Pamphlet No. 2

Infantry Company Group Tactics

RESTRICTED

Army Code No. 71612 D/HQT/18/28/137

Infantry Tactical DoctrineVolume 1The Infantry Company Group

1998

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTEDii

SECURITYThis document is issued for the information of such persons who need to know its con-tents in the course of their official duties. Any person finding this document should handit into a British Forces unit or to a British police station for its safe return to the MINISTRYOF DEFENCE, D MOD SY, LONDON SW1A 2HB, with particulars of how and wherefound. THE UNAUTHORIZED RETENTION OR DESTRUCTION OF THIS DOCUMENTCOULD BE AN OFFENCE UNDER THE OFFICIAL SECRETS ACTS OF 1911–1989.

COPYRIGHTThis work is Crown copyright and the intellectual property rights for this publicationbelong exclusively to the Ministry of Defence (MOD). No material or information con-tained in this publication should be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmit-ted in any form outside MOD establishments except as authorized by both the sponsorand the MOD where appropriate.

STATUSThe contents provide clear military information concerning the most up to date experi-ence and best practice available for commanders and troops to use in their operationsand training. If you are prosecuted for a breach of health and safety law, and it is provedthat you have not followed the relevant provisions of the ACOP, a court may find youcriminally liable unless you can show that you have complied with the requirements ofhealth and safety legislation since it is a breach of this legislation which renders a per-son criminally liable. Breaches or omissions of the ACOP could result in disciplinaryaction under the provisions of the Army Act.

AMENDMENTS

DISTRIBUTION(See page vi)

FOR THE ATTENTION OF ALL SCALE HOLDERSUnits requiring an increase or decrease to their scale should apply to DGD&D,Publications who will arrange for a revised distribution. Any request to exceed the scalemust be supported by a written justification which is to be referred by DGD&D to HQInfantry for approval.

Amdt No. Date Amdt No. Date Amdt No. Date

AUTHORITYThis publication is issued under the overall direction of the CGS. It is an MOD ApprovedCode of Practice (ACOP). Where issues of health and safety are concerned it takes intoaccount the provisions of the Health and Safety at Work Act 1974.

RESTRICTED Army Code No. 71612D/HQT/18/28/137

RESTRICTED 1998

Infantry Tactical Doctrine Volume 1

The Infantry Company Group

Pamphlet No. 2Infantry Company Group Tactics

Prepared under the direction

of the Chief of the General Staff

Ministry of Defence

April 1998

Crown Copyright Reserved

The Infantry Mission is —

‘to close with and engage the enemy in all operationaltheatres and environments, in order to bring about hisdefeat’.

RESTRICTEDiv

FOREWORD

1. The development of doctrine is a continuous process and the informationcontained in the series of Infantry Doctrine Publications will naturally be subject tochange. This change will either be driven from higher level developments or from fieldexperience. Any person wishing to propose amendments to the pamphlets in Volume1 is strongly encouraged to write to SO2 TD, Force Development Branch,Headquarters Infantry, Warminster Training Centre, Warminster, Wiltshire, BA12 0DJ.All proposals will be considered for submission to the Infantry Doctrine WorkingGroup. Other queries should be made to Infantry Publications (same address), ATNWarminster Mil ext 2325/2452.

2. Infantry Doctrine forms part of a coherent hierarchy of doctrine publications.Associated publications are: British Defence Doctrine; The British Military Doctrine;ADP Volume 1 — Operations; ADP Volume 2 — Command; AFM Volume 1 Part 2 —Battlegroup Tactics; Army Unit SOPs, and the Tactical Aide Memoire. British ArmyReview, Army Training and Doctrine News and The Infantryman provide currentthought and discussion on doctrine matters.

3. Individuals should first read the Introduction on page xi which explains the aim,layout and scope of this pamphlet as well as the structure and breakdown of InfantryTactical Doctrine Publications.

4. This is a new pamphlet and should be issued with its own binder.

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED v

DISTRIBUTION (1)HQs Commands, Divisions, Brigades and Directorates

(less HQ Infantry) — 5 copies eachInfantry

HQ Infantry/Infantry Reps and LOs — 10 copiesRegular and TA Battalions (2) — 35 copies eachIndependent/Detached Infantry Companies — 5 copies eachHome Service Battalions — 5 copies eachTraining Team Brunei — 5 copiesITDU — One copy

SAS Regiments — 10 copies eachInfantry Training Centres

Warminster — 185 copiesCatterick — 10 copiesWales — 10 copies

Army Training Regiments/Training Depots — 2 copies eachRoyal Military Academy Sandhurst — 10 copiesCATC — 2 copiesCACTG — 5 copiesCAS — 70 copiesHQ TSC (Germany) — 2 copiesBATUS — 2 copiesDGD&D–LW1 — 2 copiesJSCSC — 20 copiesAJD (JSCSC) — 20 copiesRoyal Marines

HQ Royal Marines — 2 copiesCommandos — 10 copies eachCTC RM — 10 copies

RAF Regiment Squadrons — 2 copies eachOther Arms and Services

Major Units only — One copy eachNotes:1. General.

a. The previous system of A to F scaling is being phased out for GSTPs asnew or revised publications are issued. Units will in future receive a specific ini-tial entitlement as decided by the sponsor.b. Requests for additional copies must be fully justified and are to be madeto DGD&D, Publications in the first instance. Requests will fall into one of threecategories and are to be specified:

(1) Replacement Issue. To bring units back up to entitlement as aresult of loss or damage.(2) Supplementary Issue. This applies when a unit’s role or circum-stance changes necessitating an increase to the original entitlement.(3) New Issue. This is where a unit has not previously been scaled fora particular publication.

c. Units are reminded that all publications are accountable documents and theirissue and receipt should be the responsibility of a nominated officer or SNCO.

2. Specific. Distribution of this pamphlet to Regular and TA Infantry Battalionsallows for one copy per officer.

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTEDvi

CONTENTS

Page

Foreword ..................................................................................................... vDistribution .................................................................................................. viContents ...................................................................................................... viiList of Illustrations ....................................................................................... ixIntroduction ................................................................................................. xi

CHAPTER 1. — OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS

Section 1. — Fundamentals .................................................................... 1–1Section 2. — Forces and Tasks .............................................................. 1–13Section 3. — Organization ...................................................................... 1–21Section 4. — Planning and Preparation .................................................. 1–24Section 5. — Conduct ............................................................................. 1–30Section 6. — Command and Control ...................................................... 1–43Section 7. — Combat Service Support ................................................... 1–45

Annex A — The Night Attack ................................................................ 1A–1Appendix 1. Marking a Company Night Attack FUP andLD .................................................................................... 1A1–1

Annex B — Infiltration ........................................................................... 1B–1

CHAPTER 2. — DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS

Section 1. — Fundamentals .................................................................... 2–1Section 2. — Forces and Tasks .............................................................. 2–8Section 3. — Planning and Preparation .................................................. 2–11Section 4. — Conduct ............................................................................. 2–24Section 5. — Command and Control ...................................................... 2–28Section 6. — Combat Service Support ................................................... 2–30

Annex A — Reserved Demolitions ....................................................... 2A–1Appendix 1. AF W 9811 ................................................... 2A1–1

Annex B — Routine in Defence (24 Hour Period) ................................ 2B–1Annex C — UK Mine Warfare Doctrine ................................................. 2C–1

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED vii

Page

CHAPTER 3. — DELAY OPERATIONS

Section 1. — Fundamentals .................................................................... 3–1Section 2. — Forces and Tasks .............................................................. 3–5Section 3. — Organization ...................................................................... 3–7Section 4. — Planning and Preparation .................................................. 3–7Section 5. — Conduct ............................................................................. 3–11Section 6. — Command and Control ...................................................... 3–12Section 7. — Combat Service Support ................................................... 3–12

CHAPTER 4. — TRANSITIONAL PHASES DURING OPERATIONS

Section 1. — Introduction ........................................................................ 4–1Section 2. — Advance to Contact ........................................................... 4–2Section 3. — Meeting Engagement ........................................................ 4–12Section 4. — Link-Up Operations ............................................................ 4–15Section 5. — Withdrawal ......................................................................... 4–17Section 6. — Relief of Troops in Combat ................................................ 4–23

CHAPTER 5. — OTHER OPERATIONAL TASKS

Section 1. — General .............................................................................. 5–1Section 2. — Patrolling ............................................................................ 5–1Section 3. — Raids .................................................................................. 5–5Section 4. — Ambushes .......................................................................... 5–7Section 5. — Observation Posts (OPs) ................................................... 5–21Section 6. — Fire Planning ..................................................................... 5–27Section 7. — Battlefield Illumination ........................................................ 5–30Section 8. — Protection and Security ..................................................... 5–32Section 9. — NBC Warfare (Nuclear, Biological and Chemical) ............. 5–50

Annex A — Splinter Distance Chart for Fire Planning .......................... 5A–1

CHAPTER 6. — OPERATIONS IN SPECIFIC ENVIRONMENTS

Section 1. — Introduction ........................................................................ 6–1Section 2. — Crossing and Breaching of Obstacles ............................... 6–2Section 3. — Fighting in Built-Up Areas (FIBUA) ................................... 6–12Section 4. — Operations in Forests ........................................................ 6–36Section 5. — Operations in Conditions of Limited Visibility .................... 6–44

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTEDviii

ILLUSTRATIONS

Figure No Page

1 Forms of Manoeuvre in the Attack — Frontal ......................... 1–92 Forms of Manoeuvre in the Attack — Penetration .................. 1–93 Forms of Manoeuvre in the Attack — Envelopment ............... 1–104 Forms of Manoeuvre in the Attack — Turning Movement ...... 1–105 Forms of Manoeuvre in the Attack — Infiltration .................... 1–116 Separate FUPs ........................................................................ 1–227 Stages of an Attack ................................................................. 1–318 Envelop ................................................................................... 1–369 Flank Support .......................................................................... 1–36

10 Rear Support ........................................................................... 1–3711 Possible Layout of a Company Night FUP (not to scale) ....... 1A–312 Approach Using One Route .................................................... 1A–713 Approach Using Platoon Routes ............................................. 1A–714 Mutual Support: Interlocking and Overlapping Fire ................ 2–315 Delay from Successive Positions ............................................ 3–316 Delay from Alternate Positions (Platoon Level Delay) ............ 3–417 The Company Group in the Advance ..................................... 4–418 Layout of a Company Deliberate Area Ambush ..................... 5–17

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED ix

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTEDx

INFANTRY TACTICAL DOCTRINE

VOLUME 1 — THE INFANTRY COMPANY GROUP

Pamphlet No. 2

INFANTRY COMPANY GROUP TACTICS

INTRODUCTION

Aim

1. The aim of Pamphlet No. 2 is to providea firm doctrinal base to allow companycommanders to train their companies foroperations, plan those operations and thensuccessfully lead their companies in war.

Layout

2. The pamphlet is structured closely onthe format of ATP–35(B). Sections within the chapters therefore generally follow thissequence:

a. Section 1. — The Fundamentals.

b. Section 2. — Forces and Tasks.

c. Section 3. — Organization.

d. Section 4. — Planning and Preparation.

e. Section 5. — Conduct.

f. Section 6. — Command and Control.

g. Section 7. — Combat Service Support.

Scope

3. While Pamphlet No. 1 provides the theory and background knowledge, thispamphlet provides the doctrine for the tactical practices and procedures at companygroup level. Platoon level tactics are covered in the new Pamphlet No. 3 which is anupdated version of the old Pamphlet No. 45, Part 2.

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED xi

Contents

CHAPTER 1. — OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS

CHAPTER 2. — DEFENSIVE OPERATIONSCHAPTER 3. — DELAY OPERATIONSCHAPTER 4. — TRANSITIONAL PHASESDURING OPERATIONSCHAPTER 5. — OTHER OPERATIONAL TASKSCHAPTER 6. — OPERATIONS IN SPECIFICENVIRONMENTS

4. The organizational setting for the tactical doctrine is the light role company group.The light role company has been chosen as its practices and procedures provide thetactical ‘default setting’ for the Infantry and have general applicability. Procedureswhich are particular to a type of battalion (e.g., armoured infantry) are described insubsequent pamphlets in Volume I. The company group is defined as a rifle company,or part of a company, with its headquarters and one or more combat attachments to itsnormal establishment. A company group could, therefore, range in size from acompany with a MFC to a company supported by the full range of combat and combatsupport assets. The tactical doctrine described does not assume a task organizationand considers the employment of the company and its likely combat support assets inhigh intensity warfare.

Tactics

5. Tactics is the art of using your resources to their best advantage, taking intoaccount the composition of your force, the ground over which it has to operate, thestrength and disposition of the enemy and his likely reaction to your moves. It is partflair and part knowledge which, after study and practice, add up to experience andconfidence. It is essentially the application of firepower at the right time and place.

6. Tactical ability not only saves lives but in husbanding resources lengthens theodds in your favour. A calculated risk is always acceptable in war but the aim shouldbe, by study and practice, to eliminate the risk and allow calculation to predominate.

Structure of Infantry Tactical Doctrine Publications

7. The Doctrine Hierarchy. The doctrine hierarchy ensures that Army doctrinecascades from policy and principles to practical applications and procedures. Thereare three elements to the hierarchy:

a. Principles. Principles are the guiding doctrine that is concerned withoperational art and the British outlook on operations contained in BritishDefence Doctrine (JWP 0–01). From this overarching publication is derived theBritish Military Doctrine (BMD), Army Doctrine Publications (ADPs) and variousJoint publications.

b. Practices. Practices encompass the tactical doctrine that providesguidance appropriate to specific levels of command. The practical application oftactical doctrine for field commanders at formation and battlegroup level arecontained in the Army Field Manuals. Infantry practices at company level andbelow are contained in a new range of pamphlets in the Infantry TacticalDoctrine series.

c. Procedures. Procedures are a common set of drills for the effectiveexercise of command and are the mechanics that ensure the success of

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTEDxii

operations. At Army level procedures are detailed in publications such asAFSOPs, AUSOPs and TAM. Infantry procedures are contained in the InfantryTactical Doctrine series.

8. Infantry Doctrine Development. The Director of Infantry is charged by theChief of the General Staff with the development of Infantry tactical doctrine atcompany level and below. Development of this doctrine is the responsibility of theInfantry Force Development Committee (IFDC) whose aim is to integrate the fivefunctional areas of Infantry Fighting Power: doctrine, equipment, structures, trainingand manpower and logistics. Each of these functional areas is represented by aWorking Group whose aim is to provide advice and guidance to the IFDC in their area,in conjunction with the Force Development branch of Headquarters Infantry.

9. Infantry Tactical Doctrine. Infantry tactical doctrine is defined as ‘tacticaldoctrine to provide guidance to commanders by detailing practices and proceduresappropriate to their level of command’. Tactical doctrine cannot remain stationary andmust evolve in line with changing threats, new concepts, organizations, weapons andsystems, operational reports, observations from training and feedback from units.However, it will be noted that although it has been updated and now embraces themanoeuvrist approach and mission command the doctrine contained in this first issueof the Infantry Tactical Doctrine series is current but not new. This is for two reasons:first, the Army’s and the Infantry’s force development work is still maturing; andsecondly, company level doctrine has not previously existed and the aim of this firstissue, therefore, is to provide a common, coherent basis from which future changescan be made.

Breakdown of Infantry Tactical Doctrine Publications

10. Infantry tactical doctrine is contained in two volumes:

a. Volume 1 — The Infantry Company Group.

b. Volume 2 — The Tactical Employment of Infantry Weapons and Systems.

11. The detailed breakdown of the pamphlets is as follows:

a. Volume 1 — The Infantry Company Group.

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED xiii

PamphletNo Title

1

2

3

The Infantry Company Group — The Fundamentals

Infantry Company Group Tactics

Infantry Platoon Tactics

b. Volume 2 — The Tactical Employment of Infantry Weapons and Systems.

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTEDxiv

PamphletNo Title

4

5

Armoured Infantry Company Group Tactics

Infantry Company Group Jungle Tactics

PamphletNo Title

1 Infantry Tactical Doctrine Notes

2 The Medium Mortar — 81 mm L16

3 Anti-Tank Guided Weapons MILAN

Chapter 1

OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS

SECTION 1. — FUNDAMENTALS

General

0101. Ultimate success in battle isachieved by offensive action. Even in thedefence, a commander must take everyopportunity to seize the initiative and carrythe battle to the enemy. Offensive operationsare the decisive operation of war. The princi-ples and procedures covered in this chapterapply not only to offensive operations; theyare equally applicable to counterattackslaunched as part of defensive operations orin a meeting engagement, when the com-mander decides to attack the opposingforces in order to seize the initiative.

Principles

0102. The following principles are of particular importance in offensive operations:

a. Intelligence. The commander requires all available intelligence on theenemy and information on the ground, including details of approach routes, theobjective and areas in depth.

b. Surprise. The attacker has the initiative and can achieve surprise in hisselection of the timing and direction of the attack.

c. Concentration of Combat Power. Sufficient combat power must be con-centrated quickly to overcome the enemy’s defence and penetrate through hisdefences. Forces should be concentrated where the enemy is weakest orwhere the terrain offers the best opportunity to make maximum use of mobilityand fire.

d. Maintenance of Momentum. Manoeuvre should avoid enemy strengthsand create opportunities to increase the effect of friendly fire. The generation ofechelons and reserves are essential to the maintenance of momentum.

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED 1-1

`çåíÉåíë

Page

SECTION 1. — FUNDAMENTALS 1–1SECTION 2. — FORCES AND TASKS 1–13SECTION 3. — ORGANIZATION 1–21SECTION 4. — PLANNING AND PREPARATION 1–24SECTION 5. — CONDUCT 1–30SECTION 6. — COMMAND AND CONTROL 1–43SECTION 7. — COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT 1–45

Annexes:

A. The Night AttackB. Infiltration

e. Security. The attack must be launched from a secure base, across asecure line of departure. Attention must be paid to flank security.

f. Manoeuvre. As the forces will move quickly it is essential that there isclose coordination between the fire of all weapons. Firepower destroys, neu-tralises and suppresses; it is essential in defeating the enemy’s ability to fight.When combined with movement it allows a force to manoeuvre into a positionof advantage in respect of the enemy from which force can be threatened orapplied.

g. Deception. Deception seeks to manipulate the enemy’s perception of thesituation and is used in the offence to:

(1) Provide security to the deploying force.

(2) Give the offensive commander the opportunity to exercise someinfluence over the enemy’s course of action.

h. Terrain. The best use of the terrain should be made in order to:

(1) Improve observation.

(2) Obtain cover and concealment.

(3) Obtain better fields of fire.

(4) Enhance manoeuvre.

(5) Secure approaches.

(6) Improve security of forces.

(7) Hamper enemy movement.

(8) Establish a base for launching further operations.

Purpose

0103. The purpose of offensive operations is to defeat the enemy by the applica-tion of focused violence. Manoeuvre in depth poses an enduring and substantialthreat to which the enemy must respond. The attack must, therefore, focus not onlyon the enemy’s forward positions but throughout his depth. This will force the enemyto react rather than take the initiative. Physical destruction of the enemy is a meansof creating paralysis and confusion. This destroys the coherence of the enemy’sdefence and fragments and isolates his combat power.

0104. Specific purposes of offensive action might be to:

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED1-2

a. Destroy an enemy force.

b. Seize ground.

c. Gain information (reconnaissance in force).

d. Deprive the enemy of resources.

e. Deceive the enemy or divert him from friendly forces’ Main Effort.

f. Fix the enemy to prevent him from regrouping or repositioning his forces.

g. Pre-empt to gain the initiative.

h. Disrupt enemy offensive action.

Tactical Techniques in Combat

0105. In planning and executing offensive operations the company group com-mander should seek to avoid bludgeoning it out with the enemy in a fair fight. Ratherthan dissipating the company group’s forces against the enemy’s defences, whichare likely to be on ground of his own choosing, the company group commandershould use every means at his disposal, and every technique available, to compelthe enemy to react in such a way that he exposes himself to destruction with minimalattrition to the company group’s combat power. The true aim of the company groupoffensive operations, therefore, is not to fight the enemy in his defensive position, butto destroy him during exploitation and pursuit, on ground which does not suit hisforces. This may be achieved by the application of all of the tactical techniques incombat, employed in combination with carefully selected forms of attack andmanoeuvre.

0106. Seizing the Initiative. During offensive action initiative implies neverallowing the enemy to recover from the initial shock of the attack. This is achievedthrough the use of surprise, identifying the enemy’s weaknesses and consequentlyselecting the time and place of the attack. Manoeuvre, closely integrated with fire-power, is then employed to create a fluid situation in which the enemy is forced toreact to events. As this occurs, friendly forces must act quickly to exploit the situa-tion. Retaining the initiative throughout the operation necessitates looking aheadbeyond the initial attack and anticipating events that may occur. Once contact ismade with the enemy it should be maintained and not readily given up.

0107. Synchronization. Synchronization is the focus of resources and activitiesto produce maximum combat power at the decisive time and place. Synchronizationmaximises economy of force, with every resource being used where it will make thegreatest contribution to success. In attack, it concentrates the manoeuvre force andfirepower at the decisive point.

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED 1-3

0108. Tempo. Tempo is the rate of activity relative to the enemy. Tempo involvesthe imposition of threats to which the enemy is unable to react; his responses aremade inappropriate in terms of either time or space. He reacts too late or in the wrongplace. Tempo consists of three elements: speed of decision, speed of execution andthe speed of transition from one activity to another. This requires fast thinking andquick decisions. It also necessitates the ability of all elements of the company groupto achieve rapid execution. To a large extent this will depend on the ability of com-pany and platoon commanders, troop leaders and MILAN section commanders toconduct independent action within the commander’s intent. Success will be gained ifthis action is achieved at a quicker rate than the enemy who, although he may knowwhat is about to happen, will not be able to do anything about it. As a result he willlose the cohesion he requires to continue the fight.

0109. Main Effort. The company group commander must designate a MainEffort in order to provide a focus for the activities of all elements of the companygroup. The activity designated by the Main Effort must then be supported by thewhole company group. The identification of the Main Effort permits initiative and free-dom of action for subordinate commanders. If necessary, to ensure success, thecompany group commander must be prepared to shift the Main Effort.

0110. Surprise. Surprise makes a major and often disproportionate contributionto the defeat of the enemy. Surprise will be achieved by doing the unexpected andthereby creating and exploiting opportunities. Its effect can be enhanced through theuse of speed, secrecy and deception.

0111. Deception. Deception is a vital part of offensive operations. It serves tomask the real objectives of the attack and in particular the Main Effort. It delays effec-tive enemy reaction by misleading him about friendly intentions, capabilities andobjectives. Any company group level deception plan must be coordinated with high-er level deception through battlegroup HQ so that plans reinforce rather than canceleach other. A sound deception plan should be simple, believable and not so costlythat it diverts significant resources from the Main Effort. Because a deception planseeks an enemy response, it must be targeted against the enemy commander whohas the freedom of action to respond to it as the company group commanderrequires. The deception plan is more likely to be successful if it encourages theenemy to pursue the course of action he has already chosen, i.e., it reinforces hisexpectations. Every company group operation should include a deception plan.

0112. Echeloning and Reserves. Forces must be held in reserve to deal withthe unexpected and to maintain the momentum of the attack by quickly exploitingsuccess when the opportunity is presented. Reserves should not be confused withforces specifically designated for any subsequent phase in the attack, or pre-plannedtask. These are echeloned forces, and will lack the freedom required by reserves.

0113. Integrating Combat Service Support. Tactical plans will not succeedwithout fully integrated Combat Service Support. The company group commandermust ensure that his attack can be sustained at every stage of its execution.

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED1-4

Types of Offensive Operations

0114. The company group may participate in the following types of offensive oper-ations:

a. Reconnaissance in force.

b. Raid.

c. Feint and demonstration.

d. Counterattack and spoiling attack.

e. Quick attack.

f. Deliberate attack.

0115. Reconnaissance in Force. The purpose of a reconnaissance in force is tocompel the enemy to disclose the location, size, strength, disposition or intention ofhis force by making him respond to offensive action. The enemy’s reaction mayreveal weaknesses in his defensive system. A company group is most likely to con-duct reconnaissance in force as part of a battlegroup operation, utilising either thewhole company group or one or more of its elements. The force employed for thistask must be sufficiently strong to force a reaction by the enemy. The reconnaissanceforce commander must always seek opportunities for wider exploitation. Unless suchan opportunity is presented, the force conducting the operation must aim to avoidmore decisive engagement. The reconnaissance force may be directed to fix theenemy, attack or withdraw once the primary task is complete.

0116. Raid. The purpose of a raid is to disrupt the enemy, by destroying or cap-turing a vital asset, such as a command post, OP or logistic group. A raid is likely torequire the committal of the complete company group, either acting independently oras part of a larger force. A raid will be based on detailed intelligence. It will requireswift movement into hostile territory and will end with a planned withdrawal.Opportunities for wider exploitation must be sought during the course of a raid,although the probable lack of combat service support accompanying a raiding forceis likely to preclude protracted operations. Further details are in Chapter 5.

0117. Feint and Demonstration. Feints and demonstrations are deceptionoperations, with contrasting aims:

a. Feint. The purpose of a feint is to distract the attention of an enemy forceby seeking combat with it. To achieve the required effect, a feint is likely torequire the complete company group in attack, either independently or, morelikely, as part of a battlegroup operation.

b. Demonstration. The purpose of a demonstration is to distract theenemy’s attention without seeking combat. A company group’s task within ademonstration is likely to involve movement to deceive the enemy.

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED 1-5

c. As with all deception operations, feints and demonstrations will be mosteffective when:

(1) They support the enemy’s expectations.

(2) They appear as a definite threat to the enemy.

(3) The enemy has in the past demonstrated a tendency to commitreserves early.

(4) The action would be a realistic option for attack.

0118. Counterattack and Spoiling Attack.

a. General. Counterattacks and spoiling attacks are both aimed at enemyoffensive action. Both forms of attack are likely to require the full combat powerof the company group, acting either independently or as part of a battlegroupoperation.

b. Counterattack. The counterattack is an attack by all or part of a defend-ing force against an enemy attacking force for such purposes as regaining lostground or cutting off or destroying enemy advanced elements. The companygroup is likely to conduct or take part in a counterattack when it is a reserve, orwhen it is a forward element uncommitted at the time.

c. Spoiling Attack. A spoiling attack is an attack aimed at disrupting anenemy force which is in the preliminary stages of an attack. It aims to strike theenemy while he is most vulnerable. This is likely to be while he is on the move,in an assembly area or attack position. Although the spoiling attack is normallylimited to disruption, the commander must always seek the opportunity forwider exploitation, such as the total destruction of the enemy force.

0119. Hasty Attack.

a. A hasty attack is an attack in which preparation time is traded for speed inorder to exploit an opportunity. The hasty attack seeks to take advantage of theenemy’s lack of readiness. As much information about the enemy as possibleis required, but there will be little time for reconnaissance. The company com-mander must issue the briefest of orders.

b. The hasty attack must be conducted as rapidly as possible in order toincrease the chances of surprise, and deny the enemy time to improve hisdefences and prepare his position and reaction. To achieve this, the aim shouldbe to violently assault the enemy continuously from the time of first contact untilhe has been destroyed or surrenders.

c. The enemy is attacked by direct fire from whatever elements can bebrought into contact immediately, reinforced subsequently by further assets and

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED1-6

by indirect fire. Concurrently with this action, information is collected about theenemy. It may be possible to overrun the enemy position immediately, or fol-lowing some attrition of his combat power.

0120. Deliberate Attack. A deliberate attack is an attack which requires themassing of combat power to destroy or penetrate a well-prepared enemy defence.Time will be required to plan and coordinate such an attack. Preparation will includedetailed orders and rehearsals. A company group may conduct a deliberate attackindependently, but is likely to be employed within such an attack as part of a battle-group operation. This is because the operation is likely to include breaching andcrossing obstacles, may be highly complex and may require considerable combatpower. The night attack is described at Annex A.

Exploitation

0121. Exploitation is the rapid follow-up of gains to take full advantage of successin battle. Commanders must plan to exploit success and retain the ability to exploitunforeseen opportunities. The transition from the coordinated attack to an exploita-tion may be so gradual that it is hardly distinguishable, or it may be abrupt.Commanders initiate an exploitation when the enemy has recognizable difficultymaintaining its position. Although local exploitations may appear insignificant, theircumulative effects can be decisive and commanders at all levels must act quickly tocapitalize on local successes.

0122. Opportunities for exploitation are indicated when the following occur:

a. The enemy is having difficulty maintaining his position.

b. The number of prisoners being captured increases rapidly.

c. Enemy forces disintegrate after initial contact.

d. The enemy lacks an organized defence.

e. Reports confirm the capture of or absence of enemy leaders.

f. The amount of abandoned material increases.

g. Enemy fire decreases in intensity and effectiveness.

h. Enemy command posts and materiel dumps are captured.

0123. Once exploitation has begun the enemy must be given no respite. Groundmust be held only as necessary to accomplish the mission and combat power mustnot be dissipated in achieving minor tactical success or in reducing irrelevant enemyforces. The following points will need to be noted:

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED 1-7

a. Exploitation should be decentralized with the company commander main-taining sufficient control to alter the direction of the exploitation or prevent itsover extension.

b. Subordinates find the fastest way to their objectives.

c. When an exploitation has become exhausted the commander must seekways to push through a fresh force to replace it.

d. Security will primarily be provided by speed of movement and enemy dis-organization.

e. The term ‘limit of exploitation’ must be used with care in orders and shouldonly be used to prevent the likelihood of ‘blue on blue’ incidents with flankingforces.

Forms of Manoeuvre in the Attack

0124. Forms of Manoeuvre. There are five basic forms of manoeuvre. It shouldbe noted, however, that they are not mutually exclusive and a company group mightemploy different forms during stages of the same operation. The forms of manoeu-vre in the attack are:

a. Frontal.

b. Penetration.

c. Envelopment.

d. Turning movement.

e. Infiltration.

0125. Frontal (see Fig 1). In a frontal attack the main action is directed againstthe front of the enemy forces. It may be used to overrun him in position or to fix himin position. The frontal attack is likely to be the approach that the enemy is expectingand will therefore engage the enemy’s strongest defences. It will be difficult to dis-tract the enemy’s attention away from a frontal attack. This form of attack should,therefore, be avoided whenever possible. It should only be considered when there isno better alternative and when the following preconditions apply:

a. The enemy is weak or disorganized.

b. The company group has overwhelming combat power.

c. The time and situation require immediate action.

d. The mission is to fix the enemy in position, deceive him or assist the mainattack.

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED1-8

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED 1-9

���������

���������

Fig 1. — Forms of Manoeuvre in the Attack — Frontal

Fig 2. — Forms of Manoeuvre in the Attack — Penetration

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED1-10

�

���������

Fig 3. — Forms of Manoeuvre in the Attack — Envelopment

Fig 4. — Forms of Manoeuvre in the Attack — Turning Movement

0126. Penetration (see Fig 2). Penetration seeks to break through the enemy’sdefensive position and seize objectives in depth. Penetration will be conducted on anarrow front. Successful penetration requires the concentration of superior combatpower at the point selected for breaching the enemy’s defence. Penetration may betried at one or several points depending on the forces available. However, a companywill usually focus combat power at one point and attack with echeloned platoons.

0127. Envelopment (see Fig 3). An envelopment attack is directed to theenemy’s flank or rear. Forces pass round one or both (double envelopment) sides ofthe enemy’s principal defensive positions. The attack is accomplished by avoidingthe enemy’s main strength, thus striking him from an unexpected direction. A com-pany group conducting an envelopment should secure its flanks to avoid exposure toan envelopment itself. The envelopment manoeuvre can be accompanied by demon-strations or feints to fix the enemy’s attention the wrong way.

0128. Turning Movement (see Fig 4). A turning movement is a variation of theenvelopment. The attacking force passes around the enemy’s principal defensiveposition to secure objectives deep in the enemy’s rear. Faced with a major threat inhis depth the enemy is forced out of his defensive position. For a turning movementto be successful it must attack a target that the enemy will fight to save and pose asignificant threat. A flank screen may be needed to cover the open flanks of themanoeuvre and direct and indirect fire used to suppress defilade enemy positions.

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED 1-11

���������

� �

Fig 5. — Forms of Manoeuvre in the Attack — Infiltration

0129. Infiltration (see Fig 5). Infiltration is considered further in Annex B.Infiltration may be used in conjunction with any of the other forms of attack. It is aform of manoeuvre in which a force moves through or around enemy positions with-out detection. Infiltration may involve part of or the whole company group, eithermounted or dismounted. Depending on the situation and terrain, infiltrating forcesmay need to move in small groups.

0130 – 0131. Reserved.

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED1-12

SECTION 2. — FORCES AND TASKS

Employment of Combat Forces

0132. General.

a. The infantry company group normally participates in offensive operationswithin a larger force. This will usually be as part of a battlegroup, although aninfantry company group may be employed as a formation reserve or on otherspecial tasks. Within the battlegroup, the infantry company group may play apart in a synchronized battlegroup operation. Alternatively it may conduct itsown offensive operations, supported by other battlegroup assets; such inde-pendent operations will normally be against an unprepared, moving or weakenemy force.

b. Whether the company group is attacking as part of a synchronized battle-group operation, or conducting independent offensive action, it may be sup-ported by tanks. Some tanks may be grouped with it, while other tanks may par-ticipate in the operation under battlegroup control.

c. The company group commander will normally divide his force into a num-ber of components; these could include: Reconnaissance, Direct Fire Support,the Assault Force, Protection, and Echeloned Force or Reserve.

0133. Reconnaissance.

a. The company group commander should base his attack plan on the con-cept of ‘reconnaissance pull’. The information obtained should pull the companygroup toward and along the path of least resistance. This helps the company toseize the initiative and increases its agility. This concept applies not merely tothe actions of any specific reconnaissance forces, but to information providedby all elements of the company group, throughout the operation.

b. Reconnaissance, both before and during the attack, determines:

(1) Which routes are suitable for manoeuvre by providing informationon terrain and enemy obstacles which will help the rapid execution of theattack.

(2) Where the enemy is strong and weak by acquiring information onenemy dispositions.

(3) Where gaps exist, thereby helping to guide the attacking forcesagainst enemy weaknesses.

c. Reconnaissance will be continuous and aggressive prior to and duringoffensive operations. This process may be conducted by the initial reconnais-

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED 1-13

sance element, or taken over by other elements. It is essential that continuousvisual contact is maintained with the enemy. In this way the maximum possibledetails of the enemy’s dispositions and capabilities will be obtained. Enemymovement, reaction and activity can be monitored, resulting in changes to planand seizure of opportunities. Such monitoring may lead to critical decisions,including:

(1) To bypass the position if it has been rendered ineffective by direct orindirect fire.

(2) To follow up aggressively without the necessity of assaulting theenemy’s position, if the enemy has decided to withdraw.

(3) The reconnaissance force will find the enemy, establish enemystrengths and dispositions and maintain contact with the enemy duringplanning and preparation for offensive operations. Battlegroup reconnais-sance elements may carry out this task. Alternatively, the reconnaissancetask may be conducted by the leading elements of the company group. Inclose terrain, reconnaissance patrols may be required.

(4) Before the attack, the company group commander must deploy suf-ficient reconnaissance assets to establish the enemy’s weakest points. Itis not sufficient merely to locate the enemy if his strength is to be avoided,and the attack directed against his weakness.

(5) If a deliberate attack is to be conducted, more extensive reconnais-sance of the position may take place, including air reconnaissance andthe insertion of observation posts.

(6) No matter how effective the reconnaissance force, it is unlikely thatthe full extent of the enemy position will be identified, particularly in ahasty attack where time and assets for reconnaissance will be more lim-ited. In particular, reserve and depth positions may not be immediatelyidentified. Attack forces must, therefore, be prepared to encounter unex-pected enemy.

(7) When the attack has commenced, the reconnaissance force maymanoeuvre around the objective, to gain information on the enemy’sdepth, redeploy to flank security, or be assigned other missions.

0134. Direct Fire Support.

a. Direct fire is applied to the objective before the attack begins in order tocommence the destruction of the enemy and to fix him in position. Direct fireduring the attack continues the process of destruction, distracts the enemy fromthe assaulting force and neutralizes his weapon systems.

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED1-14

b. By using a series of static fire positions, a fire support group will be able tofire with greater accuracy, and will have better observation of the battlefield,than assaulting elements. However, in deciding task organization, these advan-tages must be weighed against the reduced number of forces available for theassault.

c. The fire support group operates from a fire base, or a series of fire posi-tions. The fire support group should be positioned and make subsequentmoves to permit maximum use of its weapon range. The fire support group willideally engage the enemy from a position or positions which allows a wideenough angle for the assaulting force to get as close to the enemy position aspossible before it is necessary to lift its fire, or switch to depth positions.

d. The fire support group should not be regarded as a static force. It keepspace with the attack by using fire and manoeuvre. It moves forward on the flankof the attack, firing directly at the positions being attacked, and destroying orsuppressing depth positions.

e. The fire support group may also guard the flank of the attack. It may alsobe required to act as a reserve.

f. The fire support group may consist of one or more of the following com-ponents, dependent on task organization and terrain:

(1) Tanks.

(2) MILAN.

(3) Reconnaissance vehicles.

(4) GPMG (SF) and/or .50 in HMG.

(5) Snipers.

(6) LAW.

(7) LSW.

0135. Assault Force. The assault force is the element of the company groupwhich closes with the enemy in order to destroy him. Assault forces may all be com-mitted together, or in echelon. Subsequent echelon elements may be required to dealwith enemy depth positions, to secure terrain gained by the initial echelons, todestroy bypassed pockets of resistance, and to block enemy reinforcements into thearea of the assaulting force. The assault force is likely to be supported by MILAN andmay have tanks allocated to it. Employment of these elements will be as follows:

a. Tanks. The primary task of the tanks is to destroy enemy armour on theposition, supporting the position or threatening the attacking force. They also

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED 1-15

destroy or suppress enemy dismounted forces on the position, both in directsupport of dismounted infantry action, and in depth. If sufficient tanks are avail-able, they may be divided into the following functions.

(1) Fire Support. Tanks which provide direct fire support onto theobjective from a selected position, usually to a flank, are known as theFire Support Group.

(2) Assault Tanks. Those tanks which provide the initial shock actionas they move out of the FUP and around an objective. They move withthe intimate support tanks in the initial stages of the assault. They thusprovide direct fire support onto the objectives and protect the infantry andintimate support tanks, whilst they are fighting through the objective. Asthese tanks close with the objective they have three options:

(a) To envelop the objective to engage any withdrawing enemyand to prepare to continue the advance.

(b) To swing out to fire positions on the flanks to support the fightthrough the objective.

(c) When the position is impassable to tanks and no suitable firepositions exist on the flanks, to halt short of the objective and pro-vide fire support from the rear.

(3) Intimate Support. Intimate support tanks provide close fire supportto dismounted troops during the break in and fight through. They destroyenemy armoured vehicles not killed by the fire support group or theassault tanks. They use main armament firing high explosive and armourpiercing shells to destroy bunkers and strong points, and machine gunsto kill enemy infantry.

b. MILAN. As part of the assault force, MILAN may fulfil the assault tanks’role of security against counterattack, if assault tanks are not available.

0136. Protection.

a. Protection preserves the fighting potential of the company group so that itcan be applied at a decisive time and place. Protection can be achieved by fix-ing the enemy, and if necessary destroying him, before he can attack effectivelyand seize the initiative.

b. The main considerations for protection in offensive operations are:

(1) Maintaining mobility of the company group to prevent vulnerability toenemy fire.

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED1-16

(2) Carrying out countermobility tasks to protect flanks and fix enemycounterattack forces.

(3) Enhancing survivability through the use of such measures as:

(a) Operational security (including emission control measures andthe use of smoke).

(b) A deception plan.

(4) Providing adequate protection against enemy air attack. Passivesecurity measures such as good camouflage and use of ground play avital part in protection, especially during the preparatory and consolidationstages.

(5) Ensuring that the attack is launched from a secure base across asecure line of departure.

c. Components of Protection. Security groups protect the attacking forcesagainst enemy counter action. Security groups are likely to be double tasked.One or more of the following elements may be tasked to provide security —tanks, reconnaissance troops, MILAN and indirect fire controllers. Securitygroups may have the following tasks:

(1) Flank Protection. The flank protection element must cover openflanks and gaps with neighbouring sub units. Flank protection troops mayalso be required to provide firepower, to deal with bypassed enemyforces. They must be prepared to provide early warning of enemy countermoves, and block enemy counterattacks.

(2) Approach Routes/Assembly Area/Attack Position Security. Securitymay be required to counter enemy spoiling attacks against the assemblyarea, attack positions and approach routes.

0137. Reserve.

a. The reserve primarily aims to exploit opportunities which are presentedduring the attack. It also deals with the unexpected, including unidentifiedenemy depth positions, and takes on the role of assaulting elements if neces-sary. Once the original reserve has been committed, another one should beconstituted if possible. Reserves should be positioned so that they can bedeployed swiftly in any direction but are able to avoid becoming engaged pre-maturely. When possible, the reserve should be mounted.

b. When the attacking force has insufficient forces to permit the companycommander to retain an uncommitted reserve, double tasking will be required.In this case the company commander must accept a reduction in his capability

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED 1-17

to rapidly exploit opportunities and deal with unforeseen situations. One ormore of the following elements may constitute the reserve:

(1) Tank troops.

(2) Reconnaissance troops.

(3) MILAN.

c. In a battlegroup operation, in some situations it may not be possible for acompany group to provide its own reserve. In this case, the reserve will be abattlegroup asset.

d. It will not normally be possible to maintain a reserve at platoon level, as thefull platoon is likely to be required as a single force for the assault. The reservefunction is maintained at company level.

Employment of Combat Support Forces

0138. Fire Support.

a. The term ‘fire support’ is used rather than ‘firepower’ as this section con-siders only the use of combat support assets to provide firepower. The remain-ing elements of firepower available to the company group (the direct fireresources) are examined in the first part of this Section under the heading —Direct Fire Support.

b. The success of the attack depends upon the close coordination of indirectfire support to destroy and demoralize the enemy, to fix him before and duringthe attack and to neutralize his weapon systems during the attack. The weightof fire is switched, as necessary, during the attack in accordance with the com-pany commander’s plan. If the attack is to use surprise, fire support may bewithheld until enemy resistance is encountered, unless it forms part of thedeception plan. Some enemy positions may be neutralized or masked bysmoke in accordance with the attack plan. Whenever possible, an attack shouldbe preceded by preparatory fire, to destroy as much of the enemy force as pos-sible before the start of the attack.

c. Specific considerations for the use of indirect fire support in offensive oper-ations include:

(1) Where possible, dividing indirect fire controllers between overwatchand movement with the assault force. In general, when a forward obser-vation officer and a mortar fire controller are grouped with the companygroup, the forward observation officer is best employed in overwatch. Themortar fire controller may move with the assault force, to direct immedi-ate fire missions.

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED1-18

(2) Suppressing, neutralizing and destroying enemy defences anddirect fire systems through preparatory fire.

(3) Suppressing bypassed enemy, enemy depth positions, and otherpositions supporting the main objective, and counterattack forces, to limittheir ability to affect the attack. Pre-designated targets should be plannedto cover likely enemy supporting or reserve positions and possible coun-terattack routes and attack positions.

d. Components of Fire Support — Artillery. Artillery will be controlled by theforward observation officer. The forward observation officer must be involved inthe planning of the attack with the company commander at the earliest stage,in order to conduct the procedures necessary to obtain artillery support at thetime required. Tasks for the artillery during the attack will include:

(1) Preparatory Fire.

(a) Neutralize or destroy enemy indirect fire assets.

(b) Mask enemy observation by smoke.

(c) Suppress enemy air defence.

(d) Illuminate the battlefield. (UK artillery no longer has an illumi-nation capability.)

(2) Covering Fire.

(a) Isolate the enemy position against reinforcement.

(b) Neutralize the enemy at the point of break-in.

(c) Give fire support to the assaulting troops as they fight throughthe enemy in depth.

(d) Destruction of enemy armour.

(e) Plan and prepare to support exploitation and pursuit at anytime during the attack.

(f) Be on call during consolidation/reorganization.

(g) Mark enemy positions by smoke or illuminating shells deliv-ered onto the ground, to guide assaulting troops.

(3) Defensive Fire.

(a) Neutralize threats from the flanks.

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED 1-19

(b) Engage enemy spoiling of counterattack forces.

(c) Block through the use of scatterable mines.

e. Components of Fire Support — 81 mm Mortars. 81 mm mortars are idealfor close-in targets, targets on reverse slopes and those in areas difficult toreach with low angle fire. They are particularly effective in providing smoke. 81mm mortar fire will be controlled by the mortar fire controller, who will operatein close coordination with the artillery forward observation officer. The mortarsare the only guaranteed indirect fire support within the battlegroup. Mortars canfulfil or complement the functions of artillery fire, except they do not have thecapability to destroy enemy armour or deliver scatterable mines.

0139. Close Air Support. Close air support is air action against enemy positionsin close proximity to attacking forces. It requires detailed integration with groundmanoeuvre including positive identification of friendly forces and positive control ofaircraft. Close air support is controlled by Tactical Air Control Parties. Close air sup-port targets can also be designated by the battlegroup reconnaissance platoon andthe artillery forward observation officer. Their inclusion in the offensive support planis usually coordinated through the forward observation officer, or indirect with the bat-tlegroup battery commander.

0140. Aviation. Helicopters may be used to:

a. Assist command and control, including indirect fire control, in an attack.

b. Assist flank security, by providing reconnaissance and surveillance offlanks.

c. Destroy enemy armour.

0141. Air Defence. Air defence cover may be provided for assembly areas andapproach routes and for protection of forces during the attack. Air sentries should bedeployed to provide warning of air attack.

0142. Engineers.

a. Mobility and Countermobility. Engineer and assault pioneer support maybe required to maintain momentum in the attack by allowing mobility.Maintaining momentum will not only assist manoeuvre, but also provide pro-tection to the company group. Countermobility tasks, particularly the protectionof flanks and rapid protection against counterattacks, may also be required.Engineers and assault pioneers may be required to support the company groupby any or all of the following actions:

(1) Breaching, marking or opening minefields (own and enemy).

(2) Crossing rivers and other obstacles.

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED1-20

(3) Securing flanks by means of minefields, demolitions and otherobstacles.

(4) Supporting the consolidation on the objective by digging and layingminefields and creating obstacles.

b. Survivability. Engineer and assault pioneer assistance during offensiveoperations may be required to assist with construction of fighting positions dur-ing consolidation on the objective.

0143. EW/Operational Security. Operational security prior to an attack is pre-served by emission control measures, in which use of radios and active surveillancedevices may be restricted. This will normally apply only prior to a deliberate attack.Radio traffic should be protected by encoding as appropriate before both deliberateand hasty attacks. Smoke, produced by artillery or mortars, may assist the opera-tional security of a unit in movement and other activity both before and during attack.

0144 – 0145. Reserved.

SECTION 3. — ORGANIZATION

0146. General. It must be remembered that the control measures for offensiveoperations exist solely for the purpose of assisting control. They need not be rigidlyemployed or adhered to in all operations. If they do nothing to aid control, or indeedthreaten to hamper tempo and momentum, they should be discarded.

0147. Objective. The doctrinal definition of the objective is: ‘The tactical featurethat must be captured or seized to achieve the commander’s mission’; but this defi-nition does not fit into manoeuvre warfare theory which focuses on the enemy notground, and so will not be used in this section. “The only real objective is the enemy.”(Basil Liddel Hart). The objective in an attack is the aiming point for the attack; it isthe point to which the company group directs its efforts in order to best use the ter-rain to accomplish the destruction of the enemy. The objective may be a terrain fea-ture, or an enemy force or installation. Because the objective is merely a control mea-sure, it may be subject to change during the course of an attack.

0148. Intermediate Objectives. Intermediate objectives are closely related tothe importance of terrain and enemy locations and are also used to coordinate themovement of attacking forces with regard to time and space. Their capture must notcause the attack to lose momentum.

0149. Assembly Areas. Whenever time permits, the company group should bebrought together in an assembly area prior to the attack. They should remain in thisarea only for as long as required for administrative preparation and regrouping. Theassembly area will also allow the company group to pause, should it be necessary todo so, while artillery or other supporting elements are made available. The assemblyarea requires the following characteristics:

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED 1-21

a. It should be sited a sufficient distance away from the objective to avoiddetection by the enemy.

b. It should be large enough to disperse the entire force.

c. It should be capable of effective defence.

0150. Approach Routes. Approach routes from the assembly area to the attackposition should be concealed from the enemy and permit smooth movement.

0151. Forming Up Place(Attack Position).

a. The Forming Up Place (FUP) is the location from which the assault forceslaunch the attack. (The FUP is sometimes also referred to as the AttackPosition.) If the company group does not enter the FUP in assault formation,then it should deploy into formation in the FUP. It is occupied for as short a timeas possible. Ideally, assaulting troops should move straight through the FUPwithout pausing. If possible, the FUP should be the closest area of ground tothe enemy position which can be entered in dead ground from the enemy, andwhich is large enough to deploy the assaulting force in assault formation whileremaining in dead ground. The closer the FUP is to the objective, the shorterthe time the assaulting force is exposed to enemy direct fire as it assaults.

b. All assaulting forces need not attack from the same FUP. For example,infantry and intimate support tanks could assault from one FUP, while assaulttank troops assault from separate FUPs (see Fig 6). The advantages of thissystem are:

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED1-22

������������������������������������� ��!�

���������

������� ��!�

� ��"��������

Fig 6. — Separate FUPs

(1) The initial attack of the assault tanks will divert the enemy’s atten-tion from the infantry FUP, assisting surprise for the main attack.

(2) Attacking from a number of different directions may confuse theenemy as to the strength of the attack, and present him with the psycho-logical dilemma that he is being attacked from all directions, causingpanic.

(3) Enveloping assault tanks may avoid passing between the direct firesupport group and the objective, which permits the fire support group tocontinue to fire onto the objective until the infantry reaches the enemy.

0152. Fire Support Position. The fire support position is the area from which thefire support group suppresses and fixes the enemy in position. The maintenance ofa right angle (1,600 mils) between assault troops and the fire support position is keyto aiding momentum during the approach and fight through.

0153. Line of Departure (LD). The LD is positioned at the forward edge of theFUP. This line coordinates the movement of the attacking force at the start of theattack. Synchronization of indirect fire support, direct fire support and assaulting ele-ments of the company group is achieved by the leading elements of the assaultingforce crossing the LD at H Hour.

0154. Boundaries. Boundaries between sub units facilitate coordination andestablish responsibility for movement, fire, reconnaissance and movement. There willnot necessarily be a requirement to establish boundaries between attacking platoonsand troops at company level, although this control measure may help prevent confu-sion during operations in limited visibility.

0155. Axes and Routes. Axes and routes are used to indicate the course of themovement to be followed and the degree of freedom of movement en route to theobjective. Axes establish only the general direction of movement. The companygroup commander is free to manoeuvre within his boundaries. Designation of a‘route’ establishes the specific direction or course which movement will follow. Otherthan in operations of limited visibility, designation of routes should be avoided in orderto permit maximum freedom of manoeuvre to platoon and troop commanders.

0156. Limit of Exploitation. The limit of exploitation will normally be designatedby reference to a terrain feature. Designation of limits of exploitation should only bemade to prevent the company group from over-extending, or avoid clashes withfriendly forces. In order to permit maximum freedom of action by subordinates, limitsof exploitation should not be automatically designated.

0157 – 0158. Reserved.

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED 1-23

SECTION 4. — PLANNING AND PREPARATION

Introduction

0159. The planning of the attack will have commenced either at the time the com-pany group commander received orders to attack or, especially in a hasty attack,from the first sighting or contact with the enemy. Orders will be given during thepreparatory stage.

0160. Although more time is generally available for planning and preparationbefore a deliberate attack than a hasty attack, these procedures should be conduct-ed as rapidly and with as much concurrent activity as possible in order to enablemomentum to be maintained, and to be prepared for unexpected events which maybring planned H Hours forward without warning.

0161. Battle Procedure. Battle procedure, including orders and estimates, isfully covered in Chapter 4 of Volume 1, Pamphlet No. 1, The Infantry Company Group— The Fundamentals.

Planning

0162. Information and Intelligence.

a. Timely and accurate information and intelligence is critical to the successof offensive operations. Information requirements will include:

(1) Exact locations of trenches, bunker systems and other strongpoints.

(2) Approximate strengths of enemy infantry occupying these positions.

(3) Types and quantities of enemy weapon systems, especially anti-armour weapons.

(4) Number, type and location of enemy AFVs and other vehicles.

(5) Locations of security elements, e.g., standing patrols, observationposts, flank guards.

(6) Details of enemy defences.

(7) Confirmed or possible depth of supporting positions.

(8) Confirmed or possible locations of reserves.

(9) If the enemy force is moving (for example, when a spoiling attack isto be mounted) the extent of dispersal, position of each element, directionand speed of movement.

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED1-24

(10) Terrain information, including going, dominating features, approachroutes, potential assembly areas, FUPs and locations for direct fire sup-port.

(11) Natural and man-made obstacles.

(12) Terrain features or obstacles which might affect exploitation.

