Information Dominance as an Affirmative Countermeasure Against International Terrorism

8/14/2019 Information Dominance as an Affirmative Countermeasure Against International Terrorism

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INFORMATION DOMINANCE AS AN AFFIRMATIVE COUNTERMEASUREAGAINST INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM

by

Peter Reynolds Stephenson, PhD, CISSP, CISM, FICAF

A thesis submitted to the Faculty of Norwich University

in partial fulfillment of the requirements of the degree of

Master of Arts in Diplomacy Program.

June 2007

Copyright 2006-2007 Peter R. StephensonAll rights reserved


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Information Dominance as an Affirmative Countermeasure against International

Terrorism

by

Peter Reynolds Stephenson, PhD, CISSP, CISM, FICAF

Reviewed: Thomas C. Wingfield, Esq., Associate Professor, US Army Command and

General Staff College

Approved: ________________________________________________________

Name & Title of First Reader

Approved: ________________________________________________________

Name & Title of Second Reader

Approved: _________________________________________________________

Name & Title of Program Director

18 June 2007


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Abstract

This thesis hypothesizes that it is possible and practical to apply informationdominance as an affirmative countermeasure against terrorism by non-state actors in

much the same manner that states use information superiority in the conduct of

international politics and economics. The issue that it addresses is whether or not there issufficient foundational information relating to terrorism, information science,

international law and information warfare to develop a generalized meta-framework for

applying concepts of information dominance in a counter-terrorism context much as these

principles are applied in modern state-on-state warfare.The thesis examines all of these foundational areas and applies the findings to the

development of an information dominance meta-framework, or a framework of

frameworks applied specifically to the problem of counter-terrorism. The authorconcludes that such a meta-framework is both feasible and practical. As a starting point

for further research (outside the scope of this thesis), the author proposes such a meta-

framework based upon established work of other researchers.The meta-framework (The Counter-Terrorism Information Dominance

Framework, or CTIDF), is constructed based upon information, techniques and

technologies that are well established in their various fields. Simply put, the CTIDF is a

comprehensive, interdisciplinary, holistic approach to the application of elements ofinformation conflict to the problem of counter-terrorism.


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Acknowledgments

I would like to acknowledge the support and assistance of my thesis advisor,

Thomas Wingfield. Not only is Tom the premier expert on the areas of international law

touched by the subject matter in this thesis, he is a terrific scholar, teacher and friend. As

well, no acknowledgement would be complete without mentioning Drs Kearsley and

Lerche for allowing me to perform research using the field of information science, which

I dearly love, and which is outside the mainstream of counter-terrorism and diplomacy.

Dr. Mich Kabay, who ranks among the most intelligent and educated people I

know (as well as the perfect gentleman), listened patiently to my theories and did not

hesitate to debate them with me. The value of those debates and his friendship cannot be

overstated. Phil Susmann and Eric Brahman at NUARI The Norwich University

Applied Research Institutes added numerous opportunities for me to apply my research

in a variety of interesting ways.

Finally, I must credit some people with adding moral support, even if it only

meant letting me vent my frustrations during the program. I found, well into the counter-

terrorism part of the program, that this can be a very unpleasant subject. They listened

even when I was, perhaps, less than clear about what was bothering me.

Those include Elizabeth Templeton, Sophia Bennett and Kris Rowley (all of the

Norwich School of Graduate Studies), and, of course, Deborah, my wife who would just

as soon have tossed the whole project out and got her husband back. No matter how

many times I do things such as this, though, she always seems to manage to suffer

through them. Im done, Deb. This is my last degree (for a while, anyway).

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Contents

ABSTRACT.....................................................................................................................................I

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS .............................................................................................................II

CONTENTS.................................................................................................................................. III

FIGURES.....................................................................................................................................VII

TABLES.....................................................................................................................................VIII

1. INTRODUCTION.......................................................................................................................1

1.1BACKGROUND.........................................................................................................................1

1.2PROBLEM STATEMENT ............................................................................................................2

1.3THESIS STATEMENT ................................................................................................................2

1.4MOTIVATIONS .........................................................................................................................3

1.5CONTRIBUTIONS......................................................................................................................3

1.6SUMMARY OF THE AUTHORS RESEARCH................................................................................4

1.7SUMMARY OF CONTENTS ........................................................................................................4

2. LITERATURE REVIEW...........................................................................................................6

2.1INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS...................................................................................................6

2.2INFORMATION CONFLICT.........................................................................................................7

2.3TERRORISM .............................................................................................................................8

2.4IMPORTANT FOUNDATIONAL RESEARCH.................................................................................9

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2.6CONCLUSIONS .......................................................................................................................12

3. THE NATURE OF INFORMATION CONFLICT ...............................................................14

3.1THE INFOSPHERE:INFORMATION BATTLESPACE IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY...............14

3.2INFORMATION THEORY .........................................................................................................19

3.3SCALE-FREE NETWORKS.......................................................................................................22

3.3.1 Social Networks as Scale-Free Networks .....................................................................23

3.4INFORMATION SUPERIORITY..................................................................................................24

3.4.1 Information Dominance Theory ...................................................................................25

3.5THE COMPONENTS OF INFORMATION CONFLICT ...................................................................26

3.5.1 Active and Passive Information Conflict ......................................................................27

3.5.2 Information Warfare.....................................................................................................28

3.5.3 Cyber Conflict ..............................................................................................................29

3.5.4 Information Operations ................................................................................................29

3.6CYBER CRIME AND ITS RELATIONSHIP TO INFORMATION CONFLICT .....................................30

3.7CONCLUSIONS .......................................................................................................................32

4. THE NATURE OF TERRORISM ..........................................................................................34

4.1GOALS OF TERRORISM ..........................................................................................................34

4.2IMPORTANT TERRORIST GROUPS...........................................................................................36

4.3CLASSIFYING TERRORISM:ATAXONOMY.............................................................................36

4.4CONCLUSIONS .......................................................................................................................42

5. THE LAW AND INFORMATION CONFLICT ...................................................................44

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5.1MUNICIPAL OR DOMESTIC LAW ............................................................................................44

5.1.1 Information Conflict and Cyber Crime.........................................................................46

5.2INTERNATIONAL LAW ...........................................................................................................47

5.2.1 Jus ad Bellum The Law of Conflict Management ......................................................48

5.2.2 Jus in Bello The Law of Armed Conflict ....................................................................50

5.3THE LAW AS IT IMPACTS TERRORISM....................................................................................51

5.4CONCLUSIONS .......................................................................................................................52

6. INFORMATION CONFLICT AND TERRORISM..............................................................53

6.1THE TERRORIST BATTLESPACE .............................................................................................53

6.1.1 The Physical Battlespace..............................................................................................56

6.1.2 The Virtual Battlespace ................................................................................................56

6.2INFORMATION WARFARE IN THE CONTEXT OF TERRORISM...................................................57

6.2.1 Deliberate and Planned Application of Violence .........................................................58

6.2.2 Terrorist Acts and Insurgent Acts.................................................................................58

6.2.3 Ideological and Operational Imperatives.....................................................................59

6.2.4 Surprise, Violence, Intimidation Hostage-Taking, etc. .................................................59

6.2.5 Availability of Targets Carefully Planned....................................................................59

6.2.6 Communication Between Terrorists and Dissemination of Propaganda .....................60

6.2.7 Legitimize the Use of Violence, Recruitment ................................................................60

6.3CONCLUSIONS .......................................................................................................................61

