Indian Nuclear Program

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Policy Paper

Indian Nuc lear Programs Safety; Nonproliferation;Fic tion vs. Reality

By: Farzana Shah

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Table of Contents

Indian nuc lea r p rograms safety; nonprolifera tion; Fiction Vs Rea lity .................................. 4

Introduc tion............................................................................................................................... 4

Ind ian nuc lea r safe ty ha zards, inc idents ................................................................................ 5

Indian nuke program sans command and c ont rol system ................................................... 6

Ind ian Reac tors lac k safety, don t meet IAEA sta nd ards ..................................................... 7

INDIAN NUCLEAR FACILITIES6

.............................................................................................................. 7

POWER REACTORS OPERATING ......................................................................................................... 7

POWER REACTORS - UNDER CONSTRUCTION ....................................................................................... 8

POWER REACTORS - PLANNED AND PROPOSED ................................................................................... 8

RESEARCH REACTORS .......................................................................................................................... 9

BREEDER REACTORS........................................................................................................................... 10

URANIUM ENRICHMENT .................................................................................................................... 10

REPROCESSING (PLUTONIUM EXTRACTION) ....................................................................................... 11

URANIUM PROCESSING ..................................................................................................................... 11

HEAVY WATER PRODUCTION ............................................................................................................. 12

Prob lem s with Indian nuc lea r reac to rs ................................................................................. 13

Bha bha Ato m ic Research Ce ntre (BARC) ........................................................................... 14

Ind ira Gandhi Ce ntre for Atom ic Research (IGCAR) .......................................................... 18

Nuc lea r Fuel Com plex, Hyd erab ad (NFC) ........................................................................... 21

Tarapur Atomic Power Sta tion (TAPS) ................................................................................... 23

Kakrap ar Atom ic Power Sta tion (KAPS) ................................................................................ 26

Madras Ato m ic Reac to r (MAPS) ........................................................................................... 28

Rajasthan Atom ic Pow er Sta tion (RAPS) .............................................................................. 31

Narora atom ic power sta tion (NAPS) ................................................................................... 34

Ind ian nonp rolifera tion rec ord; Reality Vs Fic tion ................................................................ 35

The Ca se of Blac k Diam onds .............................................................................................. 36

Conc lusion .............................................................................................................................. 37

Referenc es .............................................................................................................................. 39



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Indian nuc lea r prog rams safety; nonproliferation; Fic tion Vs

Reality

Introduction

The m ysterious dea th of yet another Ind ian nuc lea r sc ientist few d ays bac k has onc e

again raised questions about the security of Indian nuclear program and weapons,

loopholes and faults.

The sa fety b lac k holes in the Indian nuc lear prog ram rang e from ha zardous mining

practices, near meltdowns, heavy water leaks, turbine-blade failures, moderator system

malfunctions, inoperable emergency core cooling systems, coolant pumps catching

fires, structure fa ilures, to flood ing inc idents, to say the least. Americ an-ba sed

wa tc hdog group -- the Sa fe Energy Communic ation Co unc il (SECC) -- desc ribe d the

Indian nuclear program, especially its reactors to be the "least efficient" and the "most

dangerous in the world." Nuclear safety experts are alarmed by the dangerously unsafe

c ond itions plaguing the Ind ian reac tors. Sharing his ala rm with the Christian Sc ience

Monitor, Christopher Sherry the resea rch d irec tor of the SECC, sa id, "The fac t tha t India 's

nuclear regulator acknowledges that reactors in India are not operated to the

stand ards of rea c tors in the US and Europe is not muc h of a surprise, [b ut] it is ve ry

disturbing. 1

Christopher Pine a nuclear expert at the Natural Resources Council in Washington

stated that Indian po wer plants have the lowest cap ac ity fac tor in the wo rld and one

of the poo rest safety rec ords.



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Indian nuclea r safety hazards, inc idents

A 1993 UN report states that occupational exposure hazards in India, calculated in

proportion to the amount of electricity generated, is six to eight times more than the

world averag e.2

Indian Parliamentary report mentioned 147 mishaps or safety related incidents reported

betw een 1995- 19983. Out o f these, 28 were of ac ute na ture a nd 9 of these 28 oc c urred

in the nuc lea r pow er installat ions.4

Dr A Gopalakrishnan former chairman Of Indias Atomic Energy Regulatory Board

(AERB), in his report about Ind ian nuc lea r fac ilities m ade to IAEA in 1996 said :

1. Indian nuclear facilities have had 130 instances of safety related concerns

inc luding 95 that require urgent ac tion.2. Ind ia is likely fac e serious nuc lear ac c ident in not too d istant future.

3. The deg ree of autom ation ac ross c hec ks on safe ty in o ld nuc lear plants are

very minimal and one can not assert at all that an accident like the one which

oc c urred in Jap an w ill hap pe n in India.

4. It is very shameful for India to have such dangerous loose management and

faulty security managements for its sensitive facilities.

"There c ould be lesser ac c idents whic h could still relea se m od erate am ounts of

radioactivity into the crowded areas surrounding some of our less-safe installations at

Ma d ras, Trom ba y or Tarap ur. It could be d evastating to a large number of pe op le ,

said Dr. A. Gopalakrishnan.

According to Dr A. Gopalakrishnan, Indian nuclear facilities have had 130 instances of

safety-related concerns, including 95 that required urgent action. He reported this in

the c ontext of a 3000 pa ge rep ort about India s nuclea r fac ilities, m ad e to the IAEA in

1996.5



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Indian nuke prog ram sans c ommand and c ontrol system

The Indian nuc lea r program is without any command and c ontrol system unlike Pakistan

where a strong c ommand c ontrol system is intac t. The lac k of suc h set up has put the

Ind ian nuc lear program at risk of illegal p roliferation a s we ll as theft a nd other disastrous

John F. Burns in his artic le In Nuc lea r Ind ia, Sm all Stash Does Not a Ready Arsenal

Make

Published : Sund ay, July 26, 1998, wrote :

For now , the o ffic ials and expe rts said , the ultim ate size o f the Ind ian a rsena l, and

whether it should be operationally deployed or kept in storage, are open questions.

Many of those interviewed said that despite the Government's ambitious claims after

the tests, it would be years before India's nuclear arsenal might attain, even on a smallsc ale , the sop histica tion of the established nuclear pow ers'.

Among other things, they said , Ind ia has no forma l nuclea r c omm and authority to set a

c lea r dec ision-making c hain in the eve nt of a c onflic t. Part of the p rob lem, the expe rts

said, was that India's three military services -- army, navy and air force -- have deep

rivalries and have never agreed on setting up an organization like the Joint Chiefs of

Staff.



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Indian Reac tors lac k safety, don t meet IAEA standards

Out of 22 Indian nuclear reactors most of which are modeled after an obsolete 1957

Shipp ingp ort ( Pennsylvania, USA ) design. Hardly seven Ind ian nuc lea r reac tors barely

mee t IAEA stand ards. The rest are accountable only to the so-called 'national standards' set byAERB.

INDIAN NUCLEAR FACILITIES6

NAME/ LOCATION

OF FACILITY

TYPE AND CAPACITY

GROSS DESIGN (NET)

OUTPUT

COMPLETION

OR TARGET

DATE

IAEA

SAFEGUARDS

POWER REACTORS OPERATING

Tarap ur 1 Light-wa ter, LEU and MOX

210 (150) MWe

1969 Yes

Tarapur 2 Light-wa te r, LEU210 (160)

MWe

1969 Yes

Rajasthan, RAPS-

1

Kota

Heavy-water, natural U

220 (90) MWe

1972 Yes

Rajasthan, RAPS-2

Kota

Heavy-water, natural U220 (187) MWe 1980 Yes

Mad ras, MAPS-1

Kalpakkam


235 (170) MWe

1983 No

Mad ras, MAPS-2

Kalpakkam


235 (170) MWe

1985 No

Narora 1 Hea vy-wa ter, na tural U

235 (202) MWe

1989 No

Narora 2 Hea vy-wa ter, na tural U

235 (202) MWe

1991 No

Kakrapar 1 Hea vy-wa ter, natural U

235 (170) MWe

1992 No



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Kakrapar 2 Hea vy-wa ter, natural U

