IN THE SUPREME COURT OF FLORIDA

STATE OF FLORIDA,

Appellant/Cross-Appellee, CASE NO. SC02-302

vs.

BENNIE DEMPS,

Appellee/Cross-Appellant.________________________________________/

____________________________________________________

On Appeal from the Circuit Court of the Eighth JudicialCircuit, in and for Bradford County, Florida

Case No. 77-116-CF-A____________________________________________________

ANSWER/CROSS-INITIAL BRIEFOF APPELLEE/CROSS-APPELLANT

Bill SalmonPost Office Box 1095Gainesville, Florida 32602-1095(352) 378-6076Fax: (352) 336-6175

Attorney for Appellee/Cross-Appellant

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TABLE OF CONTENTSPage(s)

TABLE OF CONTENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . i

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iii

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iv

STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND FACTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

ARGUMENT

I. THE ORDERS APPOINTING SALMON TOREPRESENT MR. DEMPS AND TO BECOMPENSATED FOR SUCH REPRESENTATION AREINDEPENDENTLY DISPOSITIVE AND DO NOTINVOLVE CONSIDERATION UNDER CHAPTER 27,FLORIDA STATUTES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN SETTING THE HOURLYRATE FOR SALMON’S SERVICES AT $100.00 PER HOUR

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

III. THE FLORIDA SUPREME COURT HAS AMPLEJ U R I S D I C T I O N A U T H O R I T Y , B O T HCONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORILY, TO ORDERCOMPENSATION FOR SERVICES RENDEREDPURSUANT TO ITS ORDERS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

IV. PUBLIC POLICY, INTERESTS OF JUSTICE ANDEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL FORDEATH SENTENCED LITIGANTS SUPPORTS THE

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AWARD OF FEES AND COSTS ESTABLISHED BYUN-REBUTTED EVIDENCE AND TESTIMONY . . . . . . . . . . . 10

V. COMPTROLLER’S DISINGENUOUS, INACCURATEAND FRIVOLOUS ARGUMENTS ARE UNAVAILINGTO ITS POSITION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17

CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17

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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases: Page(s)Armstead v. State,____ So. 2d ____, 27 Fla. L. Weekly S469 (Fla. 5/9/02) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

Beard v. Annis,730 F. 2d 741 (11th Cir. 1984) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

Brown v. City of Palmetto,681 F. 2d 1325 (11th Cir. 1982) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC,434 U.S. 412, 98 S. Ct. 694, 54 L. Ed. 2d 648 (1977) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

Combs v. Plantation Patterns,106 F. 3d 1519 (11th Cir. 1997) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

Hughes v. Rowe,449 U.S. 5, 101 S. Ct. 173, 66 L. Ed. 2d 163 (1980) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

White v. White,705 So. 2d 123 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

The Constitution of the State of Florida:Article V, Section 3(b)(8) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3, 7, 9

Florida Statute(s):Section 25.041(1), Fla. Stat. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3, 7, 9

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PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

The following signals and abbreviations will be used in this Brief:

The Appellant/Cross-Appellee will be referred to as “Comptroller.”

The Appellee/Cross-Appellant will be referred to as “Salmon.”

Amicus counsel filing its brief on behalf of the Commission on Capital Cases

will be referred to as “Amicus.”

George F. Schaefer, Appellee in companion case SC01-1301, will be referred

to as “Schaefer.”

Bennie E. Demps will be referred to as “Mr. Demps.”

Record on Appeal cites will generally be referring to the “Supplemental Record

on Appeal” and will be signaled by “SR-” and the respective page number. If

references are made to the original Record on Appeal in this case they will be signaled

by “R-” and the respective page number.

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STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND FACTS

On May 25, 2000 this Honorable Court issued its order directing Salmon to

represent Mr. Demps on appeal to this Honorable Court. On May 27, 2000 this

Honorable Court entered its order directing Salmon to submit his application for fees

and costs upon completion of his representation of Mr. Demps. Neither of the

Court’s orders were issued under the provisions of Chapter 27, Florida Statutes.

In compliance with this Court’s above orders Salmon provided the services

ordered by this Honorable Court.

