Important Decisions Thirty Year Cut Off

7/28/2019 Important Decisions Thirty Year Cut Off

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Report on Important Decisionsin Recent Years

By Hon. Consuelo Ynares-SantiagoAssociate Justice

Supreme Court of the PhilippinesFifth Conference of Asian Constitutional Court Judges

Standards for Constitutional Review in Safeguarding Civil,Political and Socio-Economic Rights

9-11 October 2007Seoul, Republic of Korea


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CHAVEZ v. PUBLIC ESTATES AUTHORITY

(G.R. No. 133250, July 9, 2002, 384 SCRA 152)J. Antonio Carpio, ponente.

The Philippine Supreme Court in this case, voided the multi-billion peso reclamation contract between the Philippine Estates

Authority and Amari Coastal Bay Development Corp., a privatecorporation, for blatantly violating provisions of the Constitution

expressly prohibiting the alienation of lands of the public domain.

FACTS:

In 1977, the Public Estates Authority (PEA) was created thru

P.D. No. 1084 issued by the late Philippine president Ferdinand

Marcos and was tasked with the reclamation and development of

foreshore and submerged areas of the Manila Bay. In 1995, PEA

entered into a joint venture agreement (JVA) with AMARI, a

private corporation, to develop the Freedom Islands, the parcels of

land so reclaimed under the Manila-Cavite Coastal Road and

Reclamation Project (MCCRRP) which were titled under PEAs

name. The JVA also required the reclamation of additional portions

surrounding these islands to complete their plan.

Although the parties entered into the JVA without public

bidding then President Fidel V. Ramos confirmed the same. After

former Senator Ernesto Maceda denounced the JVA as the


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grandmother of all scams, a senate investigation on the matter

was conducted. The investigation found out that the reclaimed

lands PEA seeks to transfer to AMARI under the JVA are lands of

the public domain which the government has not classified as

alienable lands making the JVA illegal.

The Legal Task Force created by President Ramos

subsequently upheld the validity of the JVA contrary to the

conclusions reached by the Senate. In 1999, PEA and AMARI

signed an Amended JVA which was subsequently approved during

the subsequent term of President Joseph Estrada.

Petitioner Frank Chavez, as a taxpayer, filed this instant

petition for Mandamus with prayer for a writ of preliminary

injunction and a temporary restraining order seeking to compel

PEA to disclose all facts on its renegotiations with AMARI to and to

enjoin it from signing a new agreement with AMARI involving such

reclamation.

ISSUES:

1.) Does the constitutional right to information include officialinformation on on-going negotiations before a final

agreement? YES.

2.) Does the Amended JVA violate the 1987 Constitution? YES.

RULINGS:


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1.) The 1987 Philippine Constitution contains a provisionon the Filipino peoples right to information on matters of public

concern. The State policy of full transparency in all transactions

involving public interest reinforces this right and these two

provisions seek to promote transparency in policy-making and in

the operations of the government as well as provide the people

enough information to effectively exercise their other constitutional

rights. Contrary to AMARIs contention, the right to information

includes official information on on-going negotiations before a final

contract. A consummated contract is not a requirement for the

exercise of the right to information otherwise the people can never

exercise the right if no contract is consummated. And if one is

consummated, it may be too late for the public to expose its

defects. The information, however, must constitute definite

propositions by the government and should not cover recognized

exceptions like privileged information, military and diplomatic

secrets and similar matters affecting national security and public

order.

2.) The 1987 Philippine Constitution like the 1935 and the

1973 Constitutions before it, has adopted the Regalian doctrine

and declares that all natural resources are owned by the State,

and except for alienable agricultural lands of the public domain,

natural resources cannot be alienated. The present Philippine

Charter continues the State policy banning private corporationsfrom acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public domainand


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allows private corporations to hold alienable land of the public

domain only through lease. A private corporation, even one that

undertakes the physical reclamation of a government BOT project,

cannot acquire reclaimed alienable lands of the public domain in

view of the constitutional ban. The Philippine Supreme Court found

the Amended JVA to have glaringly violated provisions of the 1987

Constitution and consequently declared it null and void ab initio.

AGAN JR., et al. v. PIATCO et al.

(G.R. Nos. 155001, 155547 and 155661, May 5, 2003, 402 SCRA

612)CJ. Reynato Puno, ponente.

In this case, the Supreme Court has nullified the $650 millioncontracts entered into between the Philippine government and the

Philippine International Air Terminals Co. Inc. (PIATCO) to buildand operate Terminal-3 of Ninoy Aquino International Airport.

Voting 10-3-1, the high court declared the contracts contrary topublic policy.

FACTS:

In August 1989, the Philippine Department of

Transportation and Communication (DOTC) engaged the services


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of Aeroport de Paris (ADP) to conduct a comprehensive study of

the Ninoy Aquino International Airport (NAIA) to determine

whether it can cope with the traffic development up to 2010.

Thereafter, six Filipino business leaders formed Asias Emerging

Dragon Corp. (AEDC) and submitted an unsolicited proposal to

the government for the development of the NAIA Terminal 3

under the Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT) arrangement pursuant

to the BOT Law(RA 6957 as amended by RA 7718).

A consortium composed of Paircargo, PAGS and Security

Bank (PAIRCARGO) submitted its comparative proposal to AEDCs

bid to the Prequalification Bids and Awards Committee (PBAC).

Both bidders offered to build Terminal 3 for at least $350M at no

cost to the government. Under both bids, each bidder will pay the

government a share in the gross revenues for the duration of the

operation. AEDC offered to pay the government a total of P135M

as guaranteed payment for 27 years while PAIRCARGO offered to

pay a total of P17.75B for the same period. PBAC accepted

PAIRCARGOs proposal and gave AEDC 30 days within which to

match the said bid.

The project was awarded to PAIRCARGO upon AEDCs failure

to match its bid. PAIRCARGO was subsequently incorporated into

PIATCO. Consequently, the Concession Agreement for Terminal 3

was executed between PIATCO and the government. Amendments

to the said contracts followed thereafter. The workers of the

international airline service providers, claiming that they stand tolose their employment upon the implementation of the questioned


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agreements, filed a petition to enjoin its enforcement before the

Philippine Supreme Court.

