In Postconflict Societies Promoting Democracypdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PNACA924.pdfIn Postconflict Societies An International Dialog by Robin S. Silver, Ph.D. Center for Development Information

Promoting Democracy In Postconflict Societies

Center for Development Information and Evaluation U.S. Agency for International Development

March 1999

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u.s. AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

The views and interpretations expressed in this report are those of the author and not necessarily those of the U.S. Agency for International Development.

globe graphic Conference Report No. 1

Promoting DemocracyIn Postconflict SocietiesAn International Dialog

by

Robin S. Silver, Ph.D.

Center for Development Information and EvaluationU.S. Agency for International Development

November 1998

The subject of this conference is not new becauseconflict is not new. People have been striving toensure that wars, once ended, stay ended, sincethe dawn of human history.

I am convinced . . . that the U.S. has a vital, strate-gic interest in seizing the opportunity that nowexists to strengthen the international system bybringing nations together around basic principlesof democracy, open markets, law, and a commit-ment to peace.

This conference deals with an important part of thateffort: the restoration, reform, and rebirth of societ-ies devastated by conflict or war.

Obviously, providing assistance in postconflict situ-ations is not the responsibility of the U.S. alone. It isa multinational enterprise.

—Madeleine AlbrightSecretary of State

In the last several years we have learned a greatmany lessons about working in the difficult and po-litically charged environment of transition countries.Not all of these lessons have been easy ones. . . .But as Franklin Delano Roosevelt said, “It is com-mon sense to take a method and try it. If it fails,admit it and try another. But above all try something.”We have heeded President Roosevelt’s advice. Wehave tried to learn from our mistakes, develop newmethods, and better link our diplomacy and ourassistance. Sharing these lessons is the goal of thisconference.

—Brian AtwoodUSAID Administrator

Contents

Introduction ...................................................................................................................... vii

Summary ............................................................................................................................ ix

1. The Elements of Political Transition .............................................................................. 1

2. Refugee Repatriation and Resettlement ......................................................................... 3

3. Demobilizing the Military .............................................................................................. 7

4. Police Reform ............................................................................................................... 11

5. Mechanisms for Confronting Human Rights Abuses And Sustaining Comprehensive Reform ...................................................................... 15

6. Postconflict Elections ................................................................................................... 19

7. Community-Level Peace Building ............................................................................... 23

8. The Impact of Economic Revitalization And Media Support on Intergroup Cooperation .......................................................... 29

9. Challenges for Democratic Transitions ........................................................................ 33

Bibliography ..................................................................................................................... 37

Introduction

The Center for Development Informationand Evaluation (CDIE) of the U.S. Agencyfor International Development has under-taken a program of studies to analyze the roleof international assistance in the politicalrehabilitation of postconflict societies. Thecenter represented USAID in the MultidonorEvaluation of Emergency Assistance toRwanda and subsequently authored “Re-building Post-War Rwanda.” This was fol-lowed by a volume, Rebuilding SocietiesAfter Civil War, that examined the differentdimensions of postconflict rehabilitation anddrew policy lessons for the international com-munity. CDIE then evaluated internationalexperience assisting postconflict elections insix countries, presenting its findings in amonograph, From Bullets to Ballots. A forth-coming publication, Postconflict Elections,Democratization, and International Assis-tance, expands both the framework of analy-sis and the number of selected case studies,adding greater depth and detail to our under-standing of these elections. CDIE is now fin-ishing its case studies of social reconcilia-tion in the Middle East, Bosnia, and SouthAfrica and will prepare a report on this sub-ject.

To share its findings and experience,CDIE decided to organize a major interna-tional conference on the political rehabili-tation of postconflict societies. That Octo-ber 1997 conference, Promoting Democ-racy, Human Rights, and Reintegration inPostconflict Societies, had several objec-tives: to highlight critical areas of the demo-cratic political transition; to clarify the linksbetween its components; and to draw les-sons about the efficacy and impact of ini-tiatives in postconflict societies.

More than 300 representatives of the in-ternational community—USAID, the StateDepartment, nongovernmental organiza-tions, private voluntary organizations, andbilateral and multilateral agencies—partici-pated in the conference. The subject drewthe attention of the keynote speaker, Secre-tary of State Madeleine Albright, and ofUSAID Administrator Brian Atwood.

In her remarks, Secretary Albrightemphasized not only the diversity of chal-lenges ahead, but also the uniqueness of thiswindow for action. She urged the interna-tional community to “plant the seeds” of

“human security and prosperity and free-dom,” aiding those “who have emergedfrom the ravages of war to rebuild theirlives, recreate their communities, and renewthe progress of their nations.”

In the intervening months, CDIE has pre-pared two documents on the conference toprovide wider access to, and review of, theproceedings. The first is a compendium ofthe original conference papers and the com-plete texts of remarks in the opening ple-nary sessions. The second, a more difficultendeavor, is this thematic essay by RobinSilver, which imparts both a sense of thedialog and its contribution to this field.

Dr. Silver ably weaves together the ele-ments of the political transition, emphasiz-ing several unifying themes, ideas, and per-spectives. She reviews the critical areas ofendeavor highlighted by the conference: therepatriation and resettlement of refugees, thedemobilization of ex-combatants, policereform, mechanisms for human-rightsinstitution building, elections, community-level peace-building, and the impact of eco-nomic reactivation programs on reconcilia-tion. She concludes with an assessment ofchallenges to political transitions.

I am thankful to Dr. Silver for thisexcellent essay.

I would also like to commend the finework of the conference rapporteurs fromCDIE’s Research and Reference Servicesstaff—Stephanie McNulty, Tom Buck, DanTurello, Anne O’Toole, Paul Prettitore, andJosh Kaufman—who took time out fromtheir demanding schedules to producethoughtful session summaries.

I am grateful to USAID AdministratorBrian Atwood and Chief of Staff DickMcCall for their efforts on behalf of thisconference. I would like to thank severalcolleagues for their support throughout thisentire project: Larry Garber, deputy assis-tant administrator of the Bureau for Programand Policy Coordination; Gerald Britan,director of CDIE; Richard Whelden, assis-tant director of CDIE; and Susan Merrill,director of the Program and OperationsAssessment Division of PPC.

I would be most interested in hearingcomments on the issues raised as well assuggestions.

—KRISHNA KUMAR

Team Sector LeaderHumanitarian Assistance and Democracy

USAID/CDIE/POA

viii Promoting Democracy in Postconflict Societies: An International Dialog

Summary

The end of the Cold War brought greaterprominence to intrastate conflicts. It openedthe door for their resolution and for the even-tual reconstruction of war-torn societiesthrough the assistance of the internationalcommunity. Experience has taught thatreconstruction in a period of marked turbu-lence involves three transitions: an evolu-tion from a controlled, or perhaps chaotic,economy to a free market; a rejection ofviolence in favor of negotiated accords andpeaceful methods of conflict resolution; andfinally the transition from an authoritarianregime to a fledgling democracy based onthe rule of law and respect for human rights.

The October 1997 conference PromotingDemocracy, Human Rights, and Reintegra-tion, held in Washington and sponsored byUSAID’s Center for Development Informa-tion and Evaluation, stimulated an interna-tional dialog on past, present, and futureinterventions in support of democracy. Par-ticipants outlined the obstacles to, andoffered suggestions for, appropriate andeffective engagement in postconflict soci-eties.

Repatriation andResettlement of Refugees

Repatriation and resettlement of refugeesare prerequisites to the political and socialrehabilitation of postconflict societies. Con-ference participants discussed changes inthe very nature of repatriation: differencesin the number of refugees, the timing andcontrol of repatriation, and the conditionsunder which refugees return to their coun-tries of origin—if not actually to their pre-war homes. They also analyzed the prob-lems and requirements for resettling refu-gees and internally displaced persons.

In the 1990s, voluntary repatriation hasseldom meant return to stable environments.Refugees have instead come home to terri-tories beset by conflict. Even in these tenu-ous circumstances, they are perceived asdecision-makers. But they now decide torepatriate without amnesty, without theknowledge of international agencies, andwithout assurance of political change orpersonal safety.

x Promoting Democracy in Postconflict Societies: An International Dialog

In response to this troubling context, par-ticipants made certain recommendations.International actors should reconsider andredesign their policies and programs. Forexample, the United Nations High Commis-sioner for Refugees has redefined its rolein the reintegration process. It now assumeseffective responsibility for refugees withinmuch broader UN peace plans, provideseconomic and social reintegration assistancethrough community-based programs in spe-cific areas, and protects refugees and theirhuman rights by working to augment judi-cial capacity.

Participants encouraged practitioners tothink locally in providing assistance, to buildcapacity and civil society (where possible),and to assist refugees reactively (when neces-sary). This holistic approach places the legalrights and protections of refugees within thelarger frameworks of community and society.

Demobilizing the Military

War-torn societies face the task of trans-forming themselves from militarized campsinto civilian societies. Reintegrating themany ex-combatants into both society andeconomy has proven an integral conditionfor a smooth transition to democracy.Effectively maneuvering demobilizedex-combatants is critical to the task ofestablishing tenable security arrangementsin postconflict societies. Participants pro-posed interventions that combine technicalassistance with certain moral force.

Demobilization has several stages: dis-armament and relocation, resettlement,reintegration. Ideally, these involve inte-grated planning, the martialing and organi-zation of resources, preparatory work at the

local level, and authoritative implementa-tion. Of course, the postconflict environ-ment rarely is ideal. The urgency of demo-bilization can also frustrate these efforts.Other factors, such as the nature of themilitary’s relation with civilians during theconflict, can determine a society’s eventualacceptance—or rejection—of demobilizedsoldiers.

Participants suggested that programs beflexible and make use of a wide range ofinstruments to manage favorable or unfa-vorable environments, diverse groups ofex-combatants, and unforeseen complica-tions. In this way, programs are betterequipped to handle the demobilization offemale ex-combatants, children soldiers,and members of armed groups. Participantsalso recommended that demobilization beincorporated into broader rehabilitationefforts.

Police Reform

Police reforms are essential to an over-haul of internal security—in national andlocal police forces. They provide a modi-cum of security to war-fatigued and leerypopulations while enabling the politicaltransition to proceed. Given an element ofpolitical will, well-managed reforms alsoprovide opportunities to bolster institutionalcapacity. They strengthen local civil-soci-ety organizations. And they emphasize val-ues central to democracy.