The Court’s above referenced orders were entered notwithstanding the

Comptroller’s request that Salmon be required to represent Mr. Demps under an

ethical obligation. There being no support for such request this Honorable Court

entered its above mentioned orders.

At the conclusion of Salmon’s representation he submitted his application for

fees and costs as directed by this Honorable Court. On July 13, 2001 an evidentiary

hearing was held before the trial Court, the Honorable Maurice V. Giunta, upon

Salmon’s application for fees and costs. (SR-192-299). At said evidentiary hearing

Salmon presented the un-rebutted testimony of two eminently qualified capital litigation

expert witnesses in support of Salmon’s application for fees and costs. Further, at

said evidentiary hearing, the Comptroller submitted no expert testimony or other

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evidence of any kind in rebuttal to the testimony and supporting documentation

provided by Salmon.

Previous to the evidentiary hearing on Salmon’s application for fees and costs,

the trial Court in and for Bradford County, Florida, the Honorable Larry Gibbs Turner,

ruled on Schaefer’s companion and related application for fees and costs. Judge

Turner established the “law of the case” in Schaefer’s case ruling that Schaefer’s

request for the hourly rate of $200.00 per hour was reasonable, and further, that the

provisions of Chapter 27 were inapplicable and unconstitutional as applied. (SR-15-

19).

Notwithstanding Judge Turner’s order in Schaefer’s case Judge Giunta issued

his order approving the hours and expenses submitted by Salmon but finding that an

hourly rate for Salmon’s services would be $100.00 per hour rather than $200.00 per

hour. (SR-180).

Judge Giunta included in his order that Salmon’s counsel and his expert

witnesses should be paid at the rates requested by each. Specifically, reasonable

attorney’s fees to Salmon’s counsel, Stephen N. Bernstein in the amount of $6,250.00,

reasonable fees in the amount of $2,706.52 to William J. Sheppard and reasonable fees

in the amount of $2,700.77 to Robert Augustus Harper, Jr.

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Cross appeals were then taken by the Comptroller and Salmon. These cross

appeals ensued.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

The starting point for review of the trial Court’s order awarding fees and costs

to Salmon, his counsel and expert witnesses is the order of this Honorable Court

directing Salmon to represent Mr. Demps, and not the provisions of Chapter 27,

Florida Statutes. The arguments of the Comptroller and Amicus counsel dealing

exclusively with arguments propounded under the provisions of Chapter 27 are wholly

inapposite, as this Court’s orders directing Salmon to represent Mr. Demps neither

reference Chapter 27 nor was Salmon registry counsel.

The trial Court erred in limiting the hourly rate for Salmon’s services to $100.00

because there is no lawful or factual support for limiting the reasonable hourly rate

submitted by Salmon, supported without rebuttal, by all evidence and expert witness

testimony presented at evidentiary hearing on July 13, 2001 in Starke, Bradford

County, Florida. Further, the trial Court’s reference to Chapter 27 and equitable

principles espoused thereunder are erroneous in that the “law of the case” had

previously been established by the order of Judge Turner in Schaefer’s case

establishing a reasonable hourly rate of $200.00 per hour and finding that the

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provisions of Chapter 27 were unconstitutional as applied. This contrary to the

argument of the Comptroller that there was no evidentiary hearing in Mr. Schaefer’s

case, when in fact a full evidentiary hearing was conducted before Judge Turner in

Schaefer’s case on March 13, 2001. (SR-63-94)

This Honorable Court was well within its authorized jurisdiction to direct

Salmon to represent Mr. Demps and direct payment for that representation, consistent

with the un-rebutted facts, documentation and expert testimony provided at evidentiary

hearing. Article V, Section 3(8) of the Constitution of the State of Florida authorizes

this Court to issue writs of mandamus and quo warranto to State officers and State

agencies such as the Comptroller. Section 25.041(1), Florida Statutes, vests this

Honorable Court with “all the power and authority necessary for carrying into

complete execution all its judgments, decrees and determinations in the matters before

it, agreeable to the usage and principles of law.”