7. COUNTERING TERRORISM WITH INFORMATION DOMINANCE ..........................62

7.1SHANNON INFORMATION THEORY AS A BASIS FOR INFORMATION CONFLICT .......................63

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7.2KOPPS THEORY OF INFORMATION CONFLICT .......................................................................63

7.3APPLYING SCALE-FREE SOCIAL NETWORKS .........................................................................65

7.4AMETA-FRAMEWORK FOR INFORMATION DOMINANCE IN COUNTER-TERRORISM ...............68

7.4.1 What is meant by a Meta-Framework ......................................................................68

7.4.2 Constructing a Meta-Framework.................................................................................70

7.4.3 Counter-Terrorism Information Dominance Framework (CTIDF)..............................71

7.4.4 How the Framework was Constructed..........................................................................72

7.4.5 Meeting the Requirements for a Meta-Framework.......................................................73

7.5CONCLUSIONS .......................................................................................................................74

8. SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS ..........................................75

APPENDIX A A TAXONOMY OF TERRORISM ................................................................77

WORKS CITED............................................................................................................................84

PRIMARY SOURCES .....................................................................................................................84

SECONDARY SOURCES (BOOKS) ..................................................................................................85

SECONDARY SOURCES (ARTICLES)..............................................................................................86

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Figures

Figure 1 - Information Continuum........................................................................ 15

Figure 2 - Second Dimension of Information Conflict: Criminal-Warfare

Continuum......................................................................................................................... 16

Figure 3 - Inclusion of Terrorism in the Graphical Representation of Information

Conflict ............................................................................................................................. 18

Figure 4 - Shannon's Schematic Diagram of a General Communication System

........................................................................................................................................... 19

Figure 5 - Shannon's Schematic Diagram of a Correction System ................... 21

Figure 6 - Link Analysis of "Terrorism" at the Sub-Class Level.......................... 38

Figure 7 - Relationships from Figure 6 Organized in a "Peacock" Display ......... 39

Figure 8 - Clustering of the Elements Shown in Figure 6 and 7........................... 40

Figure 9 Mind-Map of an Informal Taxonomy of the Concept of Battlespace. 54

Figure 10 - A Map Showing Links Between al Qaeda and Associated Terrorist

Groups............................................................................................................................... 66

Figure 11 - Result of Performing a Clustering Operation on the Map in Figure 10

........................................................................................................................................... 67

Figure 12 - The Zachman Framework for Information Systems Architecture

Development..................................................................................................................... 70

Figure 13 - The Counter-Terrorism Information Dominance Framework ........... 71

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Tables

Table 1 - Characteristics of the Terrorist Battlespace........................................... 55

Table 2 - Connections between Information Warfare and the Terrorist Battlespace

........................................................................................................................................... 58

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1. INTRODUCTION

This thesis breaks new ground in the application of several information

technologies. Some of these technologies are what the author refers to as hard

technologies and some are what the author considers soft technologies. Hard

technologies are those that lean towards application of computer and communications

systems to problems of information management. Soft technologies are those that lean

more towards sociology and information content. When these technologies combine,

they offer opportunities for the use of information both as an offensive weapon and as a

defensive tool.

In this thesis, the author explores one application of this approach that he refers to

as information dominance. Information dominance is a term that one generally sees used

in a state-on-state context. However, here the author attempts to generalize the term and

codify exactly what it means. In that regard, the concept ofinformation dominance

theory allows broad application as a framework for more common techniques of

information warfare and information operations. Specifically, this thesis looks at the

potential application of information dominance in the context of counter-terrorism.

1.1 Background

THE UNITED STATES is gradually losing theonline war againstterrorists. Rather than aggressively pursuing its enemies, the U.S.

government has adopted a largely defensive strategy, the centerpiece ofwhich is an electronic Maginot Line that supposedly protects criticalinfrastructure (for example, the computer systems run by agencies such as

the Department of Defense and the Federal Aviation Administration)

againstonline attacks. In the meantime,terrorists and their sympathizers,unhindered by bureaucratic inertia and unchallenged by Western

governments, have reorganized their operations to take advantage of the

Internet's more prosaic properties. (Kohlmann; 2004)


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Kohlmann goes on to say, The U.S. government is mishandling the growing

threat because it misunderstandsterrorists. In these two comments, Kohlmann

summarizes an important issue for counter-terrorism operations. However, other writers

paint a somewhat gloomier picture: information terrorism attack may be state-sponsored

and the first wave of a digital Pearl Harbor. (Devost, Houghton, and Pollard; 2002)

While these two viewpoints frame the problem, they do not give enough

information to understand the issues fully. Neither does either statement describe, fully

and unambiguously, where information science fits in the overall spectrum of counter-

terrorism issues.

1.2 Problem Statement

The key convergence of counter-terrorism and information science is in

understanding how terrorist organizations use the entire spectrum of information both

strategically and tactically, and applying effective countermeasures, both offensively and

defensively. It is here, in this convergence of understanding and application that we see

the real problem. The challenge of implementing that convergence as an information

science discipline is the topic of this thesis.

1.3 Thesis Statement

It is possible and practical to apply information dominance as an affirmative

countermeasure against terrorism by non-state actors in much the same manner that states

use information superiority in the conduct of international politics and economics.


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1.4 Motivations

Since 9/11, the Global War on Terror (GWOT) has cost hundreds of billions of

dollars and thousands of lives. Not only is the war no closer to being won, some might

say that it actually is being lost and may never be won. Public sentiment against the

GWOT becomes more and more negative with every US serviceperson killed and every

Congressional budget increase requested by the administration. Cries for a new direction,

while well meant, do not take into account that there are very few new directions left.

It is clear that along with what few strategies and tactics actually are working, we must

add some new weapons to our arsenal.

As the comments above show (section 1.1) there is a perception that the US is

behind in areas of information warfare. This is not because American strategists do not

understand the concept. Rather, it is because the GWOT is a different kind of war than

we ever have fought and we have yet to understand its deeper implications, both as a war

and as a set of enemy strategies. One area where we can improve our chances is by

wresting control of the infosphere from the enemy. If one takes Kohlmann literally, one

can see that this is a significant current vulnerability for the US and its Coalition partners

in the GWOT.

1.5 Contributions

The contributions that this thesis makes are the analysis of information conflict in

the context of terrorism, and the formulation and application of a set of tools that the US

and its partners can apply in the infosphere. These tools achieve the traditional goal of


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information operations: actions taken to affect adversary information and information

systems while defending ones own information and information systems (Wingfield;

2000). However, unlike other current approaches, this thesis examines information

conflict in the context of the Global War on Terror.

1.6 Summary of the Authors Research

The research for this thesis was conducted in several ways. First, traditional

literature searches provided a background and a context for the theory of Information

Dominance. A study of terrorism, terrorist groups and terrorist strategies in the

infosphere provided a context for the application of information dominance in the Global

War on Terror. During that research, the author applied several tools, some of which are

just coming into common use, to characterize the notion of terrorism and allow mapping

of terrorist organizations.

Concurrently, the author explored emerging techniques such as social network

mapping, scale-free networking (sometimes called small world networks) as well as the

application of both new and traditional aspects of knowledge science. Finally, the author

built up a theoretical tool kit of techniques with which to engage in information

dominance in a terrorism setting. It remains, as is discussed in Chapter 8, to test these

theoretical tools in a live environment.

