IMS for Nuclear Industry

8/18/2019 IMS for Nuclear Industry

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Technical Report Writing

CC-05

Integration of Management

Systems for Safety in theNuclear Industry

By

Muhammad Kamran Shaikh

2333

Submitted in partial fulfillment of the completion requirements

for the Zero-Semester course Technical Report Writing

Karachi Institute of Power Engineering

2016


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Abstract

The need to create integrated management systems (IMS) in order to handle the

proliferation of management system standards is undeniable. There is also evidence in

literature and practice that organizations are slowly starting to tackle the IMS issue,

mainly by putting an integrated quality and environmental management system in

place. Due to the existence of internationally accepted standards covering these two

fields, namely ISO 9000 and 14000 series, such a scope of integration comes as no

surprise. However, we can and should include other systems, for steps of execution,

the ones for occupational health and safety, dependability, accountability or

complaints handling. How this integration be helpful for the existing organizational

structures and how it could be accomplished. When we attempt to address IMS issues,

we talk about integrating the standards or the systems or both. These and other

important questions regarding IMS are addressed here. By means of set of steps of

execution from the nuclear industry, this paper focuses in particular on the integration

of a safety management system within an IMS framework. Since safety is of such a

paramount importance in nuclear plants, it makes sense to integrate safety

requirements within a quality management system, as a possible first step in the

integration efforts. Subsequently, other function-specific requirements may be

included to form an effective IMS.


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Table of Contents

1. Necessity of Integrated Management System (IMS) .............................................3

1.1 Introduction ...................................................................................................3

1.2 Importance of IMS in Nuclear Sector ...........................................................4

1.3 Companies Providing Services for IMS........................................................4

2. Scope of Integration...............................................................................................6

2.1 Defining Integration for Nuclear Power Plants.............................................6

2.2 Integration of System and Standards.............................................................7

2.3 Recommended IMS Standards for Nuclear Industry ....................................8

3. Im plementation of IMS..........................................................................................9

3.1 Basic Requirements .....................................................................................9

3.1.1 Process Orientation .............................................................................9

3.1.2 Integrated Approach..........................................................................10

3.2 Implementation Steps.................................................................................10

3.3 Documentation of Management System....................................................12

4. Operating Methods and Procedures .....................................................................14

4.1 Stepwise Execution....................................................................................14

4.2 Control and Measurements through Obtained Data...................................15

4.3 Assessment and Feedback..........................................................................17

4.4 Management Review .................................................................................17

5. Conclusion ...........................................................................................................18


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#1

Necessity of Integrated

Management System (IMS)

1.1 Introduction

Due to the proliferation of ISO 9000, ISO 14000 and other function-specific

management system standards (MSS), a need has emerged to somehow integrate them

in order to reduce costs and redundancies. At the same time, it has become imperative

for organizations to continuously improve their overall quality, environmental, safety

and even public accountability performance. By developing and implementing

integrated management systems (IMS), most organizations could theoretically “kill

both of these birds with one stone”, that is, create a lean system compliant to most

regulatory and voluntary standards, and still reduce failures, environmental impacts

and workplace injuries. Practically speaking, however, it is much easier to put

together an IMS policy and procedures manual than to implement and maintain a truly


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integrated system in an organization. Furthermore, the effective implementation of an

IMS pales in comparison with proving a quantifiable cause-and-effect relationship

between the existence of a management system and sustainable improvement of

performance. This is in spite of the fact that MSS requirements include continual

improvement. And the problems do not stop there. Difficulties in finding common

denominators for diverse business functions, disappearance of unique identities of

function-specific systems, fear of job loss as a result of amalgamation, and

misalignment of operational goals are but a few inevitable obstacles on the path to

IMS.

Nevertheless, consider the alternative. Leaving different management systemsseparate and incompatible incurs considerable costs, increases the probability ofmistakes and failures, duplicates efforts, creates unnecessary bureaucracy anddocumentation, and ultimately has a negative impact on most stakeholders, includingthe employees and customers. When these and other disadvantages are weighedagainst the numerous benefits of having a common management system, companies

are slowly choosing to go with the IMS path. The list below illustrates the prevalentadvantages and concerns regarding the integration of management systems.

