IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA€¦ · · 2014-08-19in the supreme court of the state of florida case no.: sc12-2674 fourth district case no.: 4d11-4251 circuit court

IN THE SUPREME COURT

OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA

CASE NO.: SC12-2674

FOURTH DISTRICT CASE NO.: 4D11-4251

CIRCUIT COURT CASE NO.: 2010-681-CP

ON PETITION FOR DISCRETIONARY REVIEW

FROM THE FOURTH DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL

(IN RE: ESTATE OF RAFAEL A. CASTRO-ABALLI, M.D.)

RAFAEL A. CASTRO, III

Appellant-Petitioner,

v.

ELDA HIDALGO,

Appellee-Respondent.

AMENDED JURISDICTIONAL BRIEF OF PETITIONER, RAFAEL

A. CASTRO, III, ON BEHALF OF THE NATURAL CHILDREN

Rafael A. Castro, III, Esq.

Florida Bar No. 047015

Attorney for Himself and His Siblings, the Natural Children of Decedent

Address: 5904 S.W. 64th Ave., Miami, Florida 33143

I-phone: (703) 302-0594; Facsimile: (786) 288-0782

Primary Email Address: [email protected]

Electronically Filed 02/27/2013 12:44:31 PM ET

FILED, 2/27/2013, Thomas D. Hall, Clerk, Supreme Court

Castro v. Hidalgo, Case No.: SC12-2674

Fourth DCA No.: 4D11-4251

(i)

TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF CITATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (ii)

STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND FACTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

a. JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

b. THE RECORD. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

c. SUBSTANTIVE FACTS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

d. PROCEDURAL HISTORY. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

ISSUE OF GREAT PUBLIC IMPORTANCE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

LEGISLATIVE INTENT OF THE STATUTE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

ARGUMENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

I. THE FOURTH DISTRICT’S (REPORTED) OPINION IN CASTRO v.

HIDALGO DIRECTLY AND EXPRESSLY CONFLICTS WITH THE

SECOND DISTRICT’S DECISION IN CLEMONS v.

CLEMONS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

II. THE PROBATE ORDER WAS AN APPEALABLE FINAL ORDER UNDER

FRAP 9.170(b)(13) (AND FORMER FRAP RULE 9.110(a)(2)). . . . . . . . . 9

CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12

APPENDIX A – Conformed Copy of Fourth DCA Orders. . . . . . . . . . . . 13



(ii)

TABLE OF CITATIONS

CASES PAGE

FLORIDA SUPREME COURT

In re Amendments to Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure,

84 So. 3d 192 (Fla. 2011)……………………………………………… 1

In re Estate of Mitchell,

1957 Fla. LEXIS 3578, 96 So. 2d 661 (Fla. 1957) ………..................... 6

Lowe v. Lowe,

142 Fla. 266, 194 So. 615 (Fla. 1940) ……...................................... 1, 5-6

Milam [Milan] v. Davis (“Milam”),

97 Fla. 916, 123 So. 668 (Fla. 1929) ………………………………….. 6

Milan v. Davis (opinion On Petition for Rehearing) (“Milan”),

97 Fla. 969, 1929 Fla. LEXIS 1008 (Fla. 1929) ………..…..………….. 6

Sloan v. Sloan,

73 Fla. 345, 74 So. 407 (Fla. 1917) ……………………………………. 6

Smoak v. Graham,*

1964 Fla. LEXIS 2675, 167 So. 2d 559 (Fla. 1964) ………………... 9-10

FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL

In re Estate of Alworth,

151 So. 2d 478 (Fla. 1st DCA 1963) …………………………………. 5

Morey v. Everbank & Air Craun, Inc.,

93 So. 3d 482 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012) ……………………………………. 6

* An asterisk after a case name denotes a case on which Petitioner relies in the Argument

section of this Brief.