ISSUES:

1.) Is PIATCO a qualified bidder? NO.2.) Is the 1997 Concession Agreement valid? NO.

RULINGS:

1.) Under the BOT Law, in case of build-operate-transferarrangement, the contract shall be awarded to the bidder who, in

addition to submitting the lowest bid and most favorable terms

also satisfies the minimum financial, technical, organizational and

legal standardsrequired by law.

PIATCO as the challenger to the unsolicited proposal of

AEDC has to show that it possesses the requisite financial

capability to undertake the project in the minimum amount of 30%

of the project cost which is roughly US$350M or

P9,183,650,000.00, thus PAIRCARGO has to show that it had the

ability to provide the minimum equity for the project in the amount

of P2,755,095,000.00. As computed however, its total net worth is

P558,384,871.55 or only 6.08% of the project cost. Thus the

award of the contract by the PBAC to PAIRCARGO is null and void.


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2.) The Concession Agreement is not valid considering that it

contains material and substantial amendments which had the

effect of converting it into an entirely different agreement from the

contract bidded upon.


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INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY FOUNDATION OF THE

PHILIPPINES, et al. v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS et al.,

(G.R. No. 159139, 13 January 2004, 419 SCRA 141)J. Artemio Panganiban, ponente.

Shortly before the May 2004 national elections, the Supreme

Court invalidated the P1.3-billion contract awarded by COMELEC toKorean firm-led consortium. Pointing to glaring irregularities that

attended the bidding process, the Court declared that COMELECand its officials concerned must bear full responsibility for thefailed bidding and award, and held accountable for the election

mess wrought by their grave abuse of discretion in theperformance of their functions.

FACTS:

In 1997, the Philippine Congress enacted Republic Act 8436

authorizing the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) to use an

automated election system (AES) to aid in the counting and

canvassing of national and local election results and also

mandated the poll body to acquire automated counting machines

(ACMs) and other equipments as well as to adopt new electoral

forms and printing materials.

During the bidding process that ensued, the Bids and Awards

Committee (BAC) found Mega Pacific Consortium (MPC) and Total

Information Management Corporation (TIMC) eligible out of 57

bidders. Notwithstanding the failure of both bidders in the

technical evaluation conducted by the Department of Science and

Technology (DOST), the COMELEC awarded the project to MPC.


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Thereafter, petitioner Information Technology Foundation of the

Philippines (ITFP) along with several others wrote COMELEC

Chairman Benjamin Abalos Sr. protesting the award to MPC and

seeking re-bidding.

Chairman Abalos rejected the protest and declared that the

award would stand up to the strictest scrutiny, prompting

petitioner ITFP to seek redress before the Philippine Supreme

Court via a Petition for certiorari under Rule 65, seeking to void

the award; to enjoin the implementation of any further Contract

between COMELEC and MPC as well as to compel re-bidding for

the project.

ISSUE:

Did the COMELEC gravely abuse its discretion when it

awarded the contract to MPC? YES.

RULING:

The Philippine Supreme Court granted the petition and

nullified the COMELECs contract with MPC. The COMELEC

awarded the Contract to MPC, an entity that had not participated

in the bidding there being no proof that it was the real bidder. In

the documents submitted to the COMELEC during the bidding

process, there was no sign whatsoever of any joint ventureagreement, consortium agreement, memorandum of agreement,


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or business plan executed among the members of the purported

Mega Pacific Consortium or MPC. It appears that the poll body

signed the actual automation Contract with Mega Pacific

eSolutions, Inc., (MPEI) a company that joined the bidding but

had not met the eligibility requirements.

Further, the COMELEC awarded the Contract with

inexplicable haste, without checking and observing mandatory

financial, technical and legal requirements accepting the computer

hardware and software even if, at the time of the award, they had

failed to pass critical requirements designed to safeguard the

integrity of elections. The software was nothing but a sample or

demo software, which would not be the actual one that would be

used during the elections. Keeping in mind that the Contract

involves the acquisition of not just the Automated Counting

Machines or the hardware, but also the software that would run

them, it is clear that the Contract was awarded without COMELEC

having seen, much less evaluated, the final product.


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SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, et. al. v. EDUARDO ERMITA(G.R. Nos.169777, 169659, 169660, 169667, 169834, 171246,April 20, 2006, 488 SCRA 1)J. Carpio-Morales, ponente.

The Supreme Court in this case upheld the right of Congress

to compel executive officials to appear before inquiries, so long asthese hearings are done in aid of legislation. The Court, however,declared constitutional the presidents right to ban executive

officials from appearing during the question hour in Congresswhere the sole objective is to obtain information in pursuit of its

oversight function, and does not relate to specific legislation. Thehigh court ruled that Congress has a right of information from the

executive branch whenever it is sought in aid of legislation.

FACTS:


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Under the Philippine Constitution, Congress has the power to

conduct inquiries in aid of legislation and may compel officials of

the Executive Department to appear before it and provide

information necessary for lawmaking.

In September 2005, the Senate as a whole invited various

officials of the Executive Department to appear as resource

speakers in a public hearing regarding the alleged overpricing and

unlawful provisions of the railway project of the North Luzon

Railways Corporation with the China National Machinery and

Equipment Group. A Senate committee also issued invitations to

seven high-ranking officials of the Armed Forces of the Philippines

(AFP) to appear as resource speakers in a public hearing in

connection with the alleged wire-tapping of the Presidents phone

conversation with a Commission on Elections official during the

last elections. However, the invited officials asked for a

postponement of the above scheduled hearings due to various

reasons.

Shortly thereafter, the President issued Executive Order

(E.O.) No. 464 which required all heads of the Executive Branch

and other public officials, including officials of the AFP, to secure

the consent of the President prior to appearing before either

House of Congress. The President anchored this issuance on the

principle of executive privilege where certain sensitive information

may be validly withheld from Congress. Consequently, all theofficials previously invited to appear before the Senate invoked E.O.


