CAESAR - 8

APPROVED FOR RELEF DATE: JUN. 2007

E

INDECISION AND STRESS

1950-1952

Office of Current Intelligence

C E N ~ A L INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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Following the failnre of the Horth Korean attack on South Korea and the failure of the Chinese Capmnmiste t o drive UIO f-ea f r a m Korea , Gaviet 'leaders grew Increasingly concerned about US rearma- ment and US-iasp&d integration of Western defense efforts. They apparently became particularly concerned about the establishment of US bases in various peripheral areas of the USSR, In spite of this, Soviet policy remained sterile and provocative. Bo new policy for- mulas w e r e developed t o meet the new situation. Iphere is reason t o believe that, as the months passed, th i s problem became mare and m o ~ e critical an8 controversy developed mer Stalin's continuing in- flexible line in foreign sffaire.

Coacarrently, the c r i t i ca l international stttlation apparently ccmplicated Sclnriet internal planning problems. azgft Five Year Plan and subsequent efforts t o re-drsft the plan tn 19% and 19% probably reflected top level in8ecision regarding overall SaPiet policy <n th is new situation an8 possibly conflict am- the top' Saviet leaders.

Revisions in the

, Meaneih, m e t i c controversy on s d e t 9gricult;ural policy

broke into the open in W c h 1952. There is reason t o belleve that Politburo ueuiber ghrushchev attempted t o inaugurate a drastic change in agricultural pollcy, and that this program wa8 apposed.by one or more Politburo mmbrs. Speculatively, it I s suggested that ~l .enkov backed ghrashchev, but only t o a point, a l e Beria was the leading figure in opposition,

In ADgast 1951, the zeplacement of V; 8. A b a W by 6. D. Iguatiev as Chlef of the PSB probably remcrwd the BSB f'ram,Beria*s qea of respaneibility, representing; the first mador upset In the parer bahnae that had existed am- the Politburo lpembers slnce Zhdanov's death. Judging f'rw the secrecy eloaktng this shlft and fra a statement published tn Septeuiber 1952, It is believed that the issue involved wa6 that of Party control mer the WB.

Later, In SavLet GeargLs, a seriee of purges began which e l i m - h a t e d men who had held positions of influence there far many years. It is believed that this shake-ttg reflectea aUversely an Berla, who had retained overlordship in Georglan afYalrs since his departure f'ram Georgia in 1938, Opinions m e r as t o whether Malenkov, or Stalln himself, initiated these purgee.

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In February 1952, Stal in began the series of lettere. published i n October 1952 as !Che Econaaic problem of 8ocialiem, which canati- tuted both ideological pronoancementa and observations 011 current _ _ problems. Several analysts have lnterpmted the portions dealing vith current problems as revealing slgnlflcsat caa t rmrey within Stalin's immei i iate entourage cm fundamental iseues, notab& on the f e i g n poiicy question. 'phe c h a n g e t o s ta iw~ =lex- ible and provocative fozeign policy was overruled but subsequent >dec velcrpaaents suggest that the baaic conflict waa not resolved. The de- cision t o proceed full-epeed vith the ljovietizatiaa at' Eastern (3erprany (evidently dating from June 1952) Indicated a further hardenlag of Savlet foreign policy, for it necessarily inYolvea rejection of any posstblllty adt negotiation on Germsny.

In early 1952, 8aviet leadere again ordered the W t i n g of a five-year plan. This order appeared t o reveal that definite Beci- slaps regsrding both fore- and domestto policy had been taken. fmere were indications of contrmrsy regarding the plan; the deci- eiana &ken did not appear t o resolve the fundamental questlone that are presamed t o have existed.

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By a t least June 1952, Stal ln himself began t o manifest an un- usually hlgh l e v e l of persapal activity. In July, he held an inter- vlew with au I ta l ien fellow-traveller, Pietro Nenul; unusual in that Benni dld not seek the internew and it was suggested by Sovlet of- ficials. hter, Stalin began to meet foreigners nume frequently than he had &me a t any time since the war, He apparently did not take his regular vacation a t Sochi in the fall, for he appeared a t StnoSoviet treaty eeremoniea in September, the Party Congress in October aaB the anniversary ceremanles on 7 Bopember. I I

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s phi^ unusually high level ab personal aetivity manifested by Stalia cantintma unt i l his very death. In February 1953, for example, he held t h e htervlew vith forelgneke, two of these vi th apibalrsa- dors . 19th Party Congrese. 'phe announcement was made on 20 August , ana the Congress -6 scheauled t o beg- on 5 October. The brlef perlod between the announcement and the apenlng 3ate of the conference, as well as the apparent haste evldenceh in the organlzatlon aP the var- ioae Republic congresse8 preliminary t o the All-Union Congress, sug- gested t3 reletively ed&n decision. The Congreaa itself was appar- ently dominsted by Malenkov: !Phe prLncipal speeches of the Congress

SaPetlme in aid-1952, Savlet leaders decide& t o convoke the I

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were delivered by Malenkov and by two men who sre believed t o have been associates or .proteges a t that t i m e , Khrushchev and Saburav. Changes in Party organization and Central Commi t t ee arembershlp which were effected a t the Congress-appeared t o work t o Maleukov's advantage; furthemore, several of Beria's impartant associstes either disappeared or were reduced from f u l l t o alternate-membership on the Central Committee.

In the period fram the October Party Congress t o Stalin's death, a series of events took place which appeared t o reflect high poli t i - cal tension, behina-the-aceme maaeuvering and the beginning of'-rapid personnel changes in important posts. ominous Do~tOr6' P l o t amouucemeat, appear t o indicate that a politi- cal cr i s i s had finally developed.

Theee events, along with the c

Inaddition t o the above, them were tndlcatlons of changes In the relationshtps sad responsibilities of the tup Presidium figures. Foremost, of course, was the increasing praminence actor@ Malenkm. AuLbassador &man reported In June 1952 that the "bets w e r e q n h g toward .klenkov," indicating t h a t Saviet af'ficlals recognized his incmasing stature. obbcure and unexplained:

Other changes 'took place, however, a c h remain

Q 1. In December 1952, there was fragmentary evidence

=O E3 t t u s r e ~ ! x m i b i l l t y had previously %ea

In February 1953, I. G, gsbanov was identified as Chief

that agricultural reports were - Malenkov ' SI

2. of Gossaab which, as late as H m m b e r 1951 and possibly May 1952, had been headed by K&ganovich. .

