Infinitarian Ethics AC

[I affirm.]

Economist Thomas Pugel defines economic sanctions as Discriminatory restrictions or complete bans on economics exchange, designed to punish the target country or countries. [Thus, economic sanctions are distinct from other punitive measures in that they aim to punish nations at large rather than single persons and do so specifically by restricting trade.]

From Merriam-Websters, ought expresses obligation.

[This definition is most contextually appropriate, since we use ought to express advisability or desirability only with respect to self-regarding actions, e.g. in Merriam-Websters the case given for that use is ought to take care of yourself. In the topical context of potentially thousands of lives saved or lost, its absurd to talk about acts as merely desirable.]

[Not just negates ought, meaning first, that the neg has a textual burden to prove the converse of the topic, namely that sanctions ought be used; second, that moral neutrality is aff ground, in that I have to show that sanctions are not obligatory but not that theyre morally proscribed, meaning you presume aff in absence of clear neg offense; and third, that arguments about the emptiness of normative language are grounds to affirm, in that they render all positive moral assertions false and thus their negations true.]

The qualifier to achieve foreign policy objectives limits the range of justifications for sanctions were debating. Showing that sanctions are justified by deontic moral rules or by their protective effect on domestic industries in the sanctioning country, for instance, wouldnt negate since it shows that sanctions ought be used for those reasons, but not to achieve foreign policy objectives. [Letting the neg claim any desirable outcome or feature of a foreign policy as a foreign policy objective clearly violates the textual meaning of the topic in that it makes the qualifier vacuous, so that the topic might as well just have said ought not be used.]

[The aff has the right to frame the debate to facilitate AC argumentation and compensate for time skew, so you prefer my reading of the topic so long as my arguments are reasonably topical and open to substantive answers.]

As implied by the word ought in the resolution, I value morality. A basic adequacy condition for any moral theory is that it provide positive ethical prescriptions at least where there are strong intuitions in play, i.e. that it tells us how to act in important cases. In choosing between two goods of similar magnitude where a clear quantitative comparison of values is impossible, or when faced with a conflict between essential rights, its plausible to say that morality gives no definitive prescription and leaves both options permissible. But any ethical theory that cant at least tell us that clear moral bads like the Holocaust should be avoided defeats the purpose of such theories to both guide action and explain our strongly held ethical intuitions. Since ethical truths cant be observed in the empirical world or arrived at through formal deduction, intuitions are the only basis for ethical theorizing and theories that dont come close to explaining them should be rejected. Thus, the meta-standard is preserving prescriptive strength of normative theories. This standard acts as a tool by which to compare the normative frameworks put forward by each debaterthus, the neg has a burden to show that his/her impacts function within a framework that preserves ethical prescription.

All moral theories are based on theories of value, since for some actions or states of affairs to be better than others they must share some common property that makes them better; otherwise ethics could consist only of arbitrary assertions. But theories of value by themselves dont determine an ethics since we also have to decide how to treat values, i.e. whether they should be maximized, respected as side constraints, et cetera. Ends-based theories like utilitarianism seek to maximize the total aggregate of values like pleasure or preference-satisfaction. But, under plausible empirical conditions, all such theories fail to meet the meta-standard of preserving normative prescription. Nick Bostrom writes: Recent cosmological evidence suggests that the world is probably infinite. Moreover, [I]f the totality of physical existence [it] is indeed infinite, in the kind of way that modern cosmology suggests it is, then it contains an infinite number of galaxies, stars, and planets. If there are an infinite number of planets then there is, with probability one, an infinite number of people. Infinitely many of these people are happy, infinitely many are unhappy. Likewise for other local properties that are plausible candidates for having value, pertaining to personstates, lives, or entire societies, ecosystems, or civilizationsthere are infinitely many democratic states, and infinitely many that are ruled by despots, etc. Bostrom 2 continues: Suppose the world [does] contains an infinite number of people and a corresponding infinity of joys and sorrows, preference satisfactions and frustrations, instances of virtue and depravation, and other such local phenomena at least some of which have positive or negative value. More precisely, suppose that there is some finite value such that there exists an infinite number of local phenomena (this could be a subset of e.g. persons, experiences, characters, virtuous acts, lives, relationships, civilizations, or ecosystems) each of which has a value and also an infinite number of local phenomena each of which has a value ( ). Call such a world canonically infinite. {Ethical theories that hold that value is aggregative imply that a canonically [such an] infinite world contains an infinite quantity of [both] positive value and an infinite quantity of negative value. This gives rise to a peculiar predicament. We [But we] can do only a finite amount of good or bad. Yet in cardinal arithmetic, adding or subtracting a finite quantity does not change an infinite quantity. Every possible act of ours therefore has the same net effect on the total amount of good and bad in a canonically infinite world: [namely] none whatsoever. Aggregative consequentialist theories are [thus] threatened by infinitarian paralysis: they seem to imply that if the world is canonically infinite then it is always ethically indifferent what we do. In particular, they would imply that it is ethically indifferent [e.g.] whether we cause [or prevent] another holocaust or prevent one from occurring.} If any noncontradictory normative implication is a reductio ad absurdum, this one is.