(iii)

TABLE OF CITATIONS (…Continued)

CASES PAGE

SECOND DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL

Clemons v. Clemons,*

197 So. 2d 38 (Fla. 2d DCA 1967) …………………………... 2, passim

Dempsey v. Dempsey,

899 So. 2d 1272, 1273 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005) ………………………….. 10

FOURTH DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL

Crossley v. Travelers Ins. Co.,

314 So. 2d 607 (Fla. 4th DCA 1975) ……………………………….. 8-9

Lutz v. Protective Life Insurance Co.,

951 So. 2d 884 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007) …………………………………... 2

FIFTH DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL

Pearson v. Cobb,

701 So. 2d 649 (Fla. 5th

DCA 1997) …………………………………… 9

FLORIDA STATUTES & RULES PAGE

Fla. Stat. §222.13(1) (2010) (“Statute”) ..………………………. 3, passim

Fla. Stat. § 732.101 (2010) (“Florida’s Intestacy Laws”) ..…………... 3, 7

Rule 9.030(a)(2)(A)(iv), FRAP …………………………………............. 1

Rule 9.110(a)(2), FRAP ……………………………................... 1, 4, 9-10

Rule 9.210, FRAP ……………………………………………………... 12

Rule 9.170(b), FRAP ……………………………………………... 1, 9-10



(iv)

TABLE OF CITATIONS (…Continued)

FLORIDA STATUTES & RULES PAGE

Rule 5.025(a), Fla. Prob. R. ………………………………………… 5, 10

Rule 1.140(c), Fla. R. Civ. P. .…………………………………… 3, 7-10

OTHER AUTHORITIES PAGE

David A. Monaco,

Florida Appellate Practice Forms and Commentary ………………… 10

32 Fla. Jur. 2d Judgments and Decrees §24 (1981)…………………… 10



1

STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND FACTS

The Decedent’s son, who appealed the probate order to the Fourth District,

is the Petitioner in this appeal (“Decedent’s Son”), representing pro se the

Decedent’s natural children (himself and his four siblings) (“Natural Children”).1

Their stepmother, who is the personal representative of the Decedent’s estate, was

the appellee in that appeal and is the Respondent in this appeal (“Stepmother”).

a. JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT.

Pursuant to FRAP Rule 9.030(a)(2)(A)(iv), this Court has discretionary

jurisdiction to review the Fourth District’s reported opinion in Castro v. Hidalgo,

100 So.3d 1180 (4th DCA 2011) (“Reported Opinion”) and resolve the district

conflict briefed herein, which is symbiotically and inextricably interrelated with

the issue of whether the probate order was appealable as a final order under former

FRAP Rule 9.110(a)(2).2 That Reported Opinion expressly and directly conflicts

with (i) Clemons v. Clemons, 197 So. 2d 38 (Fla. 2d DCA 1967) (“Clemons”), and,

in general, (ii) Lowe v. Lowe, 194 So. 615 (Fla. 1940) (“Lowe”), and its progeny.

1 The use of “we,” “our,” “their,” and “us” refers to the Natural Children, as

represented by Decedent’s Son.

2 A copy of the Reported Opinion (“Slip Op.”) is set out in Appendix “A.”

(“FRAP” means the Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure.) Our appeal in the

Fourth District was predicated on former FRAP Rule 9.110(a)(2). Effective as of

January 01, 2012, FRAP Rule 9.170, titled “Appeal Proceedings in Probate and

Guardianship Cases,” has subsumed that former rule. See, e.g., In re Amendments

to the Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure, 84 So. 3d 192 (Fla. 2011).



2

b. THE RECORD.

Overruling its motions panel, which had upheld jurisdiction, the Fourth

District noted that the jurisdiction issue could not be properly “. . .

determine[d] . . . without the benefit of the full record on appeal.” (Slip Op. at 3,

n.1.) We agree with this statement.

c. SUBSTANTIVE FACTS.

The substantive facts pertaining to this probate controversy are adequately

summarized in the Reported Opinion (see id. at 1-2), which contains these

outcome-determinative facts about the Decedent’s life insurance policy

(“Provident Life Policy”):

[T]he policy at issue did not specifically designate a beneficiary.

