSettlerArrivalsStatingandOccupation,

1995

1996to2004

2005*

Occupation

PercentageDistribution

199596

1996

97

1997

98

1998

99

1999

00

2000

01

2001

02

2002

03

2003

04

2004

05

Manager

sandAdminstrators

12

13.9

2

12.9

4

13

.55

13.5

2

14

15.1

6

14.7

4

13.1

9

13.1

Professio

nals

35.92

35.5

6

36.7

6

35

.94

37.1

4

43.6

9

46.1

8

45.7

46.7

8

45.8

8

AssociateProfessionals

10.15

10.3

3

8.3

8

8

.41

8.9

1

8.5

3

7.4

3

7.4

1

8.2

4

8.8

4

Tradespe

rsons

15.44

14.9

3

15.7

2

15

.35

13.2

2

11.4

9

11

12.9

3

13.1

8

11.8

7

TotalSkilledOccupations

73.5

74.7

4

73.8

73

.25

72.8

77.7

2

79.7

8

80.7

9

81.4

79.6

9

OtherOccupations

26.5

25.2

6

26.2

26

.75

27.2

22.2

8

20.2

2

19.2

1

18.6

20.3

1

Total

100

100

100

100

100

100

100

100

100

100

*(1)ManagersandAdministratorsincludesfinancemanagers,companysecretaries,

informationtech

nologymanagers,andother;(2)Profes-

sionalsin

cludesscientists,engineers,

acc

ountants,

auditors,

computing

professionals,

statisticiansand

actuaries,

medicalprofessionals,teachers

andprof

essors,

economists,

andother;

(3)AssociateProfessionalsincludesfinancialdealersandbrok

ers,financialinvestmentadvisors,

chefs,

andothe

r;(4)Tradespersonsincludeme

chanical,fabric,automotive,electrical,construction,

andother.

Source:B

irrelletal.(2005).



21/28

Demonstrating their new entrepreneurial role, both governments carried

out such measures to minimize government expenditure, while maximizingthe potential returns of migrants. Under user-pay and cost-free poli-

cies, both governments have curtailed expenses related to their migration

programswhether language classes or travel and settlement assis-

tanceand have significantly raised fees for processing visa and citizenship

applications. Additionally, migrants are now denied a variety of social

entitlements, including access to healthcare and unemployment insurance,

during their initial years of residence (Jupp, 2002; Reitz, 2004). Intended to

recover the costs of state administration, these measures have also served

as devices for attracting employable and self-sufficient migrants who willnot be burdens to the state. As they have been expanded, intensified, and

modified, the neoliberal point systems have served as mechanisms of

Table III. Canadian Settlers 15 Years of Age or Older Intending to Work by OccupationalSkill Level*

Skill Category

Percentage Distribution

1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003

Skill LevelO Managerial 3 3.1 3 2.9 2.8 3.2 3.7 3.5 3.3A Professionals 20.2 24.1 28 28.7 32.6 35.1 35.6 35.4 32.2B Skilled and Technical 19.4 20.3 20.9 17.9 14.4 13.8 13.9 14 11.4C Intermediate and Clerical 7.6 6.6 6.4 5.8 5 5.5 5.3 5 4.8D Elemental and Labourers 9.2 4.8 3.8 1.6 1.1 1 0.9 0.8 0.7Occupational Skill Level Identified 59.4 58.9 62.1 56.9 55.9 58.6 59.4 58.7 52.4New Workers 37.7 38.4 35.3 41.1 42.2 39.9 39.4 40.3 46.6Industrial Codes 2.8 2.8 2.6 2 1.7 1.4 1.2 1 1

Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100

*Skill Level O management occupations; Skill Level A professional occupationsrequiring university degree in administration and business, natural and applied sciences,health, social science, education, government service, religion and art, and culture; SkillLevel B technical or clerical occupations requiring 2 to 5 years of postsecondary educa-tion, apprenticeship or on-the-job training, includes occupations in administration andbusiness, natural and applied sciences, health, law, social service, education and religion,art, culture, recreation and sport, sales and service, trades, skilled transport and equip-ment operators, skilled primary occupation, and processing, manufacturing, and utilitiessupervisors, and skilled operators; Skill Level C intermediate occupations requiring 1 to4 years of secondary education including clerical, health services, sales and services, trans-

port, equipment operators, installation and maintenance, primary industries, and process-ing and manufacturing machine operators and assemblers; Skill Level D occupationsrequiring no formal education, includes construction, primary industries, processing, man-ufacturing, and utilities; New Workers migrants intending to work in Canada but with-out declared occupation; Industrial Codes economic migrants in the business categorywho have declared their industrial sector of activity in place of intended occupation.Source: CIC (2005).