Thus, aggregative theories fail in an infinite universe. Bostrom 3 explains why we probably live in one: In the standard Big Bang model, assuming the simplest topology (i.e., that space is singly connected), there are three basic possibilities: the universe can be open, flat, or closed. Current data suggests a flat or open universe, although the final verdict is pending. If the universe is either open or flat, then it is spatially infinite at every point in time and the model entails that it contains an infinite number of galaxies, stars, and planets. There exists a common misconception which confuses the universe with the (finite) observable universe. But the observable partthe part that could causally affect uswould be just an infinitesimal fraction of the whole. Statements about the mass of the universe or the number of protons in the universe generally refer to the content of this observable part; see e.g. [1]. Many cosmologists [also] believe that our universe is just one in an infinite ensemble of universes (a multiverse), and this adds to the probability that the world is canonically infinite; for a popular review, see [2].

Even if the world might be finite, we should prefer ethical theories that dont depend on contingent facts of nature. Bostrom 4: We do not know for sure that we live in a[n] canonically infinite world. Contemporary cosmology is in considerable flux, so its conclusions should be regarded as tentative. But it is definitely not reasonable, in light of the evidence we currently possess, to assume that we do not live in a[n] canonically infinite world. And that is sufficient for the predicament to arise. Any ethical theory that fails to cope with this likely empirical contingency must be rejected. We should not accept an ethical theory which, conditional on our current best scientific guesses about the size and nature of the cosmos, implies that it is ethically indifferent whether we cause or prevent another holocaust.

Thus, ethical theories cant be based on seeking to maximize aggregate quantities of value[, and at best under any such theory youd affirm on face since we cant be obligated either way with respect to sanctions]. Instead, ethics must place constraints on the distributional profile of values between ethical subjects, i.e. the distribution of benefits and burdens between persons and whether this distribution is intrinsically fair or is brought about fairly. While theres of course infinite fairness and unfairness in an infinite world, such distributional theories imply that acts are right or wrong independent of how they impact any total quantity in the universe. There are many distributional theories, e.g. deontic ones that think distributions should be based on respect for the rational will of subjects or Rawlsian ones that think they should be based on the abstract desirability of various distributional profiles. But all such theories seek to lay down rules for treating people fairly which seek to provide a non-arbitrary basis for action. Thus, the necessary standard under any non-aggregative theory is avoiding arbitrary harm to persons. This standard is necessarily agent-centered since if I were responsible for preventing all inflictions of arbitrary harm by others, the best I could seek to do would be to minimize them, which would collapse into aggregationalism. Thus, the standard just implies a moral duty for agents not to inflict arbitrary harm themselves.

I contend that coercive interference with private exchange, conducted through the enforcement of sanctions policies, inflicts massive arbitrary harms on persons.

