In War’s Wake The Struggle for Post-Qadhafi Libya

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In Wars Wake

The Struggle for Post-Qadhafi Libya

Jason Pack and Barak Barfi

Policy Focus #118 | February 2012


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In Wars WakeThe Struggle for Post-Qadhafi Libya

Jason Pack and Barak Barfi

Policy Focus #118 | February 2012


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All rights reserved. Printed in the United States o America. No part o this publication may be reproduced or transmitted inany orm or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopy, recording, or any inormation storage and retrievalsystem, without permission in writing rom the publisher.

2012 by Te Washington Institute or Near East Policy

Published in 2012 in the United States o America by Te Washington Institute or Near East Policy,1828 L Street NW, Suite 1050, Washington, DC 20036.

Front cover photo: Jason Pack


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Contents

About the Authors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . v

Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vii

Executive Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ix

1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

2. Te Creation o a New Center . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

3. Te Periphery: Militias Seize the Local Initiative . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

4. Strategies or the NC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

5. Te Role o Outside Powers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16

6. Policy Prescriptions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21

7. Conclusion: oward a New Paradigm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26

Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29


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The Washington Institute for Near East Policy v

About the Authors

Jason Pack, president o Libya-Analysis.com, has worked in ripoli and Washington on promoting commercial

and diplomatic relations between the United States and Libya. His articles have appeared in the New York imes,Wall Street Journal,Foreign Policy, and the Guardian. He is also a requent commentator on the BBC and AljazeeraEnglish. He has addressed the House o Commons on the pressing danger Libyas militias pose to Western inter-ests. Currently a doctoral student at Cambridge University, he holds a masters degree in imperial history rom St.Antonys College, Oxord University. His doctoral research ocuses on the strategic, diplomatic, and institutionalactors that shaped the British Military Administration o Libya rom 1942 to 1951.

Barak Barfi is a research ellow with the New America Foundation, specializing in Arab and Islamic aairs. Hisarticles have appeared in the Washington Post,Foreign Policy,New Republic,Janes Islamic Aairs Analyst, and CCSentinel, in addition to being regularly eatured in Project Syndicate. He is also a requent commentator on CNN,BBC, MSNBC, Fox News, and France 24, and has testied beore Congress about the threats posed by al-aeda

in the Arabian Peninsula. A ormer visiting ellow with the Brookings Institution, he spent six months in Libyaduring the revolution.

n n n

Te opinions expressed in this Policy Focus are those o the authors and not necessarily those o Te WashingtonInstitute or Near East Policy, its Board o rustees, or its Board o Advisors.


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The Washington Institute for Near East Policy vii

Acknowledgments

We must begin by acknowledging our many debts to diplomats, journalists, NGO workers, and countless Lib-

yan activists, students, militiamen, and politicians who generously shared their knowledge and preer to remainnameless.

Next, we owe much gratitude to George Jo, whose perspective on the stark choices acing the NC and theinternational community helped rame our argument, and to Haley Cook, whose knowledge o the intricacieso post-revolutionary Libyan politics is truly unsurpassed. Lastly, we thank Fred Pack, who used his genius withwords to clariy the text and prooread rough dras more times than he cares to remember.

It goes without saying that any inaccuracies and aults in our argument are our own.

Jason PackFebruary 2012


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The Washington Institute for Near East Policy ix

Executive Summary

he sentiments engendered by the 2011 uprisings

are not new: a strong periphery is a recurring eatureo Libyan history. Troughout the nineteenth century,the Ottoman governor o ripoli was hard-pressed toextend his authority into the countrys hinterlands andnever exerted much inuence in Cyrenaica. Since theend o the Italian colonial period in 1943, dierent seg-ments o the Libyan periphery, consisting o nonurbantribesmen and urbanites o rural backgrounds, haveactually ruled Libyagiving rise to new peripheries othe disenranchised.

he British Military Administration (194351),

the Cyrenaican-based Sanussi monarchy (195169),and the revolutionary regime o Muammar adhai(19692010) all drew their upper echelons primarilyrom tribesmen o rural backgrounds. adhas regimesurvived until 2011 because even though it deliberatelyavoided building centralized bureaucratic institutions,it was powerul enough to quell the consolidation orival power centers. Even at the height o his power,adha had to contend with occasional uprisings inthe hinterlands. oday in his absence, local notables,tribal groupings, and militias all vie to prevent the

NC rom extending its authority to their edoms,and the NCs weakness is compounded by the actthat it has not inherited unctioning national insti-tutions. his situation constitutes the key dierencebetween postrevolutionary Libya and the neighboringArab Spring regimes in unisia and Egypt, and seenin this light, it is no surprise that the NC has beenunable to bring the periphery into line.

Despite the internal challenges it aces, the NCwill remain the political and international ace o post-adhai Libya. Constructed to ensure geographical

representation rom areas across Libya, the NC hasdecisively assumed the mantle o a sovereign interimgovernment. It controls the countrys purse stringsand has a monopoly over Libyas oreign policy. Eventhough it aces a restless periphery wary o giving upthe power and inluence accrued during the eight-month revolution, there is little threat that such

ON JANUARY 20, 2012, ormer Libyan ambassador

to France Omar Brebesh was ound dead, tortured byghters rom the city o Zintan or his links to ormerLibyan leader Muammar adhai. his incident wasmerely the latest in a long string o arbitrary violent actscarried out by the ragtag militias that overthrew ad-ha. Although this volatility threatens to underminethe countrys interim government, the National ran-sitional Council, the NC has thus ar been unableand unwilling to disarm these militias, integrate theirelite ghters into ormal military brigades, or demobi-lize those wishing to return to civilian lie. Te ensuing

tension between the interim authorities and the mili-tias is best characterized as a struggle between the cen-ter, which controls national institutions, the ow ooil, and billions in unrozen assets, and a marginalizedperiphery that can challenge the centers legitimacyvia its use o orce and appeal to local loyalties.

he peripherys strength stems rom the uniqueevents o the eight-month revolution. Eastern Libya(Cyrenaica) dislodged adhas orces just days aer theprotests started in mid-February, and Benghazi quicklyemerged as the rebels political center. Fighting in West-

ern Libya (ripolitania) ell into a dierent pattern. Inkey towns such as Misratah, Zintan, Zawiya, Zwara, andGharyan, local rebels irst evicted loyalist orces romtheir cities but later ound themselves besieged by gov-ernment troops on the outskirts o their towns. Someell; others did not. Aer the imposition o a NAO-led and UN-approved no-y zone thwarted adhasattempt to retake Eastern Libya in mid-March, thebattles on the coastal road connecting Ajdabiya to Sirtewere largely irrelevant to the success o the revolution. Itwas key towns in ripolitania that bore the brunt o the

meaningul ghting, with little support rom the NC.Later successes such as the capture o ripoli, the killingo Muammar adha, and the seizure o his son Sai al-Islam were all spearheaded by ripolitanian militias. Asa result o their sacriices and eventual triumph, theseghters are regarded as heroes in a society historicallydistrustul o the ormal government.


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Te NC can also consider devolving power to locallyelected city councils to minimize discontent and easeworries that a new central government is determinedto monopolize control. However, such a step is raught

with pitalls and must be practiced careully becauseit could weaken the NC at the very moment it isattempting to project strength. All the same, the needor such devolution was made starkly clear by unrest inlate January 2012 in Bani Walid, where local inhabit-ants rebelled aer claiming that their local council didnot represent them.

In short, the path ahead is uncertain. Many mem-bers o the NC and the international communitywonder i the interim authorities should avoid under-taking potentially divisive policies, since later gov-

ernments may consider new legislation as lacking thelegitimacy that an electoral government would possess.Tis paper suggests an alternative view: namely, thatcentralization, institution building, and deeating theinherent centriugal orce o the militias are impera-tives or Libya. Only through immediate actions toaddress the current center-periphery imbalances canLibya achieve the security needed to jump-start theeconomy and hold ree and air elections.

Outside powers are well placed to help the NCsolidiy its hold over the new Libya and have vested

interests in doing so. France spearheaded the campaignto overthrow adhai and is keen to work with theNC to build strong state institutions. A stable Libyaconducive to oreign investment will help Francescommercial sector recoup the military expendituresthe government incurred in toppling adha. Libyasormer colonial overlordItalyis equally interestedin ensuring the NCs success and pro-business align-ment. It is Libyas largest trading partner and consumesthe lions share o its oil exports. However, unlikeFrance and other Western powers, Italy is likely to give

primacy to its commercial interests and to buck col-lective international eorts to strengthen the NC ithey conict with Romes ability to carve out a specialplace or its companies in Libya.