1.7 Summary of Contents

This thesis is organized from the general to the specific. Chapter 1 opens the

discussion by framing the problem and presenting the thesis statement, which offers a

solution to the problem.


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Chapter 2 is a review of some of the more important literature forming the

background, both historically and currently, for information conflict, both state-on-state

(where practitioners of information warfare are most familiar) and in the context to

terrorism. The author explores the literature both of terrorism issues and of historical

issues of international relations as they apply to this problem.

Chapter 3 lays the foundation for understanding information conflict and its

components, as well as introducing some novel approaches using information science and

new views of where information conflict, especially cyber conflict, is headed. This

chapter is important because it is from these well-established core concepts that the

approaches outlined in the final chapter emerge.

Chapter 4 briefly introduces the cogent issues surrounding terrorism. These issues

frame the battlespace. The author describes the terrorist battlespace here and proposes the

aspects of that battlespace that may be vulnerable to information dominance, the key

theme of this thesis.

Chapter 5 is a brief review of applicable international law as it applies in

cyberspace and as it converges with laws of conflict. Chapter 6 begins the convergence

of the ideas in the rest of the thesis into a coherent approach. It lays the final level of the

foundation for Chapter 7, which describes a new approach to controlling the infosphere in

the context of terrorism. This approach the author refers to as Information Dominance.

Chapter 8 addresses the future and draws some conclusions from the authors

research.


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2. LITERATURE REVIEW

There is ample literature on information conflict and a growing body of work on

terrorism. However, there is almost nothing that brings the two together. In this chapter,

the author explores applicable literature in three specific areas:

1. International relations

2. Information conflict

3. Terrorism

International relations (IR) forms a background for the effective use of

information superiority and for understanding the stage upon which information conflict

plays out globally. The many facets of information conflict are important to the theme of

this thesis. Finally, terrorism, not a new phenomenon certainly, is the target of the

authors research and we will seek to understand it in this thesis in the context of

information conflict. This chapter begins with an overview of the writers that are

important to this thesis along with some examples of their work and then discusses

relevant contributions in the convergence of the three topic areas.

2.1 International Relations

The author has proposed, in a term paper for the Master of Arts in Diplomacy

program, a theory of information dominance (Stephenson; Feb 2006) as a lens through

which, in the information age, one may analyze international relations taking into account

the impacts of generally available global communications technology. That paper

references some of the primary contributors to the literature of international relations

from the perspective of developing such a theory. Relevant authors and examples of their


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work include:

Mingst (Mingst; 2004)

Morgenthau (Morgenthau; 1967)

Nye (Nye; 1990)

Slomanson (Slomanson; 2003)

Waltz (Waltz; 1979)

Haskell (Haskell; 1980)

2.2 Information Conflict

The literature on information conflict and related topics as a basis for international

relations is surprisingly rich. This literature falls into two distinct categories. First, there

is the theoretical literature. This explores various concepts of information conflict as they

apply to international relations in the information age. The second category comprises

operational treatises, often written by military authors. While this body of work does not

address terrorism directly, it does lay groundwork for further discussion in that context.

Important authors in information conflict and examples of their work include:

Aldrich (Aldrich; 1996)

Armistead (Armistead; 2004)

Arquilla and Ronfeldt (Arquilla and Ronfeldt; 1999, 1993)

Cronin and Crawford (Cronin and Crawford; 1999)

Denning (Denning; 1999)

DiCenso (DiCenso; 1999)

Donskov (Donskov; 2003)


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Dunn (Dunn; 2002)

Erbschloe (Erbschloe; 2001)

Eriksson (Eriksson; 2004)

Freakley (Freakley; 2004)

Jones, Kovacich and Luzwick (Jones, Kovacich, and Luzwick; 2002)

Kopp (Kopp; 2005)

Naef (Naef; 2005)

Rosenau (Rosenau; 1998)

Schmitt (Schmitt; 1999)

Shen (Shen; 1995)

Thomas (Thomas; 2006)

Wei (Wei; 1996)

Wingfield (Wingfield; 2000)

2.3 Terrorism

There is a growing body of literature on terrorism. This literature addresses the

topic of terrorism in at least four distinct ways:

Historical foundations for terrorism

Terrorism motivations

State sponsorship of terrorism

Major terrorist groups, their histories, motivations, strategies and tactics

Major writers and applicable representative works include:

ONeill (O'Neill; 2005)


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Sageman (Sageman; 2004)

Hoffman (Hoffman; 2006)

Byman (Byman; 2005)

Gambill (Gambill; 1998)

Laqueur (Laqueur; 1996)

Ehrlich and Liu (Ehrlich and Liu; 2002)

Mazarr (Mazarr; 2004)

Bar (Bar; 2004)

Crenshaw (Crenshaw; 1981)

Guillaume (Guillaume; 2004)

Evans (Evans; 2005)

2.4 Important Foundational Research

One of the earliest discussions on the convergence of terrorism and information

systems appears on the Information Warfare Site on the Internet. Galley discusses the

concept of computer terrorism and concludes that it is possible, even likely (Galley;

1996). He writes: It would be suicidal for any dictator such as Saddam Hussein at the

present time to conceive a major offensive without benefiting of the advantages from the

principal Achilles' heel of the Western civilization: information systems.

In retrospect, we know that Hussein did, in fact, attempt to manipulate

information systems but not quite in the manner that Galley suggests. Rather, Hussein

attempted to use propaganda, misinformation and disinformation to influence both his

own people and the rest of the world.


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The first cogent public discussion of information warfare in the context of

terrorism appeared in 1999 (Denning; 1999 pp 68-74). In her book Information Warfare

and Security Denning discusses several facets of information warfare that range from

cyber warfare (including what today is called computer network attack or CNA) to

misinformation and disinformation. She quotes Mark Pollitt, then a special agent in the

FBI but, ultimately, the chief of the FBIs computer forensics laboratory, as defining

cyber terrorism as,

the premeditated, politically motivated attack against information,computer systems, computer programs, and data which result in violence

against noncombatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents.(Pollitt; 1997 in Denning; 1999 p 69)

She further reports the first known instance of a cyber attack (1998) by terrorists:

[E]thnic Tamil guerrillas were said to have swamped Sri Lankan

embassies with thousands of electronic mail messages. The messages read"we are the Internet Black Tigers and were doing this to disrupt your

communications." An offshoot of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam,which have been fighting for an independent homeland for minorityTamils, was responsible for the incident." (Wolf; 1998 in Denning; 1999 p

69)

However, Arquilla and Ronfeldt foresaw the emergence of cyber war as early as

1993 and described it as,

conducting, and preparing to conduct, military operations according to

information-related principles. It means disrupting if not destroying theinformation and communications systems, broadly defined to include evenmilitary culture, on which an adversary relies in order to know itself:

who it is, where it is, what it can do when, why it is fighting, which threats

to counter first, etc. It means trying to know all about an adversary while

keeping it from knowing much about oneself. It means turning thebalance of information and knowledge in ones favor, especially if the

balance of forces is not. It means using knowledge so that less capital and


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labor may have to be expended. (Arquilla and Ronfeldt; 1993)

This description was important because it began the process of defining the notion of

information conflict. This early work evolved by 1999 to include a well-formed vision of

the realm of information conflict as we see it emerging today. Although they did not

connect cyber war with terrorism, their description in 1993 did not preclude later

application of information conflict in a terrorism context.