First, sanctions inflict arbitrary harm on civilians in the target state. Charles Rarick writes: The theory operating behind sanctions is to cause as much pain as possible to the people of a receiving country in order for pressure to be brought on the government. The citizens of the sanctioned country are [thus] used as a means to achieve the foreign policy objectives of the sanctioning country. Justin Stalls furthers: The instrumental effects of economic sanctions upon the target State are in part economic but also include the human costs of suffering and death. Severe economic sanctions are bound to impoverish the majority of the population, cause hyperinflation, retard the agricultural, industrial, educational and health systems while spreading crime and corruption. Sending States ultimately believe that, denying a nation the benefits of trade will cause it to suffer, and that suffering will induce a willingness to bargain. As [and as] a result of this belief, sending States aim to make the consequences suffered by the target State as dire as possible. In fact, economic [S]anctions may have contributed to more deaths during the post- Cold War era than all weapons of mass destruction throughout history. For [instance,] example, various agencies of the United Nations . . . have [the UN has] estimated that they [economic sanctions against Iraq] have contributed to hundreds of thousands of deaths. This massive human cost is a direct result of economic sanctions. Since those hurt by sanctions include dispossessed groups and children who cant possibly be held responsible for regime behavior, harms inflicted on them are arbitrary by any ethical standard.

Second, the distribution of harms from sanctions is arbitrary on a global scale, since the targeting of countries for sanctions doesnt follow any clear ethical guidelines. Roger Normand writes: As with Iraq, [S]anctions are almost always imposed by strong countries against weaker countries without reference to objective legal criteria or standards. This has resulted in the selective use of sanctions: occupation by Iraq triggers sanctions but not by Israel; human rights violations in the Sudan trigger sanctions [in Sudan] but not in Nigeria. Further, this unfairness is inherent to sanctions since their harms can only fall on poor or undeveloped states. Emre et al write: Sanctions are a foreign-policy tool of the powerful. This is true both in regard to the ability to threaten or impose sanction (that is, in our selection models) and in regard to the decision to [do so] utilize sanctions (that is, in our count models). It is most clearly not the case that sanctions are a tool of the weak, to be used by those [weak] states instead of military force. The threat and the imposition of sanctions are used with greatest frequency by powerful states, increasing in capability, and with the ability to project force.

Third, sanctions inflict arbitrary harm on private persons within the sender state, by killing jobs and hurting businesses. Elliott writes: While the benefits of economic sanctions are elusive, the costs often are not. Trade sanctions deprive the United States of the gains from trade and frequently penalize exporting firms that are among the most sophisticated and productive in the US economy. As American sanctions have expanded and proliferated over the past 20 years, they have also led to increasing tensions between the United States and its allies and trading partners around the world. In a recent extension of the IIE research, my colleagues and I estimated that economic sanctions cost the United States $15 billion to $[15 to] 19 billion in forgone merchandise exports to 26 target countries in 1995. The analysis tentatively suggests that [E]ven limited sanctions, such as restrictions on foreign aid or narrowly defined export sanctions, can have surprisingly large effects on bilateral trade flows (see table 2). Lower exports of $15 billion to $19 billion [These costs] would mean a reduction [loss] of more than 200,000 jobs in the relatively higher-wage export sector and a consequent loss of nearly $1 billion in export sector wage[s] premiums.

The distribution of costs to domestic actors is especially arbitrary since its not spread evenly over the whole state or economy but placed fully on specific export firms. Hufbauer et al write: Economics Sanctions can amount to a discriminatory, sector-specific, and therefore unfair tax to finance foreign policy. In many [cases] instances, sanctions restrict the sale of goods that are available from competitors in foreign countries, or require the cancellation of existing contracts, or both. The impact of sanctions may fall most heavily on those few firms that suffer lost sales and damaged reputations. This sort of lopsided burden-sharing can quickly arouse political opposition to the goals of the sender government.

Thus, sanctions create and distribute harms arbitrarily, thereby failing to respect any non-aggregative moral theory, so I affirm.Frontlines

AT There can be infinite impacts

(1) Even the chance of doing infinite good or bad doesnt solve the for Bostrom since adding one infinite quantity to another doesnt make either of them bigger; infinity plus infinity is still infinity, e.g. there are just as many even numbers as natural numbers. Thats just a mathematical fact.