(13) Critically, weaknesses in the enemy’s defence.

b. Sources of Information and Intelligence. Although assessments maybe based on previous contacts by the company group it is more likely that infor-mation on enemy weapon system capabilities, enemy intentions, and probablereactions will be available only through battlegroup HQ. The following is a listof sources that may provide information and intelligence:

(1) Battlegroup HQ.

(2) Reconnaissance helicopters and fixed wing aircraft.

(3) Indirect fire controllers.

(4) Engineer reconnaissance.

(5) Battlegroup reconnaissance platoon/troop.

(6) Tanks.

(7) Own and friendly forces’ patrol activity, including observation postsand standing patrols.

(8) Prisoners of war (PW), particularly through immediate tactical ques-tioning of those captured during the attack.

c. Achieving Surprise. Surprise must be considered as a major factor dur-ing planning and both active and passive measures taken to secure it. Thesecould include:

(1) Passive Measures.

(a) Meticulous concealment of reconnaissance activity.

(b) Concealment of deployment of the main body, for example bymoving only in darkness or poor visibility, or by filtering forward insmall packets.

(c) Imposition of CSCMs.

(d) Disguising or curtailing indirect fire adjustment prior to H Hour.

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED 1-25

(2) Active Measures.

(a) Mounting feints or demonstration attacks.

(b) The use of artillery fire, smoke and vehicle movement to drawthe enemy’s attention away from the area of the attack.

(c) The use of smoke to conceal final deployment and the attackitself.

Preparation

0163. The extent of troop preparation required will depend on the time availableand the situation. Replenishment of combat supplies and issue of special equipment(e.g., FIBUA stores) may take place during this stage. Such action is unlikely to takeplace in the case of a hasty attack.

0164. Concurrent Activity. As far as possible, all activities during the prepara-tory stage should be conducted concurrently. This will only be possible through theearly issue of warning orders.

0165. During the preparatory stage the company group commander is conditioningthe enemy and preparing, grouping and positioning his own forces. Preparations mayinclude:

a. Reconnaissance (Find). The reconnaissance process is likely already tobe in progress, especially if the attack follows an advance to contact. Initialsighting or contact with the enemy will have begun the process. Collection ofinformation about the enemy and the ground by reconnaissance troops or for-ward elements of the company group must continue throughout the preparationstage, with frequent updates provided to the company group commander. Thecompany group commander may move forward to view the enemy position andapproaches. In a deliberate attack, platoon and troop commanders may also beable to reconnoitre the position. It may, however, not be possible for the com-pany group commander to get forward, especially in a hasty attack, and he mayhave to depend upon information provided by forward troops by radio, com-bined with map reconnaissance.

b. Preliminary Movement. In a hasty attack, preliminary movement willbring the company group rapidly forward to or near the assembly area or FUP.In a deliberate operation, preliminary movement will take the form of a con-trolled move to the assembly area. Even before the plan has been fully con-structed, those elements of the company group not in contact should move asfar forward as possible without depriving the commander of attack options, i.e.,not becoming committed to any one attack route or direction. This movementmay be led by the company group 2IC if the company group commander is for-

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED1-26

ward conducting reconnaissance. The company group commander may desig-nate a holding area for these troops to occupy while deciding on the attackplan.

c. Preliminary Deployment. During preliminary deployment the elements ofthe company group will come together into an assembly area. The companygroup commander may need to task troops to clear and secure the assemblyarea before occupation. In the assembly area, the company group will regroupinto the task organization for the attack as required, and disperse into a forma-tion to enable rapid and efficient movement from the assembly area. This for-mation should be organized to allow the company group to deploy from theassembly area in assault order. The company group may have to wait in theassembly area until indirect fire support or other assets are available for theattack. Such a delay at this location is much preferable to any delay in the FUP.It is possible that some or all infantry may dismount in the assembly area, if theplan calls for dismounted action beyond this stage. All elements may not moveinto the assembly area. For example, troops involved in collecting informationand fixing the enemy are likely to maintain contact to continue the process,remaining poised to provide direct fire support if ordered.

d. Infiltration. Infiltration can be used, under favourable conditions, forreconnaissance, attacks in depth, the capture of specific terrain features or thedisruption of communications. Infiltration, however, requires accurate intelli-gence and is time consuming. It is more likely that a company group will betasked specifically as part of the battlegroup or brigade plan, rather than con-duct infiltration as part of its own operation. Infiltration is considered more fullyat Annex B to this chapter.

e. Conditioning the Enemy (Fix and Strike).

(1) Conditioning of the enemy will include fixing him in position usingdirect and indirect fire. The aim is to deny him freedom of action, both toredeploy and to improve his defences. It should also aim to deny theenemy access to information on the activities of attacking forces. The fix-ing process should begin on initial contact or sighting of the enemy. Thefixing operation may be delayed if it is intended to conduct a deliberateattack, or if the enemy force is moving, and it would be advantageous toattack in a different area. Fixing may be conducted by the reconnaissanceforce, or by indirect fire observers, or both. Additional assets may also bebrought forward to fix the enemy. The most suitable system for this pur-pose is tanks. In close terrain infantry, perhaps including GPMG (SF) andLAWs, may be used for fixing. The force used for fixing may have the sub-sequent task of providing direct fire support for the attack.

(2) If the attack is conducted during an advance to contact, the leadingelements establishing contact will probably maintain contact, provideinformation required and fix the enemy.

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED 1-27

(3) The fixing process will also begin the destruction of the enemy. Theforce establishing initial contact, and then the fixing force, should destroyenemy armour, dismounted anti-armour weapons and any other obvioustargets as quickly as possible and then move to positions of observation.They must not waste ammunition, or unnecessarily expose themselves,by putting down ‘suppressive fire’ in the target area. Every shot must beaimed to destroy a pinpoint target.

(4) Indirect fire controllers should begin to adjust fire onto the objectiveas soon as possible. Dispersed AFVs are best left for destruction bydirect fire; concentrated or dug-in enemy should be engaged by concen-trated indirect fire.

(5) From initial contact, company group elements in conjunction withindirect fire support, should continuously threaten and engage the posi-tion. This will have the effect of causing attrition to the enemy, resulting inthe reduction of his ability to resist attack. It may even lead the enemy toabandon his position, thus exposing himself to pursuit and rendering himmore vulnerable.

(6) In addition to fixing the enemy and commencing his destruction, theconditioning process may involve blinding him by locating and destroyingobservation posts with reconnaissance assets and by screening hisobservation with smoke.

Preparation for Infantry/Tank Attacks

0166. Careful preparation is essential before every attack. This should include:

a. Reconnaissance.

b. Planning and coordination.

c. Orders.

d. Marrying up.

e. Rehearsals (if time permits).

Planning and Coordination

0167. In the planning and coordination phase the following points must be decided:

a. The method of attack.

b. The routes to the objective for tanks and for infantry.

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED1-28

c. The formations to be used and where changes in formation may be nec-essary.

d. Speed of movement of tanks and of infantry.

e. Timings.

f. Distance between tanks and infantry.

g. Fire plan, including where and when direct and indirect fire will be lifted orshifted.

h. Communications and control.

i. LD, which must be clearly defined, should preferably be square to the axisof the attack and must be secured by our own troops.

j. FUPs.

k. Position of tanks during reorganization.

l. How long after the completion of the attack tanks are to remain withinfantry.

Forming up Place

0168. Tanks should have a separate FUP. However, if this is not possible and thesame FUP must be used, infantry should occupy first.

Marrying Up

0169. As part of the marrying up process, the tanks must know the infantry plan forthe assault and the infantry must know how the tanks intend to work and where theyare to be located. Unless both Arms are clear about these details, cooperation can-not be really efficient and could lead to unnecessary casualties. Radio communica-tions and call signs should also be checked.

0170 – 0171. Reserved.

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED 1-29

SECTION 5. — CONDUCT

General

0172. Basic Offensive Functions. An attack is conducted as a synchronizedeffort of firepower and manoeuvre. Reconnaissance troops, infantry, tanks andMILAN are manoeuvred to positions of advantage to destroy the enemy. The fire-power of these forces is used in conjunction with supporting artillery, mortar, aviationand close air support to isolate, suppress and destroy the enemy forces. When fireis concentrated, superiority over the enemy will facilitate the manoeuvre.Manoeuvring brings the assaulting forces into new, more advantageous positions todefeat the enemy.

Procedures

0173. Stages of an Attack (see Fig 7). An attack can be divided into a numberof distinct, but closely related, stages. These stages will tend to merge into eachother. They must not be seen as distinct breaks in the action. Momentum will only bemaintained if there is no attempt to unnecessarily pause between each stage of theattack. To the participants in the attack, the stages are unlikely to be clear cut. Thesestages are:

a. Preparatory (see Section 4. — Planning and Preparation).

b. Approach.

c. The Attack.

(1) Final approach.

(2) Break in.

(3) Fight through.

(4) Reorganization and Consolidation.

d. Exploitation.

0174. Approach.

a. The commander may assign a security group to clear and secure the FUP.This group may be assigned from the reconnaissance force. It should not occu-py the FUP but secure the area using maximum observation and weaponranges. If multiple FUPs are employed, then more than one security group maybe needed.

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED1-30

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED 1-31

�������������

� �

#$ #$

�����������

��������

�����������������%�&���!���

��'��� ����'�

(���'���)��������%*������%�����

+,����������

���������

Fig 7. — Stages of an Attack

b. The approach stage may include the requirement to cross or breach obsta-cles. This is more likely in the case of a deliberate attack. Obstacle crossingprocedures are covered at Chapter 6. — Operations in Specific Environments.

c. The necessary closeness of the FUP to the enemy position will often resultin a loss of surprise to the assaulting force. Noise and movement in particularcan give away the assaulting force’s location and intentions. This risk can bereduced by engaging the enemy with indirect fire as the force approaches theFUP. Slow movement into the FUP to preserve security and achieve surprisemust be balanced against the advantages of speed directed to the same ends.If it is not possible to enter the FUP in dead ground, the entry may be screenedby smoke.

d. The enemy is likely to have covered potential FUPs with observation posts,standing patrols or other surveillance systems, and ambushes, supported bypre-planned indirect fire targets. Spoiling attack options may also have beenprepared. The minimum possible time should therefore be spent in the FUP.Where possible, the aim should be to move straight through and across the LDinto the assault. This will require careful synchronization, to ensure movementfrom the assembly area to the FUP permits movement across the LD by lead-ing elements at H Hour. The alternative to this is a responsive fire plan, with theH Hour serials commencing on call as the leading elements cross the LD.

e. Terrain constraints may prevent the attack force from deploying into attackformation before moving into the FUP; a brief pause may be necessary to rede-ploy.

f. Terrain constraints may also prevent crossing the LD in attack formation. Ifthis is the case, the assault force should cross the LD deployed to as great anextent as possible, rapidly moving into attack formation on the move as soonas the terrain permits.

g. All elements need not necessarily meet in the FUP. Some of the companygroup’s forces may remain in contact with the enemy as other elements moveto the FUP. Others, particularly tanks, may conduct their tasks without enteringthe FUP.

h. Careful use of ground is vital in order to avoid casualties and ensure sur-prise.

0175. The Attack — Final Approach.

a. General. The attack must be organized in depth and, at company grouplevel, will normally be on a narrow front. Once break-in is achieved, the assaultforce must extend laterally to produce an ever widening penetration and anincreasing number of targets for the enemy to address. Momentum must berelentlessly maintained.

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED1-32

b. Terrain.

(1) Open. In open country the assault will be led by the assault tanks,if present. They will fire on the move and move tactically over a broadfront as the ground and enemy dispositions dictate. This may involve theuse of fire and movement. The infantry and intimate support tanks, if pre-sent, should assault as soon as possible after the assault tanks, to gainmaximum advantage from their shock effect.

(2) Close. In close or difficult country, infantry will lead the assault.Tanks, if present, will move tactically from bound to bound and not pre-sent an easy target by crawling forward with the infantry. Tanks will movebehind the infantry, destroying targets located by the troops.

c. Infantry Assault.

(1) Fire and Manoeuvre. The techniques of fire and manoeuvre usedin the assault and fight through cannot be laid down in a pamphlet anymore than drills be used as a template for all attacks. The only certain factis that good use of ground and effective, controlled suppressive or cover-ing fire will ensure that casualties are kept to a minimum. The selectedmethod of fire and manoeuvre results from the commander’s estimateand must be based on the ground, the enemy and available supportingfire. It must also feature in his orders. The technique of fire and manoeu-vre in a company group attack scenario described below is one methodby which troops can move quickly across the ground to close with theenemy after coming under effective enemy fire. It is descriptive and doesnot take into account the effect of enemy fire or the shape of the ground,both of which might preclude fire and manoeuvre taking place at platoonlevel.

(2) Assault Formation. Having moved through the FUP, the companygroup will more often than not cross the LD in a standard assault forma-tion with two platoons forward and one in reserve. Formation within theplatoons and sections will vary according to the ground and the situation.Company group headquarters would if possible be in the centre but to therear of the forward platoons; and platoon headquarters would be slightlyto the rear of their assaulting sections in a good position to control them.The advance would continue in this formation until effective enemy fire isencountered.

(3) Effective Enemy Fire. Once under effective enemy fire, fire andmanoeuvre will be necessary; at what level fire and manoeuvre takesplace will depend on the distance troops are away from the enemy. Thepoint where enemy fire is effective cannot be pre-determined; it will bedictated by:

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED 1-33

(a) The assaulting infantry coming into line of sight and withinsmall arms range of the enemy. This moment can be delayed bytroops adopting a crouching posture when reaching a crest in frontof an enemy position.

(b) The effectiveness of supporting fire including provision ofsmoke.

(c) When the enemy chooses to open fire.

(4) Safety Distances. If supporting fire is accurate and effectively neu-tralizes the enemy, assaulting troops should be able to close within 250metres of the enemy and often closer, before effective enemy fire isencountered. Safety distances for our own troops to our own supportingfire are a commanders decision.

(5) Suppressing the Enemy. Once under effective enemy fire theassaulting troops should take cover, adopt fire positions and win back theinitiative by adding their small arms fire to any other supporting fire beingdirected onto the objective. All enemy positions will need to be effectivelysuppressed by fire, before any manoeuvre forward will be possible.

(6) Fire and Manoeuvre by Platoons Controlled by the CompanyCommander. At a pre-arranged signal given by the company comman-der, one of the two forward platoons will move forward as an entity andas quickly as possible to the next available cover, probably no more than30 metres away; during this time, the other forward platoon continues tobring covering fire to bear on identified targets across the whole width ofthe enemy position. When the platoon providing covering fire hears simi-lar fire being provided by the platoon which has just moved forward, it willmove forward until it is roughly level with the first platoon. This process isrepeated and should continue until the company group is so close to theenemy position that movement by one platoon masks the covering fire ofthe other. This distance will vary depending on the ground but will nor-mally be no more than 100–130 metres from the objective.

(7) Fire and Manoeuvre by Sections Controlled by the PlatoonCommander. At this stage platoons start fire and manoeuvre by sec-tions, with the company group commander retaining responsibility forkeeping the two assaulting platoons level. One section provides suppres-sive fire across the whole width of the platoon objective, whilst the othermoves forward. The process of fire and manoeuvre at section level con-tinues until once again the stage is reached where the movement of asection masks the covering fire of the supporting sections. Sectionswould then split into fire teams and continue to fire and manoeuvre for-ward on the signal given by the platoon commander; this would probablyoccur no more than 40–50 metres from the objective.

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED1-34

d Assault Tanks. Assault tanks should try to remain outside hand held anti-armour weapon range. As they near the objective, the assault tanks can adoptone of the following courses, depending on the ground and on the effectivenessof enemy anti-tank defences:

(1) Envelop (see Fig 8). If the objective presents an obstacle to move-ment or contains unsuppressed anti-armour weapons the assault tanksshould envelop it. Enveloping tanks may move on either or both flanks ofthe objective, depending on the enemy and the ground. The purposes ofthe envelopment are:

(a) To get tanks beyond the objective so that the assaultinginfantry and intimate support tanks are secure against counter-attack.

(b) To cut off enemy withdrawal.

(c) To provide direct fire from an unexpected direction onto therear of the position.

(2) Flank Support (see Fig 9). If the objective is not fully suppressed,assault tanks swing out to fire positions on the flanks of the objective, withthe aim of supporting the assaulting infantry and intimate support tanksas they fight through. Some tanks must, however, look outwards to guardagainst counterattack.

(3) Rear Support (see Fig 10). If the objective is impassable toarmour, and no fire positions exist to the flanks, assault tanks halt in posi-tions short of the objective and shoot in the assaulting infantry from therear.

e. Indirect Fire Support. As assaulting troops cross the LD, indirect fire sup-port will be intensified. Last safe moment must be determined by the companygroup commander in advance of or during the assault, and ordered by the for-ward observation officer on the artillery fire control net. The company group 2ICshould also call last safe moment on the battlegroup command net as a fail safemeasure in case the forward observation officer becomes a casualty during theassault; this message should then be acted on by the battlegroup battery com-mander and mortar platoon commander as appropriate. Fire should be shiftedinto depth as assaulting forces approach the objective.

f. Direct Fire Support. The fire support group may be engaging the enemyduring the approach. As the assault force crosses the LD, the fire support groupwill also intensify its fire. It will also provide information to the assault force con-cerning enemy action and guide the assault force onto the objective. It will con-tinue to engage the enemy position until friendly forces mask its fire. It will theneither:

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED 1-35

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED1-36

+����*������������!

������� ��!�

����!-���%

���������

����!-���%

���������

Fig 8. — Envelop

Fig 9. — Flank Support

(1) Move into new positions to fire in depth.

(2) Act as a reserve.

(3) Concentrate its efforts on flank protection or redeploy to assist withthe isolation of the position.

(4) Be prepared to join, echelon through or conduct fire and manoeuvrewith, the assault force.

0176. The Attack — Break-in. Having reached a line some 40–50 metres fromthe objective the assault platoons will break into the forward enemy trenches. Thiswill be a section-level battle. Fire teams will move forward until the fire support teamis sufficiently well positioned to be able to cover effectively an assault by the assaultfire team on the nearest enemy trench. One trench is a big enough objective for asection; the fire support team can concentrate sufficient effective covering fire toallow the assault fire team to reach the trench and kill the occupants. This may bedone in a number of ways; a grenade into the trench, shooting, physical assault withbayonet or the enemy may surrender. It may be possible or necessary for a fire teamoperating in two pairs, rather than a section, to neutralize a trench but covering firewill not be so effective. At this stage, the forward enemy positions have beenreached; the assault is over and the fight through of the position starts.

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED 1-37

Fig 10. — Rear Support

���������

0177. The Attack — Fight Through.

a. Once the break-in has been achieved, it is vital to maintain the pressure ofthe attack, not only when assaulting immediate enemy positions but also whenthrusting to take objectives in depth. The infantry must employ coordinated fireand manoeuvre between sections, platoons and intimate support tanks to fightthrough and clear the objective.

b. The fight through is likely to be a confused series of minor actions. Eachtrench or weapon position in turn must be neutralized and its occupants eitherkilled or forced to surrender. Intimate support tanks make a significant contri-bution to the momentum of the fight through. No opportunity should be lost toreinforce and exploit success, thus preventing the enemy from regaining hisbalance.

c. With the assault sections established on the enemy forward position, pla-toon commanders should move up to a position between them and carry out aquick combat estimate. Section commanders should brief on the situation intheir areas while the fire teams continue to engage identified enemy targets indepth; at the same time ammunition redistribution and magazine replenishmentshould be carried out. All the above actions take place simultaneously andshould not be allowed to break up the momentum of the attack. Snap ordersare quickly issued and the fight through commences.

d. Action in the Fight Through.

(1) Factors. The following factors will affect the fight through:

(a) Flanking movements by platoons and sections will generallynot be possible as they could open flanks to enemy positions indepth; furthermore flanking friendly forces may be endangered bythe fire of the assaulting troops.

(b) Enemy trenches will be mutually supporting, so effective cov-ering fire must be directed onto them before movement can takeplace.

(c) Sections must be kept roughly abreast of one another in orderto prevent flanks being opened to the enemy; furthermore, the com-pany group commander must be kept informed of progress so thathe can keep platoons generally in line.

(d) The whole position must be cleared systematically and areasmust not be disregarded simple because the enemy has notopened fire from them. However, success should be reinforced anda successful platoon should not be unduly held back unless it is out-reaching the support of the rest of the company.

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED1-38

(e) Clear boundaries between sub-units must be given to ensurethat the position is thoroughly cleared and to avoid confusionbetween enemy and friendly forces.

(2) Continuing the Action. Platoon commanders should organize theirplatoons to provide covering fire while assault sections either assault thenext objective or move to the next selected piece of ground. A wholeseries of section attacks involving fire and manoeuvre at fire team level,will now take place within the framework of the platoon attack until theposition is cleared. As the action continues, enemy should be confirmedas dead, or disarmed and ordered to lie in the open with hands on heads;a comprehensive formal clearance of the position including searching ofbodies should only take place once the complete objective has beentaken and the order for reorganization given. Furthermore, own casualtiesshould only be treated during a pause so that momentum is maintained.Reserve sections and platoons may be tasked to deal with casualties,PW, ammunition resupply, etc. During the fight through the vital aim is todestroy all the enemy. If soldiers stop to tend to casualties, further unnec-essary casualties will be caused, and the overall mission prejudiced.

(3) Intimate Support Tanks. During the fight through the infantry mustwork closely with the intimate support tanks using the tanks’ weapons todestroy enemy positions, whilst at the same time protecting the tanksfrom enemy short range anti-tank weapons. With tanks in intimate sup-port the fight through should take less time. However, the enemy positionmust still be thoroughly cleared. If the fight through begins to losemomentum and becomes unduly prolonged, tanks may have to redeploy,either to a flank or behind the assaulting infantry. They must not remainstatic for too long and become easy targets for enemy armour, ATGW andaircraft.

(4) Fire Support Group Tanks. When tanks are used only in a FireSupport Group, the infantry assault as usual but take full advantage of thelong range, rapid rate of fire and accuracy of the tank weapons to coverthe gap between the time the indirect fire support lifts and the time theinfantry arrive on the objective.

0178. Reserves.

a. General.

(1) As the attack progresses the enemy is likely to react violently withfire support and local counterattacks. He may seek to commit reservesheld in depth or, alternatively, he will endeavour to break contact and with-draw. Whatever his actions, the company group commander must beready to commit his own reserves to defeat the enemy’s counterattacks,or seize opportunities to exploit the enemy’s decision to withdraw.

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED 1-39

(2) The company group commander must also be waiting for the pointat which the leading platoons are no longer able to sustain momentum.At this point the company group is at its most vulnerable. The companygroup commander may need then to commit his own reserves or eche-loned platoons, or request reinforcement from the battlegroup.

(3) The company group commander must be prepared to shift his MainEffort in order to exploit success or commit echeloned platoons orreserves earlier than expected.

(4) If the leading platoons bypass resistance in order to maintainmomentum, or miss enemy positions, reserve or echeloned platoons, orthe fire support group, will take on these positions, if necessary keepingthem suppressed or under surveillance pending subsequent destruction.

b. The Reserve Platoon.

(1) The company group will often fight with two platoons, keeping thethird as a reserve. If a three tank troop is operating in intimate support, allthree should operate initially with the two assaulting platoons. One ormore of the tanks should be prepared to lead the reserve platoon to anydepth, flanking or other objective that might be discovered.

(2) The reserve platoon commander may move forward, perhaps withthe company group commander, into a position where he can observe theaction and be prepared to lead his platoon directly to exploit, deal with adepth position or meet an unexpected situation.

(3) If the reserve platoon is tasked to attack enemy depth positions,whichever of the forward platoons can observe the enemy should providefire support and assist in guiding the reserve to its objective. It is likely thatthe company group Main Effort will now switch to the action by thereserve.

(4) The reserve platoon may be required to:

(a) Protect the flanks or rear of the company.

(b) Secure the FUP and/or LD.

(c) Maintain contact with adjacent units.

(d) Clear a position which has been overrun or bypassed by theassaulting platoons.

(e) Take over the mission of an assault platoon which requiresrelief or rest.

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED1-40

(f) Attack from a new direction.

(g) Protect or assist the consolidation and reorganization on theobjective.

(h) Act as a carrying party of reserve ammunition.

(i) Be prepared to give medical assistance to wounded personnelfrom the forward platoons during lulls in the fighting.

(j) Deal with PW as required.

c. Once used in any of the above tasks they are no longer a reserve andthe company group commander must attempt to reconstitute anotherreserve, regardless of its size.

0179. Consolidation.

a. Consolidation will either follow the destruction of the enemy on the initialobjective, exploitation, pursuit or encirclement. In the event of exploitation, pur-suit or encirclement, if it is necessary also to secure the initial objective, thecompany group commander may leave elements of the company group (e.g.,MILAN, one platoon) to carry out this task, possibly under the company group2IC.

b. Unless the mission is to secure the initial objective, the company groupcommander should not become preoccupied with consolidation there.Assuming he retains sufficient combat power, his first aim must be to exploit theresults of the attack; any pause will lead to loss of momentum, reduction inpressure on the enemy and lost opportunities.

c. Once effective action is complete, the consolidation must begin immedi-ately and must be completed in the shortest possible time — to ensure that thecompany group is prepared to meet counterattacks. Unless contact has beentaken over by other elements of the battlegroup, the company group comman-der must aim to retain contact with the enemy. Consolidation consists of twoactions:

(1) Security Against Counterattack. The company group commandermust coordinate a defensive layout against both ground and air action.Tanks should be immediately deployed to the front and flanks, where theycan guard against counterattack. If the assaulting tanks were able tobreak-through or envelop the objective, these tanks will already be inposition. If obstacles make this impossible, the first task will be to find aroute which will allow it. As rapidly as possible MILAN and the platoonswill be deployed into a defensive posture. Each element must be allocatedarcs and target priorities. This should be an SOP action, adjusted as nec-

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED 1-41

essary. The defensive layout should ensure that ground adjacent to theposition is dominated by fire to prevent the enemy carrying out closereconnaissance. The company group commander will develop a new firesupport plan and, if necessary, form a fresh reserve. Engineers or assaultpioneers may be required to construct obstacles to assist security againstcounterattack and to clear any obstacles to permit defensive deploymentand mobility.

(2) Reorganization. The consolidation will include a final clearance ofthe objective, collection and treatment/processing of casualties and pris-oners, regrouping if necessary and replenishment. Ammunition and POLwill be brought forward by A1 Echelon vehicles. These vehicles may alsohave to assist with casualty and PW evacuation on the return journey.The actions of ambulances and A1 Echelon packet should be controlledby the company 2IC. If the company group has sustained a significantnumber of casualties, personnel are to be redistributed as required onreorganization, pending the issue of battle casualty replacements. Themanning of priority weapon systems, such as MILAN, must be taken intoaccount on redistribution. As soon as it is reorganized, the companygroup must be prepared to move on to further tasking without delay.

0180. Exploitation.

a. As the enemy’s resistance weakens the offence moves into exploitation.Momentum must not be lost. Exploitation is characterized by a rapid advanceagainst lessening resistance. The aim is to retain the initiative by preventing theenemy from reorganizing his defence or from conducting an orderly withdrawal.The key to success is speed as any delay will afford the enemy the opportunityto regroup and mount counterattacks or to establish delaying positions in depth.The psychological effect of an exploitation creates confusion and apprehensionthroughout the enemy force, reducing his capability to react and lowering hismorale; this may in itself be decisive.

b. Pursuit (Strike). The pursuit is designed to catch, cut off or destroy theenemy force attempting to escape. Pursuit may develop from a successfulexploitation, or during the attack when the enemy has lost his ability to operateeffectively and attempts to disengage. The primary objective is the destructionof the enemy force, although a terrain objective may also be given. In the pur-suit, the company group must direct relentless pressure against the retreatingenemy. Elements of the company group, or other battlegroup forces, should bedeployed to envelop the enemy and sever his lines of escape.

c. Encirclement (Strike). The aim of encirclement is to cut off the enemyforce in a particular area, with a view to destroying it there or forcing its sur-render. It often results from exploitation or pursuit when the pursuing force over-takes the enemy and blocks his escape.

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED1-42

0181 – 0182. Reserved.

SECTION 6. — COMMAND AND CONTROL

Command

0183. General. While planning and conducting the attack, the company groupcommander must be sufficiently far forward to both observe the action at the criticalpoint and personally influence the Main Effort.

Control

0184. Orders. The orders process is covered in detail in Volume 1, Pamphlet No.1, Chapter 4. However, the following points are particularly relevant for offensiveoperations:

a. To ensure a complete understanding of the company commander’s con-cept of operations and to allow detailed coordination to take place, orders arebest delivered personally at an orders group. This will normally only be possi-ble in a deliberate attack.

b. In a hasty attack, orders will normally be given by radio. Unless the attackis conducted immediately, these orders must be given using secure orderscards. Only the minimum number of instructions to enable a sufficient under-standing of the plan should be given. Specific orders should be issued byexception, with such matters as attack formations being SOP where possible.Only the following orders are normally required:

(1) Information on the enemy. Much of this may have been passed insighting reports, contact reports and situation reports provided by ele-ments in contact or observing. It may, however, be necessary for the com-pany commander to confirm details of the enemy.

(2) Company group mission and Main Effort.

(3) Platoon/troop missions.

(4) Locations of assembly area and FUPs and any route restrictions.

(5) Axis/axes.

(6) Essential coordinating instructions, e.g.:

(a) Time of H Hour.

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED 1-43

(b) Fire plan.

(c) Exploitation.

(d) Adjustments to SOPs.

c. To maintain momentum, orders for the hasty attack will often be given onthe move. They may be given in a number of parts, with information being filledin as it becomes available.

0185. Control Measures. The organization for combat provides for coverage ofthe area of the attack from well behind the LD to the objective and beyond. It willinclude the designation of a number of measures (assembly area, LD, axes, etc.) toassist with the controlling of the attack. The number used will very much depend onthe type of attack and on how the commander wishes to control his forces. Thesevarious measures are discussed in detail at Section 3. — Organization.

0186. Drills. In a hasty attack, the requirement for speed will dictate the neces-sity to make maximum use of drills. Slavish adherence to drills must, however, beavoided. Full account must be taken of the specific enemy dispositions and theground, and in particular the need to achieve surprise. It is unlikely that a templatesolution will be appropriate. In a deliberate attack, much more detailed analysis andplanning is possible, and the drills solution is rarely applicable.

Communications

0187. Effective radio communications are critical to the success of the companygroup in offensive operations. Radio procedure must be slick and sharp and all com-manders must constantly monitor nets to ensure that they keep up to date with thesituation and are able to respond immediately to orders, information concerning sit-uations which could be exploited and warnings of developing threats.

0188. Careful thought must be given to optimising use of radios, including rebroad-casting of the reconnaissance platoon net onto the company group net to keep allcommanders informed; and rebroadcasting the battlegroup net onto the companygroup net when orders are given, to speed up battle procedure and increase respon-siveness.

0189. While effective communications will help ensure success, the companygroup must be able to continue operations when nets are jammed or otherwise inop-erable. This can only be achieved through mission command, good training and wellunderstood drills and SOPs.

0190 – 0191. Reserved.

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED1-44

SECTION 7. — COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT

0192. General. Combat service support (CSS) assets in the offence should beorganized to maintain the momentum of attack. The CSS plan should enable thecompany group to achieve its objectives and then continue the attack, exploit andpursue.

0193. Considerations. The main CSS considerations in offensive operations areas follows:

a. Maximum forward self sufficiency should be achieved by the carriage ofoptimum loads of combat supplies within F echelon. Overburdening, however,must be avoided.

b. Arrangements should be made with battlegroup HQ to provide forwardpositioning of CSS elements to ensure that the momentum of the companygroup is not impeded. This includes replenishment, collection of casualties andreception of PW.

c. Ammunition will have the highest replenishment priority.

d. Plans should be made in anticipation of exploitation, pursuit and consoli-dation.

e. Plans should be made to counter the vulnerability of the company group’sCSS assets, especially when deploying forward for replenishment, repair orrecovery.

0194. Medical. It is unlikely that there will be scope to treat or evacuate casual-ties until the consolidation stage of the attack. The company 2IC must, however,attempt to monitor casualty levels so that additional assets can be warned ordeployed forward when required. It is unlikely that the company ambulance will besufficient to evacuate all casualties. Plans should be in place to use vehicles to assistin casualty evacuation when necessary, including the evacuation of wounded PW. Ifpossible, casualties should be centralised at platoon locations or company HQ onreorganization, to increase efficiency of collection.

0195. Prisoners of War. During the course of the attack, PW must be disarmed,subjected to immediate tactical questioning as necessary and may then have to beleft until the reorganization. On reorganization, PW should be evacuated. When pos-sible the same transport should be used to evacuate casualties and PW. The com-pany 2IC should monitor PW levels in order to warn off battlegroup HQ of additionaltransport requirements.

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED 1-45

0196. Combat Supplies Replenishment.

a. During the Attack. There may be a requirement to conduct battle replen-ishment during the attack, especially replenishment of ammunition. Runningreplenishment may also be possible during the transition from attack toexploitation. Plans must be made for these requirements. Combat supply lev-els, especially ammunition, should be monitored by the company 2IC, whomust anticipate the requirement for replenishment. Redistribution of ammuni-tion is an alternative measure to maintain momentum. Distribution and redistri-bution within the company group should be coordinated by the CSM.

b. On Reorganization. Ammunition and fuel must be replenished as SOP atthe conclusion of the operation. To save time and maintain the companygroup’s responsiveness, the company 2IC must anticipate the earliest opportu-nity for this and, if possible, have the CQMS packet moved forward into a safeholding area prior to reorganization. The immediate danger of counterattackduring the consolidation phase of offensive operations must be taken intoaccount when planning replenishment.

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED1-46

ANNEX A TOCHAPTER 1

THE NIGHT ATTACK

General

1. Night attacks may be silent or noisy but even in the case of a silent attack a pre-planned fire plan starting at H hour will be on call. Silent attacks may well unnerve aninexperienced enemy and his reactions may well be too slow to use his supportweapons and artillery effectively. On the other hand, night surveillance devices mayallow him to locate us at an early stage and then maximum fire support will berequired to manoeuvre onto his position. The command decision as to whether to gosilent or noisy will be based on the ground, enemy reactions to patrols and state oftraining of our own troops.

Mounted From Within the Forward Edge of the Battle Area (FEBA)

2. The increasing use of night fighting devices such as battlefield illumination,observation devices, driving aids and individual weapon sights will make it far moredifficult for the attacker to achieve surprise. Provided weather conditions arefavourable the defender will be able to:

a. Obtain early warning of troops deploying against him.

b. Detect active enemy devices.

c. Engage the attacker with aimed or observed fire.

d. Deploy his patrols more efficiently.

e. Locate the attacker if he moves across open country.

3. However, the attacker will be able to move faster and navigate with greater ease.He will be able to detect and observe enemy movement, use aimed fire and observeindirect fire. The stages and conduct of a night attack by a platoon are basically thesame as those for a daylight operation. However, three aspects require particularattention:

a. Simplicity of plan to assist control which will be more difficult at night.

b. Thorough reconnaissance, both by day and night, if possible.

c. Detailed preparations, including rehearsals.

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED 1A-1

4. The introduction of night fighting aids and observation devices will not solve allthe difficulties of control, but it will give the attacker more scope to manoeuvre in theapproach and assault.

5. The present methods of control are still applicable and modifications to the setpiece night attack will depend upon the training of the troops taking part and the nightfighting aids available to the attacker and the defender.

6. The phases of the night attack will be dealt with as follows:

a. Movement to FUP and LD.

b. Assault.

c. Fight through.

d. Reorganization.

7. Movement to FUP and LD. In a company attack the LD, the FUP and routesto it may be marked by tapes, defile markers, and/or lamps. Guides are provided tomove platoons into their exact forming up positions. In a platoon attack, sectionguides who have been rehearsed if possible, both by day and night, will lead sectionsfrom the assembly area to their exact positions in the FUP. These should be markedsimply, for night identification. The night vision of the platoon must not be impairedby using lights before the attack. Those leading columns must remember to moveslowly enough for those at the back to keep up. In future beta lights may be availabledown to platoon level for route and other marking tasks at night. A possible layout fora company night FUP is at Fig 11.

8. The Assault. Aids to keeping direction are compass bearings, pace checkers,use of tracer ammunition to mark an axis, use of prominent landmarks, skyline fea-tures and the moon. Leaders may wear white or luminous objects on their backs.Changes in direction after leaving the LD should be avoided. Sections must maintaincontact with the sections on their inside flanks. Depending on the ground and cover,it is better for control if the assault formation is adopted in an FUP as close as pos-sible to the enemy position. This tactic allows troops to make maximum use of cov-ered approaches at night to minimize the risk of exposure to surveillance devicesprematurely. It is also used over difficult ground where initially it may be easier tomove in file before deploying into assault formation the move into assault formationwill require rehearsal. Rates of advance will depend on the degree of darkness, thenneed for silence, the fire plan, obstacles, vegetation and the state of the ground; usu-ally it will be about half the daylight rate. Men must move at a steady pace and knowthe action to be taken if the enemy uses flares or other means of illumination. Evenwhen surprise has been lost, it is still best to exercise control with the minimum ofshouting; by listening assaulting troops can gain valuable information of the enemy’swhereabouts; furthermore, a silent approach can be unnerving for the enemy. Oneadvantage of the night attack is the psychological effect upon the enemy whose

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED1A-2

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED 1A-3

Fig 11. — Possible Layout of a Company Night FUP(not to scale)

Note:Occupation will normally be from the base of the ‘T’. Depending on the ground, occu-pation can be from any point of the ‘T’ in which case sub-unit order of march in theoccupation will vary, and need to be carefully considered.

����� �����

��$

%�

&�����

'��#���

(��)������� ����� ����*+�

&���&��)�����

����������#������������ ���� �� ��

,-.

�����������������

&��� ���%� ���

�������&���

doubts and fears are magnified by the unknown. The move to the objective requiresthe attacking troops to reach the FUP without being discovered. If the attack is dis-covered before this stage, the following action should take place:

a. The company commander will call for pre-arranged supporting fire on theobjective to neutralize enemy fire. Planned illumination will be called for to per-mit better control and more rapid movement.

b. Platoons should attempt to continue in their previous formations. If this isimpossible, they must move forward using fire and manoeuvre. If they are closeto the objective, the final assault can begin as soon as the attack is discovered.

c. Scattered fire by small elements of enemy must not be taken as loss of sur-prise and consequently as the signal to begin the assault.

9. Fighting Through the Objective. Fighting through will be the most difficultstage of a night attack. It requires detailed training and rehearsal and must be donesystematically to avoid confusion and to retain control. Particular points to be avoidedare:

a. Converging on enemy weapon flashes.

b. Use of grenades above ground level.

10. Reorganization. The details for reorganization on the objective will be simi-lar to the procedure used in daylight; however there will often be confusion resultingfrom the fight through and mopping up on the objective. Coordinated defence maybe difficult initially. In the darkness there is a tendency for sections to lay out theirpositions too close together; this can be avoided by giving clear orders for reorgani-zation; by careful liaison by section commanders; and by thorough and early coordi-nation by the platoon commander. Commanders should pace out distances betweentrenches. Commanders should know pre-arranged DF, and FPF tasks and who cancall for them. All members of the platoon should know the pre-arranged success sig-nal. Any tanks or support weapons and their detachments which join the platoon dur-ing darkness must be protected and will need guides.

Mounted Forward of the FEBA

11. Both the defender and attacker have gained many advantages by the introduc-tion of surveillance devices, therefore the well tried and recognized techniques willhave to be adjusted to meet these new aids.

12. The attacker must:

a. Assess the enemy’s likely surveillance plan.

b. Make greater use of deception.

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED1A-4

c. Make better use of ground.

d. Decentralize the control and execution of movement to company or pla-toon level.

e. Use more stealth in the initial deployment.

13. Companies will be allotted objectives and boundaries and separate start points.Objectives will be smaller than by day and more clearly defined. Companies willmove to their FUPs along routes selected by the battalion commander. Platoons mayuse the same route, moving at intervals or they may use separate routes to a com-pany RV/check point (see Figs 12 and 13).

14. When the FUP and LD are more than 150-200 metres from the objective and/orthe enemy is using surveillance devices and/or the route forward from the LD isacross broken country, it may be appropriate to keep in close formation until troopsare much nearer the objective. In this case a line, the Final Assault Position (FAP),will be laid down. This should not necessitate a formal halt and momentum must bemaintained as sub-units shake out into their assault formations to close with theenemy. This technique not only requires a high degree of training and control but alsopreferably, some rehearsal.

15. Routes forward should be cleared and protected by fighting or standing patrols.A fighting patrol of about platoon strength may be ordered to clear and safeguard theroutes ahead of the rest of the company. This patrol could also undertake some or allof the following tasks:

a. Marking and lighting routes.

b. Protecting the company RV and check point.

c. Guiding platoons forward to the LD. This will require some previous recon-naissance and must be carefully conducted (see Appendix 1).

d. Observing the objective and if possible giving aimed fire support to theassault.

16. H-hour will still be the time that assaulting platoons cross the LD which normallywill be the forward edge of the FUP. Within the battalion, companies may have a com-mon H-hour or separate ones.

17. Night attacks may be silent or noisy but fire planning will be related to the illu-mination plan, the requirement to destroy or neutralize enemy night fighting devicesand the deception plan.

18. By using observation devices it will be possible to allot platoons a separate,definable part of the objective, such as a corner of a wood or a particular group ofbuildings.

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED 1A-5

19. A company will not necessarily have to attack as a coordinated whole. Generalprinciples of, and variations from the traditional night attack are:

a. Companies can allot objectives and boundaries within which platoons willmove.

b. Within their allotted boundaries, company commanders can select theirown routes to a company release point, at which platoons may diverge on sep-arate routes, to their own platoon FUPs.

c. The FUP and LD should be as close to the enemy as possible but out ofhis effective fire.

d. The use of CWS permits LSWs to deliver observed covering fire for thefinal stages of the assault.

e. During reorganization, platoons will find it easier to site positions andweapons than in the past.

20. The co-ordination of illumination is vital if assets are not to be wasted. A strictlight plan must be enforced with the 51 mm mortars either under command of platoonsergeants or centralized at company level. If possible, the firing of illuminants shouldbe rehearsed; this will allow for continuous light cover and no firing of fresh roundsbefore those in the air have started to fade.

21. In summary, the requirements for all successful night attacks are:

a. A high standard of training.

b. Information.

c. Detailed planning.

d. Simplicity.

e. Surprise.

f. Rehearsals.

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED1A-6

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED 1A-7

*-/0

��$���#

*+�

%�

&������&��)������

,-.

����������������

&������1����������

*������0������0��

��$���#

*+�

%�

&������&��)������

*-/0 &������1����������

*������0������0��

&������'2

�����3�&�����

�����

&������'���������

Fig 12. – Approach Using OneRoute

Fig 13. – Approach Using PlatoonRoutes

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED1A-8

APPENDIX 1 TOANNEX A TOCHAPTER 1

MARKING A COMPANY NIGHT ATTACK FUP AND LD

1. Marking and securing the FUP and LD for a company night attack is likely to bea platoon operation, probably that of the reserve platoon.

2. The operation should be mounted as a platoon-sized patrol. As far as possible,section grouping should remain as for the reserve platoon task.

3. A possible grouping is:

a. Command group Platoon commander

Radio operator

Runner

One rifleman

b. Final Rendezvous Platoon sergeant(FRV) group No. 51 mm Mortar

c. Protection groups Two sections

d. Marking group One section, less one rifleman detached to command group

4. The procedure should be as follows:

a. The platoon moves to an FRV short of the FUP area.

b. From the FRV, the platoon commander leads a reconnaissance group to theselected FUP area. This group comprises the platoon commander, his runnerand the two section commanders of the protection groups. The platoonsergeant remains in command of the FRV. Tasks of the reconnaissance groupare:

(1) To check the area is clear of enemy and/or obstacles (i.e., wire ormines).

(2) To site the FUP and LD in detail.

(3) To select positions for the flanking protection groups.

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED 1A1-1

c. On return to the FRV, the platoon commander will issue confirmatoryorders as necessary. The protection group sections will then deploy to theflanks of the FUP, to protect the marking party.

d. The FRV party, commanded by the platoon sergeant, provides a firm baseat the rear of the FUP area.

e. Once the protection groups report they are in position, the platoon com-mander and the marking group begin to lay out the FUP as at Fig 11.

f. The axis of the FUP will be laid first, on a compass bearing to ensure cor-rect alignment. The platoon commander will position one man from the mark-ing group at each ‘light point’. The rifleman from the marking group sectionattached to the command group will be responsible for laying white tape orcable as required.

g. Once the FUP is laid out to the platoon commander’s satisfaction, hereturns to the FRV and reports by radio to his company commander. If on radiosilence a runner will have to be used to report verbally.

h. The company may occupy the FUP in one of two ways:

(1) Two guides may be sent back to the company’s assembly area.They bring the assault platoons forward to the base of the FUP, torchesare switched on and the FUP occupied using the manned ‘light points’ asreference points.

(2) The section providing the marking party leave their positions withthe marking torches switched on. They regroup as a section at the FRV,move back to the company assembly area under command of the sectioncommander and bring the assaulting platoons forward into the FUP. Eachman of the marking group is then responsible for guiding a particular sec-tion or sections of the assaulting platoons to his allocated sector of theFUP.

i. As soon as the assaulting platoons are secure in the FUP, the companycommander will order the marking platoon to withdraw to the FRV, reorganizeand occupy the reserve platoon position in the FUP. Alternatively, it may benecessary to leave the flank protection groups in position until after H-hour. Thereserve platoon could then collect flank protection groups as it moves forwardor they could regroup at the FRV.

5. If the enemy attack the FUP during the marking operation, the protection groupsection should defend the area. The company commander may then decide:

a. To occupy the FUP in contact and attack as planned.

b. To withdraw the marking platoon from the compromised FUP, using fireand manoeuvre by sections, and attack from the assembly area using theassault platoons.

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED1A1-2

ANNEX B TOCHAPTER 1

INFILTRATION

General

1. Infiltration is a form of manoeuvre in which a force moves through or aroundenemy positions without detection. Infiltration may be conducted either by the com-pany group with its armoured vehicles, or using only the dismounted elements. If suc-cessful, an infiltration attack is likely to achieve considerable surprise, and unnervethe enemy.

Aims

2. A company group may conduct infiltration in order to support a subsequentattack. Other possible aims of infiltration attacks are:

a. Reconnaissance.

b. Attack in depth, including key enemy positions.

c. Support of a main attack.

d. Securing obstacle crossing sites.

e. Capture of specific terrain features.

f. Disruption of communications.

Conditions

3. Infiltration will usually take place at night, in poor visibility, in close country orwhen the enemy’s defences are widely dispersed. A detailed and accurate knowl-edge of the enemy’s strengths and dispositions will improve the chances of success.

Planning and Preparation

4. Reconnaissance. Reconnaissance must be thorough and carefully planned:

a. To locate enemy defences, observation posts and surveillance devices inthe area of the attack so that suitable routes can be selected.

b. To confirm suitable infiltration routes and FUPs.

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED 1B-1

5. Infiltration Plan. Major considerations in the infiltration plan will be:

a. The Infiltration Force. The strength of the infiltration force should be suf-ficient to achieve its tasks and defeat subsequent enemy counter-attacks.Subject to the mission and terrain, assault pioneer and engineer assets andengineer reconnaissance may be key elements of the force.

b. Fire Support. The infiltration force should include MILAN and 81 mmmortars. To compensate for a lack of immediate heavy firepower:

(1) All objectives should be within artillery range.

(2) Plans must include the rapid reinforcement of the infiltration groupas soon as possible after the attack begins.

c. Infiltration Routes and Groups. Routes should be secure from enemyobservation and fire. Small parties using multiple routes are preferable to largergroups moving on only one or two routes.

d. Security and Control. Reconnaissance vehicles or dismounted patrolsshould be tasked to screen the advance and cover the flanks of the infiltrationforce. Behind this screen, guides may be deployed to critical points, RVs andFUPs. Simple reception arrangements are important to prevent confusion andclashes between infiltrating groups.

e. Surprise and Deception. All possible passive and active measuresshould be taken to ensure surprise. In addition to any other deception plan, lightand artillery fire should be on call to distract or confuse the enemy if any infil-tration group is detected.

Conduct

6. Security elements will move immediately ahead of the infiltrating force to proveits routes clear or report any opposition to be avoided, and secure the FUPs. Plannedalternative FUPs may have to be used if those originally selected prove to be unten-able.

7. Every effort must be made to reach the FUP by stealth. This will require accu-rate navigation and a high standard of light and noise discipline throughout the force.

8. If the enemy is located or contact established on the route to the FUPs, the com-pany group commander must decide between:

a. Attempting to work round the enemy or diverting to another route.

b. Withdrawing the group using that route and continuing with a reducedforce.

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED1B-2

c. Fighting through the enemy, with the probability of losing surprise.

9. From the FUPs, the operation will continue on conventional lines.

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED 1B-3

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED1B-4

Chapter 2

DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS

SECTION 1. — FUNDAMENTALS

General

0201. Defensive operations are usuallyundertaken when the enemy has the initia-tive to prevent him from seizing terrain orbreaking through into a defended area.Defensive operations aim to break theenemy attack, destroy his forces and stophim from accomplishing his aim. In doingso, they create the circumstances for offen-sive action. This is fundamental to thedefensive battle which must not drift into asituation where the defending force merelyreacts to enemy moves. Every opportunityshould be taken to grasp the initiative andforce the attacker to react to the defensive plan.

0202. Reserved Demolitions. Although the tactical doctrine for reserved demo-litions is associated with the doctrine for the delay and the withdrawal, it is moreclosely connected with the doctrine for area defence and is therefore included in thischapter. The particular requirements for the deployment of the demolition guard andthe control of the demolition make the reserved demolition an operation with uniquecharacteristics. Full details can be found at Annex A.

Principles

0203. The following principles are of particular importance in defensive operations:

a. Depth. Depth in defence is necessary to achieve freedom of action, togive time for reaction and to absorb the enemy’s momentum. Positions in depthwill surprise and unbalance the enemy thus providing opportunities for coun-terattacks. Some gaps may have to be accepted but these must be covered byobservation and fire. Depth should not be sacrificed in an attempt to cover agiven frontage in strength. Depth is obtained by the allocation of sufficientspace for:

(1) Employment of protective elements.

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED 2-1

`çåíÉåíë

Page

SECTION 1. — FUNDAMENTALS 2–1SECTION 2. — FORCES AND TASKS 2–8SECTION 3. — PLANNING ANDPREPARATION 2–11SECTION 4. — CONDUCT 2–24SECTION 5. — COMMAND AND CONTROL 2–28SECTION 6. — COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT 2–30

Annexes:

A. Reserved DemolitionsB. Routine in Defence (24 Hour Period)C. UK Mine Warfare Doctrine

(2) Employment of longer range weapons to destroy, defeat, disrupt ordelay enemy elements throughout the depth of the company group’s areaof influence.

(3) Use of battle positions, obstacles and defensive fire throughout thearea.

(4) Positioning and movement of reserves and combat support ele-ments.

b. Mutual Support. Mutual support exists when positions are able to sup-port each other by direct fire, thus preventing the enemy from mounting anattack against any one position without being subjected to direct fire from oneor more adjacent positions. There will often be a conflict between the need fordepth and for mutual support across a wide front. Depth is more important andin creating depth, the company group can also cover gaps between dug-in posi-tions, enhancing mutual support. In the less dense battlefield, gaps must beaccepted, but they should only exist between companies. Mutual support mustalways be achieved between platoons within companies. Arcs should interlockbetween platoons within a company group or across a boundary, but true mutualsupport will only be achieved if key weapon arcs overlap (see Fig 14). Whenthe threat is primarily an armoured one, mutual support between anti-armourweapons is essential.

c. All Round Defence. Although a defensive position is likely to be sightedin accordance with the IPB against an attack from a particular direction, thedefender must be capable of repelling attack from any direction. Platoons mustbe fully prepared to fight when outflanked or attacked from different directions.

d. Offensive Spirit. Energetic offensive action is fundamental to the suc-cessful defence. Defensive operations must be aggressive, harassing and dan-gerous to the enemy. Plans must focus on the enemy and commanders at alllevels within the company, working to the company mission and main effort,must seek to grasp the initiative and dictate to the enemy the way in which thebattle will be fought. Immediate counterattacks can be launched to exploit gapsin the enemy attack formations or pauses in his plans. Assaults launched bysmall groups of determined men can have results out of all proportion to theeffort.

e. Reserves. Reserves are essential at all levels for immediate counterat-tack tasks and to deal with the unexpected. Within an infantry company groupreserves will be small and will normally be provided by a depth position. Onceemployed, every effort should be made to reconstitute a reserve regardless ofits size or make up.

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED2-2

f. Deception and Concealment. The attacker must be continually delayedand confused by the defensive layout. This can be achieved by early destruc-tion of enemy reconnaissance, good concealment and dummy positions. Othermeasures include EMCON, close control of movement and a high standard ofcamouflage of vehicles, positions and combat supplies. However, concealmentshould not be sacrificed in favour of longer fields of fire. Concealment at nightis as important as by day and care must be taken to minimize and conceal heatemissions.