Participants noted that the immediate andfuture goals of police reform in post-conflict societies—particularly in CentralAmerica—stress organizing interim secu-rity arrangements, reconfiguring and retrain-ing the police force, instituting civilian over-

xi

sight mechanisms, and monitoring thereform process. The objective here is a pro-fessional, humane, and civilian police forcecommitted to the principles of democraticpolicing. The international community hasplayed a strategic role in providing techni-cal assistance and moral guidance to reformefforts.

Participants observed that while policereforms expedite the political transition,they may take many years to implement.Therefore, they urged the international com-munity to strengthen local nongovernmen-tal organizations (NGOs) to act as long-termpartners in the reform process. By monitor-ing the police, educating citizens about therole of the police in a democratic polity, andadvocating better judicial and prisonreforms, these civil society organizationsmay sustain reform.

Mechanisms for ConfrontingHuman Rights Abuses

The international community has debatedhow to best address and redress humanrights abuses ranging from the negation ofbasic civil and political rights to regime-sponsored rape, assault, and genocide. Theconference examined the postconflict expe-rience of three mechanisms: war crimes tri-bunals, truth commissions, and humanrights field operations. Each mechanism hasa specific function in the postconflictperiod; each can contribute to sustainedreform and reconciliation.

Participants observed that war crimes tri-bunals are particularly suited to societies inwhich human rights abuses included

regime-condoned violence. Criminal trialsemphasize individual, rather than collective,guilt.

Truth commissions have a different pur-pose. They try to reconstruct and examinethe larger context (social forces, historicalevents, and political structures) surround-ing the incidence of abuse. By allowing vic-tims to contribute to the official record, theyalso function as a first step in social recon-ciliation.

A Human Rights Field Operation, asorganized by the United Nations, undertakesseveral tasks as part of the mandate to pro-tect civilian populations and monitor thebehavior of signatories. During peacekeep-ing operations, the HRFO trains candidatesselected for the UN civilian police andmonitors military peacekeepers. During thepolitical transition the HRFO monitors newinstitutions, uncovering problems of insuf-ficient capacity, delivering the appropriatetechnical assistance, and then evaluating theeffectiveness of new systems.

Participants proffered some lessonslearned. First, human rights mechanismsmust make promotion of indigenous humanrights organizations a priority. Second, theinternational community should match thecall for early intervention with action. Third,demanding unlikely compliance with unfea-sible human rights standards will not guar-antee implementation. Participants advisedthe international community to advocatementoring, open and reciprocal dialog, andappropriate human rights reforms while newleaders establish stability, gain legitimacy,and learn their craft.

Summary

xii Promoting Democracy in Postconflict Societies: An International Dialog

Postconflict Elections

Postconflict elections are perhaps themost widely known and often lauded instru-ments of democratization in postconflictsocieties. These rely on critical financial,technical, and logistical assistance from theinternational community. Participantsaddressed the not-always-reconcilable func-tions of these elections, their prerequisites,the common logistical and political prob-lems encountered, and the consequences fordemocratic governance. Questioning thevalue of an instrument often unable to pro-duce sustainable reform, participants sup-ported the development of interim alterna-tives to elections.

The international community has a dem-onstrated ability in organizing postconflictelections. Yet the demands of establishingeven a rudimentary electoral infrastructurehave made it difficult to direct sufficientresources to extensive civil education orpreparation of a receptive political climate.This is unfortunate, because electoral struc-tures alone cannot compel a broader visionof political reconciliation based on accom-modation and compromise.

The panelists outlined some alternativesto early elections: extended periods ofnegotiation to broaden consensus on criti-cal issues, transitional governments or coun-cils, power-sharing arrangements or coali-tion governments. These would serve ascatalysts for social reconciliation, before po-tentially divisive elections take place. Suchinterim arrangements could also prove lesscostly in the short run and more sustainablein the future.

Community-LevelPeace Building

The international commmunity has rec-ognized the value of community-levelpeace-building efforts. These interventionsattempt to reconstitute fractured communi-ties and encourage participation in recon-struction efforts. They often emphasize themanagement of conflict, nonviolent meth-ods of dispute resolution and debate, andreconciliation.

The conference evaluated three ap-proaches to community peace building. Thefirst approach, psychosocial healing,demands that postconflict recovery effortsbe holistic and address physical, social, andpsychological elements. Participants con-sidered a five-stage model of communityreintegration and healing that could act as aguide for interventions.

The second approach employs peacecommittees for dispute resolution to limitcommunal violence. This had origins in theSouth African experience. A network ofregional and local committees evolved intoa locus of democratic debate and problemsolving. Peace committees can use theirauthority to monitor regime institutions andto oblige their representatives to participatein deliberations.

The third approach considers the role ofgrass-roots organizations in peace-buildingand reconciliation efforts. Using casematerial from Bosnia, participants discussedthe establishment of these associations, civicorganizations, and nongovernmental orga-nizations as alternative service providers

xiii

during the war. In the postwar period, manyof these indigenous organizations mobilizesupport around common interests and needs,rather than around ascriptive criteria. Theyform a community-level constituency forpeace.

Participants noted several lessons learnedhere. Environmental factors affect perfor-mance. For example, national-level politicsand state institutions exert an especiallystrong influence on community-level inter-ventions. Therefore, successful operation-alization of any intervention depends onsensitive adaptation to the institutionalenvironment. Given the influence of envi-ronmental variables, participants also urgedcaution in trying to transfer mechanismsfrom one environment to another. Thepsychosocial approach cannot be adaptedto, or implemented in, every postconflictsituation; the singular factors that affordedthe peace committees some relative successare not easy to reproduce. Similarly, inter-national interest in, and subsequent assis-tance to, postconflict Bosnia helped main-tain grass-roots organizations.

The Impact of EconomicRevitalization and MediaSupport on IntergroupCooperation

The breakdown of social networks in so-cieties once noted for relatively high levelsof integration and tolerance is a commonconsequence of intrastate warfare. Never-theless, peace building and the democraticpolitical transition require some interethniccooperation. Participants examining recon-ciliation in Bosnia reviewed economic

revitalization and media support programsthat have demonstrated some success ineither promoting or facilitating cooperation.

In Bosnia, several interventions havedemonstrated some utility in strengtheningthe private sector and increasing interaction.By activating market mechanisms, small-business lending promotes commercedetermined by the laws of supply and de-mand, not by ethnicity. Business associa-tions and financial intermediary organiza-tions with ethnically diverse directoratesseek out and support opportunities for co-operation among different ethnic groups.Reconstructing infrastructure with an eyeto interethnic commerce and trade has alsocontributed to the rehabilitation of theBosnian private sector. But political andinstitutional factors have prevented theseinstruments from fully realizing theirobjectives. In Bosnia the legal and policyframework impedes further economicdevelopment and liberalization. Politicalleaders at all levels of government continueto use available security sector instrumentsat their disposal to control trade, commerce,and the economy.

International assistance for new mediaoutlets—print and broadcast—has also beenused to promote interethnic cooperation inBosnia. The nationalist parties, generallyopposed to reintegration, control most of theexisting media outlets. In reaction to this,international support for “alternative media”with more conciliatory messages has flowedinto the region. However, these interven-tions raised questions about sustainabilityand the fine line between socially respon-sible media and propaganda.

Summary

xiv Promoting Democracy in Postconflict Societies: An International Dialog

Challenges forDemocratic Transitions

While reviewing the effectiveness of de-mocracy promotion strategies in several re-gions, conference participants highlightedboth the opportunities and challenges inher-ent in the postconflict context.

Most strategies of democracy promotioninvolve transferring purely conceptual mod-els and attempting to give them more con-crete form. Participants observed that theresulting structures do not easily take root,do not maintain their pristine form, or donot produce anticipated results. Forexample, judicial reforms sometimes gen-erate accusations of foreign imposition andencounter opposition from vested interests.Rudimentary and often unsustainable elec-toral administrations have not been the cata-lyst for further democratization. As a result,participants questioned the applicability ofthe original models.

Participants noted that democracy pro-motion also continues to suffer from theweakness of those political institutions andstate structures that should form the foun-dations for the democratization. Many fac-tors can hinder attempts to strengthen andanchor the institutions that sustain democ-racy. On one hand, transitional regimes mayoppose such capacity-building interven-tions. On the other hand, international com-munity actions or inactions—lack of visionor planning, short-term commitment of re-sources, assumptions that constitutions orelections will provide enough institution-

building momentum, and donor neglect—can also derail institutional development.

The vagaries of political will presentanother challenge to democracy promotion.Political leaders and governing regimes canrefuse certain interventions outright or limitothers. Even relatively weak regimes canfrustrate strategies through tepid commit-ments to democratization.

Under these circumstances, the interna-tional community faces a major challenge:what to do with democratically elected gov-ernments that refuse to follow the estab-lished norms of democracy. Participantsengaged in much debate and found nosimple answer to the question. They sug-gested that the international community usejudgment in classifying these situations andin selecting the appropriate strategies. Par-ticipants identified at least two scenarios.In some cases, leaders do not believe indemocracy and may reject or even sabotagedemocratization efforts. The prudent policymay be to bide time, to lower expectationsfor change. In other cases, leaders may cur-tail ongoing democracy promotion activi-ties and not step aside in favor of moredemocratic arrangements. Democracy pro-motion strategies must adapt to this limitedcompliance and work within its confines.

Recognizing this, participants suggestedthat the international community center itsefforts on deliberate institution-building.This has the potential to limit the authorityof some authoritarian leaders. Their regimesmay eventually “borrow” certain elements

xv

from the liberal democratic model: anemphasis on accountability and other com-ponents of democratic governance, relianceon negotiation to settle conflict, subordina-tion of the military in a civilian polity, or

the rejection of charisma and the establish-ment of the rule of law as the basis forlegitimacy. Of course, this strategy neces-sitates a considerable long-term engage-ment.

Summary

xvi Promoting Democracy in Postconflict Societies: An International Dialog

1. The Elements of Political Transition

The end of the Cold War—with the erup-tion of civil wars and the dissolution of po-litical and social structures in the Caucusus,the Balkans, and Central Africa—broughtgreater prominence to intrastate conflicts. Italso opened the door for the resolution ofthese conflicts and for the eventual recon-struction of these societies, through the as-sistance of the international community. Ex-perience teachesthat reconstructionin a period ofmarked turbulencemust involve threetransitions: an evo-lution from a con-trolled, or perhapschaotic, economy toa free market; arejection of violencein favor of negoti-ated accords andpeaceful methods ofconflict resolution;and finally, the tran-sition from an au-thoritarian regime toa fledgling democ-racy based on therule of law andrespect for human

rights. Of course, this tripartite divisionshould not obscure the fact that a concernfor democracy, human rights, and reintegra-tion must inform economic and social reha-bilitation initiatives.

