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Inequality: Race, Gender, Class, and Politics
Leslie McCall Professor of Sociology and Political Science (courtesy)
Faculty Fellow, Institute for Policy Research Northwestern University
Outline and Summary (1) Racial inequality: remarkable (and troubling) stability over
time (focus will be on black/white inequality); increasing attention to racial divides
(2) Gender inequality: stabilizes in late 1990s; women’s economic trends now looking more like men’s, leading to stagnant middle class family income
(3) Class inequality: grows within racial groups, among men, and among women; median incomes stagnate since late 1990s, only top earnings and incomes grow
(4) Politics: concerns about income inequality reflect concerns about economic opportunity; politics today are analogous to politics in civil rights era, which focused on reducing inequality in order to expand opportunity
Racial Gaps in Unemployment Widen
M. Hout & E. Cumberworth (Russell Sage Foundation Brief, 2012).
1st Qtr, 2015 10.4% 7.3% 5.1% 3.8%
Peak unemp. rate, all: 10.0% (2009)
Black/White Gaps in Earnings Widen
N. Irwin et al. (New York Times, 2014).
Racial Gaps in Median Income Unchanged (Black/White) or Widen (Hispanic/White)
C. DeNavas-‐Walt & B. Proctor (U.S Census Bureau, 2014).
Black/White Gaps in Income: Progress at Bottom
D. Bloome (American Sociological Review, 2014).
Racial Gaps in Wealth Larger than in Income and Widen
N. Irwin et al. (New York Times, 2014).
Women’s LFPR Stops Increasing in Late 1990s
M. Hout & E. Cumberworth (Russell Sage Foundation Brief, 2012).
Women’s LFPR Falls Relative to Other Countries
F. Blau & L. Kahn (American Economic Review, 2013).
Women’s Median Earnings Stop Increasing in Late 1990s
C. DeNavas-‐Walt & B. Proctor (U.S Census Bureau, 2014).
Women’s Hourly Wages: Only Top Quintile Still Rising
WOMEN J. Bivens, H. Shierholz, & L. Mishel (State of Working America, 2012).
Men’s Hourly Wages: Only Top Decile Still Rising
MEN J. Bivens, H. Shierholz, & L. Mishel (State of Working America, 2012).
Only Earnings of Postgrads Continue to Rise
D. Autor (Science, 2014).
Similar Levels of Earnings Inequality among Men and Women
L. McCall (Council for Contemporary Families Brief, 2014).
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
Ratio of Top to Bottom Weekly Earnings among Full-‐Time Workers , 1970 to 2010
Women
Men
Source: Author's analysis of the March Current Population Survey. Top earnings are the average earnings of workers in the 85th to 95th percentiles. Bottom earnings are the average earnings of workers in the 5thto 15th percentiles. Sample includes 25 to 54 year-‐olds who are not self-‐employed.