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED 2-3

���

���

����������

Fig 14. — Mutual Support: Interlocking and Overlapping Fire

Note:

Rifle arcs at their battle range will just meet (interlock). LSW arcs with their greaterbattle range will overlap.

Purpose

0204. The purpose of defence will include one or more of the following:

a. To wear down the enemy’s offensive capability in order to cause his attackto fail.

b. To hold ground to prevent an enemy breakthrough.

c. To gain time in order to prepare for subsequent operations.

d. To fix the enemy to allow offensive action elsewhere.

e. To force the enemy to concentrate so that he is more vulnerable to attack.

Types of Defensive Operations

0205. Defensive operations can be divided into two broad categories: mobile andarea. The categories are not mutually exclusive in that area defence can take placewithin a framework of a mobile defence and vice versa. Both categories can then befurther sub-divided into deliberate or hasty. The fundamental difference betweenmobile and area defence is that mobile defence seeks to defeat the enemy’s attackby attacking his cohesion whereas area defence seeks to defeat the enemy bydenial. Regardless of the category of defence, due to its lack of mobility the companygroup will apply the tactical doctrine of area defence.

a. Mobile Defence. Mobile defence focuses on the destruction of the attack-ing force by permitting it to advance to a position which exposes it to a coun-terattack and envelopment by a mobile reserve. The company group will act asthe fixing force in mobile defence.

b. Area Defence. In an area defence the bulk of the defending forces aredeployed to retain ground using a combination of defensive positions and smallmobile reserves. The defence will be organized around a static framework ofdefensive positions which will seek to destroy the enemy by inter-locking fire orby local counterattack against enemy penetrating between defensive positions.

Stages of the Defence

0206. The defensive battle can be divided into a number of stages which in prac-tice are unlikely to be clearly defined. These stages are:

a. Preparatory Stage. During the preparatory stage planning of the defence,reconnaissance, liaison, rehearsals and counter-reconnaissance activities willtake place. Maximum emphasis will be placed on concurrent activity.

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED2-4

b. Covering Force Action. The covering force will fight what is essentially adelay battle. It will be a battle of movement with little time to establish or fightfrom positions. Maximum destruction is inflicted on the enemy so that he arrivesat the main defensive position dislocated and with his cohesion undermined.

c. Battle Handover. Forces in the main defensive position will assumeresponsibility for the battle at the handover line. Direct and indirect fire assetsfrom the main defence force will provide support to cover the withdrawal of thecovering force. The withdrawal will involve rearward passage of lines.

d. Main Defensive Battle. The decisive battle is fought in the main defen-sive area where the effects of deep and covering force operations, coupled withthe sustaining efforts of the rear area, combine with the operations of the maindefence force to defeat the enemy. Much of what occurs will depend onwhether the formation commander has planned for a mobile or area defence.

e. Employment of Reserves. Forces will be earmarked as reserves foroffensive tasks which are integral to the defensive concept. The primary pur-pose of a reserve is to preserve the commander’s flexibility of action.Secondary purposes are to reinforce the defence of committed forces, blockenemy forces that have penetrated the FEBA, react to rear area threats andrelieve depleted units and provide for continuous operations.

Glossary of Tactical Terms

0207. The following tactical terms are associated with defensive operations:

a. Deliberate Defence. Defence organized when out of contact with theenemy. It normally includes an extensive fortified zone incorporating pill boxes,forts and communications systems.

b. Hasty Defence. Defence organized while in contact with the enemy orwhen contact is imminent and time available for organization is limited. It ischaracterized by improvement of the natural defensive strength of the terrainby utilization of foxholes, emplacements and obstacles.

c. Vital Ground. Ground of such tactical significance that its loss will makethe defence untenable. It is normally identified by a superior commander andgiven out in his orders. Subordinate commanders have to base their estimatesaccordingly. The definition of ground as ‘vital’ in defence will usually imply thatcounterattack plans must be made to regain it if it is lost to the enemy. A pla-toon commander would not normally choose his vital ground. Any vital groundin his area would be designed by superior commanders.

d. Key Terrain. Any locality, or area, the seizure or retention of which affordsa marked advantage to either combatant. This is ground which it is highly desir-

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED 2-5

able to hold, rather than essential to hold. Although Key Terrain will not beabandoned lightly and steps will be taken to recapture it, if it can be done eco-nomically (without committing too much of the reserve), a commander may beprepared to concede it. A formation or battlegroup commander normally willselect his own Key Terrain.

e. Area of Interest. The area of concern to the commander, including thearea of influence, areas adjacent thereto, and extending into enemy territory tothe objective of current or planned operations. This area also includes areasoccupied by enemy forces who could jeopardise the accomplishment of themission.

f. Area of Influence. A geographical area wherein the commander is directlycapable of influencing operations, by manoeuvre or fire support systems nor-mally under his command and control.

g. Primary Position. The main position from which a unit intends to fight. Itmay have reconnoitred or prepared another position to which it might move ifthe primary position becomes untenable. This other position is called a sec-ondary position.

h. Secondary Position. A completely new position, normally prepared butcertainly at least reconnoitred, to which a sub-unit or unit will move once its pri-mary position has become untenable or when its primary position has becomeineffective because of the flow of battle. A unit may remain in a hide until themain enemy thrust has been identified. It will then be called forward to man itsprimary or secondary position.

i. Alternative Position. A position in the immediate area to which a sub-unit,tank, GPMG(SF), fire team etc., may move once it has been located by theenemy in order to continue the engagement. Equally, if time allows, sub-unitsmay prepare two positions and select once of these alternative positions foroccupation once the enemy is identified.

j. Counterattack. An operation to recapture lost ground or to destroy anenemy. Counterattacks will either be immediate or deliberate.

k. Blocking. A move to block incursion into a defended area, or to divert theenemy into a pre-planned killing area. Blocking tasks will be planned before thebattle is joined and positions will be reconnoitred and, if possible, prepared.

l. Defensive Fire (DF). Pre-arranged artillery, mortar or GPMG(SF) fire toassist and protect a unit engaged in a defensive action. DFs may be sub-dividedinto:

(1) DF in Depth. The aim is to disorganize the enemy’s preparation foran attack or counterattack, and to inflict casualties on his reserves during

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED2-6

an assault. They are usually 2–4,000 metres from our own positions. DFsin depth are usually selected by the battlegroup commander on advicefrom his BC.

(2) Close DF. The aim of a close DF is to break up an enemy attackby engaging the enemy while he is either in the FUP or assaulting. CloseDFs are usually out to 2,000 metres from our own positions and areselected by company commanders in consultation with FOOs and MFCsbut are coordinated at battlegroup level. A company would normally beallocated 3–4 artillery close DF targets.

(3) Priority DF. A priority DF is located where the brigade commanderwants to first engage the enemy. STA assets must be able to observe thislocation. Guns will be laid on the priority DF when not on other tasks.

m. Final Protective Fire (FPF). A defensive fire (DF) target to cover the mostvulnerable approaches, usually close in to a position. Artillery will not be allo-cated to a battalion FPF. The FPF will therefore be the responsibility of the mor-tars and such direct fire assets that can engage it. Ideally all FPFs should beadjusted. GPMG(SF) will also have FPF tasks on which they are laid when notfiring other tasks.

n. Enfilade/Defilade. Enfilade fire is fire which strikes the side of the enemy.It is a principle for the siting of anti-tank weapons but GPMG(SF) should alsobe sited if possible to fire along a line of advancing enemy from one end. Adefilade position is a position at an angle to the enemy which enables engage-ment of the enemy’s flank. Thus from a defilade position, enfilade fire is pro-duced.

o. Killing Area. An area in which the commander plans to force the enemyto concentrate, so as to destroy him.

p. Free Fire Area. An area in which everything is considered hostile andneed not be positively identified as such before being engaged.

q. Destroy. To kill the enemy or to neutralize his vehicles. To destroy theenemy ‘within boundaries’ removes any concern for a specific piece of groundprovided that the enemy is neutralized or killed.

r. Deny. To prevent the enemy establishing himself upon a piece of ground.Disruption and dislocation of access from the ground and air are important ele-ments in fulfilling such a mission. Ground can be denied either by holding it orby covering the area by direct or observed indirect fire. To deny without holdingrequires surveillance.

s. Hold. To maintain or retain possession of a position or area by force. Aunit holds ground when it is physically in possession of that ground. Invariablythis requires some form of digging. It is normal to hold vital ground.

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED 2-7

t. Screen. A screen is a security element whose primary task is to observe,identify and report information and which fights only in self-protection.

u. Guard. A guard is a security element whose primary task is to protect themain force by fighting to gain time, while also observing and reporting informa-tion.

v. False Front. A false front is the positioning of forces and/or dummy posi-tions forward of a defensive position in order to deceive the enemy as to thelocation of that position.

w. Interlocking Fire. Interlocking fire is achieved when the boundaries ofindividual arcs of fire meet.

x. Overlapping Arcs of Fire. Overlapping arcs are achieved when oneweapon system is capable of engaging targets within the arc of fire of its neigh-bour.

y. Reverse Slope. A reverse slope position is a position on ground notexposed to direct fire or observation.

z. Forward Slope. A forward slope position is a position which is exposed todirect fire and to observed indirect fire.

0208 – 0209. Reserved.

SECTION 2. — FORCES AND TASKS

Employment of Combat Forces

0210. General. The infantry company group is capable of mounting an effectivedefence only from prepared positions and will, therefore, be employed primarily in astatic role as a fixing force. Defensive positions should make the best use of barriersand be located where the ground offers scope to employ the fire power and the fullrange of anti-armour weapons; it is, therefore, particularly suitable for use in closecountry such as wooded and built-up areas. The positions selected should be cov-ered from observed fire for as long as possible, thus enabling the position to retainits effectiveness. The position will need to be well supported by armour and combatsupport assets.

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED2-8

0211. Reconnaissance. Early location of the enemy is a fundamental require-ment for successful defence. Battlegroup resources will be allocated to locate andidentify the enemy and then to assess his intentions. At company level standingpatrols and OPs should be deployed forward to provide early warning, particularly atnight or when visibility is limited, and by the use of indirect fire to achieve early attri-tion and disruption. Location of these patrols and OPs will be driven by theIntelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB) and the Surveillance and TargetAcquisition Plan (STAP) that is subsequently produced from the IPB.

0212. Artillery and Mortars. The roles of artillery and mortars in defence are:

a. To commence attrition beyond the range of direct fire weapons.

b. Pre-planned DF tasks for engagement on call. These targets will beplanned and coordinated at battlegroup level.

c. Fire plans in support of counterattacks.

d. The engagement of opportunity targets.

e. The provision of illumination (mortars only) and smoke.

0213. The mortar platoon is the battlegroup’s own intimate indirect close supportweapon. Artillery is allocated as follows:

a. Direct Support (DS). The support provided by a unit or formation notattached or under command/control of the supported unit or formation, butrequired to give priority to the support required by that unit or formation. Artilleryin DS gives both the provision of artillery observers, commanders and commu-nications and a guarantee of fire which cannot be overruled.

b. General Support (Gen Sp). That support which is given to the supportedforce as a whole and not to any particular sub-division. Artillery in Gen Sp isretained under control of the formation artillery commander to influence the bat-tle at formation level.

c. Reinforcing. A tactical mission in which one artillery unit augments thefire of another artillery unit. The fire of reinforcing artillery is guaranteed.

d. General Support Reinforcing (GSR). General Support Reinforcingartillery has the mission of supporting the force as a whole and, on a secondarybasis, of providing reinforcing fire for another artillery unit.

0214. FOOs and MFCs. When considering firepower the company group com-mander must not focus solely on his direct fire weapons, leaving the planning of indi-rect fire to his FOO. If he does so then this tends to leave no clear concept of the wayin which fire support in general and indirect fire support in particular are to beemployed in the overall company plan. Company group commanders must not leave

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED 2-9

their battlegroup commander’s O Groups without being familiar with the battlegroup’s fire plan. The company group commander, with his FOO, must plan the indi-rect fire support to complement and reinforce the direct fire plan. As with obstacles,fire support priorities should support the main effort. Fire support can also be used toengage the enemy in areas that a company group cannot cover with direct fireweapons. The following items must be addressed as part of the fire support plan:

a. The location of the FOO and MFCs. They should be located where theyare best able to direct and adjust indirect fire missions to support the maineffort.

b. The artillery target list is the initial battlegroup fire support plan with thekey DFs to support the company group. The company group commandershould, with his FOO, develop the target list based on the indirect fire plan. Thefire plan should include targets in front of, on top of, and behind the main com-pany group position.

c. Close air support and armed helicopter tasks, if issued.

0215. Armour. Although armour can in certain circumstances be dug-in on acompany position and integrated into the direct fire plan, it is far more likely to beused as a mobile reserve where tanks can exploit their firepower and mobility. Tankswill be used for counterattack and blocking operations.

0216. Anti-Armour Weapons. The main threat to the company group is likely tobe posed by enemy armoured forces. The success of the defence will, therefore,depend fundamentally on the deployment, coordination and control of the variety ofanti-armour weapon systems within the company group’s area of influence. Whilebattlegroup level anti-armour weapons will be coordinated at battlegroup HQ level todestroy enemy armour in designated armour killing areas, the company group com-mander will need to tie in the company’s light anti-armour weapons to supplement thebattlegroup plan. The company will provide protection for the anti-armour weapons,help in preparing their positions and give administrative support as necessary.

0217. GPMG(SF). The deployment of the GPMG(SF) platoon will be coordinatedat battlegroup HQ level and will be linked to the anti-armour plan. It is therefore likelythat a GPMG(SF) section will form part of a company group task organization indefence. The section should be sited as three guns, each in defilade position, there-by making best use of enfilade fire and the beaten zone.

0218. Engineers. The company group commander must plan how to use thetime and engineer resources available to prepare positions, routes and obstacles. Hemust prioritize the tasks so that the most important are done first; no defensive posi-tion is ever finished. The company group must continue to develop the defensivepreparations until interrupted by the enemy’s advance. Engineer tasks will be as fol-lows:

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED2-10

a. Counter-Mobility Tasks. Counter-mobility tasks serve to disrupt, turn, fixor block enemy forces. They will be closely coordinated with the direct and indi-rect fire plans. Tasks will consist of development of barriers combining naturalobstacles and minefields and demolitions. The completion of counter-mobilitytasks is of greater importance than the completion of survivability tasks.

b. Survivability Tasks. Survivability tasks will involve construction of tankscrapes, trenches, weapon pits, command posts; development of dummy posi-tions; and providing protection for combat supplies.

c. Mobility Tasks. Engineers will reconnoitre, improve and open routes, forboth supply and counterattacks and ensure that minefield lanes are kept open.

0219 – 0220. Reserved.

SECTION 3. — PLANNING AND PREPARATION

General

0221. Even in a deliberate defensive battle there will never be unlimited time forreconnaissance and preparation. Early warning orders, sensible anticipation and thewell practised application of unit SOPs are essential to achieve concurrent activity.When time is limited battle procedure can be reduced by measures such as the issueof FragOs based on map estimates and concurrent reconnaissances.

Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB)

0222. The rationale for the layout of a defensive position will be driven by the IPB.This process is designed to help commanders at all levels identify possible enemycourses of action, suitable killing areas, decision points and surveillance targets andOP locations. Further details on IPB are at Volume 1 — The Infantry Company Group— The Fundamentals, Chapter 4.

Reconnaissance

0223. Following attendance at the battalion O Group the company group comman-der will conduct a reconnaissance of his company’s area of operations. The aim ofthe reconnaissance is to confirm the IPB and carry out detailed siting. For this taskhe will need the trace of the battalion’s defensive layout and relevant IPB traces.Particular attention will need to be paid to the armour killing areas in the anti-armourplan. Prior to setting out, a map appreciation should be conducted to select likelyvantage points for observing the area. Time is likely to be in short supply and mustnot be wasted in unnecessary travel. Whenever possible the ground should belooked at from the enemy point of view and the broad details of the IPB confirmed,or otherwise, by detailed analysis. Particular attention should be paid to likely

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED 2-11

approaches, natural obstacles and chokepoints, concealment, dead ground, fields offire, going and possible counterattack routes. The company group commandershould be accompanied by the FOO and/or MFC, MILAN section commander and ifpossible an engineer. The party may require protection and will need communica-tions. If time is short platoon guides may also need to be taken.

Where to Kill the Enemy

0224. Planning and Siting Principles. To ensure maximum coordination of firethe principle of planning ‘two down’ is applied when planning the defence. This prin-ciple should not, however, be applied to siting which is the responsibility of platoonand section commanders. The company group commander’s primary responsibilityis, therefore, to allocate centre of mass for each section position and the arcs ofGPMG(SF), LSW and LAW. Once siting has been completed he will then conductdetailed coordination of arcs on the ground to ensure that mutual support is achievedto the best possible effect.

0225. Enemy attacks are based on two principles — speed and mass. Enemyforces win by sustaining a high rate of advance (12 to 20 kms in the hour) and push-ing considerable combat power forward in a short period of time. A company groupcommander planning a defensive position must take advantage of existing naturalobstacles and must place barriers to block the enemy’s forward movement, aiming toseparate his forces. The company group commander should plan to concentrateenough indirect and direct firepower into a KA to kill the enemy in large numbersquickly. The company group must not plan to pick off enemy vehicles one at a timeas they roll towards them, because they would swiftly over-run the position. Thecompany group plan should aim instead to compress enemy vehicles and crews intoa small KA, then attack with all the firepower available. An effective defence willeither force the enemy to dig in and establish a hasty defence or withdraw from com-bat.

0226. The company group commander must study the ground and analyse how theterrain can help to defeat the enemy. If possible, he should reconnoitre the terrainfrom both his and the enemy’s view. The avenues of approach will be the most impor-tant factor to consider to determine where to position assets. All avenues of approachthat affect the position must be covered. OPs, sensors and any other surveillanceassets must be deployed, so that forces can be manoeuvred to cover avenues whereenemy elements appear. The company group commander should:

a. Work out what the terrain will allow the company to do and what it will allowthe enemy to do.

b. When the enemy is an armoured/mobile enemy, work out where the terrainwill slow the enemy down or force him into tight column formations.

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED2-12

c. Identify the places where the enemy will be most vulnerable to fire (chokepoints along the avenues of approach, or open areas lacking cover and con-cealment), with enough space and fields of fire to concentrate the available fire-power. These areas are potential KAs, which for anti-armour fire should be from1,000 to 2,500 metres from friendly positions and which for dismounted infantryshould allow for overlapping fire of all available weapon systems, includingLAW and GPMGs. Given the threat, work out which are primary, alternate andsecondary fire positions.

d. Find the best covered and concealed positions dominating likely enemyavenues of approach. Position tanks where they can cover mounted avenuesof approach.

e. When possible, avoid positioning vehicles in terrain that allows the enemyto anticipate the company group’s actions.

f. Select positions for the group to survive the enemy’s initial heavy concen-trations of indirect fire. Use reverse slopes whenever possible and do not posi-tion infantry where they will be exposed to indirect and long-range direct firelong before they are able to fire at the enemy.

g. In positioning the forces, locations should be sought where the weaponscan engage the attacking enemy from the flanks and rear.

h. Select the best terrain for OPs forward of the defensive positions toobserve likely avenues of approach. The STAP will establish OPs to providesurveillance on the primary avenues of approach and to observe secondaryavenues of approach. Also plan for passive and active air defence, perhapstasking OPs to observe air avenues of approach. Ensure that OPs are providedwith mutual support, either directly by GPMG(SF) or indirectly by mortars orartillery.

i. Decide where obstacles can be placed and tied in with natural obstacles toslow, disrupt, confuse, and turn the enemy, with the intention of giving moretime to fire and better opportunities for flank and rear engagements. Whenappropriate, endeavour to secure obstacles, particularly during periods of limitedvisibility. Obstacles that are not covered by direct fire or observed indirect fireare not obstacles.

j. Work out from where to control the battle.

0227. Having worked out which key terrain offers the weapons and troops cover,concealment, favourable fields of fire, and passable manoeuvre routes, the companygroup commander must concentrate his primary positions on the avenues ofapproach he considers the enemy are most likely to use. He should make sure thatthe primary positions can cover the KAs with overlapping fire from mutually support-ing positions. He must strive to find defilade positions from which enfilade fire can be

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED 2-13

given. He should select alternate positions in case the enemy suppresses the pri-mary positions. He should plan for secondary positions to cover secondary avenuesof approach, especially to the flanks and rear of his positions. He should make surethat his company group has good routes between these positions, preferably coveredand concealed.

0228. If there are more than enough dismounted infantrymen to cover dismountedavenues of approach and to secure critical obstacles, the company group comman-der should position those remaining to cover possible enemy dismounted assaultsalong mounted avenues of approach or use them as a reserve to conduct local coun-terattacks. He should also maintain platoon integrity when possible. If the estimateleads him to employ tanks alone or in pairs, then he may do so, but not before care-fully considering the loss of mutual support and the inability to concentrate fire.

0229. Siting Requirements. When siting positions the company group com-mander must start at the impact area of the weapons under his control. He must thenwork out arcs of fire which converge on the selected killing areas. This will then dic-tate the areas where his positions must be located. LAWs and LSWs provide theframework around which the defence of the platoon positions is built and theseweapons should be sited first. It is likely that positions will have to be sited to givelocal protection to MILAN or GPMG(SF) detachments and LAWs sited to cover gapsin the MILAN arcs of fire. Overlapping LSW arcs should be coordinated and the arcsfor each section designated. Trenches must have good fields of fire, 100 metresshould be considered the minimum, and be close enough for section commanders tobe able to control their sections by voice during battle.

0230. Firepower Integration. The integration of all available weapon systems isvital. For example, artillery and mortar DFs must not obscure killing areas; LAWshould be sited to cover areas within MILAN’s minimum range; 51 mm mortars couldbe centralized for maximum effect; and GPMG(SF) can cover MILAN positions out-side the close protection of the company.

Sequence and Timing of Fire and Manoeuvre

0231. The company group commander must determine the sequence in which heexpects the battle to occur. His first consideration is how he is to take over the con-tact battle from battlegroup elements who are forward of the FLOT. One method is toestablish a coordination point at which briefing can take place. The effectiveness ofthe STAP will be critical to maintaining contact with the enemy. He should then deter-mine where and when his subordinates must initiate actions to achieve the intendedresults. He should consider how long it would take those subordinates to react andthe movement rate of the enemy.

0232. The company group commander should work out how and where he will con-trol or trigger the initiation of each critical action. A point on the ground could beselected, which triggers the action when the enemy reach it. Or a specific event will

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED2-14

automatically trigger the action to be executed. He must confirm with his subordi-nates the location of physical trigger points or the events which will trigger action, andhe must then physically time the critical actions during rehearsals. Critical actionsmay also be controlled by issuing quick battle orders. These are used when the sit-uation is unclear, unexpected and the action has not been rehearsed. In this case,he must give himself reasonable time to make a decision, react, and issue orders.

0233. The enemy will try to mass his forces where the company group leastexpects it and will aim to create at least a three-to-one (soldiers and equipment)advantage over it. To defeat the enemy, a company group must generate enoughcombat power to reduce those odds wherever enemy forces are committed. To dothis, there are two crucial requirements:

a. First, see the enemy well forward of the company group’s main defensiveposition.

b. Second, the platoons must be skilled in manoeuvre, well rehearsed torespond immediately to pre-determined deliberate counterattack options orquick battle orders initiating quick counterattacks, and able to move rapidlywhen necessary.

If these requirements are satisfied and the company group hits the enemy when heis vulnerable, the company group will win the battle.

0234. Ideally, when engaging an attacking force, a company group commandershould manoeuvre his platoons into positions that force the enemy to turn and fightin two directions, so keeping the enemy’s flank exposed.

0235. Company group commanders must not plan to stand passively in positionexchanging fire with the attacking enemy. They should plan to draw the enemy intotheir group’s KAs and counterattack by fire, or use fire and movement from anexposed flank to finish off the enemy.

Security

0236. Security. There are many ways to protect the company group from beingfound or attacked by surprise. Some are passive, others are active; all must be con-sidered in the defensive plan and will be issued as Counter Surveillance ControlMeasures (CSCM). A few examples of passive and active security measures areshown below:

PASSIVE ACTIVE

Disperse vehicles and platoons Establish OPs.

Use camouflage, concealment and cover Deploy patrols.

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED 2-15

Impose radio-silence Place early warning devices.

Turn heat sources off and keep them cold Deploy NBC alarm equipment.

Reduce noise. Deploy air and ground sentries.

Do not move around positions.

Use no lights.

Keep antennas low.

Use defilade positions.

Do not use likely artillery target areas.

0237. Deception. Company group commanders should aim to deceive theenemy, however achieving this aim will not be easy. For example the effort neededto construct a credible dummy position must not be underestimated. Where time andresources are short, mixing real and dummy positions can achieve good results.

0238. Dispersion. A company group commander should spread his platoons asfar apart as possible, without losing control or the ability to concentrate firepoweragainst the enemy. Dispersion makes it harder for the enemy to find and hit the com-pany group, both with direct fire and with massed indirect fire.

Camouflage and Concealment

0239. Basic Drills. Good camouflage and concealment are vital in defence andmust be practised regularly in training. Natural camouflage must look right. Falsecolour infra-red photography and even TI can detect, and see through, old naturalvegetation.

0240. AFV Scrapes. The company group commander faces the dilemma of hav-ing his tanks camouflaged under nets and so risk them being unable to fire theirweapons, or, having the tanks without camouflage netting, which would enable themto go into action rapidly, but which would risk them being compromised. A solution, ifthe engineers have the time and resources, is to dig stepped vehicle scrapes. In thisway tanks can be concealed below ground until required to fire, when they wouldmove up onto the fire step. Camouflage nets would be used to cover spoil rather thanthe AFVs. This solution will also help to conceal AFVs from enemy ground basedthermal image detection equipment.

0241. Spoil. As with any dug-in defensive position, there is always the problemof what to do with the spoil from infantry trenches and AFV scrapes. This problem ismultiplied when alternative and secondary positions are taken into account. No solu-tion is offered to overcome this problem, but company group commanders must notignore it and must come up with a plan to cope with it.

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED2-16

0242. Defence Stores. Defence stores tend to be dumped on the main defensiveposition at an early stage during its preparation. If they are then left lying around inthe open they will compromise the position, especially reflective items. Defencestores must be hidden and covered.

0243. Movement Around the Position. Movement around the position almostinvariably increases the chances of the enemy reconnaissance, particularly air recon-naissance, locating the defensive position. AFVs leave distinctive tracks, particularlyin wet conditions, whilst in the summer they throw up clouds of dust. Company groupcommanders must anticipate this problem and make plans to limit its effects. Routes,conforming to the battlegroup track plan, must be carefully selected and incorporatedinto the track plan. Movement around the position must be limited and strictlyenforced. At the same time, however, company group commanders must also ensurethat all withdrawal plans, moves from battle hides to battle positions, moves frommain positions to alternate or secondary positions and deliberate counterattack plansare fully rehearsed. Those rehearsals must be coordinated so that movement is con-trolled and kept to the minimum.

Defence During Limited Visibility

0244. At night and in poor visibility, observation and weapons’ effective rangesreduce and gaps between defended localities become more difficult to cover.Furthermore, the enemy may change his tactics in such conditions and the move-ment of reserves will be slower and more difficult to control. Plans must be made toensure security of positions and provide information of enemy movements. This mayrequire the deployment of patrols, standing patrols and additional OPs and the rede-ployment of surveillance equipments and some weapon systems. At night the illumi-nation plan must be carefully controlled to avoid masking passive systems of whichfriendly forces may be at an advantage; stages of the night visibility plan will be laiddown in SOPs. To gain the best effects, preparations should be made before dark-ness falls or poor weather closes in.

0245. The company group commander must plan to fight effectively in limited visi-bility. Thermal sights and other night observation devices increase the companygroup’s capability to fight in limited visibility, but for these systems to be effective theiruse must be properly planned. The following techniques are useful during limited vis-ibility:

a. Adjust the positions and fire control measures before the onset of limitedvisibility, if possible.

b. Plan and rehearse required movements to limited visibility positions.

c. Redeploy tanks along high speed mounted avenues of approach. Theenemy is most likely to use roads and tracks for easy movement, navigation,and control during limited visibility.

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED 2-17

d. Under extremely limited visibility conditions (such as thermal defeatingsmoke, freezing or dense fog, or extremely heavy rain), adjust the fire plan tocover the mounted avenues of approach. Adjust vehicle fighting positions tocover KAs at closer ranges.

0246. OPs should be positioned far enough forward and to the flanks of friendlypositions to provide early warning. OPs must be given night observation capability, ameans of communication, and sufficient weapons to provide for self defence. Whenappropriate OPs should deploy early warning devices and small protective minefieldsto give warning and slow the enemy.

0247. Reconnaissance patrols should be deployed to reconnoitre the areas thatthe OPs cannot observe. Patrol routes must be coordinated both with the battlegroupoperations officer and with all adjacent friendly units.

The Obstacle and Anti-Armour Plans

0248. IPB will produce the enemy’s likely avenues of advance, from which the bat-tlegroup obstacle, anti-armour and Surveillance and Target Acquisition Plan (STAP)will be produced. The overall battlegroup defence plan (and from it the companygroup plan) will evolve from those plans.

0249. The Obstacle Plan. The obstacle plan must be coordinated at battlegrouplevel and must be a logical product of IPB. Considerable ingenuity is required to cre-ate obstacles to slow down the enemy’s rate of advance. The ground must be madeto work for the defenders, so natural obstacles must be incorporated into the defen-sive layout, even if they do not conveniently run straight across the enemy’s predictedaxis of advance. Artificial obstacles should be sited to protect vital and importantground, and to guard flanks. They should also be used to deflect and channel theattacker into favourable killing areas.

0250. Obstacles must play a part in the company group commander’s plan. If com-manders intend to engage the enemy from a flank then they must force the enemyto present that flank. Failing to do so can lead to infantry positions being overrun eas-ily by frontal assaults. Whilst engineers could do much of this, infantrymen can domuch to help themselves. For example a simple surface laid minefield can be pro-duced in a relatively short time. Whenever possible, obstacles must be covered bydirect fire weapons, but when this cannot be achieved they must at least be coveredby observed indirect fire. Obstacles will be needed for alternate and secondary posi-tions and should be considered for a 360°/6,400 mils threat.

0251. The company is likely to be involved in the construction of wire obstacles andprotective minefields:

a. Wire Obstacles. Wiring is a quick way of providing an obstacle to enemyinfantry. The object of wiring is to slow down the enemy’s advance and increase

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED2-18

the chance of killing him with fire. Wire must be sited so as to check the enemyoutside grenade throwing range of the platoon positions. Wire should be sited,as far as possible, to achieve surprise. For this reason, it should be well hiddenin such places as sunken lanes, hedgerows and long grass. Wire not coveredby fire is virtually useless.

b. Mines. Well sited and carefully concealed minefields covered by fire arean effective obstacle to men and vehicles. A minefield may consist of anti-tankmines, anti-personnel mines or a mixture of both depending on its aim. Thenotes governing the laying and control of minefields and other victim operateddevices are subject to the provisions of the UN Weaponry Convention (UNWC)Protocol II. Details are at Annex C. There are four types of minefields:

(1) Tactical. A minefield which is part of a formation obstacle plan andis laid to delay, channel or break up an enemy advance.

(2) Protective. These are for the close protection of a unit. Their pur-pose is to slow down an enemy attack in its final stages. They should bewell concealed to achieve surprise and should be covered by small armsand anti-tank fire. They are sited by the battlegroup commander and coor-dinated at divisional level, but laid by units.

(3) Nuisance. Laid by all arms to delay and disorganize the enemy,particularly reconnaissance patrols, by introducing a sense of uncertaintyand a need for caution, which will have a subsequent effect on morale. Alltypes of mines may be used.

(4) Phoney. An area free of live mines used to simulate a minefield orsection of a minefield, with the objective of deceiving the enemy. They aremarked in exactly the same way as a real minefield.

0252. The Anti-Armour Plan. In an armoured battle, the battlegroup anti-armourplan must be the basis for the destruction of the enemy armour. It involves the coor-dination of armoured squadron fire lines, MILAN killing areas and the areas of influ-ence of LAW, to ensure that the maximum amount of anti-armour weapons arebrought to bear on the enemy to achieve the destruction intended by the battlegroupcommander. The battlegroup anti-armour plan must be tied in with the engagementareas, identified after carrying out IPB, the obstacle plan and the artillery fire plan.Likely roles for the infantry company group are to either fix the enemy or channel himinto a specific killing area. Both of these will involve the destruction of enemyarmoured vehicles and it is therefore imperative that the anti armour defence is notonly sufficiently strong to carry out the task, but is also coordinated to ensure maxi-mum destruction of the enemy.

0253. Anti-Armour Coordination at Company Group Level. If available,armour is the primary tank killer within the battlegroup, followed by MILAN, but if theirrespective capabilities are to be exploited to the full then their deployment and use

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED 2-19

must be coordinated with LAW. An accurate and well coordinated anti-armour plan,supported by a good trace, is essential.

0254. Deployment of MILAN. MILAN are ideally suited to form the basis of anti-armour ambushes deployed forward of the main position, as well as forming the coreof the anti-armour plan in the main positions. However, if MILAN positions are detect-ed then they will invariably be subject to an infantry assault. Therefore, wheneverpossible, MILAN positions should be protected by mutually supporting rifle sectionpositions.

Reserves

0255. The company group commander must have a reserve regardless of its size.This should, whenever possible, be uncommitted to the current battle. This could,therefore, be a complete platoon supported by armour or only a rifle section. The pro-vision of the reserve will be based on the company group commander’s assessmentof which of his platoons is least critical to the integrity of the defence. The intentionto commit the reserve must always be notified to battlegroup HQ as this is a signifi-cant event in the conduct of the defensive battle and may well indicate to the battle-group commander where the enemy main effort is located.

0256. The Counterattack.

a. The reserve will need to be allocated a FUP near its most likely area ofcommitment. This should be a position which affords cover from view and directfire. The company group commander will need to know how long it will take forthe reserve to reach this position as timing of the launch of a counterattack isa critical factor in the conduct of the defensive battle.

b. The objectives of the counterattack are the destruction of the enemy andseizure of the initiative. The company group commander plans counterattacksto meet the predicted course of enemy action. Each counterattack must be acomplete plan with routes, a FUP, LD, direction of attack and an assessedobjective. Each counterattack should be rehearsed in order of priority. Wheninitiated the counterattack becomes the main effort and receives priority for allavailable combat support.

0257. The following additional tasks can be given to a reserve:

a. Blocking. A reserve can block a penetration by fire or by manoeuvre.This may create the conditions for the launch of the battalion reserve into theflank of the blocked enemy force. Indirect fire should be used to contain andreduce the penetration.

b. Secure Flanks and Rear. The reserve can prepare secondary positionsto secure the company group’s flanks and rear. These positions must be tied

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED2-20

into the mutual support plan. The reserve may have to secure a flank if a flank-ing company has been penetrated.

c. Support Forward Positions by Fire. The reserve can be positioned whereit can fire into gaps between forward positions and on their flanks and rear.

d. Other Tasks. The reserve can also assist with other tasks not related toits primary role such as resupply, reconnaissance, liaison and provision oftroops for OPs and standing patrols. However, the company group commandermust ensure that the reserve has enough preparation and rehearsal time for itsprobable missions and is immediately available when required.

STAP

0258. The company group commander will be required to comply with the STAPgenerated at BG HQ level by the IPB’s Event Template. The characteristics of thevarious surveillance and target acquisition (STA) devices that may be found in thecompany area of operations can be found in the TAM. There are two types of device:

a. Passive. CWS, MILAN MIRA, Spyglass and TOGS.

b. Active. MSTAR, hand-held laser range finder (HHLRF) and mortar illu-mination rounds.

0259. In the quest for information the STA devices must not be risked unnecessar-ily. The counter surveillance control measures (CSCM) plan is the mechanism forprotecting the devices and the assets that they cue. There are six subject areas forcontrol: radio equipment, non-communications equipment (e.g., MSTAR), whitelight, fire control orders, vehicle lights and heat and light. These subject areas arethen subjected to three levels of control: Measure 1 — no use; Measure 2 — emer-gency use only; Measure 3 — unrestricted use.

Preparation of the Position

0260. Commanders in a company group must generally accomplish the followingtasks when preparing their positions:

a. Physically site each weapon in its fighting positions.

b. Establish fire control measures.

c. Camouflage positions using natural foliage and netting.

d. Clear fields of fire.

e. Construct fighting positions to improve available cover and concealment.

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED 2-21

Infantry positions must have overhead cover. (If engineer resources are avail-able, tank fighting positions must also be constructed.)

f. Reconnoitre and prepare routes between weapon positions.

g. Establish Combat Service Support and conduct replenishment duringpreparations. Prestock ammunition and other needed supplies in platoon andsection loads near the fighting positions, with good concealment and overheadcover if possible.

h. Coordinate with higher, adjacent and supporting units. Coordinate thelocations of platoons, boundaries and fire control measures.

i. Conduct rehearsals to practise planned manoeuvres.

Digging-In

0261. Infantrymen must dig-in even in hasty defence. There is, however, no suchthing as ‘The Infantry Trench’ and the siting and concealment of the trench is moreimportant that its conforming to a standard design. The design must, however, takeinto account the ground, threat, materials available, equipment, construction timeavailable and the expertise of the troops. Overhead protection should be built forshelter and fire bays whenever possible.

0262. There is also no standard manning for trenches. The fire team concept lendsitself to the construction of four man trenches, and this manning level helps maintaindiscipline and morale and simplifies sentry and duty rosters. However, the situationwill dictate how many trenches are required to cover the task given to the company.

0263. The shell scrape offers no substitute for a trench. Except in the direst ofemergencies, trenches should always be dug.

Secondary Positions

0264. Secondary positions may be necessary to cover gaps between sub-units, anexposed flank, or possible enemy axes. If time and engineer resources permit, thesepositions may be pre-dug. The company group commander must ensure that suchbattle positions and routes to them are reconnoitred, keeping in mind the need tomaintain camouflage and concealment. Positions must be prepared beforehand.

Snipers

0265. Well trained snipers can play a significant role in the defensive battle, butexperience has shown that ad hoc sniper teams achieve little. Good snipers willcause a demoralising psychological effect on the enemy, as well as being useful intel-

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED2-22

ligence gatherers. Their deployment and tasks should be coordinated at the highestpossible level in order to maximize their effect.

NBC

0266. The enemy will try to undermine the plan for defence by attacking key bat-tlegroup assets with chemical weapons, probably as part of a preliminary fire plan.Battlegroups should produce coordinated NBC defence plans that take into accountvulnerable areas such as key terrain and choke points. Groups must ensure that theirNBC equipment is correctly deployed and that basic NBC pre-attack precautions aretaken.

Battle Cards and Traces

0267. In area defence, it is vital that the company group defence is fully coordinated.The easiest way of achieving this throughout the structure of the company group isto use talc gridded battle cards similar to those issued to the MILAN platoon (AF B9922). These can be used at levels of command from individual fire trench to platooncommander and allow information to be easily copied. To achieve effective coordi-nation, information will need to flow upwards and downwards during their compila-tion. The company group commander will need to extract and disseminate informa-tion (such as TAIs, Decision Points and the STAP) produced as a result of the bat-tlegroup IPB as well as being supplied platoon level information such as weaponarcs, dead ground or problems with covering obstacles with fire. The process ofextraction of relevant information and copying can then be repeated down to firetrench level. The company 2IC should compile a company level trace incorporatingthe information from the platoon battle cards. Cards should also be produced for pri-mary and secondary positions and, if time allows, for any other positions likely to beused. The trace should include the following details:

a. Trench locations (with call-signs).

b. Obstacles.

c. Key weapon system locations — e.g., tanks, MILAN, GPMG(SF).

d. Counterattack routes.

e. Reference points.

f. OPs and standing patrol locations.

g. DFs and FPF.

h. Boundaries.

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED 2-23

i. Dead ground.

j. Location of trip flares, Claymores, Classic, etc.

0268 – 0269. Reserved.

SECTION 4. — CONDUCT

Routine in Defence

0270. It is possible that there will be a period of time before battle is joined. Duringthis period strict attention will need to be placed on the routine of defence in order tomaintain readiness, combat effectiveness and health.

a. Information. There will be a continuing requirement to gain informationon the enemy while at the same time denying information to him. The companygroup will be required to execute the battlegroup STAP within its area of influ-ence by mounting reconnaissance, fighting and standing patrols and OPs.Information is denied by constant attention to camouflage and concealment,strict control of movement and EMCON.

b. Communications. Line must be tested regularly. Radios can only be testedwithin the control measures extant at the time.

c. Weapons, Equipment and Inspection. High standards of personal disci-pline must be demanded. The following activities will need to take place:

(1) All personal kit must be kept packed and stored.

(2) Weapon inspections should take place regularly on a staggered sys-tem.

(3) Foot inspections, particularly in extreme weather conditions.

(4) Inspection of weapon system and surveillance device functionality.

(5) Inspection of ammunition, rations, water supply, personal cleanli-ness, latrines and refuse pits.

d. Rest. Rest must be taken and organized on a duty basis.

e. Stand-To. Although stand-to can be ordered at any time, e.g., when anattack is imminent, it is routinely ordered at dusk and just before dawn to coverthe change of routine from day to night and vice versa. It normally lasts 30 min-utes. Company group commanders should ensure that they check positions inaddition to the checks that will be completed by platoon commanders. The

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED2-24

CSM can be a valuable assistant. The following should be checked beforestand-to:

(1) Every man is present, alert and properly equipped and dressed,including state of NBC equipment.

(2) All weapons are manned, properly aligned, bayonets fixed and nightsights on or off as appropriate.

(3) Ammunition is to scale and readily available.

(4) Range cards, arcs of fire and orders for opening fire are in place andunderstood.

(5) Sentries are posted.

0271. Routine in a 24 Hour Period. A suggested routine for a 24 hour period isat Annex B.

0272. Once battle is joined the company group commander has two means of influ-encing events:

a. The control and direction of fire.

b. The committal of reserves.

0273. The success of the battle will depend largely on the extent to which the com-pany group commander succeeds in using these resources offensively to impose hisown will on the enemy rather than merely reacting to the enemy’s initiative. All rankswithin the company must be imbued with offensive spirit and be prepared to use theirinitiative and seize fleeting chances.

Control and Direction of Fire

0274. Although the fire plan must allow for communications failure and delegatedcontrol, the company group commander should control fire whenever possible to con-form to his overall plan of battle. Economy of fire must be achieved in low priorityareas if the necessary concentration of fire is to be achieved at critical times andplaces. Fire must not automatically be brought to bear whenever the enemy is seen.Control must be applied:

a. To avoid compromising positions unnecessarily.

b. To ensure that scarce ammunition, particularly anti-tank natures, is notwasted on unproductive targets.

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED 2-25

c. To reinforce the canalizing effect of the obstacle plan and defensive posi-tions; not to halt the enemy everywhere, but to lure him forward into pre-selectedkilling areas.

0275. Particular attention will need to be paid to the artillery fire plan to ensure thatartillery fire does not obscure other weapon systems. This can be achieved by selec-tive artillery engagement areas.

Counterattacks

0276. There are two forms of counterattack which will involve the company group:

a. Counterattacks involving the use of the complete company group as thebattalion reserve. This will usually be when the company group is the depthcompany of the battalion defence.

b. Local counterattacks mounted within the company group’s area of opera-tions either by the formal committal of the company group’s reserve or on theinitiative or subordinate commanders.

0277. Counterattacks will employ the principles and most of the tactical techniquesdescribed in Chapter 1. — Offensive Operations. The emphasis will be on speed andmomentum, surprise and audacity to wreak maximum damage on the enemy andthrow him off-balance. A successful counterattack at the local, company level maywell create the circumstances for the launch of a more powerful attack by the battal-ion reserve.

0278. Planning. Counterattacks which are key to the defence of the companygroup’s area of operations requiring planning, coordination and rehearsal. Thedefensive plan should be organized to force the enemy into a position where thecounterattack has the best possible chance of success. The timings, responsibilitiesand the fire plan must be clearly explained in the company group commander’sorders. The time and space of the attack is a critical factor and the counterattackforce will require minimal movement to begin the assault. The greater the distancethe attacking force must move, the more likely the enemy will be able to identify themand react (see Reserves at Section 3 to this Chapter).

0279. Timing. The timing of the launch of a counterattack is critical and is prob-ably the single most important decision for the company group commander to takeduring the conduct of the battle. Launched too early the counterattack force will bevulnerable to enemy action; launched too late the force will have missed its opportu-nity and the enemy will be able to absorb the attack. To be decisive the counterattackis launched when the enemy is over-extended, dispersed and disorganized. Judgingwhen he is in this state will depend on good information from the company group andthe ‘fingerspitzengefuhl’ of the company group commander.

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED2-26

Reorganization

0280. During pauses in the battle reorganization must take place automatically.The following actions will need to occur:

a. Re-establish Security. As soon as possible OPs should be re-deployedto maintain visual contact with the enemy and provide early warning of enemyintentions. Liaison should take place with adjacent companies to assess theintegrity of the defence across boundaries.

b. Man Key Weapons. Losses among crews of key weapon systems mustbe replaced.

c. Treat and Evacuate Casualties. Casualties should receive first aid. If theycan continue to fight the lightly wounded should be returned to their positions;all others should be evacuated. The dead should be evacuated or receive fieldburial as soon as possible to minimise their damaging effect on morale.

d. Redistribute Combat Supplies. Ammunition must be redistributed andstockpiled, combat supplies issued. Ammunition should be removed from casu-alties.

e. Positions. During the attack, positions will have been compromised andthe activation of secondary and alternative positions should be considered.This may require further adjustment of other positions to ensure mutual sup-port.

f. Re-establish C2. The chain of command must be re-established as ahigh priority and new commanders appointed to replace those evacuated orkilled. If communications have failed, a SITREP must be sent by whatevermeans to battlegroup HQ. Field telephone wire and communication cords mayneed repair.

g. Repair of Positions and Obstacles. Positions will need to be repaired andcamouflage replaced or renewed. Although gaps in wire and minefield breachesshould, if possible, be closed they also offer new chokepoints for future enemymanoeuvre and the defensive fire plan should be adjusted accordingly.

0281 – 0282. Reserved.

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED 2-27

SECTION 5. — COMMAND AND CONTROL

Command

0283. Command Post (CP) Siting. The company group commander must sitehis CP from where he can best control the battle; communications and securityrequirements will also impact on this decision. Where possible the CP should be indefilade and concealed from air and ground observation. Routes will need to be allo-cated and fighting positions prepared in its vicinity. If time allows an alternate CPshould be prepared in the event of the primary CP being destroyed or proving inef-fective for the exercise of command.

0284. Position of Commanders. Although the CP will have many C2 advan-tages, it may well prove difficult for the company group commander to have a feel forthe ebb and flow of battle if he remains in it. The construction of a battle CP should,therefore, be considered from where he can observe events and command moredirectly. This position should be small and capable of holding the commander, hisFOO/MFC, a signaller and a rifleman.

Control

0285. Orders. The orders process is covered in detail in Volume 1, Pamphlet No.1, The Infantry Company Group — The Fundamentals. Due to the complexities ofdefensive operations, attendance at O Groups should be maximized to ensure acomplete understanding of the company group commander’s concept of operationsand to allow detailed coordination to take place. The following points are of particu-lar importance:

a. Maximum information needs to be given on the enemy so that his tacticaldoctrine, weapons and equipment, strength and intentions are widely knownand understood.

b. Intent of superior commander.

c. Company group mission and main effort, usually expressed in terms of vitalground.

d. Timings.

e. Control measures.

f. The fire plan and the coordination of fire including priorities, authority foropening fire, arcs and killing areas.

g. Deception and security including the STAP.

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED2-28

0286. Control Measures. Control measures are a key component of the defen-sive plan:

a. Fire Control. Fire control measures must be simple or confusion willensue. These measures can be broken down into, where to fire, when to fireand what to engage.

(1) Where to Fire. Range cards must be carefully made out with arcsand areas of responsibility. Each weapon system crew must know pre-cisely within which area it can engage. These areas should overlap, par-ticularly where the ground is broken or visibility is difficult, to avoid anyarea being left uncovered. Range cards must be related to the ground nota map. Arcs must be tied in with flanking callsigns.

(2) When to Fire. The control of fire is of vital importance, both toavoid jeopardising security and to cause maximum impact on the enemy.Enemy targets can be engaged successively by the various weapon sys-tems when they cross certain visible lines on the ground or on order. Failsafe arrangements need to be considered such as use of coloured signalflares.

(3) What to Engage. Once the order to fire has been given, weaponsystems should engage all enemy within their area of responsibility inaccordance with the laid down priorities. Eventually the intensity of battle,target obscuration and the immediate proximity of the enemy will precludeall but opportunity engagements.

b. Liaison. Liaison is effected from front to rear and from left to right.

c. Other Measures. Other control measures are:

(1) Boundaries following clearly defined features.

(2) Coordination Points.

(3) No fire lines.

(4) Minimum safety distances for indirect fire weapons.

(5) Clearly defined routes.

Communications

0287. Communication in its broadest sense will be vital to a successful defence.Unless the company group commander is able to communicate effectively to controlfire and launch counterattacks his defence will be short lived.

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED 2-29

0288. For most of the preparation period it is likely that radio silence will beimposed in order to preserve security. Maximum use must be made of line. Once incontact with the enemy radio silence may be progressively lifted. Authority for liftingwill come from battlegroup HQ. Orders will need to be explicit on the circumstancesunder which radio silence may be broken, such as by a standing patrol or OP.

0289. Although line will continue to be used, once battle is joined this method ofcommunication will be progressively cut and radio communications will be the primarymethod of controlling the battle. Enemy indirect fire is likely to destroy antennas andspares will be needed at all levels.

0290 – 0291. Reserved.

SECTION 6. — COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT

General

0292. A defensive battle can be prolonged and demands a high degree of deter-mination and the will to fight. This requires, in addition to good leadership and equip-ment, adequate supplies of ammunition, food and water, defence stores, rest andmedical care. The main problems associated with combat service support in a defen-sive battle are likely to stem from the heavy demand for mines, defence stores andammunition, the vulnerability of echelons to ground and air attack, and the difficultyof movement, particularly by day.

0293. Although the company group will be supported by the battalion logistic planthere will still be a requirement for commanders at all levels to be logisticallyresourceful and adaptable. It is unlikely that all the combat supplies needed will beforthcoming and extemporization using local materials is likely to be the order of theday.

Work Priorities

0294. There will always be a conflict between operational tasks, the work to bedone to prepare the position, the time available for the preparation and the troopsavailable to do it. This conflict will require company group commanders to lay downclear work priorities. Although the sequence of work will vary according to the situa-tion and work can occur concurrently, the following table is an example of possiblepriorities:

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED2-30

Ammunition

0295. The provision and resupply of ammunition will be a critical factor.Consideration will need to be given to forward storage and the protection of suchstocks. Resupply once battle is joined will be difficult as ammunition parties will beexposed and thought will need to be given to this aspect during the planning stage.If time allows, crawlways may need to be dug to offer ammunition parties a measureof protection.

Defence Stores

0296. The collection and distribution of defence stores and the provision of miningand wiring parties will place heavy demands on manpower during the preparationstage. Use will need to be made of local materials such as doors, timber and steelsheeting to supplement supplied defence stores. Close attention will need to be paidto trench construction as this skill is rarely practised.

Movement

0297. The requirement for movement of stores and supplies will conflict with therequirement for security. Although planning for logistic movement should be based

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED 2-31

Serial Task Comment

1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

7.

8.

Dig trenches to Stage 1

Dig CP

Clear immediate fields of fire

Wiring and mining

Help prepare combat supportweapon positions

Dig trenches to Stage 2

Dig latrines

Clear full fields of fire

To be completed by 1200 hrs

Med wh tcr aval 1000 hrs

Collection pty to A1 Ech 1430 hrs

Asslt Pnrs 1630 hrs

on replenishment at night, the proliferation of surveillance devices make the cover ofdark apparent rather than real. Movement must therefore be minimized and unnec-essary traffic, on foot or by vehicle, avoided.

Medical Plan

0298. Casualty evacuation is likely to be difficult once battle is joined and maximumreliance will have to be placed on first aid at the point of injury. A casualty collectionpoint will need to be sited with cover from direct fire weapons as a minimum require-ment.

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED2-32

ANNEX A TOCHAPTER 2

RESERVED DEMOLITIONS

Introduction

1. In the formation commander’s concept of operations, a number of importantterrain features will be critical to the movement of his formation. These features maybe bridges, routes or minefield lanes which he decides must be denied to the enemyuntil they are no longer of use to his own scheme of manoeuvre. The formationcommander will reserve the demolition at these points to himself, and will tasksubordinate commanders to guard them. His staff must then coordinate all aspects ofthe operation to guard, use and fire each reserved demolition.

2. The guarding and firing of a reserved demolition demands a high degree ofjudgement by commanders. The demolition guard commander must receive clearorders and must be kept fully informed on the tactical situation at all times. He must begiven the maximum available troops, the right task organization and guaranteedcommunications to be successful in his task.