1.2 Importance of IMS in Nuclear Sector

This paper has two main objectives. The first one is to address the key issues in thetheory and practice of integrated management systems. This is accomplished byasking what we believe are the six main questions in establishing an IMS, andsubsequently discussing the options for answering them. These questions discuss arelatively broad spectrum of topics, ranging from the meaning of integration, to thescope of an integrated system and the sequence in which existing management

systems should be integrated. Paramount to this discussion is the thesis presenting theintegration of standards and internal management systems as two largely separateissues. The second objective of the paper is to illustrate the importance of anintegrated safety management system with an steps of execution from the nuclearindustry. There are two main reasons why this industry sector was chosen. First,needless to say, safety is of paramount importance in the nuclear industry, since eventhe smallest of errors may have disastrous effects. Unlike the manufacturing industry,for steps of execution, where productivity and availability are prioritized, in thenuclear industry, these issues are not nearly as crucial as safety. Second, the nuclearsector must conform to a variety of regulations that span, for instance, qualityassurance, environmental, health and safety concerns. Establishing an IMS in thisindustry may provide an effective solution to compliance and continuousimprovement of function-specific systems. Therefore, the establishment of aneffective safety management system, in conjunction with its quality managementcounterpart, is focused on herein. The paper concludes with a brief summary andfurther explanations on why safety in the nuclear industry was chosen for emphasis.

1.3 Companies Providing Services for IMS

Supporting the developments toward IMS is the growing body of standards,

guidelines, as well as both academic and practitioner literature by different companies

around the world. Although an international standard addressing this issue is not

expected in the near future, several national standardization bodies have alreadydeveloped or are currently working on related guidelines. Useful generic references


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include the joint Australian and New Zealand standard (AS/NZS, 1999), as well as the

Norwegian guideline NTS (1996) for quality, environmental and occupational health

and safety management.

Current advances in the field are mostly focused on the development of

methodologies for the implementation and support of IMS in organizations. For stepsof execution, Karapetrovic and Willborn have extended their systems approach to

propose a generic model for the auditing of IMS, and to develop the strategies for

IMS implementation. Wilkinson and Dale (2001) provide another steps of execution

of this focus of research by including the organizational culture and other important

“soft” factors into IMS modeling. Guidelines specific to different business sectors are

also available. For steps of execution, Douglas and Glen addresses IMS

implementation in small nuclear power plants. Poestges et al. (2001) provide insights

regarding the integration in the chemical industry. Renzi and Cappelli (2000), Hauger

(2001), and Bamber et al. (2000) advocate integration of management systems in

manufacturing organizations, while Shen and Walker (2001) and Karapetrovic andWillborn (1998c) do the same for the construction and service industries, respectively.


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#2

Scope of Integration

2.1 Defining Integration for Nuclear Power Plants

Obviously, “integration” means different things to different people, even if we restrictour discussion to function-specific management systems only. For steps of execution,

providing a single manual for quality assurance and safety management procedures issufficient for a governmental office to call it an “integrated safety managementquality assurance program”, although the safety part of the manual is separated fromthe quality assurance part. However, the quality assurance policy of this officecontains elements of quality, environmental and occupational health and safetysystems, and the two parts of the manual are completely aligned, having the samestructure and table of contents. Conversely, Karapetrovic and Willborn (1998b) statethat a real IMS entails a single system, with the complete loss of unique identities offunction-specific subsystems. Although this is an ultimate step in any integrationeffort, most organizations will put their systems together in a gradual fashion, andsome of them may not even require complete integration. Therefore, the extent ofmanagement systems “integration” may vary significantly from one company to the


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other, requiring some workable definition of this term.

“Integration” is generally understood as combining separate parts into a whole.Specifically, integration of management systems can be defined as a process of

putting together different function-specific management systems into a single andmore effective integrated management system (IMS). The degree of such integration

will vary, depending on the prevailing conditions, strategies and standardsrequirements. Three degrees of management systems integration may bedistinguished: harmonization, cooperation and amalgamation. Partial harmonizationand coordination of documentation is the least stringent degree of integration. The

broadening of scope and enhancement of the combined system using integrated auditsand resource deployment takes it one step further. Finally, in a full integration,management systems are amalgamated into a new and comprehensive IMS.