Under the terms of that policy, if no individual is designated as its

beneficiary, then the owner of the policy – the [D]ecedent – becomes

the beneficiary.

(Id. at 1.) (emphasis added). In her amended pleadings, the Stepmother admitted

that the Decedent failed to designate a beneficiary in the Provident Life Policy (the

“Admitted Material Fact”). If she could not win on her affirmative defenses, we

were entitled to a final declaration of rights, and judgment as a matter of law, on

our claims of intestacy and exemption of the proceeds.3

3 Cf. Lutz v. Protective Life Insurance Co., 951 So. 2d 884, 888-89 (Fla. 4th DCA

2007) (the test for determining the sufficiency of a complaint for declaratory relief

is not success, but whether a plaintiff “is entitled to a declaration of rights at all.”)



3

d. PROCEDURAL HISTORY.

Consideration of the antecedent procedural history of this case is paramount

to a proper review of the appellate jurisdiction issue. Our appeal in the Fourth

District involved the review of a probate order denying our Rule 1.140(c) motion

for judgment on the pleadings (“Rule 1.140(c) Motion”).4

That order directly

relates to a petition to determine beneficiaries – an adversary proceeding under

Rule 5.025(a), Fla. Prob. R. – which, as a result of the Admitted Material Fact,

sought a declaratory judgment that (i) the Natural Children’s share of the Provident

Life Policy proceeds inured to them under section 222.13(1), Florida Statutes

(2010) (“Statute”); and, since the Statute now requires a designated beneficiary, (ii)

Florida’s intestacy rules, see 42 Fla. Stat. § 732.101 et seq. (2010) (“Florida’s

Intestacy Laws”), automatically applied as the only means to distribute those

proceeds to them and their Stepmother. These claims were adverse to the

Stepmother’s competing claim that she inherited all of the proceeds.5

After an extensive non-evidentiary hearing, the probate court denied our

Rule 1.140(c) Motion, reasoning that intestacy did not apply in light of the “or 4 Rule 1.140(c), Fla. R. Civ. P., is a vehicle to test – solely on the basis of the

pleadings (as amended) – the legal sufficiency of the Stepmother’s allegations in

her answer and affirmative defense(s). If, for instance, the Admitted Material Fact

obviated trial on the merits, we should have been legally entitled to judgment.

5 The total amount of the proceeds is US$372,263.79 plus interest. During the

Rule 1.140(c) hearing, the probate court focused on clause VIII, rather than clause

VI (residuary clause), of the will as being dispositive for passing said proceeds.



4

otherwise” language in the Statute and clause VIII of the Decedent’s will, which

mentioned the Provident Life Policy. The Decedent’s Son appealed that definitive

probate ruling to the Fourth District pursuant to former FRAP Rule 9.110(a)(2).

After considering the full record, and without reaching the merits, that court

dismissed our appeal, concluding that it “lack[ed] jurisdiction because the order

appealed from is neither a final nor an appealable, non-final order.” (Slip Op. at 1.)

It reasoned that “[t]he trial court’s work is not at an end,” (Id. at 3), but did not

give any weight to the Admitted Material Fact, nor any real significance to the

prior procedural history of this probate proceeding.

ISSUE OF GREAT PUBLIC IMPORTANCE

The Key Amendment,6 coupled with the Admitted Material Fact, presents

this Court with the following issue of first impression and great public importance:

Whether the life insurance proceeds became estate (probate) assets,

pursuant to the “or otherwise” language in the Proviso7 to the Statute,

or remained exempt (non-probate) assets pursuant to the Exemption 6 “Key Amendment” means an amendment to the Statute, occurring in either 1970

or 1971, which had the effect of deleting certain language (“… shall inure

exclusively to the benefit of the surviving child … or husband or wife in equal

portions ….”) that in the Statute’s earlier versions created a default presumption in

favor of distributing insurance proceeds equally to a decedent’s surviving children

and spouse.

7 The “Proviso” is that part of the Statute beginning with “… Notwithstanding the

foregoing, whenever the insurance, by designation or otherwise, is payable to the

insured or to the insured’s estate or to his or her executors, administrators, or

assigns . . . .