(2) On top of that, Bostroms reasoning about frequencies still applies: If theres a non-zero chance of some infinite good or bad then there are infinitely many of each in the universe already, so adding one more wont change anything. Its just the same as summing lots of finite impacts.

(3) Even if s/hes right about infinite impacts mattering under aggregative theories, its still totally non-responsive since any theory that only cares about infinite impacts cant meet the meta-standard in that it still wouldnt care about really big finite impacts like the Holocaust which we have strong intuitions about that ethical theories need to respect as per my argument right above the meta-standard that says intuitions are our only ethical data.

(4) Finally, s/hed need to be winning an infinite impact for any of that to matter since the best ethical theory s/he can get is one that only cares about infinities. [S/hes not claiming any impacts as infinite in the NC, which means that if you buy his/her argument you can extend the definition of ought as obligation and affirm on face since theres no ethical reason grounding a duty to use sanctions.] or [The only impact s/hes claiming as infinite is [identify impact], so at best thats the only ends-based impact that matters at all.]AT Extinction is an infinite impact

(1) Extinctions not an infinite impact: If it has a non-zero likelihood to begin with, itll happen eventually in finitely much time, meaning that only finitely many humans will ever live even if that finite number is huge.

(2) If Bostroms right then there has to be lots of other intelligent life out there too, so even if we could exist forever our existence would trade off with theirs, so the impact of human extinction is just the differential between the value well create with the space and resources we use and the value some other species would create instead, which is unknowable and could easily be negative.

AT Sanctions are omissions, dont involve direct infliction of harm

This response totally misunderstands my argument. At the very top of the AC contention I say that its not the withdrawal of trade between states that inflicts arbitrary harm but the coercive interference with exchange between private persons, i.e. the state punishing me for buying goods from someone in the target state. That coercion is clearly proactive, and Im showing you that it inflicts major harm. Dont let him/her make new answers in the next speechAT Turns saying sanctions solve some arbitrary harm/unfairness

Group [identify turns to be grouped] and extend the analysis right under the standard that says that it has to be agent-centered since if were responsible for arbitrary harms inflicted by others, the best we could ever do is try to minimize those harms, which would require aggregation and link into all the Bostrom arguments. That means none of the turns have any offensive link to the standard; dont let him/her creates new ones in the next speech.AT Universe is finite

Heres a physicist giving a bunch of scenarios for an infinite universe that are supported by current physics.

(1) Max Tegmark writes: The parallel universes of your alter egos constitute the Level I multiverse. It is the least controversial type. We all accept the existence of things that we cannot see but could see if we moved to a different vantage point or merely waited, like people watching for ships to come over the horizon. Objects beyond the cosmic horizon have a similar status. The observable universe grows by a light-year every year as light from farther away has time to reach us. An infinity lies out there, waiting to be seen. You will probably die long before your alter egos come into view, but in principle, and if cosmic expansion cooperates, your descendants could observe them through a sufficiently powerful telescope. [If anything, the Level I [such a] multiverse sounds trivially obvious. How could space not be infinite? Is there a sign somewhere saying Space Ends HereMind the Gap? If so, what lies beyond it? In fact, Einstein's theory of gravity [general relativity] calls this intuition into question.] Space could be finite if it has a convex curvature or an unusual topology (that is, interconnectedness). A spherical, doughnut-shaped or pretzel-shaped universe would have a limited volume and no edges. The [But] cosmic microwave background radiation allows sensitive tests of such scenarios [see "Is Space Finite?" by Jean-Pierre Luminet, Glenn D. Starkman and Jeffrey R. Weeks; Scientific American, April 1999]. [and s]o far, however, the evidence is against them. Infinite models fit the data, and strong limits have been placed on the alternatives.