235 (202) MWe

1995 No

POWER REACTORS - UNDER CONSTRUCTION

Kaiga 1 Hea vy-wa ter, natural U

235 (202) MWe

1998 No


235 (202) MWe

1998 No

Rajasthan, RAPP-

3

Kota


235 (202) MWe

1999 No

Rajasthan, RAPP-4

Kota

Heavy-water, natural U235 (202) MWe 1999 No

POWER REACTORS - PLANNED AND PROPOSED

Tarapur 3 Hea vy-wa ter, natural U

500 (450) MWe

2006 No

Tarapur 4 Hea vy-wa ter, natural U

500 (450) MWe

2005 No

Rawatbhata 4

Rajasthan

PHWR 220 MWe July 2001 No


235 (220) MWe

Re-

construction

No


235 (202) MWe

- No


235 (202) MWe

- No


235 (202) MWe

- No


235 (202) MWe

- No



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Rajasthan, RAPP-

5

Kota


500 (450) MWe

- No

Rajasthan, RAPP-

6Kota


500 (450) MWe

- No

Rajasthan, RAPP-

7

Kota


500 (450) MWe

- No

Rajasthan, RAPP-

8

Kota


500 (450) MWe

- No

Koodankulam 1 Russian VVER Light-water,

LEU

1000 (953) MWe

- Yes


LEU

1000 (953) MWe

- Yes


LEU

1000 (953) MWe

- Yes

RESEARCH REACTORS

Apsara

BARC, Trom bay

Light-water, medium-

enriched Uranium, pool

type - 1 MWt

1956 No

Cirus

BARC, Trom bay


40 MWt

1960 No

Dhruva

BARC, Trom bay


100 MWt

1985 No

Kamini

IGCAR,

Uranium-233

30 KWt

1996 No

Kalpakkam Fast Breeder Test Rea c tor

(FBTR), Plutonium and

- No



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natural U, 15 MWe:

operating

Zerlina

BARC, Trom bay

Heavy-water, variable fuel

100 Wt dec ommissioned

1961 No

Purnima 1

BARC, Trom bay

Fast neutron, critical

assembly zero power

decommissioned

1972 No

Purnima 2

BARC, Trom bay

Uranium-233

.005 KWt dismantled

1984 No

Purnima 3

BARC, Trom bay

Uranium-233 - No

BREEDER REACTORS

Fast Breeder Test

Reac to r (FBTR)

IGCAR,

Kalpakkam

Plutonium a nd

natural U

40 MWt

1985 No

Prototype Fast

Breeder Reactor

(PFBR) IGCAR,Kalpakkam

Mixed-oxide fuel

500 MWe planned

2008 No

URANIUM ENRICHMENT

Trombay Pilot-sc ale ultrac ent rifuge

plant o pe rating

1985 No

Trombay Laser enrichm ent resea rch

site

early 1980s No

Rattehalli

(Mysore)

Pilot-scale ultracentrifuge

plant o pe rating

1990 No

Center for

Advanced

Tec hnology,

Laser enrichment research

site

1993 No



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Indore

REPROCESSING (PLUTONIUM EXTRACTION)

Trombay Med ium -sc ale - 50 tHM/ yoperating

1964/1985 No

Tarap ur (Prefre) Large -sc ale - 100 (25)

tHM/y

operating

1977 Only when

safeguarded

fuel is present

Kalpa kkam Labo ratory-sc a le -

operating

1985 No

Kalpa kkam Large-sc ale , two lines - 100

tHM/y each- underconstruction

1998/2008 No

Kalpa kkam Fast bree der fuel

rep rocessing plant

- No

URANIUM PROCESSING

Rakh, Surda,

Mosaboni

Uranium recovery plant at

copper concentrator;

operating.

- N/A (Not

Applicable)

Jaduguda,

Narwpahar,

Bhatin

Uranium mining and

milling; ope rating

- N/A

The Singhbhum

d istric t (Bihar),

West Khasi hills

(Meghalaya),

the Bhima Basin

area (Gulbarga

district ofKamataka), and

the Yellapur

Peddagattu

area of

Nalgonda district

(Andhra

Promising uranium mining

areas

If enric hed UF6 supply fo r

India s BWRs is c ut o ff, they

may fuel w ith UO2-PuO2

- N/A



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Pradesh)

Hyderab ad Uranium purific a tion (UO2);

operating.

- No

Hyderabad Fuel fab ric ation; op erating. - Partial

Trom bay Uranium c onversion (UF6);

operating; Fuel fabric ation.

- No

Tarapur Mixed uranium-plutonium

oxide (MOX) fuel

fabrication; operating.

- Only when

safeguarded

fuel is present.

HEAVY WATER PRODUCTION

Trombay Pilot-sc ale ; Op erationa l? -

Nang al 14 t/ y; Op erating 1962 -

Baroda 67 t/ y; Intermittent

operation

1980 -

Tutic orin 71 t/ y; Op erating 1978 -

Talc her phase 1 62 t/ y; Op erating 1980 -

Talc her phase 2 62 t/ y; Op erating 1980 -

Kota 100 t/ y; Op erating 1981 -

Tha l-Vaishet 110 t/ y; Op erating 1991 -

Ma nu guru 185 t/ y; Op erating, unde r

expansion

1991 -

Hazira 110 t/ y; Op erating 1991 -



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Prob lems with Indian nuc lear reac tors

Even four decades after it launched its nuclear reactor program, technical problems

with Indian reactors remain so severe that the rated capacity of the country's reactors

tota ls only 1,840-mw, c ontributing less than 2.5% of Ind ia's c ommerc ial e nergy.

A decade ago, a nine-month long AERB safety study of Indian reactors documented

more than 130 extremely serious safety issues which warranted urgent corrective

mea sures. The m ost urge nt c orrec tive a c tions we re rec omm end ed at the Bhabha

Atomic Research Centre; Indira Gandhi Centre for Atomic Research (IGCAR); Nuclear

Power Corporation of India Limited; Uranium Corporation of India Limited; Indian Rare

Earths Lim ited ; Nuclear Fuel Com plex (NFC), and the Heavy Water Boa rd .

Due to its ag e and insuffic ient safe ty p roced ures, IGCAR is prone to serious acc idents. In

1987, during a fuel transfer process, a tube guiding fuel into the reactor was snapped.

Then in 2002, 75kg o f rad ioac tive sod ium lea ked inside a purific a tion c ab in.

In 1986, the inlets of M adras Atom ic Powe r Sta tion (MAPS) reac tors c rac ked and

Zirc alloy p ieces we re found in the m od erato r pum p. Then in 1988, MAPS wa s shut d ow n

after heavy water leaked, exposing workers to high doses of radioactivity. Again, in

1991, tons of heavy water burst out from the moderator system. Its emergency cooling

system s are sa id to be inad eq uate. 7



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Bhabha Atomic Researc h Centre (BARC)

Bhabha Atomic Research Centre is Indias premier nuclear research laboratory,

located in Mum ba i. Ind ian autho rities c laim tha t m ost of the wo rk at this Centre relates

to civilian applications. Nevertheless, the dual usage of the material produced here is

extremely significant. In fact, many regard BARC as the centre of New Delhis nuclear

weapons programme, with BARC personnel having been instrumental in the designing

and build ing of the nuclea r devices that we re tested in Ma y 1998.8

One of the problems relating to Indias civilian nuclear facilities is that, on ground, there

is no well-defined boundary separating the peaceful use of these facilities from the

weapons programme. Also, most of the civilian facilities are not subjected to IAEA

safeguards. The dual use p roblem is reflec ted in the fac t tha t the fissile m aterial fo r the

Ind ian nuc lear tests has always c om e from its c ivilian nuc lea r fac ilities. 9

Am ongst the imp ortant units a t BARC are CIRUS and DHURVA resea rch reac tors. The 40

MW CIRUS is a hea vy water, natural uranium resea rch rea c tor. The rea c tor is a Ca ndu

prototyp e insta lled with Canad ian assistanc e, and it went c ritica l in July 1960. This

reac tor uses natural uranium as a fuel, ac c om pa nied by hea vy wa ter as a moderator

and light water as a c oolant and it has a m anufac turing p otential of produc ing 10 kg of

plutonium annually, as part of reprocessed spent fuel.

Both, Ca nada and the US had initially given nuclea r assistanc e to Ind ia, and the US had

supp lied India with two bo iling rea c tors, which ha d be gun o pe rating at Tarap ur in 1969.

Atomic Energy Canada, Limited, had also supplied pressurized heavy water reactors of

the Ca nd u typ e in Rajastha n (RAPS I Kota). RAPS I is a hea vy water, na tural uranium-

based 190-220 MW rea c tor, which went c ritical in 1972. This reac tor sourc e has ofte n

been cited as the front end of the nuclear fuel used by India in its 1974 nuclear

explosion in Pokhran. The Indo-Ca nad ian and Indo -US nuc lear c ooperation apparently

ended when India de tonated the 1974 device .

Left on its own, India started replicating the Candu reactors within the country, and

c urrently it has a la rge number of Ca ndu de sign reac tors within Ind ia. The foc us on

Candu type rea c tors rests on the fac t tha t these reac tor types use na tural uranium a nd

India has large reserves of th is m aterial. Thus, m aking use o f this reac tor type was the

natural choice for harnessing nuclear energy as a potential source of cheap power

and w eapons c ap ab ility.

Nevertheless, the initial line of Candu reactors suffered from design problems. One of

the key problems has been that Indias Candu clone programme has not kept up with



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design improvements and the earlier versions of Candu reactors had inadequate

emergency cooling systems.10

Indias Department of Atomic Energy (DAE) had independently improved the cooling

system in two pairs of reactors at Kakrapar I & II and Narora I & II which are based on

the same design. However, the exact efficiency of the design improvement isdeb ata ble, even in the ne w rea c tors. The Ind ian DAE has mad e no upg rad es or

improvements in the design of the older reactors at Rajasthan and Madras all of

which have been termed as hazardous and dangerous by the Canadian

manufacturers.11

Also, equipment problems have resulted in the operation of these reactors at lower

levels than their original intended capacity. Coupled with this, the safety problems

increased manifold, due to a lack of adequate research in reactor construction and

the Indian desire to build the reac tors without incorporating adeq uate safeg uards.