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464 to decline such request on the ground that the President has

not given her consent to their appearing before the Senate.

Petitioner Senate of the Philippines went to the Supreme

Court challenging the constitutionality of E.O. 464 on the ground

that it violates its constitutional power to conduct inquiries in aid of

legislation. The other petitioners, in their capacity as citizens and

taxpayers, claimed that E.O. 464 violates their constitutional right

to information on matters of public concern.

ISSUES:

(1) Does E.O. 464 contravene Congresss power of inquiry inaid of legislation? YES.

(2) Does E.O. 464 violate the right of the people toinformation on matters of public concern? YES.

(3) Should E.O. 464 have been first published before itsimplementation? YES.

RULINGS:

(1) The specific provision in E.O. 464 which requiresofficials of the Executive Department, including officers of thePhilippine National Police and Armed Forces of the Philippines, to


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first secure the Presidents consent before appearing in the Senate

or House of Representatives to give testimony or submit

documents constitute an implied claim of executive privilege.

Under Philippine jurisdiction executive privilege whether asserted

against Congress, the courts or the public, is recognized only in

relation to certain types of information of a sensitive character.

This would cover state secrets regarding military, diplomatic and

other national security matters as well as presidential

conversations, correspondences, and discussion in closed-door

Cabinet meetings.

The invocation of E.O. 464 as a justification for non-

appearance before the Senate impliedly means that the President

has made a prior determination that the matters which the official

will disclose are covered by the executive privilege. However, in

the case at bar, the implied claim of executive privilege is invalid

per se because it is not accompanied by any specific allegation of

the ground as basis thereof. Congress is left to speculate as to

what ground is being referred to by the President. A claim of

privilege, being a claim for exemption from an obligation to

disclose information, must be clearly asserted. The due respect for

a co-equal branch of government demands that a claim of

privilege clearly state the grounds therefor. Otherwise, the power

of inquiry of Congress would be severely frustrated. It should be

noted, however, that Congress must not require the President to

state the reasons for the claim with such particularity as to compel


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disclosure of the information which the privilege is meant to

protect.

The doctrine of executive privilege is premised on the fact

that certain informations must, as a matter of necessity, be kept

confidential in pursuit of the public interest. The privilege being,

by definition, an exemption from the obligation to disclose

information, in this case to Congress, the necessity must be of

such high degree as to outweigh the public interest in enforcing

that obligation in a particular case. In light of this highly

exceptional nature of the privilege, the Philippine Supreme Court

limited its exercise to the President only. The privilege being an

extraordinary power, it must be wielded only by the highest official

in the executive hierarchy. In other words, the President may not

authorize her subordinates to exercise such power.

It follows, therefore, that when an official is being

summoned by Congress on a matter which, in his own judgment,

might be covered by executive privilege, he must be afforded

reasonable time to inform the President or the Executive Secretary

of the possible need for invoking the privilege. This is necessary in

order to provide the President or the Executive Secretary with fair

opportunity to consider whether the matter indeed calls for a claim

of executive privilege. If, after the lapse of that reasonable time,

neither the President nor the Executive Secretary invokes the

privilege, Congress is no longer bound to respect the failure of the


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official to appear before Congress and may then opt to avail of the

necessary legal means to compel his appearance.

(2) There are clear distinctions between the constitutionalright of Congress to information which underlies the power of

inquiry and the right of people to information on matters of public

concern. However, to the extent that investigations in aid of

legislation are generally conducted in public, any executive

issuance tending to unduly limit disclosures of information in such

investigations necessarily deprives the people of information which

is presumed to be a matter of public concern. Thus, this kind of

impairment of the right of the people to information as a

consequence of E.O. 464 is just as direct a violation of the

legislatures power of inquiry.

(3) E.O. 464 should have first been published because ithas a direct effect on the right of people to information on matters

of public concern and is, thus, a matter of public interest which

members of the body politic may question before the Philippine

Supreme Court.


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BAYAN, et al. v. ERMITA(G.R. Nos. 169838, 169848 and 169881, 25 April 2006, 488 SCRA

226)J. Adolfo Azcuna, ponente.

The Philippine Supreme Court in this case held that B.P. No.880 is not an absolute ban of public assemblies but a restriction

that simply regulates the time, place and manner of theassemblies and directed the police force to exercise maximum

tolerance without fail.

FACTS:

Batas Pambansa No. 880 or The Public Act Assembly of 1985

is the Philippine law which regulates the constitutional right of the

Filipino people to peaceably assemble and petition the governmentfor redress of grievances. Under this law, a person or group of

persons is required to first secure a written permit if they intend to

organize and hold a public assembly in a public place. Without

such a permit, the rally can be peacefully dispersed by the police.

This is what is commonly known in the Philippines as the no

permit, no rally rule.


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The application for permit to rally shall state the time, place,

duration and purposes of the assembly, and shall be filed with the

office of the city or municipal mayor five (5) working days before

the scheduled assembly. If the mayor fails to act on the

application within two (2) working days, the application is deemed

granted. An application may be disapproved on the ground that

there is clear and convincing evidence that the public assembly will

create a clear and present danger to public order, public safety,

public convenience, public morals or public health. If the

application is denied, the applicant may resort to the courts.

The law prescribes a policy of Maximum Tolerance in dealing

with rallyists so that police dispersals should be undertaken

peacefully with respect to rallies without permits. As regards rallies

with permits, police dispersals should be done only when the rally

has turned imminently or actually violent and unlawful; and using

only reasonable means through communication/negotiation with

the rally leaders, with the use of reasonable force as the means of

last resort. This law also mandates a city or municipality to

designate at least one suitable freedom park where

demonstrations and meetings may be held at any time without the

need of any prior permit within six (6) months from the effectivity

of the aforesaid law. However, almost all cities and municipalities

have failed to comply with this requirement of the law.


