In the Matter of Karen Quinlan

7/23/2019 In the Matter of Karen Quinlan

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In the Matter of Karen Quinlan

FACTS:

In this case is Karen Ann Quinlan, 22 years old, who was hospitalized

and lying debilitated and allegedly at a oribund state at St! Claire"shospital in #ew $ersey! For soe unclear reasons, she ceased breathingat a party %or at least two &' inute periods! A respirator was re(uiredto assist Karen in her breathing, and tracheotoy was per%ored!

A%ter three days, when she was e)ained, it was concluded that Karenwas coatose with e*idence o% decortication, a condition relating toderangeent o% corte) o% the brain, causing a physical posture inwhich the upper e)treities are +e)ed and the lower e)treities aree)tended! Ano)ia, lac o% o)ygen in the bloodstrea, was alsoidenti-ed with her condition! The doctor characterized the result as

.abnoral but it showed soe acti*ity and was consistent with herclinical state/!

Soon, 0r! 1orse, and other e)pert physicians characterized her asbeing in a .chronic *egetati*e state/! It was de-ned as .subect whoreains with the capacity to aintain the *egetati*e parts o% neurological %unction but who no longer has any cogniti*e %unction!/

Attempts to deter her from the respirator were unsuccessful. She was considered to

be totally respirator dependent and nutrition was delivered to her by means of a

naso-gastric tube.

$oseph Quinlan, Karen"s %ather sought the udicial authority o% the courtto declare hi as the latter"s guardian in light o% her incopetency,and i% granted, such letters o% guardianship to contain an e)presspower to hi as guardian to authorize the discontinuance o% all thee)traordinary edical procedures allegedly sustaining Karen"s li%e,asserting that there is no hope %or Karen"s e*entual reco*ery!

The trial court denied the petition o% the plainti3! The trial courtdeterined that the guardianship o% Karen ust be bi%urcated! 1r!Quinlan was appointed as guardian o% tri*ial property, but not theperson o% his daughter! In his stead, 1r! Coburn was appointed as

guardian o% Karen"s person!

ISS456S:&! 7hether the court was correct in denying the speci-c relie% 8authorization %or terination o% the li%e9supporting apparatusre(uested by the plainti3; <5S!



2! 7hether or not the court was correct in withholding letters o% guardianship %ro plainti3 and appointing in his stead a stranger; #=!

>! 7hether the court should grant the relie% the plainti3 prays %or! <5S!

?5@0:&! There is no parental constitutional right that would entitle hi to

a grant o% relie% in propria persona! Inso%ar as a parental right o% pri*acy has been recognized, it has been in the conte)t o% deterining the rearing o% in%ants and continuing li%e styles! There%ore, the court cannot grant the authorization %orterination o% the li%e supporting apparatus since the arguento% 1r! Quinlan that his right o% pri*acy as a parent granted by theconstitution does not gi*e hi that power!

2! The statute creates an initial presuption o% entitleent toguardianship in the ne)t o% in, %or it pro*ides:

In any case where a guardian is to be appointed, letters o%

guardianship shall be granted to the ne)t o% in, or i% it is

pro*en to the court that no appointent %ro aong the will be

to the best interest o% the incopetent or his estate, then to such

other proper person as will accept the sae!

In addition, the court cannot sustain the arguent o% the trialcourt that $oseph Quinlan"s decision aing will be distorted because

o% the grie% he would naturally %eel! The court held that although he isin grie% %or what has be%allen his daughter, his strength o% purpose andcharacter %ar outweighs these sentients and (uali-es hi einently%or guardianship o% the person as well as the property o% his daughter!

>! The court held that upon the concurrence o% the guardian and%aily o% Karen, should the responsible attending physiciansconclude that there is no reasonable possibility o% KarenBs e*ereerging %ro her present coatose condition to a cogniti*e,sapient state and that the li%e9support apparatus now beingadinistered to Karen should be discontinued, they shall consultwith the hospital 5thics Coittee or lie body o% theinstitution in which Karen is then hospitalized! I% that consultati*ebody agrees that there is no reasonable possibility o% KarenBse*er eerging %ro her present coatose condition to acogniti*e, sapient state, the present li%e9support syste ay bewithdrawn and said action shall be without any ci*il or criinal



liability there%or on the part o% any participant, whether guardian,physician, hospital or others



WASHINGTON VS. GLUCKSBERG1

The State o% 7ashington aes prooting suicide attept a %elony!7ashington *s! Dlucsberg in*ol*es a case -led by %our 7ashingtonphysicians Erespondents, who treat terinally ill patients, as well as three

gra*ely ill patients and a non9pro%t organization that counsels peopleconsidering physician assisted suicide! They all -led this case seeing todeclare the State"s assisted9suicide ban unconstitutional! They clai that theFourteenth Aendent"s 0ue Grocess Clause, which protects liberty interest,e)tends a personal choice to terinally ill adults to coit physician9assisted suicide!