2.2 Integration of System and Standards

It is not a problem to integrate the requirements of standards into a single set of IMS

criteria, or for that matter to create a common manual for separate or integratedmanagement systems (Karapetrovic, 2001). This is particularly evident in the case of

combining supportive systems, such as the ones for handling customer complaints and

developing dependability programs, with the underlying management systems, for

steps of execution an ISO 9000-based QMS. Not only is the content of the

corresponding standards (ISO 10018 for complaints handling and IEC 60300 for

dependability) fully compatible with their ISO 9001 predecessor, but the exact

organization and the four-element structure of the ISO 9001 (ISO, 2000) are also

strictly followed. Table I illustrates the similarities in structure of the quality (ISO

9001) and dependability (IEC 60300) management system standards.

Table 2-1 Comparison of Quality and Dependability management system.


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The same is true for the coupling of environmental and occupational health and safety

management systems. Both the ISO 14001 and BS 8800 (BSI, 1996)

2.3 Recommended IMS Standards for Nuclear Industry

The system is proposed on the requirements of quality, environmental and

occupational health and safety systems for a nuclear power plant. The first two

systems are supported by international standards (ISO 9000 and 14000), whereas

there are readily available national guidelines (for steps of execution BS 8800)

describing OHSMS. Furthermore, most nuclear setups and organizations are required

to meet environmental and safety regulatory requirements imposed by the government

and diverse interest groups, and it is not uncommon to group these two systems in

order to address the issue. Other MS, for steps of execution the ones for social

accountability, ergonomics, maintainability and dependability are rarely discussed,

either because of the lack of immediate pressure on industry to deal with them, or the

relative obscurity of the corresponding guidelines. However, the necessity of

integrating dependability management into quality management and its benefits are

addressed by Beckmerhagen and Berg (2000). In some cases, widely accepted

standards do not exist, and the conceptualization of a management system represents a

significant problem. However, as Wilkinson and Dale (1999) point out, the scope of a

“true IMS” should be much broader than these three and encompass whatever

additional systems that may emerge in the future. Steps of executions of such systems

may include social and public accountability (external relations), human resource

management (internal relations), as well as financial performance. Conti (1997, cited

in Seghezzi and Schweickardt, 2001) provides an interesting model of different

subsystems that make up an integrative business system and their respective

stakeholders.


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#3

Implementation of IMS

3.1 Basic Requirements

The management system shall comprise all activities with relevance to safe operation.

In this context, safe operation shall always have the highest priority.

3.1.1 Process orientation

i. All activities within the corporation or the power plant that have any relevance

to the operation of the power plant shall be identified.

ii. Those activities that have a direct or indirect influence on safe operation shall

be described in a procedural form.

a. The dangers and risks involved when performing the respective

activities, as well as

b. The safety-related internal and external requirements into account.


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iii. Process goals, process inputs, process flow and process output as well as the

criteria for the process assessment shall be specified. Interfaces between the

processes shall be identified and regulated.

iv. The organizational units and the functions (e.g., of the appointed person, of the

on-site supervisor or of the shift supervisor) involved in the process flow shall

be identified and specified for each individual step of the process. Insofar asactivities with relevance to safe operation are performed by external

companies (in particular, manufacturers, suppliers,

v. Other contractors, experts, other nuclear power plants, operating utilities), the

respective interfaces shall be regulated.

vi. All processes shall be well ordered and presented systematically structured in

the form of a process model.

3.1.2 Integrated Approach

The processes shall be designed taking the requirements resulting from different

corporate perspectives into account, and they shall be conducted using an integrated

approach.The integrated approach shall normally ensure that in the case of

competing requirements and goals, those relevant to nuclear safety and radiological

protection are assigned the correct priority in accordance with their respective

relevance.

The operating utility shall normally determine and integrate the applicable

requirements from statutory and sub statutory regulations (e.g., regarding

environmental protection, occupational health and safety protection) into the

management system.

3.2 Implementation Steps

With regard to a continuous improvement, the plan-do-check act cycle (PDCA cycle)

shall be applied to all relevant operational activities, to partial and entire processes

and to the management system as a whole.

This Section provides guidance to support the inspection of a licensee’s Standard

operating arrangements. It also gives guidance on what evidence the Inspector should

seek to confirm the arrangements are working effectively.

Standard operating-requires licensees to establish and implement management

systems which give due priority to safety. The licensee must therefore ensure that anyof its management system(s) processes (e.g. financial, commercial, project, industrial

safety or environmental) give due priority to safety. Inspectors may monitor this

during their routine inspections by looking at the outputs from the management

system processes to identify any instances where safety was adversely affected by

actions or decisions which did not give due priority to safety (e.g. a purchasing

decision for a safety significant item was based on cost rather than on fulfilling safety

requirements).