Post-‐Tax and Transfer Median Income Also Stagnates
P. Armour, R. Burkhauser, & J. Larrimore (National Tax Journal, 2014).
Part I: Summary (1) Racial inequality: remarkable (and troubling) stability over
time (focusing on black/white inequality); increasing attention to racial divides
(2) Gender inequality: stabilizes in late 1990s; women’s economic trends now looking more like men’s, leading to stagnant middle class family income
(3) Class inequality: grows within racial groups, among men, and among women; median incomes stagnate since late 1990s, only top earnings and incomes grow for both men and women
Part II: Politics of Inequality
(1) Beliefs about Inequality and Opportunity (2) Political Discourses of Inequality
Americans Have Long Desired Less Income Inequality (GSS)
10#
20#
30#
40#
50#
60#
70#
80#
90#
1987# 1992# 1996# 2000# 2008# 2010# 2012#
Percen
t# Income#differences#in#America#are#too#large#
Agreement # ######and#strong#agreement####################################ISSP$Median#########################################
By Some Measures, Intolerance Has Increased Over Time (GSS)
10#
20#
30#
40#
50#
60#
70#
80#
90#
1987# 1992# 1996# 2000# 2008#2010#2012#
Percen
t#
Income#differences#are#too#large#Inequality#con?nues#to#exist#to#benefit#rich#and#powerful#Large#income#differences#are#unnecessary#for#prosperity#
#Agree#and##strongly#agree###
228K
18K
800K
25K 100K
25K
200K
30K 0
100
200
300
400
500
600
700
800
900 3,250K
35K
2,000K
40K 0
500
1,000
1,500
2,000
2,500
3,000
3,500
US Public (GSS) Top 1% (SESA) Estimated pay & ratio Desired pay & ratio Estimated Desired 2000: 13/1 2010: 32/1 2000: 4/1 2010: 7/1 2011: 93/1 2011: 50/1
Americans Not More Likely to Be Duped by American Dream (GSS/ISSP, 2010)
96#92#
73#
50#
24#31# 31#
1#
13#
46#
21#
39#
0#
10#
20#
30#
40#
50#
60#
70#
80#
90#
100#
US,#Pub
lic#
US,#Top#
1%#
ISSP#Media
n#
US,#Pub
lic#
US,#Top#
1%#
ISSP#Media
n#
US,#Pub
lic#
US,#Top#
1%#
ISSP#Media
n#
US,#Pub
lic#
US,#Top#
1%#
ISSP#Media
n#
Percen
t#
Parent's) ) )))Coming)from)a ))))))))Knowing)the)educa6on...))))))))))))))))wealthy)family... ))))))))right)people...####################################is#essenBal/very#important#for#geIng#ahead#(%)#
Hard)work#is#essenBal/very#important#for#geIng#ahead#(%)##################################
Americans’ Optimism about Upward Mobility Fluctuates
0"
10"
20"
30"
40"
50"
60"
70"
80"
90"
100"
1987" 1992" 1994" 1996" 1998" 2000" 2002" 2004" 2006" 2008" 2010" 2012"
Percent"
Agree"and"strongly"agree"
Disagree"and"strongly"disagree"
Neither"agree"nor"disagree""
"The"way"things"are"in"America,"people"like"me"and"my"family"have"a"good"chance"
of"improving"our"standard"of"living.""
Inequality Trends Hold after Compositional/Behavioral Controls (outcome = average of three inequality questions scaled from 0 to 1)
-0.05
0.00
0.05
0.10
0.15 19
92-1
987
1996
-198
7
2000
-198
7
2008
-198
7
2010
-198
7
2012
-198
7
1992
-198
7
1996
-198
7
2000
-198
7
2008
-198
7
2010
-198
7
2012
-198
7
Avg
. dis
cret
e ch
ange
from
198
7 w
ith 9
5% C
I
Each%year's%increase%rela.ve%to%1987,%without%controls%
Each%year's%increase%rela.ve%to%1987,%with%all%controls%and%interac.ons%%
Trends Affected by Mobility Optimism and Political Orientation (outcome = average of three inequality questions scaled from 0 to 1)
-0.05
0.00
0.05
0.10
0.15 19
92-1
987
1996
-198
7
2000
-198
7
2008
-198
7
2010
-198
7
2012
-198
7
1992
-198
7
1996
-198
7
2000
-198
7
2008
-198
7
2010
-198
7
2012
-198
7
Avg
. dis
cret
e ch
ange
from
198
7 w
ith 9
5% C
I
Model&includes&all&controls&except&focal&variable(s)&
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!plus!focal!variable:&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&plus!focal!variables:&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&mobility&op8mism&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&poli8cal&ideology,&par8sanship&&&
Trends Less Affected by Demographics and Economic Status (outcome = average of three inequality questions scaled from 0 to 1)
-0.05
0.00
0.05
0.10
0.15 19
92-1
987
1996
-198
7
2000
-198
7
2008
-198
7
2010
-198
7
2012
-198
7
1992
-198
7
1996
-198
7
2000
-198
7
2008
-198
7
2010
-198
7
2012
-198
7
Avg
. dis
cret
e ch
ange
from
198
7 w
ith 9
5% C
I
Model&includes&all&controls&except&focal&variable(s)&
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!plus!focal!variables:&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&plus!focal!variables:&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&demographics&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&educa9on,&family&income&&&
Summary of Beliefs
(1) Most Americans desire less inequality (2) Intolerance of inequality is increasing by some measures (3) Many Americans recognize barriers to opportunity
(typically more than in other countries and more than top 1%)
(4) Such perceptions are increasing by some measures (5) Concerns about opportunity are associated with desires
for less inequality (McCall 2013)
What are the political implications?