The objective of the conference was toexamine the different elements of politicaltransition in the postconflict context. The

themes discussed in-cluded the following:the changing nature ofrefugee repatriation andresettlement, the demobi-lization of ex-combatantsand police reform asprerequisites to change,mechanisms for estab-lishing regimes with in-creased human rights ca-pacities, the utility ofpostconflict elections indemocracy building, ap-proaches to community-level peace building, theimpact of economic reac-tivation on reconciliation,and the efficacy of de-mocracy promotion strat-egies. These themes pro-vided the areas of delib-

[The political transition] involves insti-tutionalizing the norms of free and fairelections so that government leadersare selected through ballots and notbullets; it involves observance ofhuman rights so that people can livewithout fear and intimidation; it involvesestablishing a free media that can dis-seminate information and ideas with-out the threat of political reprisals; itinvolves strengthening grass-roots vol-untary organizations to mediate be-tween society and polity; it involvesreforming the internal security sectorso that the rights and liberties of thepopulace can be protected; and itinvolves establishing civilian controlover the military.

—Krishna KumarUSAID

eration. CDIE commissioned 14 papers fromexperts in each field.

CDIE originally proposed the conferenceto facilitate an international dialog on past,present, and future interventions in supportof democracy. To order this exchange of ideason the political transition, conference orga-nizers arranged 15 topical sessions. The ple-

nary sessions and speakers gave voice to thesensibility and spirit of the gathering.

This report does not attempt to capture therichness of this dialog, nor does it attempt todraw any conclusions. Rather, the author haschosen to emphasize those themes thatemerged repeatedly in the subject panels,roundtables, and general sessions.

2 Promoting Democracy in Postconflict Societies: An International Dialog

The repatriation and resettlement of refu-gees are prerequisites to the political andsocial rehabilitation of postconflict societ-ies. The conferencedevoted two ses-sions to these top-ics. Participantsdiscussed changesin the nature of re-patriation—differ-ences in the numberof refugees, thetiming and controlof repatriation, andthe conditions un-der which refugees return to their countriesof origin if not to their prewar homes. Theyalso analyzed the problems and require-ments for resettling refugees and internallydisplaced persons. Finally, they reviewedcurrent strategies and offered newapproaches to deal with the new challenges.

At the outset, it was noted that the end ofthe Cold War and the collapse of the SovietUnion have transformed the context in

United States policy is based on the fol-lowing premises: protection, life-sustainingassistance, durable solutions, voluntaryrepatriation under safe conditions, andacknowledging that the care of refugeesand the pursuit of solutions are sharedinternational responsibilities.

—Marguerite HouzeDepartment of State

Panelists on the roundtable “Reintegration of Refugees and IDPs” (internally displaced persons) included EdmundCain of the United Nations Development Program, Patricia Weiss Fagen of the World Bank, and Jeffrey Crisp of theUnited Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. Marguerite Houze of the Department of State, Dennis Gallagherof the Refugee Policy Group, and Barry Stein of Michigan State University served on the panel “Repatriation ofRefugees and IDPs.”

2. Refugee Repatriation and Resettlement

which the international community mustrespond to the refugee challenge. As majorpowers are no longer concerned with the

outcomes of civilwar, they are lesseager to fund long-term support forrefugees. At thesame time, hoststates realize thatthey will reap few ifany rewards foroffering asylum tolarge refugee popu-lations, especially at

certain economic cost. With little to gainfrom offering asylum, possible host statesmore readily express their view of refugeepopulations as potentially destabilizing el-ements.

This transformation in context hasaffected the nature of voluntary repatriation.Contemporary repatriation has less and lessto do with voluntary repatriations thatoccur after political change and so guaran-


tee the safety of the refugees. Instead, theissue is one of “large returns to troubledcountries where repatriation is often violent,compelled, and premature” (Stein 1997, 2).While refugees are still perceived as deci-sion-makers in these tenuous circumstances,they now decide to repatriate withoutassurances of regime change and despite thecontinuation of conflict. Furthermore, theyrepatriate “frequently without any amnesty,without a repatriation agreement or pro-gram, without ‘permis-sion’ from the authori-ties in either the coun-try of asylum or oforigin, without interna-tional knowledge or as-sistance” (Stein 1997,3). The increasing inci-dence of repatriationunder these uncertaincircumstances—withattendant chances forrefoulement (the forcedreturn of refugees de-spite great threats totheir lives and liberty)and premature repatria-tion—presents newproblems for the inter-national community.

Indeed, participantsacknowledged the debate over the currentreliance on repatriation. Before the end ofthe Cold War, repatriation was clearly notan option in many cases. Now the politicalenvironment permits agencies to considervoluntary repatriation to countries formerlydeemed beyond the pale. As one panelistnoted, this predilection for voluntary repa-triation is based on the assumptions thatrefugees want to go home, that states wantthem back—whether as a point of national

pride or economics—and that states arebound to accept repatriating refugees.

Yet, in some postconflict situations, theseassumptions are not always valid. Refugeesdo not always prefer to leave their coun-tries of asylum, whether from fear or fromeconomic or ideological considerations. Insome cases, hosts benefit from the contri-butions of these refugee populations. And,in the aftermath of civil war, countries of

origin may view expa-triate refugees as politi-cal enemies and mayimpede or obstruct theirreentry.

Furthermore, thegreat number of peoplenow afforded refugeeprotections often com-plicates the mecha-nisms of repatriation.The international com-munity may not havethe capacity to inter-vene effectively whenrepatriation movementsbegin. In addition, themagnitude can maskimportant distinctionsamong, and thereby theneeds of, members of

the repatriating population.

Despite these considerable dilemmas,there is an observed predilection towardrepatriation. Permanent asylum and third-country resettlement are often not realoptions. In point of fact, forced returnsoccur with greater frequency. As a result,international agencies regard voluntaryrepatriation to be the most viable, or the leastdisagreeable, solution.

The principle of voluntary repatria-tion came to be applied widely tomass movements of people acrossborders caused by internal conflicts,famine, and other man-made disas-ters. This wide application of the prin-ciple of voluntary repatriation wasencouraged because there was littledesire to send people back to com-munist, colonial, and apartheid re-gimes. In this new political era, whilethere is continued willingness of theinternational community to respondto humanitarian emergencies, thereis also greater impatience for per-sons displaced by them to return totheir homes as soon as possibleafter the acute emergency is over.

—Dennis GallagherRefugee Policy Group

5

Consequent to this, participants discussedthe problem of resettling large numbers ofreturning refugees and reintegrating themin the fabric of national life. They observedthat the economic dimension of resettlementis generally understood, while insufficientattention has been devoted to its politicalramifications. Assistance to refugees mustbe delivered in a fashion that does not cre-ate tensions betweenthem and other popu-lations. Often the tar-get of rehabilitationefforts should be theentire community,and not only the refu-gee population. Thereis also a need to delveinto civil and politicalrights—legal protec-tion, property rights,and political freedomof refugees. Partici-pants encouraged theinternational community to rethink and re-formulate their strategies and programs inthis neglected area.

Panelists also acknowledged the singu-lar, difficult, and changing interpretation ofUnited Nations High Commissioner forRefugees (UNHCR) responsibility in thisarena. Given the need to monitor repatria-tion and reintegration and promote recon-ciliation, the UNHCR spends larger andlarger sums of money in the country of ori-gins, rather than in host countries or coun-tries of asylum. The UNHCR’s role in rein-tegration now includes assuming effectiveresponsibility for refugees within muchbroader UN peace plans, providing eco-nomic and social reintegration assistancethrough community-based programs in spe-cific areas, and ensuring the protection of

refugees and their human rights—by work-ing to augment judicial capacity.

This is a new orientation for the UNHCR.Is the organization suited to perform thesefunctions? As a panelist noted, “Althoughthe UNHCR has an abiding concern thereturnees be firmly reintegrated into theirsocieties, UNHCR assistance and involve-

ment is limited to theirreturn and an initial,albeit lengthening,arrival and settling-inperiod” (Stein 1997,10). However, partici-pants emphasized,the UNHCR is oftenharshly criticized forfailing to do an impos-sible job. For ex-ample, the UNHCR isof ten required todesign repatriationprograms for refugees

in areas not under government control. Or,occasionally, a government will request thatthe UNHCR provide key services to anentire population, not just to refugees.

In addition to the UNHCR, NGOs, bilat-eral agencies, private voluntary organiza-tions, and UN affiliates assist in repatria-tion and resettlement. As each organizationhas its own mandate, agenda, and funding,interagency coordination becomes problem-atic. Even within the more limited universeof the UN, coordination is no easier. Rep-resentatives of the United Nations HighCommissioner for Refugees and the UnitedNations Development Program admitted toan unnecessary overlap in their efforts anda general lack of communication betweenthe two organizations in the past. A newglobal memorandum of understanding

Of all the organizations and agenciesinvolved, none necessarily stands outfrom the others as the leader . . . . Eachof the separate entities has its ownmandate, governing boards, indepen-dent fundraising, and resources. Theexisting system does not view a com-plex emergency as a whole problem. Itis unable to offer a coherent and com-prehensive approach and solution.

—Barry SteinMichigan State University

Refugee Repatriation and Resettlement

between the two should remedy the situa-tion. The participants felt that the differentagencies and organizations should considertheir comparative advantage. Significant ef-forts must be made to devise and institu-tionalize a more rational division of laborwithin the international community.

Participants encouraged international ac-tors to reconsider and redesign their poli-

cies and programs in light of the new chal-lenges and opportunities. They should thinklocally in the provision of assistance, buildcapacity and civil society where possible,and assist refugees reactively when neces-sary. Practitioners should think holisticallyand consider the whole community. Thereshould be greater emphasis on the legalrights and protections of refugees and in-ternally displaced persons.


Once parties to a conflict have indicatedtheir acceptance of a negotiated settlement,war-torn societies face the task of transform-ing themselves from militarized camps intocivilian societies. Conflicts generate armies,intelligence units, special forces, murdersquads. Reintegrating the many ex-combat-ants into both society and economy has provenan integral condition for a smooth transitionto democracy.

Effectively maneuvering demobilizedex-combatants is critical to the task of estab-lishing tenable security arrangements inpostconflict societies. Ex-combatants withoutlivelihoods, who have notfound a point of re-entryinto society, can spread dis-content and feed the mar-ket in military hardware.They pose threats to boththe regime and the civilianpopulation. Participants inthe session on ex-combat-ants outlined the obstaclespresented by the post-conflict context and of-fered suggestions for ap-

propriate and effective interventions—a com-bination of technical assistance and certainmoral force.