Arab powers such as atar and the United ArabEmirates have established spheres o inuence in thenew Libya. atar nudged the Arab world to support

orces will coalesce to oer themselves as a coherentalternative government. At the same time, a success-ul insurgency led by ormer adha regime elementsand loyalists seeking to capture the center o power is

impossible.Yet despite the lack o a viable alternative, the NCs

ability to govern Libya is challenged by both regionaland ideological militias. Te strongest brigades comerom Misratah and Zintan, which aced devastatingloyalist oensives that lasted or months. Te existen-tial threat encountered by these ghters orged bondsand instilled battle skills lacked by other units. oday,militias rom these two cities are engaged in an openstruggle or supremacy in Libya, and on February 1,they exchanged gunre in downtown ripoli.

Other weaker militias have an ideological Islamistbent. Some commanders have experience ighting inAghanistan and Iraq, but have given up their interna-tional jihadist orientation to embrace a more nation-alist ocus. Among the most prominent Islamist unitsare the ripoli Military Council and the February 17Brigade rom Eastern Libya.

Te NC must ocus on institution-building anddevise a workable ormula or integrating the periph-ery into the new Libya, harnessing its energy and youthto the benet o the nation. Te militias are destined

to orm the backbone o the new Libyan NationalArmy, which currently exists in name only. Te NChas a number o economic and political tools at itsdisposal to co-opt ighters. It has earmarked $8 bil-lion or a Warriors Aairs Committee to reintegratecombatants into civilian lie by oering training grants,job search assistance, small business loans, and nan-cial assistance or marriage. Tough the NC is wellplaced to underwrite such programs, it lacks the tech-nical capacity to implement them. Washington needsto work together with intergovernmental and nongov-

ernmental organizations oering the NC the neces-sary expertise to shepherd these initiatives to ruition.Additionally, the NC should rely on the traditionalpatronage networks that have historically connectedthe center and the periphery in Libya. It has done sodetly by naming key Misratans and Zintanis to the posts o interior and deense minister, respectively.


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Executive Summary Jason Pack and Barak Barfi

The Washington Institute for Near East Policy xi

engagement with the political rather than the mili-tary wings o the moderate Islamists, and reaching outto the losers o the Revolution are all options thatthe NC should employ and that US policy makers

should acilitate.Te Middle East has long been a penetrated system,

where Arabs have blamed outside powers or meddlingin their internal politics and economies to beneitexternal interests. By contrast, the NAO-led inter-vention in Libya in 2011 is a remarkable example ooutside powers helping an indigenous Arab-led move-ment. One must not orget that the intervention onlyoccurred because it was irst called or by the NC,then requested by the Arab League, and later endorsedby the UN. Tereore, this intervention and its aer-

math can establish a new precedent or internationaland American actors supporting genuine social orceswithin the Arab world and rewiring Americas previousdependence on dictators in the region. A stable anddemocratic Libya governed by the rule o law will notonly promote stability throughout the Middle Eastand Arica, but will also increase oil production andmake it unlikely that jihadi networks can take hold.Most crucial, it will augur a new trend where Americaninterests can be secured via supporting popular orcesinside the Arab world.

military intervention and later provided the rebelswith nancial assistance and weapons. Although theataris helped the NC overthrow adhai, theyhave not helped the council in asserting its author-

ity. Te ataris have unded Islamist militias that arechallenging the NC by resisting steps to co-opt theirghters into an institutionalized army.

Amid this morass, the United States can do muchto help the NC manage the transition to electoraldemocracy. Washington can strengthen the NC inits struggle to demobilize the militias by bringing largenumbers o ghters to America to receive vocationaltraining. o do so it will need to quickly reinstate itsvisa issuance system, which has been suspended. Open-ing a consulate in Benghazi could help as well.

Currently, both the NC and the US appear tobe operating under a security and legitimacy-irstdoctrine which maintains that bold initiatives can-not be undertaken until urther stability is achievedand a legitimate government takes ofce. Tis reportcounsels the opposite course, maintaining that simplywaiting or elections in late June and uture stabilitywill undermine the likely success o both objectives.Immediate action against the militias is necessarybeore they entrench themselves in the Libyan socialsystem. Innovative tools like anti-militia propaganda,


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The Washington Institute for Near East Policy 1

1 | Introduction

THE LIBYAN UPRISINGS that began on February 15,

2011, diered rom those in Egypt and unisia by aris-ing in and being dominated by the periphery.1 heOctober 20 capture o Sirte and the death o Muam-mar adhai on the same day brought the militaryphase o the conict to an abrupt and climactic end.Prior to the all o ripoli three months earlier, NAOair protection had allowed grassroots militias to grad-ually develop inside adhai-controlled territory.Tese enclaves were largely cut o rom coordinationwith the rebels center o power in Benghazi, wherethe uprisings began and where the rebels had created

their own institutions. Each enclave operated withouta true military command-and-control structure, andeach local uprising generated many separate and oenpoorly disciplined militias. Yet these peripheral mili-tias are now stronger than the interim governmentsnational armed orces.

By the end o January 2012 it appeared that rivalmilitias had made a truce in an attempt to strengthenthemselves against the National ransitional Coun-cil (NC), yet in recent weeks the conlict betweenthe center and the periphery has degenerated into a

struggle between regional militias.In early February,ghters rom Misratah and Zintan exchanged gunrein downtown ripoli. Te skirmishes reect a jockey-ing or power to capture strategic assets such as the air-port and prime downtown real estate.With the NCpowerless to stop these clashes, the council risks ur-ther deterioration in security and loss o aith amongLibyans that their government can stabilize a countrydevastated by eight months o war.

I Libyas transition period is to culminate in a suc-cessul handover o power to an elected central gov-

ernment, the center must become more powerul thanthe periphery.

he gap between center and periphery is the lat-est maniestation o a uniquely Libyan pattern oweak central authority that has historically plaguedthe country and impeded the development o stateinstitutions. Te 2011 uprisings re-created the type o

peripheral dominance that the Ottomans attempted

and ailedto eradicate rom 1835 to 1911. Trough-out most o the nineteenth century, an Ottoman gov-ernor ruled ripoli, while regional notables ruled othercoastal towns in ripolitania (Western Libya) suchas Misratah as well as noncoastal Cyrenaica (EasternLibya), dominated by the Sanussi Su order. More dis-tant regions in the interior were ruled by tribal groupsthat oen reused to pay taxes or oer allegiance to theSublime Porte in Istanbul. Italian colonial rule (19111942) did little to centralize authority; in act, it ur-ther ragmented Libyan society. Since 1942, the periph-

ery, consisting o nonurban tribesmen and urbaniteswith rural backgrounds, has continued to dominatethe centers o power in Libyarst under the BritishMilitary Administration and its Cyrenaican Sanussiclients (19421951), then under the Sanussi monarchy(19511969), and nally under adhas revolutionaryregime (19692010), most o whose upper echelonshailed rom two marginal tribes, the adhadha andthe Megarha. Although adhas regime deliberatelyavoided building institutions, it survived rom 1969 to2010 because it remained powerul enough to prevent

the consolidation o rival power centers. Yet even atthe height o his power, adha had to contend withoccasional uprisings in the hinterlands.

Frustrated with the regimes degree o corruptionand its ideologically driven attempts to centralizepower, the 2011 insurgents drew their orce by tap-ping into dormant, but not dead, regional solidaritynetworks to establish the militias that overthrew ad-hai. Although the uprisings began in Benghazi andthe rebels built their umbrella political organizationtherethe NCopposition elements in Cyrenaica

were largely irrelevant to the ghting that eventuallytoppled the regime. Te important militias that tookthe capital and ultimately killed adhai were romWestern Libyan towns such as Zintan and Misratah.

he powerand national reacho these localmilitias was made prooundly evident by the cap-ture on November 19 o adhais most prominent


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2 Policy Focus #118

son, Sai al-Islam, by brigades rom Zintan. Similarly,orces rom Misratah were responsible or capturingand killing adhai himsel in Sirte on October 20.Furthermore, rom the August 22 conquest o ripoli

until the November 22 announcement o the interimcabinets ormation, the militias controlled mostaspects o lie in Western Libya. In the wake o rela-tively positive reception o the new cabinet and theunreezing o vast Libyan assets at the end o 2011, thecenter appears to have developed a ew more meanso reining in the militias. Yet despite having access toover $20 billion in unrozen assets2 to create patron-age networks and purchase loyalty, the interim gov-ernment will need to do more to impose its will on themilitias. Leadershipincluding a willingness to make

difcult decisionsis required.Many members o the NC and the international

community have recommended that the interimauthorities avoid undertaking meaningul changes,given that later governments may view them as lack-ing the legitimacy o decisions made by elected lead-ers. Such an outlook relegates the struggle betweenthe center and periphery to secondary status, behindthe need to ensure ree and air elections culminatingin the handover o power to a legitimate governmentover the summer. According to this view, the coun-

cils wisest course o action would be to avoid both themuck o politics and attempts to centralize author-ity by building institutions such as a national army,which could usurp prerogatives that peripheral actorshave accumulated during the revolution. George Joo Cambridge University eloquently summarized thisposition: he NCs ailure to grasp the nettle osecurity and military institution-building is not neces-sarily so serious in the long run. What actually mattersis the electoral law and the elections themselves.3

his paper suggests an alternative view: that cen-tralization, institution building, and deeating theinherent centriugal orce o the militias are immedi-ate necessities or Libyas interim authorities. Only

through urgent interventions to address the currentcenter-periphery imbalances can Libya achieve thesecurity needed to jumpstart the economy and holdree and air elections.

o win this contest with the militias, the NC willneed to work with international actors to create jobsor disbanded militiamen and root out corruption, while simultaneously co-opting militia command-ers by bringing them into the nascent Libyan army. Itshould also employ controversial tactics where neces-sary, including a strategic communications campaign

highlighting both militia human-rights abuses and thewider threat that peripheral actions pose to econo-mic recovery.4

Amnesty Internationals February 2012 reportMilitias Treaten Hopes or Libya points to the arbi-trary nature o militia violence and its role in hinderingLibyas transition to democracy. It should be translatedinto Arabic and widely disseminated by the Libyanauthorities.