Quality Management Arrangements-standard operating (2) requires licensees to make

and implement adequate quality management arrangements in respect of all matters

which may affect safety. ONR expects such quality management arrangements toinclude.


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Scope of the Quality Management System-The scope of the arrangements should

cover all matters which may affect safety including activities both on and off the

licensed site. Inspectors should note that each facility on the site may be in a different

phase in its lifecycle (e.g. research and development, siting, design, construction,

commissioning, operation, or decommissioning) and should ensure that the licensee’s

arrangements cover all the applicable lifecycle phases. A licensee should review, and

where appropriate revise, its arrangements before entering a new lifecycle phase.

Inspectors should ensure that the processes identified by the licensee in the

management system documentation are consistent with the current lifecycle phase(s)

and that safety related activities are being controlled by the management system.

Site Steps Condition Compliance Processes-the standard operating arrangements

should include all the processes which ensure compliance with the site steps

conditions including the arrangements which are ‘made’ under specific steps

conditions. Inspectors should ensure that the licensee is able to demonstrate

compliance (e.g. by having a site steps condition compliance document that signpoststhe processes, procedures and instructions that deliver steps compliance).

Derived Powers-Inspectors should ensure that any derived powers which have been

agreed with the licensee are included in the arrangements.

i. A policy which includes a statement on quality (this may be a quality policy or

in integrated management systems it may be contained in other policies such

as the safety policy).

ii. The quality statement should be developed by senior management and be

appropriate to the activities and facilities of the licensee.

The short answer to the above question is usually no in the case of larger

organizations. Full integration is required at the top and bottom organizational levels,

while function-specific elements can be kept separate at intermediate levels. However,

these elements must be harmonized and mutually compatible. Because the priority of

executive management is the performance of a company as a whole, and not

necessarily the operation of individual QMS, EMS or OHSMS, a management

“system of systems” should be completely integrated toward achieving global

policies. Consequently, middle managers are occupied with quality, environmental,

financial and other aspects of performance, which may require some partition of

responsibilities for meeting the MS requirements. Finally, total amalgamation into the

individual work processes is demanded at the operational level. Similarly to executive

management work, an elementary operation must be performed as a whole. Although

they contain different quality, environmental or safety aspects and characteristics,

both the operation and the product are physical entities that require an integrated

system to be realized. Therefore, function-specific MS and related documentation

resources (e.g. instructions and records) should be fully integrated at this level, as

well.

However, in some cases, including small businesses, full integration is required at allorganizational levels. Such complete amalgamation is particularly important in

industry sectors operating with potentially high degrees of risk, for steps of executionnuclear and chemical industries. Since environmental and safety performance are of


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paramount importance in those cases, solid environmental, health and safety systemsmust be fully integrated at all organizational levels. The following sections illustratethe importance and methods of integrating a safety management system (SMS) in thenuclear industry, although such a system can be generically applied to anyorganization regardless of the industry sector.

3.3 Documentation of Management System

Inspectors should examine the management system documentation (e.g. management

system manual) associated with the Standard operating arrangements and ensure it

contains the following:

i. Job description of each individual shall be specified such that the duties,

responsibilities and authorizations are congruent with each other (principle of

organizational congruency). To this end, the responsibility for performing the

task and the corresponding authorizations (i.e., authorizations for making

decisions and for issuing instructions) shall also be assigned wheneverassigning a task.

ii. In case that tasks specified in the personnel organization of the operating

manual (see KTA 1201, chapter 6.2), the respective duties shall be properly

delegated to the hierarchically subordinate position. Duties may only be

delegated if the delegation recipients have the required qualification and

expertise. Responsibilities may not be delegated. Likewise, no duties may be

delegated that are directly associated with exercising responsibilities of the

radiation protection commissioner, plant security commissioner, or nuclear

safety commissioner.

iii. The directors of the organizational units and the management systemcommissioner including their representatives shall be specified by name. The

management system com-

iv. missioner shall be granted access and reporting rights directly to corporate

management.

v. The commissioners shall be provided with sufficient support by the

corporation in order to be able to perform their duties. The individual

commissioners, namely the

a. nuclear safety commissioner,

b. plant security commissioner, and

c. management system commissioner, as well as their representativesshall be positioned apart from the organizational units responsible for

production, maintenance, technology, components and systems.