5

Clause8 of the Statute, as a result of the Decedent’s failure to

designate a beneficiary in the Provident Life Policy? (And, if they are

exempt assets, whether intestacy applied as a consequence of that

failure?)

To appreciate this issue, it is necessary to thoroughly comprehend the legislative

intent of the Statute, which is currently amenable to misinterpretation by Florida’s

probate courts due to a dearth of post-Key-Amendment case law.

LEGISLATIVE INTENT OF THE STATUTE

Prior to the Key Amendment, if a Florida decedent failed to name a

beneficiary in his life insurance policy, the proceeds under that policy inured as a

matter of law under the Statute to the surviving spouse or child, in equal portions.9

After the Key Amendment, the Statute now requires a designated beneficiary and

no longer contains a default predilection. In any case, non-compliance with the

Proviso to the Statute precludes a testator-decedent from exercising his freedom to

contract and bereaves that person of the privilege of bequeathing the life insurance

proceeds pursuant to his or her will. See Lowe, 194 So. 2d at 617 (explaining that

proceeds were exempt because testator did not comply with the 1920 version of the

8 The “Exemption Clause” is that part of the Statute preceding the Proviso, the

intent of which is to exempt life insurance proceeds from becoming subject to

probate administration, where they can be attached by creditors.

9 See, e.g., In re Estate of Alworth, 151 So. 2d 478, 481-85 (Fla. 1

st DCA 1963)

(tracing the historical legislative development of the Statute from 1872-1959).



6

Statute); but cf. Sloan v. Sloan, 74 So. 407, 408 (Fla. 1917) (proceeds payable to

“insured, his executor, administrators and assigns” and were not exempt and

passed via the will’s residuary clause). To be sure, the Proviso does not take away

the exemption afforded to life insurance proceeds under the Exemption Clause, but

only adds additional rights to deal with such proceeds “in like manner” as “other

property and effects,” notwithstanding their special, unique, and regulated nature.10

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

By dismissing our appeal on jurisdictional grounds (without reaching the

merits), the Fourth District sanctioned the Stepmother’s unwinnable argument that

a facility of payment clause in the Provident Life Policy – making the Decedent the

beneficiary – could create an issue of fact warranting further judicial labor in the

probate court as to the Natural Children’s exemption of proceeds and intestacy

claims. This created express and direct conflict with the Second District’s decision

in Clemons, which held that only the Statute, which today requires a designated

beneficiary, can fill the void in a life insurance policy resulting from the absence of

a beneficiary designation in such policy. Clemons supported our intestacy claim.

10

See Milam [Milan] v. Davis, 97 Fla. 916, 923-24, 123 So. 668, 671-72

(“Milam”) (4-2 plurality opinion) (interpreting section 222.13 in connection with a

widow’s dower rights), reh’g denied, Milan v. Davis (“Milan”), id. at 973-76; cf. In

re Estate of Mitchell, 96 So. 2d 661, 662 (no surviving child or spouse)

(explaining legislative history); Morey v. Everbank & Air Craun, Inc., 93 So. 3d

482, 485-86 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012) (trust named as beneficiary in life insurance

policy and its terms made the proceeds payable to the estate).



7

ARGUMENT

I. THE FOURTH DISTRICT’S (REPORTED) OPINION IN CASTRO v. HIDALGO

DIRECTLY AND EXPRESSLY CONFLICTS WITH THE SECOND DISTRICT’S

DECISION IN CLEMONS v. CLEMONS.