Western powers and the Arab League helped theNC win the war; now it is time to help the NC win

the peace. Avoiding the deployment o oreign stabili-zation troops on the ground aer ripolis all was wise,but now is the time or oreign NGOs, intergovern-mental organizations, private companies, and relevantoreign ofcials to aid in capacity building, job creation,and general nation-building. Although oreign actorsmust not overtly interere in internal Libyan politi-cal developments, the United States and other powersshould take a rm and proactive stance in the contestbetween the militias and the interim authorities.


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2 | The Creation of a New Center

S I N C E Q A D H A F I S F A L L , the NC, irst estab-

lished as the political and international ace othe disparate groups constituting the rebellion, hasmorphed into Libyas interim government. houghhighly successul in its ormer role, the NC hasappeared ill suited or its current one.5

Selection o council members is based on geographi-cal representation, and the number o council membershas increased over time. In theory, members are chosenby municipal councils in the regions they represent, butin practice the NCs senior ofcials have played a keyrole in the nominating process.During the revolution,the lists o NC members were kept secret becausemany o the Western Libyan councilmen lived in areasunder adhas control. oday, some names have stillnot been made public, making it difcult to know thecouncils true composition. According to leaked uno-cial lists, the current council is believed to comprisesixty-one members. On November 22, 2011, the NCappointed a new Executive Ofce (or cabinet) taskedwith running the countrys aairs until elections or aconstituent assembly are held; the current deadline orthose elections is June 23, 2012.

The NTCs Strangleholdon Formal Authorityhe NC has been highly eective in its quest tobecome the sole legitimate national authority inLibya. he complete collapse o the ormer regime,symbolized by adhas death, cleared the last ormalobstacle blocking the NCs ull control over the cen-ter o Libyan power. Even prior to ripolis capture,the NC had secured legal control o Libyas assetsabroad and recognition by most o the international

community as the countrys legitimate government.Furthermore, the collapse o the old state media thatadha used to demonize the rebels has le his dis-parate supporters with no outlets to chip away at thecouncils legitimacy.6 Instead, the NC has used newand supposedly ree media outlets to bolster its repu-tation, skillully employing its inuence (but not total

control) over domestic television stations (e.g., Libya

al-Ahrar) and its access to pan-Arab outlets (e.g.,Aljazeera) to project itsel as the nations constitution-ally legitimate government.

At present, the council is unlikely to ace anythreat rom an alternative center o power such as aadhai-loyalist-led insurgency. he capture o Saial-Islam, coupled with the disintegration o the lastarmed loyalist groups in Sirte and Bani Walid, renderssuch a scenario highly unlikely. Tis threat is even lessrealistic given that global jihadist networks, whichhave traditionally exploited conict zones, would be

unwilling to support a movement led by adha loyal-ists. Te late January unrest caused by the revolutionslosers in Bani Walid was not pro-adha or jihad-ist in nature. Rather, it stemmed rom the resentmentthat residents harbor toward a local council imposedon them by the NC. he disturbances are there-ore symptomatic o peripheral discontent with theNCs blunt attempt to centralize authority. Tey alsoreect the councils stranglehold on ormal authoritybut abject lack o institutional capacity. Initially, theinterim authorities were unable to impose their will on

the townthey capitulated to local demands and, inthe end, relied on pro-NC militias rather than thenational army to reassert their authority.7Furthermore,the situation in Bani Walid is indicative o the largersituation in Libya, where grievances are predominantlylocal in character and are aggravated by ineective cen-tralization attempts that have ailed to win the heartsand minds o the populace.

Even those who criticize the NC or pine or theadha regimes returnas some o the protestors inBani Walid certainly dostill accept the NC as the

new ormal center o power. hey are not attempt-ing to create an alternative center; they acknowledgethat only the NC can pump the countrys oil, secureaccess to the ormer regimes rozen assets, and has theright to negotiate with oreign governments and cor-porations. Nevertheless, the NCs practical role asthe vehicle or distribution o state resources and its


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4 Policy Focus #118

Initially, the NC based itsel in Benghazi becausethe city was the economic and demographic centero liberated Libya, while the countrys true center,ripoli, was still under loyalist control. In practice,

however, Benghazi remained the countrys administra-tive center until the Declaration o the Liberation onOctober 23, well aer ripolis all. During this time,Libyan dissidents abroad and Cyrenaican actors wereable to consolidate control over the council.

Between its creation and midsummer 2011, theNC evolved into a semisovereign governmentadministering a territory larger than France. It washailed by international observers as remarkably eec-tive in providing basic services, getting the banksrunning, and returning people to work. And rom

its inception, it was widely accepted as the legitimategovernment by residents o Cyrenaica. Following theall o ripoli, the NC quickly gained the same or-mal legitimacy there, even though ew knew muchabout the body.11

universally recognized status as the source o ormalauthority are not by themselves suicient to ensurethat the building o the new Libya is successul.

Formation of the NTCAter the uprisings began on February 15, 2011, law-yers, youth activists, and proessors gathered in Beng-hazi to create an umbrella organization to unite thelocal actions that had dislodged regime orces romEastern Libya. On February 27, they ormed theNational ransitional Council and chose ormer jus-tice minister Mustaa Abdul Jalil as their chairman,announcing that they would act as the political ace othe revolution.8 In an attempt to create a nationwidebody, they selected representatives rom each region,

including those still under adhais control.9 heNC explained that it could not truly represent Libyaunless it included all o the separate regional uprisings,which were constantly producing their own grassrootsorganizations.10


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3 | The Periphery:Militias Seize the Local Initiative

A L T H O U G H T H E N T C controls the center o the

Libyan polity, it has not yet eectively cemented itsties to the periphery. Given the lack o preexisting or-mal institutions at the national level, the spontaneouslocal organizations created during the war must nec-essarily orm the oundation on which the new Libyawill be constructed. Yet only a strong center with viablelinks to the periphery can eectively oversee economicand political reconstruction.

Unortunately, as with most central authorities,the NC was late to understand the peripherys sig-nicance. It has repeatedly delayed rooting itsel in

those areas where the process o creating a new Libyais actually occurring. Although the council addedmembers rom besieged western areas prior to lib-eration, those representatives provided little in the way o local authority that the NC could use toinuence the periphery in a top-down ashion, par-ticularly at a time when events were being driven bybottom-up processes.

Te peripherys unique experiences during the revo-lution made it a strong counterweight to the centerslegitimate authority. Although Cyrenaica was where

the revolution erupted and the opposition establishedits seat o power, the ighting there soon reached astalemate. By mid-April, regime and rebel orces wereentrenched between the cities o Brega and Ajdabiya,with neither side able to advance more than a ewmiles. Te true battle or the country shied westwardto areas that remained under adhas control. WithNAO air cover securing the eastern center romregime attacks, the new periphery in ripolitania borethe brunt o adhas assault.

Indeed, the unique circumstances under which the

ripolitanian militias were ormed dierentiate theperiphery rom the center. Brian McQuinn, an OxordUniversity doctoral student who spent extensive timewith Misratahs ighters, notes how the existentialthreat they aced led to spontaneous solidarity net-works laced with an intense esprit de corps.12 Forced toght or their lives as loyalists besieged the town, these

rebels orged ties and gained ghting skills that those

in Cyrenaicasae rom regime counterassaults andconstant rocket attacksdid not.

Te dynamic nature o the periphery in contrast tothe stasis in Benghazi is best illustrated by events inMisratah ater local militias dislodged regime orcesrom built-up areas. Te city aced continual bombard-ment by medium-range Grad rockets launched romthe towns outskirts, which remained under adhascontrol. Fighters could not lay down their weaponsand return to civilian lie because their homes stillaced loyalist counterstrikes.