vi. Any guideline concerning representatives shall clearly transfer the duties,

responsibilities and authorizations (i.e., instruction and decision making

authorization) to the respective representative (including the main person on

standby and the on-call persons). This is to ensure that, in case of absence of

the person primarily holding this position, the transferred duties can be

completed. The representative shall fulfill the same qualification requirements

as the person represented.

vii. When defining the organizational units it shall be taken into consideration thatthe respective directors of the organizational units must be able to properly


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fulfill their managerial functions. The directive width and the directive depth

shall be specified to be in accordance with the associated duties.

viii. Insofar as duties, responsibilities and authorizations concerning safe operation

are fulfilled by organizational units of the corporation outside of power plant

organization.


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#4

Operating Methods & Procedures

4.1 Stepwise Execution

In the following, the steps of execution is provided to illustrate the necessity ofsetting up a safety management system in an integrative fashion SMS(Beckmerhagen et al., 2000). The steps of execution particularly emphasizes theimportance of including “minor events” in overall safety management. Suchanomalies, conditions or situations are commonly disregarded, especially when

personnel is busy handling other operational events, which are deemed more“significant”. On an individual basis, these low-level events may indeed appear to

be insignificant. However, when analyzed together with other low-level events orwhen brought into proper context, they can reveal common patterns and provideinformation that may be important for preventing events with substantial adverseeffects on safety or environment.

This steps of execution describes an event that occurred in a four-loop pressurized


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water reactor in Germany. After a repair of coolers in the secondary coolingchains, the plant was restarted and it was running at 60 percent of poweroperation. In this case, a level drop in a tank supplying lubricating oil to theturbine was being investigated for a possible leak. An operator switched one ofthe large bypass valves for the turbine from the automatic to the manual mode.

Seeing the rapid drop in the oil level, the shift manager ordered the shut down ofthe turbine. Because there was no possibility of dumping steam to the condenser,the secondary-side pressure rose until the secondary safety becomes operational.

Figure 4-1 Step wise execution plan loop

4.2 Control and Measurements through Obtained Data

Where measuring or test equipment is used for any inspection, testing, verification

and validation activity which may affect safety, the equipment should be of the proper

range, type, accuracy and precision. A process should ensure the measuring and test

equipment is calibrated and traceable to national standards.

Using a UKAS accredited calibration service is one method of achieving traceability.

Inspectors should check the calibration process is applied to all measuring equipment

which may affect safety (e.g. radiological measuring equipment, operational process

measuring equipment and measuring equipment used for maintenance). Inspectors


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should check that equipment is uniquely identified and within its calibration period.

Out of date equipment should be identified and segregated to prevent inadvertent use.

The licensee should assess the validity of the previous measuring results when the

equipment is found to be out of calibration (this may mean keeping a record of use of

the equipment).

Control of Documents– The document control process should describe how

documents are written; the format and numbering system used; the methods and

responsibilities for review and approval; and the method of distribution. The

arrangements should ensure that current documents are available at the point of use

and superseded documents are withdrawn. Documents may be in electronic format.

Inspectors should sample documents to ensure they are in the correct format and have

been reviewed and approved correctly. Work areas may be visited to see if documents

are at the correct issue and if superseded or obsolete documents have been withdrawn.

Inspectors should also look for any notices, aide memoires or note books which may

constitute unauthorised and unapproved instructions.

Control of ‘Approved’ Arrangementsshould be included in the document control

process. A documented process should control the revision and amendment of any

arrangements that have been ‘approved’by the ‘Executive’. The process should ensure

that no alterations or amendments are made without the approval of the ‘Executive’.

The person(s) responsible for this process should be identified. It is good practice for

‘approved’ documents to be clearly identified so as to prevent unintended amendment.

Inspectors should check if the people writing, approving, revising or controlling

‘approved’ documents are aware of the process. ‘Approved’ documents may be

sampled to ensure there have been no alterations or amendments have been madesince the date of approval.

Control of Products – The licensee may have documented processes which control the

manufacture and inspection of its products. Such processes are within the scope of LC

17 arrangements when they may affect safety. Inspectors should also be aware that

incorrectly manufactured products may give rise to hazards when they are put into use

(e.g. fuel pellets) and if product safety is found to be compromised Inspectors should

take appropriate action.

Control of Records – Technical Assessment Guide T/AST/033 provides Inspectors

with guidance when considering the management and control of records.