Jones, et al make a distinction between cyber terrorism and techno-terrorism

(Jones, Kovacich, and Luzwick; 2002 pp 109-113). They define a techno-terrorist as ...

those who use technology for terrorist activities.... This expanded the range of

possibilities for the technical aspects of cyber terrorism even though the authors viewed

the two (cyber terrorism and techno-terrorism) as separate and distinct.

Dunn was an early leader in expanding the notions of information warfare and

traditional international relations theory into a single, converged concept (Dunn; 2002).

Eriksson and Giacomello (Eriksson and Giacomello; 2004) expand independently on

Dunns theories (although they do not cite Dunn in their paper) and offer a superb

bibliography of supporting references.

Armistead (Armistead; 2004), however, took some of the most important steps in

converging international relations theory, information warfare and information operations

into a single set of converged concepts that supported practical application. Building on

Dunns work, he also expanded the seminal work of Arquilla and Ronfeldt (Arquilla and

Ronfeldt; 1999).

Arquilla and Ronfeldt developed and expanded the notion of noopolitik which

included the notion of the noosphere. This was an important step forward because it


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recognized information, not simply information systems, as a key element of information

warfare and information operations. It built upon their earlier work (Arquilla and

Ronfeldt; 1993) and of others published in a book edited by them called In Athenas

Camp (Arquilla and Ronfeldt; 2003). From a theoretical perspective, the topics addressed

in this collection of essays were seminal in shaping thinking about information conflict

but still did not address terrorism directly.

Significant, though perhaps unintended, insight on the relationships of

information warfare and terrorist insurgencies comes from work by ONeil (O'Neil; 205).

In his book, the author describes nine succinct insurgent types and a well-developed

discussion of effects of disunity within insurgent/terrorist groups. This discussion offers

insights into ways to use information warfare to disrupt terrorist groups and lessen their

effectiveness. One final important paper in this regard deserves our attention. The

Militant Ideology Atlas (Combating Terrorism Center; 2006) offers insights into

militant groups, their relationships and the nature and sources of their ideologies.

An important foundation for any discussion of conflict in cyberspace is

international law of conflict. The preeminent authority on international law in

cyberspace is Wingfield and his book The Law of Information Conflict (Wingfield; 2000)

is the authoritative reference on the topic.

2.6 Conclusions

While there is virtually nothing in the literature that addresses the convergence of

information conflict and terrorism directly in a useful manner, there is ample foundation

for extending existing thinking from conventional international politics to information


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conflict involving sub-national actors. The seminal works of Dunn, Arquilla and

Ronfeldt, Eriksson and Giacomello, Armistead, Wingfield and others offer an excellent

platform for understanding information conflict.

Hoffman, Byman, Laqueur, ONeil and others address Terrorism in general.

These writers give us a solid basis for understand the motivations, politics, strategies and

tactics of terrorists and terrorist groups, both independently and in the context of their

state sponsors. Finally, the rich and extensive literature on international relations offers a

context upon which to build although in many regards that context is dated as it applies to

an information age.


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3. THE NATURE OF INFORMATION CONFLICT

Information conflict is not well understood and has not yet reached the level of a

formal discipline. Armistead, Dunn, and Arquilla and Ronfeldt are the primary direct

contributors, although supporting theories from such indirect contributors as Shannon

(information theory) are important. In this chapter, the author explores an emerging

theory of information conflict in the context of traditional information warfare and

information operations.

3.1 The Infosphere: Information Battlespace in the Twenty-First Century

One of the most important concepts when one considers information conflict is

the difference between hard and soft power. Arquilla and Ronfeldt (Arquilla and

Ronfeldt; 1999) introduced the concept of noopolitik. Noopolitik is defined by Arquilla

and Ronfeldt as foreign-policy behavior for the information age that emphasizes the

primacy of ideas, values, norms, laws and ethicsit would work through soft power

rather than hard power.

The author discusses this notion in detail in a paper produced as part of the Master

of Arts in diplomacy program at Norwich University (Stephenson; 2006). Soft power, in

the context of noopolitik, is the power of information. However, information comes in

many guises. Even when one considers information, one may make a distinction between

the hard power end of the information continuum and soft power. Thus, we describe the

information continuum as bipolarextending from the hard power pole in the context of

information (cyber conflict) to the soft power pole (pure information and thought). In the

center of the continuum is the space where hard and soft power converges. The soft


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power pole of the continuum we refer to as the noosphere. The convergence we refer to

as the infosphere. The hard power pole comprises cyber events (i.e., those actions that

predominantly involve technology). We may represent this bipolar information

continuum graphically as shown in Figure one.

Figure 1 - Information Continuum

Most information conflict takes place in the infosphere. However, certain forms

of information conflict operations may occur at either the hard or soft power ends of the

continuum. At the cyber end, we find computer network attack (CNA) and other

technical operations such as the development of web sites on the Internet. At the

noosphere end, we find pure information that may include propaganda, misinformation,

and disinformation, especially as web site content. Therefore, information conflict, and

especially information operations as waged by information warriors,1

may occur in all

three areas of the continuum, but its results will be most observable in the infosphere.

We may break information conflict into the subsets of offensive conflict and

defensive conflict. While this thesis will address both of these subsets, the author is most

concerned with the application of offensive information conflict in the context of

counterterrorism.

1 Information warriors include those individuals with specialized capabilities such as experts in

cyber conflict, hackers, propagandists, public relations experts, intelligence analysts, and political analysts.


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We may apply the concept of the information continuum to describe the

interactions of hard and soft power within a second continuum: that of criminal activity

and warfare. Information conflict is present in contexts other than war. One can observe

the effects of information conflict even in the corporate world. For example, the

manipulation of information that positively portrays one organization and negatively

portrays that organization's competition is a form of information conflict.

Criminal organizations such as gangs may use elements of information conflict

for intimidation (e.g., gang graffiti) at the soft end of the continuum. The author has

direct experience with the use of information conflict in an attempt by a fraudster to

implicate his partner in a federal crime. In this example, the fraudster used a trivial

example of an information operation to penetrate his partner's computer and place

incriminating evidence in the form of documents on that computer.

Because information conflict can apply to the second continuum of criminal

activity to warfare, we may add a dimension to the graphical representation in Figure one.

We illustrate that additional dimension in Figure 2.

Figure 2 - Second Dimension of Information Conflict: Criminal-Warfare Continuum


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Any operation, tactic, or strategy that includes or depends for its success on the

manipulation of information in any form and the subsequent manipulation of individuals,

groups of individuals, or populations is an example of information conflict. For reasons

that this thesis will examine in a later chapter, the application of the tactics and strategies

of information conflict to the problem of counterterrorism may be promising.