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On September 21, 2005, the Executive Department issued a

press release regarding unlawful mass actions or rallies without

permits. It stated that the policy of Calibrated Preemptive

Response (or more popularly known as CPR) shall now be in

force in lieu of the policy of Maximum Tolerance. As such, the

police shall take the necessary actions to stop rallyists from

committing acts inimical to public order and peace.

Petitioners consist of three groups which conducted several

protest rallies against various policies of the Philippine Government

on September 26, October 4, 5, and 6, 2005. They claim that the

police preempted and violently dispersed their mass actions on

aforesaid dates. Thus, they filed a petition before the Philippine

Supreme Court challenging the constitutionality of The Public

Assembly of 1985. They claim that the law violates their

constitutional right to peaceably assemble and petition the

government for redress of grievances (as well as the International

Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and other human rights

treaties signed by the Philippine Government) because the law is a

content-based regulation aimed at stifling political dissent and the

clear and present danger standard is too broad and an

unreasonable limitation on their right to peaceably assemble. In

addition, they claim that the policy of CPR is void because it

contravenes the policy of Maximum Tolerance under the Public

Assembly Act of 1985and that the policy of CPR has been used by

the police to justify taking a more aggressive stance againstrallyists.


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ISSUES:

(4) Is the Public Assembly Act of 1985unconstitutional? NO.(5) Is the policy of CPR valid? NO.

RULINGS:

1.) The right to peaceably assemble and petition forredress of grievances is, together with freedom of speech, of

expression, and of the press, a right that enjoys primacy in the

realm of constitutional protection. However, while such right is

sacrosanct, it is not absolute. The right cannot be abrogated

through prior restraint except on a showing, as is the case with

freedom of expression, of a clear and present danger of a

substantive evil that the state has a right to prevent. The clear

and present danger standard embodied in The Public Assembly

Act of 1985 is a well-recognized exception in Philippine

jurisprudence as well as by international treaties. The Public

Assembly Act of 1985 is not an absolute ban of public assemblies

but a restriction that simply regulates the time, place and manner

of the assemblies. It is a content-neutral regulation of the time,

place, and manner of holding public assemblies.

2.) Respondents belatedly claim that the CPR means thesame thing as the policy of Maximum Tolerance and was notintended to replace the latter. At any rate, in view of the Maximum


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Tolerance mandated by The Public Assembly of 1985, CPR serves

no valid purpose if it means the same thing as Maximum Tolerance

and is illegal if it means something else. Accordingly, what is to be

followed is and should be that mandated by the law itself, namely,

Maximum Tolerance, as specifically defined under the law. The so-

called CPR policy has no place in Philippine legal firmament and

must be struck down as a darkness that shrouds freedom. It

merely confuses the Filipino People and is used by some police

agents to justify abuses.

The Philippine Supreme Court goes even one step further in

safeguarding liberty by giving local governments a deadline of 30

days within which to designate specific freedom parks as provided

under The Public Act Assembly of 1985. If, after that period, no

such parks are so identified in accordance with Section 15 of the

law, all public parks and plazas of the municipality or city

concerned shall in effect be deemed freedom parks; no prior

permit of whatever kind shall be required to hold an assembly

therein. The only requirement will be written notices to the police

and the mayors office to allow proper coordination and orderly

activities.


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PROF. RANDOLF S. DAVID, et. al. v. GLORIA MACAPAGAL-

ARROYO, as President and Commander-In-Chief, et al.

(G.R. Nos. 171396, 171409, 171485, 171483, 171400, 171489,

171424, May 3, 2006, 489 SCRA 160)J. Sandoval-Gutierrez, ponente.

In this case, the Supreme Court upheld President Gloria

Macapagal-Arroyos power to declare a state of emergency butruled that acts committed by government authorities under

Proclamation No. 1017 were illegal. Voting 11-3, the Court saidthat while PP 1017 was constitutional, insofar as it constituted a

call by Arroyo for the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawlessviolence, the warrantless arrests and search of the Daily Tribuneoffice were in violation of the law.

FACTS:

On February 24, 2006, as the Philippines celebrated the 20th

Anniversary of the Edsa People Power I, President Gloria

Macapagal-Arroyo issued Presidential Proclamation (PP) 1017

declaring a state of national emergency. This proclamation was

precipitated by alleged intelligence reports that the political

opposition consisting of the Extreme Left (communist rebels) and

the Extreme Right (military adventurists) had conspired to

overthrow the Arroyo Administration through violent and unlawful

means. Thus, the President, pursuant to her constitutional powers

as Commander-in-Chief, called out the Armed Forces of the

Philippines (AFP) to maintain law and order throughout the

Philippines, prevent or suppress all forms of lawless violence as

well as any act of insurrection or rebellion and to enforce

obedience to all the laws and to all decrees, orders and regulations


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promulgated by me personally or upon my direction; and as

provided in Section 17, Article 12 of the Constitution do hereby

declare a State of National Emergency. To implement this

proclamation, the President issued General Order No. 5 which

directed the military to pursue the aforementioned objectives and,

in addition, required them to suppress acts of terrorism.

Thereafter, the Office of the President announced that all

permits to rally originally granted by the cities or municipalities are

revoked. The Presidential Chief of Staff announced that

warrantless arrests and take-over of facilities, including media, can

already be implemented. Undeterred by the announcements that

rallies and public assemblies would not be allowed, groups of

protesters, including some of the herein petitioners, marched from

various parts of Metro Manila with the intention of converging at

the EDSA shrine. Those who were already near the EDSA site

were violently dispersed by huge clusters of anti-riot police. In

particular, petitioner Prof. Randy David, a professor at the

University of the Philippines and a newspaper columnist, and his

companion were arrested without a warrant but later released due

to insufficiency of evidence to criminally charge them.

At around 12:20 in the early morning of February 25, 2006,

police operatives, on the basis of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5, raided

the Daily Tribune offices (a newspaper outfit) in Manila. The

raiding team confiscated news stories by reporters, documents,pictures, and mock-ups of the Saturday issue. The raid, according


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to the Presidential Chief of Staff, was meant to show a strong

presence, to tell media outlets not to connive or do anything that

would help the rebels in bringing down the government.The police

also warned that it would takeover any media organization that

would not follow the standards set by the government during the

state of national emergency.