Conference participants noted that demo-bilization campaigns in Africa and CentralAmerica take place in a variety of politicaland socioeconomic contexts. Each demobili-zation must be evaluated in light of the fac-tors that prompted it. These may include apeace accord, shortage of funding, victory anddefeat of fighting parties, perceived improve-ment in the security situation, changing mili-tary technologies or strategies, and perceivedeconomic and development benefits of shift-

ing from a war-time to peacetimeeconomy.

This variancein cause and con-text naturally im-poses a variancein the process of,and approach to,demobilization.Nevertheless, par-ticipants under-

Demobilization and reintegration pro-grams for military personnel constitutea vital part of demilitarization in particu-lar, and of transitions from war to peacein general. Indeed, increased demilitari-zation is a precondition for reviving civilsociety, reducing poverty, and sustain-ing development in Africa.

—Nat Colletta,World Bank

The session “Demobilization and Reintegration of Ex-Combatants” included Nat Colletta, of the World Bank; KeesKingma, of the Bonn International Center for Conversion; and Johanna Mendelson, of USAID.

3. Demobilizing the Military


scored the fact that de-mobilization often in-volves the execution ofsimilar tasks. Soldiersmust be grouped, en-camped, and disarmed.Only then can they beprovided with identifi-cation and with educa-tion about civilian lifeand outfitted with somebasic provisions. Afterthis initial resettlement,reintegration can pro-ceed. The economic as-pect of reintegration—the ability to learn alivelihood—depends upon access to credit,land, and opportunities. The social aspect—acceptance by the community—depends uponthe military’s relations with civilians and re-spect for civilian social structures, the statusof the military in the postconflict polity, andcultural factors.

In connection withthis, one panelist notedthat the World Bank’sinterventions approxi-mate a “seamless webof transition from mili-tary to civilian life”(Colletta 1997, 3). Ademobilization phasecenters on the disarma-ment and relocation ofex-combatants—a return to community.Reinsertion supplies ex-combatants with a“transitional safety net” through paymentsmade over several months. Social and eco-nomic reintegration then assists ex-combat-ants in developing a livelihood.

A World Bank program is designed tofirst gather information on individualex-combatants (their characteristics, needs,

skills) and then as-sess “opportunitystructures” (marketsfor labor, land,credit, training) andinstitutional capac-ity. In this way, assis-tance can be targetedto groups of ex-com-batants, and coordi-nation mechanismscan rely on existingstructures at thenational, regional,and community lev-

els. This approach sustains ex-combatants,increases the capacity of local institutions,and facilitates economic and social rehabili-tation.

Discussion pinpointed the factors thatfavor the implementation of demobilizationprograms. Initial disarmament must precede

all else, to avoidsecurity risks andpossible disruptions.The programs shouldbe flexible, makinguse of a wide rangeof instruments toadequately addressboth diverse environ-ments and groups ofe x - c o m b a t a n t s .When possible, de-

mobilization should be incorporated intobroader rehabilitation efforts. A strong cen-tral authority is necessary to carry out thedemobilization effort and orchestrate theservices of NGOs and multilateral and bi-lateral agencies.

Assistance should involve more thanretraining or recapacitating service provi-sion structures, however. As one panelist

Clearly, there is a tension between thepolitical uncertainty that usually existsin a country emerging from a war andthe need for advance planning. Never-theless, important preparatory workincludes the mobilization of resources,needs assessment, sensitization ofstakeholders, and linking demobilizationwith reintegration efforts.

—Kees KingmaBonn International CenterFor Conversion

However, as [World] Bank experienceand understanding evolved, we havecome to appreciate the developmen-tal linkages between demilitarization,social and economic reintegration ofwar-affected populations, and the over-all reconstruction process.

—Nat CollettaWorld Bank

9

observed, it must “rebuild social capital,”promote a variety of social organizationsand forms to ease reintegration, and “workorganizing reconciliation activities, opencommunity meetings and other activities forfree and transparent public exchanges be-tween formerly hostile groups and individu-als” (Colletta 1997, 10–11). The interna-tional community should encourage rap-prochement.

The dialog on strategies addressed sev-eral ongoing debates: whether to target theneeds of individualsor those of largercommunities; bestpractices for han-dling women ex-combatants and childsoldiers; the possibil-ity of incorporatingnonsignatory armedgroups within estab-lished arrangements.

Finally, the lessons learned included thecriticality of demobilization to security sec-tor reforms, social rehabilitation, and asmooth political transition. Even so, themorality of supporting ex-combatants whencivilian populations face similar economic

deprivations raised certain ethical consid-erations. One panelist outlined the argumentadvocating special assistance to ex-combat-ants. On one hand, this group is unemployedand in need of relocation. Yet skill level andcompetence may favor eventual employ-ment, such that aid to the ex-combatantsactually contributes to economic rehabili-tation. In some cases, participation in themilitary was motivated by a dedication tosocioeconomic improvement; at other times,enlistment was not a matter of choice.Demobilization assistance could be

supported on anyof these grounds:in order to meet spe-cial needs; becauseit makes economicsense; and as a com-pensation for militaryduty. On the otherhand, withholdingassistance only in-

creases the risk that ex-combatants will notreintegrate. Experience has taught that thealternative to assisted reintegration is lifeon the political and economic margins andsurvival through illegal activities. Thesewould constitute challenges for the newregime and its security arrangements.

For demobilization to contribute to peaceand development, it needs to be embed-ded in a broader process of peace build-ing and national reconciliation.

—Kees KingmaBonn International CenterFor Conversion

Demobilizing the Military

Like the demobiliza-tion and reintegration ofex-combatants, policereforms are integral toan overhaul of the inter-nal security sector.These reforms provide amodicum of security towar-fatigued and leerypopulations while en-abling the political tran-sition to proceed. Expe-rience has taught that,given an element ofpolitical will, well-man-aged reforms also pro-vide opportunities forbolstering institutionalcapacity, emphasizingvalues central to democ-racy promotion, andstrengthening local civilsociety organizations.

The immediate andfuture goals of police

reform in CentralAmerica and otherpostconflict settingsstress organizinginter im secur i tya r r a n g e m e n t s ,reconfiguring andretraining the policeforce, institutingcivilian oversightmechanisms, andmonitoring the re-form process. Oneparticipant noted thatpolice reform inCentral America isprimarily under-stood as “demilita-rizing public secu-rity—ending theextraordinary mili-tary control over andnature of policing”(Call 1997, 2). Theobjective is the cre-ation of a profes-

4. Police Reform

During the civil wars of the 1980s,internal security forces becamedeeply involved in counterinsurgencyefforts and were responsible for manyof the 300,000 deaths attributed tothese internal wars.

—Charles CallStanford University

The legacy of authoritarianismremains manifest in corrupt and inef-ficient judicial systems, abusive lawenforcement institutions with littlecapacity to investigate and solvecrimes, continued impunity for thepowerful, and in the residue of authori-tarian political culture that acts as adrag on efforts to consolidate demo-cratic electoral transitions by makingaccountable the key institutionsresponsible for protecting and promot-ing democratic values and practices.

—George VickersWashington Office on Latin America

The session “Police Reform” included presentations from George Vickers, of the Washington Office on LatinAmerica; Charles Call, of Stanford University; and Charles Costello, of USAID.


sional, humane, and civilian police forcecommitted to the principles of democraticpolicing. Such a force allows new regimesto bring “protection, order, and justice” tothe population and reinforces regime cred-ibility (Call 1997, 2).

The participants outlined the similaritiesin the component elements of police reformprograms. El Salvador, like other countries,established a new national police force anda new National Public Security Academy.Participants also formalized mechanisms tomonitor the force for human rights abusesand other abuses of power, while reducingthe military appa-ratus and limitingits domain to ex-ternal security.Demilitarizationin the postconflictcontext must sig-nify the separationof the police fromthe military, aswell as the commission of new personnelguided by doctrine, methods, and missionsnonmilitary in orientation.

The discussion did not refrain from thedebate surrounding police force reconstitu-tion. On the one hand, police reform mayact as an instrument of reconciliation.Through the active recruitment of person-nel from previously “disenfranchised” andunderrepresented groups, a police reformprogram that seeks diversity may have asalutary effect on reconciliation. It may alsoprovide an additional measure of legitimacyand support for the regime. Of course, sucha tactic would force reformers to review cur-rent admissions requirements and standards;these need to be restructured to maintainforce effectiveness while promoting diver-sity.

On the other hand, reconstitution mayentail a serious demobilization dilemma:Would complete dismissal of existing forcesyield risks for security? In some cases, thisdilemma prompts reformers to keep at leasta segment of the old force operational,either permanently or as part of some in-terim policing arrangement. Becauserecruiting and training a new nationalpolice force is a time-consuming process,reliance on an interim public security forcehas been common. Panelists suggested that,in all cases, these personnel should be indi-vidually selected, vetted, and retrained—and their activities monitored. If members

of the old force re-main only in an in-terim capacity, afirewall should beconstructed betweenthe new and oldforces, if possible.

Participants elabo-rated on the prob-

lems that reliance on retrained members ofthe old force may generate. Where the po-lice were associated with human rightsabuses and other illegalities, employmentof retrained personnel may prompt fear anddistrust. Reforming regimes must weigh thebenefits—more immediate access to exist-ing security arrangements, and parryingfuture claims of bias from former person-nel—against the risks of popular rejectionand preserving the old corps with its anti-democratic values.

In addition to these problems, the post-war period poses specific obstacles forpolice reform efforts. The associated prob-lems and security risks would challenge ahighly professional and well-developedpolice operation. Police reforms to date havenot always anticipated massive infrastruc-

The idea that policing is to protect andserve individual citizens rather than theregime or the state is novel in most of LatinAmerica, and requires emphasis andinstitutionalization.

—Charles CallStanford University

13

selves” (Vickers 1997, 3). The UN has beenparticularly diligent in establishing autono-mous monitoring mechanisms and ensuringthat new police meet acceptable standardsof professional deportment. International in-volvement has also prompted the extensionof police services to diverse sectors of soci-ety, not just to the wealthy or politicallypowerful. The challenge before the inter-national community is to “help countrieslearn from their own and others’ experi-ences, and to respectfully insist that thereare basic values and principles at the rootof law enforcement in a democratic soci-ety” (Vickers 1997, 16).