Purchasing – Technical Assessment Guide T/AST/077 provides Inspectors with

guidance for assessing a licensee’s procurement arrangements. Where appropriate

(e.g. for safety related structures, systems and components) the licensee’s

procurement arrangements should require a supplier to be certificated to ISO 9001 by

an accredited certification body or have its management system assessed in some

other way to give confidence that requirements in the purchase specification will be

fulfilled.

Communication – The licensee’s should have a process to communicate safety,

health, environmental, security, quality and economic goals to all relevant personnelon site.


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4.3 Assessment and Feedback

A documented process should require management at all levels to carry out self

assessment to evaluate the performance of work and the status of safety culture. The

process should include recording the results of self assessment and the corrective

actions taken. Inspectors should note that self-assessment is a requirement in GS-R-3

but there is no similar requirement in ISO 9001.

The management system should contain a process for independent assessment as well.

The GS-R-3 requirement for independent assessment is more onerous than the audit

requirement in ISO 9001 and represents greater strength in depth. The independent

review process should be carried out by an organizational function which is

sufficiently independent to ensure there is no conflict of interests and the

arrangements should specify that individuals do not assess their own work. Inspectors

should judge the effectiveness and scope of the independent assessment process, the

adherence to the independent assessment programme and the quality of correctiveactions.

4.4 Management Review

A process should require senior management to carry out, at planned intervals, a

review of the management system to ensure its continuing suitability and

effectiveness. The inputs to the management review should include: outputs from all

forms of assessment, the licensee’s safety performance, non-conformances and

corrective and preventative actions, lessons learned from other organisations, and

opportunities for improvement. The process should describe how the outputs andactions from management review are managed and recorded. The management review

should be documented and records kept as required by LC 6. Inspectors should check

the licensee’s records to ensure that management review is being carried out at

planned intervals (at least annually). The Inspector should ensure that the outputs and

actions from the review are effective in promoting the continual improvement of the

management system and an improvement in safety culture.


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#5

Conclusion

This paper presented some of the key questions in the theory and practice of IMS fornuclear industry. For instance, three different levels of “integration” were identified,including harmonization, cooperation and amalgamation. It must be recognized thatfull integration requires a complete loss of unique identities of constitutingmanagement systems, in other words it results in a fusion of function-specific systemsinto a single IMS. Such integration should not be limited to a few systems, forexample quality and environment, but should involve all existing managementsystems in an organization. These systems can be organized into a “core plusfunction-specific modules” structure of an integrated “system of systems”. However,

other organizational approaches, which take into account the existing managementstructures, are also available. This paper further recognized that integrating standardsand internal systems are two largely disconnected issues, the first one being mucheasier to accomplish than the second one.

The integration of management system standards will continue to be a part of future

research in the area of IMS, not only because minor differences among the standards

still exist, but also because new standards that will stretch the boundaries of what we

currently consider as “management systems” will appear. For example, the

International Organization for Standardization is currently considering a standard on

business ethics and corporate social responsibility. Another major area of research

focus will be the provision of a “generic” methodology to implement IMS inorganizations, in other words, the study and development of a “how-to-build-your-


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own-IMS” guideline. As a part of this effort, models for supporting technologies of

IMS, including self-assessments and internal auditing, will be required. Finally,

expansion of the minimalistic requirements of standards to include business

excellence criteria will provide additional challenges for IMS researchers.


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References

AS/NZS (1999), AS/NZS 4581 Management System Integration – Guidance toBusiness, Government and Community Organizations, Standards Australia andStandards New Zealand. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/09544780210414254

Bamber, C.J., Sharp, J.M. and Hides, M.T. (2000), “Developing management systemstowards integrated manufacturing: a case study perspective”, IntegratedManufacturing Systems, Vol. 11 No. 7, pp. 454-61.

Beckmerhagen, I.A., Berg, H.P. and Wohanka, A.E. (2000), “Safety management toimprove the operational safety of nuclear installations performance”, Proceedings ofthe 8th International Conference on Nuclear Engineering, Baltimore, MD.
http://www.emeraldinsight.com/action/showLinks?system=10.1108%2F09576060010349758http://www.emeraldinsight.com/action/showLinks?system=10.1108%2F09576060010349758http://www.emeraldinsight.com/action/showLinks?system=10.1108%2F09576060010349758http://www.emeraldinsight.com/action/showLinks?system=10.1108%2F09576060010349758