(2) Max Tegmark writes: If the level I multiverse was hard to stomach, try imagining [The Level II multiverse is] an infinite set of distinct Level I multiverses, some perhaps with different spacetime dimensionality and different physical constants. Those other multiverseswhich constitute a Level II multiverseare predicted by the currently popular theory of chaotic eternal inflation. Inflation is an extension of the big bang theory and ties up many of the [its] loose ends of that theory, such as why the universe is so big, so uniform and so flat. A rapid stretching of space long ago can explain all these and other attributes in one fell swoop [see "The Inflationary Universe," by Alan H. Guth and Paul J. Steinhard; Scientific American, May 1984; and "The Self-Reproducing Inflationary Universe," by Andrei Linde, November 1994]. Such stretching is predicted by a wide class of theories of elementary particles, and all available evidence bears it out. The phrase chaotic eternal refers to what happens [O]n the very largest scales. Space [space] as a whole is stretching and will continue doing so forever, but some regions of space stop stretching and form distinct bubbles, like gas pockets in a loaf of rising bread. Infinitely many such bubbles emerge. Each is an embryonic Level I multiverse: infinite in size and filled with matter deposited by the energy field that drove inflation.

(3) Max Tegmark writes: The Level I and Level II multiverses involve parallel worlds that are far away, beyond the domain even of astronomers. But [T]he next level of multiverse is right around you. It arises from the famous, and famously controversial, many-worlds interpretation of quantum mechanicsthe idea that random quantum processes cause the universe to branch into multiple copies, one for each possible outcome. In the early 20th century the theory of quantum mechanics revolutionized physics by explaining the atomic realm, which does not abide by the classical rules of Newtonian mechanics. Despite the obvious successes of the theory, a heated debate rages about what it really means. The theory specifies the state of the universe not in classical terms, such as the positions and velocities of all particles, but in terms of a mathematical object called a wave function. According to the Schrdinger equation, this state evolves over time in a fashion that mathematicians term unitary, meaning that the wave function rotates in an abstract infinite-dimensional space called Hilbert space. Although quantum mechanics is often described as inherently random and uncertain, the wave function evolves in a deterministic way. There is nothing random or uncertain about it. The sticky part is how to connect this wave function with what we observe. Many legitimate wave functions correspond to counterintuitive situations, such as a cat being dead and alive at the same time in a so-called superposition. In the 1920s physicists explained away this weirdness by postulating that the wave function collapsed into some definite classical outcome whenever someone made an observation. This add-on had the virtue of explaining observations, but it turned an elegant, unitary theory into a kludgy, nonunitary one. The intrinsic randomness commonly ascribed to quantum mechanics is the result of this postulate. Over the years many physicists have abandoned this view in favor of one developed in 1957 by Princeton graduate student Hugh Everett III. He showed that the collapse postulate is unnecessary. Unadulterated quantum theory does not, in fact, pose any contradictions. Although it predicts that one classical reality gradually splits into superpositions of many such realities, observers subjectively experience this splitting merely as a slight randomness, with probabilities in exact agreement with those from the old collapse postulate. This superposition of classical worlds is the Level III multiverse.

Extension shells

Simple standards extension (long)

Now extend the standards. The values morality as implied by ought. Extend that any moral theory has to tell us how to act since thats the purpose of moral systems, and has to explain explain strong intuitions like our belief that the Holocaust was wrong, since intuitions are the only ethical data.

Then extend Bostrom 1 and 2 saying that if the world is infinite, aggregative theories like utilitarianism dont do that, since theres always infinitely much good and bad in the world whatever we do. Then extend Bostrom 3 saying that the most likely cosmological models make the universe infinite, and Bostrom 4 saying that even if its not we should still reject ethical theories that require us to assume that its not.

Next, extend the impact that we cant aggregate goods but have to look at how theyre distributed and whether benefits and burdens are assigned fairly based on some ethical theory like deontic constraints or Rawlsian justice. I say that whatever that theory is, it has to be prescriptive so it has to lay down non-arbitrary rules for distributing goods, so extend the standard of avoiding arbitrary harm to persons. [Lastly, extend that the standard is agent-centered since if we were responsible for preventing everyone else from causing arbitrary harm, the best we could do is try to minimize it, which would require aggregation. Thats very clearly excluding all the turns saying that sanctions prevent other actors from inflicting harms, like [identify turns].]Simple standards extension (short)