The Key Amendment opened the door to uncertainty and confusion

concerning the circumstances under which life insurance proceeds cease to be an

exempt asset.11

By dismissing our appeal, the Fourth District fostered further

unpredictability, espousing the Stepmother’s tenuous argument that the standard

terms and conditions of the Provident Life Policy prevail over the Statute (or

Florida’s Intestacy Laws) for purposes of determining beneficiaries in the absence

of a beneficiary designation in such policy. This created express and direct

conflict with the Second District’s contrary holding on the same point of law.12

The Admitted Material Fact made the Clemons decision, on which we relied

in bringing our Rule 1.140(c) Motion, directly applicable to this case, even though

11

The Key Amendment will continue to cause confusion and uncertainty for

probate courts until this Court interprets the Statute in a case, such as this one,

where a decedent dies testate with a life insurance policy that does not contain a

specific beneficiary designation (other than the facility of payment provision

provided by the express terms of the policy). Such confusion and unpredictability

will continue in spite of a modern, non-probate-revolution trend, in which testators

use will-substitutes (such as life insurance policies) as an estate planning vehicle to

avoid, as much as possible, probate administration of wills.

12

See Clemons, 197 So. 2d at 40 (noting that “the policy is complete unto itself”

because the Statute [the 1964 version of section 222.13(1)] supplies the void and

makes the widow and the children of the insured the beneficiaries, as if their names

were written in the beneficiary clause of the insurance policy).



8

it was only persuasive authority in the Fourth District. In Clemons, the decedent

failed to renew the beneficiary in his life insurance policy, inadvertently leaving

that policy without a specific beneficiary designation. The insurance policy in

Clemons contained the following facility of payment clause – titled “Claims

Payment” – which provided (in relevant part):

Indemnity for loss of life of the Insured Member . . . is payable to the

beneficiary if surviving the Insured Member, and otherwise to the

Estate of the Insured Member. (Emphasis supplied.)

Clemons, 197 So. 2d at 39. Applying the pre-Key-Amendment predilection of the

Statute, the Clemons court held that the insurance policy, a contract, was subject to

the Statute’s provisions, which automatically applied in the absence of a

beneficiary designation by the decedent. Id. at 40. It bolsters our intestacy claim.13

Much like the estate representative’s similar claim in Clemons, the

Stepmother’s contention is legally untenable and cannot create an issue of fact

warranting further judicial labor in the probate court as to the Natural Children’s

Rule 1.140(c) claim that the life insurance proceeds inured to them and were

13

Id. (noting that any provision of the Florida statutes applies to such contracts “as

if written into the same in haec verba.”) If the Statute cannot provide a

beneficiary, then intestacy applies since the Fourth District has held that “a facility

of payment clause . . . is in nowise determinative of beneficiaries.” Crossley v.

Travelers Ins. Co., 314 So. 2d 607, 609 (Fla. 4th DCA 1975) (italics added). In

dismissing our appeal, the Fourth District not only overlooked Crossley, which

made the Stepmother’s argument untenable, but considered affidavit testimony

(Slip Op. at 1-2), which is improper in a Rule 1.140(c) Motion analysis.



9

exempt assets that pass by intestacy. The Admitted Material Fact should have

caused the Fourth District, as well as the probate court, to apply the holdings in

Clemons and Crossley (its own opinion) to the substantially similar facts of this

case. Failure to do so was reversible error and created district conflict.

II. THE PROBATE ORDER WAS AN APPEALABLE FINAL ORDER UNDER

FRAP RULE 9.170(b)(13) (AND FORMER FRAP RULE 9.110(a)(2)).

The probate order, which “determine[d] exempt property,” was an

appealable final order under FRAP Rule 9.170(b)(13) (as well as under former

FRAP Rule 9.110(a)(2))14

because it definitively determined our intestacy rights.15

Whether or not it was designated a final order on its face is irrelevant, see Pearson

v. Cobb, 701 So. 2d 649, 650 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997) (reference to order as “non-

final” did not affect its finality for appeal), given the clear ruling in the record

regarding why our Rule 1.140(c) Motion was denied. In addition, the fact that it

was rendered in an adversary proceeding to determine beneficiaries clearly made

the order “final,” see Smoak v. Graham, 167 So. 2d 559, 561 (Fla. 1964) (“We

conclude that the judicial labor of the probate court is complete . . . at the point 14

Since the exemption of proceeds claim involves “the right to immediate

possession of property,” it could also have been brought under FRAP Rule

9.130(a)(3)(C)(ii) (appeal of non-final order).