On Ma rc h 1993, a fire in the Narora Atom ic Pow er Sta tion (NAPS), 180 km ea st o f New

Delhi, nearly caused a melt-down.12 The fire, ac c ord ing to rep orts, had started in a

turbine gene rator, where two blad es had snapp ed from fatigue, c ausing m ore blades

to break and the whole machine to come to a grinding halt. According to the

chronology of events released by the Indian Atomic Energy Regulatory Board to Far

Eastern Ec onomic Review,13 the ac t of injec ting a liquid to stop the nuc lea r rea c tion, in

an a ttempt to stop the fire from reac hing the reac tor door, had ac tivated a sec ondary

shut down and no n-rad ioa c tive steam had been allowed to blow off. The situa tion had

become alarming, according to this report, when the fire burned through both the

reg ular and the emergency c ab les. This c aused the c ooling pum p to stop , resulting in a

po we r loss. The a c c ount g oes on to sta te tha t, in orde r to p revent a rea c tor melt-dow n,

four crewmen stepped up besides the reactor on an 18-storey platform and cracked

op en the valves and po ured in the bo ron solution, know n as Gravity Add ition o f Boron

(GRAB) system . Had the situation not be en c onta ined , it c ould have been a rep lic ation

of the Chernobyl inc ident. Ac c ording to Gopalakrishnan, the then c hairm an of AERB, it

c ould have be en a partial melt-down or localized explosion .14

In addition, the President of the Atomic Energy of Canada, Limited, also stated that the

Canad ian Ca ndu reac tors in India w ere suffering from hybrid blisters, which c ould lead

to rupture and massive leaks of the hea vy wa ter coo lant. Acc ording to the Ca nad ian

Atom ic Energy C omm ission, The position is so b ad tha t the re is a real p ote ntial for a

pressure tube rupture to occur at any time.15 Canada was the original designer of the

Pressurized Heavy Water Reactors (PHWRs) a design adopted extensively by India,

includ ing a t the fac ilities in Rajasthan, Ma dras, Utta r Pradesh, etc .



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DHURVA is the sec ond m ajor rea c tor a t Trombay, under BARC. This resea rch reac tor is

based on natural uranium, heavy water design of Canadian origin and, like other

Indian reac tors, also suffers from d esign p roblem s. The reac tor has, since its

c onstruction, rem ained una ble to func tion at full ope rating pote ntial. This has lead to

fuel failures, whic h have not been rec tified to date .

Sim ilarly, anothe r issue c ausing c onc ern a t BARC ha s bee n the issue o f rad iation

leakag es, which hap pen reg ularly, and the d irec tors of BARC have rem ained unab le to

control leakage and the spread of radiation underground in and around BARC.16 In

1991, CIRUS had d eve loped a rad iation leak and Cesium 137 was repo rted to b e

present in the soil wa ter and vege ta tion near the d isc harge lines of CIRUS and

DHURVA.17

Sim ilarly, ac c ording to various news rep orts, the bed of the Thane c reek, which is an

extension of the sea at Mumbai port, has also become radioactive because of the

nuc lea r effluents d ischarged by the resea rc h and reproc essing plants at BARC.18

The a dded danger of these lea kages is that their sources form the ba sis of the

fabrication potential of many of the materials and equipment used in Indias military

program me so tha t the leakage s have a ve ry high g rad e o f rad ioac tivity. In ad d ition,

the fac t tha t these m ilitary fac ilities are unsafe gua rded , implies that the re c an be theft

of weap ons grade m aterial.

BARC primarily forms the basis of the Indian requirements for primary fissile material

ge neration me thod , i.e. it c onve rts uranium into m etallic rea c tor fuel, irrad iates tha t fuel

in DHURVA a nd CIRUS and then reproc esses the spent fuel to extrac t wea pons grade

plutonium. The CIRUS rea c tor has produc ed an estimated tota l of 240 to 336 kg o fplutonium from 1964 to1999.19

The la rger DHURVA rea c tor, on a c onservative e stim ate, prod uc ed a to ta l of 280 kg of

plutonium between 1985-1999. Presently Indias existing fissile material stockpile can

prod uc e, ac c ording to a c onservative estim ate, ap proximate ly 85 to 120 warhead s. 20

The inadeq uate safety m ea sures of these expansive fac ilities c ont inues to p lag ue the

Indian nuclear programme. In the mid-1990s, one of six 200,000 liter waste tanks at

BARC d eveloped major leaks and had to b e emptied . The spe c ific inc ide nts of

radiation leakage and design faults in each of the Indian nuclear reactors are grave

enough to illustrate that the nuclear radiation levels permissible in India are much

higher than what are allowed by international standards. Plans by the Indian DAE to

build up to five m ore resea rch reac tors in Trom ba y, based on the Ca ndu type designs,

will inc rease India s stoc kpile o f unsafe guarded pluton ium. The d anger lies in the fa c t

that the ne w po we r plants will be ba sed on the design o f the 100 MW DHURVA reac tor,

which has be en ope rating a t BARC.



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Indira Gandhi Centre for Atomic Resea rc h (IGCAR)

Kalpakkam Fuel Reproc essing Plant (KARP):

The Kalpakkam Fuel Rep roc essing Plant (KARP) is the third reproc essing p lant that is

nea ring c om plet ion. The p lant w as c om missioned on 27 Marc h 1996. Also known a s the

Kalpakkam Fuel Rep roc essing Plant, it rep roc esses spent fue l from MAPS, as well as from

the Fast Breeder Test Rea c tors (FBTR) a t Kalpakkam , under the Ind ira Ga nd hi Centre fo r

Atomic Research (IGCAR).21 IGCAR is one of Indias premier nuclear research and

development institutes. Established in 1971, the centers staff, of approximately 2,300,

including 1,000 scientists and engineers, conducts research on fast breeder reactors,

sod ium tec hnology, plutonium rep roc essing, and naval reac tors.22

The fa c ility has a d esign c ap ac ity to reproc ess 100 Mt of spent Ca ndu fuel eac h yea rusing the Purex proc ess.23

Nevertheless, the plant commissioned in 1985, has suffered for years because of

technical delays and financial problems and was unable to begin the scheduled

op era tions in 1990.24

While most of the plants components are indigenously developed, some of the

technology and components have been imported from the West in general and

Germany in pa rtic ular.

KARP is one of the several nuc lea r fac ilities loc ated a t the IGCAR. The FBTR fac ility a t theCentre has experienced numerous shutdowns as a result of technical problems. It was

c losed be tween 1987-89, and ran at a m ere 1 MW ca pa c ity from 1989-92.25

The rea c tor has rarely operate d a t its designed outp ut levels due to a n undersized fuel

core, and the various unsuccessful attempts of indigenizing the French reactor design

to m eet Indian needs.

The FBTR, run jointly b y IGCAR and BARC personnel, p rim arily burns MOX fuel d eveloped

at BARC. Its initial nuclear fuel core used approximately 50 kg of weapons-grade

plutonium. DAE officials have said the reactor is now being fuelled by plutonium

extracted from fuel irradiated in the Madras power reactors and reprocessed at

PREFRE.26

To c om plem ent the development o f ad vanced resea rc h for the FBTR, IGCAR and BARC

personnel have b uilt the Kam ini 30 KW resea rch rea c tor. The Kam ini reac tor is fuelled by



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U-233 (irradiated thorium) and is instrumental in neutron radiography studies of fuel

irrad iated in the FBTRs.27

The rea c tor wa s c om missioned in 1989, and went c ritic al on 29 Oc tob er 1996, and

rea c hed its full pow er ca pa c ity on 17 Sep tembe r 1997. 28

According to reports, IGCAR has reprocessed U-233 from irradiated thorium, as part of

its strategy to eventually use U-233 as the primary fuel for Ind ia s nuc lea r programm e.29

BARC personnel are building a waste immobilization (vitrification) plant at Kalpakkam to

hand le waste from the Kam ini reac tor, the FBTR, and IGCARs rep rocessing fa c ilities.30

Ind ia intend s to eventually build c ommerc ially viable FBRs. To ac hieve this goa l, New

Delhi pla ns to c onstruc t a 500 MW pressurized FBR at Ka lpakkam . The initia l c ore loa d

will use MOX fuel, containing 2000 kg of plutonium extracted from spent fuel irradiated

in India s c ommercial rea c tors.31

The c onc ep tua l design of the FBR wa s c om ple ted in 1996-97 and the c onstruct ion is

sc hed uled to beg in in 2002.32

This will add to the unsafe guarded fissile stoc kpiles, and the dangers of theft a nd

rad iation tha t tha t implies.

Kalpakkam is also a development site for Indias nuclear-powered submarine

program me c alled the Ad vanced Tec hnology Vessel (ATV), whic h c onstruc ts the

structural mechanics of reactors, thermal hydraulics, and components handling, in

add ition to deve lop ing the pressure vessel struc ture.

This site is also being used by spec ialists from BARC, w ho are d esigning the ATVs

reac tor, while IGCAR pe rsonne l are charged with its c onstruct ion.33

If Ind ia is ab le to p erfec t the tec hnique , it wo uld enable it to manufac ture m iniaturized

reactors which would make their theft easier, especially the theft of fuel rods, etc. Initial

tests of the ATVs rea c tor were reportedly cond uc ted at IGCAR in Novem be r-

Dec em be r 1995, but these fa iled . Neve rtheless, it has to b e b orne in mind tha t they m ay

pe rfec t the tec hnique in the future.34

Other facilities have been established at ICGAR to test key components such as the

subm arine s d rive turbines, propellers, and dynam om ete rs.35

IGCAR houses additional facilities, including a pilot-scale, ion-exchange,

chromatograph facility that can produce Boron-10, presumably for use in control rods

for fast breeder reactors. Boron-10 has many nuclear applications, including controlling



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c ritica lity in nuc lea r wea po ns storag e sites, rea c tors, pluton ium reproc essing plants, and

nuc lea r ma terials storag e fac ilities.