FOREIGN POLICY: S!MIEMA!I!E AF9) FRUSTRATIOE

With the collapse of the North Korean Army In September 1950, the Soviet leaders were faced with the dilemma of either loslng a l l of K m a ar of attetqting t o salvage the situation by allowing or persuading the Chinese Communists t o enter the conflict. course uas chosen. I n spite of their i n i t i a l successes, hawever, the Chinese Communists were unable t o drive UN forces out of Korea.

The latter

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Meanwhile, the Korean attack and the subsequent Chinese Camma- a i e t Intervention had provoked the US into an extensive rearmament program, had further stiamlated US efforts t o strengthen Western Europe's military forces, and.had accelerated the IWCO base program in SU~& and m c a .

he immediate sovtet reaction t o these developments Uas one of alarm, rage and frustration. 21 January 1951 speech, which touched aff vhst later was to be B p m as the Hate-America campaign. The US Euibassy i n Moscow noted t h a t this speech utarked a shift ia propaganda from the theme of the inev- i t ab i l i ty af csgltalism's econaulc collapse t o t h a t of' its defeat through war. The embassy f'urther noted t h a t th i s speech carries no assumnces that thk USSR could flaally xia wlthmt war or that the Soviet peoples would escape involvement. Bage and frustratiun were also evident ln Stalin's 16 February 1951 h t e M e w xlth a Ravda correspondent, In which he repeatedly and bluntly called C h x A t t l e e , then P h u e Mlnister of' Great Brl ta ln , a liar, and gave no hint 09 diploastic negotlatlatm or c-lee. Stalln declared tha t peace could be preserved only if "peace-laving peoples" of Western couutrtes vou1~. take its preeervatibrr into their own hands -- against the policy of their reac'tionary govermnents.

This was exemplified i n Pospelovls

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Bowever, Initla1 Sovlet feelers wltb regard t o 8 cease-fire in Korea were made ln Aprll 1951. had calminsted In massive Chinese Crmmnnist offensives, which w e r e decisively beaten. As a result of these defeats, Soviet hopes that the Chinese e t be victoriaus were probab3y dispelled. Malik's cease-fire proposal followea in midJune, and the cease-fire talks began shortly thereafter.

In April and May, m i l i t a r y operatioas

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. !Phe truce talka soon bogged down m r Corrmnmist lnsistence 011 the 38th Parallel as the demarcation line. The Ccamunists concur- rently were pmparlng mother =Jar off'enelve, which accwmulatell evLdence indicated vas echednled for early Septeaber 1951- This of- fensive was apparently suspended a t the last minute and, since UN aperatlone at that ttme were not large enough t o prejuClice the of- fensive, the suspension probably represented a major policy decision. The truce talks were re8-d at the end of October 1951, and pro- p s s e d slowly until another stalemate developed i n 1952 &r the prisoner-&-war question. Stalln * 8 death.

This stalemate prevailed u n t i l after

In Europe, negotiations between the USSR, the UK, France aad the US resulted in the prolonged and abortive Deputy Fare- Minis- ters meetings in Parls from April through June 1951. ference originally was Intended t o discuss the German question, the

While the con-

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Soviet delegation insistently attempted t o introduce the question of NA!CO bases. diplauatic campaign, officially protesting t o a number of European parers With regard t o EDC and HATO bases. In Gemany, a renewe8 propaganda caupaign was beguu i n September for unification and 8 peace treaty, standard Saviet propaganda them6 since theoarlg poet-

Withlnthe USSR, there were a nuPiber of indications of apprehen- sion over and dissatlsfaation with the uncmpromising and inelastic Stalinist foreign policy. O b d e m r s of the Soviet Union are nasal- m o w in the opinion that W3 reartmsment, Western consolidation and the progress made in establishing EWO bases constituted a growing and, finally, hinatiag preoccupation of Soviet leaders tbroagh 1951 and 1952. F'urthermore, the Znelrplicdble shifts i n Korea suggest that conflicting polit ical tendencies were operating. !this was equally e v i h n t i n S m e t pxess discussion af foreign affairs, where there was no attempt,, as A l d b g ~ ~ a d a r getman observed in June 1952, t o re- concile contradictory points of d e w re&arillng: future fore- devel- opments.

In September 1951, the Soviet Union un&rtook an intense

War Pars.

Stalin's letter Of-FebrUary 1952, which formed the main piece of his Economic Problems of Socialism, discussed same of these ques- tions, but arrived a t no new policy fonrmls. Stalin reaf'finned that the West was lncapsble of a&levIn$ lasthg unity and that, regard- less of' Soviet intransigence, the "peace" movement and the West's own econamic disputes would arouse enough disagmement in the Western w o r l d t o assure its f lnal collapse.

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In this letter, Stalin identified vbst might be called "apposi- tion" points of d e w on foreign policy when he said that "s- com- rades" believe wars between capitalist staibs are no longer *vi- table. He denied as "heretical" the following points of view: the WS was successArlly integrating the nonSoviet Orbit powera; capi- talist leaders had learned from disastrous experience t o avoid fu- ture wars; and "imperialiem" mast at t@t t@ USSR, The foreign pol- icy position adopted by Sttilin in the February 1952 letter -8 much qufeter in tane and content than that c& one rear earlier. Ifbe let- ter was a tension-reducing statement, af f lna tng t h a t there w86 no imediete danger of Western attack, but also giving no hint of forth- coming ccmceeslons t o the West. Stalin's position was one of no ad- ventures, but equally, no retreats.

also suggested by several events tbat took place between a r c h and June 1952. Germany which embodied several s ignif icant shifts from the predous

Vacillation and possible dissension on the German question are

In March, the USSR proposed a draft peace treaty for

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~ p e r a t i a n for the five year plan presuma%ly began on 13cheduJ.e

October 199, whlch mferred t o a l6.September i n 19%. !me first specific, inaicatian of indeuision appeazml. in

far t k five year plan be drawn tlp.

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In 1951, there were several references ' r b t c h suggested that the planning ess naa men started

-ch al' tbat year.

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of vereatlim aP A p r i l 1952, In which the Moacow epeakr mi imueaistely with the Industrial Finance' Plan. .the C m c lsters checks us each day. How th i s is a

moment was -indicated by an intercepted radlo-telephoae$cm,

rather one af polit ical character.. Le n

*e.. - Stalin discussed indnstrlal plana Fn his Economic Problems of.