Unlike their Western Libyan counterparts, Cyre-naican militias never experienced such threats. Withindays o the beginning o the uprisings, Cyrenaican bri-gades chased adhais security orces rom the cityand were never seriously threatened again. And onceNAO orces thwarted regime counterstrike eortsagainst Benghazi, eastern militias and the NCs nom-inal national army ceased evolving. In Benghazi, onlyIslamist units orged the types o bonds that can rivalthose o ripolitanian militias.

Beyond the dierences in military capabilities that

divided east and west lay a more troubling conundrum.While eastern areas were under NC control, theopposition pockets in ripolitaniasuch as Misratahand the Nausa Mountainsremained isolated islandsin a sea o loyalists. Te NC had relatively little pres-ence in such areas; the councilmen selected to repre-sent those regions held no local authority there. Andbecause the center could not protect these munici-palities rom adhas orces, they owed no ealty tothe NC. With no central political bodies to protectthem rom the regimes onslaught, these communi-

ties entrusted political unctions to the militias thatsprouted rom within. Unlike in the east, where politi-cal and military authority were split, the western oppo-sition united the two under the banner o the militias.Furthermore, in Western Libya the key role the mili-tias played in deeating the regime only enhanced theirlegitimacy to play a political role.


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6 Policy Focus #118

the prism o groups that are resisting the establishmento a strong central government ocused on providingsecurity and stability. Tis is the crux o the social andpolitical problems acing Libya today.

Frequently, the militias have attempted to perormthe same unctions the NC has claimed or itsel. In thespecial case o ripoli, the NCs stabilization and law-and-order unctions were relatively redundant becausethe city already had a local council prior to its all. By thetime the NC attempted to establish its presence there,the local council and the conquering militias had alreadytaken charge o the citys stabilization.14

What united all o the ragmented peripheral move-ments with the center during the revolt was the desireto remove adha rom power. Now that his regime

has been toppled, these movements believe they havelittle incentive to continue working together, andpower struggles are likely to emerge as they jockey orpower. Lisa Anderson, a longtime Libya observer andpresident o the American University in Cairo, haswarned o the dangers o regionalist triumphalism,where a series o local movements each proclaim theircentral role in deeating adha in an attempt to claima privileged position in the new Libya. Although rag-mentation into separate states is unlikely, the centerand periphery are now rivals or the spoils o victory.15

The Peripherys Historical DominanceTe struggle between center and periphery since 2011has re-created power relationships that prevailed dur-ing the Ottoman era, when a weak center was orced tograpple with a recalcitrant periphery. As discussed pre-viously, an Ottoman governor ruled in ripoli or mosto the nineteenth century, while local notables heldpower in ripolitanias coastal towns. Although nomi-nally under Ottoman control, the hinterland largelykept its autonomy, reusing to pay taxes or homage to

the authorities in Istanbul.Although these distinct local power brokers united

at timesrst to oppose Ottoman attempts at central-ization and later to ght the Italiansthe animositiesbetween various localities could not be patched oversolely in the name o ghting an outside invader. Teyears 19191922 saw an intense Arab-Berber civil war

In act, in the absence o unctioning NC insti-tutions, the militias have become judge, jury, prisonguard, and executioner all in one. Many militias havepolitical committees as well as judicial committees that

operate outside the ormal legal system but decide theates o thousands o detainees or suspected ormeradha loyalists.

Although the United States and other externalactors tend to view the peripheral rebels as spoilers,most Libyans embrace them as heroes. In the Libyandomestic discourse on the revolution, the individualreedom ighter (thair, plural thuwwar) who aban-doned his previous livelihood and le his home to riskhis lie ghting adha is the superman o the upris-ings. Deenseless as solitary individuals yet ormidable

once banded together, the thuwwarshowed resource-ulness, courage, and innovative organizational tech-niques that ew Libyans thought their countrymencould achieve. Beore the revolution, Libyan elites(especially educated women) held a poor opinion otheir ellow citizens. Yet today, they are amazed at whatthe thuwwarhave done and thereore believe that thenew Libya must attend to individual ghters needs.13Inasmuch as the thuwwarand not the educated NCmen in suits deeated adha militarily, every Libyanwho took up arms or pretended to take up arms in the

revolution is now seen as a legitimate political actorwhose current and uture deeds are to be looked uponwith respect. Tis shi has meant that even previouslyunemployed, uneducated men rom the lowest rungso tribal society are now seen as respectable, deservingo social intercourse with their betters as well as ben-ets rom the state.

It is diicult to convey the extent o this socialchange to those unamiliar with the local environ-ment in Libya. In many ways, the countrys discoursemaintains that an individual thaircan do no wrong

in pushing or his rights or making demands on thestate, no matter how arbitrary those demands may be.In the eyes o most Libyans, such men have proventheir eectiveness, while the central authorities haveyet to do so. At the same time, however, a thairwhoremains involved with a militia or similar body riskstarnishing his image. Such ghters are viewed through


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The Periphery Jason Pack and Barak Barfi

Even amid this historical tension between centerand periphery, Libyans have no appetite or separat-ism at present. he common protest chant o NoEast, No West, Just One Libya with ripoli as the

Capital reveals that they desperately crave nationalunity, notwithstanding their intense and varied localidentities. Te Libyan peoples ervent embrace o thepre-adha Sanussi agdespite its association withCyrenaicavividly testies to this desire. odays revo-lutionaries want locally accountable power and institu-tions that govern according to the rule o law, but notin the manner seen in Western countries. Rather, manyo them hope to reinvigorate traditional kinship andlocal networks to create a social web connecting Liby-ans to both the state and each other. Tey tend to see

the NC as a dispenser o patronage. Likewise, manynew NC appointees rom the periphery see their roleas doling out benets to their kinsmen.

The IslamistsSurprisingly, Islamist militias have diverged rom otherperipheral actors by establishing relatively close tieswith the NC. Many o these brigades are on goodterms with NC chairman Abdul Jalil and his seniorsta, making themselves appendages rather than rivalsto the countrys new ormal power structures.21

One action that was particularly important as theuprisings drew to a close, but later aded, is the ripoliMilitary Council (MC). Because the NC delayedits move rom Benghazi to ripoli aer the capital ell,a local power vacuum emerged. MC leader AbdulHakim Belhaj, among others, quickly stepped intothe media spotlight. His organization, then composedo more than 8,000 ghters, is unique in that it wasthe only militia to receive oicial recognition romAbdul Jalil.

Belhaj achieved ame by ighting in Aghanistan

with Usama bin Laden and later returning to Libya inthe 1990s to wage an armed uprising against adha.Te CIA, with the help o British intelligence, eventu-ally captured him in Tailand and handed him over toadha in Libya, where he was incarcerated. Aer hisrelease in 2011, he trained with elite exiled Arab orcesin the Nausa Mountains in preparation or the assault

in the Nausa Mountains, where the Italians backedand manipulated the Berber side to consolidate theircontrol over ripolitania.16

Libyas postcolonial history has continued this

trend. Under British inuence (19421951) and laterthe monarchy (19511969), tribally organized Cyrenai-can elements backed by the Sanussi order shied powerrom the Ottoman and Italian center o ripoli to thepreviously peripheral areas o Benghazi and Bayda. Tewealthy and educated urban traders representing thecenter progressively lost control, most noticeably as aresult o siding with the Italian colonialists or backingEgyptian-inspired Arab nationalism against the Brit-ish and the Sanussis.17For his part, adha leaned onMegarha and adhadha tribesmen rom the remote,

marginalized areas o Sebha and Sirte, respectively. Inshort, deep study o Libyan history over the past 150years reveals a cyclical shi o power between the cen-ter and the periphery. Each time the periphery dis-lodges the center, it gradually constitutes a new centerthat is in turn dislodged.18

he 2011 Libyan uprisings witnessed two suchcycles, as peripheral Benghazi conquered the centeronly to see itsel quickly supplanted by new diuseloci o power to the west. As ormer Oxord Univer-sity geography proessor Jean Gottmann postulated,

Peripheral location means [nominal] subordinationto the center...A lack o resignation to such subordi-nation would obviously lead to [continual] conictand instability.19 Like Aghanistan and Yemen, Libyamay be yet another country in which the culture andhistory o peripheral actors do not allow them toaccept a subordinate position, even to a center theyaccept as legitimate.

oday, Libya has shited rom a dictatorship backto its more traditional power structure, with a weakcenter having difculty making inroads with a rebel-

lious periphery. Local notables, tribal groups, andmilitias are all vying to keep the NC rom extendingits authority to their edoms. Tis ts the typologyadumbrated by Proessors Dirk Vandewalle and LisaAnderson demonstrating that Libya under adhaiwas unlike other despotic Arab regimes in that it wasuniquely stateless.20


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8 Policy Focus #118

Islamists outside the militias have been active on

the political scene as well. Te Muslim Brotherhood

has been preparing or upcoming elections, orm-

ing a political party and laying the groundwork or

grassroots organization. Te group is well organizedand is trying to ollow the urkish, unisian, and

Egyptian models by portraying itsel as moderate. It

is also attempting to rebrand itsel or the political

arena by creating a disciplined hierarchy and draing

a maniesto. Indeed, it has undergone intense reorga-

nization over the past ew months aer being banned

and driven underground by adha. On November

17, 2011, the Brotherhood held a conerence in Beng-

hazi and elected Bashir al-Kabti as secretary-general,

replacing longtime leader Suleiman Abdelkader.26And on December 22, members in ripoli announced

an independent Muslim Brotherhood party.27 he

groups inormal l inks to Brotherhood organizations

in other countries aord it valuable experience to use

in the electoral game. Additionally, Ali Salabian

inspirational preacher connected to Egyptian Islamist

Yusu al-aradawi and loosely aligned with the

Brotherhoodhas recently entered the political arena

with a new party called the National Gathering or

Freedom, Justice, and Development.28

He is extremelypopular in Libya, and his entry into politics may sig-

nal wider acceptance by moderate unarmed Islamist

elements o the new political structures established by

the NC.