The unique circumstances under which this Court directed Salmon to represent

Mr. Demps were in the highest tradition of public policy and the interests of justice

with regard to this Court’s adherence to effective representation for death sentenced

litigants. Salmon was allowed initially only three days to complete briefing and

preparation for oral argument with a brief extension subsequently granted by this

Court. Under the short time allowed by this Honorable Court for briefing and oral

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argument prior to the execution date set for Mr. Demps, Salmon was the only lawyer

who could meet such a schedule and, consistent with public policy and the interests

of justice, the sums requested by Salmon are reasonable.

Disingenuous, inaccurate and frivolous arguments are of questionable value to

this Court in resolving the issues on appeal in the case at bar. The Comptroller

proclaimed in earlier pleadings that it had arguments of first impression which it wanted

to bring to this Court’s attention to resolve the issue of payment to Salmon in this

matter. To the contrary, the Comptroller argues exclusively under Chapter 27, Florida

Statutes that Salmon is not entitled to any payment for services rendered pursuant to

this Court’s orders. Such an argument is not supported by either facts or law and

should be summarily rejected.

ARGUMENT

I. THE ORDERS APPOINTING SALMON TOREPRESENT MR. DEMPS AND TO BECOMPENSATED FOR SUCH REPRESENTATION AREINDEPENDENTLY DISPOSITIVE AND DO NOTINVOLVE CONSIDERATION UNDER CHAPTER 27,FLORIDA STATUTES

To state the obvious, this Court’s orders directing Salmon to represent Mr.

Demps on appeal to this Honorable Court and to be compensated for such

representation neither mention nor implicate the provisions of Chapter 27, Florida

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Statutes. Only after the repeated failure of the Comptroller to acknowledge its

obligation to abide by the Court’s orders did this Court refer the matter to the trial

Court below. Additionally and only to insure that the Comptroller was adequately

advised of the particulars of Salmon’s application for fees and costs it required

Salmon to submit his application for fees and costs using the procedural forms of

Chapter 27. Nowhere in this Court’s orders obligating Salmon to undertake

representation of a death sentenced litigant under circumstances unique to this Court’s

history (Salmon finds no other case in which this Court appointed counsel under

similar circumstances) did it reference Chapter 27, Florida Statutes.

It cannot be argued that this Court implicated or intended the substantive

provisions of Chapter 27 to be utilized in resolving compliance with this Court’s order

that Salmon be compensated for the extraordinary representation provided on behalf

of Mr. Demps.

Arguments of the State and Amicus based as they are exclusively on the

irrelevant substantive provisions of Chapter 27 are frivolous and undeserving for

consideration by this Court in resolving the issues in this appeal.

1The Supreme Court may issue writs of mandamus and quo warranto to State officersand State agencies.

2The Supreme Court is vested with all the power necessary for carrying into completeexecution all its judgments, decrees and determination s in the matters before it, agreeable tothe usage and principles of law.

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This Honorable Court has ample authority under the provisions of Article V,

Section 3(b)(8) of the Florida Constitution1 and Section 25.041(1), Florida Statutes2

to enter its orders directing Salmon to represent Mr. Demps and to be compensated

upon completion of said representation consistent with the un-rebutted testimony

presented at evidentiary hearing.

II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN SETTING THEHOURLY RATE FOR SALMON’S SERVICESAT $100.00 PER HOUR

At the evidentiary hearing held before the Honorable Maurice V. Giunta on July

13, 2001 in Starke, Bradford County, Florida, the evidence and testimony supported

Salmon’s application for fees and costs entirely and was wholly un-rebutted by the

Comptroller. (SR-192-299).

Two eminent capital litigators, William J. Sheppard and Robert Augustus

Harper, Jr., testified that the hours expended by Salmon and the hourly rate of

compensation requested were reasonable without qualification. The only cross-

examination of Salmon’s expert witnesses by the Comptroller was to establish that

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both Mr. Harper and Mr. Sheppard on occasion voluntarily accepted representation

in capital cases at an hourly rate of less than that requested by Salmon. Neither Mr.

Sheppard nor Mr. Harper testified that they ever reduced or would reduce their hourly

rate except when they would do so under appointment as registry counsel or otherwise

accepted representation knowing that their regular hourly rate would not be utilized for

purposes of compensation. Moreover, the Comptroller at said evidentiary hearing

presented no witness to contradict the testimony of Mr. Sheppard and Mr. Harper nor

did they introduce any other evidence that would rebut their expert testimony. The

Comptroller did not challenge the hours expended by Salmon and in fact the trial

Court found said hours to be reasonable.