806 Walsh


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supply-side regulation for expanding labor and financial markets and

indirectly brokering trade and investment flows. Utilizing migrant labor

does ensure that the socially necessary costs of labor force renewal,

whether education, healthcare, or other social goods, are externalized tothe sending country (Burawoy, 1976). However, the targeting of affluent

and highly-skilled migrants has the additional effect of eliminating the need

for subsequent government investment. In both countries, the economic

contributions of migrants have been widely recognized. In Canada,

migrants have invested billions of dollars in the economy and have played

a vital role in expanding a number of economic sectors, including housing,

information and communications technology, utilities, and business and

producer services (Harrison, 1996; Ley, 2003). In Australia, the govern-

ment has compared its migration policy to other neoliberal strategies,whether tax cuts or trade liberalization. According to government

estimates, if the volume and composition of inflows persists, migrants

should annually raise living standards by $794 per capita: The gain is

sizeable. By way of comparison, a large personal income tax cut of

about $20 billion would be required to achieve the same gain in living

standards. And it dwarfs the projected gains of under $200 per head from

the important policy reform of bring down trade barriers (DIMIA,

2004b:31). In sum, the historical trajectories of both cases indicate that two

clear regimes of migration policy were instituted during the postwar period(see Table IV). At the level of continuity, both regimes reveal attempts by

the Canadian and Australian states to improve their socioeconomic

positions by facilitating and managing large migrant inflows. However,

when examining the dynamics, outcomes, and larger regulatory context

attached to each regime, it is apparent that the postwar period was defined

Table IV. Comparison of Models of Immigration Policy in Canada and Australia

DimensionModel I Policies Under

Mass IndustrializationModel II Policies Under

Globalization

Time Period 194570 1970PresentCentral Mechanism of Selection Informal Origins Quotas Points SystemsPrimary Criteria of Selection Culture, Nationality,

EthnicityHuman Capital

Migrant OccupationalBackground

IndustrialManufacturingand Construction

Service OrientedAccountants,Engineers, IT-workers, etc.

Nature of Migration Large-Scale PlannedMigration

Large-Scale PlannedMigration

Origins of Migrants EuropeanBritish Non-EuropeanAsianLinks to Larger Regulatory

StrategiesKeynesianism, Economic

Cultural ProtectionismNeoliberalism and

Multiculturalism



23/28

by a drastic policy shift. Initially, migration policies played a central role in

the transition to a mass industrial society. Throughout the early postwar

period, they were employed to maintain homogenous, protected, and self-

sufficient economies and societies. European migrants were incorporatedinto industrial occupations, whether in manufacturing, construction, or

other secondary industries. Reflecting larger Keynesian strategies of regula-

tion, such migration was meant to establish nationally integrated scale

economies in which production and consumption were linked in stable

equilibrium. In providing two of the central components of accumula-

tionlabor power and demandmigrants ensured that the dominant eco-

nomic arrangements were realizable. In spite of the economic components

of large-scale migration, selection itself was determined by nationality.

Fearing that cultural and ethnic heterogeneity would produce socialtension and conflict, both governments employed extensive origins quotas

to control the admission of non-European migrants. With the twin forces

of economic and cultural globalization, both countries reformulated their

policies. Although this shift has often been reduced to a new political ethic

of multiculturalism and nondiscrimination, careful analytic scrutiny reveals

that the increasing diversity of migrants has been matched by more rigor-

ous economic models of selection. In fact, both countries skills-based

point systems have come to occupy an elevated position within neoliberal

programs of social regulation. Immigration policies have served asinstitutional ensembles for enabling economic growth, competitiveness, and

global integration by targeting those individualsparticularly highly-

skilled service workerswho will improve each countrys position within

the global economic hierarchy and advance the norms of free enterprise.