It also is practical to superimpose the notion of terrorism upon the representation

in Figure 2. Some have suggested that terrorism has strong criminal elements associated

with it. For example, the Interparliamentary Union, an international organization of

parliaments of sovereign states:

Unequivocally condemns terrorism as a criminal act, noting that terrorism

endangers the territorial integrity of countries and their national and

international security, destroys innocent lives and the physical andeconomic infrastructure, and destabilises not only legitimately constituted

governments but society as a whole. (Interparliamentary Union; 2003)

Terrorism, as well, is a criminal act as determined in the Article 155 of the

Criminal Code of the Republic Uzbekistan (Uzbekistan; 2005). Many other countries

including Australia, France, Germany, Greece, Norway, Spain, Sweden, and the United

States consider terrorism to be a criminal act (The Secretary of State for Foreign and

Commonwealth Affairs; 2005). With that characterization in mind, we can superimpose

the notion of terrorism as a criminal act on the graphical representation of Figure 2.

Figure 3 now shows a nearly complete graphical representation of information conflict.


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Figure 3 - Inclusion of Terrorism in the Graphical Representation of Information Conflict

From Figure 3 we can see that terrorism falls in the continuum between criminal

activity and warfare containing elements of both. We may also surmise that information

conflict relating to terrorism, as with the rest of the continuum between criminal activity

and warfare, appears largely in the infosphere. However, this is not to imply that there

are no elements of information conflict relating to terrorism at either of the opposite poles

of the continuum.

We could add a third dimensiona Z-axisthat relates to other uses of the

continuum, intelligence, for example. One might think of the Z-axis as consisting of

slices that mirror and are behind the continuum of Figure 3. We position these slices

along the Z-axis extending from operational intelligence (closest to the front) to pure

intelligence that consists largely of situation reports without any direct resultant action

implied. Each slice stands alone as an explicit definition of an intelligence goal within


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the overall continuum illustrated in Figure 3.

3.2 Information Theory

Claude E. Shannon first expounded the notion of information theory in 1948

(Shannon; 1948). According to Shannon: The fundamental problem of communication

is that of reproducing at one point either exactly or approximately a message selected at

another point. Frequently the messages have meaning; that is they refer to or are

correlated according to some system with certain physical or conceptual entities.

While Shannon concentrated largely on the engineering problems associated with

communication, the basic description of the communication problem leads to an

understanding of how one may apply elements of both offensive and defensive

information conflict to one's benefit. Shannon provides a graphical representation of a

generalized communication system. His representation is reproduced in Figure 4.

Figure 4 - Shannon's Schematic Diagram of a General Communication System

Shannon applies the notion of entropy to his theory of information systems.

Shannon's definition of information entropy is the measure of the average information

content that may be associated with a random outcome. If, probabilistically, there is an


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equal likelihood of all potential outcomes, the value of entropy is at the maximum. If, on

the other hand, the outcome is a probabilistic certainty, the value of entropy is zero. The

objective of the communication system is to achieve entropy of zero.

However, as we can see from Figure 4, the potential for the injection of noise in

the signal path between the transmitter and the receiver exists. By way of clarification,

the notions of an information transmitter and an information receiver do not necessarily

connote technical objects.

Consider the child's game of telephone. As a simple message passes from one

end of a line of children to the other, it is likely that the message received at the distant

end will not be the same message sent from the original transmitter. In this case, each

child with the exception of the first and last in the row is both a transmitter and a

receiver. Each child receives the message and passes it to the next child in line. The

process continues until the final child (receiver) receives the message. Because each

child is not only a transmitter and a receiver, but also a noise source, entropy generally is

greater than zero.

One might also interpret this process as consisting of a transmitter (first child in

the row), a receiver (last child in the row) and a noise source (all of the other children

between the transmitter and the receiver). This analysis allows us to hypothesize that by

controlling the noise source one might control the entropy of the information at the

receiver, achieving the level of entropy desired. This has interesting implications in the

use of information conflict as a countermeasure to terrorism.

For example, one might insert misinformation or disinformation (noise) in the

transmission path (web site, communications link, or other means of conveying


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information) from a terrorist leader (ideological leaders such as political theorists,

religious figures, etc.) to terrorist groups in the field. As well, one might reinterpret

ideological mandates. Transmitting credible analyses of fundamental ideological tenets

with the analysis slightly shifted (noise) to one's benefit might well have an impact upon

an ideologically driven enemy.

Additionally, when it is to ones benefit, one might insure that there is no noise in

the transmission and that a clear message with entropy of zero arrives at the receiver.

Shannon graphically describes how to accomplish this. His representation appears in

Figure 5.

Figure 5 - Shannon's Schematic Diagram of a Correction System

Notice in Figure 5 that a correction System requires an observer, the role of which

is to (1) collect information from the source (prior to transmission) and the destination

(after receiving), (2) compare the two versions of the information and (3) submit the

corrected version to a correcting device that delivers the information to the destination.

Consider the following example.


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A terrorist group kidnaps an American soldier. The group kills the soldier and

beheads him while recording the entire process on video. The group delivers the video to

al Jazeera and eventually the video finds its way to CNN. CNN televises the video but

deletes the portion where the soldier is beheaded. The producer of the newscast (noise)

distorts the content of the video between the transmitter (the source of the video,

presumably al Jazeera) and the receiver (the newscast audience). A voyeuristic, and, one

might assume, sympathetic blogger (observer) obtains the original video, places it on his

web site (correcting device), and advertises it for all to see.

Considering figures 4 and 5 one might conjecture that the management of

information based upon Shannon information theory is not simply interesting but,

arguably, useful as a tool of information conflict. Managing information becomes an

exercise in managing entropy. One may manage entropy at multiple points on the

information continuum shown in Figure 3. This thesis explores these concepts in Chapter

7.

The mathematical analyses in the Shannon paper are rigorous and are beyond the

scope of this thesis.

3.3 Scale-Free Networks

Barabasi and Albert first described the concept of scale-free networks in 1999

(Barabasi and Albert; 1999). In their early descriptions, Barabasi and others demonstrate

the concept through examples including the Internet, World Wide Web, and certain types

of social networks (Barabasi, Ravasz, and Vicsek; 2001). These networks contradicted

earlier views of network growth (Erdos and Renyi; 1959, Arquilla and Ronfeldt 1-25;


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2002) that viewed networks as growing like chains, stars or all-channel networks where

all nodes connect more or less randomly to each other. Erdos graphed these networks as

a typical bell curve while Barabasi, et al described them as power law networks.

An important aspect of scale-free, or power law, networks is the concept of

preferential attachments. These networks are characterized by growth (continued

expansion) and preferential attachment (new nodespreferto attach to nodes with the

largest number of already connected nodes) (Barabasi and Jeong; 2003).

Besides a new view of the growth of scale-free networks, Barabasis and his

colleagues described another important factor. Scale-free networks are extremely

resistant to error and failure but are not resistant to attack (Barabasi, Albert, and Jeong;

2000). These factors (preferential attachment and error/attack tolerance) become

extremely important when using information superiority as a countermeasure against a

terrorist network.

3.3.1 Social Networks as Scale-Free Networks

While Barabasi et al described social networks in general as scale-free, other

researchers extended that concept to include, explicitly, terrorist groups and terrorist acts

(Matthew and Shambaugh; 2005, Clauset and Young; 2005, Stripling; 2007). Of these,

the Stripling paper may prove the most valuable in that it extends and updates Barabasis

theory relative, explicitly, to terrorist networks and, more specifically, to the al Qaeda

network.

In his paper, Stripling adds the notion of directed links between nodes showing

that not all terrorist links are two-way. This accounts for different types of interactions


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within the same network (financial support, logistical support, training support,

operational support, etc.). These interactions characterize the state of global terrorist

networks well. Since the early years of this century, terrorist networks have tended to

become far less centralized than they were in the 1990s and earlier.