The discussion highlighted several otherlessons learned from police reform. Onepanelist noted that “such reforms generallyreflect the political context in which theyoccur more than they shape it” (Call 1997,14). Thus, the absence of political will innew national governments will preventreforms from achieving their objectives.Actors also should recognize that whilethese reforms are useful in initially expe-diting the political transition, they may takemany years to put into effect. Participantsurged the international community tostrengthen local NGOs to act as long-termpartners in reform. By monitoring thepolice, providing citizens with educationabout the role of the police in a democraticpolity, and advocating better judicial andprison reforms, these civil society organi-zations may sustain the reform process.

ture damage, the flow of refugees and in-ternally displaced persons, economic crises,soldiers in the process of demobilizing, thewide availability of guns and other arma-ments, and the documented post-settlementcrime rise. These factors have increased theneed for strong internal security arrange-ments yet have made them much harder tomaintain.

Resistance to police reform programs hasgrown among vested interests, the military,and officials harmed by the transformationprocess. Participants observed that these el-ements sometimes encourage the infiltrationof corrupt or criminal elements to destroythe integrity of new units; they also attemptto mitigate the power of the new forcethrough the creation of a parallel police unit.Police reform efforts depend on internalmechanisms of discipline that can aid thedevelopment of “an organizational cultureof probity and accountability” (Vickers1997, 11). Unfortunately, not all of thesemechanisms have accomplished their objec-tives.

The international community has playeda strategic role in providing technical assis-tance, such as training police recruits. Pan-elists viewed international assistance as pro-viding the moral force behind these efforts.In El Salvador, for example, the “vision fora truly national, apolitical, professionalforce came largely from the UN advisers,rather than the Salvadoran parties them-

Police Reform

In recent years, the international commu-nity has debated how best to address andredress abuses of human rights, from thenegation of basic civil and political rightsto regime-sponsored rape, assault, and geno-cide. In the post-conflict period, therecan be a tension be-tween populations thatdemand restitution andpunishment, and theinternational commu-nity that supports thesein view of eventualreconciliation. The conference devoted twosessions—one on war crimes tribunals andtruth commissions and the other on humanrights field operations—to the experienceof these mechanisms in handling this ten-sion. Each mechanism has a specific func-tion in the postconflict period, as well asthe potential to contribute to sustainedreform and reconciliation. Participantsassessed the lessons learned and did notrefrain from confronting the moral and

operational dilemmas that accompanyhuman rights interventions.

There is general agreement that the firstmechanism, war crimes tribunals, is particu-

larly suited to societ-ies in which humanrights abuses includedregime-condoned vio-lence and brutality.Criminal trials, espe-cially, center on theguilt of particularindividuals rather than

the “collective guilt” of a particular group.In each instance, questions of tribunal su-pervision must be decided. Internationalcommissions have particular advantages—expertise, impartiality, resources, author-ity—in conducting these prosecutions.There was further agreement that once thedecision is made to establish an internationaltribunal, the actual apparatus should remainin-country. This generally increases effec-tiveness and ensures greater public accessto tribunal proceedings.

At least in the aftermath of widespreadatrocities, justice is a necessary ele-ment of any stable peace.

—Neil KritzUnited States Institute of Peace

The session “Institutional Capacity Building for Human Rights” included Tom Farer, University of Denver;Ambassador John Shattuck, Department of State; and Ian Martin, University of Essex.

5. Mechanisms for ConfrontingHuman Rights AbusesAnd Sustaining Comprehensive Reform


Domestic prosecutions—with access tolocal sources of information—can also playan important role in the prosecution of warcriminals. A panelist observed that these tri-als might be “more sensitive to the nuancesof local culture” and might also bring a mes-sage of intended reform to the indigenouspopulace (Kritz 1997, 6). Naturally, not allregimes have the capacity or the morallegitimacy to carry out credible prosecu-tions. Yet it was suggested that in certaincases the domestic prosecution of thesecriminals can serve as the cornerstone forjudicial reform efforts. In order to facilitatethis, the international community can fos-ter links between international legal staffand the local legal community. Of course,these links cannot violate the norms ofjudicial neutrality and impartiality. Rather,they can perform an educational ormentoring function, assisting the locallegal establishment with its professionaldevelopment during the postconflict period.

Recognizing this, participants urged theinternational community to be sensitiveto opportunities forcomplementarity be-tween international anddomestic efforts. “Thebest scenario would befor the internationalcommunity to provideappropriate assistanceto enable a societyemerging from massabuse to deal with theissues of justice and ac-countability itself”(Kritz 1997, 20). Onepanelist counseled theinternational commu-nity to develop specificcriteria to help the host

country determine the authority, nature, andduration of any proposed tribunal.

Truth commissions, the second mecha-nism, perform a unique function: they helpthe population confront the totality of con-flict-era abuse. Because the commissions’task is to reconstruct and examine the largercontext—in terms of the social forces, his-toric events, and political structures—sur-rounding the incidence of abuse, it is not acriminal prosecution. (Of course, materialand testimony gathered by the truth com-mission may later assist prosecutors in a tri-bunal.) By testifying, victims of abuse havethe opportunity to contribute to the histori-cal record. One participant remarked that“truth commissions permit a cathartic pub-lic airing of the evil and pain that has beeninflicted” (Kritz 1997, 15). This is part ofthe reconciliation process. These commis-sions also should demonstrate the newregime’s commitment to reestablishing stan-dards of truth, accountability, and fairnessin both society and state.

As more negotiatedsettlements includemultiparty commit-ments to respect humanrights, the internationalcommunity increas-ingly finds itself moni-toring the behavior ofsignatories. As a result,human rights fieldoperations (HRFO), thethird mechanism, havecome to play an expand-ing role in the post-conflict period. Thismechanism should aug-ment human rights ca-pacity during peace

A common [misconception] is thatthe use of truth commissions andthe holding of trials are mutually ex-clusive. This is not necessarily thecase. The first truth commission ofnote, established in Argentina in1983, produced significantamounts of information which wasthen utilized by the authorities intheir prosecution of members ofthe military junta which had ruledthe country. The two processeswere complementary to one an-other.

—Neil KritzUnited States Institute for Peace

17

building and ongoingpolitical development.However, mounting ahuman rights field op-eration is a relativelynew task, only recentlyorganized.

A panelist explainedthat these units haveundergone changes inmanagement, scope,and function in the pastfew years. The UN’spolitical, and then peacekeeping, depart-ments directed the first human rights fieldoperations. These had no formal relation-ship with the United Nations Center forHuman Rights (UNCHR) in Geneva andcould make no use of its expertise. Therewas an increasing discrepancy between theemerging need for field services and theearly mission of the agency. The first highcommissioner for human rights, José Ayala–Lasso, officially created the human rightsfield operations for the Rwandan crisis andsubsequently extended the field presence ofhis bureau to several other conflict andpostconflict situations. The UNCHR alsoadvocated a humanrights presence in UNor joint UN–regionalorganization peace-keeping missions.

The human rightsfield operations nowhave particular func-tions, as one panel-ist explained. Duringpeacekeeping opera-tions, the human rightsfield operation trainscandidates selected for the UN civilianpolice. It is imperative that the civilian

police, while enforcingthe law, actively displaya respect for humanrights. While providingthis guidance, the humanrights field operation alsocreates links with the in-digenous population use-ful later in institutionbuilding. Other functionsprotect the security ofcivilians, to the extentpossible. As part of thiseffort, the human rights

field operation monitors military peacekeep-ers, teaching them to abide by human rightsstandards and to report any abuses they see.

During the political transition, the humanrights field operation should perform aseries of “integrated operations”: preven-tion, monitoring and oversight, technical as-sistance, and institution building (Martin1997, 7). The HRFO is in position to un-cover problems with insufficient capacity,deliver the appropriate technical assistance,and then evaluate the effectiveness of newsystems. In this way, the HRFO could rein-force the accountability of new institutions.

In discussion, the par-ticipants considered somelessons learned fromrecent experience. Whenthe international commu-nity establishes a humanrights presence in post-conflict societies, itmust make the promotionof indigenous humanrights organizations a pri-ority. Links betweencomplementarity and in-

stitution building are key. The HRFO, forexample, does not replace local civil soci-

Early intervention is far more cost-effective than late intervention. . . .The paradox here is that the worldoften does not take notice until con-ditions become increasinglydeplorable. By then, it is too latefor early intervention. We need todevelop early warning systems tocombat this problem.

—Ambassador John ShattuckDepartment of State

While civilians have always beenvictims of war, these new types ofconflicts involve massive humanrights abuses that are at the cen-ter of conflicts. These abuses (eth-nic cleansing, mass rape, andeven genocide) are not theby-product of the conflict, they arethe conflict.

—Ambassador John ShattuckDepartment of State

Mechanisms for Confronting Human Rights Abuses and Sustaining Comprehensive Reform

ety organizations; rather, it creates an envi-ronment conducive to their sustainabilityand offers capacity-building assistance,when possible. There was broad agreementthat the same is true for assistance to warcrimes tribunals and truth commissions.

In light of the Bosnian crises and delaysin mounting a human rights presence inRwanda, participants urged the internationalcommunity to match the call for earlyintervention with action. It was acknowl-edged that monitoring numerous intrastateconflicts for abuse may be difficult. Thecomplexities of geopolitics may also makeoperationalization quixotic. Panelists sug-gested the development of a mechanism toaccomplish this goal.

Finally, the question of setting standardsprovoked debate. What lessons have inter-ventions offered? The international commu-nity tends to view its interventions assupplying a “visible model and standards-setter” (Kritz 1997, 5). When it comes tointernational tribunals, one panelist main-tained, the demonstration effect is useful.A reforming judiciary can only benefit from

the presence of a neutral and fair criminalprosecution.

Yet the discussion acknowledged a quan-dary: Should the international communityalways impose its standards on newregimes? The realities of the transitionalperiod often place constraints and limita-tions on regime compliance with certain in-ternational standards. Still unstable, theseregimes often lack the capacity andresources necessary to adhere to the rule oflaw. They may also lack some legitimacy.As a result, it may be difficult for them toadequately resolve conflicting societaldemands for retribution, justice, and rec-onciliation.

Participants advised the internationalcommunity to emphasize mentoring whilestability and legitimacy remain tenuous andnew leaders learn their craft, to initiate openand reciprocal dialog, and to suggest appro-priate and feasible reforms. It is not a ques-tion of dismissing or lowering standards, butof creating the institutions and the politicalgoodwill necessary for their implementa-tion.


Postconflict elections are perhaps themost widely known and frequently laudedinstruments of democratization inpostconflict societies. These elections,theoretically held after negotiated peaceaccords, often rely on critical internationalassistance. The international communityprovides technical, logistical, and educa-tional assistance,not to mention ex-tensive financialsupport, to societ-ies where scarcityis ubiquitous.