Previous to the evidentiary hearing conducted before Judge Giunta, the

Honorable Larry Gibbs Turner conducted a full evidentiary hearing on the application

for fees and costs submitted by Schaefer in this cause. At said hearing Judge Turner

established the “law of the case” by determining Mr. Schaefer’s requested hourly rate

of $200.00 was reasonable and that otherwise the provisions of Chapter 27 were

unconstitutional. (SR-63-94).

The un-rebutted testimony presented at the July 13, 2001 evidentiary hearing

justifies this Court reversing the trial Court’s order and entering its order awarding the

full amount of fees and costs requested by Salmon for himself, his counsel and his

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expert witnesses. Combs v. Plantation Patterns, 106 F. 3d 1519 (11th Cir. 1997);White

v. White, 705 So. 2d 123 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998); Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC,

434 U.S. 412, 98 S. Ct. 694, 54 L. Ed. 2d 648 (1977); Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5,

101 S. Ct. 173, 66 L. Ed. 2d 163 (1980); Beard v. Annis, 730 F. 2d 741 (11th Cir.

1984); Brown v. City of Palmetto, 681 F. 2d 1325 (11th Cir. 1982).

III. THE FLORIDA SUPREME COURT HAS AMPLEJURISDICTION AUTHORITY, BOTHCONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORILY, TOORDER COMPENSATION FOR SERVICESRENDERED PURSUANT TO ITS ORDERS

Article V, Section 3(b)(8) of the Florida Constitution authorizes this Honorable

Court to issue writs of mandamus and quo warranto to State officers and State

agencies such as the Comptroller. Recognizing the scope of this Court’s jurisdiction

the Florida Legislature enacted Section 25.041(1), Florida Statutes which granted this

Court administrative supremacy by vesting it with “all the power and authority

necessary for carrying into complete execution all its judgments, decrees and

determinations in the matters before it, agreeable to the usage and principles of law.”

This Court, recognizing the interests of justice and the overriding public policy

established by this Court to guarantee effective representation of death sentenced

litigants clearly has the judicial authority to direct the State’s fiscal officer, the

Comptroller, to issue its warrant to the treasurer to pay the sums requested by Salmon

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and established by un-rebutted testimony at evidentiary hearing or may do so from any

of the several other available sources of funds established for such purpose within the

State’s governmental structure.

The Comptroller and Amicus seek to avoid the broad authority granted to this

Court by the Florida Constitution and statutory pronouncements in addition to its

judicial authority as the highest law of the State of Florida and restrict the Court’s

consideration of the issues before the Court to the narrow and inapplicable confines

of Chapter 27. Such an argument ignores the clear intent of this Court’s orders

directing that Salmon represent Mr. Demps and that he be compensated for such

representation which orders make no mention of and had no relation to the provisions

of Chapter 27. Meaningful consideration of the issues on appeal are simply not

advanced by arguments under Chapter 27, a statutory provision which was not and

should not be considered as applicable.

IV. PUBLIC POLICY, INTERESTS OF JUSTICEAND EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSELFOR DEATH SENTENCED LITIGANTSSUPPORTS THE AWARD OF FEES ANDCOSTS ESTABLISHED BY UN-REBUTTEDEVIDENCE AND TESTIMONY

The Comptroller acknowledges that public policy, the interests of justice and

effective assistance of counsel for death sentenced litigants are clearly lawful

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justifications for this Court’s orders regarding Salmon’s representation of Mr. Demps.

It need not be reiterated that this Court has clearly ruled that attorneys operating under

these judicial principles are, a fortiori, entitled to full compensation consistent with the

facts and circumstances of such representation provided by this Court’s orders.