Soclalim. 1952 letter, since subsequent letters merely elaborated one or another aspect of the first one. As in the case of fare- pollc questfane, Stalin merely reaff-d and defended the premiUng course of Soviet policy, rejecting "radical" solutions of either extreme. ments In the capital goode lndwtrles, and re3eated the possibillty af major cha!@eS, either in favor of heavier investment €n armament

Again the document of chief Interest I s h i s February

In' other ~ o r d s 9 he defended the stand- policy of iaves .

production or in amsnmer goods.

in 1948, was probably echeduled far completion In late 1951 or early 1952. phasis Os the investment progrsm WBS sidetraoked, Le., that it was postponed until the rearmsmeat program neared completion and u n t i l it became evldent w h e t h e r or not the USSR was faced with a serlaue possibility af war, Stalin apparently decided in late 1951 or early 1952 that circumstances did not call for plajor Increases in Saviet armuents investment; yet, In umklng this decisim, he was appar- ently subJected t o considerable pressure t o expand significantly the prodaction of consumers goods.

It w i l l be recalL?d that *he Sovlet rearmament program, begun

It thus seem very likely th in t the Issue of the future em-

This he refused t o do.

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It vi11 be zvxdlled that In February 1950 Politburo member Andreev was criticized far defending ~~~U-scale farming apemtion~, an8 that subsequently B. S. ghrmehchev, also a Politburo'member, be- came the leadlng Sapiet spokesman on agricultural policy. 25 April 1950, ghruehchev began a new policy of merging 'small col- leotive farms pinto larger ones; later, a Party Central Commit tee de- cree apparently applled this policy t o the whole USSR.

istratlve merger a9 the kolkhozes. in a speech advocated not only the merger of the kolkh02ee8 b u t also the actual resettleatent of peasants belonging t o the merged kolkhozes in single **urban** centers, known as "agro-cities". plots 09 iand possessea by the individual peasants were t o be lacated

On

The new agricultuml policy provided for more than Just admin; On 28 January 1951 Xhrushchev

91he personal

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on the outskirts of the new settlement, thus contributing t o the "proletarlanization" of the peasantry.

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Soviet press treatment of two ghrushchev speeches on new agri- cultural policy prarrides the first indicathn that the new policy may have run into traubb. He delivered a mar)or speech on the merger of the kolkhozes on 20'December 1950, but it w ~ 6 not pubibhed unt i l 8 February 1951. A second speech on 28 January 1951, in which he aiscwaed the agro-city proposal, was not published u n t i l 4 March. Pravda which pibushed this speech, carried a curiaus editorla1 note -* the follawing day stating that Khrushchev's article ha8 been run as material far discnssion, thus implying that It was not a statenen. . of policy.

"Discussion" was not long delayed. A speech delivekd by G. A.

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Arutyunov of Soviet Armenia, published in the Armenian K o u u u d s t (@$Iy newspaper) on 21 March, had th i s t o my: amalgemation 09 small collective farms, 8- copprsdes have ma& statements saring c-5 on..,(t~~?y d e c b ) tbt one of the main problems of the amalgamted farms is t o move emall VLUages, Le., merge the papulation d mnaU'villirges and resettle it in vil- lage....I am of the o p ~ l o n t h a t these proposals are closer t o fan- tasy than t o the real requirements of the collrective fai.mS.,,.I will not dwell on other unacceptable propossls. .,(regarding) reduc-

"In connection with

ing private &den plate.. .... On 26 May 1951, Baktnskll Rabbchil af Baku published a speech

aP M, D. A. Bagirov, Firs t Secretary of the Communiet Party of Savlet Azerbaijan, in which Baglrov aeserted that the "Party had hemsnded an en&" t o the "Incorrect idea" that the most important b e k ln kol-

khoz settlements. He also eaid that the practice of reduelag the siee of the garden plot near the peammt'8 ham and mwing psrt af

khOZ C O & t r U C t i O l l W86 tht3 m w O f E m a l l H-6 h t 0 ' 6 - h kol-

his plot beyind eettleabent limits-was har0d"al and intoleribie. Moat curiausly, when Pravda pd~lished Bagirov's speech cm 29 May 1951, it - anitted th i s aepect.

peared from prominence, but the program of kolkhoz amalgamation con- tinued, Malenkov, at the 19th Party Congress In October 1952, 88- serted that, as a result of the merger program, the nwnber of colbctive farms had been reduced A-om 254,000 t o 97,000. With re- gard t o the agro-city program, Malenkov said that "certain of our leading officials have indulged in a wrong approach," their mistake being that they had "overlooked" the main task, 1.e. , agricultural production, Stalln, in his Econanic Problems of Socialism, avoided direct mention of the agro-city policy but, in discussing the

Follcrving the above developments, the sgro-city concept dlsap-

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elimination of essential differences between "tam and country, " said that "new great tams will appear as centers of the msximum development of culture,.and as centers not only of larp-scale in- dustry, but also of the processing of agricultural produce., .and Kill tend t o even q p conditions of lffe i n tom and country," He discussed. the agricultural problem a t length i n each of hlgs letters (February, April, b y and September). In general, Stalin's discus- sion envLeaged the ultimate elimination of the "free market" aspects of Sovlet agriculture and the expansion of so-called "product ex- change" as the ideal market relationshtp between kolkhozes and the rest of the economy. This "product-exchange" is simply a form of barter which takes place between the kolkhozes and the Sovfet Gov- ernment. Stalin envisaged that product-exchange would eventually displace all farms of marketing engaged tu by the kolkhozes: How- ever, Stal in repeatedly emphasized the long-term nature of th i s pro- gram and stressed the necessity for proceeding slowly and cautiously. . e..

+t the period ?der rev iew, Malenkov I r L I I I I AUdreeV, too,. l a e U as

inan. or tne council for Kolkhoz Affairs. An-ev. it w i l l be recalled, was no longer'the Politburo spokespnm for a&icultw, followlug the censure he received i n February 1950.

. The question now is: What did these varioua developments sig- nify: posals had been originated by Stalin himself, and then withdrawn when they ran Into peasant resistance. Same observers have 'consid- ered the agro-city propsat t o have been an experiment in developing a new form of agricultural cqanizstion. A thm hypothesis is that the merger and agro-city proposals bad been advanced by 6ome one f lg- ure or another below Stalln, and these praposerls met w i t h disagreement within the Politburo, While the problems involved in these hypotheses cannot be definitely answered, sorue possibilities can be! suggested,

It has been argued that the kolkhoz merger and agro-city pro-

.... .._ .. . .. .. The handling of the agro-aity pruposal in Arutyunov'sr and Bagiroy's. speeches suggests that it also uas Intended t o be Unlon- wide. efter its inauguration, without allowing t i m e for the "experiment" t o run its course, also suggests that it had not been conceived as an experimental program.