Also at Kalpakkam, Indian engineers have completed the design of a Fast Reactor Fuel

Reprocessing Plant (FRFRP), which will have a capacity to reprocess up to 1000 Mt of

spent fuel per year. A limited number of components, such as ventilation equipment,have a lso be en ma nufac tured .36

The FRFRP was ten ta tively sc hed uled to be c old c ommissioned in Decem ber 2000, but

the pla nt has not gone c ritica l as it still need s wo rk.37

Given the problems experienced by the DAE with its other reprocessing facilities and a

lac k of financ ing , it is doub tful that this fac ility will ac tually beg in to rep rocess signific ant

amounts of spent fuel in the near future. Yet as it stands semi-completed, it becomes a

source for ac quiring c lande stine rad ioac tive mate rial.

Of the nuc lea r fac ilities affilia ted with MAPS, the tritium extrac tion plant is the o nly plantor facility, which is identified as directly related to New Delhis nuclear weapons

programme. It could provide New Delhi with enough tritium to build a large arsenal of

boosted fission, or thermonuc lea r we apons. The tritium produc tion plant wo uld also be

the first documented case in which India directly used a commercial reactor for its

nuclear weap ons programme.38

Hence the possibility of theft from this plant might not only be possible but is a cause of

grave concern, since the actual status of the plant is commercial. When fully

op erationa l, the p roliferation c onc ern of this fac ility will be inc rea sed . The levels of

security at any Indian commercial plant have been found wanting and variousaccidents at these facilities as well as reported thefts show the vulnerability of these

c ommercial units.



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Nuclea r Fuel Complex, Hyd erabad (NFC)

The c ity of Hyderabad is hom e to three go vernment-owned fac ilities that c ond uc t

nuc lea r-related ac tivities. The Nuclear Fuel Com plex (NFC), estab lished in the e arly

1970s, is geared to making nuclear fuel and reactor core components for Indias

ato mic power prog ramme. The site ha s a vast array o f im po rted and dom estic ally

prod uc ed nuclea r-related ma c hinery, inc luding a slurry-extrac tion system for uranium-

oxide production, high-temperature pellet sintering furnaces, vacuum annealing

furnac es, cold red uc ing m ills, bea ring p ad we lding mac hines, and spe c ialized we lding

equipment.39

The c om plexs prim ary function is to fab ric a te nuclear fuel, uranium purific ation a nd

related m aterials. The fac ility has units, whic h are capable of uranium purific at ion - tha t

is, it c an c onvert yellow c ake (U308) into uran ium oxide (U02). This fac ility ha s bee nop erationa l since 1971. This p lant has the ab ility to p roduc e 250 Mt o f UO2 per yea r and

is c urrently be ing e xpa nde d to a level where it will be able to p rod uce up to 600 Mt pe r

year.40

After converting yellow cake into uranium oxide, the NFC fabricates the UO2 into

nuc lea r fuel. The New Uranium Fuel Assem bly plant c an make 300 Mt o f heavy wa ter

reac tor fuel pe r yea r. This fac ility has be en operating since 1971, and now its c ap ac ity is

be ing expa nded to 600 Mt p er year.41

The NFC a lso has a sm aller 25 Mt p er yea r fac ility that m akes fuel for light water

mod erate d reac tors such as those a t Tarapur.42

None of these facilities are subject to IAEA safeguards unless they are handling

im po rted enric hed uranium o r using safeg uarded fuel.

Facilities to support the production of nuclear fuel are also located at the Hyderabad

site. These inc lude a zirc onium meta l produc tion p lant, which has a c ap ac ity of 210 Mt

per year. This fac ility beg an op erations in 1972, with a titanium p roduc tion plant, and a

plant that separates zirconium and hafnium using what a DAE report described as a

"pyrochemical" process.43

The Hyde rabad site has add itiona l fac ilities to p roduc e spec ial m aterials, used to

advance the weaponisation potential of fissile material into atomic bomb cores. One

plant produces high-purity titanium oxide, a chemical which is resistant to corrosion by

liquid ac tinides, suc h as plutonium nitrate , and therefore, c an b e used to line hot c ells

for rep rocessing plutonium, or c ruc ibles, for ca sting wea pon c ores.44



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Although, tita nium is not on the Nuc lea r Suppliers Group (NSG) Trigger List of c ontrolled

goods, it is listed in an IAEA mem orand um on dual-use te c hnolog y.45

The ava ilab ility of suc h mate rial c an lead to situations whe re m ate rial may be subjec t to

theft or nuclear terrorism, as the biggest problem faced by nuclear terrorists remains

that of protecting the core and maintaining the critical mass so that the destructivepotential of a c rude device c an be e nhanc ed.

The output o f m ost o f the NFC s fac ilities, suc h a s nuclea r fuel and zirc onium

components, has contributed indirectly to New Delhis nuclear weapons programme.

The threa t o f theft from these plac es c anno t be ruled out. While there is no o vert

evidence that such thefts have occurred, the possibility cannot be completely

precluded because most of the fuel and power reactors are not under IAEA or any

other kind of safeguards. In addition, there is no international supervisory inventory

c ontrol of the fissile materials.



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Tarapur Atomic Power Station (TAPS)

The Tarap ur Atom ic Pow er Sta tion (TAPS) reac tors are the old est in the world . They

experienced extensive tube failures which led to the de-rating of its reactors from 210-

mw to 160-mw . The tw o reac tors share the sam e emergenc y c ore c ooling system ,

which expe rts say is a rec ipe for the reac tor meltdo wn.

The Tarapur Atom ic Powe r Sta tion (TAPS) is am ong Ind ia s olde st c ommerc ial nuc lea r

reac tors, many of w hich we re provide d by the United Sta tes in the 1960s. TAPS I and II

are boiling water reactors (BWRs) that have maximum design capacities of 210 MW.

However, the combined capacity of the two reactors, of 420 MW, has been

downg rad ed to 320 MW.46

Both units have operated at lower ca pa c ity levels and now have m aximum net outputsof 160 MW ea c h. The reac tors, ow ned and op erated by India s Nuclea r Pow er

Corporation (NPC), have operated at 58 percent capacity since the beginning of

commercial operations in 1969.47

These pla nts have also had signific ant rad iation p roblem s. In 1995, the rad ioac tive

wa ste from the p lant ha d c ontam inated the w ate r supp ly of nea rly 3000 villag ers living

nea rby. Though the reac tor was shut down the leak wa s de tec ted afte r 45 days. 48

The d eg ree and the intensity of the rad iation leakage fac ed by the Indian nuclear

reactors suggest that there is a need to focus on the safety and security of these

reac tors and the p ossibility of nuc lea r thefts. The sta te o f the reac tors indicates tha t thedesign and maintenanc e problems have never been ad dressed properly by the Indian

DAE, especially when seen in reference to questions such as what are the radiation

levels in the various sub-system s, ma c hinery, p ipes and eng ineering c om po nents of the

BWR a t TAPS. How safe is the ad joining sea from rad iation leve ls?

In 1989, a high d osage o f iod ine was found in the sea water around TAPS. It was 740

times higher than the no rmal level. 49

Rad iation leaks a t these fa c ilities, and in particula r at TAPS I have a ffec ted innumerab le

personnel. Hundreds of workers of these facilities have reportedly been exposed to

exce ssive d osag es of rad iation. They have neve r been informed ab out the dang ers of

radiation. On March 14, 1980, cooling water leaked from reactor I, and 26 workers

eng ag ed in rep airs had to be rushed to the ho spital.50



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For exam ple, in 1992, in Unit one of TAPS II, 94 curies of rad ioac tivity was relea sed into

the env ironment d ue to a leaking emergency cond enser tube in a loop of the unit. The

tube fa ilure was a ttributed to c orrosion-assisted therma l fa tigue.51

Both the reactors suffer from inter-granular corrosion of primary piping. In 1996, a pipe

from the w aste p rocessing p lant in Tarapur was found sp illing rad ioac tive liquid wasteinto a nearby wa ter canal used by the p ublic .52

Inspectors discovered that a pipe had been incorrectly connected to an external

discharge line instead of an internal tank.53

The a ging reac tors are now rea c hing the end o f their planned op erational lifespa n and

at lea st one former Chairm an of the Ind ian AERB, Dr Gopalakrishnan, has said they are

a serious safety ha zard .54

Desp ite these w arnings, Ind ian o ffic ials c laim that the TAPS I and II reac tors are in goo d

c ond ition and c ould have their op erationa l lives extended b y ano ther twe nty years.55

The p otential o f hav ing a rea c tor melt-down in any o f these a ge ing reac tors is far too

high. Under a 30-yea r nuclea r c oope ration a greem ent, the United States, in add ition t o

build ing the Tarap ur rea c tors had ag reed to provide the low-enric hed uranium (LEU) for

the BWRs. The agreement had stipulate d tha t the United Sates wo uld supply Ind ia w ith

suffic ient LEU to fue l the rea c tors until 1993, but Washington te rm inated the agreement

in 1979, as a result o f its 1978 Nuclea r Non-Proliferation Ac t, 56 thereby leaving India to

fulfill the rea c tors requirem ents for LEU throug h ind igenous sourc es.57

New Delhi is build ing tw o a dd itiona l rea c tors at Tarap ur that w ill have d esign c ap ac ities

of 500 MW and m aximum net outp uts of 470 MW. These PHWRs, which would be Ind ia s

largest indigenously-produced nuclear power plants, are tentatively scheduled to be

c om pleted by 2006 and 2007 respe c tively, by Larsen a nd Toub ro a nd Walc hand nag ar

Industries, Ltd . 58

Site prep arations and excava tion for TAPS III and IV had beg un soo n a fter the o rder was

plac ed in 1991, but a d elay occurred bec ause o f a lac k of funding.