New Framework (1) Dominant redistributive models, and elite partisan
approaches that embed these models, are limited:
Conservatives/Republicans: “equalize opportunities, not outcomes” (e.g., economic growth, education) Liberals/Democrats: “equalize outcomes” (e.g., taxing and social spending).
(2) Non-‐elite driven alternative (e.g., MacLean 2006): “equalize outcomes to equalize opportunities” (e.g., civil rights rights agenda – EEO, affirmative action, comparable worth).
Alternatives, Part I: Labor Market Redistribution (i.e., “equalize outcomes to equalize opportunities”)
Examples:
(1) Say-‐on-‐pay laws (Switzerland, Dodd-‐Frank) (2) Disclosure of executive/median worker pay (Dodd-‐Frank) (3) EU caps on banker bonuses (4) B Corp and Corporate Social Responsibility movements (5) Employee Stock Ownership Plans (Blasi, Kruse & Freeman) (6) Anti-‐Wal-‐Mart campaigns (Ingram, Qingyuan & Rao) (7) Minimum/living wage/wage theft campaigns (8) Fast food worker strikes for higher pay (9) Family leave campaigns (Milkman & Appelbaum) (10) State anti-‐de-‐unionization battles (Ohio, Wisconsin) (11) Ban-‐the-‐box and other anti-‐discrimination efforts (12) Wage targeting: A Triple Mandate for the Fed
Alternatives, Part II: Education (not Welfare) (i.e., “equalize outcomes to equalize opportunities”)
“Raises tax on household income at and above $250,000 (and $125,000 for individual filers). Reduces income taxes on unemployment benefits in 2009. Provides funds currently budgeted for education, health care, public safety, other services.”
Oregon Ballot Measure 66/67 Passed, 54% of vote, January, 2010
“Temporary Taxes to Fund Education. Guaranteed Local Public Safety Funding. Initiative Constitutional Amendment.”
California Proposition 30 Passed, 55% of vote, November, 2012
Alternatives, Part II: Education (not Welfare) (i.e., “equalize outcomes to equalize opportunities”)
Other Examples:
(1) Bill Di Blasio: Raise taxes on rich to fund universal pre-‐K (2) “Millionaire taxes”: New Jersey (2004), California (2005),
Maryland (2008), Hawaii (2009), Wisconsin (2009), New York (2009), Connecticut (2010) (see Young and Varner)
(3) Social Investment and Inclusion strategies in Europe e.g., UK Commission on Social Mobility and Child Poverty (Reeves; Morel, Palier & Palme; Larsen)
(4) Focus on “IGM” definition of opportunity in US (Chetty et al.)