The fact that the agro-cfty proposal was redected so promptly

It seems unlikely t h a t the merger program and agro-city pro- posals were merely exgerlmental in nature. while begun in the Moscow Oblast, was not limited t o it, b u t rsther was applied Uni year. 'phis is"evident1

The merger program,

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Furthermore, as previously noted,

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There ts good reason t o aappose that both the kolkhoz merger an8 the..agro-city proposals arlginsted with Khrushchev: who took over from Anareev In 1950 the position aP Politburo spokes- man an agriculture. Secondly, the kollchoz merger progzmu was begun . by Khmshchev in Moscow Oblast a t least bs April 1950, and it was n& until later that year that a Central Committee decree vas issped on the subject. This suggests that Khrac;bchev had begun the program in loscar Oblast before it vas All-Union Party policy. Finally, Khrwh- chev, in his t h e speeches on the merger program and the agro-city proposal, continually cited i l lustrative exgerlences from the Ukalne, where he had been Firs t Secretary from 1938 to 1949 (except for a brief period in lgki'), suggesting t h a t he was attempting t o sell, on an hl-Union basis, policies he had p r e v L k l y developed. in the

It vas Khrushchev

wralne . The last question c o n c e v the nature and ldentificatian of op-

position t o the agro-city proposal. It is generauy conc6ded that Aratyrmov and Bsgirov ha8 P o u t b m le-1 support befm they-msae

curious e&Ltorial note opening Khrushchev's 28 Jannary 1951 speech "for dlsctl~slon" is considered t o be highly Irregular and possibly indicative of top-level ilissensfaa. Lastly, it may be nurtea that ghrushchev, unlike Andreev the year previous, was not required t o apologize or recant for his "iucorrect" views.

,Who formed this apposition? Andreev had been humlllated the previous par (1950.) and he did not reappear as a prmlnent figure following repudiation of Khrushchev In 1951. Malenkov had been, and

' st i l l was a t the t i m e of the dispute, actively concerned with -1- cultuml proble

repudiation.

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nor did he lose'.J ture XOlLOWl ng =h chev's Neither Malenkov nor Stalln, In their respectfve

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statements on the subdect In 1952, criticized the agro-city concept .per se; klenlcm, it is true, did criticize It In terms of timing.

overlordship over the Sjoviet Trant3caucasus, within whlch are both Soviet Amenla and Azeybaidan, as well as Georgla. been .the case that Anatyunov and Bagirov, in their a t t a c ! on Khruehc v's proposals, we ing Kith Bern's appr-1 and

tueen close terms wlth Beria, although there I s conflicting evidence on this point,

One clue 1s.pravided by the allegation that Beria exercised

!L'hua It may have

s reparted a close association be- ar. Lrov llkewlse has been reported on

SWPO 3

In Augus t of 1951, a development of msjar importance took place when Mlnieter of State Security Abakumm was replaced by S. D. Ignatiev, a Cammrmist Party functionary. A b a W bad held t h i s position since July 1946, Followbg his replacement, a t least'nine Republic E B Ministers were replaced, w h i l e four new Deputy -1s- ters appeared a t the MlaZstry In Moscow. Mlnister for Personnel, was identified

had earlier been a prominent Party odfficial with Khrushchev in the Ukraine.

One of these, the Depu ie 8 A. A, Eplshev, who, l ike Ignat 42% y functlonarg rather than a career security of'flcer, Eplehev

These Party appointments, as well as an rmusual statement by the n v MiB Mlnlster ln Georgia, A. I, Kochhvashvill, which was pub- lished l n SeptelPber 1952, shed soate llght pn this shift. shvfll stressed the need for more effective Party control over the

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purge, been established tha t 'Ber la , under varlous ficti t ious excuses, h-d In every way the solution of very important, urgent prob- lema In the ephere of agriculture. !Fhls was done t o undennlne the collective farm and t o create difficulties in the country's food supply." mis charge was a very corioue one, since krta had never been overtly associated with agriculture, nor was the charge subsequently elaborated t o any extent In propaganda on the Berfa case. It may be t h a t the present leaders do not wlsh to go Into concrete aspect6 of the Beria "agricultural platform" for domestic political reasona.

On 10 July 1952 the Pram editorial stated: "It bas now -

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local M3B and continued vigilance by local E B organs. He c r l t i - cized l d Party 0re;ans for insrrpficient attention t o the pol t t icai education of the security police, and declared that the GeFgian Central Cotmaittee had sent mexperienced Party workers" into the WB. He promised that th i s practice would continue in the futuk. most eignff'icant aspect 09 Koshlavashvili's speech is its euggestlon that Party supremacy had been jeo&wdized by the actioas-iind negli- gence of the police; the admonition t o follow Party directives and the transfer of Party workers t o the MGB iplply t h a t the BGB organt- zaticm had been becamiw a l a w unto itself. In sadition, a report af December 1951 asserted that Aba-'s replacement bad been dne t o criticism of the security organ,

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whilt: there is no firm information on the actual reasozls for t h i s K B shif t or on the details and r;smifications of it, the re- placement af Abakmnov by a Party figure could not have been anythtng but a blow t o Politburo member Berla. Abakumov was of ! I , ~ I U W I U C E ~ E ~ ~ U origin, and in 1938 was a junior security micer in the Caucaeus. In 194.0 or 1941 he became Beria's counter-intelligence chief and in 1943, after the EIgIzB m e separated from the "D, he became a Deputy Minister of the BEB. He replaced 9krkulov as Minister in mid-1946. Thereafter the )IEB (formerly N E B ) continued gradually t o gather

Berla retained Politburo level responsibility urisdiction all police and m i l i t i a functions,

a t least up t o May of 1950. Beris was last aesoc- . lated with security questions In February 1951; a t that time he went t o Prague for a series of conferences following the wldespread ar- rests of key men i n tbe Czechoslovak Communist Party and Czech Be- curity agpsrcitns.

TEE G E O R G M PURGES

Another area in which prevlouer and long-stan8ing errangeulents were changed was In tbe Georglan Republic, from the latter part of 1951 through August 1952. During th i s period there wae a- complete reshuffling of positions, in the course of which all of the Central C&i t t& secretarlee were changed, the Bur0 of the Central Commit- tee was completely revaqped, and many of the Ministries, including those of Internal Affairs and State Security, were given new chiefs.