The Threat

3. The enemy must be assumed to have conducted his own IPB and will haveselected and possibly reconnoitred his main axis of advance. He will have a shrewdidea of our tactical doctrine and will have made an educated guess as to our likelywithdrawal routes and the points at which they cross obstacles. Enemy combatreconnaissance patrols will close rapidly on these points, closely followed by the firstechelon forces. At the same time, or in advance, the enemy may mount an airborne orheliborne assault on them. The demolition and its guard will be subjected to artilleryand air attack and is a likely target for chemical munitions. Sabotage may also beused.

Glossary of Tactical Terms

4. The following terms are used in connection with reserved demolitions:

a. Reserved Demolition. A reserved demolition is a demolition which mustbe controlled at a specific level of command because it plays a vital part in thetactical plan, or because of the importance of the structure itself, or because thedemolition may be executed in the face of the enemy. It must, therefore, beprotected and its firing controlled.

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED 2A-1

b. Authorized Commander. The authorized commander is the commanderwho has the authority to order the firing of the demolition. He may delegate hisauthority to a subordinate commander as the battle progresses, in which casethe subordinate becomes the authorized commander.

c. Demolition Guard. A demolition guard is a force positioned to ensure thata demolition is not captured or sabotaged by an enemy before it has beensuccessfully fired. The demolition guard commander is responsible to theauthorized commander for the operational command of all troops on thedemolition site, including the demolition firing party.

d. Demolition Firing Party. A demolition firing party is technically responsiblefor a demolition. It is normally an engineer party and is required for all reservedemolitions.

e. Uncharged. This is the state of a reserved demolition when it has beenprepared to receive charges. These charges are packaged and stored in anearby, safe place.

f. Charged. This is the state of a reserved demolition when charges havebeen placed. The charges are maintained at one of the following states ofreadiness:

(1) State of Readiness 1 (Safe). The charges have been placed andsecured, but are not yet armed.

(2) State of Readiness 2 (Armed). The charges have been placed andarmed and are ready to fire. The danger of premature firing (caused by theclose explosion of a bomb or a shell when the charges are armed) must bebalanced against the time required to change from State of Readiness 1 toState of Readiness 2.

g. Completion. This means that the demolitions were fired, were effectiveand that all related tasks in the area, such as mining the approach to the target,have been completed. It is incorrect to think, however, that the firing of thedemolitions necessarily completes the intended destruction. Engineers mustensure that the demolition was effective before reporting that the mission iscomplete. In the event of a misfire, or only partial destruction of the target, thedemolition guard must continue to provide protection while the charges arereset or more charges are placed on the target and fired.

h. Contact Point. This is the place where withdrawing friendly units makeinitial contact with the demolition guard and make their final approach to the site.

i. Road-Block. This is a position occupied by a friendly unit that controlsaccess into the area.

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED2A-2

j. Firing Point. This is the location from which the demolition firing partycommander physically executes the demolition.

k. Bridge Guard. This is the unit stationed on and around the bridge toprotect it against sabotage or an enemy attack.

Forces and Tasks

5. There are two elements to a reserved demolition force:

a. Demolition Guard. The task of the demolition guard is to ensure that theenemy does not capture the demolition before it has been successfully blown.The guard will normally consist of an infantry company group and include tanks,an ARV, Javelin, MILAN, FOO and an MFC party. A tank bridge and provost mayalso be allocated.

b. Firing Party. The firing party, usually of section strength, is responsible forthe placing and firing of the demolition and will be provided by Royal Engineers.Depending on the engineer effort required elsewhere, the engineers may placethe demolitions and circuits and handover detonation to the guard force.

Planning and Preparation

6. The demolition guard commander will need to employ the tactical doctrine of thedefence in planning the deployment of his guard. The guard must be deployed to giveall round protection to the demolition and must include the constant close defence ofthe demolition itself against sabotage, for example by ‘refugees’ or special forces,such as frogmen.

7. Once he has assessed the most likely enemy approaches for land, airborne andheliborne attacks, the demolition guard commander must deploy troops forward tocover these approaches and give early warning of attack. He must also consider thecoup de main attack. Wherever possible, close air defence weapons should bedeployed to cover the threat from both fixed wing aircraft and helicopters. Obstacleplans must be designed to disrupt all means of attack.

8. Any high ground which dominates the demolition from either bank should beoccupied. However, in allocating troops to this task the demolition guard commandermust ask himself whether the high ground is of such importance that he should sparetroops to occupy it.

9. The maximum number of anti-tank weapons should be deployed forward of thedemolition. However, the deployment of any vehicles on the far bank of a waterobstacle must be carefully considered, especially in anti-armour weapons can giveeffective anti-tank cover from the home bank.

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED 2A-3

10. The guard commander must be aware of the artillery support he can expect atevery stage in the defence, but in particular against a coup de main attack. FOOs andMFCs must be deployed to cover likely approaches and possible helicopter landingsites should be adjusted.

11. In conditions of reduced visibility, and by night, it will be necessary to adjust thedemolition guard positions to concentrate the force in close protection of the bridge toavoid infiltration. However, this concentration must be balanced against the danger ofvacating dominating ground. Some element of the guard equipped with STA devicesmust be left on the vital ground to ensure that the enemy are not in possession of itwhen visibility improves. STA devices must also remain deployed on the far bank togive warning on the most likely approaches.

12. A reserve must always be held, in a hide on the home bank, near to thedemolition. Its tasks are to counter-attack, to counter heliborne or parachute landingsand to reinforce. It must be held ready for immediate counter-attack. Clear ordersmust also exist for the deployment of any other reserves in support, but not underdirect command, of the demolition guard commander.

13. Critical Timings. From the outset the demolition guard commander must beaware of the time it takes:

a. To go from State of Readiness 1 (Safe) to State of Readiness 2 (Armed).

b. To complete the demolition. To close a minefield lane, cratering and miningwill take some time, and he must continue to guard the position until the lane isclosed.

Conduct

14. Firm control must be imposed on vehicle and foot movement, to keep the routethrough the demolition clear. The ARV’s recovery cables should be pre-laid across thedemolition so that any blockage can be cleared with the minimum of delay.

15. A checkpoint is always necessary and it must be sited so that all withdrawingunits pass through it. Each withdrawing unit must provide an LO who is incommunication with his unit. He must know what sub-units are withdrawing over thedemolition, when, and in what order. The checkpoint must be in communication withthe guard commander, although not collocated.

16. A road block should be established to ensure that the enemy do not bounce thecrossing. In addition, it will probably be required for the control of refugees. Groups ofrefugees may contain saboteurs. Refugee numbers are likely to be considerable andbeyond the immediate resources of the guard commander. A provost detachment andcivilian police assistance will almost certainly be necessary, but may not always beavailable.

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED2A-4

17. Communications between the authorized commander and the demolition guardcommander must be guaranteed and, wherever possible, duplicated. Their provisionis the responsibility of the authorized commander. Duplication can be achieved byLOs, the engineer net, the artillery net via the FOO, or civilian telephone.

18. Changes of State. Reserved demolitions are normally prepared to State 1(Safe). They are normally changed to State 2 (Armed) some time before theanticipated time of firing in the interests of a prompt reaction when firing is ordered.Changes of state must be ordered by the authorized commander.

19. Time to Fire. It takes time for the firing party to implement changes in states ofreadiness. It is the responsibility of the demolition guard commander to ascertainthese timings from the firing party commander and to pass them to the authorizedcommander. He must also make the authorized commander aware of any likelydelays between receiving the order to fire and completing the demolition. Whenissuing the sequence of orders for the firing, the authorized commander can thusallow adequate time for technical procedures on the ground to take place.

20. Firing the Demolition. The demolition will normally be fired upon receipt of acodeword from the authorized commander. This codeword will have been recorded onthe AF W9811 on their issue to the demolition guard commander. A proviso may beadded to the AF W9811 stating that the demolition may be fired by the demolitionguard commander without the receipt of the codeword if the enemy is in the act ofcapturing the demolition. Once the demolition has been fired, the success orotherwise of the demolition must be passed to the authorized commander.

Command and Control

21. If a company group is tasked as a demolition guard, the company groupcommander is the demolition guard commander. He is under the command of, andreports directly to, a senior commander who will be designated as the authorizedcommander. The senior man in the demolition firing party is the demolition firing partycommander. However, the demolition guard commander has overall responsibilityregardless of rank.

22. The HQ initiating the demolition guard mission prepares and provides an orderto the demolition guard commander and an order to the demolition firing partycommander. It also prepares and provides the demolition firing party commander witha target folder. This normally contains a description of the target, its location and thetechnical data needed for the placement of charges. The demolition guardcommander must be familiar with the information in the target folder and use it wheninspecting the demolitions.

23. Orders. Orders for the firing of reserved demolitions are recorded on AFW9811 (STANAG 2107). These forms are prepared by the authorized commander’sG3 staff and contain all the necessary orders and coordinating instructions for the

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED 2A-5

demolition guard commander and the firing party commander. They also contain theprocedures to be used for the delegation of the power of authorized commander. Anexample of an AF W 9811 is at Appendix 1.

24. Position of HQs. The demolition guard commander, the commander of thefiring party and the liaison officer of the authorized commander must be collocated inthe same CP. The demolition guard commander must be sufficiently close to thedemolition to exercise control and to have unimpeded view from the home side overthe demolition site. An alternative CP must be sited and prepared, usually on the farside of the obstacle in case firing has to be from there.

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED2A-6

APPENDIX 1 TOANNEX A TOCHAPTER 2

AF W 9811

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED 2A1-1

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED2A1-2

ANNEX B TOCHAPTER 2

ROUTINE IN DEFENCE (24 HOUR PERIOD)

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED 2B-1

Serial Time Event Remarks

(a) (b) (c) (d)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

0530 hrs

0600 hrs

0620 to0640 hrs

0645 hrs

0700 hrs

0700 hrs

0715 hrs

Relief OP Party(ies) moveinto position.

Standing patrols to return tomain position. Reveille.

Platoon commanders visiteach trench.

Stand-to.

First light.

Clearance patrols.

Stand-down.

Food, radio and codes, spare batteries,log sheets, etc., must be taken. Mustknow password for following 24 hourperiod.

Probably situated on minefield lanes orlikely enemy approach routes. Platoonwoken up, pack away all equipment, pre-pare for ‘stand-to’.

No movement by anyone in the com-pany area. Men fully dressed, CEFOworn. 94 mm LAW prep for firing. Allarcs covered.

Radio checked (if not on radio silence).Line checked.

To check areas of close cover nearposition for enemy recce patrols whichmay have infiltrated during the night.These clearance patrols will be cov-ered by the remainder of the platoon.Trip flares disarmed (if situation per-mits). Line physically checked for tam-pering, etc.

When clearance patrols have reportedall clear.

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED2B-2

(a) (b) (c) (d)

8

9

10

11

12

13

0730 to0800 hrs

0800 hrs

0815 hrs

0830 to0915 hrs

0915 hrs

0945 hrs

Wash, shave, cleanweapons (if situation per-mits).

Breakfast arrives.

Platoon commanders’inspection of positions.

Platoon commanders’inspection of positions.

Working parties commencework.

a. Day sentries posted.b. Check camouflage.c. Half section wash, shave, cleanweapons.d. Half section clean weapons, wash andshave.

Party d. of Serial 8 collect food (if cookingcentralized) and remainder finish washing.

Party c. of Serial 8 collect food. Food mustbe collected in organized groups andshould, if possible, be eaten in trenches notat the distribution point. In an adverse airsituation or in close contact, or on a for-ward slope feeding will have to becompleted during the hours of darknessbefore ‘stand-to’.

Breakfast eaten, mess tins and areacleaned. Party a. of Serial 8 cleanweapons. Troops check and clean personalkit and pack it away. Section commandersinspect areas.

He must check:a. Weapons. )b. Surveillance devices. ) For cleanlinessc. Ammunition. ) and serviceabilityd. Radios. )e. Reserve rations, water, ammunition.f. Men for personal hygiene.g. Clothing and equipment (one or twoitems each day, gloves, mess tins, mugs,etc.).h. Area, including sleeping bags/shelters,latrines and waste pit.i. Sentries.j. Platoon sergeant to note men’s require-ments for replacement equipment andNAAFI stores.

Wiring, mining, etc. As per priority.

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED 2B-3

(a) (b) (c) (d)

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

1100 hrs

1150 hrs

1230 hrs

1730 hrs

1800 hrs

1810 to1829 hrs

1845 hrs

1900 hrs

1915 hrs

1930 hrs

2030 hrs

2300 hrs

0530 hrs

Company group commandervisits.

Company ‘O’ group.

Lunch. Patrols briefed andcarry out patrol battle prepa-ration and daylightrehearsals.

Evening meal (dependingon situation, this could beafter ‘stand-down’).

Prepare to ‘stand-to’.

Platoon commanders visiteach trench.

Stand-to.

Last light.

Stand-down.

Patrols carry out silentrehearsals and final checks.

Patrols Out.

First sentry relieved.

Company group commandervisits position.

Relief OP Party(ies) leavemain position.

Inspect area, weapons, kit, etc.Accompanied by CSM.

Issue orders as necessary, password,etc.

Platoon moves to collect food in twoorganized parties. Letters collected anddistributed.

As for column (d) Serial 15. NAAFIstores, items of kit may be issued at thistime.

No movement by anyone.

Double sentries posted, others maysleep unless required for other duty.Standing patrols leave position.

Return before first light.

As for column (d) Serial 1.

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED2B-4

ANNEX C TOCHAPTER 2

UK MINE WARFARE DOCTRINE

General

1. The overarching UK mine warfare doctrine is that there is a continuingrequirement to create obstacles, and observe and cover them with fire. UK forcesmust also continue to train for mine warfare in order to be able to use mines ifauthorized and counter them when necessary. However, the UK has accepted the UNWeaponry Convention (UNWC) Protocol II which defines prohibitions and restrictionson the use of anti-personnel landmines (APL) and anti-tank (ATk) mines underinternational law. This notwithstanding, it cannot be assumed that because the UKand our likely allies adhere to the UNWC that potential enemies, or other warringfactions, will do so. APL and home-made variants will remain a cheap and effectiveweapon and are likely to be used indiscriminately by the unscrupulous and undisciplinedfor the foreseeable future.

Summary of the Protocol

2. The following points are to be noted and actioned when necessary:

a. The spirit of the UNWC is to prevent unwarranted civilian casualties,particularly after a conflict has ended. This should always be borne in mindwhen deciding on a course of action.

b. It is illegal to target civilians with mines directly and all feasible precautionsshould be taken to avoid civilian casualties in any event.

c. The use of APL, or their training variants, or photographs of any APL, isprohibited on public open days, recruiting campaigns and so forth. The onlyexception is where +APL are being used to show EOD or clearance operations.

d. If APL are used on operations, they must be placed in marked, fenced andmonitored areas in order to prevent unnecessary civilian casualties. APLminefields must be recorded and the records retained to aid clearance andcopies handed over as required. APL cannot be used, unmarked and unmonitored,around route denial tasks or for nuisance mining.

e. Current UK minefield signs do not comply with the UNWC and requiremodification before use (see paragraphs 4 and 5).

f. All APL must be detectable by common metal detectors. The C3 Elsie minecannot be so detected even with its detector ring in place and therefore is notnow to be laid.

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED 2C-1

g. After any minefield, whether APL or ATk, is not required, it must be cleared,or maintained and monitored until cleared. However, the minefield can behanded over to another nation who formally accepts responsibility for it. If theydo not accept the minefield, responsibility remains with those who originally laidthe mines.

h. Booby traps may be used unmarked and unmonitored, but only where thereare military targets and not where there is a reasonable likelihood of civiliancasualties. Individual booby traps must be recorded in terms of both theirlocation and operating mechanism.

i. Claymore, when regarded as an APL (i.e., victim operated), may be used inan unmarked area for up to 72 hours but only in the proximity of the unit that laidit, and when effective monitoring can reasonably exclude civilians. Claymore,when command detonated, are not regarded as APL but do require MODapproval for use, and must be recorded and cleared as for APL.

Recording of Minefields

3. The following recording aspects apply to all non-remotely delivered APL and ATkmines:

a. The perimeter and estimated dimensions of any area where APL and/orATk mines are laid must be recorded and related to the coordinates of at leasttwo identifiable landmarks or reference points. Note that GPS alone is notsatisfactory for this purpose due to possible degradation of this system in war.

b. The minefield records must contain complete information of the type,number, emplacing method, type of fuze, date and time of laying and any otherrelevant information of all APL and ATk mines.

c. The exact location of every APL and ATk mine laid should be recordedwherever feasible. However, if the mines are laid to a pattern in a row, therecording of the pattern and the location of every row is acceptable, such as forthe Barmine ATk mine when laid in rows.

d. The precise location and operating mechanism of each booby-trap laidshall be individually recorded.

e. Minefield records are to be completed using AF W4017.

Minefield Signs

4. Current UK minefield perimeter signs do not meet the requirements of theUNWC, principally in that they do not have a yellow reflective border, an easilyidentifiable mine ‘symbol’, nor space to put in another (local) language. A design for a

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED2C-2

new UK sign has been approved and it should be available for service in 1999. Anexample is shown at the end of the Annex.

5. Minefield Perimeter Sign Details.

a. Shape. A triangle or square no smaller than 28 x 20 cm (11 x 7.9 in) for atriangle and 15 cm (6 in) per side for a square.

b. Colour. The sign should be red or orange with a yellow reflective border.

c. Symbol. The symbol should be readily recognizable in the area in whichthe sign is to be displayed as identifying a dangerous area.

d. Language. The sign should contain the word ’mines’ in one of the sixofficial languages of the UNWC (Arabic, Chinese, French, Russian, Spanishand English) and the language or languages prevalent in the area.

e. Spacing. The signs should be so placed around a mined area and at adistance sufficient to ensure their visibility at any point by a civilian approachingthe area.

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED 2C-3

�����

�����

��������

���������� ���

�����

������������

�������������������

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED2C-4

Chapter 3

DELAY OPERATIONS

SECTION 1. — FUNDAMENTALS

General

0301. A delay is an operation in which aforce under pressure trades space for timeby slowing down the enemy’s momentumand inflicting maximum damage on theenemy without becoming decisivelyengaged. Companies are unlikely to conductdelay operations independently but will fightas an integral part of a battalion operation.Delay against an armoured enemy will be adifficult operation with high risk of decisiveengagement or bypass and encirclement.

Purpose

0302. Delay operations buy time to permit something else to happen at a morecritical place on the battlefield. This is done by defending, disengaging, moving anddefending again. A company may also delay to draw the enemy into a vulnerableposition. The delay will end with a planned operation such as a defence, a withdrawal,or an attack.

0303. In between the periods of movement the company will occupy defendablepositions from which to exact delay. Most, if not all, of the tactical doctrine fordefensive operations will apply to the planning and conduct of the defence of thesepositions. Likewise the disengagement and movement to the next delay position willemploy the tactical doctrine of the withdrawal.

Principles

0304. The following principles are of particular importance for delay operations:

a. Intelligence. Accurate intelligence will be vital. Timely intelligence will beneeded throughout on enemy intentions and capabilities. The IPB will be a keycomponent in the planning and conduct of the delay and dissemination of itsproduce down to company level essential.

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED 3-1

`çåíÉåíë

Page

SECTION 1. — FUNDAMENTALS 3–1SECTION 2. — FORCES AND TASKS 3–5SECTION 3. — ORGANIZATION 3–7SECTION 4. — PLANNING AND PREPARATION 3–7SECTION 5. — CONDUCT 3–11SECTION 6. — COMMAND AND CONTROL 3–12SECTION 7. — COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT 3–12

b. Manoeuvre. For the dismounted infantry company group the principalmanoeuvre effect will be its firepower. Maximum fire will need to be applied tosurprise and confuse the enemy and to make him pause and deploy.Disengagement and movement on foot to the next delay position will be a highrisk operation and will need to use concealed routes and be covered by indirectfire support.

c. Terrain. Selection of the best ground to exact delay will be vital. Terrainshould be selected which:

(1) Has good natural obstacles, or features which can be easilyimproved, for canalizing the enemy.

(2) Provides good observation and fields of fire.

(3) Allows easy disengagement.

(4) Provides concealed routes for withdrawal.

d. Time. There are two essential timings:

(1) The time available to prepare positions; including reconnaissance,deployment and obstacle preparation.

(2) The length of delay to be imposed at each position.

e. Space. The depth of the delay will be closely related to time; the longerthe delay required, the greater the depth. Reduced depth can only becompensated for by increase in strength of the delay forces.

f. Aggressive Action. Aggressive action will be vital to success and thetenets of the manoeuvrist approach must find full expression during a delayoperation. An enemy who is continually harried, ambushed and counterattackedwill generally conduct his advance in a cautious manner. This will not only causedelay and attrition on the enemy but is likely to reduce own casualties.

g. Balance. Balance is required within the force so that the company groupis able to conduct defence, disengagement and withdrawal. Regrouping is likelyto be frequent and unexpected situations will need to be dealt with.

h. Security and Protection. Security and protection are essential to avoidbeing surprised and a decisive engagement ensuing. Effective STAP andcounter surveillance plans must be implemented throughout the delay.

i. Deception. Deception is necessary to reduce the inherent vulnerability ofany force during rearward movement. Deception helps maintain secrecy andassists in achieving surprise.

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED3-2

Types of Delay Operations

0305. The company group will normally fight the delay as a cohesive sub-unit aspart of a battlegroup operation. This is to minimize both the command and controlchallenges inherent in delay operations and the danger of the company beingdefeated in detail if it employs delay tactics at platoon level. There are two types ofdelay operation:

a. Delay from Successive Positions (Caterpillar). This is the most likelymethod to be used as it is easier to control. It is used when the mission requiresa wide sector or avenue of approach to be covered and all or most of theavailable forces have to be deployed forward to cover the area. As the battleprogresses, the company fights from a series of successive positions (see Fig15). The method of extracting platoons, once the required delay has beenbought, will depend on the situation. Forward platoons can either disengage firstwith the depth platoon providing overwatch, or the rear platoon can bewithdrawn first to provide a firm base at the next position. If the situationdeteriorates rapidly the entire company may have to disengage simultaneouslyand the possibility of becoming decisively engaged increases if enemy forcesmove quicker than expected. The threat of being outflanked must be continuallyassessed.

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED 3-3

Fig 15. — Delay from Successive Positions

b. Delay from Alternate Positions (Leapfrog). A delay from alternatepositions involves two or more company groups in a single sector occupyingdelaying positions in depth. Once the first company group has achieved its delayit leapfrogs past the second company group and occupies a position in greaterdepth while the second group takes up the fight. Although this method offersgreater security than a delay from successive positions, it requires more forcesand continuous coordination. The tactics of delay from alternate positions is alsopossible within the company if the terrain is so close that it restricts thecompany’s frontage to a single platoon (see Fig 16). In essence, this will be aseries of platoon ambushes. However, the risk of being defeated in detail is highand coordination will be a challenge.

0306 – 0307. Reserved.

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED3-4

Fig 16. — Delay from Alternate Positions(Platoon Level Delay)

SECTION 2. — FORCES AND TASKS

Employment of Combat Forces

0308. Infantry. Dismounted infantry must be employed in restrictive terrain to besuccessful in delay operations. Dismounted infantry are best employed in broken,close terrain or built-up areas where they can make extensive use of obstacles. Lackof both protection and speed of movement will demand greater attention to theoperations of disengagement and manoeuvre between positions. These shouldideally be conducted under cover of fire support, using concealed routes and duringnight or conditions of poor visibility. Dismounted infantry can be used in a stay behindrole to harass the enemy advance by mounting ambushes and the use of indirect fire.

0309. Armour. Armoured forces are ideal for delay actions. Their long range,rapid fire systems allow them to force the enemy to slow down, deploy and react tocontact. Tanks are a key element in counterattacks. They can fire on the move andhave a fast rate of fire and short engagement times. Their speed, firepower and shockaction provide the perfect force to counterattack the enemy to slow his advance andprovide time for a delaying force to break contact. Tanks should be used to cover themost dangerous armoured avenues of approach, but must still be vigilant against anenemy dismounted threat.

0310. Aviation. Armed helicopters can engage enemy armour from unexpecteddirections causing confusion and delay. Their rapid deployment will provide cover fordisengagement and rearward movement. Helicopters will provide vital information onenemy axes and strengths.

0311. Reconnaissance. Reconnaissance can best be used as a security force toprovide the early eyes and ears to a company group. When not performing as thesecurity force, reconnaissance elements are employed in a flank screen or required tomaintain contact with the enemy. Reconnaissance elements are not organized orequipped to conduct independent delay operations.

0312. Anti-Armour. Careful planning must ensure that anti-tank systems are ableto fire and move without becoming decisively engaged. Commanders should employanti-tank assets in depth and should engage the enemy as far forward as possible.MILAN will then move to subsequent positions to provide in-depth, over-watching firefor the delay battle of other elements of the company.

0313. Snipers. Snipers can perform several tasks in the delay. They can bedeployed forward of initial positions to provide early warning, to provide intelligenceand to disrupt enemy forces by calling for indirect fire against enemy units andprecision sniper fire to kill enemy leaders.

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED 3-5

Employment of Combat Support Forces

0314. Artillery. Fire support for the delay must be planned in depth for the entiresector. Massed fire is planned along likely enemy avenues of approach andchokepoints to cause him to close down, strip away infantry protection for armour andcanalize him into engagement areas that permit accurate direct fire. The FOO partieswill be deployed by their BC where they can best control artillery fire in support of theirbattlegroup. Indirect fire will be used:

a. At long range to wear down the enemy without close contact and decisiveengagement.

b. To permit manoeuvring forces to withdraw at the critical moment.

c. To plug gaps with scatterable mines to prevent bypass.

d. To assist in the defence of successive defensive positions.

e. To assist the hand-over.

0315. Engineer. Engineers initially are forward assisting in counter-mobility,survivability and then mobility tasks. In the counter-mobility role, engineers placeobstacles such as minefields and tank ditches to slow the enemy. The use of nuisancemining, together with real and phoney minefields, will make the enemy mine awareresulting in caution and delay. In the survivability role, engineers dig vehicleemplacements starting with the Main Effort. In the mobility role, engineers clear routesback to subsequent positions. This process continues for the follow-on delaypositions. The battlegroup commander will assign an engineer unit to a company,specifying either a level of completion or a time limit for them to complete their work. Itis critical that the company commander and the engineer commander site thecompany obstacles and positions together.

0316. NBC. NBC operations in the delay concentrate on survivability. The level ofNBC posture will depend on the threat; the use of NBC detection equipment will haveto ensure rapid recovery if required.

0317 – 0318. Reserved.

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED3-6

SECTION 3. — ORGANIZATION

General

0319. The organization of delay operations is similar to that used in the defence.The delay normally starts on a report line or battle position and extends rearward tothe line where responsibility for the enemy passes to another force. Companies will begiven control measures in the form of either a sector or battle position which will formtheir lateral boundaries. Frontages tend to be larger than in the defence. Thecompany commander must decide which parts of his area are critical to his delaymission, which parts he may abandon earlier than others and which ones may only bemonitored.

0320 – 0321. Reserved.

SECTION 4. — PLANNING AND PREPARATION

Characteristics

0322. The delay is punctuated by fluid operations, which force commanders to beflexible and act within their commander’s intent. The following is a list ofcharacteristics a commander should keep in mind when planning delay operations.

0323. Force the Enemy to Deploy and Manoeuvre. Terrain must be used tomake maximum advantage of direct and indirect firepower and the enemy should beengaged at maximum range. This causes the enemy to take time-consumingmeasures to deploy, develop the situation and manoeuvre to drive the delaying forcefrom his position. Repeated use of this technique will slow the forward progress of theenemy and will trade space for time.

0324. Make Maximum Use of Obstacles. Man-made and natural obstaclesshould be used to canalize and slow enemy progress and provide security to theflanks. To be effective, obstacles must be covered by observation and direct or indirectfire.

0325. Maintain Contact with the Enemy. Continuous observation must beconducted to establish and maintain contact with the enemy. Maintaining enemycontact requires visual observation of the enemy, observation and correction of firesand freedom of manoeuvre to avoid decisive engagement. Enemy forces withfreedom of manoeuvre and mobility will try to bypass or envelop the flanks, orpenetrate between units conducting the delay.

0326. Avoid Decisive Engagement. In a delay, positions should be occupiedsufficiently long to deceive and force the enemy to deploy. Thereafter the situation can

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED 3-7

be developed to gain the initiative and manoeuvre conducted to counterattack if thesituation permits. The next position must be occupied before becoming decisivelyengaged. Maximum use should be made of indirect fire to assist in disengaging. If acompany remains in position when the enemy launches its attack, it is likely tobecome decisively engaged and it will sustain unnecessary losses.

Planning

0327. IPB. An effective IPB will be crucial to the conduct of the delay. The IPBshould determine the ground most suitable for defence, the enemy’s likely avenues ofapproach and bypass routes, and the decision points for triggering direct and indirectfire and withdrawal to the next position.

0328. Delay Position Selection. A reconnaissance of delay positions is made asearly as possible. Likely avenues of approach from the IPB are determined and plansare made to deny their use to the enemy. The commander selects positions that allowlong range fields of fire with routes suitable for rearward and lateral movement. Heestablishes the order in which each of his sub-units will move and along which routes.Positions should incorporate as many of the following characteristics as possible:

a. Natural obstacles on the front and flanks.

b. Long range observation and fields of fire.

c. The longest delay with the fewest forces.

d. Cover and concealment for forces on the delaying position.

e. Covered and concealed routes of withdrawal.

f. Sufficient distance between successive positions to require the enemy toreorganize before attacking the next position.

0329. The company must try to reduce the enemy’s mobility advantage by the useof obstacles, firepower and effective use of terrain. Enemy rates of movement usingterrain should be considered by the commander, compared to how fast his unit canmove to the next position. These time distance factors dictate the amount of time thecommander has to engage the enemy and move his unit before becoming decisivelyengaged. This process should be done with each enemy avenue of approach. Thecompany group commander must use clearly defined decision points to triggerwithdrawal. It is critical that all leaders understand these, and know when they mustmove. This will become important if commanders become casualties or there is a lossof communications.

0330. Obstacles must be tied into the plan to slow the enemy long enough for thecompany to engage and then move. They must be covered by direct or indirect fire

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED3-8

and force the enemy to deploy or take action. This will allow the company todisengage and set-up in the next position ready to re-engage the enemy.

0331. The following should be considered when the commander makes his plan:

a. The commander must develop clear platoon missions and tasks.

b. The initial positions to defend.

c. The plan for controlling engagements, the sequence and criteria fordisengagement and movement instructions.

d. Subsequent positions to the rear.

e. General routes to follow from position to position.

f. Instruction about the company harbour party.

g. Instructions on the movement of supplies, equipment and vehicles.

h. Priorities for the engineers and assault pioneers.

Control Measures

0332. Control measures a commander chooses are key to his intent. Controlmeasures usually include:

a. Phase lines.

b. Report lines.

c. Checkpoints.

d. Battle positions and sectors.

e. Engagement areas and target reference points.

f. Assembly areas, main supply routes and CSS points.

g. Coordinating points.

h. Routes and lanes.

Reserves

0333. The reserve is located initially in a central area where it can respond quickly tocounterattack, block or reinforce against an enemy penetration. The commander mustdesignate the likely contingencies and routes that the reserve will use. The reserve

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED 3-9

then conducts a reconnaissance of the routes and rehearsals of the contingencies.When possible, the reserve force should include tanks.

Limited Visibility

0334. Although conditions of limited visibility can provide concealment for breakingcontact and movement, they degrade the company’s ability to detect and engagetargets. Limited visibility conditions can be caused by darkness, fog, rain, smoke, dustor any battlefield obscurant that may be employed. These conditions may require theuse of image intensifiers, thermal sights, binoculars and artificial illumination. Devices(such as image intensifiers and the thermal sights of tanks and MIRA) should be usedtogether so the capabilities of one system can offset the disadvantages of the other.Increased security measures, such as more OPs, patrols and remote ground sensors,will be needed although their provision must be balanced against the probablerequirement for rapid extraction.

Deception

0335. Deception is critical in delay operations and the enemy must be made to thinkhe is approaching the main defensive position. The company in the delay must,therefore, fight aggressively, forcing the enemy to deploy and spend costly timepreparing for an assault. This can be accomplished by employing phoney minefields,obstacles, massing of combat power for short durations and the massing of indirectfire. The use of smoke can also deceive the enemy as to exact positions and numbers,while providing cover for rearward movement.

Preparation

0336. Preparation for the delay is similar to the defence. As much work as possiblemust be completed early to forward positions. This ensures the appearance of astrong defence. This includes: obstacles, forward and covered by direct and indirectfire and OPs forward for early warning. As the enemy approaches, engineer assetscan move to start preparing the next delay positions. It is critical that commandersconduct reconnaissance of positions in depth with engineers. This allows theengineer work to continue while the battle is being fought in the forward positions.

0337 – 0338. Reserved.

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED3-10

SECTION 5. — CONDUCT

General

0339. A sequence for the delay is depicted as follows:

a. Initial delay positions are occupied, security and OPs are established andpriority of work is determined. This creates the illusion of a determined defenceand increases the amount of delay obtained.

b. As the enemy approaches, long range direct and indirect fire are used toinflict casualties, to disorganize and force him to deploy or take action. Ifpossible, enemy reconnaissance elements and advanced guards are destroyedor ambushed.

c. Each position is occupied until the enemy threatens an assault orenvelopment of the position. Decisive engagement is avoided.

Disengagement

0340. The company group commander must be given unequivocal instructions onthe criteria for disengagement. He then moves on the basis of prearranged times,trigger points, on order, or when appropriate based on his commander’s intent.Movement will need to be coordinated with flanking companies.

0341. When maximum delay has been achieved, movement to the next delayposition begins. Coordination of fire and recognition signals between the movingelement and adjacent, supporting and over-watching elements is an important task.

Break Contact

0342. If elements of the company are threatened with decisive engagement or havebecome decisively engaged, the commander may take several actions to facilitatetheir disengagement. In order of priority, he may do any of the following:

a. Allocate priority of all indirect supporting fire to the threatened platoon. Thisis the most rapid and responsive method of increasing combat power.

b. Direct adjacent units to engage enemy targets forward of the threatenedplatoon. This may require repositioning.

c. Reinforce the platoon.

d. Conduct a counterattack.

0343 – 0344. Reserved.

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED 3-11

SECTION 6. — COMMAND AND CONTROL

Command

0345. The commander is usually situated forward along the main avenue ofapproach. This provides him the best view and a feel for the pressure his company isencountering. Forward positioning allows the commander to best determine whetherhe can stay in positions, counterattack an enemy weakness or withdraw to the nextposition.

Control

0346. Map overlay control measures (such as phase lines, report lines, nicknames,nicknumbers) provide the key tool in controlling a unit in the delay and provide thecoherent battle plan for the company. It is critical that every commander has a copy ofthe overlay as the fluid nature and high risk of delay operations may find others incommand.

Communications

0347. The primary means of communications in the delay will be radio. Althoughland line communications are seldom practical except for the initial position, the abilityto use line will depend on the amount of time available in each position. Pyrotechnicsignals should be used as a back-up in the event of communications failure or enemyjamming.

0348 – 0349. Reserved.

SECTION 7. — COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT

General

0350. Combat service support in the delay requires constant monitoring of thecompany’s supply situation. It is generally not practical to dump supplies on theground during a delay because of the likelihood of rapid movement. Instead, duringbattle the company should set up an emergency replenishment that allows sectionsthat have expended ammunition or supplies to come back to get re-armed then goback into the fight.

0351. Movement of echelons and other CSS must be timely. Those assets mustprovide responsive service but cannot impede the movement of the company.Supplies and equipment that cannot be used or evacuated should be destroyed orcached. The commander must plan for and expect high casualty rates. He must useall available means of transportation to evacuate the non-walking wounded.

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED3-12

Chapter 4

TRANSITIONAL PHASES DURING OPERATIONS

SECTION 1. — INTRODUCTION

0401. This chapter describes thetransitional phases which link the threeprimary operations of war. Linking theoperations may require a simpletransition from one operation to anotherwithout breaking contact, for example,from defence to offence, or it may benecessary to disengage or re-establishcontact. The transitional phases,therefore, ensure the continuity ofoperations although in themselves theycan never be decisive and they are means to achieve the ends of the three primaryoperations.

0402. Tempo. One of the main factors that will affect the tempo of operations isthe speed of transition between activities. Training must therefore concentrate onbeing able to transfer activity rapidly via the transitional phases. A detailedunderstanding of the tactics of each of the phases and well rehearsed drills areessential to achieving this.

0403. Transitional Phases. The transitional phases are as follows:

a. Advance to Contact. The advance to contact is a transitional operationdesigned to gain or regain contact with the enemy.

b. Meeting Engagement. A combat action that occurs when a moving force,incompletely deployed for battle, engages an enemy at an unexpected time andplace. The enemy force may be stationary or in motion.

c. Link-Up Operations. A meeting of friendly ground forces, such as, whenan advancing force reaches an objective area previously seized by an airinserted force, when an encircled element breaks out to rejoin friendly forces, orwhen converging manoeuvre forces meet.

d. Withdrawal. A retrograde operation in which a force in contact with theenemy frees itself for a new mission.

e. Relief of Troops in Combat. Relief of troops occurs when combat activitiesare taken over by one force from another. There are three types of relief

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED 4-1

Contents

Page

SECTION 1. — INTRODUCTION 4–1SECTION 2. — ADVANCE TO CONTACT 4–2SECTION 3. — MEETING ENGAGEMENT 4–12SECTION 4. — LINK-UP OPERATIONS 4–15SECTION 5. — WITHDRAWAL 4–17SECTION 6. — RELIEF OF TROOPS INCOMBAT 4–23

operations. Relief in place, forward passage of lines and rearward passage oflines.

0404 – 0405. Reserved.

SECTION 2. — ADVANCE TO CONTACT

Introduction

0406. The company group conducts an advance to contact to make or regaincontact with the enemy under the most favourable conditions. It is always conductedin preparation for a subsequent operation and is concluded when the main force ispositioned in accordance with the commander’s plan. A company group will normallybe given an advance to contact mission as the lead company group for a battlegroupor brigade attack, or as a counterattack element for a brigade attack. An advance tocontact terminates with the occupation of an assigned objective or when enemyresistance requires the battlegroup to deploy and conduct an attack.

Principles

0407. There are three principles for the advance to contact:

a. Surprise. This is achieved by swift reaction and manoeuvre, boldnessand the concentration of combat power at unexpected times and places.

b. Security. The complementary principle of security must be consideredand precautions taken to secure manoeuvre routes and flanks. The bestsecurity, however, often lies in boldness and surprise.

c. Maintenance of Momentum. Maintaining the momentum of the advancewill keep the enemy off balance. This serves to reduce the probability of enemycounter action and to take advantage of fleeting opportunities. It is achieved by:

(1) The use of mission command providing a clear directive that willenable junior commanders to use their initiative in furthering the companygroup commander’s plan.

(2) Balanced grouping and deployment.

(3) Sensible anticipation by commanders at all levels, and timelypreparation to counter likely obstacles and enemy resistance.

(4) Urgency and quick reaction throughout the company group.

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED4-2

Terminology

0408. The following terms are used in the advance to contact:

a. Axis of Advance. An axis is a general line of advance astride which a unitmoves. Boundaries may be imposed to limit lateral movement. The leadingbattlegroup is not responsible for clearing the axis unless ordered to do so.

b. Route. A route is the prescribed course to be travelled from a specificpoint of origin to a specific destination.

c. Cleared Route. A cleared route is a route that must be cleared of enemydirect fire. It must be kept clear until responsibility is handed over to another unitor formation.

d. Bound. A bound is a feature of tactical significance on or astride the axiswhich could be held defensively if the need arose.

e. Report Line. A report line is an easily recognizable feature, at right anglesto the axis, which is used to report progress. It need have no tacticalsignificance.

f. Phase Line. A phase line is used for the control and coordination ofoperations and is usually a terrain feature extending across the zone of action.

Forces and Tasks

0409. A force advancing to contact (see Fig 17) will normally incorporate theelements listed below. The detailed task organization will depend on the mission, thethreat, the ground, the rate of advance to be achieved and the bypass policy. As aminimum the advance’s organization should provide the commander with earlywarning and reaction time.

a. The Covering Force. The Covering Force has two components: the screenand the guard.

(1) Screen. The function of the screen is to obtain information on theenemy and the ground over which the advance will be conducted. It willlook in particular for gaps and weaknesses in the enemy’s deployment toallow for subsequent bypass, envelopment or attack by follow-on forces.The screen will also identify suitable hides. At battlegroup level the screenwill be provided by the reconnaissance platoon. The strength of a screenat company group level will depend on the ground and the number of axesover which the company can advance; it is unlikely to be greater than aplatoon in strength.

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED 4-3

(2) Guard. The function of the guard is to expedite the movement ofthe main body, maintain contact with the screen, provide security to theimmediate front of the main body by observing and reporting enemyactivity, maintain surveillance, impede and harass the enemy withsupporting fire and, within its capacity, destroy or fix enemy elements. Itwill follow the screen at least one tactical bound behind, and it will allowroom for the screen to manoeuvre. At battlegroup level the guard willnormally consist of a company group supported by armour and will usuallydeploy a lead platoon as its own screen/guard. It will be grouped to be ableto fight if necessary. At company group level a guard would consist of aplatoon reinforced as necessary.

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED4-4

���

���

��������

� �����

��������

���

��� �

Note: Organization is representational only. The tactical situation will determine thecompany group’s organization.

Fig 17. — The Company Group in the Advance

b. The Main Body. The main body contains the main combat power of theforce. It reacts to the situation based on the actions of the covering force andshould be organized in such a way that elements can be ordered to take over theguard role; change direction or route, either to bypass enemy positions or totake advantage of better routes; and deal with enemy which have beenbypassed or are holding up the advance. Functional groups will move from hideto hide along the cleared axis, except in a very rapid advance. Tasks will includethe destruction of enemy forces found and fixed by the covering force. Thecommander’s aim will be to retain a large element of his force secure anduncommitted. The position of the main body in relation to the guard will bedetermined by the commander and will be based on such variables as ground,the enemy and the mobility of the force.

c. The Flank and Rear Guards. Flank and rear guards protect the main bodyfrom ground observation and surprise attack. They should be strong enough todefeat minor enemy forces, or to fix larger ones, or to delay strong attacks untilthe main body can react. Creating this force is likely to be difficult as resourcesare by now nearly all committed. Thought should be given to the use of areconnaissance section, supported by anti-tank detachments. During anadvance on many axes, flank protection may be provided through thecoordination of lead elements across the formation by neighbouring units andcompanies.

0410. The role of combat and combat support forces in the advance to contact is asfollows:

a. Combat.

(1) Armour. Armour can be grouped with any of the elements of theadvance although it is most likely to be found reinforcing the coveringforce or providing combat power to the guard. The combination of armourand dismounted infantry on a long advance to contact will createdifficulties due to the marked differences in their rates of movement.Infantry should lead armour in close country and built-up areas.

(2) Aviation. Helicopters may be available to support the advance.However, command and control of these assets is likely to rest with aformation HQ at the lowest. Individual utility and/or reconnaissancehelicopters may be placed under temporary OPCON for the duration of aspecific phase. These aircraft may, therefore, be used for:

(a) Surveillance and reconnaissance.

(b) The exercise of command and control through the provision ofairborne CPs.

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED 4-5

(c) Desant operations for the seizure of critical points and keyterrain features.

(d) Resupply and medical evacuation.

(e) Flank protection.

b. Combat Support.

(1) Artillery/Mortars. FOOs and MFCs must accompany leadingelements so that they can provide immediate and effective fire support.This will enable the force to engage the enemy, whilst retaining freedom ofaction to bypass, or to attack. Immediate, accurate and heavy indirect firewill reduce, or negate the need to deploy troops on contact. To simplifymatters, a series of targets should have been selected off the map beforethe force crossed the line of departure. These targets should be madeknown down to the lowest levels. Although the advance should always beconducted under the indirect fire umbrella, the movement of gun andmortar lines should be of no concern to the company group commanderexcept when the advance is conducted in isolation.

(2) Air. Under normal circumstances air assets are unlikely to be madeavailable to the company group commander. If the force is the leadelement of a much larger one, then tactical air support may be available to:

(a) Assist in protecting the advancing force from air attack.

(b) Provide information and intelligence about the enemy.

(c) Provide close air support to supplement artillery.

(d) Interdict enemy units attempting to withdraw or reinforce.

Whatever the circumstance, air assets will be controlled by speciallytrained personnel. These may be either TACPs or BALOs, who willprovide the communications necessary to control and direct aircraft.

(3) Air Defence. The company group is unlikely to be allocated ADassets, but may find that it is moving through areas already protected bysystems such as Javelin and Rapier. AD assets may travel well forward. Inthis circumstance the company group commander may have some controlover their deployment, and should use them to protect his HQ.

(4) Engineers. Whilst the battlegroup may have access to engineersupport through the RE troop commander, the covering force shouldinclude an RE reconnaissance team, normally under the command of aSNCO. If engineers are not available then the tasks will devolve to theassault pioneer platoon. Engineer tasks will include: clearing obstacles

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED4-6

and mines, keeping open and maintaining routes. Early identification ofpossible engineer tasks will be of key importance.

Planning and Preparation

0411. Planning must make best use of all available intelligence. The forcecommander must carry out a combat estimate and IPB before crossing the line ofdeparture. The IPB will focus on the following:

a. Ground. Analysis of the ground will enable the commander to determine:

(1) Avenues of approach and mobility corridors.

(2) Key terrain, in particular ground which may be used:

(a) By the enemy to impede the advance.

(b) By the company group to cover the advance.

(3) No go and slow go areas.

(4) Defiles which must be forced and/or secured.

(5) Obstacles which must be crossed or avoided.

(6) Covered approaches which may be used by the leading elements.

(7) Routes and hides for use by depth/follow up elements.

b. The Enemy. Analysis of the enemy’s strength, air capability, known andsuspected defences and state of preparedness, in conjunction with the missionand the ground, will enable the commander to decide:

(1) The balance to be struck between speed and security.

(2) The size of the force required both to sustain the advance andsecure its flanks and rear.

(3) Whether the ground, and the force available to him, will permit theadvance on more than one axis. It will, however, be rare for a companygroup to advance on more than one axis.

(4) Where the advance should be pressed hard and where caution willbe necessary.

(5) The level of precaution necessary against enemy air attack. In theextreme case, this could dictate that the advance be conducted only bynight, or in poor visibility.

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED 4-7

(6) Contingency tasks which may be necessary to sustain themomentum of the advance. These could include:

(a) Specific tasks for reconnaissance to find suitable routes,bridges or gaps.

(b) Engineer bridging or obstacle crossing tasks.

(c) Action to capture or mask known or suspected enemydefences.

c. Bypassing. A clear bypass policy will be issued in battlegroup orderswhich will indicate the size of enemy forces which may be bypassed, at whatlevel and to what depth. The company group commander will, in turn, producehis own company level bypassing policy. In general, the fewest possiblerestrictions should be placed on bypassing in order to maintain the momentumof the advance, but it will often be difficult in practice to determine the exactstrength of any enemy position. When ordering a position to be bypassed, thecompany group commander must ensure that arrangements are made in theshort term to fix or mask the enemy to prevent interference with the continuedadvance. The fixing platoon may subsequently be required to capture theenemy position or may hand this task over to a main body company.

d. Reconnaissance. Although a preliminary reconnaissance by commandersforward of the line of departure will normally be impossible, if at all possiblecommanders should try to view the ground over which the advance will beconducted. Helicopter reconnaissance from behind the line of departure wouldbe of benefit.

Combat Formations

0412. There are six basic formations which can be used in the advance to contact:column, line, echelon, box, wedge and vee; all are a variant of line or columnformation. By designating the formation to be used the commander needs to take intoaccount the following factors:

a. The relationship of one force to another on the ground.

b. Where he predicts the enemy will make contact with his force and how hewill deal with this.

c. Where he wants his firepower.

d. The level of security required.

0413. Column. Column formation is used when early contact is not expected, theobjective is distant and speed and control are critical. The column is generally the best

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED4-8

formation in which to move larger forces quickly, especially when limited routes areavailable and when moving during limited visibility. The column makes contact withthe smallest force, facilitates control and allows the commander to generate massquickly. It also provides a base for easy transition to other formations and is useful inrestricted terrain. However, it is very vulnerable to concentrated fire from the front andthe majority of the firepower is to the flanks. When using column formation there is anincreased chance of inadvertently bypassing enemy forces.

0414. Line. Line formation is any formation with two or more elements movingabreast. It is best for an assault as it provides maximum firepower to the front. A lineformation can easily transition to an attack or fire support position. It allows coverageof wider frontages although, since it does not distribute forces in depth, it affords lessflexibility than other formations and is vulnerable to enfilade fire. Control is harder inrestricted terrain or in limited visibility.

0415. Echelon. The echelon formation arranges the force diagonally right or leftand is used by forces operating on the flank of a larger force. It allows for theconcentration of fire forward and in the direction of the echelon. It aids control in openterrain but is more difficult to control in restricted terrain.

0416. Box. The box formation arranges the force with two elements forward andtwo to the rear. The box can be easily changed to any other formation. It allows forrapid movement and all-round security but requires the availability of multiple routesor good open terrain.

0417. Wedge. The wedge formation best disposes forces to attack an enemyappearing to the front and flanks. The wedge is used when contact with the enemy ispossible or expected, but his location and dispositions are vague. It is the preferredformation for a movement to contact because it initiates contact with the smallestelement. When enemy contact is not expected, the wedge may be used to cross openterrain rapidly.

0418. Vee. The vee formation gives the force two elements abreast and one ormore to the rear. This arrangement is best suited for an advance against a threatknown to be to the front. It can be used when enemy contact is expected and thelocation and disposition of the enemy are known. It provides good forward firepowerand can be changed rapidly to line, wedge or column formation. However, it is lesseasy to reorient than the wedge and is very difficult to control in restricted terrain.

0419. Movement Techniques. There are three movement techniques which willbe used by combat formations:

a. Travelling. A travelling technique is used when speed is necessary andcontact with enemy forces not likely. All elements move simultaneously and thecommander positions himself where he can best control the advance.

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED 4-9

b. Travelling Overwatch. The travelling overwatch technique is used whencontact with the enemy is possible but speed is important. The rear element willpause for short periods to overwatch the lead element at a distance that will notprevent it from firing or moving to support the lead element.

c. Bounding Overwatch. Bounding overwatch is used when contact isexpected. This technique involves both lead and rear elements and involves therear element leapfrogging the lead element to the next terrain feature. While oneelement is moving, the other is in overwatch position able to support bymanoeuvre or fire alone.

Conduct

0420. Screen. The advance will be led by a screen force consisting of thereconnaissance platoon, an FOO and MFC, engineer reconnaissance and possibly aMILAN section if operating well ahead of the guard. The screen will normally operateunder battlegroup control but could be placed under the control of the lead companygroups if the battlegroup is advancing on two or more distinct axes. The screen will betasked to establish whether routes or axes are clear for the remainder of the battle-group, and locate and identify enemy positions. It may also be specifically tasked tofind routes through and around enemy defences or obstacles. It will advance tactically,working in sections, supported by indirect fire and also whenever possible givenoverwatch by MILAN and/or armour.

0421. Guard. The guard will normally be based on a company group. Armour willlead the advance in open terrain and infantry in close terrain and in poor visibility. Thecompany group will usually have MILAN grouped with it and be supported by a FOOand a MFC. Its actions in the advance are likely to be as follows:

a. The rate of advance will vary across the front and will depend on terrain, thelocation and strength of enemy positions and the possibility of bypassing theopposition. The formation used will depend on the ground, the number of routesavailable and the frontage to be covered. If terrain is rough, it may be best tomove by bounds. Each platoon advances on its assigned axis, taking advantageof available cover and concealment, searching for indications of enemy activity,and employing reconnaissance by fire against possible enemy locations. If oneplatoon meets resistance on its axis, the platoons nearest it support by fire.

b. On making contact with the enemy speed, manoeuvre and initiative mayovercome the enemy before he can react. It is therefore imperative that theenemy is fixed while immediate and vigorous manoeuvre is conducted to testthe enemy strength and find gaps and weaknesses. It is vital to maintain themomentum of the advance and enemy positions should be outflanked wheneverpossible. Orders should lay down whether positions can be bypassed and, if so,their size. If bypassing is not allowed, an attack must be mounted to force a gap.A SOP consisting of simple battle formations and battle drills is useful in dealingwith such light opposition.

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED4-10

c. If the resistance is too strong for the company group to overcome, it shouldrequest supporting fire from the main body or request permission to bypass theresistance after reporting its location and nature to the battlegroup commander.The battlegroup commander may then require the company group to provide afire base to support the manoeuvre and attack by the main body. The attack maybe an envelopment, using the company group as a pivot, or penetration. As themanoeuvring force approaches the objective and the fire of the company groupis masked, movement to a more advantageous position will be necessary tosupport the assault.

0422. Main Body. If the company group is part of the main body, its movementand actions will be controlled by battlegroup HQ. Movement may well be via a seriesof hides which are successively occupied and evacuated as the advance progresses.Further details on the tactics for movement out of contact is in Section 8, Chapter 5.

