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Increasing Work and Earnings Among Families in Social Housing James A. Riccio. Centre for Economic and Social Inclusion 2012 Welfare-to-Work Conference Birmingham, UK. MDRC. Not-for-profit social policy research organization Based in NYC - PowerPoint PPT Presentation
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Increasing Work and Earnings Among Families in Social Housing
James A. Riccio
Centre for Economic and Social Inclusion2012 Welfare-to-Work Conference
Birmingham, UK
MDRC
• Not-for-profit social policy research organization
• Based in NYC
• Rigorously evaluates (and sometimes helps design) innovative social policies
• Pioneered large-scale random assignment evaluations of social programs
• Mission: Build evidence to improve the lives of low-income families
2
Topics General theme: Is social housing a good “platform” for intervention to
improve work outcomes for low-income families? Evidence from the US:
• Jobs-Plus: A place-based employment intervention for residents of public housing (social housing)
Evidence from the UK:• ERA (Employment Retention and Advancement
demonstration): Results for social housing residentsMore evidence from the US:
• NYC Work Rewards demonstration for “Housing Choice Voucher” recipients (like Housing Benefit)
Final reflections 3
National Jobs-Plus Demonstration
Target group: Residents of public housing (estates)• Place-based employment intervention
• Multi-component, “saturation” strategy
4
Origins of Jobs-Plus—poverty and place
Build mixed-income communities “from within”• Response to growing concentration of joblessness,
underemployment, welfare receipt, and poverty in public housing and surrounding neighborhoods
Public and private sponsors: • US Dept. of Housing and Urban Development (HUD)• The Rockefeller Foundation • Other public and private funders
5
Jobs-Plus sites
Diverse housing developments in 6 cities: Baltimore Chattanooga Dayton Los Angeles St. Paul Seattle
Randomly allocated developments within each city to program and control groups
Local partnerships and collaboration: • Public housing authorities• Welfare agencies• Workforce agencies • Residents
• Other service agencies
Mandatory partners
6
Jobs-Plus model: Comprehensive approach
3 components:1. Employment and training services
Convenient on-site “job centers” 2. New rent rules to “make work pay”
Rent rises less as earnings grow3. Community support for work
Neighbor-to-neighbor outreach (“Community coaches” share info about work)
“Saturation-level” outreach and assistance- Aim to assistance all working-age residents
7
Job assistance and service brokering on-site, where people live
Creates easier opportunities and many informal opportunities to meet with, advise, encourage, and assist residents:
• Often on a “drop-in” basis at the Jobs-Plus office
•In the neighborhood (e.g., on a corner; at events)
• At residents’ homes
Staff closer to residents’ day-to-day lives
•More holistic understanding of family problems, support networks, and neighborhood conditions
1. Employment and training component
8
Making work “pay” for everyone through new rent rules
• With traditional “30-percent-of-income” rule, earnings are implicitly “taxed” at 30%
• New rent rules: “Flat/fixed” rents (with income-based rents as “safety net” if job loss)
2. Rent reform
9
Promote “neighbor-to-neighbor” support for work, with aid of resident outreach workers
“Building captains,” “community coaches…
• share information on job and training opportunities, other services, and financial incentives
• encourage participation in Jobs-Plus and employment
• add legitimacy to the program and open up further informal avenues of helping other residents
3. Community support for work
10
Foster integration of housing services and employment assistance
• Housing authorities promote employment from time new residents move in—message “comes with tenancy”
• Housing authorities link employment assistance with efforts to head off evictions over nonpayment of rent
• Housing authorities must transcend traditional, nearly exclusive focus on housing management
Community support for work (cont.)