The session onpostconflict elec-tions presented aconsidered analysisof these elections,prompting discus-sion of several criti-cal points. It ad-dressed the not-always-reconcil-able functions ofthese elections,their prerequisites,

the common logistical and political prob-lems encountered, and the consequencesof postconflict elections for democraticgovernance. Participants supported thedevelopment of interim alternatives toelections, questioning the utility of an in-strument not always effective in produc-ing sustainable reform.

The internationalcommunity, participantsobserved, tends to viewthe postconflict electionas a means to transform-ing a society in the wakeof social and political up-heaval to democracy.These elections are oftenperceived as securing thenegotiated settlementand resolving stickingpoints, while simulta-neously establ ishingdemocratic structuresand institutionalizingnonconflictive methodsof decision-making. Theentire election process—

6. Postconflict Elections

Clearly, elections are necessary toprovide legitimate and representativegovernment, maintain stability, andpromote progress. But although elec-tions must be part of a postconflictstrategy, they are not a sufficientstrategy. Nations come to democracyat their own speed. . . . But whetherelections are held sooner or later, theinternational community should strivefrom day one to help assemble thecore ingredients of democracy: freepress, political parties, equal rightsfor women and minorities, and evena new constitution if one is needed.

—Madeleine AlbrightSecretary of State

The panel “Postconflict Elections” included Krishna Kumar, of USAID; Marina Ottaway, of the Carnegie Foundationfor International Peace; and Larry Garber, of USAID.


from planning to execution—is viewed as“on-the-job training” for a regime and apopulace new to democracy. The interna-tional community encourages the govern-ing regime to permitboth an independentmedia and freedom ofexpression. It alsoviews an election as atrue commitment todemocratic values suchas adherence to therule of law and respectfor human rights.

This is a tall order forany intervention: creat-ing the foundations forfuture democracy, whileconstituting a moreimmediate, function-ing democratic system.This task is made all themore difficult by thefact that some political leaders do not pos-sess a commitment to democracy. Both op-position parties and transitional govern-ments occasionally agree to an election as astrategy of last resort. Sometimes rewards,such as economic aid or freedom from aninternational peacekeeping force, promptregimes to hold swift elections.

Given the complicated context in whichelections take place, it is difficult to guar-antee that any intervention will be evennominally successful. Postconflict electionsoften follow a similar sequence: fromnegotiated settlement and the demobiliza-tion of combatants through the adoption ofan electoral law to the formation of an elec-toral administration, the registration of vot-ers and candidates, and, finally, the elec-tion. However, panelists emphasized thatsimply maintaining this trajectory did not

ensure even technical success. Rather, thepresence of certain preconditions increasedthe chances for sustainability and reducedoverall costs of the intervention.

Several prerequisiteswere identified: a statewith the capacity toperform certain func-tions; a consensusamong parties about thestructure and role of thegovernment and the na-ture of intergovern-mental relations; a“demonstrable politicalcommitment on thepart of the major con-flicting parties to carryout the peace accord;”and “progress towarddemobilization and thereintegration of com-batants” (Kumar and

Ottaway 1997, 16). Indeed, the three pro-totypical categories of international assis-tance—financial, political, and technicaland logistical—have targeted particular ar-eas in which the desired preconditions didnot materialize and have extended capac-ity.

The participants recognized the interna-tional community’s demonstrated ability inorganizing postconflict elections. However,the demands of establishing and develop-ing more than a rudimentary electoralinfrastructure sometimes prevents the inter-national community from dedicatingenough time and resources to enhancing thepolitical climate. Given the difficult natureof the assignment and usually brief periodbetween accords and elections, technical andlogistical assistance have tended to over-shadow civic education programs, the

In South Africa, peace committeeswere employed primarily as a short-term tool to help manage conflictduring an interim period while thecountry’s political transition wasbeing negotiated.

The peace committees were unableto end impunity on the part of thesecurity forces, but they were ableto help equalize the balance ofpower between those in power andordinary citizens on specific issuesand to strengthen the concept ofaccountability.

—Nicole BallOverseas Development Council

21

training of election workers, and thestrengthening of indigenous civil societyorganizations. The short-term goals of “get-ting on with the elections” have taken pre-cedence over longer-termprocesses of political de-velopment.

Throughout the con-ference, in this session aswell as in the roundtableson democracy promo-tion, questions of long-term political develop-ment and sustainabilitysurfaced repeatedly.Members of the interna-tional community beganto assess the cost-effec-tiveness of elections: Arethey worth the tremen-dous cost? Should the in-ternational communityspend $2 billion in Cam-bodia or $85 million inMozambique when “many of the case stud-ies point with alarm to the disappearanceof electoral institutions” (Kumar andOttaway 1997, 12–13). There are no assur-ances. International assistance can providethe necessary technical expertise to workout logistical problems, and it can fundprodemocracy local NGOs, but it cannot al-ways dictate or create political will. The in-ternational community has succeeded inpressuring political losers to accept imme-diate election results; it cannot compel abroader vision of political reconciliationbased on accommodation and compromise.

The international community should con-sider certain lessons learned from this analy-

sis of elections assistance. Immediate elec-tions do not cure all ills; in every case, theinternational community must decidewhether, and when, an election is appropri-

ate. As Secretary of StateAlbright observed, “Inthe early stages of a tran-sition, an interim coali-tion government maywork better and do morefor the cause of recon-ciliation than a weakelected one.” In fact, thepanelists outlined somealternatives to early elec-tions: extended periodsof negotiation to broadenconsensus on critical is-sues, transitional govern-ments or councils, andpower-sharing arrange-ments or coalition gov-ernments. The particularsocial and political con-figuration of each case

would determine the alternative selected andthe duration of its utility.

These alternatives would serve as a cata-lyst for reconciliation before potentially di-visive elections take place. Participantsviewed these alternatives as occasionallynecessary in preventing a postelection “re-turn to conflict or the consolidation of au-thoritarian regimes” (Kumar and Ottaway1997, 17). Finally, interim arrangementscould also prove less costly in the short runand more sustainable in the future. Asexperience teaches the international com-munity that a successful political transitionrequires a longer-term commitment, theseconsiderations carry greater weight.

The more the success of elec-tions was due to internationalintervention, the more fragile wasthe outcome. In postconflict elec-tions, the tendency by the inter-national community has so farbeen to do whatever possible tomake the elections a success.Unless sustainability is taken intoaccount in designing programs,future elections may still requireexorbitant amounts of interna-tional support—or be doomed tofailure.

—Krishna Kumar, USAID, andMarina Ottaway, CarnegieEndowment for InternationalPeace

Postconflict Elections

The international community has recog-nized the value of community-level peacebuilding efforts. The objective is to encour-age the participation oflocal residents in socialand political reconcilia-tion. Attempting to re-constitute fracturedcommunities, these ac-tivities emphasize themanagement of residualconflict, provide arenasfor public debate, anddevelop mechanisms forthe nonviolent resolu-tion of differences.

The conference of-fered three approachesto community reconcili-ation and peace build-ing. The first outlined aconceptual model forpsychosocial healing.The other two reviewedspecific examples of

conflict resolution and social reintegration.In South Africa, the peace process itselfestablished a network of regional and local

peace committees.These contained vio-lence and supportedSouth Africa’s peaceaccords and embry-onic institutions. InBosnia, grass-rootsdevelopment initia-tives have given atten-tion and support toinclusive, rather thanexclusive, associationsand organizations.

The first approach,psychosocial healing,posits that postconflictrecovery efforts mustaddress physical, so-cial, and psychologicalelements as well asconflict issues. Usingconcepts adopted from

7. Community-Level Peace Building

The session “Community-Level Peace Building” included Ambassador Gordon Streeb, of the Carter Center; NicoleBall, of the Overseas Development Council; and Kimberly Maynard, of Mercy Corps International. Iain Guest,consultant, offered his approach in the session on “Interethnic Conflict in Bosnia: Is Reconciliation Possible?”

The response of the internationalcommunity in the aftermath of suchturmoil has traditionally concentratedon physical and economic recon-struction, often overlooking the keydeterminants of social and psycho-logical well-being. At the same time,the attention given to broad recov-ery programs loses sight of the criti-cal role of the individual. In recentyears, however, we have watchedhow conflict seeps down through allaspects of society, ultimately pool-ing in the lowest element—that of thecommunity and its members. Con-sequently, to ignore the grass rootsis to overlook a critical componentof the rehabilitation equation.

—Kimberly MaynardMercy Corps International


the recovery para-digm, this model ofcommunity reintegra-tion has five progres-sive stages: establish-ing safety and someeconomic security;beginning the healingprocess through thecommunalization ofgrief and bereave-ment; rebuilding trustand the capacity totrust to encourage in-terdependence; re-establishing personaland social morality toreplace social anar-chy; and reintegrating and restoring demo-cratic—systematic and participatory—dis-course.

The model has certain implications forstrategy. As one panelist explained, it askspolitical leaders, as well as the internationalcommunity, to expand the “concept of peace-making from that ofnegotiating settle-ments between lead-ers to ones inclusiveof rebuilding a senseof trust, morality, andparticipation popula-tionwide” (Maynard1997, 6). Accordingto this holistic per-spective, postconflictstrategies and inter-ventions should beselected for theirlonger-term utility inhealing communitywounds and in rein-vigorating indigenouscivil society.

During discussion,participants consideredthe model’s explicitfunction as a guide fors tage -app rop r i a teprojects. The dialogexplored the possibilityof tailoring this concep-tual model for practicaluse. The fusion of therecovery and postcon-flict paradigms provedcontroversial, as did theparticular sequencingof stages.

The South Africanexperience provided a

second and case-specific approach to rec-onciliation. As explained during the panel,politically motivated violence in SouthAfrica threatened to disable peace buildingefforts and presented a serious obstacle toreconstitution of the polity. In response, sig-natories to the National Accords in 1991sought to “bring an end to political violence

in our country and to setout the codes of conduct,procedures, and mecha-nisms to achieve thisgoal” (Ball 1997, 1).The National Accordsestablished an instru-ment for communitypeacebuilding: a net-work of regional andlocal committees tosettle disputes and to“find nonviolent solu-tions to the intergroupconflict” in the absenceof effective—or neu-tral—state structuresand institutions (Ball1997, 2). In effect, the

The legacies of apartheid cannot beovercome that rapidly, and it is clearthat there is a continuing need for trustbuilding and relationship strengthen-ing, particularly at the local level. Thissame need exists in other countriesengaged in significant political transi-tions. Until adequate mechanisms ofgovernance are in place, and the his-tory of state dominance and repres-sion can be overcome, innovativemethods of building trust among thedifferent groups within society will berequired.