The Court ruled that 7ashington"s prohibition against causing or aidinga suicide attept does not *iolate due process clause! The Court pointed outthat the issue here is whether .liberty/ specially protected by the due processclause includes a right to coit suicide which itsel% includes a right toassistance in doing so! The respondents in this case asserted that the.liberty/ includes the .right to choose a huane, digni-ed death/ and .theliberty to shape death!/ In lieu o% this clai, the Court in(uired whether theright asserted by the respondents has any place in the #ation"s traditions! Itwas held by the Court that asserted right has long been consistently andalost uni*ersally reected, e*en %or terinally ill and entally copetentadults! As such, to rule in %a*or o% the respondents would re*erse centuries o% legal doctrines and practice and to strie down the considered policy inalost e*ery state! ?owe*er, the respondents %urther asserted that theliberty interest they assert is consistent with substanti*e due process and notwith #ation"s history and practice! The Court, nonetheless, ruled in thenegati*e because the State"s assisted9suicide ban is related to legitiatego*ernent interest! As held by the Court:

“These interests include prohibiting intentional killing and preserving human life; preventing the serious public-health problem of suicide, especially among the young, the elderly,and those suering from untreated pain or from depression or other mental disorders; protecting the medical profession’sintegrity and ethics and maintaining physicians’ role as their

patients’ healers; protecting the poor, the elderly, disabled persons, the terminally ill, and persons in other vulnerablegroups from indierence, prejudice, and psychological andnancial pressure to end their lives; and avoiding a possibleslide toard voluntary and perhaps even involuntary euthanasia! The relative strengths of these various interestsneed not be eighed e"actingly, since they are un#uestionably important and legitimate, and the la at issue is at least reasonably related to their promotion and protection!$

1'2& 4S H2, $une 2J &H!



VACCO VS. QUILL2

The State o% #ew <or, as in ost States, considers a crie aiding tocoit or attept suicide! ?owe*er, patients ay re%use e*en li%esa*ingedical treatent! This case was -led by Lespondent #ew <or physicians

who assert that, due to the #ew <or"s assisted9suicide ban, they areprohibited %ro prescribing lethal edication to entally copetent,terinally ill patients who are su3ering great pain and desire a physician"shelp in taing their own li*es, e*en i% it would be consistent with thestandards o% their edical practice! ?ence, they sued the State"s AttorneyDeneral, claiing that the ban *iolates the Fourteenth Aendent"s 5(ualGrotection Clause!

The Court held that #ew <or"s prohibition on assisting suicide does not*iolate the 5(ual Grotection Clause! The Court pointed out that: .5(ualGrotection Clause ebodies a general rule that States ust treat cases aliebut ay treat unlie cases accordingly!/ The respondents clai that there is

no distinction between assisted9suicide and the law peritting patients tore%use edical treatent! ?ence, they clai that assisted9suicide, based one(ual protection clause, should be allowed! ?owe*er, the Court held that:.the distinction between letting a patient die and aing that patient die isiportant, logical, rational, and well established: It coports with%undaental legal principles o% causation!/ As such, the Court disagreed withthe respondent clai that the distinction is arbitrary and irrational! The Court%urther held that the ban on assisted9suicide is %ounded on *alid andiportant public interest!

2'2& 4S H>, $une 2J &H!



People v. Kevorkian

This case involves the conviction of Jack Kevorkian for second degree murder. The case

involves the death of Thomas Youk a former race car driver in September of !""#.

At the time the incident took place Youk was fifty-two years old and had amyotrophiclateral sclerosis $A%S& also known as %ou 'ehrig(s disease. )efendant twice videotaped

himself interacting with Youk. *n the first videotape defendant went to Youk(s home to

discuss his condition while in the second videotape defendant administered a lethal drugto Youk.

)efendant later was a guest on the television news show +, inutes during which

segments from both videotapes were shown. The ury saw the videotapes and the +,

inutes interview at defendant(s trial. /evertheless defendant attempted to persuade the ury not to convict him because the murder he was charged with committing was in his

view a 0mercy killing.1

Jack Kevorkian made a plea to the ury to adopt his views on euthanasia in this appeal

defendant has given almost no attention to his claim that this homicide had a legal ustification or e2cuse. *ndeed e2actly seven out of the fifty pages in his brief to this

3ourt address euthanasia. 4ven at oral arguments defendant(s appellate counsel made not

a single reference to this issue.

5owever it would seem that euthanasia is the main issue which needs to be resolved inorder to resolve the case.

)efendant(s other arguments involve6

!. )efendant argues that the unenumerated rights protected by the /inth

Amendment and its ichigan constitutional counterpart # include a patient7s rightto be free from unbearable pain and suffering.