Despite this lurry o political organizing, hard-

line groups such as the Salaists will devote most o

its eorts to taking over mosques rather than winning

control o municipal councils. o date, the dierent

currents among the Salastss have united only at the

nongovernmental level, without orming a politicalparty.29 In a country where the previous regime muz-

zled religious leaders and the new government has yet

to prove it can even unction, control o mosques pro-

vides a powerul platorm or setting the ideological

agenda. In act, small-scale ghting over mosques has

already emerged between rival religious actions.30

on ripoli. Belhaj used his reputation as an Islamistighter to establish his own links with the outsideworld. He skillully employed a public relations rm towrite an op-ed in his name or the British newspaper

he Guardian.22

He also conducted his own oreignpolicy with the help o the atari government.

Despite his presence in the headlines, Belhaj holdslittle ormal power in the new Libya. Zintani andMisratan ighters squeezed him and the MC outo the capital by the end o November. His star onthe decline, he and some o his ghters le Libya orthe urkey-Syria border to train ghters against theSyrian government.23 And on the political ront, hewas excluded rom the interim cabineta predict-able move, given the NCs desire to demonstrate to

its international patrons that it is not a ront or anIslamist takeover. Nevertheless, Belhajs links to otherIslamists throughout Cyrenaica and ripolitania,such as ormer members o the Libyan Islamic Fight-ing Group, could allow him to mobilize oppositionto the NC and/or wait until the transition periodis over and seek power electorally. Considered bysome as the leader o the politically active Islamistswho ought in the revolution, Belhaj could airlyeasily align with a moderate Islamist politician andachieve a plurality in a uture assembly despite his

current isolation.Elsewhere, other Islamists have consolidated power

only to umble it away. In Cyrenaica, ormer deputydeense minister Fawzi Bu Kati became head o theEastern Rebels Association (ajamaua huwwar al-Sharq), composed o 4,000 ighters.24 Although itremains the largest orce o Cyrenaican ighters whohave not disbanded and returned to civilian lie, it hasallen prey to inighting among eastern Islamists inrecent months. Te February 17 Brigade in Benghazi,considered the most elite o the Cyrenaican troops,

strongly supports Bu Kati. In November, however,dozens o other militia leaders in Cyrenaica issuedstatements denying his leadership over the regions bri-gades and threatening reprisals i he continued to por-tray himsel as head o the association.25 As a result osuch internal power struggles, the eastern Islamist mili-tias are ading rom prominence.


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in the liberation o ripoli via the August 18 Gharyanconquest has been downplayed. he Zintani militiasare arguably the most disciplined in Libya: they workedairly closely with the NC during the revolution,

receiving weapons rom Benghazi via a local airstrip.Unlike Misratahs rebels or the Islamists, a number oZintans senior commanders possess ormal militarybackgrounds. hey have been accused by both Mis-ratans and ripolitans o hoarding weapons and usingtheir control o ripolis civilian airport to extort maxi-mum advantage in the current intermilitia tur wars.36

On November 22three days aer Zintan militiascaptured Sai al-Islamtheir commander, Osama al-Juwaili, was appointed to the post o deense minister,urther solidiying their position in the new Libya. A

ormer military trainer,37 Juwaili is now in a positionto use the levers o central authority against the center,should he so choose.

Some say that the Zintanis and the Misratansbriey ormed an alliance to strengthen their positionagainst the NC. Te rising power o both actionswas marked by the January appointment o Yusse al-Manguish, a Misratan, as army chie o sta. Yet eveni one discounts clashes between Zintani and Mis-ratan militias on February 1 as merely accidental, it isdoubtul the alliance was orged or this reason.38 For

one thing, the militias have no track record o con-trolling their component parts or ceding authorityto others to aid in the construction o a new Libya.In act, it appears that despite the goodwill o manyindividual militia commanders, the militias on thewhole benet rom impeding a return to security andeconomic growth, as such developments would leadto their political marginalization.

Regional Militias: Misratah and ZintanEven as Islamists try in vain to consolidate their power,the nonideological regional militias have already estab-lished themselves as the primary counterweight to

the NC. Numerically, and in ghting skill, the Mis-ratans possess the most powerul militias. Te area hasapproximately 200 brigades comprising more than20,000 ighting and nonighting members.31 As thetotal population o Misratah is about 350,000, thisrepresents a surprisingly high level o mobilizationamong young men. hese militias work closely withthe Misratah Military Council and are largely madeup o civilians without prior military training. hebrigades sprang up according to neighborhood and,as such, are connected only via loose alliances. Despite

the potential or chaos, the Misratan militias are unitedby a cumbersome but unctional command-and-control structure.32

Misratah has virtually reverted to being the capitalo an independent city-state, as it essentially was rom1918 to 1922. Its security orces control the entranceto the city and establish checkpoints at night.33 Teirtreatment o adhai symbolized this iercely inde-pendent streak: ater Misratah militias captured andkilled him in Sirte, they took his body back home asa trophy.34 And two months earlier, they removed the

inamous golden-ist statue rom his Bab al-Aziziyacompound and carted it back to Misratah. In addi-tion, they have projected their power around the coun-try by setting up barricades hundreds o miles romMisratah, completely independent o the ledglingNC-sponsored national army and police.35

Meanwhile, the militias o Zintan, an Arab town inthe Jabal Nausa region, believe that their essential role

The Periphery Jason Pack and Barak Barfi


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10 Policy Focus #118

4 | Strategies for the NTC

are to be made available through the Warriors Aairs

Committee are in the public sector.42

NC chairmanAbdul Jalil has embraced this way o thinking, yetimplementation remains the key challenge.

Requesting outside assistance. Te United Statesand the UN can help bring the NCs ideas to rui-tion. Te council will soon have access to even morecash, but not to the expertise necessary to spend it properly through massive human-development andcapacity-building schemes. o date, Washingtonhas generously helped the Libyans in sectors such

as healthcare, but ripoli has not yet requested suf-cient assistance in capacity-building sectors other thanelectoral preparedness. Capacity-building is the areawhere the United States can make the most immediateimpact in Libya by readily linking political assistancewith the establishment o training centers in elds suchas hospital management, road construction, and university administration. Yet the United States, Britain,and most other Western countries are hesitant to oersuch assistance until the Libyans request it expressly.Tereore, the NC must reach out to the interna-

tional community or technical expertise to help but-tress its position against the periphery beore it is toolate. (For a ull discussion o the U.S. and internationalroles, see the ollowing chapter and the concludingpolicy recommendations.)

Political PatronageIn addition to subsidies and job training programs,the most powerul orm o patronage available to theNC is political appointments, and so ar, interimprime minister Abdul Rahim al-Keibs use o min-

isterial appointments appears to be a qualiied suc-cess. Both the Zintanis and Misratans have beengiven a stake in the cabinet, and even those militialeaders who were excluded rom representation havepraised the NC. Abdullah Ahmed Naker, head othe ripoli Revolutionists Council (but a Zintannative), described the cabinets ormation as the cue

T O P R E V E N T A N ineicient ragmentation o

authority, a low-intensity civil war, or a Pakistan-likeco-optation o the security services by the militias andthe Islamists, the interim Libyan authorities must rap-idly centralize and institutionalize power.39 he cen-ter has several dierent tools at its disposal, includingeconomic incentives, requests or outside assistance,political patronage, calculated devolution o power,and propaganda.

Economicshe NCs control o Libyas purse strings means it

is never powerless. Te council is the lawul guardiano about $150 billion in rozen assets throughout theworld. As mentioned previously, it has received some$20 billion o these assets to date.40 Around $8 bil-lion has been earmarked or a Warriors Aairs Com-mittee to reintegrate ormer ghters back into civilianlie through a number o programs, including educa-tion and training grants, job search help, small busi-ness loans, and nancial assistance or marriage.41 Yet itremains unclear whether the Libyans have the capacityto spend this money eectively.