0423. Night Advance. A night advance is conducted in the same general manneras a daylight advance. However, distances between elements are likely to beshortened, frontages may be reduced, the rate of advance is slower, and supportingfire is less effective; but the possibility of gaining surprise is greatly increased.

Command and Control

0424. Position of Commanders. Commanders at all levels must move wellforward so that they can influence the battle quickly and make the most of fleetingopportunities. Normal command arrangements will be strained by the need for rapidmovement and the fact that, until contact is made, the advance should be conductedunder radio silence.

Combat Service Support

0425. CSS must provide the requirements of the advance and for the anticipatedrequirements of any subsequent mission. The problem with the advance is that ofsustaining a force that is moving, perhaps quite rapidly, and is therefore constantlyextending its supply lines. At the start of the advance, all elements of the force shouldbe as self-contained as possible. To that end, the company group CSS effort,supplemented by battlegroup resources, must be aimed at ensuring that the forcecrosses the LD as replete as possible. The company group commander will wantsupplies on wheels as far forward as is safe to do so, in order to reduce resupplytimes. Whenever possible, resupply should be carried out using stock held on wheelsat battlegroup so as not to reduce the logistic ‘first aid’ dedicated to that companygroup. Casualties, both personnel and equipment, should be left on the axis ofadvance for recovery by follow up forces.

0426 – 0427. Reserved.

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED 4-11

SECTION 3. — MEETING ENGAGEMENT

Introduction

0428. The meeting engagement is most likely to occur during an advance tocontact. A meeting engagement is the initial contact that occurs when a platoon orcompany group not completely deployed for battle encounters an enemy force onwhich little information is known. The enemy may be moving or stationary. Thecompany group commander plans his contingencies to define how much initiative hewill allow subordinate commanders in reacting to a meeting engagement. The goal,once contact is made, is to overcome the enemy quickly and decisively before he caneffectively react. To do so, the company group commander keeps his force in aposition to manoeuvre immediately to the contact, gather and report information, andissue instructions.

Conduct

0429. Although the screen or the guard are the elements most likely to make theinitial contact, this tactical doctrine assumes that it is the guard. The size and activityof the enemy force must be rapidly determined and action taken to avoid being fixed ordestroyed. If possible, the security force avoids detection. The basic principle is theseizure and retention of the initiative. By retaining the initiative, the company groupcommander can regain or retain freedom of action and subsequently adopt the bestcourse of action to accomplish his original mission. Success will depend largely onspeed of reaction of the company group commander and his forces.

0430. The key characteristics of a meeting engagement are lack of information andtime available to the company group commander to develop the situation. Plans mustbe drawn up and executed as fast as possible and combat power brought to bear fullyand quickly. At all levels bold and vigorous action and use of initiative will be vital tosuccess.

0431. If the enemy is moving, the guard determines the direction of movement andthe size and disposition of the force; it then engages the enemy elements with indirectfire. Speed of decision and execution is critical when the enemy is moving. If theenemy is stationary, the guard determines if enemy positions are prepared andreinforced by obstacles or minefields. The guard attempts to identify individual anti-tank weapon positions, and the enemy’s flanks and gaps in his positions.

0432. The lead platoon quickly moves to overcome and destroy section sizedenemy positions. Larger enemy forces will normally require deployment of theremainder of the company or battlegroup. The lead platoon can protect the remainderof the company group by fixing up to platoon sized enemy forces to allow freedom ofmanoeuvre.

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED4-12

0433. In developing the situation, the lead platoon commander maintains pressureon the enemy by fire and manoeuvre. He probes and conducts a vigorousreconnaissance of the enemy’s flanks to determine exact locations and composition.The information gained by the platoon is used to develop a company group or battlegroup plan of action.

0434. The company group commander has several action-on-contact optionsbased on the enemy situation:

a. Bypass. If rapid forward movement is required, and if bypass of enemyforces has been authorized by the battlegroup commander, the company groupcan bypass. If the size and mobility of the bypassed force represents a threat,the enemy force must be fixed or contained until released by the battlegroupfollow on forces or reserve.

b. Hasty Ambush. Ambush is effective against a moving force that is notaware of the presence of the company group. Instead of immediately openingfire, the lead platoon and possibly the entire company group moves into hastyfiring positions orientated on an engagement area. When most of the enemyformation is in the engagement area, the enemy is attacked by massed fire andmanoeuvre.

c. Hasty Attack. Company group planning and battle drill reactions tocontact define the criteria for conducting a hasty attack or for slowing theadvance to prepare a deliberate attack. Preparations for a deliberate attack areinitiated when the enemy is in strong, prepared positions with extensiveobstacles, bypass is not authorized, and a hasty attack is not possible or hasfailed.

d. Defence. The company group may defend after making contact with astronger force or as a prelude to a deliberate attack. It defends initially fromhasty positions, employing spoiling or counterattacks as appropriate to slow anddisrupt the enemy advance.

Forces and Tasks

0435. The role of combat and combat support forces is as follows:

a. Combat.

(1) Armour. Armour’s ability to deploy rapidly to counter unexpectedthreats, coupled to its firepower, make it a decisive element in the race toseize the initiative. Armour should be used aggressively and decisively asearly as possible.

(2) Aviation. Armed helicopters are able to play a decisive part in ameeting engagement due to their speed of reaction and firepower.

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED 4-13

b. Combat Support.

(1) Artillery/Mortars. The amount of initial fire support available to theforce is dependent on the mortars and artillery movement plans. Thoughtmust be given to ensuring that the maximum number of indirect assets arein range, static and ready to provide fire support. The FOO and MFCsmust be well forward and not tied to the company group commander,except by radio. A meeting engagement is considered to be an idealsituation in which to use scatterable mines to restrict the enemy’s freedomof manoeuvre.

(2) Air. The ability of close air support to deliver large quantities of highexplosive with little or no warning can have devastating effect on theenemy. However, immediate availability of aircraft is unlikely unlessdiverted in flight from another sortie.

(3) Air Defence. The company group is unlikely to be allocated ADassets, but may find that it is moving through areas already protected bysystems such as Javelin and Rapier. Should the task include the seizureof critical ground or key terrain, AD assets may move well forward. In thiscircumstance the company group commander may have some controlover their deployment, and should use them to protect his HQ, or theyshould be positioned along enemy air avenues of approach to overwatchhis forces on the move.

(4) Engineers. The rapid deployment of engineers, including assaultpioneers, can be crucial. Engineer reconnaissance must be well forward,as must be any combat engineers supporting the battlegroup. They mustbe prepared for mobility and counter mobility tasks. With regard to thelatter, the rapid use of scatterable mines should be considered.

Combat Service Support

0436. CSS must be capable of responding quickly to the rapid changes in planswhich may occur. CSS commanders must be ready for the unexpected by ensuringthat combat supplies and material levels are maintained at the maximum practicallevel as far forward as possible. The CSS effort should concentrate on:

a. Rapid resupply of ammunition.

b. The move forward of medical support and the development of a casualtyevacuation plan.

c. Planning the recovery and repair of battle winning equipments.

0437 – 0438. Reserved.

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED4-14

SECTION 4. — LINK-UP OPERATIONS

Introduction

0439. A link-up operation is conducted when forces are to join-up in enemycontrolled territory. It involves the establishment of contact between two or morefriendly units which may have the same or differing missions. It may be necessary todestroy the enemy between the forces so that the link-up can be achieved.

Planning Considerations

0440. Command Relationships. The headquarters directing the link-up mustestablish command relationships between forces and the responsibilities of eachforce during the operation.

0441. Liaison Responsibilities. When possible, the commanders of the unitsinvolved establish liaison. If conditions permit, the commander and liaison teams meetface to face before the operation begins. If the enemy is between the forcesconducting a link-up, this liaison may not occur and coordination is then accomplishedby radio. During the operation, the two units attempt to maintain continuous radiocontact with each other or the higher headquarters. As a minimum, the units exchangethe following information:

a. Enemy and friendly situations.

b. Locations and types of obstacles.

c. Fire support plans.

d. Air defence control measures.

e. Recognition signals.

The headquarters directing the link-up is responsible for ensuring that frequencies,call signs and recognition signals are compatible between forces. The use ofauthentication procedures on combat net radio will help reduce the chance of theenemy carrying out electronic deception. If the linking units do not have the samefrequencies and call signs, the higher headquarters directs one unit to change —normally the unit not in contact. If the units involved in the operations are neither underOPCON nor attached, they maintain their parent command nets; however, recognitionsignals must be exchanged.

0442. Coordination of Schemes of Manoeuvre. All elements in a link-upcarefully coordinate their operations to minimize the risk of fratricide. Thiscoordination continues throughout the operation and increases as the units approachthe link-up points. Measures used are:

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED 4-15

a. Zones of Attack or Axis of Attack. If one or more of the forces are moving,their direction and objective are controlled by the higher headquarters.

b. Report Lines. Movement is controlled by higher headquarters through theuse of report lines.

c. Restrictive Fire Lines (RFL). These lines are used to prevent friendlyforces from engaging one another with indirect fires. One technique is to makereport lines on-order RFLs. As the unit crosses one report line, the next reportline becomes the RFL.

d. Link-Up and Alternate Link-Up Points. The link-up point is a designatedlocation where two forces meet and coordinate operations. The point must beeasily identifiable on the ground, and recognition signals must be planned.Alternative link-up points are established in the event that enemy actionprecludes link-up at the primary point.

Conduct

0443. Link-up operations are generally offensive in nature and a major considerationwill be speed in establishing the link-up to reduce the possibility of enemy reaction andminimize the period of vulnerability. The operation may involve deliberate attacks or, ifcircumstances permit, the more rapid movement of an advance to contact. During thelast stage of the link-up operation the speed of advance must be carefully controlled;reconnaissance elements must seek to establish contact with the other force as earlyas possible and plans adjusted or confirmed accordingly. The mission given to acommander will normally state the location of the route where the link-up will takeplace and a time by which it is to be effected.

0444. Actions Following the Link-Up. If possible, subsequent operationsshould be coordinated before the link-up operation and modified, if necessary, whenthe link-up occurs. The two commanders should collocate near the link-up point, or ata prearranged location, to confirm or coordinate subsequent operations.

0445. Combat Support and Combat Service Support. The role of combatsupport forces and combat service support is as follows:

a. Combat Support.

(1) Artillery/Mortars. Fire control must be carefully exercised until alink-up has been achieved in order to avoid losses. Normal fire controlmeasures will be used by link-up forces, but specific coordination betweenFOOs and BCs is vital. In practice, this coordination is likely to be carriedout at FDC level.

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED4-16

(2) Air. Particular attention must be given to the control of offensive airsupport in the area between the forces as they approach the area of link-up.

(3) Engineers. In link-up operations, mobility support of forces that aremoving to link-up is critical. The clearance of routes and enemy barriers isessential for the timely completion of the operation.

b. Combat Service Support. In principle, combat service supportconsiderations will be the same as those for offensive operations. There may bea requirement to provide support to the force with which it is intended to link-up.

0446 – 0447. Reserved.

SECTION 5. — WITHDRAWAL

Introduction

0448. Withdrawal is an operation in which a force in contact with the enemy freesitself for a new mission. Disengagement is defined as breaking contact with the enemyand moving to a point where the enemy can neither observe nor engage the unit bydirect fire. Thus, disengagement is an essential part of any withdrawal.

0449. Withdrawal may be conducted under enemy pressure or free of it. It isperformed with or without assistance from other friendly forces. A withdrawal isinherently dangerous because it often involves breaking contact with a strongerenemy force. To withdraw successfully or disengage, the company group must:

a. Conceal its intentions from the enemy.

b. Establish a sequence for withdrawal.

c. Reconnoitre routes to ensure rapid movement.

d. Allow early withdrawal of non-essential units to avoid congestion on theroutes of withdrawal.

e. Provide for security and overwatch.

f. Use obstacles to slow or stop the enemy’s progress.

g. Move as quickly as possible without losing control.

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED 4-17

Principles

0450. The principles of the withdrawal are as follows:

a. Flexibility. Due to the difficulties likely to be experienced in a withdrawal,the plan must contain maximum flexibility to allow for reaction to theunexpected. Flexibility will be enhanced by commanders at all levelsunderstanding higher commanders’ intents and continually reassessing thetactical situation in the light of the original mission statement.

b. Offensive Action. If the enemy is harrying the withdrawal, everyopportunity must be seized to take offensive action. If successful, this will buytime to break clean and regain the initiative. The tactics of the delay will beemployed to take offensive action.

c. Simplicity. A simple plan is essential. Notwithstanding enemy action, theweather and acts of God, a withdrawal in contact is a complex operation in itsown right and planning complexities must be strenuously resisted.

d. Maintenance of Morale. Morale will be vulnerable during a withdrawal.Commanders must be seen at critical places and times to maintain confidenceand as far as possible troops must be kept aware of what is happening.

e. Control. Although plans must be flexible and simple they must also allowfor control to be exerted on the withdrawal. Control will be achieved bymeasures such as report lines, boundaries and timings.

f. Security. The success of the withdrawal will largely depend on thesuccess of OPSEC measures put in place prior to the withdrawal’s start. Allranks must be aware of the need to maintain security, particularly on radio nets.CSCMs will be a key part of the security plan.

g. Information. Information is closely linked to the maintenance of morale.Troops must be kept aware of developments.

Planning

0451. Withdrawals are accomplished in three overlapping phases:

a. Preparation Phase. Reconnaissance and rear reconnaissance elementsare despatched, Warning Orders issued and planning initiated. Non-essentialpersonnel and vehicles are relocated to the rear.

b. Disengagement Phase. Designated elements begin their movement tothe rear. When contact with the enemy is broken, they assemble and conduct atactical movement to a designated assembly area or other position.

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED4-18

c. Security Phase. A security force assists disengagement of otherelements, assumes responsibility for the operational sector, deceives theenemy and protects the movement of disengaged elements with manoeuvreand fire.

0452. Grouping and Tasks. Normal organizations should be retained as far aspossible. Regrouping during the operation must be avoided.

0453. Manoeuvre Elements. The commander will arrange his forces as follows:

a. Security Element. Covering troops are required between positions toimpose delay and caution on the attacker. At the start of the withdrawal they willtake up station behind the old main position ready to hold the front when thatposition is abandoned. Thereafter they will cover back between positionsimposing as much delay as possible.

b. Main Body. The main body of the force will move back to pre-determinedintermediate or main positions which they will prepare and occupy. As theymove they will need to ensure that forces are allocated to the protection of theflanks as well as advance and rear guards. The main body may have to allocatetroops to assist a hard-pressed security element.

c. Reserves. Reserves will be difficult to find and usually a commander willwant to earmark troops not in contact as his reserve. Their tasks will be to takelimited offensive action, to block penetrations of the front, assist with extricationof troops in contact, reinforce threatened areas and protect withdrawal routes.

Command

0454. The company group commander should remain well forward where he cansee the situation and personally influence events. In withdrawal his presence forwardis even more necessary for its morale effect. Confidence and morale will be undergreat strain. Everything possible must be done to tell troops what is going on anddispel rumours. The greatest factor in sustaining morale is, however, likely to be thesuccess achieved in exploiting opportunities to strike back at the enemy.

Control

0455. The maintenance of effective control is an essential element of a successfulwithdrawal. Control measures include:

a. Timings.

(1) Denial Time. Time up to which the position is to be denied to theenemy.

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED 4-19

(2) No Rearward Move Before. Applies to all but reconnaissanceparties.

(3) Thinning Out Start Time.

(4) Final Abandonment Time.

(5) Clear of Line Time.

b. Physical Measures. These include checkpoints, RVs and embussingpoints.

c. Security. Measures to achieve security include:

(1) Withdrawal during conditions of limited visibility.

(2) Maintenance of normal activity as long as possible. If not on radiosilence prior to withdrawal, continue normal traffic for as long as possible.

(3) Cover noise of movement with indirect fire.

(4) Maintain effective control of rearward reconnaissance and thinningout.

Conduct

0456. Withdrawal Free of Enemy Pressure. Deception and operational securityare essential to the success of this operation. Several things can be done to deceivethe enemy:

a. A small detachment in contact could be left behind to make the enemybelieve forces are still in position.

b. Maintain normal communications.

c. Mask the noise of the withdrawal by artillery fire or other noise.

d. Withdraw during periods of poor visibility or adverse weather.

0457. Withdrawal Under Enemy Pressure. When ordered to withdraw while incontact with an attacking enemy, the company group is withdrawing under pressure.The goal is to preserve the unit and prevent the enemy from forcing withdrawal into adisorganized retreat.

0458. Techniques. The techniques for a withdrawal under pressure are verysimilar to the techniques for a delaying action. The difference is that in the latter, thecompany group maintains contact with the enemy and, in the former, the companygroup conducts fire and movement to break free of enemy contact. The base of fire

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED4-20

may be provided by an overwatch element or security force positioned to cover thewithdrawal. This may be another company group overwatching or one platoon mayoverwatch the other platoons.

0459. Battle Procedure. Once the basic framework of timings and routes hasbeen determined at battlegroup HQ, planning centres largely on battle procedures,drills and movement control arrangements. The sequence of withdrawal should bebased on:

a. Receipt of battlegroup Warning Order which should contain as a minimumthe following information:

(1) Outline of new battlegroup task.

(2) Time position must be denied to the enemy until.

(3) Time rearward reconnaissance may start.

(4) Time rearward move may start.

(5) Location of battlegroup RV.

(6) Route from battlegroup RV to release point.

b. As soon as it is permitted, the despatch of a rear reconnaissance partyunder the company 2IC to reconnoitre the company group’s next task. Thereconnaissance party should include platoon sergeants and guides and supportweapon representatives.

c. The withdrawal of non-essential personnel, vehicles and material.

d. The withdrawal of the depth platoon.

e. The withdrawal of the forward platoons and support weapons. Dismountedinfantry will move before armour.

0460. Movement Planning. The movement plan should employ secure andconcealed withdrawal routes from all platoon areas. Enemy STA assets must be takeninto account and for all ranks to understand that in a night withdrawal the coverafforded by darkness may be apparent rather than real. The withdrawal will use asystem of checkpoints, RVs and embussing points/helicopter LSs:

a. Checkpoint. The company checkpoint is located at a convenient place onthe route to the company RV. The purpose of a checkpoint is to ensure that alltroops are accounted for. Troops do not stop at a checkpoint but are countedthrough. The company checkpoint will usually be manned by the CSM.

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED 4-21

b. RV. The company RV should be in a secure location which is not anobvious indirect fire target. It requires to be protected by the first platoon toarrive. At the RV the platoon commanders report to the company groupcommander.

c. Embussing Point/LS. An embussing point is an area to the rear of thebattlegroup RV where marching troops join their transport. It is normallycontrolled by the MTO. If support helicopters are allocated for moving troops acareful time appreciation is required as the helicopters become very vulnerableif they have to wait on the ground. The location of the LS must be far enoughback not to compromise the withdrawal.

0461. Communications. Good communications are vital, and the policy for radioand electronic silence must be clearly stated in the unit CEI. Links, methods ofoperation and traffic densities must be maintained for as long as possible to avoiddisclosing to the enemy ESM operator that things are about to change. Companygroup signal detachment commanders may be ordered to create radio traffic to add toany formation deception plan. Once any element has disengaged from the enemy,they will normally be expected to observe radio silence.

Combat Support

0462. The role of combat support forces is as follows:

a. Artillery/Mortars. Indirect fire assets must be deployed to cover the entireoperation. Long range artillery will be withdrawn early and placed far enoughback to cover the withdrawal. Troops on the ground, however, should not beexpected to operate with any less than that which was being provided at thestart of the withdrawal. Indeed, artillery may well be massed to cover thewithdrawing force. Coordination will be carried out at FDC level with BCs andFOOs moving only with the last elements of the force.

b. Air. Offensive air support is likely to play an important part in harassingthe enemy following up the withdrawal or attempting to bypass the withdrawingforce. Close air support will be particularly useful. FACs/TACPs will be deployedinto the brigade area to coordinate all air assets. Support helicopters can beused to speed up the withdrawal, but are unlikely to be used in such exposedpositions.

c. Aviation. Reconnaissance/LBH can be used to great effect either tocontrol indirect fire and ground attack sorties, or to extract stay behind forces.

d. Air Defence. Rapier will be deployed to cover defiles and chokepoints onwithdrawal routes whilst HVM and Javelin should be used to protect HQsagainst enemy ground attack aircraft whether they be fixed or rotary wing, and tocover likely landing sites for air delivered forces.

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED4-22

e. Engineers. Engineers and assault pioneers will be heavily committed inany withdrawal:

(1) Mobility. Routes must be cleared of all obstructions and thenmaintained and finally kept open.

(2) Counter Mobility. Demolitions and obstacles, including boobytraps, must be prepared to delay the enemy following up the withdrawal.

Combat Service Support

0463. The CSS Plan should ensure that the requirements of the withdrawing forceare met and that useful material, particularly fuel, does not fall into enemy hands.Ideally it will be withdrawn. If this cannot happen, stocks must be destroyed but not ina way that may alert the enemy. The forward resupply of troops still in contact mustcontinue. In addition:

a. Equipment Support (ES). The ES effort must be concentrated onpreparing and maintaining equipments, particularly the battle winning ones,required for the operation. Recovery resources should also be located at or nearcritical locations to keep routes open, and to recover equipments wheneverpossible.

b. Supply. Before rearward movement begins, all forward stocks should berun down, backloading when necessary. Losses may exceed normal wastage.The parent formation should plan for this.

c. Medical. Company aid posts, and walking wounded, should be evacuatedalong the medical chain of command. This will provide space for subsequentcasualties.

0464 – 0465. Reserved.

SECTION 6. — RELIEF OF TROOPS IN COMBAT

Introduction

0466. A relief is an operation in which a fighting force is replaced in combat byanother. Responsibilities for the mission and assigned sector or zone of action areassumed by the incoming one. Reliefs may be conducted during offensive ordefensive operations and during any weather and light conditions. They are normallyexecuted during limited visibility to reduce the possibility of detection. Theseoperations are undertaken when forces:

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED 4-23

a. Are unable to continue with their mission.

b. Are required for operations elsewhere.

c. Have accomplished their mission.

d. Are due for rotation to avoid exhaustion.

e. Are not suitable to accomplish the new task.

Generally, relief is undertaken in order to sustain the overall level of combat power.Inherent in these operations is the transfer of operational responsibility for a combatmission or sector. The requirement is that this transfer should take place whilemaintaining the required level of operational capability.

Relief of Troops in Place

0467. A relief in place occurs when a unit is replaced by another unit. Thebattlegroup commander will direct when and how the relief will be conducted. A reliefin place is conducted to maintain combat effectiveness of committed units. Theincoming force normally assumes the mission of the outgoing one, usually within thesame boundaries and, at least initially, with a similar disposition of forces wherepossible.

0468. Planning Factors. The following factors are important when planning therelief in place:

a. Security and Protection. The intention to conduct a relief in place must beconcealed from the enemy. Deception measures should be employed whichinclude continuing with the normal pattern of activity.

b. Early Liaison. Liaison at an early stage, which should includereconnaissance by the incoming force, is vital. Close cooperation at all levelswill be required.

c. Allocation of Routes. Routes must be allocated for the incoming andoutgoing forces. Although possibly disadvantageous, the same route may haveto be utilised.

d. Allocation of Areas. The allocation of areas will include areas for stagingand deployment.

e. Timings. The detailed timing of the operation will be made within theguidelines set by the overall commander.

f. Fire Support. The force in position will always provide fire support for themoving force.

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED4-24

0469. When planning the relief:

a. Issue a FragO immediately.

b. Use an advance party composed of key leaders to conduct detailedreconnaissance and coordination.

c. Adopt the outgoing unit’s normal pattern of activity as closely as is possible.

d. Determine when you are to assume responsibility for the position.

e. Collocate your headquarters with the relieved unit’s headquarters.

f. Maximize operation’s security to prevent detection (conduct the relief atnight if possible).

g. Relieve combat support and combat service support elements after combatelements.

h. Transfer excess ammunition, telephone lines and material to the incomingunit.

i. Control movement by:

(1) Reconnoitring and designating routes into and out of positions.

(2) Providing guides for the incoming unit.

(3) Using organic transportation assets whenever possible.

0470. Operation Order. When planning and coordination are complete anoperation order will be issued. The order will include all elements in the standard orderformat and will specifically designate:

a. The time the relief is to begin and end.

b. The method for conducting the relief.

c. Critical control measures.

d. When responsibility will change.

e. Operation’s security considerations.

f. Locations and transfer of obstacles.

g. Contingency plan in case of enemy attack during the relief.

h. Responsibilities and requirements for transfer of supplies and equipment.

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED 4-25

0471. Conducting the Relief. There are two methods in which a relief may beconducted: sequential relief — one element at a time; or simultaneous relief — allelements simultaneously. In both these methods, both outgoing and incomingcompanies operate on the outgoing company group net. The outgoing companygroup maintains routine traffic volume while the incoming unit monitors. Movement iscontrolled by guides. Emergencies are handled on the incoming company group net.When the relief is complete, the incoming unit continues to operate on the outgoingnet until the next scheduled change.

a. Sequential Relief. This is the most time consuming method. The relievingcompany moves to an assembly area to the rear of the company group to berelieved. Sequential relief may be designated in any order desired. The relieftakes place as follows:

(1) Collocate company group headquarters to facilitate the relief andtransfer of equipment, excess ammunition, fuel, water and medicalsupplies, etc.

(2) Move the first relieving platoon to the position of the first platoon tobe relieved.

(3) Relieve each vehicle and dismounted position one at a time.

(4) Move the outgoing sections and vehicles to their assembly areabehind the position.

(5) Once the first outgoing platoon clears its release point en route to itsassembly area, move the second platoon from the relieving unit forward tothe platoon it will replace.

(6) Battle handover normally occurs after two-thirds of the incomingcombat elements are in place.

(7) When the second outgoing platoon clears its release point,subsequent platoons move forward to relieve the rest of the outgoing unit.

(8) Complete the transfer of supplies between units.

b. Simultaneous Relief. This is the fastest but least secure method ofrelieving elements. The incoming unit may occupy the existing primary oralternate positions. The relief takes place like the sequential relief, except asfollows:

(1) All incoming platoons move along designated routes to the outgoingplatoon positions.

(2) All vehicles and dismount sections are relieved simultaneously.

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED4-26

(3) Battle handover occurs when two of the three incoming platoonsreport that they have completed the relief.

(4) Outgoing platoon elements immediately move to assembly areabehind their old positions.

(5) Relieved platoons immediately move to a company group assemblyarea.

(6) Relieving platoons occupy primary positions.

(7) Complete the transfer of supplies between units.

Forward/Rearward Passage of Lines

0472. A passage of lines occurs when one unit passes through another. Passagesmay be designated as rearward or forward. Patrols, security forces, attacking forcesand withdrawing forces normally conduct a passage through another force during theexecution of the operation. A passage of lines is dangerous because the concentrationof forces provides a lucrative target for attack by the enemy. The passage of friendlyforces under enemy pressure is especially dangerous because of difficulty indistinguishing friendly vehicles from enemy ones. Before issuing the order, conduct areconnaissance of the routes the platoon or company group will use for passage.During reconnaissance, meet the other unit commander involved in the passage topass critical information. If the passage is to be done at short notice and without thebenefit of coordination or reconnaissance by company group commanders, it cannormally be handled by the company 2ICs.

0473. Forward Passage of Lines. The incoming force will be organized so thatthe mission can be carried out after passage of lines. The outgoing force should adopta posture which will facilitate the passage and provide the maximum support.

0474. Rearward Passage of Lines. The outgoing force should be organized fordisengagement. The incoming force will be organized so that it can carry out itsmission as soon as it assumes this responsibility. For this purpose, a handover line willbe established, which will have some or all of the following characteristics:

a. It should be forward of the feature from which the enemy can first engagethe next defensive position with observed fire, and be situated so that crossingsand defiles used by the outgoing force can be protected.

b. It should be in an area which can be defended, at least temporarily.

c. It should be supported by good lateral routes to allow the use of alternativeentry points.

d. It should be easily identifiable on the ground.

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED 4-27

0475. Check-List. During reconnaissance and coordination, look for and confirmthe items shown in the following check-list. Take as many leaders as possible(especially the 2IC or the person responsible for final coordination of the passage)with you to help in this reconnaissance. The check-list includes the minimuminformation to exchange and actions to be coordinated for a passage of lines:

a. Designation of unit to pass.

b. Enemy situation (location, strength, recent activity).

c. Mission of passing unit and tentative battle plan.

d. Friendly situation and positions.

e. Time of passage.

f. Contact and coordination points.

g. Passage points and lanes.

h. Number and types of vehicles to pass.

i. Vehicle identification.

j. Long and short range recognition signals.

k. Patrol routes and observation locations.

l. Obstacles — types and locations.

m. Contaminated areas.

n. Battle handover line.

o. Fire support plan (direct and indirect).

p. Hide, harbour, leaguer and FUP locations.

q. Combat support and combat service support locations and assets.

r. Routes and priority on routes.

s. SOI/SOP information.

t. Communications information package — CEIs, SOCs, etc.

0476. Sequence. After coordination has been completed, the passage willnormally occur in the following order:

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED4-28

a. Passing unit moves to contact point to pick up guides from the passed unit.

b. Company group headquarters collocate.

c. Guides lead passing elements through the passage lane.

d. Guides leave the unit at the release point after the last friendly unit ispassed.

e. Passing unit deploys to execute its mission or moves to designated area.

0477. The Battle Handover. The battle handover may occur at different points intime and space depending on the situation and missions assigned to both units. In aforward passage of lines, the passing unit commander assumes control of the battlewhen his combat elements are through the passage point and deployed. Duringrearward passages, a battle handover report line is established within the direct fireand observation range of the stationary unit. The stationary unit assumes control atthe battle handover line allowing the passing company group to disengage andwithdraw.

0478. Combat Support. The role of combat support forces is as follows:

a. Artillery/Mortars. Regimental FDCs will try to site the incoming artilleryassets in such a place that no further redeployment is necessary, avoiding thoselocations that have already been used, or have been engaged by enemycounter battery. In a forward passage of lines, it would be unusual to redeploythe outgoing artillery as long as they can provide support from their presentpositions.

b. Air. Depending on the size of the operation, we would attempt to producelocal air superiority to reduce the vulnerability of the force during periods ofcongestion. For relief in place the company group, as part of a larger formationplan, may be provided with offensive air support.

c. Aviation. Commanders should consider the use of utility/LBH to save timein the deployment of liaison and reconnaissance parties.

d. Air Defence. The principal air defence challenge is the inevitable andunavoidable concentration of forces typical of relief operations which willincrease the vulnerability of the force. The battlegroup AD commander will haveto consider redeployment to cover critical areas during the timed operation.

e. Engineers. Whether conducting forward or rearward passage of lines, thein-place force has the responsibility to provide mobility for the passing unit alongagreed and cleared routes through its sector. Creating lanes through existingobstacles requires the permission of the force commander. Engineer tasks willinclude:

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED 4-29

(1) Relief in Place. Help with survivability and the takeover of theexisting barrier plan.

(2) Forward Passage of Lines. Opening and maintaining routes,including the crossing of any obstacles.

(3) Rearward Passage of Lines. The maintenance of routes andcounter mobility tasks, including the closure of routes and the destructionof crossing points to impede the enemy.

Combat Service Support

0479. During a relief operation, the stationary force should assist, wheneverpossible, with casualty evacuation, traffic control, vehicle recovery, fuel andammunition. The in-coming company group should arrive fully replenished, and maybe authorized to take over stock and material from the out-going force.

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED4-30

Chapter 5

OTHER OPERATIONAL TASKS

SECTION 1. — GENERAL

Introduction

0501. This chapter covers those opera-tions which are common to all operations ofwar and involve the company group eitheron a continuing basis in the case of securityand protection, or on a short term basis in thecase of fire planning and ambushes. A num-ber of the tasks described will requireinfantry skills at their most professionalwhile others are of a standard operating pro-cedures’ nature.

0502. The following tasks are described:

a. Patrolling.

b. Raids.

c. Ambushes.

d. Observation Posts.

e. Fire Planning

f. Protection and Security.

g. Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Defence.

0503 – 0504. Reserved.

SECTION 2. — PATROLLING

Introduction

0505. The aims of patrolling are threefold:

a. To obtain information.

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED 5-1

Contents

Page

SECTION 1. — GENERAL 5–1SECTION 2. — PATROLLING 5–1SECTION 3. — RAIDS 5–5SECTION 4. — AMBUSHES 5–7SECTION 5. — OBSERVATION POSTS (OPs) 5–21SECTION 6. — FIRE PLANNING 5–27SECTION 7. — BATTLEFIELD ILLUMINATION 5–30SECTION 8. — PROTECTION AND SECURITY 5–32SECTION 9. — NBC WARFARE (NUCLEAR,BIOLOGICAL AND CHEMICAL) 5–50Annex:A. Splinter Distance Chart for Fire Planning

b. To destroy or disrupt enemy forces.

c. To dominate the area of influence of defensive positions and the gapsbetween formations and units.

0506. In war, a commander cannot plan a successful operation without accurateand up to date information. Patrolling is one of the most reliable means of obtainingthis. Successful patrolling calls for good planning, a high standard of individual skills,good team work, efficient execution, and initiative and determination on the part ofthe commander. Thorough preparation is the basis of success.

0507. There is a misconception that patrolling is restricted to defensive operationsand that the skills are the preserve of the platoon level of command. This is not thecase and many of the skills of patrolling are directly transferable to the other opera-tions of war and patrol tactical skills will be required for company level operations,such as raids and infiltration manoeuvres.

Types of Patrol

0508. Terminology. All patrols will fall into one of the following three types:

a. Reconnaissance patrols.

b. Standing patrols.

c. Fighting patrols.

0509. Reconnaissance Patrols. A reconnaissance patrol is a small patrol usedto gain information by observation and stealth. Although composition will be the min-imum strength for the task the patrol will normally consist of a commander and threeto five men. The patrol avoids fighting except in self defence or to take advantage ofan unusual opportunity. Tasks include:

a. Collecting topographical information on features, routes and going.

b. Finding enemy positions.

c. Obtaining details of enemy positions, minefields and obstacles.

d. Obtaining information on enemy equipment, habits and movement.

e. Checking integrity of own minefields and obstacles.

f. Conducting radiac or chemical survey of suspected contaminated areas.

0510. Standing Patrols. Standing patrols are established to give warning ofenemy movements by watching likely approaches, covering dead ground in front of

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED5-2

and between defended localities and covering minefield and obstacles which cannotbe covered from main positions. The patrol is kept as small as possible but can beup to section strength. It must have communications and be able to call for indirectfire support.

0511. Fighting Patrols. A fighting patrol is tasked to harass, ambush, attack orto create a diversion. It is prepared and equipped to fight. The strength of the patrolis rarely less than two sections and a HQ. A platoon offers the ideal organization fora fighting patrol in terms of control, firepower and strength. The type of tasks whichfighting patrols may be given include:

a. Denying enemy patrols freedom of action.

b. Harassing or disrupting enemy working parties.

c. Diversion as part of a deception plan.

d. Ambushing — anti-armour and anti-personnel.

e. Protection for reconnaissance patrols, activity of other arms and OPs.

Coordination and Planning

0512. Responsibilities. The detailed organization of patrols will be the responsi-bility of an officer within battlegroup HQ known as the Patrol Master; this is usuallythe Operations Officer or OC Fire Support Company. He is responsible for: main-taining a patrol situation map showing exact locations of own troops, DFs, informa-tion from earlier patrols and patrol routes (future and historic); passing briefing mate-rial to the companies; drawing up accurate patrol task descriptions to avoid duplica-tion; adjusting routes and timings to avoid repetition and clashes; preparing and issu-ing the patrol timetable; and keeping the record of patrol reports. Patrols can bebriefed by the company commander, Patrol Master or, for a particularly importanttask, the commanding officer. At company level the Company 2IC is likely to beresponsible for patrol coordination and planning.

0513. Mission. The mission must be clearly defined and understood.

0514. Time for Planning. Patrols should be planned sufficiently far ahead toallow a full briefing of the patrol commander. Sufficient time must be allowed for thepatrol commander himself to carry out full battle procedure, study maps, air pho-tographs and intelligence reports, and carry out a reconnaissance. The time requiredfor this will depend on the task and whether the members of the patrol are familiarwith the ground. Although occasions will arise when patrols will have to be sent outat short notice, a minimum of four hours should be allowed for the planning andpreparation of the patrol. Thorough preparation, planning and rehearsals are essen-tial if patrols are to achieve their missions.

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED 5-3

0515. Sequence of Preparation. The sequence of action might be:

a. Warning order issued by battlegroup HQ. Patrol commander issues pre-liminary warning order.

b. Patrol briefing officer briefs the patrol commander.

c. Patrol commander makes a time appreciation.

d. Warning order by the patrol commander detailing task, organization, timeand place of RV or O Group, no move before time and administrative arrange-ments.

e. Selection of OPs from maps and air photographs. Plan reconnaissance.

f. Reconnaissance from OPs by patrol commander, where time and situationpermits.

g. Estimate and plan.

h. Preparation of orders by patrol commander.

i. Preparation of model by patrol 2IC.

j. Preparation and inspection of weapons, equipment and radio, includingtest firing if situation permits.

k. Patrol commander meets the patrol and points out the ground from OP.Map, model or air photographs are used if OP not available.

l. Orders.

m. Inspection prior to rehearsals.

n. Noisy daylight rehearsals.

o. Rest and meals, preparation continued.

p. Silent night rehearsals.

q. Final check on weapons and equipment by patrol commander.

r. Patrol action.

s. Patrol commander debriefs patrol.

t. Patrol commander debriefed and patrol report made out.

u. Hot drink and meal.

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED5-4

0516. The debriefing of the patrol commander and the compilation of the patrolreport must be done as soon as the patrol returns and before administration takesplace. The debriefing should ideally be carried out by the same officer who briefedthe patrol. The whole patrol may attend the debrief or just the patrol commander. Inthe latter case the patrol commander should debrief his patrol thoroughly before hisown debrief.

0517 – 0518. Reserved.

SECTION 3. — RAIDS

0519. Introduction. A raid is a surprise attack mounted for a specific purposeother than seizing ground. It is conducted to destroy a position or installation, todestroy or capture enemy soldiers or equipment, or to free friendly prisoners. It couldalso be used to distract the enemy as part of a deception plan. The key characteris-tics are: surprise, coordination, firepower and violence. Successful execution willrequire tactical skills of the highest order. It is in essence a fighting patrol conductedat company group level.

0520. Planning Considerations. As raids are normally deep operations con-ducted in enemy-held territory the requirement for surprise is paramount. Detailedintelligence of the target will be essential and the methods and routes to be used forinfiltration and extraction will be critically important. A number of the planning con-siderations are likely to be the responsibility of higher headquarters, in particular: tim-ing, method of insertion and extraction, coordination and combat support. The fol-lowing planning considerations are key to the success of the operation:

a. Maximum Use of Intelligence. Provision of high grade intelligence will beof vital importance. Commanders must press for continual updates during everystage of the raid.

b. Reverse Planning. As the operation will probably be airmobile thereverse planning sequence should be used. The raid has four phases:

(1) Phase 1 — insertion or infiltration. The raid is likely to be launchedat an unexpected time and place, using cover of darkness or poor visibil-ity and using routes the enemy may consider impassable.

(2) Phase 2 — movement to assault positions and seal off objectivearea to prevent enemy interference.

(3) Phase 3 — enemy on objective overcome making maximum use ofsurprise and the shock effect of firepower. All available fire support shouldbe employed including attack helicopters, MLRS and close air support.The objective is then assaulted and the mission’s aim accomplished.

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED 5-5

(4) Phase 4 — rapid disengagement followed by withdrawal and extrac-tion or exfiltration.

0521. Company Organization. There are four organizational elements at com-pany level: command group and security, support and assault elements:

a. Command Group. The command group controls movement and actionsat the objective. It will consist of the company group commander, signallers andcombat support LOs.

b. Security Element. The size of the security element will be determined bythe mission, size and type of enemy including his mobility and state of alert,ground and avenues of approach and the time needed to insert the seals. Thetasks of the security element may be:

(1) Secure the FUP and assault position.

(2) Early warning of enemy movement.

(3) Block avenues of approach.

(4) Cut-off.

(5) Overwatch for the assault element and suppressive fire to cover thewithdrawal.

c. Support Element. The support element provides the firepower needed toneutralize the objective; close control will be required for this heavy weight offire. On order or as planned the support element will shift targets to fix alternateenemy positions to allow the assault force to strike. The support element mayalso be given specific locations to cover by fire in support of the security ele-ment, such as routes into the objective, key terrain and other installations.Organizations of the support element will be determined by:

(1) Size and type of objective including the geography of the surround-ing area.

(2) The threat.

(3) Mission.

(4) Fire support available from combat support assets.

d. Assault Element. The assault element seizes and secures the objectiveand provides close protection for any specialist teams such as demolition par-ties. The organization of the element will be determined by the mission. Theelement could include FACs, FOOs and other combat support specialists.

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED5-6

Conduct

0522. Preparation. At company level full scale rehearsals under the most realis-tic conditions possible will be essential and very high levels of individual night move-ment skills and navigation will be fundamental to success.

0523. Phase 1. — Insertion. Following insertion the company will occupy anFUP. From here confirmatory reconnaissance can be mounted and the plan con-firmed. Following any adjustments to the plan the elements move to their task loca-tions.

0524. Phase 2. — Movement to Assault Positions and Sealing of Objective.Security elements seal the objective and keep all elements updated on enemy action.The support element moves into position while the assault element deploys closeenough to allow immediate assault if the operation is detected.

0525. Phase 3. — Assault. The assault will be triggered by the support ele-ment’s suppressive fire. As supporting fire lifts to secondary targets the assault ele-ment attacks and secures its objective. The security element prevents enemy inter-ference.

0526. Phase 4. — Withdrawal. The raid will be progressively withdrawn to pro-vide maximum protection from enemy interference. On order the assault elementwithdraws to the FUP covered by the support element. The support element will thenwithdraw followed finally by the security element. Minimum time should be spent inthe FUP where, under the cover of its own local security, the force will swiftly takestock and reorganize as required. As soon as possible the force will exfiltrate or moveto an HLS.

0527 – 0528. Reserved.

SECTION 4. — AMBUSHES

General

0529. An ambush is a surprise attack, by a force lying in wait, upon a moving ortemporary halted enemy. It is usually a brief encounter and does not require the cap-ture and holding of ground. The attack from ambush is normally at short range of lessthan 100 metres. Ambushes may be used in front of, or behind the FEBA, againstboth regular and insurgent forces. A series of successful ambushes will make theenemy apprehensive and cautious in movement. Ambushing is often considered tobe a counterinsurgency operation with little application to conventional war. This isincorrect. The enemy encountered in conventional war is just as vulnerable to a wellsited ambush as a guerilla soldier. Ambushing requires the highest standards of field-craft and training; since the majority of ambushes are never sprung, determined lead-

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED 5-7

ership at all levels is required to maintain these standards for long periods, ready totake advantage of opportunities which may only last for seconds.

Ambush Sites

0530. Suitable places for ambush include:

a. Known enemy routes in forward and rear areas.

b. Administrative areas, supply and water points. In counterinsurgency oper-ations, the approaches to a village or cultivated area and known or suspectedfood dumps or arms caches are particularly suitable.

c. Areas where a marked change of vegetation occurs, such as the junctionof forest and grassland.

d. Probable lines of enemy withdrawal after a successful attack by our forces.

e. The approaches to our own base camps, and defensive positions.

f. The withdrawal route from an ambush site to catch an enemy follow-up.

Categories of Ambush

0531. There are two categories of ambush: Deliberate and Immediate. Bothambush types may be further sub-divided into basic or area ambushes, and be shortor long term.

0532. The Deliberate Ambush. A deliberate ambush is one planned and exe-cuted as a separate operation. There should be time to allow planning, preparationand rehearsal in great detail. It may vary in size from a small section ambush to amajor operation using a whole battalion although success with large scale ambush-es may be more difficult to achieve. At company level the deliberate ambush willeither be a large scale area ambush involving each of the three rifle platoons with itsown ambush area or a prolonged ambush where the platoons successively conducta relief in place of a single platoon ambush area. Security and concealment of thislatter form of ambush will be very hard to achieve and it is more likely that small scaleambushes up to platoon strength will be mounted. The smaller the force the easier itwill be to move it into the ambush area, to control the operation and to withdraw itafter the battle.

0533. The Immediate Ambush. An immediate ambush is unlikely at companylevel and is one set with a minimum of planning either to take advantage of ‘hot’ infor-mation or as a contact drill by a patrol. Little or no time will be available for recon-naissance and the amount of success achieved will depend on the initiative of thecommander concerned, rehearsed and well known drills and the general ability anddiscipline of the force.

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED5-8

0534. The detailed tactics of ambushing are beyond the scope of Pamphlet 2 andwill therefore be described in Pamphlet 3. — Infantry Platoon Tactics. The followingparagraphs will concentrate on the principles and planning of ambushes.

Principles

0535. Sound Intelligence. Ambushes should not be set on chance or just tokeep soldiers occupied, but based on sound intelligence. Information will come from:

a. Patrol reports and OP logs.

b. A knowledge of the area and therefore an appreciation of likely enemymovement.

c. Surveillance devices.

d. Military intelligence sources.

e. Police Special Branch (counterinsurgency operations).

0536. Planning, Reconnaissance and Rehearsal.

a. Study the enemy so that his tactics and counter-ambush techniques canbe used to the ambusher’s advantage.

b. Plan the reconnaissance and make it detailed and thorough.

c. Ensure that all the ambush party know exactly what to do. Do not plan sev-eral variations.

d. Rehearse all possible actions by day and, if applicable, by night. A with-drawal to avoid enemy counter-ambush drills could prove disastrous if it hasnot been rehearsed.

0537. Security.

a. Too much reconnaissance and movement in the ambush area could giveaway the position. The enemy has the choice of:

(1) Avoiding the area.

(2) Booby trapping the area.

(3) Ambushing our forces as they move in.

b. Move out of the main base camp or position by night and be clear of civil-ian areas by dawn.

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED 5-9

c. Plan for an enemy follow-up after the ambush has been sprung. Protect theroute back to the base camp or main position.

d. Do not reoccupy old ambush sites.

0538. Concealment.

a. Do not leave tracks in the ambush area, especially on likely enemyapproaches and in the killing area.

b. Cutting foliage to obtain good fields of fire could help the enemy to spot theambush.

c. Ensure that personal camouflage is of the highest standard.

d. Smoking and cooking will be forbidden.

0539. Good Control.

a. All members of the ambush must know the plan in detail and the exactlocation of all groups.

b. Have clear signals for “Open fire”, “Cease fire”, “Search” and “Withdraw”.Keep the system simple otherwise confusion will arise.

c. Control can easily be lost if the enemy proves to be too strong for theambush. Ensure that all members of the ambush know:

(1) The location of the FRV and company RV.

(2) The withdrawal routes from their positions to the FRV and companyRV.

(3) The order in which groups withdraw to the FRV and company RV.

(4) Action in the FRV and company RV.

0540. Maximum Use of Fire Power.

a. Where possible site LSWs so as to make the best use of their flat trajectoryand long beaten zone. The automatic capability of the rifle makes it an excel-lent ambush weapon but fire discipline will have to be maintained to conserveammunition.

b. On springing, fire must be instantaneous to provide maximum shock effect.

c. Make best use of remotely fired devices, i.e., Claymore mines and impro-vised explosive devices (IEDs).

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED5-10

0541. Battle Discipline.

a. There must be no noise and the minimum of movement in the ambush.

b. All must be prepared to stop smoking, coughing and to live on cold rationsfor the operation. This can be for hours or even days.

c. A high standard of alertness must be maintained. Only men nominated bythe commander can relax.

d. Reaction to signals must be fast.

e. All in the ambush must clearly understand the drills to hold their fire and toshoot to kill.

f. Weapons must be ready to fire at a moment’s notice.

0542. The secret of success is fast coordinated action against a surprised enemyheld within a well covered killing area.

0543. Use of Indirect Fire.

a. Use artillery and mortars to:

(1) Hit the enemy outside the killing area.

(2) Disrupt the enemy counterattack.

(3) Harass the enemy flight.

(4) Assist the ambush party to withdraw.

b. However, before planning the use of indirect fire, the following factorsshould be considered:

(1) As an area weapon system, accurate fire cannot be guaranteedunless adjusted — this may compromise the security of the ambush.

(2) Adjustment of indirect fire in close country is very difficult and is aslow cumbersome procedure.

(3) Operational safety rule for the adjustment of mortar fire states thatat least 700 metres should lie between the target area and any friendlyforces.

c. In some situations, indirect fire assets may be tasked to fire ‘harassing’ firemissions on the ambush area after the withdrawal or on routes into the ambushsite once the ambush has been sprung.

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED 5-11

d. The use of indirect fire in conjunction with a control measure such as a ‘clearof’ line in order to prevent or slow an enemy follow up may be considered.

e. Advice from specialists such as MFCs/FOOs should always be sought.

Planning

0544. The ambush commander will be given the aim of a deliberate ambush. Hemay be told or decide himself the strength, general location and duration of theambush.

0545. The strength of an ambush must be kept to the minimum required to achievethe aim. A prolonged ambush will need reliefs and will raise the overall size of theambush force but not the strength of the ambush party. An increase in automaticweapons or an intelligent use of other killing devices, e.g., Claymore mines, mightallow a reduction in strength of the ambush party.

0546. The amount of planning which an ambush commander can carry out beforeleaving his base will depend upon the availability of information, his knowledge of theground and whether he has been able to carry out a preliminary reconnaissance. Hisplanning will not be complete until he has carried out a detailed final reconnaissance.It is quite possible that this final reconnaissance will be the only one that the ambushcommander will be able to undertake for security reasons.

Planning Factors

0547. There are many factors to be considered when planning an ambush. All ofthem are directly related to the principles of ambushing.

0548. The Mission. Normally will be:

“To destroy enemy by ambush at Grid 123456 in order to .......... ”

0549. The Enemy. The following information must be known:

a. Habits, organization, state of training, uniforms and arms.

b. The aim of patrols, their size, individual and group spacing, their routes.

c. Tactics and counter ambush action.

d. Artillery or mortar support, including response time and efficiency.

0550. Friendly Forces.

a. Area clearance (area out of bounds to other patrols).

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED5-12

b. Location of other patrols.

c. Location of back-up forces to reinforce or to assist withdrawal. Thisincludes transport if required.

d. Location of own bases.

e. Location of own artillery and mortars and their available fire support.

0551. Surprise and Security.

a. Obey the principles of security and concealment.

b. Select a site where the enemy is unlikely to deploy forward or flankingscouts in advance of his main body.

c. Vary ambush patterns and methods.

d. Use a deception plan to cover the move of an ambush force from its basecamp.

e. Assume that civilians are hostile and plan for civilians walking into or spot-ting the ambush.

0552. Fire Support. Consider the use of other available weapons:

a. 51 mm mortar.

b. GPMG in the light or SF role.

c. LAW.

d. Mines (Claymore and Elsie).

0553. Ground. It may be possible to select a site by careful study of maps, airphotographs, remotely piloted vehicle (RPVs), and recent patrol reports. Detailedreconnaissance is essential to select:

a. An FRV and company RV (if needed).

b. A covered route into the ambush site.

c. Enemy approach routes.

d. The killing area.

e. Positions for sentries/OPs.

f. Cover from view in the ambush area and fields of fire.

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED 5-13

g. Positions for all groups and anti-tank weapons.

h. Positions for all Claymores and their direction of fire.

i. Positions for all trip flares and other illuminants.

j. Suitable base area if ambush is to be long term.

k. Withdrawal routes, check points, ERVs and emergency HLS.

l. Enemy escape and counterattack routes.

0554. Obstacles. Maximum use should be made of both natural and artificialobstacles to channel the enemy, to hinder his counterattack and to delay his flight.These obstacles may include natural features, Claymore or anti-personnel mines,grenade necklaces, barbed wire or any other device. Suitable places for obstaclesand Claymore mines are:

a. On likely enemy lines of withdrawal.

b. In dead ground beyond the killing area and to the flanks of the ambushsite.

c. In areas outside the killing area where the enemy main body is likely to haltand form up for a counterattack.

d. On likely enemy counterattack routes.

0555. Control and Signals. Good control is essential and the larger the ambush,the harder it is to achieve. The following must be planned and all members of theambush force briefed in detail, bearing in mind that there is a limit to the amount ofdetail that can be absorbed and remembered. The signals and the method of send-ing them should be standard within a company, so that men can learn them by heart:

a. The detailed deployment into the ambush position.

b. The signal for ‘ambush set’.

c. The method of relieving platoons, groups and sections of the ambush.

d. The method of alerting the ambush party on the approach of the enemyforce.

e. The signal for opening fire.

f. The signal for cease fire.

g. The signal for the search (if situation allows).

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED5-14

h. The signal for withdrawal.

i. The methods of withdrawal to the FRV:

(1) In face of an enemy attack.

(2) When the enemy has withdrawn, leaving dead and wounded behind.

(3) When the ambush has not been sprung.

j. The plan if the ambush is detected or compromised.