Because a successful attack against a scale-free network depends upon disabling a

critical number of nodes, and because other nodes tend to attempt to rebuild the network

after a failure, two important points emerge. First, disabling links is not an effective way

to disable a scale-free network because the links will re-establish wherever possible.

Second, a critical mass of node destruction must occur before the network becomes

effectively disabled. Two groups of researchers have shown that careful selection

(targeting) of nodes can cause a cascading effect that will bring down the network

(Motter and Lai; 2002, Moreno, Gomez, and Pacheco; 2002). Inducement of a cascading

effect using information superiority may affect terrorist networks and may offer an

effective countermeasure against them.

Another strong proponent of the notion of scale-free social networks (although he

refers to them as small world networks) is Sageman (Sageman; 2004). Sageman has

taken the work of Barabasi et al and applied it to his seminal work on characterizing

terrorist networks.

3.4 Information Superiority

The notion of soft power is a staple in the writings of Dunn (Dunn; 2002) and

Arquilla and Ronfeldt (Arquilla and Ronfeldt; 1999). Additionally, Armistead wrote an

entire book on the topic of soft power and its role in modern warfare (Armistead; 2004),


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building upon the work of Dunn and Arquilla and Ronfeldt. This author explored these

writers in the context of various lenses on international relations and proposed a theory of

information dominance that builds upon prior work in the field (Stephenson; 2007).

Armistead, however, did not expand extensively on why traditional views of

international relations are limited in the context of the information age. For that we must

turn to the writings of Eriksson and Giacomello (Eriksson and Giacomello; 2004).

Another challenge is that virtually all theories of international relations, including

those proposed by the above writers and researchers do well at analyzing events that have

passed but have proven, based upon this writers research, to be weak at anticipating

trends or events of interest. Thus, beyond providing basic understanding of why things

happened the way that they happened, virtually no current theory offers a direct path to

actionable intelligence.

3.4.1 Information Dominance Theory

This author proposed a theory of information dominance that takes into account

the need to anticipate the actions of an organization or state. Information dominance

theory uses Rosens definition of anticipatory systems for the purpose of expanding upon

the past and anticipating the future (Rosen; 1985). Rosen defines an anticipatory system,

An anticipatory system is a system containing a predictive model of itself and/or of its

environment that allows it to change state at an instant in accord with the models

predictions pertaining to a later instant.

We also may turn to Rosen for a concrete description of complexity (Rosen;


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1998), A system is simple if all its models are simulable. A system that is not simple,

and that accordingly must have a nonsimulable model, is complex.

This is important because this author speculates (Stephenson; Feb 2006) that part

of the difficulty in developing an anticipatory international relations theory is the

complexity of such systems. This complexity increases when the target is not a well-

defined nation-state, but, rather, is a non-state entity such as a terrorist group or network.

However, the success of a program of information dominance as an affirmative

countermeasure against terrorism requires an anticipatory system to be useful. The

authors paper proposes:

[A] theory of IR that views international politics viewed through the

lens of information operations as a Theory of Information Dominance. By

its name, one can see that this theory would share concepts with structuralrealism in that it seeks to explain the relationship of an actor to its

environment from the perspective of power. This is consistent with

Dunns thinking.Information Dominance Theory must account for a broad discourse on

international politics, economy, law, military power and other elements ofinternational relations. It also would be useful if such a theory couldanticipate the behavior of actors on the international stage.

The application of Rosens theory of anticipatory systems to create appropriate

models, along with information dominance and social network theory may offer the

underpinnings of an actionable response to extremist terrorism using information warfare

and operations.

3.5 The Components of Information Conflict

Kopp defines information conflict as a more generalized term used to

describe what most of the literature calls Information Warfare, InfoWar, or IW


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(Kopp; 2006). In turn, Wingfield gives the definition of information warfare as

[i]nformation operations conducted during a time of crisis or conflict to achieve or

promote specific objective over a specific adversary or adversaries. To understand this

definition, Wingfield also provides a definition of information operations as [a]ctions

taken to affect adversary information and information systems while defending ones

own information and information systems. (Wingfield; 2000)

If we look at a somewhat more generalized characterization of information

conflict, we find that it contains elements of information warfare, information operations

and cyber warfare or cyber conflict (information warfare restricted to cyberspace).

3.5.1 Active and Passive Information Conflict

We may characterize information conflict in other ways as well. One

differentiator is whether the operations involved are active or passive. Active

information conflict includes actions taken in the context of exploiting an adversary

directly. These are actions taken against the adversary.

Passive information conflict includes defensive action and actions taken against

an adversary without the intent of direct exploitation using those actions. An example of

such an action is reconnaissance or spying. This could involve such activities as

intercepting communications and breaking their cipher if necessary, monitoring public

information from and about the adversary. It might also include accessing information

provided by insiders and espionage agents placed inside the adversarys ranks. Active

and passive information conflict may exist in the context of either offensive or defensive

information conflict.


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3.5.2 Information Warfare

Information warfare as a concept is not new. Several writers have attempted to

define it and the most common definitions combine the definitions of information warfare

and information operations in section 3.5. Conceptually, information warfare is

exploiting an adversarys information systems while protecting our own. Information

warfare generally is thought of in terms of active, ongoing conflict the same as

conventional warfare.

However, information warfare is not always a hot war. For example, there are

writers who believe that China, although not engaged in a shooting war with the US,

none-the-less, believe that we are at war with China (Jones, et al; 2002, Exhibit 7). The

Chinese view of information warfare focuses, in part, upon preemption or, in terms used

by Sun Tzu, winning war without fighting (Yoshihara; 2000). Yoshihara describes six

pillars of information warfare:

1. Physical Attack/Destruction Use of kinetic (physical) attack to render

offensive IW systems unusable.

2. Electro-Magnetic Warfare Undermining the adversarys IW

capabilities through use of electro-magnetic energy.

3. Computer Network Attack (CNA) Using computers to attack

computers and computer systems.

4. Military Deception Manipulation and falsification of information

misinformation, disinformation, etc.)

5. Psychological Operations use of mechanisms such as propaganda to

influence perceptions.


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6. Operations Security Defensive mechanisms that prevent the adversary

from collecting or analyzing your information.

3.5.3 Cyber Conflict

Rattray defines cyber conflict as Efforts to dominate/gain advantage in

cyberspace to achieve objectives (Rattray; 2006). In simple terms, cyber conflict is

information conflict in cyber space. Cyber conflict tends toward the technical end of the

information warfare spectrum.

3.5.4 Information Operations

Information operation is, arguably, the best understood of the terms related to

information conflict. However, it also is the least stable in terms of solid definitions

because the concepts that make it up are in a constant state of flux.

Generally, information operations are considered part of an information war. The

difficulty with this, however, is that a war implies an ongoing declared conflict with an

identifiable enemy. Information operations may or may not fit cleanly within that

paradigm. Information operations may be carried out as part of a war, to be sure, but they

also may be carried out as individual skirmishes in a propaganda war between states

where no declared hot war exists.

This should not be confused, however, with the notion that information operations

are a subset of information warfare. In fact, in todays parlance, quite the opposite is

true. Information warfare grows out of information operations, not the other way round.