Currently, the NC is employing traditionalpatronage networks to co-opt peripheral militias inthe absence o unctional training programs. Underadha, the state subsidized housing, ood, and gaso-line while employing those who could not otherwiseind work. he NC has continued this cradle-to-grave welare model o government. o gain long-termauthority, however, the NC must not only continuethese massive patronage schemes until the economy isstrong enough to stand on its own, it must go beyondthe mentality o subsidies and turn existing patronage

schemes into job-training programs. Such programsare essential to Libyas success because until they havejobs, militiamen have little incentive to disband. Sinceshort-term economic prospects are not conducive tonew private-sector positions, the NC is providingjobs o its own to get militiamen o the streets and sus-tain its legitimacy. Indeed, many o the positions that


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Strategies for the NTC Jason Pack and Barak Barfi

Just such an antidemocratic bargain was struck betweenthe Fezzan and Cyrenaica in 1950 and accounted or theensuing weakness o the Libyan kingdom.48

oday, most Libyans support a united country and

do not want to reintroduce the destabilizing and cen-triugal orces o ederalism. Experts such as MansourOmar El-Kikhia not only acknowledge the dangers oa ederal system, but also conrm that it is a nonstarteror the new Libya: Te new government will set theconstitutional ramework, and theres lots o pressureson them to develop a real state-wide, ederal system.But what I see happening is that the new cabinet willnot go in that direction because it wont serve it to goin that directionit will [attempt to] reconstitute thepower [base] in ripoli.49

Insufficient devolution. Despite this aversion orederalism, Libyans are equally wary o a strong cen-tral government. I the NC attempts to monopolizepower, as many accuse it o doing, then the peripherywhich controls the bulk o both heavy weaponry andthe loyalties o the citizenrymay rebel once again.Although the militias are the most well-organizedand well-armed parts o the periphery, any group odisaected citizens would likely draw upon the zeit-geist o the Arab Spring and the example o Egypts

perpetual revolution to see that their demands aremet. For example, many employees at the Ministryo Oil, the Central Bank, the Ministry o Education,the Great Man-Made River Water Usage Authority,and other technocratic ministries have protested untiltheir bosses were orced to resign. Te general com-plaint against such ofcials is that they are tainted bytheir association with the adha regime and thatthey monopolize authority rather than devolving it tolocalities, midlevel ofcials, and the citizenry. Teseprotests indicate the peripherys organizational power

relative to the representatives o centralized authority,who usually ail to mobilize counterdemonstrations.

Similarly, Benghazi residents have reportedly eltneglected since the NC moved to ripoli. Tey alsoeel underrepresented in the interim cabinet. Recently,this growing dissatisaction in Cyrenaicawhich isboth the NCs birthplace and a part o the excluded

or militias to switch rom war to politics. Naker toldreporters that the men under his command, whomhe said numbered the impossible gure o 100,000,would transer their allegiance to the Deense and

Interior Ministries, though he did not say when.43Similarly, Abdul Hakim Belhaj announced that herecognizes the cabinet as legitimate and does notaspire to an appointment or himsel, although hisdeclaration appears to have been made in exchangeor many o his men receiving upper-level positionsin the security services and the Interior Ministry.44Although political patronage has worked well tobring peripheral players into the central political sys-tem, this approach has diminishing returns becauseit is impossible to create more top-tier cabinet-level

positions to co-opt newly threatening actors.

Devolution of PowerAnother potential arrow in the NCs quiver isdevolving power to the local level. Such ederalism,however, has a bad reputation in Libya. From 1951 to1963, the United Kingdom o Libya was ruled as a ed-erated state o three provinces: Cyrenaica, ripolitania,and the Fezzan.45 Tis system o devolution led to end-less ineiciencies and squabbling as local authoritiesnever trusted the Libyan state to act on their behal.46

oday, with modern oil inrastructure and the GreatMan-Made River crisscrossing all o Libyas regions,too much devolution o power is an even greater dan-ger than it was then.

Te countrys population distribution95 percento Libyans live on 5 percent o the landalso pres-ents a problem or uture elections and the rationaleor aspiring supporters o ederalism.47 People romsparsely populated desert areas tend to support ederal-ism because their regions would be better representedthan in a purely per-capita proportional system. Tis is

reminiscent o debates about the structure o the newLibyan state between 1949 and 1951. I any complexelectoral or ederal system comes into being, the inhab-itants o Cyrenaica and the Fezzan would have an incen-tive to collude to deprive ripolitaniawhich holds70 percent o the population but less than 25% o theland areao its demographic share o representation.


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authority, various municipalities and regions have bynecessity exerted more day-to-day control over theiraairs. Paradoxically, adhais ideology o Jama-hiriya (or mass-ocracy) called or just this sort o

local direct democracy in the orm o Basic PeoplesCongresses.56 Although adhais implementationo this system was merely sham, it preconditionedLibyans or a devolution o authority. Arguably, then,a healthy degree o decentralization has naturallyresulted not only rom the uprisings, but also romthe residual impact o adhas ideology.57

Yet too much devolution o power or ederalismwould ultimately be incompatible with the processo trying to rebuild Libya as a modern state withcoherent institutions and inrastructure. Tereore,

the NC should preemptively delegate local powersto the spontaneous organizations that arose in eachtown during the uprisings, creating a chain o com-mand that links these organizations to ripoli. Inother words, the way orward seems to be the exten-sion o the NC brand to cover all local militiasand citizen groups, converting them into a nationalarmy and national administration. Te Zintanis mustrun Zintan, and the Benghazi transparency activistsmust be involved in local Benghazi governancebutas representatives o the interim central government.

Once they are institutionalized into the center, theywill have less incentive to riot (as protestors did inBenghazi) or issue local ultimatums (as Zintani mili-tias did when they used Sai al-Islams capture as abargaining chip to obtain control o the DeenseMinistry or as militiamen rom Suq Juma did whenthey stopped a unis Air light rom taking o inripoli in December).

o some extent this process is already happening,with local councils in most towns already rebranded aspart o the NC. Abdul Jalil must extend this inclu-

sion to potentially threatening local actors, even thosethat disagree with his positions. For example, to ensureBenghazis continued cooperation, he told reportersthat as o January 22 he was suspending the NCs sixrepresentatives to the area until the local council con-rmed them or chose new ones.58

periphery under adhaihas led to protests overcorruption and lack o transparency.50 On January 21,2012, these protests turned into a riot in which peoplestormed the NCs Benghazi ofce, where chairman

Abdul Jalil happened to be at the time. He emergedunscathed, as the protestors merely carried o urni-ture and ofce equipment. Yet some rioters had guns,and explosions rom homemade bombs were reportednearby.51 Te resignation the next day o deputy NCchair Abdul Haiz Ghoga and Benghazi local coun-cil head Saleh el-Ghazal may hint at ractures thatcould cause uture resignations in the cabinet as well.52

According to anonymous NC sources in Benghazi,some councilmen have decided among themselves thatZubeir Ahmed El-Shari (the NC representative or

political prisoners) should become chairman i AbdulJalil resigns over issues connected to the mishandlingo the incorporation o the periphery and insufcientdevolution o power.53 So ar, Abdul Jalil has said thathe will continue to serve until the June elections. Yetcertain oreign diplomats have long speculated that thecabinet will not survive in its initial incarnation untilthen, and many are now orecasting that this will hap-pen even sooner than expected.54I the cabinet were toail, the NC would be hard-pressed to establish a moresuccessul power-sharing agreement and eectively cen-

tralize authority. In that scenario, a new cabinet wouldbe orced to urther devolve power as the price o main-taining popular legitimacy, which at present derives notrom holding a government post, but rom participa-tion in the revolution.

Since adhas all, local communities are increas-ingly clamoring or control o their own aairs with-out ormal ederation. As discussed previously, recentevents in Bani Walid urther illustrate this phenom-enon. In late January, area residents kicked out the rep-resentatives o the central government and demanded

that the NC make concessions. Te NC was orcedto compromise and accept devolution o power toBani Walid rather than negotiating rom a position ostrength and proactively initiating it.55

Since the beginning o the revolution and the con-comitant deterioration in the central governments


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On November 29, the Interior Ministry expresslyorbid the militias rom conducting their own justicesystem outside the NCs judicial process. However,this decree has not undamentally changed mili-

tia practice.As mentioned above, one approachrecommended

by Noman Benotman o the counterradicalizationthink tank Quilliam Foundationis to publicly high-light the militias human rights abuses. Tis could beremarkably eective in light o the peoples overwhelm-ingly negative eelings about adhas abuses. A recentUN report on the militias highlighted similar viola-tions, including the unlawul arrest o 7,000 detaineeswith no ofcial accusations against them.62

A sustained propaganda campaign could weaken

the militias appeal among their local constituencies,making them less likely to make signiicant gains inupcoming elections. Currently, their legitimacy stemsrom their role in toppling adha; i, however, theydisobey orders to disarm, make political missteps, orare seen as trying to rig the elections, they will quicklylose popular support. At present the militias derive agreat deal o their popularity rom advocating thatormer adhai oicials be barred rom positions opublic authority. he NC should respond by par-tially embracing this position while publicly announc-

ing that militia members who engaged in war crimeslike torture, extrajudicial justice, or hindering the con-struction o new Libyan institutions will also be barredrom uture public employment. Such statementscould drastically shi the public debate.