11
3 sites allowed “full test” of JP concept
Dayton, Los Angeles, and St. Paul: Positive effects• Offered and sustained the full Jobs-Plus “package”• Strong housing authority commitment• ~ 3 of 4 working-age residents took advantage of
services, rent incentives• Infused development with self-sufficiency message
Seattle: Positive short-term positive effects• Early exit from demo because of reconstruction
Baltimore and Chattanooga: No effects• Incomplete implementation
12
1998 cohort = focus of impact analysis
• All nondisabled working-age residents
• Living in Jobs-Plus or comparison developments in October 1998 (random assignment of developments)
• Includes recent arrivals and longer-termers in 1998
• Includes those who moved or stayed after 1998
• Long-term comparative interrupted-time series analysis, using Unemployment Insurance wage records
• Sample size: Program Comparison Total 2,123 2,651 4,774 13
Pooled average quarterly earnings for the 1998 cohort (full implementation sites)
Figure pooled 1
Mean Quarterly Earnings for the 1998 Able-Bodied Sample:3 sites pooled
Post-program period
Pooled average quarterly earnings for the 1998 cohort (full implementation sites)
Figure pooled 1
Mean Quarterly Earnings for the 1998 Able-Bodied Sample:3 sites pooled
Post-program period
Pooled average quarterly earnings for the 1998 cohort (full implementation sites)
Figure pooled 1
Mean Quarterly Earnings for the 1998 Able-Bodied Sample:3 sites pooled
Post-program period
Earnings impacts through 7 years (full implementation sites)
SiteAvg. per year (2000 - 2006)
Cumulative (2000 - 2006)
Change (%)
Pooled $1,300 $9,099 16%
Dayton $984 $6,888 14%
Los Angeles $1,176 $8,233 15%
St. Paul $1,883 $13,181 19%
All results statistically significant
17
Earnings impacts for subgroups
Subgroup Per year (2000-2006)
Impact ($) Change (%) Full implementation sites:
TANF group (Welfare-recipients)
937*** 13%
Non-TANF group (Non-welfare recipients)
1,874*** 21%
Dayton only:
Black women (non-Hispanic)
1,206*** 17%
Los Angeles only: Hispanic men
3,494**
31%
Hispanic women
564
9%
St. Paul only:
S.E. Asian men
3,172**
31%
S.E. Asian women 2,297*** 29% 18
Earnings impacts by age group (during program)
Subgroup
Per year (2000-2003) Impact ($) Change (%)
Full implementation sites:
21 - 24 years old 1,921*** 22%
25 - 34 years old 1,323*** 14%
35 – 61 years old 756*** 11%
19
Replication effortsNew York City
• Now serving 3 large public housing developments• A key feature of Mayor Bloomberg’s new
“Young Men’s Initiative”: Will include up to 8 new Jobs-Plus sites
San Antonio, Texas• Operating on 1 large public housing
development
Obama administration (HUD) • Proposing federal expansion in new budget
20
UK ERAUK Employment Retention and Advancement Demonstration
Impacts by housing status
• Focus today on ND25+ group (largest effects)
22
Evaluation sponsor• UK Department for Work and Pensions (DWP)
US Research Partner• MDRC
UK research partners• Policy Studies Institute (PSI)• Institute for Fiscal Studies (IFS)• National Institute for Economic & Social Research (NIESR)• Office for National Statistics (ONS)
Lessons traveled in both directions!
Transatlantic collaboration
23
Unemployed and entering New Deal welfare-to-work program:
(1) New Deal Lone Parents (NDLP)
(2) New Deal 25-Plus (ND25+)
Working part-time (lone parents):(3) Working Tax Credit (WTC) group
UK ERA Target groups
24
Operates within Jobcentre Plus centers• Separate staff• In some offices, separate post-employment teams
33-month program: • If unemployed at intake, get job placement
through New Deal w-t-w program (~ 9 months)
• Post-employment for all who work: 24+ months of “in-work” job coaching and support from “Advancement Support Advisors”
24 months of financial incentives
UK ERA model
25
Retention bonus £ 400 3 times/yr for for sustained full-time work 2 yrs (£ 2,400 total)
Tuition assistanceif combine training + work £ 1,000
Tuition bonus if complete training up to £ 1,000
In-work emergency funds £ 300/worker
Financial incentives
26
6 districts (Total N = 16,000 people):• 4 districts in England
– (E. Midlands, London, NE England, NW England)• 1 in Scotland• 1 in Wales
Spread across 58 local offices (where random assignment took place)
The pilot sites
ND25+: Long-term unemployed at baseline
Random assignment
New Deal intake
ERA
Control
ERA New Deal
Welfare-to-work +advancement focus
Regular New Deal
Welfare-to-work
In-work support + incentives
JOB
JOB
Random assignment
PRE-employment
POST-employment
27
Months after Random Assignment
% E
mpl
oyed
Program group employment rates
WTC61%
28
“Outcomes” vs. “impacts”
29
Target Group
Outcome Ranking
Sustained Impacts for Full Sample?