The personnel shif ts began in Nmember 1951, when the Georgian Central Cowsittee removed M. I. Baramiya f r o m his post as Second

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Secretary and expelled A. N. Rapava, Minister of Justice and f-r Minister of State Security from the Party. Rapaw and Shbniya, the Procurator of the Republic, were relieved of their offices and turned over.to the courts for prosecution. These actions climaxed disclo- sures of large-scale enibezehment in one of the largest Tbilisi con- struction trusts; the charges against the three men included the as- sertion tht, as is "well hum," they "gave protection t5 various workers who had perpetrated crimes, and in every way defended them." A t the same t i m e K. Chichinadze and V. Kuprava were removed from their positions in the Georgian apparatus for "mistakes in.. .sebc- ting cadres." The purges contlnued in December 1951 and January 1952.. The Firs t Secretary of the Komsanol, I. S. Zodelava, was re- moved and replsced by M. Megrelishvili.

? Ister, a t an April 1952 meeting of the Georgian Central Cbprmit-

tee, which L,' P. Beria attended, Georglan Firet Secretary Charkvlani was removed from his position and replaced by A. I. Mgeladze, who had been p r w n t in K a a s a m o l work and was a t the time Fi rs t Secre- tary of the Abkhaz ASSR. C h a r k v i s n i , who had held his post ab Georgian F i rs t Secretary since 1938, had presided a t a Jaavary meet- lng in Tbilisi of leading officials' at which econcmic malfeasance in many ministries was a-d. ter of State Security, Charkxdani's sin had been "a blunting of v2g- ilance and.. .political blindness," whlch had "enabled hostile ele- ments t o ingratiate thatseivles, occupy responsible P O S i f i O n 8 , ana. inflect damage on Party work and the Georgian people." It was m- ported that C h a r w u l had "departed from the limits of the Repub- lic." Soviet as well as f'ran his &her posts.

In the words of' N. Rukhadze, the Minis-

Consequently, he wa's removed from the Presidium of the Supreme

C h a r m n i t s removal did not end the purge. I n April 1952, the four reannining old secretaries af the Georgian Kamsaaol were removed, and in July, the Mlnieter of AgrLculture, the Minister of Rgde and even RukhaaZe, the Mlnister of State Security, fell. A t the Georgian Party Congress ip September 1952; it was revealed that aiueteen gav- emmental afficiale had loet their jobs between June aOa. Anguet, and that K - h l i y z , who had been made a Secretary of the Central Corn- mlttee & the prepLoue December, had already los t his post.

a partial justification far the cuurplete overhaul of Georgian per- sonnel. Econamic lnefflclency on the part of governmental afficiale, collusion With Party personnel, embezzleme& and other ecancnnic crimes, and an increase in Georgian nationalistid outbursts w e r e , in themselves, supficlent to c&mn Party leadership in Georgia. These charges csrried over into the Georgian Party Congress held in Septem- ber 1952 and formed the maJor substance of the speeches. The cry

The official chargee had s f l i c l e n t truth in t h e m t o constitute

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went up for vigilance agaipst economic saboteurs and internal and external enemies of the Sta te who were trying t o unaemnine socialist advances at the behest of !the capitalists.

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There can be little doubt that thiB purge was directed from MOSCOW. 1

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a 7;ncmiase - up 1n worgia. P-a that s-11 n I

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purge of Ivom as Stalia's e

ted by Malenkav, acting that these purps weakened

Throughout the period, propaganda insisted that the purge was instituted under the direct guidance of Stalin and, after Beria's attendance a t the Plenum of 1 April! which removed Charldanl, the Tbilisi newspaper !&rya-Vostoks wrote that Be- "aided in.. .aacov- ering the mistakes and shortcomings in the work of the Georglan Party organizations. sage t o Beria prmlelng him t h a t "we will resolutely struggle against any attempts af a hostile agency t o harm the task of communist-can- structioa and undermine the m i g h t of the Sovlet State."

The 17 April Tbillsi meeting adupted a mes- .

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There I s ample reason, despite Beria's presence a t the'Aprl1 1952 Central Committee meeting and the propaganda associating him with the purges, for believing that the Georgiaa purges were CUI ad- verse reflection on him. Beria has been assumed t o bave had a per- sonal interest in Gearglan affaire for many years, but Stalin, a Georgian by bbirth, had also -ken a personal interest in these same &fairs. !i%e severity of the purges may have been an indication of Stalln's personal disltatisfactlcm wlth the course of events there.

SIw;3lrl'S "ECOnoMIC PROBLE3S OF GOCIALISM"

Frequent reference has been made throughout t h i s mmr to Stalin's-Economic Problems of Socialism, published on 2 6ctober 1952.g The publication of this document, with its accompsnying

J=/ mere vi11 be no attempt here t o recapituLate Stalin's i t e c w t i a a on particular policy problems, which were covered In the appropriate sections. The attempt .here, rather, is t o present certain aspects of the Economic Problems not easily discussed in the other sections.

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propaganda fsnfare, tended t o overshadow the opening of' the Party Congress three days later.

'lihe Ecoaomic Problems is a series of four letters, ostensibly written by Stalin, dated 1 February, 21 April, 22 May and 28 Septem- ber 1952. The first letter coastitate8 a comnaentary by 8talia on the proceedings of a canference of economists, pmporteinrsr held in November 1951, which di cussed a draf ' t textbook on the "po l i~ i ca l economy of Socialimn. NJ The other t b e letters aFe replies t o econamists who had written t o Stalin in response t o his flr i t le t ter .

Stalin Is letters discussed Communist politfco-econamic theory, . the prerequisites for attaining Commmnism in the mSB, and the inevi- tabi l i ty of war between capitalist states. As has alrea'&y been noted, a large part of the discussion of the transition t o Caumtmiam con- cerned the Saviet agricultural problem and commodity exchange in the TBSB, A s one study of ScrPiet econcaic theory bas pointed out, Stalin's EconoPnic Problew selectively sumred up e ~ d e n t in Suvlet themetical thinkim since the

declared it t o be "a theoreti&l grouudlng of policies and an 'attempt t o sett le troubles pbints of theory never- satisfactor-

Isaac Deutcher has noted that "the'trandition frat Socialism t o

real problems " in S t a l i n t & ? g k y The author farther commented:

ily xvxonciled wlth redlty. "T? Communism is.,,the chief ' fOrakUh for the di6CUSSiCm Of

r/ Such a textbook had long been.discussed in the USSR, but& accept- able book had never been produced, In 1947, Zhdsnov Paenttoned that one was being prepared. According t o Dedijer's biography of Tito, Malenkav told the Yugoslav~ in September 1947 that Soviet thearists were working out Scrviet politicosconaaic doctrine on the basis of Utmian Soclalircm. I I r e P O r t e d -8 in 1949 or 1950 t h h u n ma ssslgnea t 0 Malea bv &e task af pmparing a standard work on the ecmmlc principles of Camnunism; reported3y the task was entrusted t o a special c Maleukm I s I d.irect ion. told in the form of a

Soviet Studies, April 1953, "A Political Economy in the Making," J, Miller,

c3/ Current Soviet Policies, the Current Digest of the Sovlet Press.