An alternative model o popular outreach is exem-plied by the December 7 antimilitia demonstrationorganized by the ripoli city council. Over 2,000 resi-dents illed Martyrs Square to protest the continuedpresence in the capital o peripheral militias, such asthose rom Zintan and Misratah. Such demonstrations

represent an attempt to channel popular displeasurewith the militias toward strengthening the interimgovernment. hese demonstrations show respect orthe thuwwaras individuals, but not or the militias ascollectives. It will be interesting to see whether suchlocally-led antimilitia movements are re-created inother localities.

Propaganda and Popular Outreachhe logical option o simply disbanding the militiasby incorporating them into the army and police is nota total solutionit must be pursued alongside other

strategies. Te NC can chip away at the militias pop-ularity while solidiying its own by using propaganda,raming the debate so that the population sides withthe center against the militias and other peripheralgroups. o date, the council has been woeully ineec-tive in getting its message to the Libyan people. hemilitias have used Aljazeera, local posters, and wordo mouth ar more eectively than the central govern-ment. Failings in this regard are among the councilsmost signicantand avoidablemissteps.

During a January 3 speech in Benghazi, Abdul Jalil

warned, We are now between two bitter options. Wedeal with these violations [clashes between militias andtheir human rights abuses] strictly and put Libyans ina military conrontation, which we dont accept, or wesplit and there will be a civil warI theres no secu-rity, there will be no law, no development, and no elec-tions.59 Building on this and similar speeches, the NCshould run television and print ads and erect billboardshighlighting the abuses committed by wayward ghtersand the economic disruptions caused by various protes-tors. For example, some brigades have rounded up inno-

cent men, while citizen groups have had innocent bossesred and their homes and ofces ransacked. Others haveexploited the security situation to exact personal ven-dettas.60 Most Libyans seem exhausted with the nightlygunre and rustrated by the militias arbitrary diktats.61

Propaganda was a key element in the rebel cam-paign against adhai. During the revolution, therebels deeated the regime rst in the moral and pro-paganda sphere and only later on the battleeld. In thePR battle the international community, led by shrewdatar, helped the rebels by providing a media platorm

to turn Libyans against adhai while the West putorth the case o his human rights abuses. Tis strategycan serve as a model or the current struggle againstthe periphery, though there are associated risks: i thisapproach were to ail, it would likely oster an opposi-tional climate between the militias and the central gov-ernment. Hence, it must be waged with great nuance.


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Zintan, Misratah, and elsewhere have retained theirstrategic positions in the capital.64

Hajjars ailure, however, was predictable, becausehis plan lacked the right incentive structure or capac-

ity to be carried out. Earning a government salary byjoining the national security orces proved to be notas enticing to individual ighters as the NC hadanticipated. High-level militia members decided theywould rather take the opportunity to gain additionalpolitical power by seeing their rivals disband irst.On December 26, a group calling itsel the Union oLibyan Tuwwar and claiming to represent 70 percento the countrys ghters demanded that the NC give40 percent o its seats to ormer ghters.65 Again, theDecember 20 ultimatums ailure to achieve the desired

eect o a mass handover o arms cast grave doubtsconcerning the eectiveness with which the center canimpose its will on the periphery. Te January 25 BaniWalid incident is in the same vein, with peripheral ele-ments orming an impromptu political and militaryorganization and rebelling against NC attempts toimpose authority.

In response, the NC must orge an incentivestructure that motivates whole militia units to jointhe new national army, police orce, or job-trainingprograms. O course, absorbing existing militia units

enmasse carries certain dangers, since the units couldretain their previous loyalties. Te NC may there-ore need to break them up in the process o incorpo-rating them.

According to George Jo, local groups must takethe initiative in transerring power to the center: thecentral authorities can acilitate this move, but theycannot initiate it. In his view, Libya will not become aunied country unless the dierent regional interestsvoluntarily cede some o their power to the center, lestchange be orced upon them rom the center. Addi-

tionally, he sees oreign intervention in Libyan powerstruggles as a very dangerous path, though he recog-nizes that external powers have certain technocraticand governance skills that Libya needs badly.66

By contrast, Noman Benotman, who has expe-rienced Islamist militia lie rom the inside as acoounder and combatant with the Libyan Islamic

Enlist the international community in the PR war.o urther the likelihood o success, the internationalcommunity should acilitate the NCs public rela-tions eort, despite the risk o creating ssures in

Libyan society. Just as the international community(eventually) spoke with one voice against adha, soit must now say with one voice that it will not let Libyabecome a ailed state (with the proviso that no outsideboots be put on the ground). I the international mili-tary campaign against adha was successul becauseit was backed by both Arab and Western states, so tooshould the campaign against the militias be backedby regional powers, including urkey and the UnitedArab Emirates. Certainly, propaganda calling ordemobilization o units and registration o weapons

will be more eective coming rom Arab and Muslimallies than rom the United States and Europe alone.

Outside powers could also help resolve the appar-ent tug-o-war between Abdul Jalil and Prime MinisterKeib, who seems to believe that the chairman is beingsot on Islamists and militias. Western pressure onAbdul Jalil to crack down on the militias or ace losingsupport could succeed i pursued delicately and behindclosed doors. Such a course would strengthen Keibsposition. Te Libyan revolution must remain Libyan,but outside actors can oer support and retain a made

in Libya appearance by acting in unison with theLibyans and securing Keibs support. Te local oppo-nents o this international-coalition-based approach,namely the militias, are being hypocritical on thisront, since they themselves benet rom outside helprom atar. In act, Libyans are more likely to viewthe Islamist militias, and not the NC, as representingoutside interests.

Caution from the ExpertsSo ar, direct attempts to demobilize the militias have

ailed. On December 6, or example, ripoli municipalcouncil chie Abdel-Rak Bu Hajjar announced a planto orce militiamen in the capital to give up their armsor join the nascent security orces by December 20.63Many simply reused to hand in their weapons, claim-ing that without their security protection, the capi-tal would descend into chaos. Hence, militias rom


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in the revolution has developed its own resh eel-ings oasabiyya (esprit de corps). Wolram Lacher hasdescribed the new political groupings as a recasting oamilial and class solidarities that existed prior to ad-

ha under the monarchy. Christopher M. Blanchard othe Congressional Research Service has ollowed suit,seeing the resuracing o tribal loyalties as the primarydivisive orce in the new Libya and the underpinningo the militias separate agendas.69

he reality is more complex, however. he mili-tias solidarity networks certainly draw upon old reso-nances o amily, tribe, and class, but they also tran-scend them. For example, the Zintani militias overseethe Western Military Council, which includes Arabsand Berbers, ormer military ofcers and unemployed

civilians, townsmen and rural elements. Tese sponta-neousasabiyya networks generated by the uprisings arestronger than old tribal or class ties, but they necessar-ily remain volatile.

I the militias are able to provide materially ortheir members and the NC does not intervene,these asabiyya networks will become entrenched.70Both Libya and the West have a core interest in pre-venting the militias rom becoming deeply rooted insociety. Hence, the interim government, with out-side support, must act while these elements are still

vulnerable, beore they have taken over the localpolitical scene. With the correct actions undertaken,using a wise mixture o the strategies outlined here,the militias asabiyya will prove transitory ratherthan transormative.

Fighting Group, argues that the NCsupportedby the Westshould take a bold stand against themilitias. He preaches a divide-and-conquer strategythat runs counter to the purely consensual approach

recommended by the International Crisis Group.67

Inhis view, i each regional or ideological grouping canremain united and continue its recruitment drive, themilitias will soon have the power to orm their ownalliances and take over the countrys political scene.He believes that i Libya waits until the ormation oan elected government beore conronting the militias,it will be too late, since they can use the elections tocement their power i they uphold the status quo untilthe summer.68

he international community would be wise to

heed both pieces o advice. George Jo is correct inpointing out that nothing substantial can be achievedwithout signicant local buy-in, and that the interna-tional community must act very cautiously and hum-bly in Libya. Yet Benotman is also correct in highlight-ing the dangers o a totally hands-o approach and thereasons why international engagement cannot waituntil aer elections.