One of the most important innovationsamong the South African peace com-mittees—which saved an unknownbut not insignificant number of lives—was the decision to extend their man-date and engage in the proactivemonitoring of public events. Theobjective was to prevent demonstra-tions, public meetings, funerals . . .from degenerating into violence andoften required peace committee staffand unpaid peace monitors to physi-cally position themselves betweenarmed disputing parties.


25

peace committees represented a transitionalmechanism, one that would assist local com-munities in resolving some apartheid-eraconflicts before the first postconflict elec-tions.

A national peace secretariat established11 regional committees, with representa-tives from civil society organizations, localand tribal authorities, trade unions, businessand industry, and the security forces. Onepanelist commented that the purposeful in-clusion of such a wide swath of South Afri-can society helped the committees gainlegitimacy, as anticipated. The regionalcommittees had established more than 260local peace committees by April 1994.Unfortunately, conference participantsnoted, opposition to local peace committeesoften prevented their installation—until ac-tual communal violence made conflict reso-lution a necessary, but also more difficult,proposition. In addition, the peace commit-tee network did not find support amongthose with vested interests in extant SouthAfrican institutions.

Once in place, however, local peace com-mittees exceeded their original mandate forsettlement dispute, reconciliation, and liai-son with local police and justices of thepeace. The peace committees could noteradicate nor prevent the violence endemicto South African society and the apartheid

regime. They did serve six broader func-tions, which the participants addressed:opening channels of communicationbetween opposing communal groups; legiti-mizing the concept of negotiation; creatinga safe space to mediate problems andaddress sensitive topics; strengthening theaccountability of the local police; equaliz-ing the balance of power between “those inpower and ordinary citizens”; and reducingthe incidence of violence (Ball 1997, 5–6).The peace committees evolved into politi-cal arenas where community concerns couldbe voiced.

Actively monitoring local police andpreventing outbursts of violence at publicevents gave them credibility as institutionsof the new order. This evolution enhancedthe committees’ usefulness as instrumentsof peace building.

Yet the evidence presented at the sessionsuggested that committee performance andcapabilities differed, community by com-munity and region by region. For example,the more successful committees benefitedfrom the political will of community lead-ers or a network of supportive local civil

The Mission found that civil society isunusually strong and vibrant . . . and thereis vitality, individualism, and innovation inthe communities of Bosnia. This contrastswith the picture of defeatism, aggressive-ness, and toadying subservience tonationalism politicians that characterizesso many accounts of village life in Bosnia.The challenge for international policy-makers is to make better use of this for-midable resource while they still haveleverage in Bosnia.

—Iain GuestConsultant

A conflictwide response needs to incor-porate the intergroup dynamics at theleadership, individual, and communitylevels, since each influences the opin-ions, attitudes, and perceptions of theother, ultimately affecting the grass roots.

—Kimberly MaynardMercy Corps International

Community-Level Peace-Building


society organizations. In fact, the panelistenumerated 14 environmental factors thatenhanced or hindered peace committeefunction. When peace committees receivedcooperation from political parties and se-curity sector institutions and had access toqualified staff, they were more effective.Similarly, when the committees includedimportant stakeholders or could increase thedegree of local ownership, they accom-plished more.

Participants noted that environmental fac-tors such as these determine the suitabilityof any proposed intervention; interventionsare not a priori appropriate. National-levelpolitics (including the peace process) andstate institutions exert an especially stronginfluence on community-level interventions;they set limits on peace building. Successfuloperationalization depends upon sensitiveadaptation to the institutional environment.In South Africa, peace committee goals,structure, and composition were not prede-termined; these reflected differences, particu-larly in the configuration of authority (Ball1997, 13).

The third approach to peace building wasalso case-specific: assistance to grass-rootsorganizations in Bosnia. Here, too,postconflict environmental factors have pre-sented certain opportunities, as well as setlimits. The disintegration of Yugoslaviaforced a certain self-reliance on communi-ties suddenly denied access to state services.In response, grass-roots associations, civicorganizations, and nongovernmental orga-nizations were established. These often pro-vided basic services but also served as formsof social organization in the absence of pre-vious structures.

As part of its efforts to promote recon-ciliation in postwar Bosnia, the internationalcommunity sustains these grass-roots orga-nizations with program funding and capac-ity-building assistance. The panelists indi-cated that these organizations and associa-tions contribute to peace building becausethey encourage membership based onmutual interest or need, rather than onascriptive criteria, like ethnic backgroundor religion.

The international community’s objectivehere is to create a constituency for peace—that is, a critical mass of grass-roots orga-nizations that have a stake in the reforma-tion of Bosnian society. Therefore, evenorganizations that do not make reconcilia-tion a primary goal facilitate the process.The participants described associations rep-resenting women, minorities, mixed mar-riages, victims of war, business and profes-sional groups, and associations represent-ing families of mixed ethnic origin. Someprovide services to specific populations,while others concentrate on securing civilrights and human rights protections.

The panelists acknowledged the limita-tions of this approach in postconflict Bosnia.The current legal framework is clearly pro-hibitive; Bosnian law allows NGOs tooperate only for humanitarian assistance oras savings and loan institutions. This limitsbroader involvement and enables the gov-ernment to monitor activities. NGOs are alsopenalized with an especially high tax bur-den and are charged more for utilities suchas water and electricity (Guest 1997, 32).

During the discussion of lessons learned,participants considered certain questions

27

posed by these approaches to community-level peace building. Should the interna-tional community play a significant role infostering reconciliation and peace at thislevel? Can the international community cre-ate instruments or models, transfer themfrom one environment to another, andexpect adaptation? The panelists urged cau-tion in the replication, or transfer, of thesemodels. The psychosocial approach cannotbe adapted to, or put into effect in, everypostconflict situation; the singular factorsthat enabled the South African model to

exceed its original mandate are not easy toreproduce. Similarly, the level of interna-tional interest in, and subsequent assistanceto, postconflict Bosnia facilitated the con-tinued maintenance of these grass-roots or-ganizations. Panelists also noted that anemphasis on early exit and the subsequentremoval of funds from community-levelinterventions can prevent them from hav-ing any significant influence. They coun-seled the international community to adopta longer-term commitment.

Community-Level Peace-Building

The breakdown of social networks—evenin societies noted for relatively high levelsof integration and tolerance—is a commonconsequence of intrastate warfare. When apolicy of systematic human rights abusesexacerbates and intensifies social disintegra-tion, the populations involved are not easilyconvinced that cooperation is either desirableor possible. Neverthe-less, the demands ofpeace building and thedemocratic politicaltransition require somedegree of interaction.The panel on intereth-nic reconciliation inBosnia reviewed theexperience of economicrevitalization and me-dia support programsthat have demonstratedsome success in pro-moting cooperation.The Bosnian situationalso presented seriousproblems for implementation, problems notuncommon in postconflict settings.

Economic development programs, rely-ing on the market’s ability to organizeactors motivated by economic interest, havethe potential to generate opportunities forcooperation. The private sector rehabilita-tion program in Bosnia included the reacti-vation of medium, small, and micro-businesses; the sponsorship of financial

intermediary organiza-tions and business asso-ciations; and infrastruc-ture reconstruction.

Over the past fewyears, lending to Bosnianmicrobusinesses has in-creasingly meant invest-ing in populations atrisk—women, internallydisplaced persons, andrefugees. While theseloans provided necessaryfinancial support, it wasnoted that their impacton cooperation was in-

significant. This was due, in part, to the factthat microbusinesses primarily employ fam-ily members.

8. The Impact of Economic RevitalizationAnd Media Support on Intergroup Cooperation

The Bosnia that emerged from thiswar currently resembles a mosaicof tiny city–states. Many ethnicdivisions have been reinforced bynew municipal boundaries. Frag-mentation poses a formidableobstacle to rebuilding Bosnia as aunitary state, and the task toreturn to interethnic cooperation iseven more difficult when politicalboundaries reinforce ethnic divi-sions.

—Susan MerrillUSAID

The panel “Interethnic Conflict in Bosnia: Is Reconciliation Possible?” included David Smock, of the United StatesInstitute of Peace; Susan Merrill, of USAID; and consultants Iain Guest and Julia Demichelis.


Stimulating small businesses has had agreater impact, however. One panelistemphasized that supply and demandprompted these businesses to operate with-out concern for group identity: “Commerceis ethnically blind” (Merrill 1997, 9). Non-profit business associations, formed to sup-port regional private sector development,have provided assistance in making theselinks. Similarly, new financial intermediaryorganizations intentionally maintain anintegrated leadership and organizationalstructure. Relying on their multiethnic con-stitution, these organizations can identifyand provide loans to a variety of small busi-nesses, encouraging further interethnicarrangements.

Private sector reactivation also includedinternational underwriting of these ethni-cally diverse business and professionalassociations. Although some of these orga-nizations existed prior to the conflict,USAID’s Office of Transitional Initiativeshas been particularly successful in devel-oping new, community-based businessassociations throughout the region. In aneffort to increase both their capacity andeffectiveness, USAID provided computer-based e-mail networks to Serbian andBosnian associations, facilitating commu-nication between communities.

Some participants observed that with in-ternational assistance, business associationsalso have helped consolidate interest onissues of mutual concern. In one case, twoassociations jointly expressed dissatisfactionwith “high employee taxes, the lack of avail-able credit, and existence of nonformal mar-kets” (Merrill 1997, 11). These shared con-cerns have prompted the associations toexceed their original business mandate andgain a political voice not ethnic in origin.

Through loan provision, the developmentof business associations and financial inter-mediaries, and infrastructural reconstruction,the international community has supportedthe reactivation of the private sector and pro-moted cooperation. However, it was stressedthat political and institutional factors inpostconflict societies often prevent thesemechanisms from achieving their objectives.In Bosnia, the legal and policy frameworkremains inadequate to the task of further eco-nomic development and liberalization. Fed-eration members have yet to establish a bank-ing system and regulatory structures, devisea new tariff and customs regime, and ration-alize policy in this sector. Absent these, po-litical leaders at all levels of government con-tinue to use available security sector instru-ments to control trade, commerce, and theeconomy. One panelist concluded, “This isthe single greatest obstacle to peace, eco-nomic reactivation, and ‘reconciliation’ in thebroadest and most basic sense” (Merrill 1997,17).

International assistance for new mediaoutlets—print and broadcast—also has beenused to facilitate cooperation in Bosnia.Because nationalist parties generallyopposed to reintegration efforts control mostof the existing media outlets, support for“alternative media” with more conciliatorymessages has been forthcoming. However,the dual emphasis on capacity building(increasing the number of accessible out-lets) and substance (censoring or disallow-ing potentially divisive material) raised cer-tain concerns for participants.