Extend the value of morality and the argument that moral theories have to guide action and tell us not to do bad things like the Holocaust. Then extend Bostrom 1 and 2 saying that if the world is infinite, aggregative theories like util dont do that since we cant change the total amount of good or bad in the world. Extend Bostrom 3 saying that our best models say the world is infinite, and Bostrom 4 saying even if it isnt we should reject ethical theories that force us to assume that its not. Then extend that since we cant aggregate values we have to look at how theyre distributed based on some rule like deontic constraints or Rawlsian justice, and that any such theory has to give rules for distributing goods and burdens non-arbitrarily, so extend the standard of avoiding arbitrary harm to persons. [Lastly, extend that the standard is agent-centered since if we were responsible for preventing everyone else from causing arbitrary harm, the best we could do is try to minimize it, which would require aggregation. Thats very clearly excluding all the turns saying that sanctions prevent other actors from inflicting harms, like [identify turns].]

Bostrom writes: Infinitarian paralysis threatens a wide range of popular ethical theories. Consider, to begin with, hedonistic utilitarianism, which in its classical formulation states that you ought to do that which maximizes the total amount of pleasure and minimizes the total amount of pain in the world. If pleasure and pain are already infinite, then all possible actions you could take would be morally on a par according to this criterion, for none of them would make any difference to the total amount of pleasure or pain. Endorsing this form of utilitarianism commits one to the view that, conditional on the world being canonically infinite, ending world hunger and causing a famine are ethically equivalent options. It is not the case that you ought to do one rather than the other. The threat is not limited to hedonistic utilitarianism. Utilitarian theories that have a broader conception of the goodhappiness, preferencesatisfaction, virtue, beautyappreciation, or some objective list of ingredients that make for a good lifeface the same problem. So, too, does average utilitarianism, mixed total/average utilitarianism, and prioritarian views that place a premium on the wellbeing of the worst off. In a canonically infinite world, average utility and most weighted utility measures are just as imperturbable by human agency as is the simple sum of utility.

Bostrom writes: The situation for mixed ethical theories that include nonconsequentialist sideconstraints in addition to an aggregative consequentialist component is slightly more hopeful. For example, a theory constructed along these lines might say that permissible acts are those that satisfy deontological sideconstraints (no unjustified killing, lying, cheating, stealing, etc.), and that a right act is a permissible act that scores highest on the aggregative consequentialist criterion among the available permissible acts. The sideconstraints would serve as a buttress, reducing the theorys dependence on empirical assumptions to avoid the fanaticism problem and the distortion problem. The theory could thus make do with a weaker empirical assumption, which means that it could potentially meet a higher methodological acceptability standard.

Babic et al write: The rationality of sanctions precisely presupposes this kind of [an] initial inequality of powerin the case of comparable power structure the war-like character of the conflict would have been [be] fully visible from the outset. What country would voluntarily tolerate the blockade of its borders and restrictions on its freedom and well-being that ensues from it? Thus, [C]learly in a case of power equilibrium sanctions could play no role whatsoever. The disproportionality of power is an element of the logic of decision making in this context. Thus, insisting in any given case that sanctions are unfair carries no weight. For if the side imposing sanctions did not believe itself to be in the rightthe proof of which is only in the effectiveness of accomplishing the [its] set goals, and nothing elsethey would not get involved in this activity in the first place. This only goes to show that [Thus] sanctions, as a distribution of power, are a way of making a claim that one is entitled to construct on behalf of others what their definition of value ought to be.

Justin Stalls writes: It appears that [T]he third-world's struggle within the United Nations for economic development has not succeeded in creating protection from the economic powers of the western world. The voice of the third world has been heard in the UN General Assembly, and it cries out for protection from the economic powers of the western world. Unfortunately though, this voice has not been heard in the UN Security Council. In fact, the United Nations Security Council is presently increasing its use of multilateral economic sanctions. Therefore, the United Nations has provided a forum for the third-world to request freedom from the West's economic coercion and, at the same time, a means, i.e., economic sanctions, that makes the third-world's request[s] [for freedom from economic coercion] appear meaningless.