Armistead (Armistead, Chapter 1; 2004) describes information operations both

vertically and horizontally. Vertically, he describes [c]apabilities and related activities


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for IO as:

Civil affairs

Computer network attack

Deception

Destruction

Electronic warfare

Operations security

Public affairs

Psychological operations

He differentiates information warfare and information operations based upon the

notion that a war is narrow while information operations are broad. Armisteads

information warfare focuses upon a military infrastructure while information operations

generalizes across economic, political, information and military infrastructures. We may

say, however, that in the context of information conflict, an information operation may

be, but must not necessarily be, part of an information war.

3.6 Cyber Crime and its Relationship to Information Conflict

People often attempt to characterize cyber crime as a form of information conflict.

However, some distinguishing factors make this association inaccurate. First, one cannot

equate cyber crime to any type of war, formal or informal. Second, the notion of

information operations is inconsistent with the characteristics of cyber crime. Third, and

perhaps most important, no contemporary characterization of cyber crime addresses

either the six pillars of information warfare or the capabilities and related activities of


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information operations. Revisiting Rattrays definition of cyber conflict, again, we see no

consistent connection.

One tends to think of cyber crime as actions in cyber space that support illegal

activities. This is inconsistent with all notions of information conflict.

Generally, one equates the notion of cyber crime with definitions of electronic or

computer crime. The national Institute of Justice provides a working definition of

electronic crime that one can use to compare cyber crime with information conflict:

Crimes including but not limited to fraud, theft, forgery, childpornography or exploitation, stalking, traditional white-collar crimes,

privacy violations, illegal drug transactions, espionage, computerintrusions, or any other offenses that occur in an electronic environment

for the express purpose of economic gain or with the intent to destroy or

otherwise inflict harm on another person or institution. (National Instituteof Justice 2; 2001)

From this definition and those of the various aspects of information conflict, one

can see that there is virtually no connection between the two concepts. However, as

shown in Figures 2 and 3, criminal activity is part of the information conflict continuum.

This is an important distinction because although information warfare, information

operations and cyber conflict are not directly considered to be criminal activities under

current definitions, if one approaches the problem in the reverse one sees that there is, in

fact, a connection.

The connection between information conflict and cyber crime (or electronic

crime) comes in the effect, not the cause. In other words, while current definitions

consider the motivation for a criminal act ( fraud, theft, forgery, child pornography or

exploitation, stalking, traditional white-collar crimes, privacy violations, illegal drug


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transactions) they do not consider the outcome (e.g., terrorist funding from illegal

drug trafficking) which may be both a criminal act and an act of information operations.

Consider the example of the Internet as a tool for raising money to fund terrorist

activities through the illegal production and sale of drugs. The Internet may be used as a

communications mediaelectronic mail, for examplebetween drug suppliers and

terrorist groups. Another example is the use of terrorist web sites to advertise the results

of a kidnapping for propaganda purposes, clearly an aspect of cyber conflict. However,

the kidnapping itself is a violation of law in most states. Thus, the continuum between

crime and war, especially where the traditional paradigms of war break down, is valid

and, beyond typical definitions of both one finds common ground that must be addressed.

3.7 Conclusions

Understanding information conflict requires an understanding of its components

and of theories that contribute to it. The components of information conflict include

information warfare, information operations and cyber conflict. However, new theories

are emerging that attempt to explain the environment in which information conflict

exists. The notion of information conflict policy seems, from the literature, to be

secondary to the theories of how information conflict works..

The author takes the position that policy follows understanding. Operational

theories follow definitional theories. At this writing, definitional and operational theories

are just beginning to evolve into a state of usefulness. Additionally, an understanding of

various aspects of terrorism and counter-terrorism are crucial to the development of a

meta-framework for the application of information dominance theory to counter-


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terrorism. Finally, contributing theories such as information theory, game theory and

scale-free social network theory may play a significant role in evolving such a meta-

framework. The rest of this thesis explores those contributions and develops a meta-

framework for using information dominance as a counter-terrorism tool.


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4. THE NATURE OF TERRORISM

An understanding of terrorism in depth is beyond the scope of this thesis.

However, a few key elements determine how one might approach an effective use of

information superiority as a counter-terrorism tactic. The first of these elements is an

understanding of terrorist goals and objectives. This is an element that is not well

understood by most Westerners and it is key to any successful information warfare effort.

The second element is some detail as to the target. While there are hundreds of

terrorist organizations (over 70 in Iraq alone) ranging in size from a few members to al

Qaeda with over 50,000 members worldwide, only a few are of real consequence. As we

will discuss in Chapter 7, scale-free social network theory implies that by attacking some

key groups successfully, we can disable most of the terrorist infrastructure.

The third element is understanding the tools that terrorists use to plan and execute

their attacks. Finally, a concise characterization of terrorist tactics and motivations is

important. Sun Tzu said, If you know the enemy and know yourself, you need not fear

the result of a hundred battles.2 Understanding what drives terrorists, what their tools are

and how they operate will assist in understanding where their weaknesses are. In this

chapter, we consider these issues briefly.

4.1 Goals of Terrorism

Todays terrorists have multiple goals and their goals have multiple aspects.

Sageman produced a concise study of why Salafist terrorists perform acts of terrorism

2 There are dozens, perhaps hundreds, of translations of this venerable classic on The Art of War.

This one is the 1910 translation from the Chinese by Lionel Giles. It may be found at

http://www.chinapage.com/sunzi-e.html.


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(Sageman; 2004). He characterized this group of terrorists, the most prominent of todays

terrorist networks, in the preface to his book as the global Salafi jihad. Sagemans

study was unique in that it drew from detailed first person information about more

than170 mujahadin. It also was unique in that it was the first to explore seriously the

notion of social networks based upon scale-free network theory (referred to by Sageman

as small world networks). This thesis explores that approach in more detail in Chapter

7.

Hoffman characterizes terrorist goals as political (Hoffman, 40; 2006). However,

when one examines contemporary terrorism and terrorist groups, one finds that

Sagemans Salafists dominate them. Thus, for the purposes of this thesis we will focus

upon Salafists (or as some refer to them, Islamist fundamentalists) and their

motivations.

Islamist motivations are complex and are rooted in strict fundamentalist

interpretation of the Koran and the teachings of Muhammad. Various sects, such as the

Wahabist sect, interpret these teachings so strictly that they have added to and augmented

Islamic teaching to include the duty of jihad. In the early 1900s Sayyid Qtub took up the

Wahabist teachings and proclaimed that there must be jihad to establish a true Muslim

state, a departure from traditional Wahabist doctrine (Sageman, 10ff; 2004).

The duty of jihad consists of the near jihad and the far jihad. The far jihad

aims to create a global jihad with the goal of a global Muslim state. This fundamentalist

interpretation is at the heart of most of the Islamist terrorism seen today. There are other

aspects, such as poverty, a view that justice has bypassed Muslims and other socio-

economic factors. However, before one can address those factors using information


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warfare, one must understand the cultural underpinnings of Islamist terrorism. This issue

suggests one fertile target for information operations. Another fertile target, affected by

all of the other factors, is terrorist fund-raising and other support or sponsorship from

individuals, groups and states.

One observable facet of the jihad is its dependence upon communications.