These reac tors will have the c ap ab ility to p rod uce large am ounts of plutonium through

the reprocessing of spent fuel, although the plutonium produced in these reactors will

be rea c tor-grad e and , therefore, not idea lly suited for use in nuclear weap ons due to alow c onte nt of the d esirable Pu-239 isoto pe.59

But its capacity for easy convertibility to weapons-grade plutonium makes it particularly

attrac tive for theft and for the ma nufac ture of a c rude nuclear device o r an enhanc ed

po tential of rad iation da m age.



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In addition to the use of plutonium in these facilities, India seeks to burn MOX fuel, as

pa rt of its nuclea r power produc tion p rog ram me stoc ked qua ntities. The MOX c onta ins

a mixture of uranium and plutonium. India has loaded a total of at least 70 kg of MOX

fue l in TAPS I in 1994 and in TAPS II in Oc tober 1995.60

New Delhi has processed MOX desp ite internationa l ob jec tions, espec ially from the US,on using plutonium in civilian reactors due to proliferation concerns. According to

Indian sources, the use of MOX fuel is considered necessary, despite the proliferation

challenges, because of the fact that Washington and Paris cut-off the promised

supplies of LEU fuel fo r the Ind ian c ivilian rea c tors. 61

Ind ia has fab ric a ted four of the MO X c ores for TAPS I and II a t its Advanc ed Fuel

Fabric a tion Fac ility, wh ich is run by BARC p ersonnel.62

This fac ility has a design c apac ity to manufac ture 10-20 Mt o f MOX fuel pe r yea r, using

plutonium extrac ted a t Tarapurs PREFRE.63

In future, Ind ia m ay use a sol-gel pilot plant tha t is be ing develop ed a t Tarapur to

fab ric ate MOX fuel or to rep roc ess plutonium.64

PREFRE, one of the three Ind ian fa c ilities tha t e xtrac t p lutonium from spent reac tor fuel,

has a d esign c ap ac ity to reproc ess as much a s 100 Mt of Ca ndu spe nt fuel ea c h yea r,

using the Purex proc ess. 65

Since PREFRE beg an op erations in 1979, tec hnical p roblems and a lac k of spent fuel

availability are believed to be the cause of the plants inability to operate at its

maximum levels.66

These p rob lems have led the DAE to reva mp the p lant s design and c onstruc tion

program me. The fac ility, which wa s expec ted to b ec ome op erational in 1998-99, has

still to be fully ope rationa l and its c om plete functions are no t yet c lear.67

To d ate , the p lutonium extrac ted a t PREFRE is not known to have been used for any

activity other than producing MOX fuel or f or research. Nevertheless, the military

implications of the plants capabilities cannot be ignored. MOX fuel is particularly

worrisome because it involves the use of plutonium in the civilian power reactors and

grea tly inc rea ses the d ang er that plutonium could b e d iverted or stolen.68



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Kakrapar Atomic Power Station (KAPS)

Kakrapar Atom ic Pow er Sta tion (KAPS) reac tors are c onsidered to b e Ind ia's m odel

reactors for controlling radiation leaks; not surprisingly, even they emit three times the

rad iation a s m uch as the internationa l norm , a fac t adm itted by S.P. Sukhatme ,

c ha irman of AERB. Mr. Sukha tme's shoc king adm ission put the rest of the c ountry's

nuc lea r-pow er plants in grave p erspe c tive. Top Ind ian antinuc lea r ac tivist Suren

Ga dekar found the a dmission to b e extrem ely shoc king and d isturbing. He said , "The

main implication is that other nuclear-power plants are much worse than even

Kakrapar." In Feb ruary 2002, c ha irman Sukhatm e req uested the Nuclea r Pow er

Corpo ration o f Ind ia Ltd to plug tritium c ontaminated wa ter lea ks in its rea c tors.In 1994,

ow ing to its faulty design, conc rete c ontainment d om e of KAPS c ollapsed . The c ollapse

expo sed the workers to high d oses of rad ia tion. Therea fter the flood wa ter ente red the

condenser pit and turbine building basement which resulted in four-year delay in its

commissioning.

The Kakrapar Atom ic Pow er Sta tion (KAPS), Gujara t, a lso uses pressurized hea vy w ater

(PHW) reactors of Canadian design. It has two units, which went critical in early 1990

Unit one in 1992 and Unit two in 1993. The reac tors experienc ed a near disastrous fire

ac c ident in 1991. Extensive d am age was also c aused to rea c tors as a result of the 1994

floods.69

The c oo lant tubes in KAPS are similar to the c oo lant tubes in RAPS and MAPS and , as of

now, all these c oolant tub es are a t d ifferent stag e o f hydrating and em broilment. Thetubes are more prone to becoming weakened by accelerated hydrating and

em broilment d ue to the fac t that they c an o verheat a nd m alfunction ea sily. This c an, in

turn, lead to a catastrophic failure that would result in the emission of radioactive

mate rial from the c ore, inc rea sing the p rob ab ility of a reac tor melt-dow n.

There have also b een c ases of rad iation leaks a t these p lants. The effec ts of the se

radiation leakages are felt by the population around the plant, as they are reported to

be suffering from rad iation-related health problems.

The Emergency Core Coo ling System (ECCS) designed for modern prac tice s and usage

in plants, though it has been insta lled , has not b een tested even o nc e. The system is

extremely unsafe as it has not been test-proven and the system can suffer a failure

similar to that experienced at the Narora plant, 70 which ha d resulted in a fire. It is still

not very clea r as to w hethe r the ECCS will func tion prope rly.71



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The g reatest conc ern from these reac tor types is the p lants a b ility to p rod uce

signific ant am ount o f plutonium-bea ring spe nt fuel for rep roc essing and use in we ap ons

production.



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Madras Atom ic Reac tor (MAPS)The Ma d ras Atom ic Rea c tor (MAPS) a t Kalp akkam , near Chenna i, is prim arily a

research reactor of 30 KW power generation capacity, with an ability to use Uranium

233. The rea c tor is, inte restingly, in c lose proxim ity to the area in whic h m ost o f theuranium the ft cases have b een registered and taken pla c e. This rea c tor is a PHW of

Canadian design. It has two units, each of 220 MW, but due to design and safety

problems, they were d owng rad ed to 170 MW eac h.

The reac tors near Ka lpakkam , i.e. MAPS I & II, are not under IAEA safeg uards. The two

units had run into problems soon after they were commissioned in the mid-1980s.

Ac c ording to rep orts, the rea c tors suffered from ac ute d esign p rob lems and saw high-

scale radiation leakages. It is claimed that, soon after construction, the moderator

distribution systems collapsed inside the reactor, leading to a situation where advance

robotic s had to be developed to remove the de bris.72

Since the early 1990s, bits of meta l from broken m anifolds have b een lying a t the

bo ttom of the c ham be rs of the Unit one and Unit two o f MAPS.73

To d ate, efforts to retrieve the b its have remained unsucc essful. Acc ording to va rious

analysts and reports, the constant flow of uranium fuel inside the tubes, and the

pressurized heavy water around them, had caused the detachment of the manifolds,

cutting them into several pieces. In the early 1990s, MAPs Unit one also faced a

mec hanic al problem, as a turbine blad e b roke down.74

Sim ilarly, the outp ut of MAPS I and II has d ropp ed below average in rec ent years

because of functional problems in the coolant channels, which are now going to be

rep lac ed . In add ition to this, there a re reports that the tem pe rature in the sea nea r the

fac ility has remained high d ue to the rad iation leakages.75

However, in March 1999, due to the malfunctioning of coolant channels, there was a

ma jor leak in the hea vy wa ter reac tor.76 Under normal conditions, the temperature in

the sea a t Ka lpa kkam is 85 deg rees F, but w hen the plants are in operation it rises to 140

deg rees F.77

Such tem pe rature increases c an b e a ssoc iated with the p resenc e o f the 340 MW

rea c tor in the vicinity and a po ssible rad iation leakage from the p lant, as it is be lievedthat the radiation leakage from somewhere within the reactor is causing the water to

heat. Increased sea temperatures, as a probable result of radiation leakage, are of

grave c onc ern to the po pulation c enters, as we ll as to the m arine life.78

By 2004-5, India plans to build two new power reactors based on a Russian-design,

VVER Pressurized Wate r Rea c tors of 1000 MW at Kood ankulam in Tam il Nad u. Fea rs



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rega rd ing the VVER design stem from the fa c t tha t the US Three M ile nuc lea r pow er

plant was of this design and it suffered a nuc lear ac c ident in the ea rly 70s. The p ote ntial

radiation leakage from these Russian origin, light water reactors, each having a

c ap ac ity to p rod uce 1000 MW power, therefore, rem ains a high p rob ab ility. In suc h an

event, the e xac t or the full im pa c t of the 2000 MW pow er rea c tors in Koodankulam will

be c atastroph ic , espec ially since M APS I and II a re unsafe guarded rea c tors and the ir

spent fuel is an a ttrac tive sourc e o f plutonium fo r rep rocessing p lants. The p lutonium

extracted from these sources would lead to higher reserves of reprocessed plutonium.