(5) Apprenticeships and Training Partnerships (e.g., Lerman; Center on Wisconsin Strategy)
No Increase in Desire for Government Redistribution
-0.35
-0.30
-0.25
-0.20
-0.15
-0.10
-0.05
0.00
0.05
0.10
0.15
0.20 19
92-1
987
1996
-198
7
2000
-198
7
2008
-198
7
2010
-198
7
2012
-198
7
Avg
. dis
cret
e ch
ange
from
198
7 Model&excludes&inequality&a1tudes&index&(but&includes&controls)&1
03
05
07
0
1987 1992 1996 2000 2008 2010 2012
Government Should Reduce Rich/Poor Gap (%)
Increase in Desire for Spending on Education
-0.35
-0.30
-0.25
-0.20
-0.15
-0.10
-0.05
0.00
0.05
0.10
0.15
0.20 19
92-1
987
1996
-198
7
2000
-198
7
2008
-198
7
2010
-198
7
2012
-198
7
Avg
. dis
cret
e ch
ange
from
198
7 Model&excludes&inequality&a1tudes&index&(but&includes&controls)&1
03
05
07
0
1987 1992 1996 2000 2008 2010 2012
Supports more Spending on Education (%)
Testing Preferences for Labor Market Redistribution
General Social Survey (GSS/ISSP), 2012 (eqwlth) Amazon Mechanical Turk Survey (Mturk), 2014 (N=953) “Some people think that the government ought to reduce income differences between the rich and the poor, perhaps by raising the taxes of wealthy families or by giving income assistance to the poor. Others think the government should not concern itself with reducing this income difference between the rich and poor… What comes closest to the way you feel?” 1= Government should do something to reduce differences . . .
7= Government should not concern itself with such differences
Testing Preferences for Labor Market Redistribution
General Social Survey (GSS/ISSP), 2014 (new question, not available) Amazon Mechanical Turk Survey (Mturk), 2014 (N=953) “Some people think that major companies ought to reduce pay differences between employees with high pay and those with low pay, perhaps by reducing the pay of executives or by increasing the pay of unskilled workers. Others think that major companies should not concern themselves with reducing this pay difference … What comes closest to the way you feel?” 1= Major companies should do something to reduce differences . . .
7= Major companies should not concern themselves with such differences
Testing Preferences for Labor Market Redistribution (mTurk survey, 2014)
28# 25#
39#
50#56#
62# 64#
83# 80#
0#
10#
20#
30#
40#
50#
60#
70#
80#
90#
100#
Gov,#GS
S,#'12#
Gov,#Mturk
,#'14#
Bus,#Mturk
,#'14#
Gov,#GS
S,#'12#
Gov,#Mturk
,#'14#
Bus,#Mturk
,#'14#
Gov,#GS
S,#'12#
Gov,#Mturk
,#'14#
Bus,#Mturk
,#'14#
Percen
t#
#####Support#for#government#and#business#to#reduce#income#differences#(%)#!!!!!!!Republicans! ! !!!Independents !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!Democrats#############
Testing Preferences for Labor Market Redistribution (mTurk survey, 2014)
19# 21#
4#7#
11#
37#
8#11#
2#7#
31#
41#
0#
10#
20#
30#
40#
50#
60#
Don't#Re
duce#
Low#Inco
me#Ind#Char
i?es#
High#Inco
me#Ind#
Governm
ent#
Major#Com
panies#
Don't#Re
duce#
Low#Inco
me#Ind#Char
i?es#
High#Inco
me#Ind#
Governm
ent#
Major#Com
panies#
Percen
t#
Which#of#the#following#groups#has#the#greatest#responsibility#for#reducing####differences#in#income#between#those#with#high#and#low#incomes?#(%)#!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!Republicans!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!Independents !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!#############
Revise Conventional Models (1) Conservatives/Republicans:
From “equal opportunity, not equal outcomes” to ???
Liberals/Democrats:
From “equal outcomes” to ??? (e.g., “taxing & spending” to “taxing for opportunity”)
(2) Non-‐elite alternative draws analogy from civil rights strategies:
Reduce labor market and educational inequality as an equal opportunity strategy (e.g., affirmative action, comparable worth)
Conclusion
Absence of political and economic innovation and leadership is primary obstacle to reducing inequality, not public tolerance or ignorance. New emphasis in research literature on connections between racial, gender, and class inequality, and the political strategies to address each are converging.