Petitioners went to the Supreme Court to challenge the

constitutionality of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 on the grounds that: (1)

the President exceeded her commander-in-chief powers as there

was no factual bases to justify the calling out of the military, (2)

the issuances are a usurpation of legislative powers by the

President, (3) the issuances violated petitioners rights to

peaceably assemble and freedom of the press, and (4) the

President cannot takeover privately-owned utilities or businesses

affected with public interest during a state of emergency without

authority from Congress.

On March 3, 2006, exactly one week after the declaration of

a state of national emergency and after all these petitions had

been filed, the President lifted PP 1017.

ISSUES:

(6) Was the Presidents exercise of her calling out powersbereft of factual bases? NO.


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(7) Do portions of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 usurp legislativepowers and are thus, unconstitutional? YES.

(8) Was the implementation of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5through warrantless arrests, and warrantless searches

and seizures unconstitutional? YES.

(9) Can the President takeover privately-owned utilitiesand businesses affected with public interest during a

state of national emergency without Congressional

authority? NO.

RULINGS:

(4) Under Section 18, Article VII of the PhilippineConstitution, the President may call out the armed forces to

prevent or suppress lawless violence, insurrection or rebellion.

However, the 1987 Constitution has granted the Supreme Court an

expanded jurisdiction to determine whether such exercise of power

was done with grave abuse of discretion prescinding from the sad

experiences during the martial law years where the Court hid

behind the political question doctrine in cases of this nature. In the

case at bar, petitioners failed to prove that PP 1017 was without

factual bases as the same was supported by intelligence reports

submitted by the counsel for the government.


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(5) PP 1017s extraneous provisions giving the Presidentexpress or implied power to issue decrees and to direct the AFP to

enforce obedience to all laws even those not related to lawless

violence as well as decrees promulgated by the President are

unconstitutional because only Congress may enact laws. A decree,

within the context of the martial law years, had the same force

and effect as laws. As regards G.O. No. 5, the words acts of

terrorism have not been legally defined and made punishable by

Congress and should thus be deemed deleted from the said G.O.

While terrorism has been denounced generally in media, no law

has been enacted to guide the military, and eventually the courts,

to determine the limits of the AFPs authority in carrying out this

portion of G.O. No. 5 which makes a fertile ground for abuse.

(6) The warrantless arrest of petitioners Randolf S. Davidand Ronald Llamas; the dispersal of the rallies and warrantless

arrest of the KMU and NAFLU-KMU members; the imposition of

standards on media or any prior restraint on the press; and the

warrantless search of the Daily Tribuneoffices and the whimsical

seizures of some articles for publication and other materials, are

not authorized by the Constitution, the law and jurisprudence.

Not even by the valid provisions of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5. These

acts are declared unconstitutional without prejudice to prosecuting

the individuals responsible therefor.

(7)

Finally, the President, in the absence of legislation,cannot take over privately-owned utilities and business affected


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with public interest during a state of national emergency as a

reasonable reading of the text of the Constitution reveal.

GREATER METROPOLITAN MANILA SOLID WASTE

MANAGEMENT COMMITTEE and the METROPOLITANMANILA DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. JANCOM

ENVIRONMENT CORPORATION and JANCOM

INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS PTY. LIMITED

OF AUSTRALIA

(G.R. No. 163663, June 30, 2006, 494 SCRA 280)J. Carpio-Morales, ponente.

THE Supreme Court in this case nullified the P390-billionsolid waste management contract signed between the Metropolitan


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Manila Development Authority (MMDA) and Australian firm JancomEnvironmental Corporation to operate the San Mateo Waste

Disposal Site in the Rizal province which would have disposed of

about 8.000 tons of Metro Manila garbage daily. The contractcannot be executed due to lack of approval from President Gloria

Macapagal-Arroyo.

FACTS:

Pursuant to Presidential Memorandum Order No. 202

creating the Greater Metropolitan Manila Solid Waste Management

Committee (petitioner GMSWMC) to oversee and develop waste

disposal sites in Rizal and Cavite under the Build-Operate-Transfer

(BOT) scheme, the Philippine government through the

Metropolitan Manila Development Authority (MMDA) entered into a

BOT contract for the creation of a waste disposal site in San Mateo,

Rizal with respondent JANCOM Environmental Corporation

(JANCOM), the sole complying bidder.

Prior to the Presidents approval of the contract, the

government ordered the landfills closure due to the clamor of the

residents of Rizal. Thereafter, petitioner GMSWMC adopted a

resolution not to pursue the contract with JANCOM citing as

reasons the passage of RA 8749 otherwise known as the Clean Air

Act of 1999, the non-availability of the landfill site and costly

tipping fees.

JANCOM filed a petition for certiorari with the Regional TrialCourt of Pasig City (RTC) to declare such resolution void and to


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enjoin the MMDA from entering into new waste management

contracts with third parties. The RTC granted JANCOMs petition.

On appeal before the Court of Appeals, the said decision was

affirmed in toto. By Decision of January 30, 2002 and Resolution of

April 10, 2002, the Philippine Supreme Court affirmed the decision

of the Court of Appeals and declared the contract valid and

perfected, albeit ineffective and unimplementable pending

approval by the President.

JANCOM and the MMDA later purportedly modified the

contract and came up with an unsigned draft Amended Agreement

dated June 2002. JANCOM then filed an Omnibus Motion before

Branch 68 of RTC-Pasig seeking to compel MMDA to cease from

entering into any contract with third parties relative to waste

management and disposal; the immediate submission of said

Amended Agreement to the President; and to compel MMDA to

comply with its contractual obligations.

The trial court granted the same in an Order and directed

the MMDA to cease from entering into any contract with third

parties in violation of JANCOMs contractual rights; to submit the

Amended Agreement to the President for his signature and

approval and to comply with their obligations as provided in the

contract. Alias writs of execution implementing said Order was

subsequently issued by the RTC.