Sovlet Studies, A p r i l 1953, "Dogma and Reality in Stalin's 'Eco- nmic Problems, 'n I. Deutscher. before Stal€n's death.

This article had been written

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s "Stalin's recent writings offer a glimpse .of the mOVement

of ideas going on i n the Soviet ruling circles behind the half- real and half-deceptive facade 09 uniformity. It is th i s move- ment that distinguishes present day Russia from the R u s s F a of the la te th i r t ies which was from head t o foot stunned and pet- rif ied after the shock of the great purges. ideas reflects conflicting social aspirations and pm-ssures which even a monolithic regime is not in a position t o e l i m i - nate for good."

Deutscher goes on t o suggest that the discussions of the "tran- sit ion from socialism t o communism," which had been started in 1947, had'provided an opportunity for Iwplicit criticism of the reg-: "The guesses about the future sametimes eomd like reflections on the present -- t h l s I s not the first time that Utopia is elther an implied critique of existing society cr an escape from it."

The movement of

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Ambassador Exman's analysis of the Economic Problems, on 20 Oc- tober 1952, drew attention to two significant aspects of the docu- ment. Stalin as "a very old-fashioned dew," reminiscent of the th i r t ies and appearing t o ignore -."all that hs8 hamened in the intervening fourteen years' since H i t l e r ' s attack on Poland. t o say:

Mr. Kennan described the v i e w of the vmld put forward by

Mr. &nuan went on

"We see reflected (in this) the fact t h a t this Saviet Gov- ernment is today an old um.1'8 government, ruthless and terrible t o be sure, but insensitive to the contewarary evolution 09 its external environment just as it is t o the deeper e of its own subject peoples, livlng in its own past...

Mr. Kennan then analyzed certain political implications af Sts l in 's discussion of the capitalist world, and noted that, j e i n g fropl the letters, the view Stalin had put farward was not a pnanimaas view in the Kremlin but one that had been opposed by a group which doubted its EJOIXI~~SB and challenged it.

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . r/ This observation takes on considerable significance in 1-t of

subsequent medical analyses 09 Staliu's physical and emcrtional condition, based on tb report report. Stal in had suffered emotional changes for sane t h e prior t o h is final illuees, and these changes would have been in the direction of "living in the past." This xlll form the subject af a separate paper

Stalin's iljmess and the autopsy The majority oplnion of medical specialists is that

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-- "It requires no great stretch of the imagination t o see

that th i s difference of opinion was no abstract disagreement about the nature 09 capitalism; it was a polic,y issue of great- est moplent. Whoever said that It was dangerous t o depend on the internal break-up of capitalism and the development of another war between Germany and the western parers, res sum ably said that you had t o face up t o the reality of the western coa- l i t ion and its grawing strength, w'hich want that you had t o prepare sooner or later t o fight it or t o come to some sor t of accoamDodation with it --- w h e t h e r t o do the one or the other t o depend, we must seam, on what terms you could get. however, want negotiations --- and not only fdemaastrativef negotiations far propaganda purposes, or disarming approaches t o weaker members of the western coslitian with aivlsivk intent, but actually negotiations wlth the ma3or paember of the western coalition: the United states.

This,

"This view was obviously overruled. !I!here are only two major arguments that could have been used against It by the dom- inant granp whose views found Stalin's sqpport. the argument that has now been made public: it I s unnecessary t o negotiate with the Americans; their wor ld , wlth a little help from us, will go t o pieces .on them anyway, The second argument, however, may have been: it is impossible t o negoti- ate wlth the Americans; they are bent only on the overthrow of t@ Soviet system, by subverslon or war as %he case may be; they could never be induced t o negotlate seriously. Plainly3 t o the extent t h a t th is latter thesis can be established it avershadows and zenders unnecessary further discussion of thesXs number one. But it is thesis number one which has been revlealedas the real center of ideological disagreement i n gi.emlin circles,"

The first is

'PBE PAKPY CONGRESS: ocs1oBEB 1952

011 20 A u g u s t 1952, it was announced that the long overaue P&y

!kern is some evidence which suggests that the Party Congress

Congress would be convened on 6 October,

was t o have been held in 1948 or 1949, For example, the new name which the Party adopted In October 1952, i.e,, Communist Party e the Soviet Union, had been used by Suslov, klenkov and 0ther8 dur- ing 1948. i s noted earlier, Madame Kollontai referred in A p r i l 1949 t o a forthcaning Party Congress, and there were many lumars in 1948 and 1949 that me would 8oon be held. Mkover, as MY?. Kknnan has pointed out, it is doubtful that the Sovlet Union would have accused

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Tito and the Yugoslavs of not having held a Party Congress far mw years if they were not planning t o hold one soon themselves. it appears very probable that the Congress vas indeed planned a t that t i m e , but for 8- unknown mason was suspended.

When the Congress was finally convoked, the period 8 U m d for the holding of preparatory regional Congresses was extre-y short, and in many case6 there was evldence of haste.

The announcement calling the Congress outllned as subjects for "discussion" a series d changes i n the Party statutes. Two of the most important changes indicated were the dissolution of the Orgburo (one of the three bodies which had been se t up originally t o handle matters in l ieu of meetings of the Central Carmnittee) and a change in the name of the Politburo. The new Presidium, as the Politburo was t o be called, would "control the work of the Central C o m m i t t e e &tween pleaarg sessions," and the Secl.etartat was t o "control cur- rent work, primarily 0re;anizing verification of fulfillment of Party dec'isione and selection of cadres."

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As was the case wlth the other change6 i n the Party stetutes, these changes seemed in%ended t o regularize already existing prac- tices rather than t o institute new one6. The Orgburo apparently had . ceased t o function, and the authority of the Secretariat in person- nel matters had been Increased accordingly. Both the Secretariat and the Orgburo had been controlled by the Politburo, which was re- sponsible for fins1 policy decisions and, in the person of Stalin, had exercised ultimate authority in the selection of personnel for all important posts. The new statutes abolishing the Orgburo an8 assigning personnel selection "primarily" t o the Secretariat did not therefore reduce the authority of Stalin and other top Politburo (Presidium) members over top-level persoyel matters.

than tbe old Politburo and may have been designed largely as an hon- orary body. While the Politburo bad ll f u l l members and one alter- nate, the Presidium included 25 full muhers and ll alternates. loose, umrieldy body may never haw met; decisions probably were taken in its pame by a "Buro" uf the Presidium, 9 body whose exis- tence was not acknowledged until Staltn's death.--/ An analysis of

!Fhe Presidium that was appointed at the Congress was mch lskger

W e

1/ Hew members t o the Presidium apparently did not surrender their old podtiom. One Presidium member, Korotcheliko was subse- quently identified as functiaaing i n his old pos i t id .