This Court directed Mr. Salmon to represent Mr. Demps under the most

difficult adversarial and personal circumstances. This Honorable Court was clearly

committed to maintain an un-postponed execution date for Mr. Demps. So committed

that it allowed initially only three days for Salmon to complete briefing and preparation

for oral argument. Recognizing the severe time limitations placed on Salmon this

Court graciously granted a brief extension moving the scheduled execution date

scheduled for Mr. Demps forward a mere eight days. Salmon complied with this

Court’s truncated time table for briefing even though Rule 9.140(f), Rules of Appellate

Procedure would generally allow 30 days for completing Mr. Demps’ initial briefing

period. This limitation in light of the Court’s reluctance to grant a stay or

postponement of the scheduled execution date, clearly required Salmon’s intense

concentration on briefing and preparation for oral argument to the complete exclusion

of his other obligations and extreme personal difficulties. Nonetheless, Salmon

complied with this Court’s briefing and oral argument schedule as reflected in his

application for fees and costs.

3Specifically:Mr. Nickell: My name is William Nickell. I am assistant general counsel for theComptroller’s Office. (SR-66).

------The Court: Alright. Now, Mr. Nickell, I’ll hear from you. (SR-76-77).Mr. Nickell: Your Honor, thank you very much for letting me appear by phone. (SR-77).

------The Court: I’ll take that as a no. This is the hearing isn’t it? This is when we’re having ahearing. You are noticed for the hearing. This is when I’m supposed to receive and considerevidence. (SR-80).Mr. Nickell: Your Honor, that’s true. I was not . . (SR-80).

------The Court: Alright. Alright. Any further argument from the Comptroller? (SR-82).Mr. Nickell: No, Your Honor. (SR-82).

------The Court: I specifically find that the Makemson decision out of our Supreme Court controls.I find as a matter of fact that Mr. Schaefer has served the public by defending Mr. Demps and,frankly, the integrity of this legal system. I find as a matter of fact that to compensate him ata rate of less than $200.00 an hour would be confiscatory of his time, energy and talents andI quite honestly think that $200.00 an hour is the low end of reasonable compensation for thework performed and under the circumstances it was performed. (SR-85).I find that to apply the statute any other way and limit him to $100.00 an hour under the statutewould be unconstitutional as applied under these circumstances and I’ll thus authorize payment

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Not only did this Honorable Court enlist the services of Salmon under the most

difficult of circumstances, his application for fees and costs was supported at

evidentiary hearing without rebuttal. The testimony of expert witnesses Sheppard and

Harper went unchallenged except as they allowed, pursuant to cross-examination, that

in the highest traditions of commitment to this Court’s ideals, frequently but voluntarily

provided capital litigation at less than the reasonable hourly rate of $200.00 which they

testified was reasonable under the circumstances of Salmon’s representation of Mr.

Demps. (SR-63-94)3. The hours and expenses incurred by Salmon went unchallenged

of Mr. Schaefer at the rate of $200.00 an hour as he has requested. I have reviewed theaffidavits of respected members of the bar of this community and find as a matter of fact that$200.00 an hour is consistent if not low for similar work in this area and find that his..the ratethat he has requested is reasonable. (SR-86).

------The Court: Likewise the Court finds that pursuant to Section 27.710, Florida Statutes, subparen4 that the Comptroller’s office and State of Florida through the Comptroller’s office haswaived its right to challenge the fees there being no evidence that they met the requirementsof that statute. (SR-86).

Mr. Nickell: Your Honor, I respect your ruling. (SR-89).------

The Court: Okay. Anything further from the Comptroller. (SR-92).Mr. Nickell: No, Your Honor. (SR-92).

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by the Comptroller. Id. The Comptroller presented no witness or evidence to

contradict in any way the testimony of Mr. Sheppard and Mr. Harper. The un-

rebutted testimony presented at the evidentiary hearing in support of Salmon’s

application for fees and cost justify this Court’s adherence to such un-rebutted

testimony notwithstanding all arguments presented by the Comptroller and Amicus.