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Petitioners sought recourse before the Court of Appeals

which in turn affirmed the trial courts Order having found it to be

proper. Petitioners then raised the matter to the Philippine

Supreme Court alleging that the Court of Appeals gravely erred in

upholding the assailed Order.

ISSUE:

Did the Court of Appeals act with grave abuse of discretion

in affirming the trial courts Order? YES.

RULING:

The Supreme Courts January 30, 2002 Decision and April 10,

2002 Resolution held that although the contract between the

government and JANCOM is a perfected contract, it is still

ineffective or unimplementable until and unless it is approved by

the President providing that such approval is necessary for its

effectivity.

Since the contract provides that it shall become effective

only upon approval by the President, the trial court improperly

issued the alias writs of execution, for in doing so, it had, in effect,

ordered the enforcement of the contract despite the Supreme

Courts unequivocal pronouncements. Also, the Amended

Agreement was unsigned by the parties and as such was merely a


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draft document containing the proposals of JANCOM subject to the

approval of the MMDA.

LAMBINO v. COMELEC

(G.R. No. 174153 and 174299, October 25, 2006, 505 SCRA 160)

J. Antonio Carpio, ponente.

In this case, the Philippine Supreme Court dismissed the

petition of charter change advocates seeking to revise the 1987Constitution via a peoples initiative. By a hairline vote of 8-7, the

high court ruled that the Commission on Elections did not commitgrave abuse of discretion when it denied the pleas of charterchange advocates for revision.

FACTS:

In August 2006, petitioners Raul Lambino and Erico

Aumentado, invoking their constitutional right to propose

amendments to the 1987 Philippine Constitution by way of

peoples initiative, filed a petition with the Commission on Elections

(COMELEC) submitting the following proposition:1

1It appears, however, that this proposition differs from the one submitted to the people and which was

in the abstract of the petition which states: Do you approve of the amendment of Articles VI and VII of

the 1987 Constitution, changing the form of government from the present bicameral-presidential to aunicameral-parliamentary system of government in order to achieve greater efficiency, simplicity andeconomy in government; and providing Article XVIII as Transitory Provisions for the orderly shift


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Do you approve the amendment of Articles

VI and VII of the 1987 Constitution, changing theform of government from the present bicameral-

presidential to a unicameral-parliamentarysystem and providing Article XVIII as TransitoryProvisions for the orderly shift from one system

to another?

Several groups and individuals opposed the petition, citing

Santiago v. COMELEC (270 SCRA 106), they argued that the

COMELEC has no jurisdiction to entertain the petition because of

the permanent injunction of the Supreme Court in the case. They

alleged that RA 6735 (Initiative and Referendum Act) is deficient

and inadequate to implement a peoples initiative on amendments

to the Constitution and that the signature campaign was

orchestrated by the government and thus, not truly reflective of

the Filipino peoples will. Moreover, even if there were a law, the

changes sought are not amendments but revisions which may not

be effected through an initiative.

The COMELEC dismissed the petition but did not rule on

whether the petition was correct in substance and in form. It also

refrained from ruling on the authenticity of the 6 million signatures

that purportedly backed the petition. However, it stated in its

decision that the petition appeared to meet the required number

of registered voters

from one system to another? Petitioners later filed an Amended Petition together with a Manifestationciting corrections on the text of the proposed amendments.


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Petitioners subsequently filed a petition for Certiorari and

Mandamus before the Supreme Court praying that the COMELECs

resolution be set aside on the ground of grave abuse of discretion

and further prayed for the issuance of a writ of mandamus

ordering the COMELEC to entertain the Petition for Initiative and

Referendum, to comply with the Constitution, and to set the date

of the plebiscite pursuant to its ministerial duty as provided by law.

ISSUE:

Did the petition for initiative comply with the Constitutional

requirements on amendments through peoples initiative? NO.

RULING:

The petition on initiative miserably failed to comply with the

requirements of the Constitution for conducting a peoples

initiative. The draft of the proposed constitutional amendment

should be ready and shown to the people before they sign such

proposal the essence of the amendments directly proposed by the

people through initiative upon a petition is that the entire proposal

on its face is a petition by the people.

Thus, an amendment is directly proposed by the people

through initiative upon a petition only if the people sign on apetition that contains the full text of the proposed amendments.


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The admissions petitioners made during the oral argument for this

case established beyond any doubt that they failed to show the full

text of the proposed changes to the great majority of the people

who signed the signature sheets that they circulated and

subsequently submitted to the COMELEC. The result is a grand

deception on the supposed 6.3M signatories who are left in the

dark to fathom the nature and effect of the proposed changes.

In the words of the ponente of this case, J. Antonio Carpio,

the Court, whose members are sworn to defend and protect the

Constitution, cannot shirk from its solemn oath and duty to insure

compliance with the clear command of the Constitution- that a

peoples initiative may only amend, never revise, the Constitution.

ESTRADA v. DESIERTO

(G.R. Nos. 146710-15 and 146738, March 2, 2001, 353 SCRA 452)J. Reynato Puno, ponente.

The Supreme Court in this case ruled on the validity of thePresidency assumed by Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo after declaring

that former president Estrada resigned from the presidency afterhis ouster by People Power during EDSA 2.


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FACTS:

On the line in the case at bar is the Office of the President of

the Philippines. Petitioner Joseph Estrada was the duly elected

President in the May 1998 elections where Gloria Macapagal-

Arroyo won as Vice-President. Both were to serve a 6-year term

beginning in June 1998. Although elected with an overwhelming

mandate of 10M votes, Estradas term was plagued by controversy

which all came to a heed on October 2000 after his long time

friend and provincial Governor Luis Chavit Singson came out on

television and said that the former president pocketed bribes from

illegal gambling operators in the provinces.

The Senate trial for Estradas impeachment which ensued in

December 2000 was aborted when a majority of senator-judges

voted to reject evidence linking Estrada to millions of dollars in ill-

acquired wealth. The vote spurred a walk-out by the prosecution

panel and massive anti-Estrada protests leading to eventual ouster.