Communications allow the jihadists to plan terrorist acts, obtain funding, spread

propaganda, proselytize, and recruit followers. These communications comprise every

type from mouth-to-ear conversations to sophisticated use of the Internet and the World

Wide Web. Clearly, Islamist communications fall well within both Shannon

communication theory and the political theories of Dunn, Arquilla and Ronfeldt, and

others.

4.2 Important Terrorist Groups

Based upon the authors research and open source data, there are over 70 terrorist

groups in Iraq alone.3 Globally, there are at least 76 terrorist groups aligned in one way

or another with al Qaeda. This makes al Qaeda, with an estimated 50,000 members

worldwide, arguably the most important terrorist organization within the Islamist

terrorism networks (MITB; 2007).

4.3 Classifying Terrorism: A Taxonomy

The author published a paper that addresses in depth the topic of a taxonomy of

terrorism (Stephenson; Nov. 2006). Much of this section references that paper. The

3 One particularly useful open source for this type of information is MITB Terrorism Knowledge

Base - http://www.tkb.org/Home.jsp


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complete taxonomy appears in Appendix A.1.

One of the key difficulties in developing a counter-terrorism strategy is

understanding terrorism itself. Simplistic issues such as a universally accepted definition,

obviously a requirement for beginning any sort of understanding, are problematic when

one discusses terrorism. Different states have different definitions for terrorism and its

associated concepts. Often these definitions aim to serve national, political or religious

objectives rather than contribute to a clearer understanding of the phenomenon. For

example, Jenkins addresses the problem repeatedly (Jenkins; 1986).

The author extracted definitions of terrorism from 33 international documents that

included laws, treaties and other defining information (JUSTICE; 2006) along with

definitions from some of the important writers on the subject. While there is no

universally accepted definition of terrorism, there are several defining characteristics. A

few of these characteristics, such as violence against non-combatants and ideological or

political motivation, seem to appear regularly in the literature. It was the authors intent

to extract all of the relevant characteristics and, through a series of extractions,

refinements and analyses, develop a taxonomy that allowed a more useful analysis of

such things as terrorist acts and motivations.

Although the author describes the entire process in detail in his paper, it is useful

to summarize here. The steps involved in extracting and analyzing the characteristics of

terrorism are:

1. Extraction of key definitional elements from a variety of sources

2. Broad classification using CATA (Computer Aided Thematic Analysis)

(Kabay; 2006)


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3. Development of stratified ontology

4. Extraction as a taxonomy

5. Refinement into a paired representation

6. Link analysis to discover non-obvious relationships

The full taxonomy in Appendix A.1 reflects the extraction referenced in step 4.

The link analysis (step 6) appears in Figure 6 below.

Figure 6 - Link Analysis of "Terrorism" at the Sub-Class Level

Figure 6 represents the definitional elements of terrorism present in the literature

illustrated hierarchically. This is useful for demonstrating definitional dependencies. The

key elements of terrorism those elements that provided a context for analysis include:

Internationally protected persons

Justifiability

Targeting aircraft and ships

Hostage-taking


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Means of invoking terrorist acts

Targeting the general public (i.e., non-combatants)

Causing damage to property or the environment

Invoking a state of terror or fear

The individual relationships become more obvious if the link analysis is displayed

slightly differently as in Figure 7.

Figure 7 - Relationships from Figure 6 Organized in a "Peacock" Display

A yet more meaningful analysis emerges when we extract clusters from the

overall analysis. The authors paper describes clustering in detail and illustrates the

clustering of the data at one level deeper then illustrated here. However, clustering of the

elements shown in Figures 6 and 7 is instructive. That clustering appears in Figure 8.


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Figure 8 - Clustering of the Elements Shown in Figure 6 and 7

Clustering analysis reveals those elements or groupings with the tightest

interconnections. Thus, we may think of a cluster as a representation of the important

relationships in a link analysis. As shown in Figure 8, there are six important

relationships to the core term: hostage-taking, damage to property or the environment,

targeting the general public, damage to aircraft and ships, the means of performing

terrorist acts, and the invocation of a state of terror in victims. This cluster aids in the

analysis of acts suspected to be of terrorist origin. However, it does less to help us

understand what, exactly, terrorism is.

The authors paper goes into detail regarding the second level analysis of the

ontological data extracted in step 3 above. However, from that analysis eight core

characteristics emerged:

1. Threatens International Peace and Security

2. Effects Are Psychological

3. Threat of Violence


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4. Induces Fear

5. Use of Force

6. Conspiracy

7. Financing

8. Targets General Population

From these eight core determinants one begins to see the emergence of a

definition that addresses the most nearly universally accepted elements of terrorism. The

author, in his paper, proposed an axiom that is necessary but not necessarily sufficient to

characterize terrorism based upon this analysis:

Axiom 1 Universal Characteristics of Terrorism

Terrorism must be comprised of at least all of the following

characteristics:

Consists minimally of acts that threaten international peace and

security, that depend upon psychological effects for their success and that

induce fear through the use of force or threat of violence against the general

population. Terrorism is financed and is characterized by conspiracy among

participants.

Here, then, we have the beginnings of a universally acceptable definition by virtue

of the strong interconnections between the most frequently appearing elements in the

literature. However, from the literature we also find that terrorism is ideological or

political in its underpinnings (appearing in the ontology as a slot under motive and not


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shown at the analysis level of Figures 6 and 7).

Therefore, in the context of this thesis, the author will use the following definition

of terrorism. This definition seems well supported by the literature.

Definition 1 - Terrorism

Terrorism consists of violent acts, ideologically or

politically motivated, that threaten international peace and

security, that depend upon psychological effects for their

success and that induce fear through the use or threat of

violence against non-combatants.

4.4 Conclusions

The nature of terrorism in todays global environment is that it is, by a large

majority, Islamist in nature. While Islamist fundamentalism is at the core of global

terrorism, however, other socio-political-economic factors also offer opportunities for

applying information dominance as a soft counter-terrorism measure successfully.

A key factor in understanding the cultural and religious differences between

fundamentalist Islamists and the Western world in the context of terrorism is a clear

understanding of terrorism itself. There are no globally accepted definitions of terrorism

that are useful to us, but we can characterize factors and aspects of terrorist acts and

motivations. We have extracted a profile of terrorism from a variety of acceptable


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sources and from that, we have evolved a useful definition. Using that definition and the

taxonomy of terrorism, we can begin to address countermeasures in a meaningful way.


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5. THE LAW AND INFORMATION CONFLICT

In the context of this thesis, there is little need to explore this area in depth. Most

of the seminal work on this topic has been done by Wingfield (Wingfield; 2000).

However, it is useful to note where the law and information conflict either are adequate

or are inadequate to address terrorist activities.

Many analysts address terrorism and the law both domestically and

internationallyby viewing terrorist acts as criminal acts. In this regard, it may be useful

to analyze the convergence of the law, information conflict and terrorism. To that

purpose, this chapter offers a brief discussion of the legal issues potentially involved in

the use of information warfare, information operations and cyber conflict as tools for

counter-terrorism.

The context for this chapter is counter-terrorism, terrorist groups and sub-national

actors. The question to be answered is, does international or domestic law prohibit the use

of elements of information dominance, especially cyber conflict, in the context of

counter-terrorism? The primary reference for this chapter is Wingfield; 2000.

5.1 Municipal or Domestic Law

Domestic law

Documents

Information Dominance as an Affirmative Countermeasure Against International Terrorism