V. COMPTROLLER’S DISINGENUOUS,INACCURATE AND FRIVOLOUS ARGUMENTSARE UNAVAILING TO ITS POSITION

The Comptroller and Amicus rely exclusively on disingenuous arguments

ostensibly supported by the provisions of Chapter 27, Florida Statutes. This Court

neither referenced nor could it have appointed Salmon under the provisions of that

legislative enactment, commendable as it may be. The only reference to Chapter 27

made by this Court was one which provided the Comptroller with information

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supporting Salmon’s application for fees and costs, a procedural requirement for

counsel proceeding under Chapter 27. This Court neither appointed Salmon under

Chapter 27 nor do its order contemplate substantive consideration of his application

for fees and costs under Chapter 27. The trial Court considered the un-rebutted

testimony presented in support of Salmon’s application for fees and costs at

evidentiary hearing but beyond confirming the time and expenses contributed by

Salmon under this Court’s orders, the final authority for determining the amount to be

paid is left to this Court under the un-rebutted testimony presented at that evidentiary

hearing. The trial Court by halving the hourly rate requested by Salmon and proved

by his expert witnesses and all other testimony presented at the evidentiary hearing

before Judge Giunta, was attempting a compromise for resolution of the issue of

Salmon’s compensation again commendably but contrary to the un-rebutted

testimony.

It appears that this Court’s order directing Salmon to represent Mr. Demps had

never been utilized previously in the Court’s history and thus it is the un-rebutted

testimony exclusively that this Court should rely upon. Without granting a stay or

significant postponement of Mr. Demps’ scheduled execution date, this Honorable

Court remaining constant to its commitment to full compensation consistent with the

circumstances of such representation, has no opposing argument otherwise to

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overlook the un-rebutted testimony presented on behalf of Salmon’s application for

fees and costs. Armstead v. State, ____ So. 2d ____, 27 Fla. L. Weekly S469 (Fla.

5/9/02).

The Comptroller again seeks to inaccurately argue that the law of the case

established by Judge Turner in Schaefer’s case was without benefit of an evidentiary

hearing. That is so disrespectful of Judge Turner’s providing the Comptroller with a

full and fair opportunity to present any evidence it chose in support of its argument at

Schaefer’s hearing that the Comptroller’s good faith is questioned. Not only did the

Comptroller ask permission to appear before Judge Turner by phone, Judge Turner

took the comprehensive step of asking the Comptroller during the evidentiary hearing

conducted in Schaefer’s case: “Anything further from the Comptroller,” to which the

Comptroller’s counsel responded, “no, sir.” (SR-92).

Grasping the provisions of Chapter 27 may be the only argument the

Comptroller and Amicus could rely on but it is akin to nothing more than Humpty

Dumpty’s hope that all the kings horses and all the kings men could put him back

together again.

The evidence supporting the application for fees and costs submitted pursuant

to this Honorable Court’s orders is un-refuted and the arguments of the Comptroller

and Amicus are illusory at best.

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CONCLUSION

Based on the un-rebutted and irrefutable evidence presented at evidentiary

hearing in support of Salmon’s application for fees and costs and the unavailing

arguments of the Comptroller and Amicus, it is respectfully requested that this Court

reverse the trial Court’s order and enter its order directing the Comptroller to issue its

warrant to the treasurer in payment of the full amount requested by Salmon in his

application for fees and costs, and on behalf of his counsel and expert witnesses, and

other relief deemed just and appropriate by this Honorable Court.

Respectfully Submitted,

_________________________________Bill SalmonFlorida Bar No. 0183833Post Office Box 1095Gainesville, Florida 32602-1095(352) 378-6076Fax (352) 336-6175

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing

Answer/Cross-Initial Brief was furnished by U.S. Mail this 12th day of July, 2002 to:

Richard T. Donelan, Jr.Chief CounselOffice of the Comptroller101 E. Gaines Street, Suite 526Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0350

Michael Pearce DodsonGeneral CounselOffice of Legislative ServicesThe Florida Legislature111 West Madison Street, Room 701Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1400

Curtis M. FrenchAssistant Attorney GeneralThe Capitol, Suite PL-01Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050

George F. Schaefer2830 NW 41st Street, Suite 601Gainesville, Florida 32606-1111

William P. CervoneState AttorneyPost Office Box 1437Gainesville, Florida 32602-1437

_________________________________Bill Salmon

CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE

In accordance with Rule 9.210(2), Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure,

undersigned counsel certifies that this computer-generated Answer/Cross-Initial Brief

was prepared in 14 point Times New Roman font.

_________________________________Bill Salmon