Estrada left Malacanang Palace at around 2:30 in the afternoon on

January 20, 2001 amid the resignation of cabinet members and

key military and police officials. Earlier at noon on the same day,

Philippine Supreme Court Chief Justice Hilario Davide administered

the oath to respondent Arroyo.

Several cases previously filed against Estrada before thegraft court were set in motion. A criminal case for plunder, graft


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and corruption was also filed against him and his co-accused.

Estrada subsequently sought recourse before the Supreme Court

insisting that he never resigned as president and was merely on

leave making Arroyos presidency unconstitutional. And because

he is still sitting president, he is immune from suit.

ISSUES:

1.)Does the petition present a justiciable controversy? YES.2.)Did Estrada resign as President? YES.3.)Is conviction in the impeachment proceedings a condition

precedent for the criminal prosecution of Estrada? NO.

Assuming that he is still President, is he immune from

criminal prosecution? NO.

RULINGS:

1.) The cases at bar present pose legal and not political

questions since the principal issues for resolution require the

proper interpretation of certain provisions in the 1987 Constitution

as well as a ruling on the scope of presidential immunity from suit.

2.) The totality of prior, contemporaneous and posterior

facts and circumstantial evidence bearing a material relevance on

the issue shows that Estrada resigned as President. His resignation

cannot be doubted. It was confirmed by his leaving Malacanangfor the sake of peace and in order to begin the healing process of


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the nation and not due to any inability. In the press release

containing his final statement, he acknowledged the oath taking of

Arroyo as President albeit with reservation about its legality. He

expressed his gratitude to the people for the opportunity to serve

them, this without doubt referred topast opportunitygiven him to

serve the people as President. All these point to the inescapable

conclusion that his presidency is now in the past tense.

3.) Estradas argument that he cannot be prosecuted for

the reason that he must first be convicted in the impeachment

proceedings lacks merit. Considering the peculiar circumstance

that the impeachment process against him has been aborted and

thereafter he lost the Presidency, Estrada cannot demand as a

condition sine qua non to his criminal prosecution before the

Ombudsman that he be convicted in the impeachment proceedings.

The cases filed against Estrada are criminal in character.

They involve plunder, bribery, graft and corruption. By no stretch

of the imagination can these crimes, especially plunder which

carries the death penalty, be covered by the alleged mantle of

immunity of a non-sitting president.


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PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES V. JOSEPH EJERCITO

ESTRADA, JOSE JINGGOY ESTRADA, CHARLIE ATONG

TIU HAY SI ANG, EDWARD S. SERAPIO, YOLANDA T.

RICAFORTE, ALMA ALFARO, JOHN DOE aka ELEUTERIO

RAMOS TAN or MR. UY, JANE DOE akaDELIA RAJAS, JOHNDOES and JANE DOES

(Criminal Case No. 26558, for: PLUNDER, September 12, 2007)

Republic Act No. 70802 penalizes public officers who amassimmense wealth through a series or combination of overt or

criminal acts in violation of the public trust. The reason behind thelaw was explained in the Explanatory Note of Senate Bill No. 733quoted in the case ofEstrada v. Sandiganbayan3as follows:

Plunder xxx punishes the use of high office for personal

enrichment, committed through aseries of actsdone not in thepublic eye but in stealth and secrecy over a period of time, thatmay involve so many persons, here and abroad, and which touch

so many states and territorial units. The acts and/or omissionssought to be penalized do not involve simple cases of

malversation of public funds, bribery, extortion, theft and

graft but constitute plunder of an entire nation resulting inmaterial damage to the national economy.

The present case is the first of its kind to be filed charging

the highest official of the Philippines, a former President, amongothers, of the offense of plunder. The resolution of this case will

set significant historical and legal precedents.

2

Otherwise known as the Anti-Plunder Law, approved on July 12, 1991.3G.R. No. 148965, February 26, 2002, 377 SCRA 538, 555.


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FACTS:

In April 2001, the prosecution filed an Amended Information

against the accused charging them with the crime of PLUNDER

committed as follows:

a.) by receiving money in the sum of FIVE HUNDREDFORTY-FIVE MILLION PESOS (P545,000,000.00)from illegal gambling in connivance with co-accused

Charlie Atong Ang, Jose Jinggoy Estrada,Yolanda T. Ricaforte, Edward Serapio, and John

Does and Jane Does in consideration of tolerationor protection of illegal gambling;

b.) by diverting public funds amounting to ONEHUNDRED THIRTY MILLION PESOS

(P130,000,000.00) representing a portion of the

TWO HUNDRED MILLION PESOS (P200,000,000.00)tobacco excise tax share allocated for the Province

of Ilocos Sur under RA No. 7171, in connivancewith co-accused Charlie Atong Ang, Alma Alfaro,

John Doe a.k.a. Eleuterio Tan or Eleuterio RamosTan or Mr. Uy, and Jane Doe a.k.a. Delia Rajas, andother John Does and Jane Does;

c.) by directing the GSIS and the SSS to purchaseshares of stocks of the BELLE CORPORATION in thetotal amount of ONE BILLION EIGHT HUNDRED

FORTY SEVEN MILLION FIVE HUNDRED SEVENTYEIGHT THOUSAND FIFTY SEVEN PESOS AND FIFTYCENTAVOS (P1,874,578,057.50); for which he

received commissions in the amount of ONEHUNDRED EIGHTY NINE MILLION SEVEN

HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P189, 700,000.00),which became part of the deposit in the Equitable-

PCI BANK under the account name JOSEVELARDE;


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d.) by unjustly enriching himself in connivance with

John Does and Jane Does, in the amount of more

or less THREE BILLION TWO HUNDRED THIRTYTHREE MILLION ONE HUNDRED FOUR THOUSAND

AND ONE HUNDRED SEVENTY THREE PESOS ANDSEVENTEEN CENTAVOS (P3,233,104,173.17) and

depositing the same under his account name JOSEVELARDE at the Equitable-PCI BANK.