Without international monitoring, these reserves can be susceptible to theft by potential

nuclear terrorists.

Tarap urs Power Reac tor Fue l Reproc essing Plant (PREFRE) ha s a lso started rep roc essing

spent fuel from MAPS I & II, since they went c ritical in the m id-1980s. Though PREFRE

supplies plutonium to the Fast Breeder Test Reac to r (FBTR) and Tarapurs MOX 79

Fuel fabrication facilities, it is not known whether any of the fuel reprocessed and usedhere can be utilized for the Indian weapons programme. However, the operational

capacity of the two reactors leads to the speculation that if minimum production

standards are observed in the two facilities, each reactor can have the potential to

create approximately 10 kg of weapons-grade plutonium annually for Indias weapons

programme .80

Indian officials have stated that the Kalpakkam reprocessing plants will primarily extract

plutonium from spent fuel, irradiated in the countrys commercial reactors.

Nevertheless, its m ilitary usag e c anno t be ruled out, nor ca n the c hanc es of rad ioa c tive

material being stolen from here. Under normal conditions, plutonium extracted from

c ommercial rea c tors is not fit for use in nuc lear wea pons, due to its low c onc entration

of p lutonium. However, tests in the US have p roven tha t reac tor-grad e p lutonium c an

be used to p rod uce unstab le nuclea r devices.81

In the c ase o f Ind ia, to d ate the p lutonium e xtrac ted from MAPS at PREFRE has been

used to p rod uc e MO X fuel, or to c ond uc t resea rch. Similarly, the Sol-gel p ilot p lant a nd

electro refining plants, like all facilities for the Kalpakkam nuclear programme, are

proliferation c onc erns. The reason b eing the presenc e o f rep rocessed plutonium, which

could be easily diverted or stolen because of the unsafe guarded nature of these

nuc lea r fac ilities.

Furthermore, since there exists an inherent difficulty in detecting clandestine nuclear

ac tivities, Ind ia s pursuit o f fast b reeder rea c tors c an be termed as an attrac tive source

for theft by crime mafias especially since fast breeders produce more fissile material

than they use, thereby adding to the fissile stocks. Because most of this fissile material is

intended for military use, so there is the possibility that any material diverted or stolen



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from these facilities will have a higher degree of enrichment, thereby increasing the

potential of radiological terrorism. In addition, various design problems have led to

op erational failures in Indian nuc lear powe r plants and these p ose a c onstant threa t of

rad iation to those living in the vic inity of these p lants.



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Rajasthan Atomic Power Station (RAPS)

In 2002, the AERB ordered the closure of Indias first nuclear plant -- Rajasthan Atomic

Pow er Sta tion (RAPS). The reac tor was p lagued with a series of serious defe c ts rang ing

from turbine-blade failures, cracks in the end-shields, a leak in the overpressure relief

device, and leaks in many tubes of the moderator heat exchanger. It was not the first

time tha t seriously da ngerous ac c idents forced RAPS to shutd ow n. In 1976, due to

c onstruc tion e rrors, the reac tors we re floode d, whic h force d the shutdo wn. The rea c tors

were once again flooded in 1992. Also in 1992, four of its eight pumps caught fire. On

Feb ruary, 12 1994, it was shutd own for the repa ir of its c aland ria o verpressure relief

devic e which leaked rad ioac tive heavy wa ter.

Later, in 1994, the Indian Express reported that in the aftermath of Canadian reports on

the possibility o f rupture in the pressure tub es of Canada-Ind ia Rea c tor, US (CIRUS)reac tors, RAPS a lso w ent through the safety c hec ks, as it was designed from the c op ied

Canadian blueprints. Once, the emergency core cooling system got obstructed,

lead ing to a ne ar meltdown. RAPS' innumerab le problem s forc ed it to b e d e-rated from

220-mw to 100-mw. RAPS func tioned without high-pressure em ergency c ore c oo ling

system. 82

Ra jastha n sta te is hom e to the Rajastha n Atom ic Power Sta tion (RAPS) and the Kota

Hea vy Wate r Produc tion Plant . RAPS, which is ow ned by the DAE and op erate d by the

government-owned Nuclear Power Complex (NPC), consists of two Candu type PHWRs

with maxim um d esign c ap ac ities of 220 MW. 83

Both RAPS I and II are und er IAEA fa c ility-spec ific safeg uards. RAPS I was c onstruc ted

by Cana da s General Electric and it be ga n commercial ope rations in 1973.84

Canad a provided half of the initial nuclea r fuel c ores load as well as 130 Mt o f heavy

water. However, later the agreement was terminated, and the Russians stepped in to

provide the rema inder of the req uirements. New Delhi has rep roc essed up to 20 Mt o f

spent fue l from the RAPS I rea c tor at its Pow er Rea c tor Fuel Rep roc essing Plant a t

Tarap ur till the 1980s. 85

Both RAPS have suffered numerous tec hnica l problem s and shutd ow ns throughout their

func tioning history. How ever, RAPS I has suffered from more tec hnica l prob lems than

any other Indian nuclear reactor and the magnitude of these problems is so long and

persistent tha t it is Ind ia s least p roduc tive reac tor. In the 1980s, a c rac k in the e nd shield

of RAPS I s Unit one had c aused a rea c tor shut d ow n for several years and , in 1994, the

Unit had to be shut down for about three and a half years due to recurrent technical



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and func tiona l prob lems. Since the rea c tor is based on the earlier design of PHWR

reactors from Canada, it suffers from severe design faults, and there have been

reported cases of radiation leaks in the area surrounding these reactors. Cancer and

leukemia cases have been on the rise in the area, as well as among the workers of

these facilities. Efforts to repair the damage were hampered by the cessation of

Canadian nuclear assistance following Indias 1974 atomic blast. As a consequence,

the reac tor s estimated produc tion c ap ac ity has been d own-rated from 220 MW to 100

MW, while RAPS II rem ains a t 200 MW. To date, the reac tor has not ac hieved even the

dow n-ra ted outp ut since resta rting operations in late 1997. The reac tors have operate d

at full cap ac ity for just 21 pe rc ent o f the time, which is lowe r than bo th the India-wide

ave rag e of 49 pe rc ent and the world a verage o f 70 percent. 86

Other reported problems include shortages of heavy water, cracks in the reactors

turbines, and a 1994 heavy water leak, all of which have resulted in numerous

shutdowns of the reactor facilities.87 These p rob lems have bec am e so c omm on that

Ind ia s Parliam enta ry Stand ing Comm ittee on Atom ic Energy rec omm ended that thereactors status be changed from a commercial plant to a research facility, which

would be run by the DAE. 88

RAPS II has had tec hnica l prob lems, which have led to freq uent shutd ow ns. For

instance, following repeated heavy water leaks, the reactor was shutdown from

Sep tem ber 1994, till May 1998, to rep lac e its 306 coo lant c hannels.

Though the reac tor has been restarted , it is not expe c ted to reac h full cap ac ity

anytime soo n. Throug hout its life span, RAPS II has opera ted a t full c apac ity just 46

pe rc ent of the op erational time o f the reac tor.89

India is build ing tw o a dd itional PHWRs at RAPS tha t will have d esign c apac ities of 235

MW and maximum net outputs of 220 MW, respe c tively.90

Construction of the reactors by Indias Walchandnagar Industries had began in 1990,

using an indigenous design, but work was halted after the Kaiga I reactors

c onta inment dom e c ollapsed in 1994. The rea c tors, with a d esign sim ilar to Ka iga I,

we nt c ritica l in Sep tem ber 1999 and ea rly 2000 respe c tively. These pla nts use na tural

uranium 238 and indigenously produced heavy water.91 the unsafe guarded reactors

burn natural uranium mined in Ind ia and fab ric ate d at the NFC. The spe nt fuel from

these rea c tors is rep roc essed at Tarapur or at Ka lpa kkam . New Delhi hop es toeventually build four ad d itiona l, heavy wa ter, natural uranium rea c tors of a c ap ac ity of

500 MW by 2004.92

The Kota hea vy-wate r prod uc tion p lant, operated by the DAEs Hea vy Water Boa rd ,

forme rly used stea m g ene rated by RAPS I and II. Canada sta rted c onstruction o f the

plant, but c ea sed its c oope ration a fter Ind ia s 1974 nuclea r test. BARC then c om pleted



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the d esign o f the plant, which c an p rod uce up to 100 Mt o f heavy wa ter per year using

a hydrogen sulfide water-exchange process.93 Operations were originally expected to

begin in 1976, but were delayed until 1985 due to problems associated with the

accumulation of toxic chemicals created during the production of hydrogen sulfide

gas.94

Inadequate and unreliable supplies of power and steam from the adjacent RAPS

rea c tors have also plag ued the p lant and c ontributed to its low outp ut.95

RAPS I and II have a long history of tec hnica l diffic ulties, making them unec onomica l for

commercial use. Moreover, the frequent shutdowns adversely affected production at

Kota s hea vy-wa ter produc tion plant. These p roblem s supposed ly have been resolved

and the Indian officials claim that the Kota facility is operating efficiently. Nevertheless,

in view of the past record and the oft repeated technical problems, it is not clear how

satisfactorily these problems have been dealt with.96

Sim ilarly, for muc h of its existenc e, the he avy water pla nt s history of low o utput, huge

cost overruns, and frequent shutdowns have made the plant a financial burden on

Ind ia s struggling nuc lear pow er programme.