WTC lone parents Highest No
NDLP Medium No
ND25+ Lowest Yes
30
ND25+: Long-term unemployed
Cumulative employment outcomes for ND25+ control group
Ever workedin 5 years Months worked
in 5 years
ERA Control ERA Control 30
31
ND25+: Long-term unemployed
Impacts on employment outcomes
Ever workedIn 5 years
+ 1.1 months** (+ 8%)
+ 2.2 pp* (+ 4%)
Months workedin 5 years
ERA Control ERA Control
Tax Year
Control group
ND25+: Long-term unemployed
Impacts on earnings trendsEa
rnin
gs (£
)
32
Tax Year
Control group
ND25+: Long-term unemployed
Impacts on earnings trendsEa
rnin
gs (£
)
ERA group
5-year cumulative impact: £1,814 ** (+ 11%)
ERA ended for all by October 2007 (earlier for some)
33
ND25+: Long-term unemployed
Impacts on ever worked within 5 years after random assignment
Family housing Social housing Private housing
ERA Control ERA Control ERA Control34
35
ND25+: Long-term unemployed
Impacts on ever worked within 5 years after random assignment
Family housing Social housing Private housing
- 1.9
ERA Control ERA Control ERA Control
††
36
ND25+: Long-term unemployed
Impacts on cumulative 5-year earnings,by housing status at baseline
Family housing Social housing Private housing
ERA Control ERA Control ERA Control
37
ND25+: Long-term unemployed
Impacts on cumulative 5-year earnings,by housing status at baseline
Family housing Social housing Private housing
ERA Control ERA Control ERA Control
£703
New York City’sWork Rewards Demonstration
Target group: Low-income households with “Housing Choice Vouchers” • Alternative to public housing
• Rent subsidies to help families pay rent in private housing market
• Tenants pay 30% of their income for rent
• Many don’t work, or are underemployed38
Evaluation goalsTesting 2 interventions: Do the interventions improve economic security?
1. Family Self Sufficiency Program (FSS)• Case management • “Escrow savings accounts” (asset-building)• 5-year program
2. FSS+ Workforce Incentives Incentives adapted from UK ERA• Cash rewards for full-time work: $150/month• Cash rewards for education/training completion• Rewards available for 2 years
39
Evaluation design: 3-way random assignment
Voucher-holders sign up
RandomAssignment
FSS-only
FSS + incentives
Control group
• Recruited volunteers from housing roster• N = 1,455 households; 1,603 adults
5 years of follow-up (ongoing)40
Cumulative impacts on earnings within 2.5 years after entering program
FSS-Only FSS + IncentivesImpact
($)Change
(%)Impact
($)Change
(%)
Full sample 503 2.8 551 3.1
41
Cumulative impacts on earnings within 2.5 years after entering program
FSS-Only FSS + IncentivesImpact
($)Change
(%)Impact
($)Change
(%)
Full sample 503 2.8 551 3.1
Employment subgroups
Not working at baseline 1,658 24.3 3,102** 45.4
Working at baseline -706 -2.4 -1,904 -6.5 ††
42
Subgroup earnings trends
43
$0
$200
$400
$600
$800
$1,000
$1,200
$1,400
$1,600
Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 Q6 Q7 Q8 Q9 Q10 Q11
Note: Earnings include $0 for non-workers
Subgroup: Not working at baseline
Control group
Subgroup earnings trends
44
$0
$200
$400
$600
$800
$1,000
$1,200
$1,400
$1,600
Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 Q6 Q7 Q8 Q9 Q10 Q11
FSS + Incentives
FSS-Only
Note: Earnings include $0 for non-workers
Subgroup: Not working at baseline
Incentives end
Control group
New federal study of FSS
• MDRC launching test of national Family Self-Sufficiency Program (FSS) in 15+ cities
• Opportunity to test whether subgroup patterns hold elsewhere.
• But no special workforce incentives (unless we can raise other funding)
45
Earlier US welfare-to-work studies
• Studies of mandatory welfare-to-work programs for lone parents in the US (from the 1990s, early 2000s) looked at housing subgroups
• General pattern: Effects of welfare-to-work programs were larger for welfare recipients living in public housing or with rent vouchers than for other welfare recipients without housing subsidies.
46
Final reflections• Growing evidence: Employment interventions can work
for public/social housing and other rent-assisted groups– Implement UK ERA for long-term unemployed in social housing?
• Encouragement for linking housing and work policies—and, hence, for inter-agency collaboration
• Strategies that combine services + incentives may work best
• Place-based interventions, such as Jobs-Plus, offer multiple avenues for engaging families
• However, strategies to promote work advancement remain elusive and call for more innovation and testing
47
Final reflections (continued)
• Building further evidence for policy US: – Longer-term impact testing of services, incentives, and
rent reform for subsidized tenants
– Study replication of Jobs-Plus in public housing
UK: – Confirm impact of ERA for long-term unemployed in social
housing under new welfare reform; test a refined model?
– Test a place-based work intervention (like Jobs-Plus)?
Both:
– Continue search for effective advancement strategies48