Justin Stalls writes: Security Council [A]uthorization to use economic sanctions based on a human rights violation will inevitably be premised on a definition of human rights that is not accepted by the offending State. For [instance,] example, the United States consistently denies that the death penalty violates international human rights norms, while nearly the entire developed world disagrees. The United States does not believe that the Security Council has the right to authorize economic sanctions against it based upon the use of the death penalty because the United States has determined that use of the death penalty does not violates human rights. However, the Security Council could claim that the United States has violated human rights norms and authorize the use of economic sanctions against the United States.As a study commissioned by the UN concluded, the amount of information available today on the devastating economic, social, and humanitarian impact of sanctions no longer permits policymakers to entertain the notion of unintended effects. A member of the Security Council has declared that it is disingenuous to talk of unintended side effects when everybody knows that the sector most affected by sanctions, as presently applied, are precisely civilian populations. There is nothing surprising or unintended about it.

Marks, Stephen P. Economic sanctions as human rights violations: reconciling political and public health imperatives. American Journal of Public Health, October 1999, vol. 89, issue 10.

Thomas Pugel (Ph.D. in Economics from Harvard University in 1978; Professor of Economics and International Business at the Stern School of Business, New York University), International Economics (Hill-McGraw textbook), 12th edition, 2004, http://highered.mcgraw-hill.com/sites/0072487488/student_view0/glossary.html

http://m-w.com/dictionary/ought [used to express obligation , advisability , natural expectation , or logical consequence ]

Nick Bostrom (Professor at University of Oxford, director of Oxfords Future of Humanity Institute, PhD from London School of Economics), The Infinitarian Challenge to Aggregative Ethics, 2008, http://www.nickbostrom.com/ethics/infinite.pdf

Slow down and emphasize bracketed section.

Charles Rarick (Professor of Management, Barry University), and Martine Duchatelet. 2008. Economic A airs. An Ethical Assessment of the Use of Economic Sanctions as a Tool of Foreign Policy." Pgs. 48 -52.)

Justin Stalls, Economic Sanctions, University of Miami International and Comparative Law Review, Vol. 11, 2003.

Roger Normand, Sanctions as economic violence, The Progressive Response (a publication of Foreign Policy In Focus, a joint project of the Interhemispheric Resource Center and the Institute for Policy Studies), Vol. 2, no. 32(a), 17 October 1998

Hatipoglu, M. Emre., Morgan, T. Clifton. and Palmer, Glenn. "Economic Sanctions and Foreign Policy Substitutability: An Application of the Two Good Theory" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the International Studies Association 48th Annual Convention, Hilton Chicago, CHICAGO, IL, USA, Feb 28, 2007 . 2009-05-24 http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p180760_index.html p24

Kimberly Ann Elliott (Peterson Institute for International Economics), Evidence on the Costs and Benefits of Economic Sanctions, speech given before the Subcommittee on Trade Committee on Ways and Means, 23 October 1997, http://www.www.piie.com/publications/papers/paper.cfm?ResearchID=294

Hufbauer, Shott, and Elliott 1990 Economic Sanctions Reconsidered: History and Current Policy. Gary Clyde Hufbauer and Jeffrey J. Schott. Washington Institute for International

Max Tegmark (professor of physics and astronomy at the University of Pennsylvania; studies cosmic microwave background and galaxy clustering; much of his work bears on the concept of parallel universes: evaluating evidence for infinite space and cosmological inflation; developing insights into quantum decoherence; and studying the possibility that the amplitude of microwave background fluctuations, the dimensionality of spacetime and the fundamental laws of physics can vary from place to place), Parallel Universes, Scientific American, 14 April 2003, http://www.krabach.info/astro/parallel_universe/parallel_universe.html

Ibid.

Ibid.

Babic, Jovan and Aleksandar Jokic. Economic sanctions, morality and escalation of demands on Yugoslavia. International Peacekeeping, vol. 9, no. 4, Winter 2002, pp. 119-126.

Justin Stalls, Economic Sanctions, University of Miami International and Comparative Law Review, Vol. 11, 2003.

Justin Stalls, Economic Sanctions, University of Miami International and Comparative Law Review, Vol. 11, 2003.

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