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the caqposition of the Presidium gives u6 some clues as t o its prob- able function, as well as t o the probabg membership of the ''Buro".

The most imporbtint leelnbers of th i s bcdy vere the ten men f r o m the old 12-member Politburo: Stalin, Molotov, Malenkov, Berla, Voro- shilov, Bulganin, Kaganovich, Mikoyan, Ehrushchev and Shveruik.g The only portraits praminently displayed in Red Square ou-fimaher 7th vere of these ten IeadRrs. The treatment these men received i n propaganda, and references after Stalin's death t o a "Buro" of the Presidium, suggests tht the Presidium as 8 whole was ln no sense a ruling body, but rather that the old Polltlruro m e m b e r s constltuted Its nucleus.

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The remainder of the Presidium was camgosed, far the most part, of two categories of personnel: Gomrrmbent and Party administrators 011 the level &st below the old Politburo, and regional Party secre- taries or m&rs of the Central Party ajgaratus. iacluded the four remaiaing Deputy Chainnen of the Council of Minis- ters who had not been in the Politburo, Pervukhln, Saburav, &lyshev add Icevosyan; two members of the old Secretariat, Ponomarkenko aud Saelov; the Secretary of' the Kcuisapnol, Mikhailov; the head 09 the Party Control CCXI~UISS~O~I , M. F. Shklryatov; and, among others, VyshLnaky, the Minister of' Fareign Affairs, and Zvlerev, %he Mlnister 09 Finance.

The fanner group

Party Secretaries from key areas and Party and prqp8e;anda spe- cbxllsts compriseti the balance of the 36-~hember Presidlam. BndrLaaov from Leningrad, Korotchenko and Melnikav fran the Ukraine, Aristov f20m ChelyabFnsk and Brezhnev rrom Moldavla were a few of the re- gional ofplclals t o be facluded. From the Central Commi t t ee appa- ratus Carme .a, M. Peguv, head of the Light Industry Section. I), I. Chesnokov, Chief E d i t o r of Questions of Philosophy, P. F. Y u d h and M, B. M i t i n represented the partg propaganda specialists.

the PoiitbuFo had camnitte es which handled v s r l o u ~ aspects ougn a system

of Soviet policy, and that top level adminLstrators bad reported t o . these comatttees on technical aspects of problems; the lnclaeioa on the Presidium of those tDePibers aP the technical bureaucracy who pre- , sunably would have reported t o these committees suggests that much of the enlargement of the Presidium was a formel recognition a€' t h i s system.

r/ Poiitburo Paember A. A. Andreev was dropped completely, while A, 19. Icosygin was reduced to candidate membership of the new Presidium.

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A t the same t ime, the enlargement of the Presidium and the Sec- retariat, as w e l l as of the Central Coonnittee i tself , created more honurary positions i n the top hierarchy for deservhg Farty members, Soviet leaders may have been concerned over the gap which had been developing between the top and lower echelons of the Party hierarchy, Since the 1930’8, real power had been concentrated i n a sma?.l., self-

ever enter-. aries had lost ily concerned with maintaining their positions, mising their own standards of livlng, even illegally, and eluding the Party’s multiple control ~~~ lxmlsms .

perpetuating Functionary had 1ittle”hope crf have reported that Party function-

fervor and had become prim-

A t the Congress, the spate of criticism directed against bureau- cratism and the repeated demands for improved leadership pointed t o the growth of this self-seeking group as o m .of the regime’s m o s t pressing Internal problems, T6 alleviate this situation, the Kremlin was tightening controls, demniiing greater Party disciplbe, and placing increased embasis on education ana criticism and self-&ti- cim.

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A t the same time, however, new rules concerning methods of ex- pulsion from the Party were introduced as a means of safeguarding the position of the members of the hierarchy. It was stipulated that, on the lower levels, a member was t o be anowed to continue to take a full part i n the work of his cell, incluaing i t a secret meet- ings, at11 his exclusion ha6 been rat i f ied by higher caanpittees. For members of the Party caDnnittees a t any level, expulsion was t o be decided upon by a two-thirds maJority af the plenary session of the comittee t o which the member belonged. The expulsion of an All-Uniou Centrsl Committee m e m b e r was t o be decided upon by a Party

. C o n g r e s s , t o be convened once in every four years, or by the 811- Union Central Couunl t tee between congresses. In this way, while the new rules made greater demands on party members , they also made their positions, a t least farmally, more secure.

been full members of the old Central Committee elected in 1939. The remaining three had been alternates; one of them, I. G. Igoatw, had been elected as an alternate member i n 1939 but excluded in 1941 for failure t o discharge his duties. His r e tu rn t o membership, not only on the Central C a m u i t t e e but on the Presidium and the Secretariat as well, suggested the back- of sane powerful figure on the old Polit- b b o level, the Presidium and Secretariat, had vorkd in the Central Committee apparatus since a t least 1947 when he was identlfied as Chief of *he Light Industry Section.

of the f ive new members added t o the Secretariat, anly two had

N. M. Pegov, another of the newly elected membkrs of

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The election t o the Central Coaunittee of 125 full members and 111 candidates broke a precedent set i n the late 1920'6 when the full membership was stabilized a t 71 and the candidate WEbership a t 68. Prior t o this t i m e , the Central CcrPmittee had reflected the con- tinued growth in Party membership, The stabilization i n 1927, des- pite a continually growing Party membership, occurred after Stalin , had completely consolidated his personal supremacy by pack- Party organizations vith his own appointees.

The expansion of $he Central Commit tee i n October 1952 indicated the elevation of Party careerists over speciallste ana techaictsns from other sections of society and clearly indicated the comparative importance of the prafessionsl Party w o r k e r , This development prob- ably increased Malenkav's influence in this body, since he was the Party organization speclaliet and therefore probably had had a great deal t o say in these a p p o i n ~ n t s .

of the 156 new Cen-1 C a m m l t t e e members, some 61 full members and 17 candidates are Party careerists, as contrasted vith some 15 full llbembers and 47 candidates who have governmental assignments. Seventy percent of the full u~embers of the Central Caarmlttee have come up through Party ranks. Only 26 of the 236 Central Cotmnittee members have military camnand assignments; in 1939' the ra t io w a ~ 20 t o 139, and in 1941 it was 2'7 t o 139. After 1941 there'were nlne full members of the Central Commi t t ee who were career military men; the new Centml Camtttee has only five. Several afficers who pre- vl0usI.y bad been full members were dropped to alternate st8tb. Rather than having Zncreased its share uf -these honarary posithms, t tae military appeared t o have los t consi&l.sble'graund.