These programs demonstrate how the nation-state plays an active role in

managing and brokering the space of flows, of which migration, while

often neglected, is a constitutive element (Hannerz, 1996). By catering to

affluent professionals, investors, and entrepreneurs, Canada and Australia

have attempted to weather the inherent risk and volatility of a deregulatedglobal economy by attracting its central human agents. Rather than

members of a global working class, the targets of contemporary policies

are largely members of an emergent transnational capitalist and profes-

sional class (see, e.g., Robinson, 2004; Sklair, 1995). Although in the past,

migration policies were aligned with narratives of economic and cultural

insularity, differences in customs and origins are presently overlooked so

long as one reflects the ideals of homo economicus, or the rational actor

who adopts and is well versed in the logic and idioms of the market. These

changes demonstrate that despite appeals to multiculturalism, for Canadaand Australia the selection of migrants has ultimately been reduced to their

potential economic contributions.

808 Walsh


24/28

CONCLUSION

By way of conclusion, this article has traced the recent trajectories of

Canadas and Australias migration policies to firmly situate the nation-state within the processes of globalization and international migration.

The general argument that globalization has altered the volume, patterns,

and political perceptions of international migration is clearly supported by

the Canadian and Australian cases. State officials and policymakers in

both countries have routinely identified the process as the central force

shaping migration policy. However, the essential argument of received the-

oriesthat exogenous transnational factors, ranging from human rights

regimes, illegal migration, global economic arrangements, and cross-

border ethnoscapes, have undermined state sovereignty and territoriality(Appadurai, 1996; Cornelius and Tsuda, 2004; Soysal, 1994)fail to

account for the experiences of both cases. In place of a control gap or

deflated borders, both countries have remained committed to policies of

controlled mass migration as components of societal regulation.

An analysis of both cases suggests that the nation-state remains a

constituent within the processes of international migration and globaliza-

tion. Presently, migration policies represent vital mechanisms of state

management and highlight the articulation and pursuit of new programs

and rationalities of government under globalization. While remainingcommitted to large-scale planned migration, attracting highly-skilled

knowledge workers, capitalists, entrepreneurs, and investors, instead of

industrial workers of European descent, has become the dominant policy

objective. In expanding government control over the migration process

and placing greater emphasis on the economic potential of migrants,

skills-based point systems have ensured that with the onset of globaliza-

tion migration controls have actually become more tightly linked to the

exigencies of nation building and statecraft. In both instances, the state

cannot be viewed solely as a passive observer or receptor of migratoryflows, but must be seen as a central mediator, manager, and intervening

variable that tightly defines and limits the admissible paths of movement.

Both cases thereby challenge accepted beliefs that national sovereignty is

being undermined by international migration and other postnational

forces and that states are losing control of their borders (Sassen, 1996;

Soysal, 1994).

In addition to providing an empirical account of immigration and

state management, this investigation has also clarified a broader substan-

tive issues related to the sociology of migration, the nation-state, andglobalization. Through its analysis this study has demonstrated that the

sovereignty, territoriality, and general efficacy of the nation-state and



25/28

globalization are not mutually exclusive and, in certain instances, are

mutually enabling. Immigration policies have been utilized by both

governments in managing, negotiating, and navigating their positions

within an increasingly flexible and volatile world order. Through theirmigration policies, Canada and Australia have attempted to manage the

composition of their populations and resolve new fiscal and structural

crises and facilitate globalization while advancing their positions within it.

These actions demonstrate that nation-states may be less able to maintain

cultural homogeneity and engage in economic redistribution and regula-

tion, but their territorial borders and associated regulations continue to

have very real human and material consequences.

As a final admonition, while I have striven to be comprehensive,

space constraints prevent a full discussion of the theoretical and analyti-cal implications of the issues at hand. The propositions advanced within

this investigation are intended to generate discussion, reorient debates,

and suggest new directions for subsequent research. Further empirical

work is both desirable and necessary. The managerial stance of both

countries is exceptional and their experiences represent a distinct model

of policy under globalization. Future research could expand the scope

of inquiry and apply this articles analytic approach to other national

contexts. Doing so would help construct a broader typology of border

control under globalization and help account for further diversity. Otherpolicy types could include those of receiving societies who face high

levels of undocumented migration and those of major sending societies.

The first includes countries ranging from the United States to South

Africa and demonstrates how state policy has been instrumental in crim-

inalizing undocumented populations and creating segmented and flexible

labor pools. The second includes countries of emigration, whether India,

the Philippines, or Mexico, that have attempted to manage and coordi-

nate large outflows of their populations. Although distinct from the

Canadian and Australian model, both types reinforce the larger argu-ment that states have proactively adjusted their migration policies in the

face of globalization, whether to secure exploitable labor for the lower

tiers of the service economy or to govern mobile and de-bounded

citizenries.

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