After the issuance of the arrest warrants against them the

Estradas (FPres. Estrada and his son Jinggoy) and Serapio

surrendered to the authorities and were subsequently arraigned

where a plea of not guilty was entered for them. FPres. Estrada

was eventually placed under house arrest in his residence in Tanay,

Rizal while Jinggoy and Serapio were granted bail. Accused Charlie

Atong Ang (Ang) was extradited from the United States. Having

executed a Plea Bargaining Agreement with the prosecution, Ang

pleaded guilty and was convicted for the lesser offense of

Corruption of Public Officials. He is currently under probation.

Prosecution star witness, former Ilocos Sur Governor Luis

Chavit C. Singson (Chavit) testified to the systematic collection

and delivery to FPres. Estrada of jueteng protection money in the

amount of P5M every 15 days which was methodically recorded in

two sets of ledgers covering the period November 1998-July 1999

and August 1999-August 2000. Sometime in July 1999, FPres.

Estrada instructed Chavit to turn over 123M in jueteng money to

Estradas accountant Yolanda T. Ricaforte (Ricaforte) to bedeposited in the latters accounts. Bank officers from several


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branches of Equitable-PCI Bank subsequently testified to the

existence of Ricafortes active accounts involving staggering

amounts of money. In early 2000, FPres. Estrada directed Chavit

to transfer 200M of jueteng money to Serapio. Bank officers of

Equitable- PCI Bank later testified to the existence of the accounts

of the ERAP Muslim Youth Foundation in the sum of 200M which

were deposited through several checks issued by Serapio.

Chavit and FPres. Estrada subsequently had a falling out

when the franchise of the government sanctioned numbers game

called Bingo 2 Ball in Ilocos Sur was awarded to Eric Singson,

Chavits political rival. Fearing that his life was in danger, Chavit

gathered evidence and came out with this expose.

In his defense, FPres. Estrada stated that he did not receive

a single centavo from any form of illegal gambling. He even sought

to legalize jueteng so that the government can earn money to help

provide essential services for the poor. He stated that he met

Serapio in 1999 and was impressed by the latters credentials so

he appointed him as Presidential Assistant on Political Affairs.

FPres. Estrada claimed that he started the ERAP Muslim Youth

Foundation on seed money from his salary as well as with the

funds raised from a golf tournament. He denied that he ordered

Chavit to give jueteng money in the amount of 200M to Serapio

for the ERAP Muslim Youth Foundation stating that Serapio told

him that an anonymous donor thru Chavit gave said amount to thefoundation. FPres. Estrada maintained that Chavit is accusing him


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with these unfounded allegations out of desperation. He stated

that Chavit sought his help with the Commission on Audit (COA)

because he was unable to liquidate his cash advance from the

tobacco excise tax share of Ilocos Sur under R.A. 7171. FPres.

Estrada refused because COA is an independent constitutional

body.

FPres. Estrada likewise vehemently denied Chavits

allegations with respect to the diversion of the excise taxes for the

province of Ilocos Sur under Republic Act No. 7171. Chavit claimed

that FPres. Estrada approved his request for the release of said

funds in consideration of P130M which was credited into the

accounts of Alma Alfaro, Delia Rajas and Eleuterio Tan as shown

by bank documents presented by the prosecution.

FPres. Estrada also belied any knowledge pertaining to the

purchase of Government Social Insurance System (GSIS) and

Social Security System (SSS) of shares in Belle Corporation despite

the testimony of its Vice-Chairman and Director Willy Ocier that

FPres. Estrada brokered the sale through Jaime Dichaves in

consideration of a commission in the amount of 189.7M. Ocier

stated that after the purchase was concluded, the corporation

issued a check in the amount of 189.7M and delivered it to

Dichaves who in turn deposited the same in his account with Far

East Bank and Trust Co. After some inter-bank transactions, the

check finally landed in the account under the name ofJose Velarde


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which turned out to be FPres. Estradas account upon his own

admission that he signed under said alias upon Dichaves behest.

ISSUE:

Are the above-named accused guilty of Plunder as charged?

RULING OF THE SANDIGANBAYAN:

The SANDIGANBAYAN held that the prosecution has proven

beyond reasonable doubt the elements of Plunder as follows:

a.) The principal accused, FPres. Estrada, at the time of thecommission of the acts charged in the Amended

Information was the President of the Republic of thePhilippines;

b.) He acted in connivance with then Governor Luis ChavitSingson, who was granted immunity from suit by theOffice of the Ombudsman, and with the participation ofother persons, in amassing ill-gotten wealth as follows:

i. by a series of acts for receiving bi-monthlycollections from jueteng, from November 1998-

August 2000 in the total amount of

P545,291,000.00, P200M of which was depositedin the ERAP Muslim Youth Foundation; and

ii. by a series consisting of two acts of ordering theGSIS and the SSS to purchase shares of stock of

Belle Corporation and receiving commission from

the sales in the amount of P189,700,000.00which was deposited in the Jose Velardeaccount.


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The Court found that the prosecution failed to prove, beyond

reasonable doubt the misappropriation of the excise tax share of

Ilocos Sur as charged and likewise failed to offer evidence on the

alleged illegal sources of the numerous deposits in the Jose

Velarde account which belongs to FPres. Estrada, except for the

commission received from the sale of Belle shares and the money

collected from illegal gambling.

FPres. Joseph Estrada was found GUILTY beyond reasonable

doubt of PLUNDER. Jinggoy Estrada and Edward Serapio are

ACQUITTED for failure of the prosecution to establish their guilt

beyond reasonable doubt. The penalty imposable is RECLUSION

PERPETUA and the accessory penalties of civil interdiction and

perpetual absolute disqualification. The SANDIGANBAYAN also

declared the forfeiture in favor of the government of the following:

a. the total amount of P545,291,000.00 with interestand income earned, inclusive of the amount ofP200M deposited in the name and account of theERAP Muslim Youth Foundation;

b. the amount of P189,700,000.00, inclusive of interestsand income earned, deposited in the Jose Velarde

account;c. the real property consisting of a house and lot

dubbed as Boracay Mansion located at #100 11th St.New Manila, Quezon City.

Documents

Important Decisions Thirty Year Cut Off