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.. .. . .. . . .. . The belated announcement 00 30 October that Marshal 0, A.

Govorcrv had been inadvertently left aM the list of candidate mem- bers aroused speculation regarding the operation of behind-the-scenes influences lnvolvlng military leaders. Observers pointed out that a mistake of this nature was inconceivable and that sane disgruntled element must have forced the eddition of Gavorcm to the Central Can- mittee after the in i t i a l selection. Govorm, it xi11 be remembered, was apparently part cxf, or on the periphery of, the Zhdanov "faction," and he hter figured in the Doctore' Plot announcement.

The problem of succession W ~ S not dealt with overtly in the p p a j o r readJnstment of Party leadership a t the conclusion of the 19th Party Congress. However, the increased importance accorded t o the

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regional Party secretaries, as demonstrated In their election t o the leading Party organs, reemphasized Malenlcov's key positipn. sime the basis of their sekction appears t o have been more their P ~ z = ~ o z I ~ ~ qualifications and connections than thk elgnfficance of the geograph- ical areas frhich they represented, it is highly probable that they owed tbir'advancetraent t o Malenkov, as well as t o s ta l in . he con-' gress itself was apparently domtnated, a t least indirect%, . by &leu- kov since It was he who delivered the keynote address, Le., the "re- port" of the Central Committee, which at past Congresses had been given by Stalin.

WGT-CONGRESS DEVEIOPIBNTS: POLITICAL C R I S I S

......

Every republic Congress held before the 19th All-Union Congress strongly emphasized the need for vigilance, stresaiag that t h e bour- geois natioualist rather than the actual "spy" was the root of trouble. Only the Congresses in Georgia, Lithuania and Estonia spe- cifically cited foreign spies -- British, American and Turkish -- as the eneq t o be watched, but even here the Internal enemy, the bour- geois nationalist and the lax pereoh, was strongly c0sdePll;ed. .

The unifwnlty or0 certain remerks made a t these congresses, cop- cerning espiomge and hostile actions by kulaks and bourgeois nation- a l i s t s and concerning negligence and crime by industrial managers and workerti , pointed t o the existence of one or more central Party dtrec- tives on these subjects. have been 16ng-standing apatby toward Party am, neglect aP respon- s ib i l i ty and failure to react propqly t o the line of Great Russian natioualWn. ' Speeches a t the 19th Ccmgress left no doubt concerning these probkrae. Malenkov, Saslov, B u l g a u h and Poshbyshev, among others, strongly warned against such e w e . which increased the Party uePiberS' duties and made i&ol&ical atudy mndatorg, w e r e aimed a t erasing apathy.

~hr0ughou-t Amember i g p a number 09 arrests for crimes ranging from embezzlement t o cheating the public and s t a t e were announced ln the press. ' On 2 December, the death penalty was imposed' on three persons charged with leading a gang in "speculation, embezzlement, and racketeering." This was th first application of the death pen- alty for -economic crimes since this penalty had been reintroduced in Jan- 19%. Also in December 1952, an editorial and propaganda campaign was begnn agatnst "wool gathering" and "gullibility."

indicated continued polit ical tensian and maneuvering behind the scenes.

Ttbe cause for these critic€sms seems t o

The Party statutes,

FolloKing the October Party Congress, a number of other events

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1. On 30 October, f if teen days after the conclmian of the Party Congress and the publication of the list of new Cen- tral Camnittee mem-rs, a special announcepbent stated t h a t the name of Marshall L. A. Govorov had been mistakenly omitted from the list of Central Committee members. the cehtral Camnittee as an alternate m a r .

On 24 December, an article in Pzqvda by M. A, Snalov

He was a&& t o -

2, - criticized P, Fedoseev for haviw written articles on, Stal in ' B

Economic Problems of Socialism without a t the same ti& admit- tiw that he too had held the erroneous views denounced by Stalin. Fedoseev's art icles had app&ared in Imestla aboit two weeks- earlier. Fedoseev hastily apologized in puljlic far th i s error, while the Izvestia editorial b m apologized for per- mitting the ar t ic les t o m. I n his article, Snslov questioned whether or no* Fedoseev was "being sly" and had really changed his views.

3. D. T. Shepilov, ousted from Agitprop in 1949 far nu- merous "shartcomings" including complicity' in the Voznesensky affair, was identified in midLDecember as the new editor of Pravda. -. -

4. . On 13 Januarg 1953, the D o c t o r s ' Plot was announced.

5. In January 1953, conferences of econcPniats and 'of so- cia1 scientists were held, in which various figures apologized for having hsld the incorrect vlews criticized by Sta1in.i The chief report at the session d the Academy of Sciences un 31 January 1953 was given by Pave1 Yudin. numerous specific figures were criticlzed, whlle Yudin, i n hfs speech disclosed that the proscribed.Wews were w i d e l y held i n high Soviet circles.

In these conferences,

6. It was l e w d in January that Pospelav had been re- moved as head of the Msrx-Engels-Leain Institute and reassigaed as a Deputy Editor of pravda. A t the 21 January ceremcmies coamaemareting the anniversary of hnin's death, the principal speech was given by 1. A. Mikhailov; sin- 1949, this speech had been delivered by Pospelov. since 1925, the Soviet press failed t o publish the list of Politburo mePibert3 who had attended,

- Curiously, for the first time ,

7. On 6 February, Pravda published a vit r iol ic article - entit led "Revolutionar~r Vigilance," which was striklzq in the extent t o which it revealed disputes. The article lashed out at "certain rotten theories," i.e., that capitsl ist encircle- ment no longer exists, and that capitalism will renounce its

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attempts t o harm the increasingly strong Soviet UnZon. ticle charged that "Soviet successes" had given rise t o moodEI of complacency, self-satisfaction and conceit. In its pro- nouncements on foreign policy, the ar t ic le appeared t o both paraphrase and supplement Stalin's foreign policy discussion of February 1952. Its sharp tone, i n the Context of the vigilance campaign following the D o c t o r s ' Plot announcement, s-@gested that the foreign policy disputes had not been resolved, but rather had become more acute, over the year since February 1952.

The ar-

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