0556. Equipment. The equipment required depends on the task and duration ofthe ambush. Special items which might be needed include:

a. Mines, booby traps and explosives.

b. RGS (Classic), CWS, Spyglass and GPPNVG.

c. Wire and defence stores.

d. Flares and means of igniting them.

e. Nylon cord for communications cord and prisoners.

f. Battery operated ambush lights.

0557. Grouping. An ambush is made up of a number of groups. The size of thesegroups will vary but each group must be self contained and have a nominated com-mander. If a preliminary reconnaissance has not been possible a broad allocation ofgroups can be made during the preliminary orders. The final deployment will then beconfirmed after the final reconnaissance when the ambush force reaches its area.

Communications

0558. The organization of communications within an ambush area so that mes-sages and orders can be passed easily, and yet do not betray the position, poses adifficult problem. Communications are required:

a. From the ambush commander to all his groups.

b. From the ambush commander to his ambush base.

c. From the FOO or MFC to the guns or mortars.

d. From the ambush commander to company HQ.

e. Within groups.

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED 5-15

0559. A large ambush will need good radio communications and possibly line. Asmall ambush will depend on hand signals, hand taps and cord for all communica-tions within the ambush. Electrical systems such as light bulbs and buzzers havebeen used successfully but these are not simple as they necessitate a code of flashesand buzzes, and are susceptible to the effects of humidity and climatic variations.

Layout of an Ambush

0560. In laying out an ambush (see Fig 18) there are three basic principles toobserve:

a. All possible approaches must be covered. Information may often give thedestination of the enemy but will seldom give the exact route he will take. Nomatter how good the information, the enemy may arrive from an unexpecteddirection. This has caused many ambushes to fail in the past.

b. The ambush must have depth. The type of depth will vary with the enemytactics:

(1) If the enemy usually scatters and flees at the first burst of fire, thechances of getting a second burst from the same position are small. Inthis case the depth is outwards to cover escape routes and to get anothershot at the enemy.

(2) If the enemy counterattacks then this type of depth will make controldifficult and could result in the loss of stop groups. In this case the depthmust be to the rear and flanks of the killing group to cover the ambushparty’s withdrawal and to block the enemy counterattack.

c. The ambush must have all-round defence. No matter the type of enemy orthe type of ambush, all ambushes and if possible each group, within anambush, must be sited with all-round defence. The main fire power is neededto kill the enemy in the killing area and to guard against enemy counter-ambushmoves.

0561. An ambush is normally set on one side of the killing area only, so that con-trol is easier. However, some of the enemy may escape on the opposite side. To pre-vent this stops may be placed in dead ground, or mines, wire and booby traps laidon the opposite side of the killing area.

Action After Springing the Ambush

0562. The action after springing the ambush must be planned in great detail as itis at this stage that control can be lost. It is governed by:

a. The nature of the task.

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED5-16

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED 5-17

Fig. 18 — Layout of a Company Deliberate Area Ambush

����������

������

����

���������

�

����������

���������������� �

������

�

������ �

��������

��������

��������

������������

������

�

�������

��������

����� �! �����

��

b. The anticipated enemy strength and his likely reaction.

c. The ground.

The Withdrawal

0563. The route and method of withdrawal will have a bearing on the selection ofthe ambush site and frequently on the detailed layout. Detailed plans for the with-drawal must be made. This will involve specifying the movement of all groups. Whenan ambush is sprung and it is quite obvious that the aim of the ambush cannot befully achieved, the ambush commander must make full use of the surprise and con-fusion amongst the enemy to inflict the maximum number of casualties and at thesame time to achieve a clean break. Small parties may be left behind to cover thewithdrawal and to ambush any enemy follow up or relief force. Withdrawal plans mustcover the following circumstances:

a. Searching the dead after a successful ambush (if searching is ordered).

b. When no enemy enter the ambush area and the ambush is not sprung.

c. When a superior enemy force either approaches the ambush site or isambushed and counterattacks.

d. Withdrawing with a number of casualties hampering the speed and silenceof your movement.

Administration

0564. Some ambushes are sprung within a few hours of setting and require no spe-cial administration other than arrangements for rest within groups. These are calledshort term ambushes. Where ambushes are set for more than 12 hours they becomelong term ambushes and administrative arrangements for relief of groups, for feed-ing and for sleeping are necessary. Such an ambush may be placed on a knownenemy supply or patrol route. Long term ambushes require good self discipline andtraining in lying still for very long periods.

0565. In long term ambushes an ambush base should be set up. This is exactly thesame as a normal patrol base and must follow the same principles. It should be sitedfar enough from the ambush position to avoid noises and smells disclosing the pres-ence of troops. This distance may vary from 200 metres in jungle to 500 metres inopen country. It may well be possible to use the ambush base as the RV or as adepth position to which groups can withdraw if the enemy counterattacks. Thereforethe base must have a permanent commander and may well have fire trenches pre-pared and Claymore mines sited to block likely enemy attack routes.

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED5-18

0566. Routes from the base to the ambush site will have to be cleared to avoidgroups missing the way and to enable reliefs to be carried out silently. Although thewhole party in the ambush will eventually be relieved, only one fire position shouldbe changed at a time in case the enemy approaches during this period. The reliefsshould take place when no enemy movement is expected. The system of relief mustbe rehearsed and all groups must know the time of relief of their own group and offlanking groups. It is advisable for each group to have a length of cord from the groupcommander running 10 to 15 metres back along the route to the base so that theincoming reliefs can signal their approach. Normal relief should not be attempted atnight when all movement is considered to be hostile.

0567. Ideally a long term ambush should be divided into three parties; one in theambush position; one as a reserve or cover party and one resting in the base. Onrelief the party resting in the base takes over the ambush position, the party in theposition becomes the reserve and the reserve party moves to the rest area. This sys-tem provides:

a. A well rested party for the ambush site.

b. A tired party for the cover party and reserve. This is acceptable as thereserve is unlikely to be involved in springing the ambush and half can be rest-ing at a time.

c. A base party which can relax, except for sentries, and who can provide adefended RV to assist withdrawal.

0568. With an under strength platoon, if it has to be divided into three parties, eachparty may be too weak to do its task properly. In this case there should be two par-ties, one half of the platoon providing the killing and cut off groups, the other half rest-ing in the ambush base with a number of men on stand by as reserve. This secondsystem has the advantage of being simpler to plan and easier to operate than thethree party system of relief.

0569. Because of security it may be impossible to cook or smoke in the ambushbase. Ambush commanders must plan their rations carefully so that the food takenon the operation is both sustaining and palatable when eaten cold. It may be neces-sary to ensure that no one attempts to take hexamine or cigarettes with them.Hygiene will be of major importance and steps must be taken to ensure that sanita-tion is at a high level.

0570. The ambush commander must plan for the evacuation of casualties. Thiscan cause difficulty out of all proportion to the casualties received and action willdepend on:

a. The remaining active strength of the force.

b. The nature of the casualty.

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED 5-19

c. The distance to the nearest friendly location.

d. Suitable helicopter LS.

e. Enemy reaction.

f. Time of day.

g. Weather.

0571. Arrangements should be made for improvised stretchers and a well equippedmedical bag to be carried and possibly a medical orderly to be included in the party.

Alternative Plans

0572. Alternative plans should be avoided if possible, unless the alternative plan tobe adopted in particular circumstances is simple and obvious to all. The ambushcommander must devise a fool proof method of informing everybody of a change ofplan.

0573. If the enemy surprises the ambush by appearing from an unexpected directionor in unexpected strength, the ambush commander must decide whether to lie low andwithdraw secretly, or to open fire and rely on surprise and confusion amongst theenemy to make good his withdrawal. In either case he will often find it worthwhile to setanother ambush on his withdrawal route to delay the enemy follow-up.

Night or Day Ambushes

0574. The decision to set a day or night ambush will depend on:

a. The terrain, the cover from view and the fields of fire.

b. The pattern of enemy movement.

0575. A high proportion of night ambushes will be set in desert or cultivated coun-try where cover is limited and where enemy movement will take place at night. Dayambushes will be set in dense country which gives good cover to enemy day move-ment and to an ambush force.

0576. Night ambushes have similar characteristics to day ambushes. Particularpoints which apply to night ambushes are:

a. Concealment is easy but shooting is much less accurate.

b. Automatic weapons will produce a better volume of fire than single shotweapons, but single shot fire is more accurate.

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED5-20

c. All weapons, particularly LSWs firing down tracks, must have the left andright of their arcs of fire fixed by sticks in the ground.

d. Once the signal for ‘ambush set’ has been given the ambush party mustnever move about. All movement will be regarded as enemy.

e. Clear orders, precise fire control instructions and good signals are essential.

f. Men and groups will be sited closer together than by day. Control at nightis all important.

g. It is more difficult to take up an ambush position at night. Where possible,it should be occupied before last light. However, there will be times when tomove in by daylight could compromise the ambush:

(1) When ambushing near a village or cultivated area.

(2) When ambushing in very open country. Therefore, platoons must berehearsed in the occupation of an ambush position by night as part oftheir ambush training.

h. Illumination may be needed.

0577. A long term ambush may be occupied by night and not by day or vice-versa,or it may be occupied by day and night. This may pose additional problems as thenight position may be too exposed for use by day. This would require an alternativeday position, with the risk of the enemy spotting traces of the night position as theyenter the killing area.

0578 – 0579. Reserved.

SECTION 5. — OBSERVATION POSTS (OPs)

General

0580. Commanders at all levels need the maximum possible information about thestrengths, movements, positions and intentions of the enemy. In defence, and in cer-tain IS situations, a very effective way of obtaining information is by the use of OPs.The OP plan will be produced at battlegroup level as part of the STAP. The STAP, inturn, will be driven by the IPB.

0581. Under present organizations, OP work at battlegroup level is dividedbetween the reconnaissance platoon and the rifle companies. FOO and MFC partiesalso provide OPs for fire control purposes, though all OPs must be capable of direct-ing fire.

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED 5-21

Selection

0582. The following factors must be considered when choosing an OP position:

a. Observation. It must give observation over the area required by theSTAP.

b. Arc and Field View. It should cover as wide an arc as possible, andshould have as little dead ground as possible.

c. Approach and Exit. These should both be in cover. This is especiallyimportant in the case of an OP operating from a firm base.

d. Cover. Cover from fire and view is necessary. Digging in will almost cer-tainly be necessary. The position chosen should not be an obvious OP site.

e. Communications. Radio must be able to work from the chosen position.Line should be laid if this is practicable. Minimum radio should be used, to avoidenemy DF.

f. Alternatives. These should be selected in case a move becomes necessary.

g. Manpower Required. To be balanced against the need for concealment.

Composition

0583. A section OP task of some duration dictates the division of the section intotwo groups; one group will be on duty in the OP, the other resting in the rear basearea. The two groups will alternate between duty in the OP and rear base area asdictated by the requirements of the observer, vulnerability of the move between OPand rest areas, severity of the weather and duration of the OP. The changeover mustbe slightly staggered to maintain continuity in the observer’s position.

Battle Procedure

0584. General. There are six phases in the procedure:

a. Planning and Preparation.

b. Route Out.

c. Action in FRV (Initial Reconnaissance).

d. Occupation.

e. Routine.

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED5-22

f. Withdrawal to FRV.

0585. Planning and Preparation. The preparation sequence is the same as fora patrol and is organized as follows:

a. Warning order is issued. Men are selected, kit is assembled and packed.

b. The OP commander receives orders.

c. The OP commander makes his estimate and plan. Quite often the OP willhave to be selected off the map.

d. The OP commander prepares his orders which will closely follow patrolorders.

e. The OP commander issues orders.

f. Rehearsals and preparation.

g. In certain circumstances it may be necessary to send out a fighting patrol toprovide security to enable the OP to be established. The actions which areexplained in the remainder of this section assume that such a patrol is provided.

0586. Route Out. The whole party must move as a properly constituted patrol. Itmust be organized for defence on arrival.

0587. Action in FRV (Initial Reconnaissance). The OP commander, 2IC, rifle-man and radio operator move to the chosen OP area where they do the following:

a. Clear the immediate area and check for the presence of the enemy in thegeneral area.

b. Place rifleman and radio operator in position.

c. Select exact OP position (this may be impossible during the hours of dark-ness).

d. Communications check to control from OP position.

e. Commander and 2IC return to the main body.

f. Final briefing by OP commander.

g. Main body moves to OP position.

0588. Occupation.

a. On arrival the sentries are checked and the ground cleared again.

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED 5-23

b. Group A moves to the OP position and Group B to the selected rear base(at approximately 50–150 metres distance from the OP depending on avail-ability of cover). It is important that the base is able to provide fire support tothe OP in emergency.

c. The groups are orientated (if applicable).

d. The protection party deploys.

e. Control is informed of the exact grid reference. (The exact location mayhave to be confirmed at day break.)

f. Digging starts. Range cards and panoramas are begun.

g. The OP is completed and checked by the commander.

h. The OP is manned and reports that it is operational. Panoramas and rangecards are completed, enemy positions are identified and recorded.

0589. Routine. Routine work is started as soon as occupation is complete.

a. Observation.

b. Duties Within the OP.

(1) Two men should be on watch at any one time, alternating sentryduty every 20 minutes. Change over of OP teams should be staggered.

(2) The sentry is required to watch the local area of the OP.

(3) Radio silence should be maintained and a listening watch kept.Routine reports will be sent at pre-arranged times (every four hours ormore depending on the situation).

(4) Special reports can be sent back at any time.

c. Administrative Arrangements. All administration must be carried out inthe rear base area. If the OP is manned for a long period the arrangements willinclude:

(1) Food and Water. Pre-heated food may be supplied, or smokelessfuels may be used if cooking smells are acceptable. The security of the OPmust not be compromised for the sake of eating and drinking hot food.

(2) Hygiene. Sanitation arrangements must be made, in the hide itselfif necessary. Sealable plastic bags are useful.

(3) Clothing and Bedding. Parkas may be taken. Only enough sleep-ing bags to operate a ‘hot bunk’ system need be carried.

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED5-24

(4) Spares. Spare batteries (radio, CWS, etc.) and radio ancillariesmust be taken.

(5) Kit and Equipment. Kit will be carried to the OP position mostly inrucksacks. Anything not in use must be packed away, and the OP partymust always be able to move instantly. Loose items in use by the observer/sentry should be placed on a groundsheet/poncho, ready to be bundledup and carried off.

(6) NBC Clothing and Equipment. Must be taken where appropriate.

(7) Digging Tools

d. Relief Procedure. Two men should be awake and in the OP itself at anyone time. Relief should be staggered so that, as with double sentries, oneobserver is always fully ‘read in’ to the situation while a relief is taking place. Toalleviate fatigue the two groups (OP and rear base) should change over at leastevery 12 hours.

0590. Withdrawal. Considered in three ways:

a. Ordered or Preplanned. By time expiry or radio message. Care must betaken to recover all equipment and re-camouflage the position.

b. Compromised. Dependent on situation a quick SITREP should be sent,all equipment recovered and if possible an alternative location occupied to con-tinue the mission.

c. Contact. Dependent on situation an initial contact report. Op log, radiosand observation devices must be taken. Groups should use F & M, indirect firesupport, Claymore mines, etc., to withdraw and break contact.

Selection for OP Work

0591. All soldiers will be liable for OP work. Ideally, however, the sort of man chosenshould be:

a. Intelligent and with common sense.

b. Able to work in a small group.

c. Trained in observation and recognition.

d. Fit and well.

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED 5-25

Training

0592. The following subjects in particular need to be covered in training for OPwork:

a. Contact Reports and SITREPS. These must not just be left to the OPcommander, who may be resting at the crucial moment.

b. Recognition. (e.g., AFV or terrorist) Specific to theatre.

c. Map Reading. An observer must be able to give accurate six figure ref-erences.

d. Artillery Target Indication. The commander must be trained and ideallyall members should be.

e. Camouflage and Concealment.

f. Observation Technique. Correct use of binoculars and observing intoshadow.

g. Memory Training. To notice the suspicious, one must be able to comparethe present with the past.

h. Panorama Sketching. This is a useful skill which will lead to betterdebriefs.

i. Range Cards and Distance Judging. Mark six figure references of promi-nent objects and artillery/mortar target numbers on range cards.

0593. Equipment. Some or all of the following items should be taken. The list isnot exhaustive.

a. Personal weapons (including LSW).

b. Optics of all types, including II and TI devices.

c. Prismatic Compass.

d. Log and code sheets.

e. Map and air photographs.

f. Food and water.

g. Radio equipment. Spare radio, batteries and ancillaries.

h. Medical equipment.

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED5-26

i. Warm clothing, camouflage nets, face veils.

j. Rubbish sacks.

k. Sleeping bags for half the patrol.

0594. Laser Threat. Commanders need to be aware of the threat posed by thepotential use by an enemy of lasers, either to damage or dazzle the operator and hisoptics or to locate weapon sights by the technique of retro-reflection. Although retro-reflection will detect current optical sights (including SUSAT) it is of most significanceto armoured vehicles, MILAN firing posts, optical reconnaissance devices, snipersand MFCs. Infantry TD Note 5 covers the topic in more detail. Until technologicaldevelopments are introduced to counter the threat, commanders should:

a. Educate their subordinates to the threat so that they are able to operate ina laser environment and are not unnerved by exposure to the unknown.

b. Understand the symptoms of laser damage to both the human eye andoptics and ensure that incidents are reported swiftly.

c. Balance battlefield observation requirements against a known enemy retro-reflection or laser damage threat. Assess risk of being located against risk ofinadequate surveillance.

d. Good use of ground (e.g., defilade positions), camouflage and concealmentwill not only minimize exposure to conventional weapons but also markedlyreduce the laser threat.

e. Where there is a laser threat, troops using optical systems should useexisting protection measures (e.g., laser goggles). Unnecessary lookingtowards enemy positions, particularly through magnifying optics, should beavoided.

0595 – 0596. Reserved.

SECTION 6. — FIRE PLANNING

General

0597. There are two types of fire plan: offensive and defensive.

0598. Offensive.

a. Offensive fire plans are divided up as follows:

(1) Manoeuvre Fire Plans. Manoeuvre fire plans are normally in sup-port of a company group or battlegroup. They can vary from a simple on

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED 5-27

call fire plan involving the mortar platoon to a fully scheduled plan involv-ing two or more artillery groups, close air support, naval gunfire support,attack helicopters and offensive EW.

(2) Deliberate Fire Plans. Deliberate fire plans are originated atbrigade level and above to support battlegroup attacks, often by isolatingobjectives.

(3) Advance Fire Plans. Advance fire plans originate at brigade ordivisional level and disseminate down to battlegroups where the BC willcoordinate the battlegroup’s selection of DFs on its axis.

b. Offensive fire plans will make use of the following types of fire:

(1) Preparation Fire. Preparation fire is used to fix the enemy beforean attack, to shock the enemy and force him to take cover. Ammunitionconstraints will limit the amount of preparation fire available to a compa-ny group. Close air support is best used as preparation fire as its arrivaltime cannot be guaranteed.

(2) Covering Fire. Covering fire is used to cover assaulting troops dur-ing the approach phase of the attack. It will be used up until the chosenlast safe moment.

0599. Defensive. Defensive fire plans consist of a series of ‘on call’ targets onlikely enemy approach routes or FUPs. There are two defensive fire tasks that maybe used in a company group level defensive fire plan:

a. Close DF. Close DF aims to engage the enemy as soon as he is spottedand to cause continual attrition in combination with direct fire weapons. A com-pany group will normally have three or four close DFs for its position, one ofwhich may be the battlegroup FPF.

b. Priority DF. The Priority DF is the DF which covers the most likely enemyapproach to the position and is selected by the manoeuvre commander. It is thepoint where the enemy is expected to be first detected by day or night.

Fire Planning Responsibilities

05100. Reception. On arrival at the HQ coordination will need to take placebetween the FOO/MFC and the supported company group. The aim of this coordi-nation is to integrate the FOO/MFC into the company group as rapidly as possible.The following information will be required:

a. From FOO/MFC.

(1) SITREP.

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED5-28

(2) Vehicle and equipment (MSTAR, OTIS, etc.) types and serviceability.

(3) Nominal roll (including ZAP numbers).

b. To FOO/MFC.

(1) Full briefing to include Situation, Mission, Concept of Ops (includinghigher intent and main effort), local defence, STAP, CSCM, administrationand C2.

(2) Indirect fire assets with which to liaise.

(3) Names of key company group personnel.

(4) CSS replenishment procedures.

(5) CEIs, BATCO and maps/battle cards.

05101. The company group commander is responsible for drawing up companylevel indirect fire plans with advice from the FOO and the MFCs. The FOO/MFC mustbe included in the planning of an operation so that they fully understand the overalltactical plan and the main effort. The FOO/MFC will advise the commander on whatindirect fire support is available for the operation, what targets can be engaged andhow much and what natures of ammunition are available. To enable the commanderto decide on his H Hour, the time it will take for adjustment, if needed or allowed, willalso be provided. The detail of the fire plan to support the commander’s tactical planshould be developed during the R Group. It will then be given to the FOO/MFC whowill interpret the commander’s requirement into executive orders for the supportingindirect and direct fire units. The basic fire planning information which must be coor-dinated by the company group commander and his FOO/MFC is as follows:

a. Defensive Operations.

(1) Allocation of 3–4 DFs and FPF.

(2) Adjustment policy.

(3) Coordination of indirect fire plan with artillery/mortars and direct fireweapons.

(4) Determine trigger points and authority to fire.

(5) Determine effect — where, when (and for how long) and what.

b. Offensive Operations.

(1) Availability of resources, including ammunition.

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED 5-29

(2) Objectives, order of engagement, other targets (DFs and FPF).Agree target numbers and nicknames.

(3) Confirmation of last safe moment for the indirect fire to lift. If the tac-tical situation warrants the commander may order a reduction in the safetydistances, accepting as he does so an increased risk of casualties. Asplinter distance chart is at Annex A.

(4) Effect required — destruction, attrition (30%), neutralization (10%),suppression, harass, blinding, illuminate.

(5) Restrictions on adjustment balanced against the degree of guaran-tee of accuracy.

(6) Outline of attack (e.g., Main Effort, assembly area, FUP, LD, routes,axes, boundaries).

(7) Timings including H Hour and rate of advance.

(8) Location of FOO/MFCs in assault or anchor and observation plan.

(9) Modifying authority.

(10) Synchronise watches.

05102. Prior to the O Group the FOO/MFC should discuss with the company groupcommander the fire plan that they have drawn up to ensure that there has not beena change to the plan or tactical situation since the R Group. The FOO/MFC shouldexplain the fire plan at the O Group to ensure that everyone in the company group isaware of the fire support that they will receive for the operation.

05103. MSTAR. The capability of MSTAR to produce dead ground traces in addi-tion to its target acquisition function should be noted.

05104 – 05105. Reserved.

SECTION 7. — BATTLEFIELD ILLUMINATION

05106. Concept.

a. Battlefield illumination is defined as ‘the lighting of the battle area by artifi-cial light either visible or invisible to the naked eye’.

b. The capability to illuminate the battlefield at an appropriate point is animportant factor in the development of maximum combat power. The require-ment for battlefield illumination may originate at any level, from an individualsoldier upwards.

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED5-30

c. Although battlefield illumination will be employed primarily to assist friendlyforces on the battlefield, it may also be used offensively to defeat enemy sur-veillance equipment or as part of a deception plan.

05107. Principles of Employment.

a. Illumination, once provided, must be continued so long as it is required.

b. Battlefield illumination must be closely coordinated with flanking units inorder to prevent the exposure of friendly positions and operations and preservethe performance of friendly night viewing aids.

c. Illumination should, whenever possible, be provided by a source not directlyin contact with the enemy being engaged. A unit providing such support mustbe in direct communication with the commander of the unit in contact.

d. When used, illumination should, if possible, be provided by two or moreindependent sources to ensure reliability and continued availability.

e. Illumination should be controlled at the highest level practicable and its useis a command responsibility.

05108. Planning.

a. In addition to terrain and atmospheric factors, commanders who plan theuse of illumination must be aware of the limitations:

(1) The danger of compromising friendly forces.

(2) The illumination plan must fit in with the Emission Control (EMCON)plan.

(3) The possible adverse effect of illumination on certain night viewingaids, although, if used carefully, it can enhance the performance of cer-tain systems (e.g., image intensifiers).

b. Illumination will be based upon the requests of supporting units, the judge-ment of the commander and, if applicable, direction from higher headquarters.Details will normally be found within the surveillance and target acquisition plan(STAP).

05109. Methods of Battlefield Illumination. Currently no operational artilleryillumination round is available. Methods of battlefield illumination that may be avail-able include:

a. Hand held flares and trip flares.

b. Mortar illumination.

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED 5-31

c. Naval gunfire illumination.

d. Aircraft flares.

05110. Command and Control.

a. The ordering of battlefield illumination is a command responsibility.

b. Command, control and coordination of battlefield illumination must beexercised by the commander in the area to be illuminated.

05111. Conclusion. While the importance of battlefield illumination might diminishas night viewing aids become more widely available on the battlefield, if carefullyemployed it will continue to be a valuable asset to the commander.

05112 – 05113. Reserved.

SECTION 8. — PROTECTION AND SECURITY

Introduction

05114. Protection.

a. No unit or sub-unit can be regarded as safe, unless it is protected fromattack from any direction, both in and out of combat. The essence of protectionlies in drills which are known and practised by all ranks and covered in UnitSOPs. These drills should include measures for:

(1) Warning. The provision of sentries to counter the ground, air andNBC threat. The employment of OPs, standing patrols and surveillancedevices. The provision of passwords and a knowledge of alarm signalsand alert measures.

(2) Precautions. Sentries should always be posted and troops armed.When engaged in tasks, such as digging, which prevent them carryingweapons they should always have them within reach. Vehicles must bedispersed and camouflaged. Trenches, or alert positions such as shellscrapes, should always be constructed.

(3) Action on Attack. All ranks must know what to do when they areattacked. They must understand and practise alert procedures fordefence against conventional, nuclear or chemical weapons. Anti-ambush drills and orders for opening fire in particular must be clearlyunderstood.

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED5-32

b. Measures against attack must be continuous. Protection is largely a mat-ter of discipline with everyone being constantly alert and inquisitive. Platooncommanders and their NCOs must ensure that protective measures are care-fully planned, rehearsed and continually practised for reasons of continuity anddiscipline.

c. NBC Protection. All ranks must carry full IPE and be trained to survive inan NBC environment.

05115. Security. Security measures must be known by all ranks and are con-tained in Unit SOPs. Measures can be divided into:

a. Routine Security. These are matters applicable in both peace and warsuch as security of information and equipment. They will be covered in unitsecurity instructions laid down by the Unit Security Officer (usually the battalion2IC).

b. Operational Security. This includes additional matters applicable to theconduct of operations and radio security, and includes Electronic Counter-Measures (ECM) and destruction of equipment. Examples are:

(1) Marked Maps. Only the minimum amount of information should goonto maps. Marked maps and written orders should not be taken onpatrol.

(2) Conduct After Capture. No personal documents except identitycards and discs will be carried on operations: if captured the only infor-mation which may be given to the enemy is a soldier’s number, rank andname. If captured, it is the duty of all ranks to escape as soon as possi-ble.

(3) Communications Security. Strict observance of rules for the use ofradios, voice procedure and codes is essential. Radio transmissionsshould be kept to a minimum and maximum use must be made of theClansman line facility.

(4) Destruction of Equipment. Methods of destroying weapons,ammunition, vehicles and equipment must be known.

Protection When Static

05116. Action on Halts. Whenever troops are halted for any length of time orwhen in a rest area, they must be allotted tactical positions to be occupied in theevent of an alarm. These positions are termed ‘stand-to’ positions and should besited to meet a ground attack from any direction and give concealment from airobservation. Everyone must know where his ‘stand-to’ position is situated by day andby night, and practice ‘stand-to’ must be carried out regularly to ensure this. Shell

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED 5-33

scrapes which could be developed into fire trenches should be dug whenever troopsanticipate remaining in one position for more than 30 minutes.

05117. Sentries.

a. Sentries must always be posted for the local protection of any body oftroops, to give early warning of enemy movement or attack and to check theidentity of visitors or suspicious persons in the vicinity. They should be postedto give all round protection, and sited to cover the likely enemy approaches.

b. The local commander must brief, position and control his sentries toensure that they understand their orders. Sentries must have reliable commu-nications with the officer or NCO on duty in their platoon or section HQ as thesecurity of any force ultimately depends on them. They must be made to appre-ciate the great responsibility they have for their comrades’ lives. Orders mustbe clear and thorough. Nothing is to be left to chance or liable to misinterpre-tation.

05118. Passwords. This paragraph, and the next, implement STANAG 2129:

a. Passwords are issued by formation HQ and disseminated by BG HQ.Passwords are changed every 24 hours at 1200 hours daily. They consist of achallenge bigram and an answer bigram and each bigram uses the same let-ter, e.g.:

Challenge: CHARLIE CHARLIE Reply: BRAVO BRAVO

b. Limitations. Passwords are liable to compromise. They must thereforebe considered as only one of a number of methods of establishing whether ornot troops are friendly. Thus, the correct response to a challenge must not beregarded as complete proof of identity. Other methods of confirming identityare:

(1) Visual identity of persons and equipment.

(2) ID Cards (this is additional evidence, not proof).

(3) Questioning.

05119. Challenging.

a. The standard challenging procedure must always be followed. Failure todo so may result in casualties being inflicted on our own troops, particularlyreturning patrols. The section commander must always be alerted if any unex-pected person or group approaches the position and, if the situation warrantsit, he will ‘stand-to’ the section. The sentry will do the challenging. The chal-lenge will be given quietly at a range that will enable the section to kill anyenemy who tries to run away but not so close that the enemy could rush the

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED5-34

post. If the order to halt is not obeyed, it is repeated and if still not obeyed, theorders for opening fire must be followed. The section commander must ensurethat his whole arc remains covered and that all his men do not concentrate onone incident.

b. The standard procedure for challenging and reply is:

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED 5-35

Serial Action by Sentry Action by Persons or GroupChallenged

1 Alerts his immediate commanderof the approach of a person/group,and covers him/them with hisweapon.

2 Waits until the person/groupapproaching is within audiblerange, but not so close that theposition can be rushed, and thenorders him/them to stop with thecommand “HALT HANDS UP”.

Halt raises hands.

3 Orders by voice or sign one per-son to approach — “ADVANCEONE”.

Person (or group leader)advanced towards the sentry’sposition.

4 Allows the unknown person toapproach close enough for visualrecognition, or to give the chal-lenge in a quiet voice, and thenorders him to stop — “HALT”.

Halts.

5 Gives the challenge quietly, e.g.,“BRAVO BRAVO” — if he does notrecognize the person.

Gives the reply — e.g.,“FOXTROT FOXTROT”.

6 Calls the remainder of the groupforward, either as individuals —“ADVANCE ONE” or altogether —“ADVANCE” — as the situation ororders dictate.

Second unknown person, or theremainder of the group,advances to be recognized bythe sentry, assisted by the groupleader who stays with the sentryuntil all have passed.

05120. Length of Sentry Duty. The length of time spent on duty may be as shortas half an hour but should never exceed two hours. The shorter duty may be usedwhen soldiers are working in extreme climatic conditions. A longer duty will be nor-mal in completed positions to allow worthwhile rest between duties. When platoonsentries are provided by sections in turn, sections should not change responsibilitytoo frequently or there may be confusion over reliefs. When the section responsibilitydoes change, the relief must be supervised by the platoon commander or platoonsergeant.

05121. Sentries in a Defensive Position. Company HQ will normally depend onits security by being within the overall protection of the rifle platoons’ sentries. Thenumber of sentries normally required by a platoon occupying or preparing a defen-sive position is:

a. Out of Contact.

(1) By Day. Normally one ground, one chemical and one air sentry perplatoon subject to the local situation and weather. If there is no chemicalthreat one ground and one air sentry could suffice. The chemical sentrymust wear full IPE and should be collocated if possible with another, pos-sibly the air sentry, to overcome the effect of degradation from wearing fullIPE. On occasions the platoon may have to provide a nuclear observer inaddition to the others.

(2) By Night. Two ground and one chemical sentry per platoon. Reliefsat night must be staggered to ensure that one is always fresher than theother. This method also ensures that the senses of at least one sentry arealways well adapted to night vision and conditions, e.g., calls of animals,shape of trees and bushes, which could otherwise cause alarm.

b. In Contact.

(1) By Day. One ground sentry per section and one chemical and oneair sentry for the platoon.

(2) By Night. Two ground sentries per section and one chemical sen-try for the platoon.

05122. There are two methods or organizing sentry duties by night. They are:

a. First Method.

(1) Platoon HQ.

(a) The platoon commander and his sergeant alternate through-out the night. They may be on call but one of them must be awake.

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED5-36

(b) The 51 mm mortar is manned by one of the other members ofplatoon HQ who also acts as sentry.

(c) The platoon chemical sentry is found from one of the sections.

(2) Section Posts.

(a) Normal staggering of sentries, supervised and posted by sec-tion commander/2IC.

(b) Section commander or 2IC are awake and on call.

b. Second Method.

(1) Platoon HQ.

(a) Watchkeeping duties are divided between the platoon com-mander, platoon sergeant and three section commanders.

(b) Security of the HQ is the responsibility of one sentry who alsomans the 51 mm mortar.

(c) A platoon chemical sentry is found from one of the sections.

(d) When not on duty, section commanders return to their owntrenches.

(2) Section Posts.

(a) The section 2IC remains in the sentry trench, and is to beimmediately available.

(b) Sentries post themselves as follows:

i. The finishing sentry reports to the section 2IC then rousesthe relieving sentry and escorts him back to the sentry trench.

ii. The finishing sentry reports to the section 2IC and returnsto his own trench.

(c) Every man must have a watch.

(3) Alertness. The duty watchkeeper at platoon HQ makes at leastone tour of the position to check alertness during his duty.

c. Advantages and Disadvantages.

(1) The first method ensures alertness as sentries are posted hourly byNCOs. The platoon commander or sergeant is immediately available onthe radio or telephone. This is the recommended method.

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED 5-37

(2) The second method allows hard worked commanders to get moresleep but it places a great deal of trust on the men who may themselvesbe very tired.

05123. Weapons. All sentries should use their own personal weapons, be it arifle or LSW. At night, if a GPMG (SF) is deployed in the platoon, this must bemanned and laid on its FPF. Strict orders for opening fire must be given to avoid dis-closing the position of sentries and the GPMG (SF)

05124. Alarms and Signals. All ranks must be aware of what to do in the eventof an alarm being raised. These alarm signals, which are also used within NATO, areas follows:

a. Enemy Ground Attack. Depending on the situation any of the followingmay be used:

(1) Voice. “Stand To” or similar phrases. (To avoid confusion with airand chemical attack, whistles are not to be used.)

(2) Silent Method. For example communication cord.

(3) Radio Codeword.

b. Imminent Air Attack.

(1) Voice. “Air Attack”.

(2) Whistle or Vehicle Horn. Succession of LONG blasts.

(3) Visible Alarm. Red square.

(4) Visible Signal. Rapid crossing of arms above head.

c. Imminent Arrival or Presence of NBC Hazards.

(1) Donning of respirator and drawing attention to it.

(2) Voice. “Gas, Gas, Gas”.

(3) Vehicle Horn. Succession of SHORT blasts.

(4) Others. Rapid and continuous beating of metal on metal or NerveAgent Immobilized Enzyme Alarm and Detector (NAIAD) or other audiblesignals, i.e., air horn.

(5) Visible Alarm. Black triangle.

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED5-38

d. All Clear.

(1) Voice. “Stand Down”.

(2) Vehicle Horn. Continuous blast for one minute.

(3) Radio. Codeword.

(4) Removal of Visible Alarm.

05125. When the alarm is raised all ranks should move to their ‘stand-to’ positions.Thereafter there must be no movement until ‘stand-down’ is ordered. The exceptionbeing when a NBC hazard does not prevent men from carrying out their duties in fullIPE. Anyone moving therefore is likely to be enemy. Strict orders for opening fireagainst ground and air attack must be issued, as enemy patrols may only be tryingto locate positions by deliberately causing the alarm to be raised.

05126. Command Posts (CPs). Sentries at all CPs should be sited tactically soas to be able to check the identity of visitors out of earshot of any orders and radiotransmissions coming from the CP.

Protection on the Move

05127. Movement Discipline.

a. Companies on the move must always be alert and ready to react instantlyto enemy action. Good movement discipline will prevent unnecessary casual-ties.

b. When a platoon is moving in areas where the enemy’s location is unknownit may employ scouts in front and on the flanks. If speed is essential, scoutsshould not be used in front. It is the responsibility of every individual to observehis allotted arc of responsibility.

05128. Scouts.

a. The aim of a scout is to detect the enemy ahead of his sub-unit unseen bystealth. Scouts may often locate gaps in the enemy’s position and so enable thesection to infiltrate between hostile positions.

b. Scouts work in pairs and move forward by bounds. Bounds selectedshould be points which give as good a view ahead as possible and are suitablefor signalling back to the section. When the place for the next bound has beenselected, one of the pair chooses his route to it and moves forward as rapidlyas possible, whilst the other observes and covers. When the first scout reacheshis bound, he signals the other to come forward. This having been done, theprocess is repeated. The reasons for this procedure are:

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED 5-39

(1) The second scout is able to cover the advance of the leading scoutwith fire and to help him to withdraw if surprised by the enemy.

(2) If the leading scout gets into difficulties, the other can inform the sec-tion commander in time for him to take action.

c. The distance ahead that scouts move depends on the nature of the coun-try. A short distance in open country is useless unless the scouts are able tosee more than the section commander. Section commanders must maintainstrict control over the movements of their scouts. Should they wish to give freshorders they must signal to their scouts to halt and then move up to them.

d. Scouts should move with their rifles set to automatic for immediate fire-power in an emergency.

05129. Movement in Transport.

a. Bad transport movement discipline may cause delay and congestion in awhole column making it vulnerable to air attacks and artillery fire. Vehicles willnormally move in packets of about four to eight according to the size of sub-units. Each packet should be commanded by an officer, warrant officer, or NCOwith a commander detailed in each vehicle. Packets should travel at theordered speed and distance to make them a difficult target.

b. The rules of road transport discipline are:

(1) Packet Commander. A packet of vehicles will have a nominatedcommander. He will be issued with a copy of the movement order and bebriefed by the convoy commander. He will usually have a radio and willbe specifically responsible for reporting the progress of his packet alongthe route. A packet commander can be a vehicle commander.

(2) Vehicle Commander. The vehicle commander is the senior rank inthe vehicle. He should be detailed before moving off and will be respon-sible for the conduct of the driver and other passengers. He must travelin a position from which he can see out of the vehicle in every directionincluding the rear. If he cannot see out of the rear, he must detail some-one in the back of the vehicle to do this. The vehicle commander is to bein possession of a route card and map which he must follow. At unex-pected halts, he must not get out and go forward to find out the cause ofthe delay unless ordered by the packet commander.

(3) Density. Traffic density is the average number of vehicles thatoccupy a kilometre of road space. It is expressed as vehicle/kilometres.The density of a column will be laid down for any move in convoy to avoidvehicle bunching and also to prevent the column taking up too much roadspace.

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED5-40

(4) Speed. The average speed will be laid down in the movementorder. Standard figures are given for planning purposes but they varyaccording to the type of vehicle and convoy, the road conditions andwhether it is day or night. Individual vehicles can move quicker if they areauthorized as free runners.

(5) Overtaking and Double Banking. Overtaking and double bankingmust not be allowed except on the orders of the military police or of offi-cers controlling traffic. Individual vehicles which have dropped behindmust wait for the column or packet to halt before regaining their positions.

(6) Halts. Times and duration of halts will be laid down for the move.Whenever possible, vehicles should move from hide to hide. These hides,such as woods and villages, will be pre-selected from maps, air pho-tographs or knowledge of the route. Ideally they should provide cover offthe road for halted vehicles. They do not have to be any special distanceapart. If hides are not available, vehicles should move off the road and becamouflaged. Every precaution must be taken at halts to conceal vehiclesfrom air observation. Sentries, including chemical, must be posted andtraffic control men detailed if necessary. ‘Stand-to’ must be practised. If await of more than 30 minutes is envisaged normal halt procedures apply(see Action on Halts, earlier in this section).

(7) Breakdown. Vehicles which break down must be parked on theside of the road and display a yellow flag by day and red triangle by night,to show other vehicles the cause of delay. (Peacetime restriction only.) Ifthe breakdown is likely to be only temporary, a sentry must be posted onthe opposite side of the road to act as a traffic policeman and wave on therest of the convoy. If the breakdown is permanent and the vehicle blocksthe road, it must be pushed clear even at the risk of further damage.

(8) Movement Orders. Movement orders should be issued for all roadmoves. They will include such details as route, speed, vehicle density,composition of vehicle packets, action on halts and details of support ser-vices.

Anti-Ambush Drills

05130. Precautionary Measures.

a. Any troops moving outside a secure area must be prepared to counterenemy ambush tactics. The obvious measure is to avoid being ambushed. Thismay be done by good security concerning our movements or by detecting theambush in advance.

b. To avoid ambush:

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED 5-41

(1) Routine movement must be reduced to a minimum.

(2) Except in completely secure areas, roads and tracks should neverbe used if they can be avoided.

(3) Security of impending operations and movement must be main-tained until the last possible moment.

(4) Plan and use deception whenever possible.

(5) Maps, air photographs, patrol and other reports must be studied tofind likely ambush sites.

05131. Anti-Ambush Action.

a. A force laying an ambush has the advantage of selection of site, initiativeand surprise. The ambushed force is at a tactical disadvantage which can beminimized by good training and resolute action. The basis of the anti-ambushdrill is controlled offensive action. There are no hard and fast rules. However,there are two actions which can be taken. These are:

(1) Immediate offensive action. Every effort must be taken to break outof the killing area as rapidly as possible.

(2) Commanders must retain control. Alternative arrangements for com-mand must be known and listed in the event of commanders being lost inthe first contact.

b. One particular method which is best suited to close country and restrictedenemy fields of fire is an immediate assault into the ambushing force. This typeof drill must be planned and thoroughly rehearsed. The only orders required, ifany, might be “Ambush Right (or Left)”, “Follow me” or some other simplewords or signal to achieve an immediate reaction. (Remember you may well bemoving into more enemy forces in depth.) Fire and manoeuvre by groups mustbe used and tightly controlled, especially the limit of exploitation.

05132. Action if Only Part of a Force is Ambushed.

a. The portion ambushed must take aggressive action to fight its way out ofthe immediate killing area using fire and manoeuvre. This part of the force thenforms a hasty defensive perimeter sited to bring fire onto the ambushers. Caremust be taken to avoid adopting reorganization positions in obvious places asthe enemy may have laid mines or booby traps in the area.

b. The remainder who are not caught in the actual ambush must execute animmediate encircling attack against a flank. In so doing contact with enemyblocking parties can be anticipated. Full advantage should be taken of anyavailable artillery, mortars or close air support. If, however, this would delay the

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED5-42

mounting of the attack, its advantages should be carefully weighed against therequirements to relieve the ambushed force.

05133. Action if the Whole of a Force is Ambushed. All troops must takeaggressive action to fight their way out of the immediate killing area. The followingcourses are open:

a. Launch an immediate assault with the aim of breaking up the enemyambush to form a hasty defensive perimeter whilst the commander decideswhether to attack part of the ambush in order to break out, or whether his forcewill break down into small groups to filter out. In either case, the troops mustreform at a pre-planned RV as soon as possible.

b. Launch an immediate assault to break out of the killing area to seizeground on which a reasonable defensive perimeter can be established. Theaim would then be to hold this perimeter, to bring in close air support andartillery or mortars against the enemy position or to await the arrival of a mobilerelief force possibly brought in by helicopter. Such action will often force thewithdrawal of the enemy ambush and has the advantage of preventing our ownwounded and equipment falling into enemy hands.

05134. Action by Night.

a. Control will be especially difficult at night. Orders for anti-ambush actionmust be clear and drills carefully rehearsed.

b. If platoons are ambushed at night they must make every effort to move outof the killing area especially if it has been illuminated. They must fight their wayfrom the ambush to a pre-planned RV, using fire and manoeuvre. Above allcommanders must be ruthless in retaining control. If lost it must be regainedvigorously and as soon as possible.

05135. Action in Vehicles. When travelling in vehicles, even some distancebehind the combat zone, there is a risk of ambush. In counter revolutionary warfareoperations the threat is continuous but ambushes may well also occur on other oper-ations and similar principles and drills will apply.

05136. Preparation of Vehicles. Vehicles will require special preparation for amove, particularly if there is a threat of mines, which might include the following:

a. Sand bagging the floor of the vehicle.

b. Removing glass and doors.

c. Mineplating.

d. Removing the canopy and bars.

e. Fixing wire mesh over windows and the rest of the vehicle.

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED 5-43

05137. Command and Control. The vehicle commander should be in the pas-senger seat and the 2IC in the rear of the vehicle where they can see and commandthe men. There should be at least one ground and one air sentry per vehicle with theair sentry using the LSW in a mount if fitted and the ground sentry with rifle, HE andsmoke grenades available for immediate action. Whenever possible passengersshould sit back in the centre of the vehicle with weapons easily accessible.

05138. Action on Contact.

a. There are two courses open to the packet/vehicle commander. To breakout of the killing area by driving through it or to stay and fight. In either eventthe following action must be taken:

(1) Contact Report sent.

(2) Ambushed vehicles carry out the immediate action drill.

(3) Other packets avoid entering the ambush area.

(4) The commander of the ambushed group launches an immediateassault.

b. To ensure quick and accurate support the exact location at the moment ofambush must be known. The route must therefore be followed in detail by thepacket commander to enable accurate information on his own and the enemy’slocation to be passed to the controlling HQ.

05139. Immediate Action Drills. The immediate action drill for a vehicle is:

a. The sentry returns fire immediately.

b. The vehicle commander makes a rapid decision whether to drive out orfight. If it is to fight, then he must order “Dismount” and launch an assault.

05140. Dismounting Drill. Dismounting drill for troops in the vehicle is:

a. The vehicle commander shouts “Dismount LEFT (or RIGHT)” to indicatewhich side of the vehicle to muster.

b. Sentries open fire on the enemy and throw smoke grenades.

c. Troops debus and move to the indicated flank to provide covering fire forthe vehicle sentries.

d. Commander sends Contact Report.

e. Sentries debus when troops are firm.

f. Vehicle commander launches assault on the enemy.

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED5-44

05141. Special Points. The following special points must be remembered bycommander when moving in areas where they are likely to be ambushed:

a. In the opening volleys of an ambush the enemy will aim to kill commanderand radio operators in order to increase confusion. The latter must not be con-spicuous and must avoid moving to a set pattern within a column. Badges ofrank should not be obvious, and unless the radio sets are being operated, aeri-als should be folded down or removed.

b. During all movement, maximum dispersion must be balanced against thethreat and need to maintain control. Commanders must ensure that the forma-tion being adopted prevents the whole of the force being ambushed simultane-ously. Too often troops are closed up, forming a ‘crocodile’, thus making them-selves vulnerable to a comparatively small ambush. This is particularly applic-able to the rear of a column.

c. Pre-planned ERVs in the event of an ambush must be known to all ranksand contained in unit SOPs. Two suggestions for ERVs are:

(1) A set distance (e.g., 300 metres) from the rear of the column, backalong the direction of approach. This is probably not suitable for forceslarger than a platoon.

(2) The location of the last long halt.

Protection Against Air Attack

05142. Principles. The principles of providing protection against air attacks are:

a. Concealment.

b. Dispersion.

c. Self defence.

d. Early warning of approach of hostile aircraft.

e. Ground alert measures known and practised by all.

05143. Concealment.

a. The most effective method of protection against air attack is concealment.Enemy aircraft are liable to attack any ground forces whose location has beendiscovered by ground or air reconnaissance by manned aircraft or drones usinga combination of photography, TI or Electronic Surveillance Measures. High pri-ority must therefore be given to concealment at all times. Even the sighting ofa few troops could lead to the disclosure of a whole unit otherwise well con-cealed.

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED 5-45

b. When moving on foot in open spaces, commanders must make best useof ground. The following rules should be observed:

(1) On a road or track when tactical deployment is not essential, sec-tions should move dispersed in single file on one side.

(2) Sections should move in single file along hedgerows rather than inthe open. In wet or frosty conditions in particular, a few men movingacross a field leave a plainly visible track.

(3) If movement has to take place across open ground, sections shouldmove in an irregular formation, well dispersed.

(4) In areas of soft sand in the desert or on beaches, movement shouldbe along outcrops of harder sand or rock or on the water’s edge to avoidleaving tracks.

c. When static, such as occupying a defensive position out of contact with theenemy, the following points should be observed:

(1) At temporary halts, men should rest dispersed under cover withvehicles camouflaged. If there is no cover, they should be well dispersedand lie down keeping still and not looking up when aircraft are overhead.

(2) Track discipline must be maintained when a position in the open isoccupied. The track plan laid down by the platoon commander must beunderstood and ruthlessly enforced. Rules for track discipline in the openare:

(a) Make full use of existing tracks.

(b) Do not cut corners.

(c) Keep new tracks to an absolute minimum.

(d) New tracks must blend into the background pattern, followinghedges, areas of stone or rock, gullies and stream beds, undertrees and along the edge of grassland and scrub.

(e) New tracks which cannot be fitted in the ground pattern mustnot stop at the position to which they lead, but be extended furtherto deceive the enemy.

(3) Fire trenches and shelters must be progressively camouflaged asthey are constructed. The concealment of spoil and renewing of camou-flage is a continuous process. If necessary, spoil should be taken fromtrenches as they are dug and carried to the nearest cover. Any which isused for parapets or overhead protection must be camouflaged, as must

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED5-46

the bottom of open trenches. At no time should work cease until all cam-ouflage is complete.

(4) Fire trenches should be sited under cover or along some break inthe pattern of the ground, e.g., at the edge of a cultivated area or an areaof low scrub or long grass. If may be difficult at times to balance con-cealment with the other principles of defence, but a compromise will usu-ally be possible. Trenches in the open, away from any break in the groundpattern are always difficult to conceal.

(5) Work on a defensive position during the hours of daylight willdepend on the air threat and the degree of enemy observation. Underadverse air conditions it may be possible only at night.

(6) Shiny or light objects which will attract the attention from the air mustbe used under cover. All kit should be packed away and camouflagedwhen not in use. Men should not be allowed to remove their shirts.

(7) Fires must not be lit where there is any possibility of observation.

(8) Vehicle engines that are warm should be screened against thermaland infra-red sensors preferably with a solid object such as an old doorbut not foliage. Ideally they should be hidden in or amongst buildingswhere their signature can blend into the background more easily.

05144. Dispersion.

a. Dispersion is probably one of the most difficult measures to enforce evenwith well trained troops. In open country, or anywhere where control on themove or when static will not be prejudiced, the platoon must keep dispersed toassist concealment, avoid presenting a worthwhile target and reduce casualtiesif attacked.

b. Platoon and section commanders must appreciate that, when withinenemy artillery or mortar range or under an air threat they are responsible forthe dispersion of those under their command. Control must be maintainedthroughout. The advantages of having central distribution points for meals,rations, water, etc., must be carefully considered in the light of the threat.

c. Vehicle commanders moving by day must ensure that their drivers main-tain the ordered interval. In open areas, vehicles should be dispersed even fur-ther, whether it be APCs moving across country or soft skinned vehicles onroads. At halts vehicles should get under cover, sentries (including chemical ifrequired) should be posted and ‘stand-to’ practised. Normal halt proceduresshould be followed.

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED 5-47

05145. All Arms Air Defence (AAAD).

a. Introduction. Small arms fire has an important role to play in the overallair defence structure and can provide an effective deterrent. Full details can beobtained from the AAAD pamphlet (Army Code No. 71078), When properlycoordinated, small arms fire can achieve the following:

(1) Destruction of, or damage to, enemy aircraft.

(2) Deter the pilot from completing his mission.

(3) Force enemy aircraft to climb to heights where they are vulnerableto other air defence weapons.

(4) Maintain morale of friendly troops.

b. Air Sentries. Air sentries trained in aircraft recognition must always beposted during daylight whenever there is an air threat. Sentries should be posi-tioned to provide all-round coverage and complete a tour of duty of no morethan 30 minutes. The air sentry provides general early warning of air attack andspecific warning to an AAAD team manning a weapon system in the anti-air-craft role.

c. Control of AAAD Fire. Strict orders for opening fire on aircraft must begiven to avoid disclosing our own positions and to safeguard our own aircraft.There are two weapon control orders which apply to all anti-aircraft weaponsincluding small arms:

(1) “Weapons Tight”. Fire is not to be opened on aircraft unless:

(a) Aircraft is visually recognized as hostile.

(b) Aircraft commits a hostile act.

(2) “Weapons Hold”. Fire is to be stopped and is not to be opened.But fire may be opened in self defence against an aircraft that is attack-ing the weapon position or nearby friendly forces.

(3) Definition of Hostile Act. A hostile act is committed when one ormore aircraft:

(a) Fire on intercepting friendly aircraft or clearly and persistentlymanoeuvre into position to attack.