On one hand, an independent media is aprecondition of postconflict elections andmany democracy promotion strategies, andso the new outlets are necessary. On theother hand, the notion of the media’s social

31

responsibility, as advocated and enforced bysome members of the international commu-nity, constrains freedom of expression andsets a mean example for subsequent demo-cratic development. Can and should theinternational community pursue both short-term cooperation and long-term politicaldevelopment in this manner?

Media support has also run up againstproblems with sustainability. Because of theemphasis on short-term objectives and rapidimplementation, the new media outlets havetended to be expensive and may prove dif-ficult to sustain once funding is withdrawn.In some cases, one-time grants to a largenumber of initiatives may broaden theimpact of assistance but may make the ben-eficiaries less secure in the future. Panelistsadvised the international community to

reconsider the costs of these interventions,as well as their benefits.

To facilitate intergroup cooperation, prac-titioners and policymakers alike should con-sider the lessons learned from the Bosniancase. The international community mustunderstand the dual character of its role.Programs that encourage interactions thattranscend ascriptive criteria may produce adegree of cooperation. By reactivating theprivate sector and the associational andorganizational environment that sustains it,and by establishing an independent media,the international community can promotecooperation. It must also prevail on vestedinterests to disassemble the institutions,political systems, and ideologies that servethem well yet remain obstacles to coopera-tive endeavors.

The Impact of Economic Revitalization and Media Support on Intergroup Cooperation

The conference examined democracy pro-motion strategies in two ways. The subjectpanels asked participants to review past andpresent interventions in their fields. Theround tables asked area specialists to con-sider the nature and effectiveness of democ-racy promotion strategies in selectedpostconflict societies. These discussions onAfrica, Central America and the Caribbean,and Cambodia invited significant cross-national and cross-regional comparisons.

Participants again raised questions aboutpostconflict elections. As elaborated earlier,the international community generally viewsthese elections as having multiple objectivesthat create a momentum toward democracy.Yet when ethnic divisions replicate politicaldivisions, elections can reinforce social frag-mentation. During discussion, the panelistspresented cases in which postconflict elec-tions have had a somewhat more positiveimpact on nation building. Elections reducedethnic tensions, to some extent, in Liberiaand Uganda. In Liberia, for example, theelections offered the local population an op-portunity to voice a national desire for peaceand a national commitment to the Abujapeace accords.

However, panelists also noted that elec-tions do not always produce anticipatedresults for democratization. The interna-tional community has often relied on a newconstitution and subsequent elections toinfluence the direction of the political tran-sition. In 1995 the international communitypressured the Ugandan government to drafta constitution as the basis for ongoing de-mocratization. Yet, according to observers,the democratization process did not continueafter the elections.

Strategies for sustaining grass-roots po-litical development also were a subject ofdiscussion. These bottom-up interventionsoften complement top-down reforms. Theadvantage, in the view of some panelists, isthat this strategy targets indigenous localinstitutions; it is not imposed on them.Intrastate conflicts often result in the emer-gence of local NGOs and civic organiza-tions, as in Haiti and El Salvador. These or-ganizations often require special assistancein the postconflict period.

In some cases, an emphasis on grass-rootsdevelopment has also provided opportuni-ties to channel funds to neglected rural

9. Challenges for Democratic Transitions


areas. Prior to the coup in Cambodia, theinternational community supported localNGOs responsible for rural rehabilitationand training programs. Co–Prime MinisterHun Sen’s recent assumption of power mayput this program’s longer-term politicalobjectives into question, but not the strat-egy itself.

Participants stressed two major con-straints on democracy promotion inpostconflict societies: lack of political willand insufficient attention to institutions thatshould form the basis for further democra-tization.

Throughout the conference, practitionersreflected on the vagaries of political will.They emphasized that political leaders andgoverning regimes establish boundaries fordemocracy promotion activities. Theydetermine the viability of any proposedintervention. Even relatively weak regimescan frustrate strategies through tepid com-mitments to democratization. This limits theinternational community’s ability to directthe political transition.

Lack of political will can produce a stale-mate. In Cambodia the 1993 elections gen-erated a fragile coalition government and afour-year power-sharing arrangementbetween the United National Front for anIndependent Neutral, Peaceful, and Coop-erative Cambodia (Funcinpec) and the Cam-bodian People’s Party. The growing weak-ness of the U.S. partner, Funcinpec, enabledthe CPP’s Hun Sen to take power. His July1997 coup made these arrangements anddemocratization moot. Hun Sen’s lack ofcommitment to democracy has putCambodia’s political transition in jeopardy.

The constraining influence of insufficientinstitutions is also ubiquitous. In the con-

text of these discussions, the effect of in-sufficient institutionalization revealed itselfin the weakness of political institutions(such as an electoral administration or partysystem), the weakness of state structures(such as a neutral judiciary), and donorinattention to either. These institutionalproblems can render democracy promotionineffective despite the promotion of inter-ventions amenable to political leaders.

Participants suggested that many factorscan hinder attempts to strengthen and an-chor the institutions that sustain democracy.On one hand, transitional regimes mayoppose such capacity-building interven-tions. On the other hand, international com-munity actions or inactions—lack of visionor planning, short-term commitment ofresources, assumptions that constitutions orelections will provide enough institution-building momentum, donor neglect—canalso derail institutional development.

Several cases illustrate these points. InSierra Leone the newly elected politicalleadership had great difficulty reformingweak and corrupt state structures; the inter-national community’s shortsighted democ-ratization strategy emphasized early elec-tions and paid insufficient attention to thisproblem. One panelist saw this as a factorin the regime’s inability to sustain itself af-ter 15 months.

In Uganda the international communitydid little to promote the nascent institutionsand processes that could facilitate andencourage democratic competition. Instead,the absence of postelection institutionaliza-tion only reinforced regime resistance tosubsequent democratization.

In Cambodia the international commu-nity expected sweeping changes in the

35

political system but did not establish thenecessary political institutions or state struc-tures. The 1991 Paris Agreements and thesubsequent 1993 elections contained noblueprint that would reorient Cambodia’sclient–patron society or its zero-sumapproach to politics. The 1993 elections didnot create the institutions and processesrequired for future democratic competition.Further, questions of state structure andreform were not addressed or were avoidedin subsequent years. This want of institu-tional reform left little foundation fordemocratization.

In addition to these constraints, theinternational community currently faces anobstacle in democracy promotion: noncom-pliance. On one end of this spectrum,political interests antipathetic to democracyhave gained power and reject efforts atdemocratization—even sabotage them. Atthe other end, “soft” authoritarian leadershave curtailed further democracy promotionafter gaining some legitimacy throughpostconflict elections. What strategies makesense in these situations? Should the inter-national community retreat, or seek lessambitious objectives?

Hun Sen’s repudiation presents a quan-dary of the first order. Despite a massiveinternational commitment, Cambodia’sweak experiment in democracy has reachedan impasse. Elections originally scheduledfor May 1998 did not take place. Confer-ence participants foresaw little movementin the character of Cambodian politics. Asthis report was going to publication, newelections had been set for July 26. In themeantime, Hun Sen is an improbable part-ner in the democratic venture.

The participants maintained that fewstrategies remain. A maximalist approach,calling somewhat belatedly for a reorgani-zation of the Cambodian political process,would be quite difficult to impose on HunSen. A minimalist approach might be morerealistic: If the elections take place, they maylegitimize the current government. Theinternational community could concentrateits efforts on securing a legitimate govern-ment in Phnom Penh while promoting sta-bility throughout Cambodia.

Promoting democracy in societies withsoft authoritarian regimes has often meantaccepting limited compliance. The panel-ists observed that postconflict elections tendto sustain existing regimes. It is unlikely thatregimes such as those in Uganda or Liberia,for example, will exit the stage quickly infavor of more democratic arrangements.Expectations that elections, or new consti-tutions, would act as catalysts for the po-litical transition have proven unrealistic.

Recognizing this, participants suggestedthat the international community direct itsefforts on deliberate institution building. Ithas the potential to limit the authority ofthese authoritarian leaders. Their regimesmay eventually borrow certain elementsfrom the liberal democratic model: anemphasis on accountability and other com-ponents of democratic governance, relianceon negotiation to settle conflict, subordina-tion of the military in a civilian polity, orrejection of charisma and establishment ofthe rule of law as the basis for legitimacy.Of course, this strategy necessitates a con-siderable engagement.

Challenges for Democratic Transitions

Ball, Nicole. 1997. “Community-LevelPeace Building: Lessons from theSouth African Peace Committees.”

Call, Charles. 1997. “Police Reform,Human Rights, and Democratizationin Postconflict Settings: Lessonsfrom El Salvador.”

Colletta, Nat. 1997. “Demilitarization,Demobilization, and the Social andEconomic Integration of Ex-Combatants: Lessons from the WorldBank Experience.”

Gallagher, Dennis. 1997. “Challenges toVoluntary Repatriation.”

Guest, Iain. 1997. “Moving BeyondEthnic Conflict: Community Peace-Building in Bosnia and EasternSlavonia (Croatia).”

Kingma, Kees. 1997. “Post-WarDemobilization and theReintegration of Ex-Combatants intoCivilian Life.”

Kritz, Neil. 1997. “War Crimes Tribunalsand Truth Commissions: SomeThoughts on AccountabilityMechanisms for Mass Violations ofHuman Rights.”

Kumar, Krishna, and Marina Ottaway.1997. “From Bullets to Ballots: ASummary of Findings From SixPostconflict Election Studies.”

Martin, Ian. 1997. “Human RightsMonitoring and Institution-Buildingin Postconflict Societies: The Role ofHuman Rights Field Operations.”

Maynard, Kimberly A. 1997. “SocialReintegration in PostconflictSocieties.”

Bibliography

The following papers were all presented at the Conference on Promoting Democracy,Human Rights, and Reintegration in Postconflict Societies, U.S. Agency for InternationalDevelopment, 30–31 October 1997, in Washington.


Merrill, Susan. 1997. “EthnicReconciliation in Bosnia.”

Stein, Barry. 1997. “RefugeeRepatriation, Return, andRefoulement During Conflict.”

Vickers, George. 1997. “InternationalAssistance to Internal SecurityReforms: Some Lessons fromCentral America and the Caribbean.”

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Documents

In Postconflict Societies Promoting Democracypdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PNACA924.pdfIn Postconflict Societies An International Dialog by Robin S. Silver, Ph.D. Center for Development Information