8. )efendant also maintains that the 9ourteenth Amendment " and its ichigan

constitutional counterpart !, also include this right by proscribing state

deprivation of liberty without due process of law either under constitutional privacy concepts or as a 0necessary and direct corollary of this position that a

person should not be forced to suffer unbearably.1 )efendant thus contends that

he is entitled to have his murder conviction reversed and no further criminal

proceedings instituted against him for 0aiding in Thomas Youk7s assertion of hisconstitutional right to be free from intolerable pain and suffering.1

:. )efendant urges that the 3ourt subscribe to the loaded weapon of the right to

privacy cases. 5e asks us to use this weapon to resolve the situation faced by a person who suffers from literally unbearable pain and who wishes to end that pain

by dying.

http://caselaw.findlaw.com/mi-court-of-appeals/1372937.html#footnote_8












;. )efendant asserts that his trial attorney )avid 'orosh did not provide him with

his constitutional right to effective representation. 5owever defendant has failed

to demonstrate that 'orosh performed deficiently at any time he actually acted ascounsel. )efendant also failed to prove that 'orosh while acting as standby

counsel took control of the case or did anything to destroy the ury(s perception

that defendant was representing himself. 4ven assuming for the sake of argumentthat a claim for ineffective assistance of standby counsel is legally cogni<able

defendant still has not proven that 'orosh acted deficiently and preudicially.

)efendant chose = almost certainly unwisely but nevertheless knowinglyintelligently voluntarily and une>uivocally = to represent himself. 5e cannot now

assign the blame for his conviction to someone who did not act as his trial

counsel.

?. )efendant claims that the prosecutor improperly referred to defendant(s decisionto e2ercise his right to remain silent thereby denying him his rights under the

9ifth Amendment. The remarks at issue were the prosecutor(s proper obections to

defendant(s repeated and improper attempts to inect facts that were not inevidence into his closing argument. As such the prosecutor(s remarks were not

direct and une>uivocal references to defendant(s failure to testify and therefore

were not misconduct.

+. Third defendant claims that the trial court erred in e2cluding the testimony of Terrence and elody Youk. 5owever defendant misreads the applicable

standards with respect to res gestae witnesses and then fails entirely to

demonstrate how the proposed testimony would have been relevant. Thus even

on this narrow evidentiary issue defendant(s arguments have no merit.

*ssues6!. %iability of a person who administers lethal drugs.

8. @hether or not a person should be held liable for assisting a person(s death on the

ground that the victim should not be made to suffer unbearable pain.

5eld6

The 3ourt affirmed the conviction of Jack Kevorkian for second degree murder inrelation to the death of Thomas Youk. The 3ourt held that rather than asking the court to

hold that his actions were ustified under legally acceptable theories such as aiding Youk

in e2ercising his right to refuse medical treatment or attempting to alleviate Youk(s painin a manner other than death and rather than asking the court to rule that he legally

assisted in Youk(s suicide the defendant has specifically asked the court to legali<e

euthanasia. The defendant argued for the legality of euthanasia on two constitutional

grounds however the court threw out the defendant(s /inth Amendment claim for failureto brief the issue on appeal. The 9ourteenth Amendment of the 3onstitution

$3onstitution& provides that 0no state shall deprive a person of life liberty or property

without due process of law.1 The ichigan 3onstitution counterpart is nearly identical.



As to the 9ourteenth Amendment claim the court held that the constitutional right to

privacy does not include a right to commit euthanasia so that an individual can be free

from intolerable and irremediable suffering. 9urther a 0right1 to assisted suicide 0is not afundamental liberty interest protected by the )ue Brocess 3lause.1 The court states that

its decision is driven by a lack of meaningful precedent on the issue the fact that

e2panding the right to privacy to include euthanasia would essentially take the debate outof the arenas of public debate and legislative action and that by e2panding the right to

privacy to include euthanasia the court would be involving the udiciary in deciding

>uestions beyond its capacity i.e. how much pain is re>uired before it becomesintolerable and irremediable.

Cn the argument of right to privacy the 3ourt declined to give credence to the said

argument for the following reasons.

9irst there is no meaningful precedent for e2panding the right to privacy to include a

right to commit euthanasia so that an individual can be free from intolerable and

irremediable suffering. To our knowledge no court of last resort in this country hasever recogni<ed such a right. 4ven in the assisted suicide cases dealing with an asserted

0right to die1 courts have steadfastly refused to e2pand the right to privacy to include theright to commit or receive euthanasia.

Second the 3ourt held that by e2panding the right to privacy as defendant suggests wewould to a great e2tent place the matter outside the arenas of public debate and

legislative action. @hatever the life e2periences or the policy preferences of the

members of this 3ourt might be we must e2ercise the utmost care to assure when asked

to break new ground that the liberty protected by the )ue Brocess 3lause of the9ourteenth Amendment not be subtly transformed into an e2pression of personal belief

rather than an adherence to the rule of law. *f society is to recogni<e a right to be free

from intolerable and irremediable suffering it should do so through the action of themaority of the legislature whose role it is to set social policy or by action of the people

through ballot initiative.

3onsidering all these arguments the 3ourt upheld the conviction of the defendant.

Documents

In the Matter of Karen Quinlan