The Militias VolatileSolidarity Networkshe shared local experience o the uprisings has cre-ated intense eelings o group solidarity within themilitias, sentiment that draws on preexisting amilial,tribal, and ideological connections yet is distinct romthem. Each new set o local groups that participated


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5 | The Role of Outside Powers

to be unded by atar. Nevertheless, senior French

oicials have indicated that their country expects togain uture compensation or its military outlays. InAugust, Foreign Minister Alain Jupp stated, WhenI am asked about the cost o the operation (the deenseminister speaks o one million euros per day) I remarkthat it is also an investment in the uture.74

ItalyO all the oreign powers involved in the Libyanconlict, none has more at stake than Italy, whichcolonized Libya rom 1911 to 1943 and is the coun-

trys largest trading partner. Italy is also the largestimporter o Libyan oil, accounting or 28 percent oall purchases in 2010.75 ENI, the Italian national oilcompany, is the largest oreign producer o Libyanpetroleum products, pumping approximately 17 per-cent o all Libyan oil.76 ENI also owns 50 percent othe Greenstream natural gas pipeline that producedaround 10.5 billion cubic meters o gas in 201077andprovides Italy with about 10 percent o its gas con-sumption.78 Indeed, Libya is ENIs biggest theater ooperations, accounting or 15 percent o the compa-

nys total oil and gas production.79

For his part, adha long sought to invest his coun-trys oil wealth in Italy. oday, Libya holds a 7.5 percentstake in the Italian banking group UniCredit, a 2 per-cent share in Italian automaker Fiat, and a 2 percentinterest in Italian deense contractor Finmeccanica.80

Italys dependence on Libya or energy and invest-ment capital let Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconireluctant to denounce adha with the same speed asdid his British and French counterparts. Five days aerthe violence erupted in February 2011, he deended

his decision not to contact the Libyan leader: hesituation is still in ux and so I will not allow myselto disturb anyone.81 Nevertheless, once it became clearthat the Western powers would move to create a no-yzone, Berlusconi threw his support behind the rebels.

oday, Italy, like other Western nations, supports astrong NC and its aspirations to create a powerul

T H E U N I T E D S T AT E S and its Western and Mid-

dle Eastern allies have a variety o interests in Libyasuture, all o which would be well served by cementingthe NCs centralization eorts. Each country shouldthereore help the council establish its authority how-ever possible.

FranceTe French government was the driving orce behindthe international communitys decision to intervene inLibya. President Nicolas Sarkozy led the way by call-ing or a no-ly zone and Western military interven-

tion.71 When it became clear that air power alone wasnot enough to topple adha, France sent in militaryadvisors to guide airstrikes and work with the rebels. Itwas also the rst country to recognize the NC as thelegitimate Libyan government.

Prior to the conict, France did not have a large eco-nomic stake in the country. For example, the Frenchoil company otal produced only 55,000 barrels o oilper day in Libya.72 But, despite its low proile in thecountry, France is heavily dependent on Libyan petro-leum products, which constitute 15 percent o Libyan

imports and accounting or approximately 11 percento French consumption.73

Frances involvement in Libya largely stems romSarkozys desire to adopt an activist approach andreturn his country to international prominence. Hehas consistently advocated an Atlanticist oreign pol-icy that does not shy away rom inserting the nationin external conicts. o this end, he increased Frenchinvolvement in Aghanistan and rejoined NAOsmilitary command, rom which President Charles deGaulle had withdrawn in 1966.

Following this Atlanticist paradigm, even i Sarkozyloses to Socialist candidate Francois Hollande in theupcoming presidential election, France will remain akey player in the new Libya and will work closely with Washington to strengthen the Libyan government.Te French government is also planning to establish aprogram in France to train the Libyan security orces,


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Role of Outside Powers Jason Pack and Barak Barfi

become more resilient to the requent great powergales o the Middle East.87 Tis approach has beenevident in the emirates proactive policies toward theArab Spring. atari strategists clearly believe that

creating and supporting a sympathetic new govern-ment in ripoli would greatly support their regionalagenda. Tis logic has compelled atari patronage oa broad spectrum o emerging political movementsthroughout the Arab Spring countries, especiallyamong moderate Islamists. As the Saudis were slow toabandon their old allies in North Arica, the atarishave usurped their position as the primary Gul pres-ence in the region. Some observers have even spokeno emergent atari imperialism.

Reinorcing these geostrategic imperatives is a web

o close personal connections between the atariroyal amily and Libya. In the words o analyst BlakeHounshell, atars ties to Libya run surprisinglydeep: the atari emir, Sheikh Hamad bin Khalia al-hani, made close Libyan riends [connected to theSanussi dynasty overthrown by adhai] during histime studying in Britain, while the ather o his sec-ond wie, Sheikha Mozah bint Nasser al-Misned, livedand worked in Libya during his political exile in the1970s. As a result, Sheikha Mozah hersel spent parto her youth in the country.88 She later ormed links

with Mahmud Shammam, who served on the board oAljazeera and is now a member o the NC. Sourcesin atar note that or much o the conict Shammamhad virtually unettered access to atars ruler. Healso headed the atar-backed satellite channel Libyaal-Ahrar, which beamed pro-rebel propaganda intoLibya rom Doha at the same time adhas own statetelevision was removed rom Arab satellites.

atar did not limit its support to secular leaderssuch as Shammam. It also unded Islamists, repeat-ing the strategies it used in unisia and Egypt. As

with Shammam, atar built on preexisting Libyandiaspora networks based in the emirate. he mostactive o these is led by Ali Salabi, an Islamic clericand Libyan dissident jailed in the 1980s by adha,who has lived in atar or decades. Despite his lie-long opposition to the adhai regime, Salabi wasinvolved in Sai al-Islams campaign to persuade the

central government. But unlike its counterparts, Romeand its business enterprises have been known to blazetheir own trail in Libya to protect their commercialinterests and special relationship with the country,

requently getting out ahead o the international con-sensus.82 Tereore, Italys primary diplomatic ocus inLibya will be not only retaining but expanding its com-mercial preeminence in the country.

QatarI France pushed the Western powers to intervene inLibya, it was atar that worked behind the scenes tosecure the Arab Leagues cover, enabling the UN Secu-rity Council to adopt Resolution 1973 authorizing theno-y zone. Te tiny Persian Gul emirate ollowed up

this success by becoming the rst Arab country to rec-ognize the NC as Libyas legitimate government.

But atar did not limit its eorts to mere diplo-macy. When it became apparent that the NAObombing campaign alone would not sufce to toppleadha, Doha played a crucial role in arming the reb-els. Beginning in April 2011, it supplied French Milanantitank missiles and Belgian FN riles. Over thecourse o the revolution, atar provided more than20,000 tons o weapons in eighteen shipments.83 ataralso brought hundreds o Libyan ghters to Doha to

train. And during the nal campaign to take ripoli,atari special orces84 ought shoulder to shoulderwith the militias and supervised their plans, accord-ing to the atari chie o sta.85

his involvement was not spurred exclusively byhumanitarian motives, but also by economic and, morecrucially, geostrategic actors. atar had major invest-ments in adhas Libya. In 2008, it concluded agree-ments to invest $8 billion.86 Moreover, as the worldslargest exporter o liqueed natural gas, atar saw Lib-yas gas reserves as a gateway to Mediterranean markets

that would give it a crucial advantage against Russia,the number-two LNG exporter.

Furthermore, over the past ew years, the atarishave come to realize that the only way to protecttheir sovereignty against traditional Saudi meddlingin their internal aairs is to act like a regional power.By pitching a stake in every major regional issue, they


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Washington and the CurrentState of Playhe United States played a supportive role in boththe diplomacy that led to Resolution 1973 and the

ensuing post-adha engagement. In act, the use ocertain U.S. military technolog y and personnel was asine qua non or the no-y zones success. Yet Wash-ington has been exceedingly reluctant to leverage thisact and secure specic U.S. interests in Libya. In act,the Obama administration has instead pursued a con-sistent lead rom behind policy.95 his approach,combined with the high number o American-educated ministers in the new Libyan cabinet, hasengendered universal respect in both the streets andthe corridors o power. It has also le many Libyans

clamoring or increased U.S. engagement now thatthe ghting is over.96

Rhetorically, Washington is committed to helpingthe interim authorities create job-training programsor militia members while providing advice on how tobuild a national army, collect weapons, and deactivateman-portable air-deense systems (MANPADS) andother heavy weapons.97In short, the ofcial Americanposition is to help the center in its quest to consoli-date its authority and incorporate the periphery. Yet inthe words o a recent Congressional Research Service

report, Te Obama administration has not publiclydisclosed plans or U.S. participation in multilateralpost-conict security, stability, or reconstruction oper-ations in Libya.98

o date, little has been achieved rom Washingtonspostconict eorts because security concerns preventcivilian U.S. government sta rom rapidly increasingtheir numbers and directly interacting with militiamembers outside ripoli and Benghazi. In act, U.S.personnel are active almost exclusively in those twocities. his pattern is similar to that o the UN and

Documents

In War’s Wake The Struggle for Post-Qadhafi Libya