The RAPS reac tors have c ontribute d to the c ountry s fissile m ateria l stoc kpile a s well. To

date, at least 25 kg of reactor-grade plutonium have been extracted from the un-

safegua rded spe nt fuel of RAPS I, and much m ore c ould b e rep roc essed , if needed .

When com plete d , RAPS III and IV will have the c ap ability to p roduce signific ant

am ounts of un-safeg uarded plutonium through reproc essing of spe nt fuel.



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Narora atomic power station (NAPS)

Despite a w arning from the US-based General Elec tric (GE), the m anufac turers of the

turbines, in 1991, Ind ia c om missioned the Narora Atomic Power Sta tion (NAPS). As a

result, in 1993, failure of two steam turbine blades resulted in a major fire in one of the

hea vy wate r reac tors, whic h nea rly led to a nuclea r meltdown. The d isaster co uld have

been averted had either the government, or the DAE found it prudent to yield to GE's

warnings. 97



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Indian nonproliferation rec ord; Rea lity Vs Fic tion

The m ost pow erful argum ent vo iced by the suppo rters of Indo-US nuc lear dea l is the

misconception that India has a clean proliferation record hence she deserved to besupplied with the nuclea r ma terial and tec hnology without any a de qua te c hec ks and

balanc es system .

How far this argument is true this can be judged from the historical facts about Indian

proliferation and cheating viz viz diverting civilian nuclear technology for military

purposes c lea rly in breac h of internationa l law s.

Kelly Motz and Ga ry Milhollin in an a rtic le titles Sevente en m yths about the Ind ian

nuc lea r dea l: An analysis of nuc lear c ooperation w ith Ind ia published on June 13, 2006

wrote:

Myth #10: India has an exemplary nonproliferation record and is a reliable trading

partner.

Fac t: Ind ia has a long rec ord o f develop ing bo th nuc lear weap ons and ba llistic m issiles

under the guise of peaceful nuclear and space cooperation. India tested its first

nuclear weapon in 1974 by diverting plutonium made with nuclear imports from the

United States and Ca nad a tha t we re supp lied for pea c eful purpo ses.

In the 1980's, India had a deliberate policy of defeating international controls by

sm ugg ling heavy water from the USSR, China a nd Norwa y, which a llow ed Ind ia to use

its reactors to make plutonium for bombs. In a similar fashion, India built its largest

nuclea r-ca pa ble m issile, the Agni, by imp orting from NASA the design of a n Am eric an

spac e launc her, aga in for ostensibly pea ceful purposes. Even today, Ind ian m issile and

nuc lea r sites c ontinue to imp ort sensitive Am eric an eq uipm ent in violation o f U.S. law .



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The Case of Blac k Diamonds

In 1992, BARC sc ientists we re alleged ly involved in an illega l prac tice of exporting blac k

d iam ond s to the internationa l market.98

According to news reports, the illegal practice had admittedly been going on at BARC

for over 20 years. Som e sen ior BARC sc ient ists were m aking money by using the

resea rch rea c tor, APASRA, 99 to irradiate natural diamonds, thereby making them

darker in c olor, as well rad ioa c tive, and then selling these fake blac k diamonds on the

internationa l ma rket. Ac c ording to the Lond on-ba sed Diam ond Trad ing Corporation

(DTC), these d iam ond s had dangerously high levels of rad ioa c tivity. The DTC w arned

the government of India not to allow its facilities to be used for these practices.100

The inc ident he ightened fears regard ing the safe ty of Ind ia s nuclear program me ,g iven the fac t tha t its sc ientists we re also p repa red to sell nuc lea r-rela ted material. This

also a ggrava tes the susp icion tha t Indian nuc lea r sc ient ist c an ea sily fall prey, as we ll as

have ac c ess to the und erground c riminal networks



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Conclusion

The p oo r safety and sec urity arrangem ents are witnessed to the vulnerab ility of Ind ian

nuclea r prog ram to falling into wrong hand s, proliferation and theft. The inad eq uatesafety measures of nuclear facilities have enhanced the chances of slippage of the

nuc lea r ma terial in the hands of terrorists.

Ma ny inc idents of grave na ture have never been public b y the Indian government.

An Ind ian atomic -pow er expe rt Dhirend ra Sharma estim ates that Indian nuc lear

industry has suffered from "300 incidents of a serious nature... cause radiation leaks and

physica l damag e to workers." He further conc ed es, "These ha ve so fa r rem ained o ffic ial

sec rets."

India's nuclear-power program has always been secretive, because politicians use it as

a c ove r for the c ountry's weap ons program . The Indian g overnment d oes not release

information about the leaks or accidents at its nuclear power plants. Laws prohibit

scientists and politicians from speaking out about the radioactive contaminations and

accidents in the nuclear facilities. What throttled the absolute secrecy of accidents at

its nuclear programs was the Indian Atomic Energy Act of 1962 (NO. 33 OF 1962. 15th

Sep tem ber, 1962), wh ich p resc ribes tha t the nuc lea r program should be shroud ed in

sec recy. The Ac t provides the Indian Dep artment of Atom ic Energy (DAE) enormous

powers and the rights to withhold any information from public. Critics call the DAE an

'unaccountable organization'. It prohibits private and public equity from within and

outside the country. It also says the program should be run by the DAE with limited

participation from private industries. Due to obscure international oversight and the

1962 Act the safety conditions at Indian nuclear facilities remain dangerously unsafe

and largely hidden from the public . 101

The inc idents of nuc lear ma terials theft in Ind ia rep orted time to tim e indica te tha t

Ind ians are involved in supp lying prohibited blue p rints, nuclea r material, and tec hnic al

know how to o ther countries. The Indian g overnment s involvement c an not b e ruled

out whereas involvement of Indian scientists aggravated the suspicion that Indian

scientists can easily fall prey as well as have access to the underground criminal

networks and terrorists.

The existing international c onventions on nuclea r safety do no t d ea l with prob lems of

safety conditions to govern mining of radioactive substances and the possibility of

nuclea r theft. The lac k of safe ty fea tures in uranium m ining ha s end ang ered no t only



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Indian citizens but any theft of such hazardous material can give concrete form to

threat of internationa l nuclea r terrorism.

Indo-US dea l led to w aiver of NSG for supp ly of nuc lear powe r rea c tors, equipm ent,

natural and low-enric hed uranium to India. The supp ly of nuclea r fuel by othe r

countries will enable India to divert its indigenous uranium/plutonium reserves forexc lusively making nuc lear wea pons c ove rtly export it. Moreove r there is no p rovision in

the Additional Protocol with IAEA to ensure that India will not divert nuclear material,

know how ob tained from ab roa d for military purpo ses.

After the c onc lusion o f Indo-US dea l, Ind ia is all ready for building m ore indigenous and

foreign nuclear power reactors. But if the security standards remain the same, these

nuclear reactors would be vulnerable to high probability of terrorist attacks, accidents

and moreover would increase the c hanc es of fissile m ate rial theft.



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References

1. Indian nuclear program: disaster in making, By Adnan Gill, July 10, 2006.

2. Naya n Chanda, The perils of Pow er , 4 Janua ry, 1999, www.wsj.com.

3. Ritu Sarin, Hunt fo r yellow c ake , The Ind ian Express, June 4, 1998, see e .g.,

www.expresidia.com

4. Ibid.

5. Naya n Chanda, The perils of Pow er , 4 Janua ry, 1999, www.wsj.com.

6. NUCLEAR SAFETY & TERRORISM: A CASE STUDY OF INDIA by Dr. Shireen M . Mazari

& Ma ria Sultan

7. Indian nuclear program: disaster in making, By Adnan Gill, July 10, 2006.

8. And rew Koc h, Resourc es on India a nd Pakistan: Selec ted Ind ian Nuclea r

Fac ilities , July 1999, Monte rey Institute of Inte rnat iona l Stud ies, Centre fo r Non

Proliferation Studies.

9. Buddhi, Kota & Subbarao, Ind ia s Nuclear Prowess: False c laims and trag ic

truths. www.freespeech.org/manushi/109/nukes.html.

10. Ind ia: Near Miss in 1993 , www.antenn.nl/wise/506/4978.html

11.Ibid

12.Ibid

13.www.fareasterneconomicreview.com

14.Ibid

15.Candus in India in ba d c ond ition , The Financ ial Post, Cana da, 20 Sep tem be r,

1994.