15

Like FRAP Rule 9.110(a)(2), FRAP Rule 9.170(b) allows interim probate

orders to be appealed piecemeal as final orders, provided that they “finally

determine a right . . . of an interested person as defined in the Florida Probate

Code,” such as our intestacy and exemption of proceeds claims.



10

when . . . defense of such independent action is required as a condition to any

further consideration of the claim in probate.”), since from our vantage that

independent proceeding was necessary to defend our intestacy claim.16

Had the

Fourth District focused on that proceeding or on the effect,17

rather than the type,

of the probate order, it might have upheld jurisdiction (as its motions panel did).

CONCLUSION

By denying our Rule 1.140(c) Motion, the probate court finally (but

unfavorably) determined that we were not entitled, as a matter of law, to our share

of the Provident Life Policy proceeds – an exempt asset – by virtue of intestacy.

By failing to apply the Clemons holding (which supported intestacy) to these

substantially similar facts, the Fourth District created district conflict. This Court

should invoke its discretionary jurisdiction to resolve that conflict, or, alternatively,

should remand the case to the Fourth District for further proceedings on the merits

with clear guidance that the probate order was an appealable “final” order under

former FRAP Rule 9.110(a)(2) (now subsumed within FRAP Rule 9.170(b)). 16

See Dempsey v. Dempsey, 899 So. 2d 1272, 1273 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005) (noting a

difference, in light of the meaning of final orders, between a non-adversary and an

adversary proceeding under Rule 5.025(a), Fla. Prob. R., and explaining that the

question of finality must be viewed from the perspective of the interested person

challenging the order).

17

See David A. Monaco, Florida Appellate Practice Forms and Commentary 103

(The Harrison Co. Publishers 4th ed. 1998); see also 32 Fla. Jur. 2d Judgments and

Decrees §24 (1981) (noting that it is the legal effect, rather than the language of a

judgment, that governs.).



11

Respectfully submitted,

/s/ Rafael A. Castro, III

_____________________________________


Petitioner and Attorney for Himself and His Siblings,

the other Natural Children of the Decedent

5904 SW 64th

Ave., Miami, Florida 33143

I-Phone: (+1) (703) 302-0594

Fax No. (+1) (786) 288-0782

Fla Bar No. : 047015

Primary E-mail: [email protected];

Secondary E-mail: [email protected]

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

Undersigned counsel certifies that on February 14, 2013 the original of

Petitioner’s Amended Jurisdictional Brief has been sent by overnight mail for

filing to the Florida Supreme Court and that a copy has also been electronically

served upon such Court; and that, on the same date, a copy has also been served on

Cartolano & Alvero, P.A., c/o Joseph Cartolano, attorney for Respondent, by

electronic mail at [email protected] (primary e-mail address) and

[email protected] (secondary e-mail address), as well as by

priority mail to the following address: 11645 Biscayne Blvd., Suite 302 & 304,

North Miami, FL 33181.


_____________________________________



mailto:[email protected]






12

CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that this Brief has been prepared using Times New

Roman 14 point font and is otherwise in compliance with the type and font

requirements of FRAP Rule 9.210(a).


_____________________________________


Petitioner and Attorney for Himself and His Siblings,

the other Natural Children of the Decedent

5904 SW 64th

Ave., Miami, Florida 33143

I-Phone: (+1) (703) 302-0594

Fax No. (+1) (786) 288-0782


Primary E-mail: [email protected];

Secondary E-mail: [email protected]





13

APPENDIX “A” TO PETITIONER’S

AMENDED JURISDICTIONAL BRIEF

Conformed Copy of the Reported Order of the Fourth District Court of

Appeal (Castro v. Hidalgo) Dismissing the Appeal of the Natural Children and

the Order Denying their Combined Motion for Clarification and for

Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc or Certification

Documents

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA€¦ · · 2014-08-19in the supreme court of the state of florida case no.: sc12-2674 fourth district case no.: 4d11-4251 circuit court