(b) Attack friendly forces or installations.

d. Commanders must be aware of the Rules of Engagement in force, asthese may further restrict the authority to fire on an aircraft.

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED5-48

Harbour Areas

05146. A harbour area is an area, out of contact, in which the emphasis is onadministrative activity, although protection and concealment will be required. It is anarea where rest and preparation can take place well back from the area where theaction is expected. The following factors need to be taken into account:

a. Selection. Maximum use should be made of local cover in the form ofbuildings, which minimise infra-red emission and the need for camouflage, andwoods.

b. Concealment. Points to consider are:

(1) Cooking controls.

(2) Track discipline.

(3) Movement of personnel to be minimised.

(4) Noise.

(5) By night lights must be well concealed and optics shuttered.

c. Threats. The likely threats to a harbour area are:

(1) Air attack.

(2) Harassing indirect fire.

(3) Combat reconnaissance patrols.

d. Protection. Trenches or, if this is not possible, shell scrapes should bedug. Sentries must be posted on all likely ground approaches, air sentries onvantage points and chemical sentries upwind of the position. Clear orders mustbe issued on challenging procedures and opening fire.

e. Action on Sighting the Enemy. If enemy ground activity is seen, the har-bour should be brought to a silent ‘stand to’. All should then maintain a listen-ing watch. The principle is to lie low unless discovery is inevitable. If discoveredthe harbour should try to regain the initiative and destroy the threat. To this endarcs of fire should be allocated to platoons.

f. Compromise Drill. If the harbour area is compromised the companyshould rapidly move to a predesignated RV and then occupy a fresh harbourarea. This procedure must be well known and routes laid down. Rehearsalshould take place if possible, although the threat to the harbour’s concealmentmust be taken into account.

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED 5-49

g. Organization. Occupation must be a well rehearsed drill. Harbour areasshould be reconnoitred by the company IC and, whenever possible, guidessent beforehand to allow swift occupation by the platoons. Sentries must beposted as soon as possible.

05147 – 05148. Reserved.

SECTION 9. — NBC WARFARE (NUCLEAR, BIOLOGICALAND CHEMICAL)

Introduction

05149. The Threat.

a. In any future conflict NBC weapons are likely to be used by any enemy toachieve surprise, to disrupt command and control and to reduce combat effi-ciency. The end of the Cold War and Superpower control has led to a prolifer-ation of such weapons. A number of Third World countries are producing theirown and they have been used in recent conflicts.

b. Because of the precautionary actions necessary, the very threat of suchattacks will have a disruptive effect on all operations unless units are well prac-tised in individual and collective NBC defence. All ranks must become accus-tomed to living and operating at a high state of NBC readiness so that all thephases of war discussed in the previous chapters can still be conducted.

05150. The Aim of NBC Defence. The aim of NBC defence is to enable units tosurvive and to continue to operate effectively in an NBC environment.

05151. The Aim of this Section. This section is designed to give only an outlineof the characteristics and the effects of NBC weapons on tactics. Full details of NBCdefensive measures are contained in the following publications:

a. Army Training Directive No. 4 (ATD 4). This document is held in everybattalion HQ and lays down the standards of mandatory NBC defence trainingto be achieved throughout the Army.

b. Army Field Manual Volume I Part 5. — Chemical Operations (Army CodeNo. 71346 Part 5).

c. Theatre Training Directive 102 (TTD 102). This is an NBC supplement toATD 4 to meet specific in theatre needs.

d. Survive to Fight (JSP 410). This pamphlet should have been issued toevery man in the Army and is designed to enable an individual to survive anNBC attack.

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED5-50

e. Manual of Nuclear Biological and Chemical Defence Training on Land(Army Code No. 71328):

(1) Pamphlet No. 1 — A Background to NBC Defence.

(2) Pamphlet No. 2 — A Guide for NBC Advisers.

(3) Pamphlet No. 3 — NBC Cell Operations.

(4) Pamphlet No. 4 — Unit Instructors Handbook.

(5) Pamphlet No. 5 — Organization of NBC Defence and Training.

Characteristics and Effects of Nuclear Weapons on Operations

05152. A nuclear detonation produces flash, blast, shock and heat similar to thatproduced by a high explosive weapon but on a much greater scale. It also producesradiations which are extremely harmful to man and some of which will affect electri-cal equipment.

05153. The distinguishing characteristics of a nuclear explosion are:

a. Flash.

b. Fireball.

c. Heat.

d. Blast and shock.

e. Nuclear radiation.

f. Electromagnetic phenomena.

g. Cloud.

05154. The extent of nuclear effects can be altered by varying weapon yield, heightof burst and type of warhead. A summary of likely direct nuclear weapon effects onpersonnel is shown below:

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED 5-51

*EMP — Electromagnetic Pulse. The interaction of nuclear radiation with air mole-cules in the atmosphere produces a powerful burst of broad band radio energy ofshort duration. This can cause damage to electrical and electronic equipment.

Defence Against Nuclear Weapons

05155. The principles of nuclear defence are:

a. Concealment and Deception.

b. Dispersion.

c. Movement.

d. Warning and Reporting.

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED5-52

2 Heat Sunburn effectand slightblistering.

Light:First Aid

Medium:Medical Aid

Severe:Ineffective

Ser EffectTypical Physical Injuries

1st/2nd degreeburns, shock.

2nd/3rd degreeburns, shock.

Remarks

Severity varies withskin area affected.

1 Flash Temporarydazzleminutes/hours.

— Permanent,rarelyblindness.

Weapon size governsduration and strengthof flash.

3 Air BlastandGroundShock

Minor abra-sions and per-haps temporarystunning.

Eardrum rup-ture,Temporary con-cussion,Lacerations,shock.

Bone fractures,Severe lacera-tions,Lung damage,Haemorrhages,Shock.

4 Radiation Slight nausea/vomiting forhours/days.

Fatigue/diarrhoea forsome days.Most recover,some may die.

Fever andprostration,eventualdeaths indays/weeks.

Dependent upon rateof exposure as wellas total dose.

5 EMP* No known effect upon human beings but explosion or other failure ofequipment due to EMP may put nearby personnel in hazard.

Injuries mostly frombodily movementand/or displacedobjects.

e. Protection.

f. Contamination and radiation dose control.

05156. Concealment and Deception. Good camouflage, track discipline andavoidance of unnecessary noise and lights will help avoid detection. Deception com-bined with good concealment will provide defence against attack.

05157. Dispersion. The best possible tactical dispersion must be achieved toprevent large numbers of men and equipment being destroyed by one strike.Dispersion will also aid concealment and prevent worthwhile targets to the enemy.

05158. Movement. Frequent moves of likely targets for enemy nuclear attack willreduce their vulnerability.

05159. Warning and Reporting. To reduce casualties there must be an efficientorganization for warning and reporting of nuclear strikes and their resultant hazards.Nuclear observers, radiological monitoring and survey teams will be required.

05160. Protection. Protection is an essential requirement of nuclear defence.This may be achieved by:

a. Pre-Strike. When a nuclear attack is expected men should wear theirNBC suits and every effort should be made to keep them and their equipmentunder cover, e.g., in trenches with overhead cover, emergency shelters, cellarsor within armoured vehicles. When men must be outside they should cover allexposed skin. Electronic equipment not in use should be switched off and dis-connected, spare parts should be kept readily available.

b. Against Immediate Effects. Whether under cover or not, the immediateaction on sensing the explosion’s flash is to close the eyes, drop to the groundface downwards, hands tucked under the body. Remain in this position until allthe effects of the explosion have passed.

c. Against Residual Effects. On receiving warning of radioactive fallout inthe area:

(1) Men and equipment must be kept under cover as far as possible.Food and water must be covered.

(2) Any persons who must be outside should wear their NBC suit andkeep their skin covered, particular care being taken of cuts and wounds.

(3) In dusty conditions respirators should be worn. If it is not dusty menmust breathe through the nose keeping the mouth shut. They must notsmoke, eat or drink in a contaminated area.

(4) Avoid raising dust through unnecessary movement.

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED 5-53

(5) Avoid touching surfaces that may be contaminated.

05161. Contamination Control. To reduce casualties it is necessary to reduceto a minimum the amount of radioactive contamination deposited on men and equip-ment. Men and equipment can become contaminated either directly by fallout land-ing on them or indirectly by picking it up from contaminated surfaces. Contaminationis controlled by:

a. Avoidance.

(1) Placing men and equipment under cover before fallout arrives andhaving them operate from shelter.

(2) Marking and avoiding contaminated areas as far as operationallypossible.

b. Limitation of Spread. Controlling movement into, within and from conta-minated areas.

c. Decontamination. Radioactivity cannot be destroyed, it can only bemoved from one place to another. When decontamination drills are being car-ried out care must be taken to prevent contaminated material being moved toor left in places where others may become affected by it. There are threestages of decontamination:

(1) Immediate. Removal from the individual.

(2) Operational. Removal from parts of the equipment with which indi-viduals are in constant contact; limited to what is necessary to completethe operational task.

(3) Thorough. Removal to reduce contamination to the least possibleamount. A unit will be non-operational while this is carried out.

d. Decay. Radioactivity will decay naturally over a period of time. Thismeans that contamination becomes progressively less dangerous.

Note: Details of these methods are given in NBC Defence Training pamphlets.

05162. Radiation Exposure Control. Closely allied to contamination control iscontrol of the amount of residual radiation absorbed by individuals. All absorbed radi-ation is harmful to man but limited amounts may have to be accepted for operationalreasons. Radiation is detected and absorbed doses measured by radiac instruments(dose rate meters and dosimeters). It is important that a record is kept of the doseabsorbed by a unit or a group of individuals, e.g., those in a particular shelter, andthat commanders are kept aware of the effect that this and any further exposure willhave on their men.

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED5-54

Characteristics and Effects of Biological Weapons on Operations

05163. ‘A biological agent is a micro-organism which causes disease in man,plants or animals, or causes deterioration of material’ (NATO definition). The objectof biological warfare would be to reduce the target population’s ability to wage war.

05164. Method of Delivery. Biological agents can be disseminated as liquiddroplets, as aerosols, as dry powders by smokes, by insect vectors or by addition tofood and water supplies. They are of particular use in clandestine attack.

Defence Against Biological Weapons

05165. The principles of biological defence are:

a. Preparation.

b. Detection.

c. Decontamination and disinfection.

05166. Preparation. Certain measures can be taken to inhibit or prevent theeffects of biological attack:

a. Physical.

(1) The wearing of NBC individual protection to protect the respiratorysystem.

(2) Collective protection using AFV or shelters equipped with NBC fil-tration units.

(3) Strict control of food and water sources.

(4) The prompt preparation and consumption of food. The food shouldbe cooked to high temperature.

(5) High standards of personal hygiene and field sanitation.

(6) Stringent rodent and pest control.

b. Chemical. Chlorination and filtration of water supplies followed by boilingbefore drinking.

c. Biological. Immunization by use of vaccines or other means. However, itis impracticable to immunize all personnel against all possible forms of biolog-ical attack.

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED 5-55

05167. Detection. Normally a biological attack will be difficult to detect. Without aneffective detection system decisions on defensive measures will have to be based on:

a. Intelligence. The enemy being known to be adopting procedures consis-tent with a biological attack.

b. Observation. Hostile aircraft or other devices apparently producing amist or spray, or enemy activity which has no other logical interpretation.Deposits of powdery material may be observed on surfaces.

Note: The first indication that an attack has taken place may well be a large num-ber of men reporting sick with similar symptoms.

05168. Decontamination and Disinfection. Although there are exceptions, bio-logical agents generally do not present a continuing contamination threat. Micro-organisms rapidly lose their virulence and vitality in direct sunlight. Actions such aswashing in hot soapy water, boiling clothing where appropriate (NOT NBC suits),exposure to strong sunlight, high temperatures or decontamination by use of servicedecontaminants all reduce the threat from contamination.

Characteristics and Effects of Chemical Weapons on Operations

05169. ‘A chemical agent is a chemical substance which is intended for military oper-ations to kill, seriously injure or incapacitate man through its physiological effects.Excluded are riot control agents, herbicides, smoke and flares’ (NATO definition).

05170. Chemical agents can be classified by their military use:

a. Lethal Agents. Designed to kill but non-lethal doses may cause incapac-itation.

b. Damaging Agents. Primarily designed to cause either short or long termdamage to men but may cause death.

c. Incapacitants. Primarily designed to cause mental or physical incapaci-tation, usually only temporary.

05171. Chemical agents can be delivered as vapours (gas), aerosols (like a finemist or smoke), powders or as liquids. They can be divided into:

a. Non-Persistent. Agents designed to contaminate the air, they will dis-perse fairly rapidly. Frequently colourless and odourless they are likely to bedelivered by ground burst as a vapour or aerosol. They will enter the bodythrough breathing in or through direct contact with the eye. There will usuallybe both a local and downwind hazard.

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED5-56

b. Persistent. Agents designed to contaminate surfaces but which may alsogive off toxic vapour. These agents may remain effective for hours or days.They are likely to be delivered as small liquid droplets by means of a spray orair burst; they could also be in the form of a powder. They will enter the bodythrough the nose, mouth, eyes or skin. In addition to the contact hazard, therewill usually be both a local and downwind vapour hazard.

05172. Types of Agent.

a. Nerve Agents (e.g., Sarin (GB)). These are lethal agents which interferewith the nervous system and thus disrupt such bodily functions as breathingand muscular coordination. One of the first effects of exposure to nerve agentwill be constriction of the pupil (myosis) accompanied by pain or headache.Some nerve agents are persistent others are non-persistent.

b. Blood Agents (e.g., Hydrogen Cyanide (AC)). These are lethal agentswhich prevent body tissues from using oxygen in the blood. These agents arevery volatile but high concentrations will cause rapid death.

c. Choking Agents (e.g., Phosgene (CG)). Lethal agents which attackbreathing passages and lungs. They are normally delivered in non-persistentform.

d. Damaging Agents (e.g., Mustard (H)). Blister agents produce a persis-tent contact hazard and both a local and a downwind vapour hazard. Theycause inflammation and, after several hours, blistering of the skin, eyes andbreathing passages.

e. Incapacitating Agents (e.g., Quinuclidinyl Benzilate (BZ)). Incapacitatingagents cause temporary disabling conditions which can be either physical ormental. The conditions may last for hours or days after exposure to the agent.Incapacitating agents should not be confused with riot control agents.

05173. Methods of Delivery. The two main methods used to deliver chemicalagents are:

a. Bursting Munitions. Shells, bombs, bomblets, missiles, rockets, chemicalmines.

b. Spray Equipment. Mounted in aircraft or missiles.

Defence Against Chemical Weapons

05174. The principles of chemical defence are:

a. Protection.

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED 5-57

b. Anticipation.

c. Detection, Warning and Reporting.

d. Contamination Control.

05175. Protection. Protection comprises:

a. Individual Protective Equipment (IPE), including respirator, NBC suit,gloves and overboots.

b. Pre-treatment, in the form of the Nerve Agent Pre-treatment Set (NAPS).

c. Self aid against nerve agent, in the form of the Combopen Autoject.

d. Where possible, collective protection which permits the relaxation of indi-vidual protection.

e. Emergency drills and procedures to reduce the chemical agent hazard (inparticular the chemical safety rule and immediate action and decontaminationdrills).

f. For casualties, the casualty and half casualty bag (casbag).

05176. Anticipation.

a. Peacetime.

(1) Individual and collective training.

(2) Holding the correct scales of serviceable equipment.

(3) Training the correct numbers of specialists.

(4) Modifying operating procedures for use in chemical conditions.

b. Pre-Alert.

(1) Positioning chemical sentries and detection devices.

(2) Organizing a local alert system which will fit in with the warning andreporting system.

(3) Wearing individual protection appropriate to the chemical threat.

(4) Taking pre-treatment (NAPS) when ordered.

c. On Alert. Following the immediate action drill. Taking shelter where pos-sible.

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED5-58

05177. Detection, Warning and Reporting. If individuals are to be permitted torelax their individual protection as far as possible with minimum risk of casualties,there must be an efficient detection and warning system. All ranks must know thechemical safety rule. For this system to be effective platoons and companies mustpass quick and accurate reports of chemical attack to their battlegroup headquartersNBC warning and reporting cell. This cell in turn must predict the area which may besubject to any chemical downwind hazard and warn those at risk. This cell must alsopass reports and warnings to higher, lower and flanking headquarters when appro-priate.

05178. Contamination Control.

a. This can be broken down under the same headings as for nuclear conta-mination control, that is to say:

(1) Avoidance.

(2) Limitation of spread.

(3) Decontamination (Immediate, Operational, Thorough).

(4) Weathering.

b. There are, however, major differences between chemical and nuclear con-tamination control:

(1) Unlike radioactivity, chemical contamination can in principle be neu-tralized or destroyed by chemical means. Some agents can also beabsorbed into certain materials (e.g., Fullers Earth) and then removed.

(2) Greater urgency is needed with chemical decontamination because:

(a) Chemical contamination will cause casualties more rapidly.

(b) Liquid chemicals will quickly penetrate into cracks and will beabsorbed into permeable materials where they cannot be reachedby decontaminants. The agent will then gradually evaporate fromwithin to form a vapour hazard. There may also be a contact haz-ard if screws are removed or hatches opened.

c. Methods for destroying chemical agents using calcium hypochlorite (HTH)or removing them using the absorbent Fullers Earth are given in NBC DefenceTraining pamphlets.

d. As with nuclear contamination, particular care must be taken to preventcontamination of food and water. Although wood, cardboard and polythene willprotect against fallout and possibly chemical vapour, they will only resist pene-tration by liquid chemical agents for a limited time. The presence of chemical

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED 5-59

agents in water can be detected by kits issued to medical officers, medical andengineer units. Food and drink suspected by contamination must not be con-sumed.

e. To avoid contamination by liquid agents, stocks must be well dispersed andmaximum use made of cover, e.g., buildings, trees or the Chemical AgentResistant Material (CARM).

05179. Platoon Tasks in NBC Warfare. Descriptions of the tasks of NBC sen-tries, use of CAM and NAIAD and chemical reconnaissance can be found inPamphlet No. 3, The Infantry Platoon — Basic Tactics.

Performance Degradation

05180. When full IPE is worn an individual’s performance, particularly in warm con-ditions and over long periods of time, will be degraded. Degradation is both mentaland physical. Mental degradation can arise from claustrophobia and a feeling of iso-lation because IPE reduces vision and the ability to speak and hear.

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED5-60

ANNEX A TOCHAPTER 5

SPLINTER DISTANCE CHART FOR FIRE PLANNING

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED 5A-1

Weapon System Lt Gun105 mm

AS90/FH70155 mm

MLRS 81 mmMortar

Ammunition Type L31 L15 M483 M77 HE

LethalSplinterDistance

(m)

GroundBurst

40 55 30

AirBurst

50 85

Bomblet 100 x115

600 diameter(1 launcher)

SafeSplinterDistance

(m)

GroundBurst

250 (1)125 (2)

400 (1)200 (2)

300 (1)125 (2)

AirBurst

400 (1)200 (2)

500 (1)250 (2)

Bomblet 600 (1)200 (2)

1000 (1)600 (2)

Notes:

(1) Unprotected.(2) Protected.

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED5A-2

Chapter 6

OPERATIONS IN SPECIFIC ENVIRONMENTS

SECTION 1. — INTRODUCTION

General

0601. In addition to the three primary landoperations of war with the associatedtransitional phases which link them, thereare a number of other operations whichrequire their own tactical doctrine due to thespecific nature of the environment in whichthe operations take place. The environmentcan be: terrain specific, for instance forestsor built-up areas; climatic specific, such asdesert or arctic regions; or a combination of the two such as mountainous regions. Forthese operations there is no change to the employment of the fundamental principlesof war or the manoeuvrist approach.

0602. This chapter describes the doctrine for five types of operations in specificenvironments. Doctrine for other operations can be found in the following publications:

a. Jungle Operations. Infantry Tactical Doctrine, Volume 1, Pamphlet 5 —Infantry Company Group Jungle Tactics (to follow — replaces Pamphlet No. 46— Company Group Jungle Operations Basic Skills and Drills (Army Code No.71467)).

b. Mountain Operations. AFM Volume 4 Part 1.

c. Desert Operations. AFM Volume 4 Part 3.

d. Cold Weather Operations. AFM Volume 4 Part 4.

0603 – 0604. Reserved.

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED 6-1

Contents

Page

SECTION 1. — INTRODUCTION 6–1SECTION 2. — CROSSING AND BREACHINGOF OBSTACLES 6–2SECTION 3. — FIGHTING IN BUILT-UPAREAS (FIBUA) 6–12SECTION 4. — OPERATIONS IN FORESTS 6–36SECTION 5. — OPERATIONS IN CONDITIONSOF LIMITED VISIBILITY 6–44

SECTION 2. — CROSSING AND BREACHING OF OBSTACLES

Introduction

0605. An obstacle is a natural or man-made restriction to movement which willnormally require special equipment or munitions to overcome. A coordinated series ofobstacles is known as a barrier. Forces require an ability to cross obstacles tocontinue movement in support of operations. Although normally crossings occurduring offensive operations, they may also be necessary during defensive or delayingoperations. They can occur throughout the combat zone and along lines ofcommunication further to the rear. Often they involve a passage of lines.

0606. Types of Obstacles and Their Characteristics.

a. Inland Bodies of Water or Waterways.

(1) Bodies of water are normally obstacles after the destruction of fixedbridges.

(2) Detours are not normally possible.

(3) The need for crossing operations can normally be foreseen.

(4) Some types of vehicles may cross without engineer assistance.

(5) Crossing difficulty will depend on climatic and terrain conditions.

b. Minefields.

(1) Normally cause attrition.

(2) Normally covered by observation and fire.

(3) Detours/bypassing may be possible.

(4) The need for a breach may not be anticipated.

(5) Normally engineer assistance is required for a breach.

c. Other Obstacles.

(1) Rough, soft or marshy ground, terrain covered by deep snow.

(2) Craters and ditches.

(3) Vertical steps and slopes.

(4) Contaminated areas.

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED6-2

(5) Abatis, extended wire entanglements, debris, including collateraldamage from nuclear weapons.

Note: In situations where both a crossing and a breaching are required(e.g., integrated river and minefield obstacles) it will be necessary to takenote of their individual characteristics. Minor obstacles are crossed andbreached by units using their own resources. The crossing of theseobstacles is not considered further in this Section.

0607. Types of Crossing and Breaching.

a. Hasty Crossing/Breaching. A hasty crossing/breaching takes place fromthe line of march, with little preparation, using resources immediately available.The intent of conducting such an operation is to execute a crossing before theenemy has the opportunity to prepare his defensive position fully.

b. Deliberate Crossing/Breaching. A deliberate crossing/breaching requiresextensive preparations and heavy or special engineer equipment. It isconducted because of the complexity of the obstacle, or when a hastycrossing/breaching has failed.

0608. Employment Considerations.

a. Any obstacle can be overcome given sufficient resources and time. Acommander should aim to seize a crossing site or minefield lane intact orconduct a hasty crossing/breaching of the obstacle before the enemy has timeto react.

b. Bypassing an obstacle is often more expeditious, even if forces have totravel greater distances. On the other hand, bypassing an obstacle may complywith the intentions of the enemy.

c. If obstacles cannot be bypassed, it may be useful to overcome them inplaces where it is not expected by the enemy. Combined with deceptionmeasures, it may thus be possible to surprise the enemy and to avoid losses.

d. The movement of troops and equipment across the obstacle and theirdeployment on the far side must be strictly controlled to maintain momentum,avoid congestion, provide flexibility and establish sufficient force to defeat anyenemy counter-action.

e. Limited visibility creates favourable conditions for overcoming obstacleswhile impeding observed enemy fire. The protective effect of limited visibilitymay be reduced by modern surveillance and fire control means.

f. In most cases, obstacles defended by the enemy will not be overcome untilthe enemy fire has been neutralized.

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED 6-3

0609. Planning. The following factors are applicable to all crossing andbreaching operations:

a. Adequate and timely intelligence and reconnaissance will:

(1) Confirm the existence and nature of any obstacles.

(2) Assist the commander’s decision to bypass or mount a hasty ordeliberate operation. From this decision, the requirement for anydeployment of engineer equipment and other forces will be established.

b. Effective movement control measures including timings.

c. Maximum use of deception to achieve surprise.

d. Adequate air defence and fire support.

0610. Forces and Tasks. The battlegroup commander will normally divide hisforce into three basic groups:

a. The In Place Force. The tasks of the In Place Force are to secure thehome bank of a river or minefield breach and to assist the assaulting troops inmounting the operation. Clear orders should be given for any direct fire supportrequired. FOOs must be deployed so that both the crossing and the subsequentfighting to establish a bridgehead can be covered. The following points shouldbe noted:

(1) To assist the assaulting troops, the In Place Force will be responsiblefor:

(a) Marking assembly areas and routes.

(b) Prepositioning engineering equipment such as assault boats,rafts and explosive breaching equipment. In view of the weight of theequipment this should be as close as possible to the crossing point.

(c) Establishing crossing sites or, in the case of a minefield, aminefield breaching site, with an appointed commander and thenecessary engineer resources both to undertake the operation andmaintain access routes.

(d) Providing guides and traffic control posts.

(e) Security and implementing any deception plan.

(f) Providing overwatch and direct fire support for the assaultingforce.

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED6-4

(g) Evacuation of wounded.

(2) The command and control arrangements for the In Place Force needto be clearly defined. There must be no ambiguities about responsibilities,planning must be flexible and communications excellent, although radiosilence should be maintained until surprise is lost.

(3) Whenever possible, the In Place Force should be provided by a unitor units not involved in either establishing or breaking out of thebridgehead. An infantry battlegroup will only be able to conduct a rivercrossing or major breaching operation unaided against light opposition. Amedium reconnaissance squadron is particularly suitable for employmentas the In Place Force.

b. Bridgehead Force. The Bridgehead Force will consist of an assaultechelon and a main body.

(1) The assaulting troops will normally consist of infantry and MILAN,FOOs and MFCs, reinforced by armour as soon as a crossing site isopened.

(2) The tasks of the assaulting troops will be:

(a) To establish an initial bridgehead to cover the completion andimprovement of the breach or crossing sites.

(b) To expand the initial bridgehead to give sufficient space for theassembly of the breakout force.

(c) To conduct the breakout if this must be done from within thebattlegroup.

(3) The initial bridgehead must be rapidly enlarged and reinforced.Armour should then be ferried across as soon as possible and, onceassembled, used to spearhead an enlargement. Unnecessary delay willonly result in the enemy being allowed time to recover from their initialsurprise and deploy their own reserves to counterattack. Should abattlegroup be tasked with undertaking a crossing or breaching operationunaided, then those elements of the battlegroup required for enlarging thebridgehead or breaking out may, at least in part, have to be employedinitially on In Place Force tasks.

c. Breakout Force. The Breakout Force is tasked with the continuation of theoperation. This is usually allocated to a separate unit but can be given to theBridgehead Force. It is important to remember that the breakout is the aim of abreach or crossing and time must not be wasted unnecessarily during theassault and build-up stages.

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED 6-5

0611. Conduct. The conduct of a company group level obstacle crossingoperation will follow these lines:

a. Initial Actions.

(1) When the lead elements, which may or may not include closereconnaissance, reach an obstacle they will inform the company groupcommander and then try to find a way around the obstacle. At the sametime, they will look for suitable crossing sites. If engineer reconnaissanceis available they must be provided with close protection while carrying outtheir reconnaissance tasks. Early warning order of likely engineerresources will greatly assist maintaining momentum.

(2) While the reconnaissance continues, one or two platoons will moveup as quickly as possible to provide overwatch for the reconnaissancegroup. The company group commander starts his estimate.

(3) Remaining forces, controlled by the company group 2IC, occupyhides. The 2IC then deploys forward to behind the overwatch force withthe support group, which may consist of MILAN, GPMG(SF), ambulanceand the company echelon. He will then select a RV in dead ground fromthe obstacle and some 200–300 metres from it.

b. Preparation Stage. If the reconnaissance group find no way round theobstacle and the company group commander does not order a bounce crossing,the crossing drill will continue into the next stage.

(1) With the crossing site identified, either by reconnaissance or thecompany group commander, the engineer resource requirement will beconfirmed.

(2) The company 2IC moves to the RV with the support group. He thenmarks the route from the RV to the crossing site.

(3) The company group commander issues his warning order whichmust include:

(a) Location of the crossing site.

(b) Location of the RV.

(c) Platoon(s) providing overwatch.

(d) Platoon(s) to form bridgehead.

(e) Tasks for supporting combat forces — armour, MILAN,GPMG(SF).

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED6-6

(f) Order of march.

(g) H Hour not before.

(4) The FOO will then develop his fire plan, including smoke anddeception targets.

(5) Overwatch group moves to cover crossing site and ensures sitecannot be interfered with direct fire from the far side.

(6) The assault group move into hides near the RV. The company groupcommander issues his orders and the FOO the fire plan.

c. Assault Stage. With all elements in place the assault stage begins.

(1) Under the cover of a deception fire plan engineers move forwardfrom their hide to the RV and thence to the crossing site.

(2) The engineers start to work on the obstacle. The time at which theystart is H Hour.

(3) Once breach is successful the 2IC calls forward the assault group viathe RV to the crossing site according to the order of march.

(4) The assault group cross then clear enemy direct fire systems to allowthe overwatch group to disengage and cross the obstacle.

0612. Combat Support.

a. Fire Support. Artillery and mortars are usually positioned so that they canprovide continuous support during all phases of a crossing. The primary task ofboth of these weapons is to provide supporting fire to troops in the bridgehead.They should also mask enemy observation of the crossing sites and employcounter battery fire to neutralize enemy forces defending the obstacle. Armedhelicopters provide the commander with additional flexible fire support.

b. Engineer Support. Nearly all crossings require engineer support. Themain task of the engineers is to enable the bridgehead force to cross theobstacle. As a secondary task, they may be required to prepare obstacles toprotect the flanks of the crossing force. Usually personnel and equipmentcommitted to both of these tasks are drawn from forces not involved in thecrossing or subsequent operations as these forces require their own engineersfor the assault and tasks in and beyond the bridgehead. Operations may berestricted by the amount of specialized crossing equipment available.Additionally, engineers are required to support following forces.

c. Air Defence. Forces conducting a crossing present a particularlyattractive target to the enemy. Although each force is responsible for its own air

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED 6-7

defence, special arrangements may be made for the actual crossing sites andthe routes to them because of their importance.

0613. Command and Control. In a battlegroup level operation most of thecommand and control infrastructure for a crossing operation is at levels higher thancompany. However, all crossing operations must have a clear command organizationwhich plans and executes the plan. For a major crossing operation a separatecontrolling HQ may be formed by the tactical commander.

Planning a Water Crossing Operation

0614. A crossing is done in three overlapping phases:

a. Assault. To gain a lodgement on the far side of the obstacle. This phase isnot required for an unopposed crossing.

b. Build-Up. To extend the lodgement into a bridgehead.

c. Consolidation. To establish a firm base within the bridgehead from whichto break out and continue the overall operation.

0615. At battlegroup and formation level, if possible the crossing will be conductedon a broad front with multiple crossing sites. Areas selected for the crossing ofobstacles should have, either naturally or through engineer development, thefollowing features:

a. A suitable number of crossing sites, with alternatives, which are dispersedto reduce vulnerability and to provide flexibility. The number of crossing sitesestablished is normally twice that required by the desired traffic flow. This isnecessary as time does not normally allow other sites to be started, should theinitial ones fail. In addition, the threat may dictate moving to another site.

b. Cover from observation.

c. Routes to and from crossing sites, to include lateral routes which have therequired load classification and capacity.

d. Waiting areas.

e. Sufficient space for the establishment of a bridgehead.

f. Locations for elements providing support by direct fire and observedindirect fire.

g. Assembly areas which are located some distance from the obstacle whereforces wait to move to the crossing site. The assembly areas need to bedispersed, have good routes to the crossing sites, and good cover andconcealment.

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED6-8

0616. Selection of a Bridgehead. A bridgehead should have the followingcharacteristics:

a. Defensible terrain of sufficient extent that the enemy cannot seriouslyinterfere with the crossing.

b. Sufficient crossing and movement facilities to avoid congestion.

c. A base for the continuation of the overall operation.

0617. Crossing Area. The tactical commander — generally the commander of abrigade or higher formation — will order a crossing area only if the tactical situation orthe nature of the obstacle requires it. The depth of the crossing area is normally notvery great. However, its depth will depend on the size of the obstacle and the terrain.Its near and far boundaries should be positioned within the closest lateral routesapproximately three kilometres from the water or easily recognizable terrain features,which run parallel to the obstacle.

0618. Equipment Reserve. Selected items of equipment must be held inreserve, ready for short notice replacement or to maintain crossing sites. Once acrossing is completed, equipment must be recovered for re-use or replaced withpermanent equipment as soon as possible.

0619. Liaison. The tactical commander must keep the engineer commanderinformed of his intentions and plans. Thus the engineer commander is able to makehis estimate of the situation and advise on the resources available, the number andlocation of suitable crossing sites, the assistance needed from other elements and thetime required for preliminary work. Additionally, this allows the crossing areacommander and the crossing site commander to operate decentralized in times ofreduced communications or changes in the situation or threat.

0620. Methods of Crossing. The methods of crossing water are by:

a. Boat. This is normally done using assault boats. However, the use of localcivilian craft should not be ignored.

b. Flotation. Flotation employs improvised buoyancy means. This iseffective for small numbers of men when out of contact with the enemy.

c. Infantry Bridge. The primary role of the infantry bridge is to enabledismounted infantry to cross a water obstacle quickly and more efficiently thanhad hitherto been possible. When the force is less than platoon strength theeffort of bridge construction may not be worthwhile and other forms of crossingmay be more appropriate. Full details of the infantry bridge can be found inPamphlet 3 and Infantry TD Note 2.

d. Helicopters. There are occasions when the advantages gained frommoving troops, support weapons and possibly essential equipment well into the

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED 6-9

bridgehead by helicopter will outweigh the risk of losing aircraft. An examplemight be moving troops to block likely counterattack routes in an operationmounted against a lightly held river line.

Minefield Breaching

0621. Types of Breaching. The types of breaching are:

a. Hand Breaching. Hand breaching is a slow operation, during which troopsare very vulnerable. A full scale hand breach is not practicable when in contactwith an enemy with modern surveillance devices. However, it may be used todevelop lanes after an initial breach by explosive or mechanical means, and toclear routes through our own minefields.

b. Explosive Breaching. This is using an explosive filled hose for breaching.There are two types, one for clearing anti-personnel mines and the other forclearing anti-tank mines. The range of these weapons is limited and if theminefield is deep, several successive firings may be required. Infantry assaultpioneers are trained in the use of the anti-personnel mine breaching equipment.

c. Mechanical Breaching. Mechanical breaching is done by ploughsmounted on AVREs and which can also be mounted on AVLB tanks.

0622. Anti-Tank Ditches. A combination obstacle, for example an anti-tank ditchin a minefield, can be difficult to breach. Equipment exists to deal with each part of theobstacle, but the difficulty of controlling equipment, in the confines of a minefield,under fire and perhaps at night, is obvious.

0623. Organization. The breaching force must be under a single commanderand at battlegroup level this would be a sub-unit commander. The task of thebreaching force is to open, and keep open, one or more routes through the minefieldfor the assaulting force. The breaching force on each route is likely to consist ofarmour, infantry for local protection, field or armoured engineers, FOO, MFC,elements of the traffic control organization and a recovery vehicle.

0624. Command and Control. All components of the breaching force should beplaced under the breaching force commander. If one route through the obstacle isrequired it will be normal to attempt two or more lanes close together. A breachcommander is required for each route. If there are several obstacles in depth, onebreach commander should be given the task of making the lane through all theobstacles on one route.

0625. Planning.

a. Seizure of minefield lanes intact or an opportunity for a hasty breachingmust be exploited. If this fails a deliberate breaching will be necessary.

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED6-10

b. For breaching to have a reasonable chance of success, the minimuminformation required is the minefield depth, its front and rear edges and detailsof enemy weapons covering the minefield.

c. The aim must always be to breach paths and lanes through enemyminefields from the very beginning in order to enable dismounted infantry andcombat vehicles to cross the barrier. Whether paths may be prepared inadvance will depend on the situation, terrain, type of barrier and breachingequipment available. Paths are to be enlarged rapidly to form lanes. As manylanes as possible should be breached.

0626. Execution.

a. For enemy obstacles, reconnaissance should include, if possible, thebreaching of a patrol path or lane through the minefield.

b. If the enemy situation allows, dismounted troops cross the minefield andestablish a lodgement on the far side, although this may not always be possible.If either case, it is necessary to form a breaching force to open lanes forpersonnel and vehicles of the assault echelon.

c. If the minefield has been prepared by friendly forces, it is crossed usingexisting gaps or lanes, or newly breached lanes.

d. Once lanes are open, traffic control posts both ends of the lanes arerequired. In addition, recovery posts will be established at the approaches to alllanes and, occasionally, on both sides of the minefield.

e. With the assault echelon across the minefield and secure, engineerscomplete their preparation of breaching sites to include marking. Movementcontrol elements complete their deployment to control the movement of themain body across the minefield. Complete clearance of barriers requires aconsiderable amount of time and resources. Therefore, usually it can be justifiedonly if operationally necessary.

Wire Obstacles

0627. Wire is laid around a defended locality to prevent the position being overrunby attacking dismounted infantry. It will normally be covered by fire and will often belaid in conjunction with a protective minefield.

0628. Methods of Breaching or Crossing Wire Obstacles. Whatever method isadopted, it must be included in the plan so that the correct equipment or vehicles areavailable at the right time. Methods are:

a. Cutting. The use of wire cutters is a quiet but slow method of making alane through wire.

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED 6-11

b. Mats or Improvised Ladders. Mats or improvised ladders may be used tolay over the wire to provide a crossing.

c. Bangalore Torpedo. A bangalore torpedo consists of a number of explosivefilled metal tubes which can be joined together and pushed through the wire. It isdetonated by riflemen and will clear a path three or four metres wide.

d. Artillery or Tank Fire. Sustained artillery fire or tanks firing HESH can cutgaps in wire but ammunition expenditure will be high.

e. Tank Dozer Blade. AVRE and MBT fitted with a dozer blade will clearmost types of obstacle.

f. Driving Over. Tracked vehicles can be used to flatten wire obstacles butmay be immobilized if the wire lodges in the tracks.

0629 – 0630. Reserved.

SECTION 3. — FIGHTING IN BUILT-UP AREAS (FIBUA)

Introduction

0631. In general, built-up areas are an obstacle to tactical movement, in particular ofarmoured forces. Narrow streets and alleys, power and telephone lines, buildings,low-tonnage bridges, and debris from buildings destroyed in battle, present obstaclesfor movement and for the fire of most weapon systems. Therefore the majority ofoperations will rely on dismounted troops in close combat. However, none of thesefactors should preclude the tenets of manoeuvre warfare.

0632. Built-up areas are characterized by observation and fields of fire extremelylimited at ground level by buildings. Ranges can be as short as 100 metres but mayextend to as much as 1000 metres on some wider roads. Observation may beincreased on upper floors or roofs of higher buildings; but because of surroundingbuildings, this advantage is often negated due to dead space. Proper deployment andthorough reconnaissance can provide adequate hide positions, fire positions androutes for armoured vehicles. Covered fighting positions will probably have to becreated for defensive operations.

0633. Avenues of approach exist at multiple levels in built-up areas. The traditionalavenues of approach follow major roads that support the movement of combinedarms units. Avenues of approach also exist for dismounted infantry below street level(through sewers, maintenance tunnels and cellars), and above street level (roof tops,or through walls of closely joining buildings).

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED6-12

Planning Considerations

0634. Operations in built-up areas are characterized by the following:

a. Detailed centralized planning and decentralized execution.

b. Infantry are the predominant force used in urban terrain.

c. Operations concentrate on narrow frontages.

d. Close cooperation and detailed planning of combat support and combatservice support.

e. Psychological and physical stress of soldiers and leaders is a major factorduring the battle.

0635. The following is of special interest in built-up areas:

a. The company is likely to expend huge quantities of small arms ammunition.

b. Transportation of supplies and evacuation of wounded are very difficultduring battle because of collateral damage and limited safe routes formovement. Pre-stocking supplies at key locations and strong-points is veryuseful. Distribute medical supplies to the lowest level possible. Additionalmanpower may need to be allocated for ammunition resupply and casualtyevacuation.

c. Armour is very vulnerable to infantry attack with hand-held anti-tankweapons and demolitions.

d. Radio communications are usually poor in urban areas and must beaugmented by wire communications in defence. Public telephones, thoughinsecure, are often a reliable communications resource.

e. In the defence, obstacles must be carefully planned and prioritized to makesure adequate routes are available for manoeuvre, counterattacks and logisticalresupply.

f. Civil authorities are responsible for civilians in the area. If no civil authorityis dealing with the problems of refugees and civil discipline, the military policeare responsible for their control. Civilians who volunteer may help constructpositions or act as guides or interpreters.

Offensive Operations in Built-Up Areas

0636. If the company group is operating independently its combat power will limit itto attacks on built-up areas of village-size and below. If it is operating within a

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED 6-13

battlegroup or brigade concept then the group can be a part of a much larger offensiveoperation with the capacity to assault a town.

0637. The general tactical principles for the attack apply equally to FIBUA, varied tosuit the size, layout and construction of the built-up area. Normal attack procedureswill be used to seize objectives on narrow frontages. Movement in short bounds mustbe covered by fire and seized areas must be thoroughly cleared to ensure that noenemy are left behind.

0638. Stages. Whatever the level of attack there are five stages:

a. Stage 1. — Investment. When tactically possible, and provided there aresufficient troops, the area should be isolated to prevent the defender’swithdrawal and to hamper reinforcement and resupply. The Investment Forceshould acquire information on enemy positions and may assist with direct firesupport. Reconnaissance troops with artillery support, backed by armour, aresuited to this task. In some circumstances cut-offs should be sited so as toencourage the defender to attempt to break out. This could expose him to flankattack in the open and make the clearance task easier.

b. Stage 2. — The Break-In. A deliberate attack will usually be launched togain a foothold in the town and to secure firm entry points for the subsequentclearance phase. The defender is likely to have good surveillance and fields offire with well prepared cover and concealment. The break-in should have limitedobjectives with the maximum direct and indirect fire support. It should belaunched at night or under cover of smoke and with speed. Plans should bemade to neutralize enemy surveillance devices and to deceive the enemy aboutthe main line of approach. Once entry has been gained, the lines of approachmust be made secure to ensure free movement into and out of the area.

c. Stage 3. — Securing of Objectives. Systematic fighting through the built-up area will be conducted on narrow axes in order to seize the limited objectives.It is simpler and often more sound to clear on parallel axes so that a measure ofmutual support can be given. Circumstances and strength may sometimespermit a simultaneous attack from more than one direction, which may confusethe defender and complicate the commitment of his reserve. The phase shouldculminate in the securing of the main objectives, which may be enemystrongpoints, key buildings or a major route and should result in the attackergaining control of the built-up area. The relentless maintenance of momentum isthe key to this stage.

d. Stage 4. — The Clearance. Based on secure objectives the clearanceoperation will be conducted by sectors, designed ultimately to kill or capture allremaining enemy.

e. Stage 5. — Reorganization. Defensive positions should be established toensure that any remaining enemy do not infiltrate or recapture the cleared

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED6-14

objectives. Regrouping is likely to be essential, together with immediateresupply of ammunition and water. The treatment of casualties and control ofPWs and civilians are tasks that will also require the allocation of manpower andresources.

0639. Planning and Preparation. Planning and preparation for an attack willconcentrate on the following aspects:

a. Information. As much information must be sought from all availablesources: large scale maps, town plans and guide books, sewer, transport andservices charts, air photographs, local police and authorities, air and groundreconnaissance and civilians.

b. Estimate. The commander’s estimate will seek to identify the mainobjectives and the approaches to them. Allocation of troops to task must ensurethat it is sufficient to match the task with an echelon available to maintainmomentum. Surprise and deception will be key considerations. The plan mustbe simple and flexible.

c. Planning Factors. The plan will include the following factors:

(1) Main Objectives. Main objectives are key points, often placedcentrally or in a dominating position. The capture of a main objectiveshould provide the attacking force with a firm base from which to mountfurther assaults. The company group will probably have the capture of amain objective as its mission.

(2) Limited Objectives. Progress to the main objective is made by thecapture of a series of subsidiary or limited objectives. These will probablybe platoon missions.

(3) Momentum. Maintenance of the momentum is essential as pauseswill give the enemy time to regroup, react and regain local initiative. It willbe achieved by commanders being well forward personally directingoperations and triggering echelons and reserves.

(4) Control. Strict control by commanders at all levels is vital to preventfriendly fire incidents and to keep the attack focused on its objectives.Nicknames, report lines and boundaries assume particular importance.The adoption of a common building numbering system, division of areasinto sectors and use of a building marking system will aid control.

(5) CSS. To be successful a FIBUA assault demands a sound logisticplan to overcome the particular requirements of resupply and casualtyevacuation. Provision must be made for high rates of ammunition usageand for casevac, ideally, controlled by the CSM, together with additionaldedicated manpower.

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED 6-15

0640. Progress. Progress will be slow and must allow for each objective to beseized, and then turned into a firm base before fresh troops are passed through toassault the next objective. It should always be part of the attacker’s design to be reallyclose to the defender in order to minimize his defensive fire, create opportunities forquick surprise attacks, and to cause strain and fatigue to the defenders who will haveto man forward positions in strength. The following factors should also be taken intoaccount:

a. Reinfiltration. Reinfiltration into areas already cleared will not be difficultfor an offensively minded defender. To counter this, cleared areas must bedominated by patrols and observation based upon the securely held mainobjectives. Tanks and anti-tank weapons must be sited and protected, mineslaid and obstacles set up. Ammunition and supplies must be replenished, cellarsand buildings strengthened and access cleared through them.

b. Progress Markers. All elements of the attack force must be aware of eachother’s progress, particularly when infantry are supported by tanks or aircraft.Methods of indicating progress must be agreed, e.g., coloured smoke, aircraftrecognition panels, blankets hung from windows, paint and chalk marks ondoors. Cyalumes/lightsticks are very effective by day and night and colouredmine tape may be used to mark a safe route through and between buildings.

c. Civil Population. Civilians may be caught in the fighting and foundsheltering in cellars or similar refuges. They may be of value in providingimmediate intelligence on enemy positions. Care should be taken to ensure thatenemy are not concealed among them disguised as civilians.

0641. Street Clearing. Street clearance is a company group operation with theattacker having the choice of some or all of the following routes:

a. Streets, but keeping away from the open areas exposed to enemy fire.

b. Gardens and backyards parallel to the streets.

c. Roofs of houses.

d. Inside houses through dividing walls by mouse-holing.

e. Underground approaches using sewers and drains.

0642. In clearing a street, two platoons may work in parallel along opposite sides,their advance being controlled by the company commander who ideally should be in aposition to observe progress. The platoons will move forward alternatively giving firesupport to each other. Tanks or Warrior may be called forward to provide fire supportbut this requires close cooperation with the Infantry, who must select targets, firepositions and routes for AFVs.

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED6-16

0643. Each platoon commander must first arrange covering fire for the leadingsection to enter the block he is to clear. The section must clear the first house, which isthen made into a firm base. Men from this section should be posted so that they cancover the second section when it passes through them to secure the next house.Sections must be kept within easy reach by voice and hand signal.

0644. Sections advance from house to house by mouseholing, working throughwalls, over roofs, through sewers or back gardens and keeping away from the openstreet exposed to enemy fire. Ideally each house is entered at the top and cleareddownwards. There must be a thorough search in each house as it is cleared, includingouthouses and cellars. Reorganization should be on the ground floor and not the topfloor. Safe routes between and through buildings should be marked.

0645. Infantry Weapons in the Attack. Within the confines of house to housefighting all infantry weapons are of value if correctly used. However, a knowledge ofhouse construction is necessary to avoid endangering the firer or crew; for instanceattempting to fire through the ceiling of a room to neutralize the occupants of the floorabove or below may be disastrous if the house has concrete upper floors. Similarly tothrow an HE L2 grenade from a landing into a room of a pre-fabricated house mayprove equally self defeating.

0646. The principal infantry weapons in FIBUA are:

a. IW. The 5.56 mm Rifle being short, light and fully automatic, is particularlysuitable for FIBUA.

b. L96 Sniper Rifle. Sniping is especially effective in FIBUA as it is difficult tolocate the sniper’s position. It can best be used to pick-off commanders andradio operators, to ensure that tanks remain closed down, and createpsychological uncertainty in the minds of the enemy. Although more normallyassociated with defence, snipers are very effective in the attack. In addition totheir traditional roles, they should be used to locate and kill enemy snipers and areeffective on the flanks where they can interdict the defender’s movement.

c. GPMG(SF). Machine guns are the main supporting weapon in a FIBUAattack but approximately 100 rounds of 7.62 mm from a GPMG is required tocreate a hole one foot in diameter in a brick wall 20 inches thick. Another 300rounds approximately are necessary to enlarge the hole to two feet in diameter.Nevertheless, as part of the direct fire support they are very effective.

d. 51 mm Mortar. This is effective as a smoke projector when, if necessary,the bombs can be directed at low angle against the sides of buildings to achievea shorter range than would otherwise be possible. The HE bomb is invaluablefor firing over buildings and reaching enemy dug-in in gardens and similar typesof enclosed cover. A minimum range of 50 metres can be achieved.

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED 6-17

e. 81 mm Mortar. The use of this weapon in the immediate battle is limitedbecause of the short distance between opposing forces. However, it will bevaluable in preventing enemy reinforcements or protecting flanks. Post impactdetonation fuzing is particularly useful in allowing penetration of more fragileroofs before detonation.

f. Grenades. The L2 HE grenade is a basic tool for house clearance and anample supply must be arranged. Grenade launchers such as the RGGS, with anaccurate range of up to 150 metres, will be of particular significance in FIBUAoperations. The red phosphorus L84 grenade provides effective, short rangesmoke cover.

g. MILAN. Because of its minimum range of 300 – 400 metres, MILAN is oflimited value inside built-up areas where the short range weapons dominate.Difficulties may also be experienced with wire guided missiles because ofoverhead wires and cables found in many towns. If fired inside buildingsoverpressure is likely to cause ceilings to fall and walls of single brick thicknessbehind the firing point may collapse; timber shoring may, therefore, be required.However, MILAN will be effective outside the built-up area with the InvestmentForce or direct fire support group. Its thermal sight is a useful adjunct to theSTAP.

h. LAW. This is the primary anti-armour weapon for FIBUA but is alsounsuitable for firing from inside buildings. LAW, like all HEAT weapons, isunsuitable for making entry holes through brick or concrete walls. However, it iseffective as an anti-personnel weapon when fired through windows orloopholes. The arming distance of LAW 80 in 20 metres.

0647. Combat and Combat Support Forces. Although the brunt of FIBUA fallson the infantry, their success will depend on combined arms cooperation. The keypoints regarding the tactical employment of the other combat and combat supportforces are as follows:

a. Armour. Tanks with close infantry protection can provide intimate directfire support in all phases. They will be of particular value during the break-inphase as cut-off forces and in dominating parks and open areas. Tanks can alsogive cover to infantry with machine gun fire, knock entry holes in walls, destroybarricades, reduce enemy strong points, provide flank security and block enemyavenues of approach and withdrawal routes. However, they have a number oflimitations when operating in built-up areas:

(1) Mobility is restricted as they are confined to roads or streets whichwill often require clearance of debris, and possibly mines. Where possible,tanks should take advantage of parks and gardens which offer the bestfields of fire.

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED6-18

(2) Buildings will restrict the full traverse of the turret and the elevation ofthe main armament may be insufficient to reach top floors and rooftops.However, the commander’s machine gun is not so restricted.

(3) Tanks are particularly vulnerable to short range anti-tank weaponsand their crews, if exposed, may become casualties from snipers. Tanksmust, therefore, move through built-up areas closed down. They mustmove in short bounds using suppressive fire and be supported, if possible,by other tanks. At all times, tanks will require infantry support andprotection and single tanks will usually be under command of the infantryplatoon.

b. Artillery. The close quarter nature of the fighting, the difficulties ofobservation and correction, and the possible hindrance to our own movementby damage, all combine to limit the value of indirect fire support for the attackonce assault forces are inside the built-up area. Artillery fire is therefore bestused:

(1) To counter enemy artillery.

(2) To support the break-in attack.

(3) To harass and disrupt the movement of enemy reserves andsupplies.

(4) To attack known enemy locations in depth with airborne FOOs.

Guns can give intimate support in the direct fire role over open sights, to engagestrong points, but they will be vulnerable in this role and will need protection.

c. Engineers. Engineer advice will be essential in planning the attack. Fieldengineers with extra plant be essential to support all stages of the attack. A fieldtroop or armoured engineer troop may well be put under company groupcommand. Assault pioneer sections should work closely with engineers.Engineer tasks include:

(1) Assist with preparation of mousehole charges.

(2) Use of explosives for attacking strong points.

(3) Assisting infantry to gain access to buildings.

(4) When armoured engineers are available, the reduction of strongpoints using AVRE demolition guns and the crossing of obstacles usingAVLB or fascines.