16.www.freespeech.org

17.Ibid

18.Ibid

19.Resources on India a nd Pakistan , op c it.

http://www.wsj.com/http://www.expresidia.com/http://www.wsj.com/http://www.freespeech.org/manushi/109/nukes.htmlhttp://www.antenn.nl/wise/506/4978.htmlhttp://www.fareasterneconomicreview.com/http://www.freespeech.org/http://www.pdffactory.com/http://www.pdffactory.com/http://www.pdffactory.com/http://www.freespeech.org/http://www.fareasterneconomicreview.com/http://www.antenn.nl/wise/506/4978.htmlhttp://www.freespeech.org/manushi/109/nukes.htmlhttp://www.wsj.com/http://www.expresidia.com/http://www.wsj.com/


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20.George Perkovich, Ind ia s Nuclea r Bom b: The impa c t on g loba l p roliferation.

(California : Unive rsity of California Press, Ltd ., 1999), pp . 400-442.

21.V.L. Kalyane, ed., BARC Progress Report 1995 (Mumbai, India: Bhabha Atomic

Resea rch Centre, 1996), p. 120; Third Rep roc essing Plant Sta rts Up , Nuc lea r

Engineering Internationa l, May 1996, p. 8; Third Rep rocessing Plant Op ene d atKa lpa kkam , Nuc lear News, May 1996, p. 43.

22.Department Of Atomic Energy Annual Report 1996-1997, Government of India,

1997; Atomic Energy, http://www.meadev.gov.in; Indira Gandhi Centre for

Atomic Research, see www.igcar.ernet.in

23.Nee l Patri, Nuc lea r R & D Bud get Rises Slightly in India for Com ing Fisc al Year,

Nuc leonics Week, 14 March, 1996, pp. 15-16.

24.G. Sud hakar Na ir, Efforts for Self-Suffic ienc y in N-Energy Reviewed , Telegrap h, 8

January, 1985, p. 7; Worldw ide Rep ort, 13 Feb ruary, 1985, pp . 77-81.

25. Ind ia s Test Breeder Rea c tor Was Resta rted May 11, Nuc lea r News, July 1989, p .

67; Department Of Atomic Energy Annual Report 1996-1997, Government of

Ind ia, 1997; Rea c tor Group , see www.igcar.ernet.in.

26.Mark Hibbs, Tarapur: First Sep arat ion Line a t Ka lpakkam Slated to Beg in

Operations Next Year, Nuclear Fuel, 1 December, 1997, p. 8; David Albright,

Frans Berkhout a nd William Walker, Plutonium And Highly Enric hed Uranium 1996

(New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), p. 268.

27.Ibid.

28.Ibid, Neel Patri, Ind ia Sta rts Up Resea rch Unit Using Fuel Made from Thorium ,

Nucleonics Week, 7 November, 1996, p. 2; Reactor Group,

http://www.igcar.ernet.in.

29.Ibid

30.Delhi Acq uires Nuclea r Waste Ma nagem ent Tec hnology , Financ ial Express, 23

March, 1998.

31.Maya Ranganathan, New Reactor at Kalpakkam by 2007, Indian Express, 24January, 1997.


1997; Maya Ranganathan, New Reactor at Kalpakkam by 2007, Indian Express,

24 January, 1997.

http://www.igcar.ernet.in/http://www.igcar.ernet.in/http://www.igcar.ernet.in/http://www.pdffactory.com/http://www.pdffactory.com/http://www.pdffactory.com/http://www.igcar.ernet.in/http://www.igcar.ernet.in/http://www.igcar.ernet.in/


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33.Subm arine s N-Pow er Plant Getting Rea dy , Times of Ind ia, 29 Decem ber, 1995;

in Strate g ic Digest, March 1996, pp. 440-441.

34.Vivek Rag huvanshi, Tec hnical Snags Frustrate Ind ian Nuclear Sub Program me ,

Defense News, June 24-30, 1996, p. 40.

35.Ibid.

36.Department of Atomic Energy Annual Report 1996-1997, Government of India,

1997.

37.N-Safety Resea rch Fac ility Nea r Chenna i, The Hindu, 21 Feb ruary, 1999.

38.Perkovich, op . cit.

39. Three N-Centres to Be Commissioned Nea r AP , Financ ial Express, 7 August, 1995,

p . 5.

40.Shahid-ur-Rehm an Khan, Ind ia and Pakistan Exchange Lists of Nuc lea r Fac ilities ,

Nuc leonics Week, 4 Janua ry, 1992, p. 10.

41. Three N-Centres to Be Commissioned Nea r AP , Financ ial Express, 7 August, 1995,

p. 5, the plant is called the New Uranium Fuel Assembly Plant, work on this facility

has bee n c om pleted and trial produc tion has begun; NFC Gea ring to Double

Uranium Outp ut , The Hind u, 15 July, 1996, p . 6.

42.World Light Water Rea c tor Fuel Fabric a tion Fac ilities , see

http://www.antenna.nl

43.Ind ia s Department of Energy s Annual Rep ort 1999.


1997; Atom ic Energy in Ind ia: Nuclear Fuels and Structural Com pone nts ,

http://www.barc.ernet.in

45.Com munic ations Rec eived from Certain Mem be r States Reg arding Guidelines

for the Export of Nuclea r Ma terial, Equipment, and Tec hnology , Interna tional

Atomic Energy Agency Information Circular, 24 February, 1998,

INFCIRC/ 254/ Rev.3/Part 2.

46.Nuclear Engineering International, World Nuclear Industry Handbook 1996,

(Lond on: Reed Business Publishing , 1995), p . 22.

47.Ibid.

http://www.antenna.nl/http://www.barc.ernet.in/http://www.pdffactory.com/http://www.pdffactory.com/http://www.pdffactory.com/http://www.barc.ernet.in/http://www.antenna.nl/


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48.Rahul Bed i, Ind ian nuc lea r plant lea k hits villag e s wa ter , The Elec tronic

Telegrap h, World New s, 4 July, 1995.

49.Ibid.

50.Ibid.

51.Ibid.

52.Naya n Cha nda, The p erils of pow er , Far Eastern Ec onomic Review , 4 Janua ry,

1999.

53.Ibid.

54.S. A. Gopalakrishna n, Of the Shortcom ings, the Risks , Frontline, 8-21 May, 1999.

55.Ag ing Tarap ur Atom ic Pow er Sta tion to Live Longer , Ind ian Express, 25 Ap ril,

1999.

56.The Ac t puts a b an on p rov iding US assistanc e to those c ount ies which m ight get

involved in harnessing nuclear energy for military purposes. India had conducted

a nuclear explosion in 1974, which had be en seen as a c ause o f conc ern by the

nuc lear powe rs, therefore a n at tem pt w as mad e to stop the a ssistanc e o f those

c ountries whic h c ould bec ome a proliferation co nce rn.

57.The Ac t req uired tha t a ll rec ipients of US nuc lea r tec hnology pe rm it full-sc op e

IAEA safeguards. New Delhi declined to do so and the agreement was

terminated we ll be fore 1993.

58.Ux Weekly, 14 September, 1998; in Uranium Institute News Briefing, 9-15

September, 1998, see also http://www.uilondon.org

59.There is c onside rable sc ient ific resea rch which ind ica tes tha t, reac tor-grad e

plutonium c an b e used effectively for making a c rude nuclear devic e, or c an b e

used for high dispensation of radiation in case the material is used for carrying

out radiological terrorism. However, the effectiveness of using this material for

high p rec ision nuclea r dev ic es is questionable

60.Mark Hibb s, Tarap ur-2 to Join Twin BWR in Burning PHWR Pluto nium , Nuc lea r

Fuel, 25 September, 1995, pp. 18-19; Mark Hibbs, China Will Supply U, SWU to

India, Nuclear Fuel, 24 October, 1994, p. 6.

61.Mark Hibb s, Tarap ur-2 to Join Twin BWR in Burning PHWR Pluto nium , Nuc lea r

Fuel, 25 September, 1995, pp. 18-19.

http://www.uilondon.org/http://www.pdffactory.com/http://www.pdffactory.com/http://www.pdffactory.com/http://www.uilondon.org/


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62.Nuclear Engineering International, World Nuclear Industry Handbook 1996,

(Lond on: Reed Business Pub lishing , 1995), p . 113; V.L. Kalyane , ed ., BARC Prog ress

Rep ort 1995 (Mum bai, Ind ia: Bhabha Atom ic Resea rch Centre, 1996), p . 3.

63.Ma rk Hibbs, Ind ian Rep rocessing Programme Grows, Inc reasing Stoc k of

Unsafeg uarded PU , Nuc lea r Fuel, 15 Oc tober, 1990, pp. 5-7; The Bomb BehindNuclea r Pow er , Plutonium Investiga tion, 10 Dec em be r, 1998, pp . 1-6.

64.The sol-gel process uses a g lass-like substanc e to fabric ate nuc lea r fuel tha t is

ea sier and less hazardous to ha ndle than standard nuc lear fuel.

65.David Albright, Frans Berkhout and William Walker, Plutonium And Highly Enric hed

Uranium 1996 (New York: Oxfo rd Unive rsity Press, 1997), p . 181; Nuc lea r

Engineering International, World Nuclea r Industry Handbook 1996 (Lond on: Reed

Business Publishing , 1995), p . 116; Frans Berkhout a nd Surendra Gade

Documents

Indian Nuclear Program