(5) Clearance of mines, booby traps, debris and obstacles.

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED 6-19

(6) Assistance in reorganization by the construction of strong points andobstacles.

(7) Clearance of routes for resupply.

(8) Restoration of essential services and control of damage where life isin danger from leaking gas mains, and serious flooding from broken watermains.

d. Helicopters. Although vulnerable to air defence and small arms fire, lightsupport helicopters can perform some useful tasks:

(1) Visual and photographic reconnaissance.

(2) Air OP and FAC.

(3) Delivery of troops and OPs to high buildings.

(4) Movement of cut-off parties.

(5) Casualty evacuation.

(6) Resupply.

0648. Command and Control. FIBUA is difficult to control. Dispersion anddisruption can seldom be avoided in the mass of buildings and side streets. Control,once lost, is not easy to regain. Commanders must exercise tight command on theirfeet, close to the action, but without stifling the initiative of their subordinates. Theymust allow both time and space for subordinates to secure objectives, especiallywithin buildings when progress may be slow.

0649. The attack plan must be simple, meticulous and methodical. Objectives mustbe limited, clearly defined and well understood by all ranks. Momentum is achieved byfrequent leap-frogging with groups passing through being kept under observation andgiven fire support.

0650. The complexity of FIBUA and the high casualty rate, with commandersparticularly vulnerable, demands a simple plan clearly understood by all ranks. Acomplex plan will lead to confusion if commanders become casualties orcommunications fail.

0651. Control is best exercised by dividing the built-up areas into sectors, reportlines and boundaries:

a. Sectors. Clearly defined and recognizable sectors should be numberedor lettered and have a named commander. Sectors will normally be allotted ascompany group clearance tasks and then divided into sub-sectors for platoon

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED6-20

tasks. The area must be cleared methodically sector by sector. Each buildingwithin a sector should be allocated a number.

b. Bounds and Report Lines. Bounds, which should be defensible featuresor locations, and report lines which are merely landmarks, will normally beselected along streets, rivers, railway lines, etc., at right angles to the line ofadvance.

c. Boundaries. It is important that boundaries should be easily identifiable,so main thoroughfares are an obvious choice. However, enemy resistance willprobably be greatest on these obvious approaches which will require clearanceon both sides by one group. A commander must, therefore, balance theadvantages and disadvantages of choosing a thoroughfare as a boundary andseek alternatives. Boundaries should be down back alleys and gardens.

d. Collection Points. These should be established by each company groupas it completes the clearance of its allotted sector. It is to, and from, these pointsthat combat supplies are delivered, and casualties collected.

e. Nicknumbers. Key points, important buildings, main streets, open areas,etc., may be allotted nicknumbers.

0652. Communications. Internal security operations in urban areas havedemonstrated how easily VHF radios are screened and how limited their rangesbecome. As a consequence, radios must be carefully sited and maximum use must bemade of rebroadcast stations and the remoting of antennas to high points. The use ofthe upper end of the VHF band and high power switches on radios, where these exist,will improve communications. Commanders must be prepared to encounter difficultyin establishing and maintaining communications; they must therefore set limitedobjectives, covering a small area, and plan for the frequent resiting of rebroadcaststations in order to ensure communications. The use of heliborne rebroadcast stationsshould be considered. If time and the battle situation allow, maximum use should bemade of the civilian telephone system, if it has survived, supplemented by our ownline; this will be more likely in defence than in advance. Against a sophisticatedenemy, electronic warfare will need to be considered.

Defensive Operations in Built-Up Areas

0653. Principles. The normal tactical principles for defence apply to FIBUA.Consideration should always be given to an active defence with plans for local attacksand counter action as well as strong point positions. The tactical concept at companygroup level will depend on the task, size, layout and construction of the area and onthe time available for preparation. There are two tactical situations:

a. Defending a built-up area as part of a battlegroup task.

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED 6-21

b. Fighting from a village as part of a plan to destroy enemy forces in the openaround it.

0654. It should be borne in mind that historically, defenders in built-up areas, evenbehind extensive fortifications, have suffered considerably more casualties thanforces attacking or counterattacking.

0655. Components. There are four main components for the defence of a villageor town:

a. Perimeter Force.

b. Disruption Force.

c. Main Defensive Area (MDA).

d. A central reserve.

These will be backed by a comprehensive obstacle plan. In some circumstances, afinal defensive position is planned in depth to which the defenders withdraw as aprelude to holding out, withdrawal or to regroup for a counterattack.

0656. Organization. The precise tasks and troops given to each component willdepend on the size of the built-up area and the task organization of the battlegroup. Ina village or hamlet each component can be well manned and mutually supportingbecause the perimeter is short and the reserve sufficiently strong and close to providedepth and mutual support.

0657. In a town an ideal balance will seldom be possible. The length of theperimeter (even a small town one kilometre square has a perimeter of four kilometres)and the building density will stretch the perimeter force, reduce mutual supportbetween defended localities and increase the tasks and spread the reserve. It will thusbe necessary to concentrate on selected parts of the town, such as main routes orsuitable key points which must be denied to the enemy. These should be strongly heldby self supporting localities with all round defence each providing a firm base fromwhich to launch counter offensive operations. These localities should operate within acoordinated defensive plan that seeks to limit the enemy’s ability to manoeuvre by useof obstacles, mines and route denial, so forcing the enemy onto ground of thedefender’s choosing.

Preparation and Planning

0658. The defending commander has the great advantage of intimate localknowledge of the town from maps, charts, police and inhabitants. This localknowledge must be fully exploited by all of the defending force in the preparation andplanning stages of the operation. In common with all operations, the commander willneed to conduct an IPB for his task.

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED6-22

0659. Estimate. Based on the IPB, the commander will decide on his concept fordefence. This will form the basis of his allocation of troops to tasks and his obstacleand deception plans. Finally the plan will take account of preparation time for asuccessful defence.

0660. Perimeter Force. This will be established covering the most likelyapproaches, with interlocking arcs of observation and, if possible, fire. It will have thefollowing tasks:

a. To give warning of approaching enemy and thus prevent surprise.

b. Identify enemy strengths, intentions and Main Effort.

c. To destroy enemy reconnaissance and investment forces.

d. To force the enemy, by direct and indirect fire, to deploy and mount adeliberate attack in order to break into the town and concurrently reduce hiscombat power.

e. To deceive the enemy as to the strength and main locations of thedefending force.

These posts will be manned by the reconnaissance platoon reinforced by snipingtanks (if available), MILAN detachments, FOOs, MFCs and possibly infantry includingsome snipers. Concealed positions and routes will be essential for this mobile force tocarry out its task.

0661. Disruption Force. The disruption force is designed to inflict the maximumnumber of casualties on the enemy between the MDA and forward to the perimeterforce. This area must be littered with obstacles designed to delay, confuse and disruptthe enemy, and in so doing to channel him into killing areas covered by the defendedlocalities. Rubble, mines, booby-traps, snipers and tank-hunting parties of infantryshould abound. However, on the main routes leading to the defended localities theenemy will be allowed a comparatively trouble free run: his natural tendency to exploitsuccess will tend to lure him into the killing areas. The disruption force may be basedon the fire support company HQ and include elements from the reserve companygroup. To be successful the force needs sufficient space to conduct highly mobileoperations, similar to the concepts of a delay operation.

0662. MDA. At battlegroup level this will comprise a coordinated defence withdefended localities sited to cover a series of killing areas. The defended localities willbe of company group strength with tank support if available. They will consist ofmutually supporting platoon strong points with all round defence and their task is todeny a route or key point to the enemy. Within each defended locality a local reservemust be kept well forward to counterattack any enemy penetration. The strong pointshould not be held indefinitely and alternative positions must be prepared to helpdeception and for occupation when the original locality becomes untenable. The key

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED 6-23

will be to draw the enemy into selected killing areas where the defenders canconcentrate their firepower. Where possible the enemy should be deceived intoattacking evacuated strong points and then be forced on to the defensive byaggressive counterattacks.

0663. Reserves. In addition to local reserves in defended localities, thebattlegroup commander must hold a strong, mobile, central reserve as his principalmeans of influencing the battle. It should be of company group strength and will bereinforced by the perimeter force once the latter withdraws. The main tasks of thereserve will be to:

a. Seal off and destroy any enemy penetration between localities.

b. Counterattack to restore an over-run locality, especially when the enemyhad over-extended himself.

c. Reinforce the perimeter or, more likely, the disruption force.

0664. The Obstacle Plan. The obstacle plan must include areas outside andinside the built-up area. This must include the approaches to the perimeter force andkilling areas. As part of the commander’s concept of operations, obstacles shouldcanalize, block, disrupt and delay, while leaving routes open for reserve action andresupply.

0665. Civilians. The civil population will be a major problem. When they areunfriendly or actively hostile it is essential to clear them from the defended area. It isdesirable to evacuate friendly civilians but sometimes the active men and those inessential services may be retained to assist with preparation of the defence; but laterthey could become an administrative burden. Friendly civilians should not be givenweapons.

0666. Logistics. Defended localities should be logistically self-sufficient,including water, for as long as the defence is expected to last. Resupply and casualtyevacuation may have to be fought through. Fire fighting equipment must be available.

Conduct of the Defence

0667. Offensive Action.

a. Care must be taken by commanders to avoid the rigid layout of built-upareas becoming imposed on their dispositions. Flexibility will be enhanced if thedefenders fully exploit the advantage which will accrue from the thoroughacquaintance of all ranks with the side-streets, alley-ways, passages,alternative ways into and out of buildings and compounds, etc., which abound ina built-up area. Extensive local knowledge, which the attackers will not have, willgive innumerable opportunities for moving reserves unseen, for ambushing orfor cutting off the enemy. The defence must be aggressive with the attackers

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED6-24

harried by day and night. This can be achieved by re-infiltrating into buildingspreviously evacuated or captured, by sniping and local counterattacks.

b. It must be the object of the defence not merely to repel an attack but todestroy as many of the enemy as possible. If penetration is made between twolocalities, the defending garrisons must not only attempt to block furtheradvance (which is merely to react to the enemy) but must exploit their superiorknowledge of the ground to cut through and encircle as many of the attackers aspossible. Every opportunity must be taken to deny the enemy routes through abuilt-up area.

0668. Patrols and Snipers. The attacker will exploit concealed approaches andmay attempt to concentrate undetected to change the weight or direction of attack. Heshould be observed and harassed by energetic patrolling, sniping and ambushing, toprevent him surprising the defence in this way. Small patrols should disorganize theenemy by every means and to such an extent that any movement by him will bedangerous. In FIBUA the value to the defence of one well sited and well concealedsniper is immeasurable.

0669. Perimeter Action. Unless well concealed, the perimeter force is liable tobe pinpointed and destroyed by fire. It should be sited behind an obstacle of sufficientdepth to force the enemy to deploy and mount an attack a cross it. The use of directand indirect fire on enemy FUPs can be effective in reducing enemy combat powerand disrupting their attack. Sniping positions, especially by tanks, can surprise anddeceive the leading enemy. When the perimeter force can no longer inflict casualtieson the enemy, and are in danger of being cut-off, they should be withdrawn to adefended or depth locality. Stay-behind OPs should be left to continue to engage themain approaches by indirect fire.

0670. Disruption Action. The coordinated action of small, mobile teams con-ducting ambush and counterattacks, in conjunction with well planned obstacles, willeffectively disrupt the enemy’s attack. Tank hunting patrols will be effective.Encouraging the enemy to assault down a street whose exit is blocked, then attackingthe enemy’s rear, will reduce his momentum and break up his attack. Ultimately theseactions should be part of a coordinated effort to drive the enemy into the MDA’s killingareas.

0671. Action in MDA. Within each defended locality strong points must be bitterlydefended and re-infiltrated or counterattacked by the local reserve if lost. Localitiesnot under attack should patrol vigorously. Penetration between localities should be leftto the disruption force. Maximum use should be made of natural and artificialobstacles, streets must be blocked and fields of fire cleared. In time the strength andprogress of the enemy may make a counterattack inadvisable and it would be wiser toredeploy to an alternative or depth position.

0672. Counter Action. The central reserve must remain concentrated andmobile, using defended localities as bases from which to launch violent action to carry

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED 6-25

out its tasks. It should include tanks. The reserve may also be used to reinforce adefended locality, possibly bringing forward combat supplies, to secure withdrawalroutes, or to screen the final withdrawal from the town. It must be ready to producequick, shock action and should not be tied down in defensive preparation or sucked inpiecemeal to defensive action. Local knowledge, reconnaissance and rehearsal areimportant. If the composition of the battlegroup permits it will often be best to providetwo mobile reserves, each with a locality allotted as a secondary role. According to thedirection of the attack, one will occupy its allotted locality whilst the other remainsavailable as the striking force; it is essential that the commander should make thedecision on the respective roles sufficiently early to allow the timely occupation of thelocality which is to be defended.

0673. Strong Points. A company group defended locality will comprise a numberof section and platoon strong points so sited as to be mutually supporting and to givedepth to the locality. The localities must be capable of all round defence and contain areserve to act as a counterattack force within that locality. Strong points should not berestricted to one building which can be easily isolated and destroyed. Defensivestrength can best be achieved by grouping a strong point around a killing area, withfire positions in two or three different buildings providing interlocking and mutuallysupporting fire. Strong points may be of platoon strength or, in large buildings, ofcompany group strength and may include tanks. The tactical requirements and factorsregarding strong points are as follows:

a. Tactical Requirements. The first consideration is that a house or buildingmust satisfy the tactical requirements, which may be to provide a firm base fromwhich the reserve can operate, to withstand assault, to cover an obstacle, tosupport another building, to provide a link in a chain of communications, or todeny a particular approach. Any tactical requirement must be balanced againstthe protection afforded by different types of house or building construction. Itfollows that the size and location of the buildings chosen are of criticalimportance:

(1) Size. The size of the building being considered as part of apotential strong point is an important and frequently difficult consideration.Some buildings are too small, affording insufficient space for the troopswho must occupy them or so concentrating them that a single direct hit willdestroy them all. Other buildings will be too large, forcing too wide adistribution of defenders to ensure coverage of all approaches and anadequate concentration of firepower on those approaches, or theutilization of only a portion of the house, thus providing uncoveredapproaches and the requirement to defend within the building. Theselection of buildings for use as strong points ranks among the mostdifficult decisions that a sub-unit commander engaged in FIBUA mustmake.

(2) Surroundings. Adequate fields of fire are essential in order thattactical offensive requirements may be met, but buildings must also be

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED6-26

considered from the point of view of their own defence. A house may berejected, even if half the area round it is flat and open, if the other half hasapproaches that are difficult to guard and therefore the most likely to beused by the enemy. A house selected for defence should not be open toobservation from a dominating feature. Covered approaches to and from abuilding should be available. Where possible full use should be made ofweapons sited in trenches and gardens and outside areas surrounding thestrong points. Fire positions outside should be linked to the strong pointsby communication crawl trenches. Outside trenches will also usually benecessary for local protection of strong points.

b. Tactical Factors. When considering the selection of buildings for use asstrong points, the following tactical factors should also be considered:

(1) Men must never occupy rooms in a building singly, they should bestationed at least in pairs.

(2) Every ground approach to the building must be either covered bysurveillance and fire or blocked off either internally or externally, so as torender it unusable. Approaches over roofs and up through sewers must besimilarly catered for.

(3) Troops must not be concentrated in small buildings where a single hitfrom a large shell would be likely to incapacitate them all. On the otherhand, they must not be deployed in any building in less than half sectionstrength, thus to avoid their being overrun piecemeal.

(4) Troops should be deployed in tactically adjacent buildings so as toprovide mutual support or a firm base for a counterattack.

(5) Any buildings selected for occupancy should have a covered accessroute, either for escape or for resupply or reinforcement.

0674. Preparation. Preparation must be carried out both outside and inside thestrong point:

a. Outside the Strong Point. The following should, if possible, be carried out,but if there is insufficient time to carry out all the defensive measures outlinedbelow, commanders must establish clear priorities:

(1) Selected streets should be blocked and the obstacles covered byfire. However, some will need to be kept free for the movement ofreserves.

(2) Obstacles, either wire, barricades, mines including Projectors AreaDefence (PADs) should be placed around the houses themselves and onlikely approaches to prevent the attacker from getting close enough toplace pole charges.

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED 6-27

(3) Slit trenches should be dug.

(4) Fields of fire should be cleared, and dummy positions might beconstructed to attract the enemy and influence his choice of lines ofadvance.

b. Inside the Strong Point.

(1) Material Protection. Sandbags, mattresses, earth-filled cupboards,chests of drawers, etc., will be required for providing additional protectionwhere walls, particularly those in which loop-holes have been made, andfloors do not give sufficient protection. A possible requirement for defencestores is shown below; much can often be procured from local sources:

(a) Sandbags.

(b) Dannert wire.

(c) Barbed wire.

(d) Pickets 2 ft and 6 ft.

(e) Black hessian.

(f) Chicken wire.

(g) Water pumps and hose.

(h) Lamps.

(i) Crowbars.

(j) Sledgehammers.

(k) Rope.

(l) Lightweight ladders.

(m) Axes.

(n) Fire extinguishers.

(o) Pre-prepared mousehole charges.

(p) 1lb demolition charges.

(2) Access. Entrances should be barricaded, except those required foruse by the defenders and those intentionally left open as traps. The lattershould be specially prepared for blocking at short notice. Staircases and

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED6-28

passages will require blocking. Movement thereafter should be via holescut in the ceilings, through which ladders or knotted ropes can be lowered.

(3) Communications. Communications from the roof and within thehouse must be considered. If time permits, alternative means of passingfrom room to room by means of mouseholing should be made, providedthat the structure of the building is not seriously weakened. If cellars areused they should have two exits.

(4) Shoring Up. Rooms, especially cellars and ground floor rooms, willhave to withstand the additional weight of sandbags and protectivematerial, and the blast effect of explosions. Floors must be sufficientlystrong to take the extra pressure. Shoring timbers must be strong andvertical and must rest on a solid base. Boards or planks must be insertedbetween the top of the timbers and solid portions of the ceiling. Wedgeswhen driver between a baseplate and the bottom end of a shoring timbermust take up the strain sufficiently without lifting the ceiling constructionabove.

(5) Fire Precautions. Water, sand and implements for dealing with anoutbreak of fire are necessary. All baths, basins and buckets should bekept full. Gas and electric light should be turned off at the mains.Inflammable material not required should be removed.

0675. Siting of Weapons. For the defence of the building itself, automaticweapons should generally be sited near ground level and hand grenades thrown fromfirst floor level or higher. MILAN and LAW will have an improved hit and kill capability ifsited in upper storeys, so that they fire downwards onto the less protected tops of amore exposed target. Alternative positions should be provided so that fire can beswitched as required. All weapons should be used as far back from a window, loop-hole or aperture as is possible, consistent with their fields of fire having sufficient widthand depth. Sufficient windows and loop-holes are required for alternative positions,but the number of loop-holes should be kept as low as possible because they weakenthe structure of the building and involve labour and material. Loop-holes, especiallythose for observation, should be made in unexpected places such as under a windowsill or through the tiles of a roof. Each building must be prepared in depth so thatdefence from room to room can take place. The following considerations should alsobe borne in mind:

a. To obtain a wide arc, loop-holes are often made in the form of rectangularslits. They are, however, more effective if shaped like a ‘V’ with the wider sectionon the inside. Since they are also likely to be used for firing at targets above andbelow, they should be roughly cone shaped to present as small an exterioraperture as possible.

b. The edges of a loop-hole, especially when made in brickwork, will be liableto splinter when hit by a bullet. If possible, a protective lining, e.g., sacking held

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED 6-29

in place by wire netting, should be installed to reduce splinter effect. For thesame season, sandbags nearest to the firer or observer should be filled withearth or sand, and not shingle or stones.

c. When not in use, a loop-hole or window requires some form of cover, bullet-proof if possible, which can be placed in position to prevent the enemy seeing orfiring through it.

d. The glass of all windows of occupied rooms should be removed andreplaced by anti-grenade wire netting.

e. Methods of concealment and deception include making dummy loop-holesindistinguishable from the real ones; painting or draping well known and likelyobjects against or round loop-holes; use of lace curtains and placing of dummyfigures using clothing left behind in the house at apertures not in use.

f. When using a window, a firer should normally have a kneeling or standingposition prepared on either side of the window and protected by the wall. As hewill require to fire downwards, these positions should be raised well above thelevel of the sill upon a table or similar object, and sufficiently far away to preventhis rifle protruding through the window. A lying position does not always allowsufficient freedom for firing at widely varying angles, especially in elevation.

g. Some loop-holes should be made inside the building in case the enemyshould break in. Holes in floors will enable grenades to be dropped from anupper room into the one below.

0676. Combat and Combat Support Forces.

a. Tanks. Tanks form an integral part of the perimeter force and the mobilecentral reserve. They will also be useful within defended localities, providingmobile support for strong points or in the anti-tank role from prepared firepositions. They must not be used as static pill boxes in the open. Tank dozerblades can provide quick demolitions and clear rubble.

b. Artillery. Indirect fire will play a large part during the perimeter battle of thedefence and should continue to engage enemy approaching the built-up area.This will necessitate OPs remaining on the perimeter or in high buildings.Because of the probable closeness of opposing forces in FIBUA, and theproblems of observation, indirect fire becomes difficult for the defender toemploy during the MDA battle.

c. Engineers. Field engineers, assisted by assault pioneers if available, tankdozers and armoured engineers have the important task of preparing theobstacle plan. This plan, closely linked to the defensive plan, must be wellknown to all ranks, otherwise the defender’s ability to move will suffer. It willinclude:

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED6-30

(1) Protective minefields and demolitions on the perimeter approaches.

(2) Obstacles in the disruption force area and on the approaches tostrong points and defended localities.

(3) Cratering the areas between defended localities, taking advantage ofsewers and manholes whenever possible.

(4) Mining, surface laid when necessary, making use of craters andrubble. Also off route mines and Projectors Area Defence (PADs) both ofwhich are particularly effective when sited to fire downwards at an anglefrom first floor level.

(5) Blocking roads by rubble or in conjunction with a crib or vehicle.

(6) Extensive use of barbed wire on roads, roofs, or in gardens and inalleyways.

(7) Blocking underground systems which are not required by thedefence.

(8) Additional tasks include:

(a) Preparation of strong points including mouseholing andstructural strengthening of buildings.

(b) Provision of defence stores.

(c) Clearing fields of fire.

(d) Clearing routes.

(e) Water supply for domestic use and fire fighting.

(f) Maintenance of public services at the commander’s discretion.

There will never be enough sappers or assault pioneers to complete all thesetasks. Firm priorities must be laid down and all arms must be prepared to assist.

d. Helicopters. During the enemy approach and the perimeter battle, armedhelicopters may have the opportunity to engage approaching armour.

e. Infantry Support Weapons. Earlier in this section the strengths andlimitation of various infantry weapons in the attack are covered. These alsoapply in defence.

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED 6-31

0677. Command, Control and Communications.

a. Command. Although movement between defensive localities and strongpoints will be dangerous, command must be personal, close and aggressive.Because of the difficulty in communicating once battle is joined, commanders atall levels must thoroughly understand their task and be prepared to act withoutrecourse to higher authority for long periods. This will place a considerablestrain on junior commanders.

b. Control. Control must be maintained by simple plans, defined sectors andclear boundaries. Boundaries must be so arranged that all enemy lines ofapproach fall clearly into the area of responsibility of one defended locality oranother, hence boundaries should never run up a road.

c. Communications. Communications can be extremely difficult. VHF radiowill often be heavily screened and subject to sharply reduced ranges. The use ofhigher power sets, including HF, in armoured vehicles may have an advantageover manpack sets although judicious siting of manpacks may improve theireffectiveness. It may be possible to make use of local telephones and lineshould be laid wherever and whenever feasible with alternative routing wherepracticable, making maximum use of underground systems to protect line.

Fighting from Villages

0678. Principles. Fighting from a carefully selected and prepared village, infantrycan deny easy access through it and destroy enemy tanks from the flank and rear asthey move in the open ground around it. A defence based on a group of such villagescan provide significant opportunities to canalize an enemy advance across opencountry, to destroy enemy tanks en masse by enfilade fire and disrupt the advance byseparating the enemy armour from their supporting infantry who will be forced to clearthe villages by dismounted action.

0679. Thus fighting from built-up areas combines the principles of FIBUA with thoseof conventional armoured warfare in open country. However, the dispersion of thevillages may enable the enemy swiftly to isolate and reduce them one by one.Therefore, the defence of individual villages will form part of a wider plan incorporatingminefields, indirect fire, mutual support by long range anti-tank weapons and the useof armoured reserves. The overall coordination of such a plan would be at brigadelevel with the infantry battlegroup being given a group of villages with the tasks of:

a. Holding the important ground against direct attack.

b. Canalizing the enemy into ground suitable for the destruction of armour.

c. Providing a base or pivot for the employment of the brigade’s armouredreserve.

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED6-32

0680. The key to success at battlegroup level is:

a. The careful siting and controlled use of anti-armour weapons in conjunctionwith minefields, obstacles and indirect fire.

b. The firm defence of villages as the base for the anti-tank framework.

c. The timely deployment of a concentrated armoured reserve.

0681. Planning. In planning the defence, villages covering likely enemy axesshould be selected to provide:

a. Good fields of fire for anti-armour weapons across surrounding countrysideespecially to the flanks and rear.

b. Protection and concealment for defending forces.

c. Long range mutual support with other villages.

d. Covered withdrawal routes.

0682. Anti-Tank Framework. Following production of an IPB the battlegroupcommander will plan the anti-tank framework to cover the most likely approaches androutes through the area. His aim will be to engage enemy armour in the flank and rearfrom covered fire positions in the edge and rear of the villages. He will combine andcoordinate the fire of all available long and medium range anti-tank weapons in thebattlegroups — tanks, Swingfire and MILAN. The STAP, the plan for night andreduced visibility, and the obstacle plan are all complementary to the anti-armour plan.Minefields will usually be sited to deflect and canalize enemy armour not to block it.Mutual support will be between villages and when the ground or distance makes thisimpossible the commander must plan to use his reserves.

0683. Village Defence. Village defence has the fourfold aim of deflecting theenemy around the village, providing protection for the battlegroup anti-tankframework, defending against direct attack and providing a base for the employmentof battlegroup reserves. This will normally be a company group task and has thefollowing elements:

a. The forward perimeter, usually strengthened by obstacles and protectiveminefields, must be lightly manned to observe, engage and deter the initialadvance.

b. Platoons on the edge of the village as protection for the anti-tank weaponssited there.

c. A MDA in depth in the rear of the village on the main axis through it.

d. A local mobile reserve.

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED 6-33

0684. Reserves. The battlegroup commander must maintain a strong armouredreserve for counter penetration, especially in areas where mutual support is difficult,and for counterattack when the enemy is committed to direct attack on the village. Heshould not underestimate the difficulties, particularly in timing, of executing thereserve tasks which should, if possible, be rehearsed. Plans must be simple and thereserve concentrated on one task at a time.

0685. Preparation Time. Commanders must appreciate that the preparation forfighting from villages takes time and effort. At least 48 hours is needed for asuccessful village defence to be prepared.

Conduct of Village Defence

0686. The perimeter force, probably consisting of the reconnaissance platoon,reinforced with tanks or other anti-armour weapons, with an FOO and perhaps someinfantry, will give warning and destroy enemy reconnaissance, and engage probingattacks with indirect fire, sniping tanks and close ambush associated with theperimeter obstacle. Once a formal attack is launched, the force will deploy to the MDAbefore it is overwhelmed.

0687. The flank forces hold their fire until the enemy target array is open toconcentrated fire from both flanks with devastating effect. This requires strict firecontrol at, at least, company group level.

0688. The local mobile reserve is held ready, usually in the MDA, to reinforce theperimeter or flank forces to meet probing attacks or infiltration.

0689. The successful disruption of an enemy advance will, at some stage, result in aformal attack by a battalion or regiment onto the village. The perimeter and perhapsflank positions will become untenable and the defenders will pull back alongpreviously reconnoitred covered routes to the main defended locality. The battle thenbecomes defensive FIBUA. The MDA will consist of a series of mutually supportingstrong points on the main routes through the village and should, where possible, besited towards the rear of the village. This will allow long and medium range anti-armour weapons to continue the attrition and disruption, by enfilade fire, of enemybypassing the village. Other routes through the village must be cratered, mined andmade impassable. Ambush parties should be prepared to cover attempts to infiltrateround the MDA. Within the village, infantry will be most effective using short rangeanti-tank weapons, personal weapons and grenades.

0690. Combat Support.

a. Anti-Armour. Detailed reconnaissance and careful siting in defilade ofwell concealed and strongly protected fire positions are needed to ensure thateach anti-armour weapon is effectively used. Alternative positions for reducedvisibility must be planned and enemy use of smoke foreseen. Mutual support by

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED6-34

guided weapons and tanks between the villages and in depth, with LAWproviding close to village fire, and strict fire control to avoid overkill are essential.In principle, enemy reconnaissance and APCs should be engaged by thereconnaissance platoon, infantry, sniping tanks and indirect fire so as not todisclose the presence and arcs of the main anti-tank framework. Within villagesLAW will be the primary tank killer.

b. Artillery. The priorities for indirect fire, which must be concentrated formaximum effect, are likely to be:

(1) Counter battery.

(2) Destruction of enemy troops as they concentrate and dismount forthe village attack.

(3) Disruption of enemy armour.

(4) Support of counterattacks.

(5) Cover possible withdrawal with HE and smoke.

There are unlikely to be sufficient FOOs to cover the whole area, so all armsmust be prepared to call for fire support.

c. Helicopters. In addition to observation and fire direction, the main role ofhelicopters might be to provide a quick reaction anti-tank reserve to counterpenetration between villages by enemy tanks. Fire positions using the cover andconcealment of defended villages should be pre-planned and pre-reconnoitred.

d. Engineers. Limited field and perhaps armoured engineer support may beavailable to assist and to give advice on demolitions, minefields, the constructionand improvement of obstacles, anti-tank ditches and the normal protectiverequirements of FIBUA. Many of the following tasks will have to be carried out bythe infantry, with engineer or assault pioneer assistance or advice:

(1) Laying and recording protective minefields.

(2) Demolitions.

(3) Preparation of buildings for defence including mouseholing,reinforcing floors, sandbagging and other work.

(4) Digging of positions with overhead protection.

(5) Clearing of fields of fire, particularly cable obstructions for wireguided weapons.

(6) Preparation of covered routes for redeployment within the village.

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED 6-35

(7) Preparation of secondary positions within the village.

(8) Arming off-route mines.

e. Combat Service Support. Normal resupply in villages once the battle hasbegun will be difficult. Each village position should be made self-sufficient withpre-dumped ammunition, rations and water. Special arrangements will have tobe made for the care of casualties and their evacuation.

0691 – 0692. Reserved.

SECTION 4. — OPERATIONS IN FORESTS

Introduction

0693. The purpose of this section is to outline the effects of forests on tacticaloperations. The term ‘forests’ will be used to describe expanses of terrain which arecompletely covered by forests or where the majority of the area is wooded and wherevehicle movement is largely restricted to roads, clearings and fire breaks,necessitating different tactics to those employed in more open terrain.

0694. In the combined arms battle infantry will be required to take the lead in closecountry in all phases of war. In the offence, infantrymen lead and clear ahead of anarmoured force to maintain the initiative. In the defence they become the eyes, earsand early warning for armoured forces and they destroy the enemy as they attackalong the dismounted avenues of approach.

Characteristics

0695. Operations in forests have the following characteristics:

a. The tempo of operations is greatly reduced.

b. Fields of observation and fire are limited and, therefore, fighting often takesplace at short range.

c. Concealment increases the possibility of surprise.

d. Command and control is harder and is exacerbated by degrading of radiocommunications. This may call for decentralization of command and increasedliaison.

e. During periods of dry weather, the increased possibilities of forest fires mustbe considered.

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED6-36

f. Forests reduce the effectiveness of firepower. Because of the problems ofobservation and difficulty of target acquisition, long range weapons lose many oftheir advantages. Manportable weapons become increasingly important and,when targets do appear, a quick accurate response is vital. Troops fighting inclose country will expend ammunition at very high rates.

g. The problems of visibility, both in identifying enemy positions and in controlof our own troops, coupled with limited communications, difficulties in navigationand heavy casualties will rapidly lead to a confused battle with small groups ofmen fighting a series of disjointed actions often in isolation.

h. The effectiveness of conventional HE ammunition against unprotectedpersonnel is increased by the fragmentation effect of explosions in treebranches.

i. Limited visibility will have a psychological effect on the troops who areemployed in operations in forests for extended periods of time.

0696. Concept.

a. There will be fewer opportunities to use massed armour. Armour will usuallybe forced to use rides and fire breaks although, depending on the size of trees,their spacing, the undergrowth and the ground, armoured vehicles may be ableto force their way through off the tracks although this will be a slow process. Alarger proportion of dismounted troops than normal is required in defensive aswell as offensive operations.

b. Forest areas have the effect of splitting up and canalizing an attackingforce. They favour troops engaged in defence or delay. Characteristically, thebattle will be a series of isolated small unit actions. The maintenance of acohesive posture will be extremely expensive in troops; commanders may find itnecessary to accept gaps. Because of the excellent concealment for operations,there are increased opportunities to outflank, infiltrate and ambush, and a smallforce can have an influence on the battle out of proportion to its size.

Conduct of Operations

0697. Organization.

a. General. Some organizational and tactical adjustments may benecessary when operating in forested areas. These may include:

(1) Increased security at all levels, to avoid surprise.

(2) Stricter control of movement and allocation of routes.

(3) Decentralization of armoured resources.

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED 6-37

(4) Decentralization of combat support assets.

(5) Decentralized reserves held well forward.

b. Organization for Defensive Operations. The Main Effort should bedirected against the most likely enemy approaches although the defender mustbe organized for all round defence to avoid being outflanked or bypassed.

c. Organization for Offensive Operations. Initially forces will be echeloned indepth on a narrow front, preceded by combat reconnaissance operating on awide front to identify enemy locations and possible axes of advance. Wherepossible, forests of limited depth should be penetrated by one attack. Inextensive forests, the attack will be launched to seize a succession of shortrange, intermediate objectives.

0698. Planning.

a. Defensive Operations. Planning must take into account that groundreconnaissance, particularly at lower levels, will require more time than in openterrain. Attention must be paid to the road/track network, clearings and the depthof the forest, all of which will influence the selection of positions. The defendershould consider the following factors in his planning:

(1) Positions. The bulk of the positions should be established awayfrom forest edges because they attract fire and observation. If available,armoured troops should be located forward of the forest edge. By contrast,non-armoured troops will, in general, be positioned far enough into theforest so that the enemy is unable to carry out an attack with tanks or tosupport an attack with observed fire from his heavy weapons. Forces mustbe positioned so that they are capable of all round defence and, wherefeasible, of achieving mutual support.

(2) Armour. Even though there will be limitations to their effectiverange, armoured elements should be used where adequate fields of fireare available. This may necessitate the splitting of some of the armouredassets into small elements so as to cover roads, firebreaks, etc. Positionswithin the forest should be selected to deal with enemy penetrations andthese positions may provide a base from which mobile operations can bemounted. The most effective use of armour as a reserve is to hold it to therear of the forest, sited in such a way that enemy armour can be destroyedas it leaves the wooded area. Small parties equipped with anti-tankweapons should make the fullest use of woods to disorganize and inflictmaximum casualties on the enemy armour.

(3) Gaps. In forests, it is difficult to control gaps between defensivepositions. When gaps have to be accepted, they should be where there islittle likelihood of an enemy attack, because of the nature of the terrain or

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED6-38

because they can be easily obstructed, or interdicted by observed fire.Surveillance of gaps will be enhanced by patrolling, outposts and the useof ground sensors.

(4) Barriers and Obstacles. The defender should exploit the numerousopportunities that forests provide to prepare barriers. Obstacles areparticularly useful in impeding a frontal assault or an attempt by the enemyto bypass the defence and advance through gaps. They may also be usedto set an ambush. At the same time, the manoeuvrability of the defendingforces in order to counterattack or withdraw should not be impeded.

b. Delaying Operations. The nature of forested areas makes them effectivefor use in delaying operations. Also, unlike open terrain, they provide goodopportunities to employ non-armoured forces to execute delaying operations.Delaying forces usually focus their efforts on areas which the enemy is likely touse to make quick and deep penetrations (roads, tracks and firebreak areas).Coordination between the different elements of the force involved in the delay ismore difficult. It requires careful control to prevent elements from being cut-off orbypassed.

c. The Attack. The following points are important when planning an attack:

(1) Task Organization. Forests make reorganization during battledifficult and time consuming. The initial task organization should besuitable for the whole operation and changes should be kept to aminimum.

(2) Reserves. These will generally follow closer to the attacking forcesthan they would in open terrain in order to swiftly exploit any successachieved and to rapidly counter surprise actions by the enemy.

d. NBC Effects. In planning forest operations the following specific NBCeffects must be taken into consideration:

(1) Blast. As a result of blast, tree blowdown will considerably hamperall types of troops, although the radii of damage from the blast of nuclearweapons may be considerably reduced.

(2) Thermal Radiation. In forest areas the effects of thermal radiationon personnel will be considerably reduced. However, the fire hazard willbe considerably greater.

(3) Chemical Agents. The persistency of chemical agents will beincreased and their dispersion will be reduced.

0699. Conduct.

a. Conduct of Defensive Operations.

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED 6-39

(1) General. During the battle, the commander’s ability to exercisecontrol is more restricted than in other environments; subordinatecommanders must expect to conduct operations independently.

(2) Security. As the effectiveness of reconnaissance equipment andforces is restricted in forests, there is an increased requirement forsecurity elements. Consequently, the defending forces must always beprepared for enemy elements appearing unexpectedly.

(3) Cohesion. A major consideration is the maintenance of cohesionof the defence. Wherever possible, positions should be selected whichoffer all round defence and mutual support. Maintenance of cohesion willdepend on holding these positions; giving them up involves the risk oflosing contact with adjacent forces and of creating gaps which are noteasily closed. If the enemy succeeds in overrunning or bypassing aposition, commanders at the lower level must react immediately to restorethe situation. The same principle applies to situations when the enemyattacks in areas which are only kept under surveillance.

(4) Counterattacks.

(a) Counterattacks will be undertaken by local reserves, as quicklyas possible, to prevent the enemy from consolidating his penetration.Counterattacks with armoured forces will generally be restricted tosectors of terrain where observation is good and manoeuvre ispossible.

(b) Should the enemy succeed in achieving a penetration into thedefence area, elements still in position must be prepared to move toattack the enemy flanks, exploiting the opportunities offered by theforest.

b. Conduct of Offensive Operations.

(1) General. It will be impossible for the commander to plan in thedetail which would be possible in open terrain, because the overall pictureof the terrain and the disposition of enemy forces will be incomplete. Muchwill depend on the results of the initial phase of the battle.

(2) Organization. In offensive operations, the company group willoperate on one or at most two axes. The company group should organizeinto four sub-groups. These are:

(a) Reconnaissance Teams. If battlegroup assets are notavailable, deploy small teams of three to four men forward 500metres to 1000 metres ahead of the lead elements. The main role ofthese teams is principally information gathering, route identification

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED6-40

and flank screens. Secondary tasks, should the opportunity presentitself, may include tank hunting and control of indirect fire.

(b) Main Body. For a single axes this should comprise the twolead platoons operating dismounted and clearing either side of theaxis. One platoon would need to be given the axis as inclusive toensure that it was clear for armour use. A tactical bound behind, theheadquarters group would move up the axis. This would comprisethree elements:

i. Headquarters element with engineer reconnaissancesergeant, if available.

ii. Assault pioneer section/immediate reserve.

iii. Fire support element comprising MFC and three 51 mmmortar teams and possibly three GPMG(SF) teams.

(c) Reserve. Reserve elements may be tasked with a number ofcontingency missions. The most likely missions given to the reserveare:

i. Flank security.

ii. Fire fighting.

iii. Clearance/establishment of a fire support base.

iv. Security of headquarters/echelon packets/key equipments.

(d) Echelon Element. Echelon element with CQMS party withimmediate replenishment of ammunition and ambulance.

(3) Conduct of the Attack. The general direction of attack is governedprimarily by the existence of routes. Even though they are where strongenemy defences may be expected, such routes must be cleared to allowall elements of the attacking force to move.

(4) Commitment of Forces. The commander conducting offensiveoperations in forests must not commit the bulk of his forces too early,particularly since redeployment of forces is time consuming and difficult inthis type of terrain.

(5) Initiation of the Attack.

(a) Where an attack is launched against the edge of a forestinitially, the forces employed should include armoured or anti-tankforces to neutralize the enemy’s observation elements, armour andanti-tank weapons.

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED 6-41

(b) The attacker should seek to pass through the defences alongthe edge of the woodland as quickly as possible. For penetration intothe forest, infantry will generally be employed to continue the attack,passing through and pushing ahead of the armoured elements.

(6) Fighting Through the Forested Area.

(a) When attacking through a forest, the leading elements will tryto avoid roads, tracks and fire break areas which will normally beblocked by the enemy and covered by fire.

(b) Enemy positions should be bypassed using gaps, attackingthem from the rear and subsequently continuing to advance deeperinto the enemy-held area. This can also be achieved by infiltration. Ifneither method is feasible, the forces should be concentrated andlaunched in a deliberate attack.

(c) Reorganization. If it is intended to continue the attack beyondthe forest, combat forces should be reorganized for this purposewhile still under cover of the forest. Terrain permitting, the forcesshould attack from the forested area on a wide frontage, using thecover provided to achieve surprise.

c. Conduct of Delaying Operations. As delaying operations in forests willgenerally be conducted in the form of a temporary defence, the provisions givenunder ‘Conduct of Offensive Operations’, earlier in this paragraph, apply.

06100. Combat and Combat Support Forces.

a. Armour. Although armour is seen as vulnerable in close environments, anumber of simple guidelines can significantly enhance their survivability:

(1) AFVs should not go forward of dismounted troops.

(2) Where armour goes infantry must scout and protect.

(3) Where possible armour should operate in mutual support.

b. Within the above guidelines a number of roles can be undertaken byarmour which are outlined below:

(1) Fire Support. Intimate, direct fire support of dismounted troops withmain armament, co-axial machine guns and possibly smoke dischargers.

(2) Resupply. Armour allows protected carriage of essential combatsupplies to infantry engaged in close combat.

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED6-42

(3) Counterattack. Armour accompanied by infantry can provide ahighly effective counterattack force.

c. Artillery/Mortars. While the normal principles of indirect fire support applyto operations in forests, the deployment of artillery and mortars will be limited bythe nature of the terrain. In addition, artillery and other fire support means arehampered by the lack of gun positions and of survey, the difficulty of locatingtargets and the lack of observation of fire. Trees affect the ability to shoot at lowangles and also cause premature detonation of projectiles. Observers should beassigned to forward elements and frequently fire will have to be controlled bysub-unit commanders. It will often be necessary to deliver unobserved fire.

d. Close Air Support. Target acquisition is difficult and so most targetmarking and control of close air support will be by airborne forward aircontrollers. Because of the difficulties of employing close air support, the bulk ofthe air resources will be directed on targets in depth.

06101. Other Combat Support.

a. Engineers. The demand for engineers to deal with additional mobility andcounter mobility tasks, in forest operations, is greater than in open terrain. Allroads and track networks must be continuously maintained and, wherepossible, improved in order to enhance movement forward, rearward andlaterally. Engineer support may also be required for the construction of landingzones, drop zones and artillery firing positions.

b. Air Defence. Air defence should be concentrated on roads, tracks,clearings, exposed river crossings and other chokepoints.

06102. Command and Control. In forests, liaison, communication andcoordination will be more difficult and will require more resources. Command andcontrol measures assume an even greater importance for the effective control of theoperations of war when conducted in forests, and it may be necessary to decentralizecontrol to a much lower level than normal.

06103. Combat Service Support.

a. General. The nature of the terrain, however, will make it more easy for theenemy to interdict supply lines and attack rear area facilities. This will impose arequirement for additional attention to their security. Routes and chokepointsmay also have to be secured and additional security forces provided for convoys.

b. Resupply. Because main routes can be easily blocked, units andformations must be prepared to fight for prolonged periods without supply. Thiswill involve the build-up and maintenance of forward stocks. Supply points andlogistics installations may have to be located further forward than normal.Resupply by air, including the use of helicopters, may be an essential feature.

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED 6-43

06104 – 06105. Reserved.

SECTION 5. — OPERATIONS IN CONDITIONS OF LIMITED VISIBILITY

Introduction

06106. General.

a. This section considers the effects of limited visibility on tactical operationsand the steps that must be taken to overcome the problems created.

b. Visibility will be affected by darkness, fog, precipitation and smoke.Technology has provided the means to partially offset the restrictions resultingfrom limited visibility.

06107. Characteristics.

a. The time of the change from night to day is known, however, changes invisibility due to weather or to the unexpected use of smoke normally cannot bepredicted. The time at which the fog lifts may be forecast or be standard in thearea for the time of year.

b. Reduction of visibility will have the following effects on operations:

(1) Psychological and Physiological. Individual performance will bedegraded by increased physical and mental stress. The result may beincreased apprehension and fatigue, which will erode combateffectiveness.

(2) Weapons. The effective ranges of weapons will be reduced. Indarkness, muzzle flash may reveal the location of weapons, however, fogand smoke will reduce the signature produced by them.

(3) Surveillance and Target Acquisition. The recognition and locationof targets and the identification of forces will generally occur at muchshorter ranges. Dazzle may affect the human eye and some surveillancedevices.

(4) Movement. Navigation is more difficult and the speed of movementis reduced.

(5) Work Rate. Many typical battlefield tasks, including NBC surveyand decontamination activities, will require additional time. On the otherhand, conditions of limited visibility will provide concealment which willmake tasks easier to complete.

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED6-44

c. The impact of the effects outlined above can, in part, be offset byequipment, training, special techniques and planning. It should be borne in mindthat they also affect enemy operations and this may be put to advantage.

06108. Employment Considerations.

a. Under these conditions, ingenuity and foresight are required to make thebest use of all the assets available. Forces must be able to carry out alloperations under conditions of limited visibility and to exploit these conditions tothe full.

b. Modern equipment and thorough training can provide the ability to carry outoperations under conditions of limited visibility almost as well as in cleardaylight. The situation will almost certainly lead to a condition of continuousoperations, placing a more severe demand on human endurance and combatservice support.

c. In general the normal organization of forces will remain unchanged.Surveillance effort will need to be intensified and careful consideration will haveto be given to the use of battlefield illumination. Unexpected changes in theconditions of visibility may require an adjustment of the original organization.

06109. Technical Aids.

a. General. In order to overcome the problems of limited visibility, it isessential that surveillance aids are used correctly. Aids vary in their effectivenessin differing conditions of visibility.

b. Types. There are two types of devices, passive and active:

(1) Passive Devices. Passive devices use the reflected incident oremitted energy from the target., Such devices are:

(a) Daylight optical instruments.

(b) Image intensifiers.

(c) Low light-level television.

(d) Thermal imagers.

(e) Remote control sensors.

(f) Infra-red receivers.

(g) Electromagnetic alarms.

(2) Active Devices. Active devices radiate energy which is thenreflected from the target. Such devices are:

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED 6-45

(a) Visible light emitters, including flares and search lights.

(b) Active infra-red emitters.

(c) Radars.

(d) Lasers.

c. Employment. Active devices radiate energy and thus can be detectedand located, passive devices generally cannot. At the beginning of an operationwhen the emphasis may be on covert movement and deployment to achievesurprise, passive devices are preferable. However, once contact has beenmade the most effective aids are likely to be the active ones. Depending on thesituation, one type of device may offer significant advantages over others. Someare effective in absolute darkness but not in fog or smoke. Others operateeffectively regardless of the amount of light available and can penetrate variousobscurants. In choosing which of the available aids to use, the following shouldbe considered:

(1) The capabilities of the available devices.

(2) The use of devices in complementary roles.

(3) The limitations imposed by the illumination and surveillance plans.

(4) Whether the advantages to be obtained from using active devicesare worth the possible security compromise involved.

(5) Enemy counter measures.

d. Limitations. Some of the devices have limitations and impose constraints.For example:

(1) Their field of view is less than that of the eye, so trained operatorsmust be employed who are capable of interpreting the devices displayed.

(2) The limited number of devices available will require carefulallocation, control and maintenance to achieve effective employment.

(3) Under certain conditions, particularly smoke, the effectiveness ofsome of these devices is seriously degraded.

e. Daylight Use. Some equipments have capabilities exceeding those ofnormal daylight vision. For example:

(1) Magnifying scopes enhance firing accuracy and target identificationat longer ranges.

(2) Thermal sights can see through most smoke, haze and light foliage.

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED6-46

06110. Planning.

a. The fundamentals of planning operations in limited visibility are similar tothose of clear daylight operations but with particular emphasis on the followingfactors:

(1) Plans must be kept simple. However, orders may need to be moredetailed.

(2) Sufficient time for reconnaissance is required for all levels, preferablyin daylight.

(3) Reserves may be kept closer.

(4) Closer coordination with adjacent forces is required.

(5) Specific attention must be paid to noise and light discipline.

b. The Illumination Plan. This is an integral part of the operation plan. Itcoordinates the use of technical aids/devices and includes rules for, andrestrictions upon, the use of active devices. Once battle contact has been made,these restrictions may no longer apply.

c. Defensive Operations. The following factors should be considered inplanning the defence:

(1) Concealment of defensive positions will be easier by night. However:

(a) The possibility of detection by enemy devices must be takeninto account.

(b) Concealment and camouflage must be such that they are stillsatisfactory when visibility improves.

(2) To avoid surprise by the enemy more reliance will be placed onreconnaissance and surveillance. More emphasis should be given tosecurity, as warning time will be reduced.

(3) The enemy use of smoke may seriously degrade the effectiveness ofguided weapons, neutralizing a part of the anti-tank defence. This can becompensated for by balancing the force with an appropriate mix ofweapons.

(4) Identification will be more difficult and clear procedures must be laiddown.

d. Delaying Operations. Particular emphasis should be given to thefollowing:

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED 6-47

(1) Surveillance of gaps between positions will have to be intensified.

(2) The increased opportunity for ambushes.

(3) The disengagement of the delaying forces may be easier, but willrequire more planning and coordination for the rearward passage of lines.

e. Offensive Operations. The following factors should be considered in theattack:

(1) Reconnaissance should be conducted in daylight, if possible.

(2) Rate of movement will generally be slower.

(3) Objectives should be easily identifiable. The distance to, and thewidth and depth of objectives may have to be reduced, and moreintermediate objectives may be required.

(4) Axes of advance should, if possible:

(a) Lead straight to the objective.

(b) Follow easily identifiable features.

Conduct

06111. Execution.

a. Defensive Operations.

(1) If long range direct fire weapons are not equipped with night viewingaids, engagement ranges will be reduced. Visibility may be less than theminimum range for guided weapons, thus preventing their use.

(2) There is a danger of being overrun by large numbers of enemycoming out of the obscuration at short range. This calls for a quick andaccurate response.

(3) Technical aids should be carefully sited to cover likely approaches.

(4) In the surveillance plan there is a need to cover gaps.

b. Delaying Operations. Limited visibility will enhance opportunities tosurprise the enemy, conceal the strength of the force and assist indisengagement. As obstacles cannot be easily identified, they will be moreeffective and delay the enemy’s ability to follow-up. On the other hand, it will notbe possible to engage targets at maximum ranges.

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED6-48

c. Offensive Operations.

(1) While the preparation and deployment of forces for the attack will bebetter protected than normal from enemy observation, control may bemore difficult.

(2) Maintenance of direction will be difficult, particularly over groundwhich may be poorly mapped and which has not been carefullyreconnoitred. Movement may have to be slower and restricted to obviousroads and tracks in order to maintain direction and cohesion.

(3) The force may use reconnaissance elements including guides tolead the advance and may delay deployment into the assault formationuntil the last possible moment.

(4) If it is the aim to achieve surprise in the initial phase, the preparationfor the attack will be completed with maximum attention being given toconcealment. Noise will be kept to a minimum and there will be nopreparatory artillery fire. Fire support should be planned for the wholeoperation but withheld until contact is made.

(5) Reduced visibility will facilitate the use of infiltration techniques.

06112. Fire Support.

a. Virtually all fire support means have a capability to provide battlefieldillumination. This aspect requires a high degree of centralized control.

b. Limited visibility restricts the observer’s ability to acquire targets and adjustfire.

c. Close Air Support. This support may not be as effective or responsive.Increased reliance will have to be placed on integral fire support and groundreconnaissance.

Command and Control

06113. Responsibilities of Command and Control. The task of the commanderduring conditions of limited visibility is more difficult because of the effect of suchconditions on orientation, surveillance and target acquisition, and morale. Emphasismust be placed on the initiative of subordinate commanders, close coordination,liaison and the employment of technical aids in complementary roles.

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED 6-49

Combat Service Support

06114. Combat service support units must have the capability of performing theirrespective missions under conditions of limited visibility as a routine extension ofdaylight operations. Their goal must be to provide continuous support, including anincreased requirement to provide support for the technical aids used during limitedvisibility operations.

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED6-50

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED