INFORMATION PEACEKEEPING:Innovative Policy Options

Robert D. Steele'

Abstract

Information peacekeeping is the strategic deterrent of the 21st Century. It is thefoundation for i?7formed policy--successful policy--rand it enables both the policy-makerand the commander to avoid hattle--he acme of skill--while achieving policy objectivesvital to U.S. national security and national competitiveness. Unfortunately, informationpeacekeeping is also the anti-thesis to traditional warfighting. It calls into question theutility of our existing intelligence community as it is inow structured, as well as thewisdom of our existlig defen'se orgTaizationl, ast it is now trail ed, equipped. andorganized. Information peacekeepiing requlires the ahandonment of the concept of aunilateral military.focused strictly on conventional armed conflict, tand reLqu/res thai"warfighting "--like peacekeeping--he unLdelstood cand carried out ill ct mtch broadercontext--a context which recognizes that our home/fiont is our Achilles' heel: that

politics, economics, culture, demographic movements, and the environment are "war byother means "; and that the sitglek most vital contributor to .srvival at the dcnaw of the

21st Century is truth--the production and exploitation of accurate intelligence.

Contents

Changing Nature of War and Peace .......... 2Four Warrior Classes..........3

Information Continuum..........4Cognitive Battlefield..........5

Net Assessments..........6Knowledge Terrain..........7

Information Peacekeeping Psychology .......... 8The Information Peacekeeping Chessboard..........9

Integrated Information Peacekeeping .......... 10Information Peacekeeping--Application Scenarios.......... I1

Improving Policy Options Through Applied Intelligence .......... 12Preliminary Definition of Information Peacekeeping.......... 13

T he author is providing this material in his capacity as an interested citizen, with no commercialofferings or equities. Comments are eagerly solicited so that this might be refined into an article forpublication in a defense journal. Communicate with the author at <ceo(d!oss.net>. voice (703) 242-1701.fax (703) 242-1711. or mail to OSS. Inc.. 11005 Langton Arms Court, Oakton. Virginia 22124-1807.Two pertinent articles. one with a military thrust and one with a civilian thrust. are recommended andprovided to the workshop as background reading: "Creating a Smart Nation: Information Strategy, VirtualIntelligence. and Information Warfare". in (CT'BERIWAR: Securitv, Stratev, and Conflict in theInformation Age (AFCEA International Press. 1996): and "Creating a Smart Nation: Strategy. Policy.Intelligence. & Information". in Government Information Quarterly (Summer 1996).

255

Changing Nature of War and Peace

WAR

PEACE

Talking Points:

01 Policy options have to start "here", during violent "peace", and "now"02 Information peacekeeping is the ultimate global presence03 Information can move at the speed of light and cover large areas04 This means information peacekeeping is thefirst policy option--both to ensure that

our own policy-makers have a full deck of cards, and to impact on the cards beingheld by those whom we seek to influence

05 Need to develop an information "order of battle" with related Tables ofOrganization and Tables of Equipment--much of this might be "virtual" and rely onprivate sector providers of information and information technology

06 This means that intelligence now has an operational dimension & a civil dimension07 This will require changes in concepts, doctrine, procurement, and security

256

LO

HERE THERE

TIME)

Four Warrior Classes

Physical Stealth.

Physical Stealth.Precision Targeting

ECONOMIC WAR

GUERRILLAHIGH WARS LOWTECH TECH Natural Stealth,

BRUTES BRUTES RandomTargeting(MIC/HIC) (LIC)

Money-Ruthlessness| POWERBASE I TERRORISMKnowledge-Ideology

Cyber-Stealth,Database Targeting

HIGHTECH

SEERS(C31 WAR)

LOWTECH

SEERSCULTURAL (JIHAD)

WARS

Ideo-Stealth,MassTargeting

Talking Points:

01 Need to consider information aspects of each warrior class02 Intelligence collection, processing, and analysis deficient for 3 out of 403 Make no mistake: the foundation for good policy is good intelligence04 Need to hold policy-makers accountable for failing to demand intelligence05 Three of the four warrior classes are already inside our perimeter06 This drives home the inseparable integration of law enforcement at home with

military operations and civilian policy lemarches abroad07 Information is the ultimate countervailing force against all four warrior classes

257

Information Continuum

0\ o0-rv-

"A \ AL

OS

V6LY

L.

.t-lt l-5

Schools Private InvestigatorsK-12 Libraries Information Brokers Government Intelligence

ist5e~o Universities Business Media Defense

j(2-, (-,3- ~ q- u~u e,,.-ri -2r-

a map<2,£r aa i Uo K e2Vir T-S ts OWD4

Talking Points:

In the age of distributed information. "central intelligence" is an oxymoron90% of the information "power"-oTa nation is not military and not under controlNetworking--"knowing who knows" is the emerging source of powerHow do we create an "order or battle' for national and international information?What are the security, procurement, and doctrinal implications?What is the role of the analyst in a networked environment?How does this change the way the policy-maker and commander do business?

258

01

020304050607

F

Cognitive Battlefield

PoliticiansExecutive LeadershipLegislative Leadership

Personal & Professional Staffs

Government OfficialsDepartment HeadsAssistant SecretariesProgram ManagersMessage Traffic

Private and Public SectorLobbyistsExecutivesCitizen GroupsPollstersIndividuals

MediaCNN/C-SPANNewspapersWire ServicesRadio/TVPool Reporters

P0LICY

MAKER

PersonalFamilyIntimatesChurchClubsAlumni

Foreign Officialsand OrganizationsDiplomatsCounterpartsCorrespondence

Autonomous ResearchersThink TanksAcademicsAuthorsFoundationsLaboratories

Intelligence CommunityCIANSA/DIAStateServices

Talking Points:

01 Policy-maker is inundated with contradictory unvalidated information02 Thefirst mind that must be won is the home policy mind03 Thefirst heart that must be won is the home public heart04 Censorship and secrecy are not viable options on the home front05 Traditional PSYOPS will not work in today's environment06 "Multi-channel" precision-delivery of tntth is the SIOP of the information age07 Winning hearts & minds is an information-intensive campaign--and not a cheap

campaign either: information costs money to collect, process, and disseminate;information peacekeeping is not a low-cost alternative to traditional warfare, but itis less expensive

259

Net Assessments

gi, %ius_ L dltl L stateC LEVEl - InMetoted Akicetein ef ai rntlacl ourace of pow

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*IOCATII $Strateglic eeo-politicl locaton or surce of materlstl

CGEOGRAW \ALIE ^^ ak External relatlonaip of strategic lport

4. lt . - -r u--A . · iUL *f lcl n Lot l .o al !W -r

ttlll of *illtary paTr milmble for cmltment

Intierml noitul urce .ordlAn *«lf-suatelnwt

Internl preclpitnts & precadltlw of oltillty

-am- Ae -a et-...- .1 It ... #I It ELt~~tL .fUU~ #i -- -' ..- mf -l~ e m · i-tItVl - I-p ilcl l i '! I- lL - -E ...-. .- ~ - ---

act *f tralnlir & aintrnmc en ulstilr capbilltle

Internl si agraic candltion *fiectring blilty

Internl Agr durulcs affectnlg cdhean & qpartlorn

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. ._.. - .-. I...ai in H d in lsoatlonIL. - .... - ......

Ifectiwnel of specific c ilitie urlin no conrainis

Internal cl-te* affectir syste pfor wc

Civillar stnrcture errbling or blocting *syst m

IHSSll AREA AmNATSIS SLICE Vertical it orliontl teootVertical: thrugh eac level of wrfweoritentfl: In relatlon to geoyrqhic & civil lactors

Talking Points:

01 Threat changes depending on the level of analysis--threat might not be military

02 Military "threat" is meaningless outside a specific civil and geographic context

03 "Center of gravity" for any confrontation will vary from level to level and also

between military, civil, and geographic--challenge is to find the center04 Cannot mirror pain thresholds and vulnerabilities-cultural intelligence critical

05 Each level of analysis has its own timeframe--technical moment, tactical hour,

operational day, strategic period--information peacekeeping has same timeframes06 Think about this analysis model in relation to non-state actors: gangs, corporations07 Think about strategic generalizations--aviation temperature, cross-country

mobility, line of sight distance, bridge loading, port availability--acquisition today

does not really support optimal policy flexibility across varying contingencies

260

Nil

NIL

Nil

Knowledge Terrain

POLITICAL SOCIO- IDEO- TECHNO- NATURAL-LEGAL ECONOMIC CULTURAL DEMOGRAPHIC GEOGRAPHIC

Talking Points:

01 Information Peacekeeping must use all available knowledge terrain02 "Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield" applies to knowledge terrain03 Named Areas of Interest, Target Areas of Interest, Mobility Corridors04 Each of these domains has a multi-layer psychological scale which constitutes

the foundation for 21st century "information operations" vice PSYOPS05 Cannot be effective at information peacekeeping without a solid understanding

of the preconditions and precipitants of revolution--"information peacekeeping"is the art of instigating revolution along lines favorable to democracy and peace

06 Most of the expertise in these areas is in the private sector, and way beyond theken of the average civilian or military intelligence analyst

07 "Information peacekeeping" abroad begins with information networking at home

261

Information Peacekeeping Psychology

Stage One: Individual ExcitementPerception of disequilibriumIdentity established with others

Stage Two: Collective UnrestCompetence in organizingInvestment (dedication) to group

Stage Three: Formal TransitionRisk adoption becomes commonExtroversion becomes the norm

Stage Four: LegalizationTranscendence through integrationSynergy through success

Talking Points:

01 Starts with the individual: impact on perceptions of the problem, then focus onhelping individuals identify with (and communicate with) one another

02 Then shift to collective organization, seeking to help individuals organize in acompetent and secure fashion, and to reinforce their investment /commitment tothe ideas favorable to U.S. policy

03 In third stage, those in favor of U.S. policy are empowered to take more riskand to communicate their views to others

04 Finally, the information peacekeeping effort culminates with the internalizationand legitimization of U.S. policy through integration and success, with tangibledividends perceived as a reward for adopting new behavior or course of action

05 Think about how the U.S. Information Agency should play in this arena--theycan produce cultural and biographical intelligence, and can communicate ideas,coordinate delivery of"tools for truth"

06 "Tools for Truth": cellular phones, fax machines, computers, subsidized accessto the Internet, to commercial online services, to international investigativeresources

07 Bottom line: you can inform, you cannot deceive. Access to information isultimately the arbiter for democratic success, and the objective of informationpeacekeeping

262

The Information Peacekeeping Chessboard

DIMENSIONS OF CHANaE

POLITICAL-LEGAL SOCIO-ECONOMI C 1;EC-CULTL;AL

ISOLATION OF tLITES

INADEUATrl INTELLIUGNCRESTRICTED CITIZENSHIP

SASE FOR ELITES

iACl

O COWSENSUS ATHE ELITES

FAILURE TO CONSTITUTETHC GOVERUtMNT

FAILURE TO ENlurlATE AUVPlRoIRTIES

WEAK O* INEFFICIENTGOVERIWMNT

'XCISSIV5 o0 INAtDEUAtOBtUIAUCRt I AT ION

CGO-CENTRIC PHILOSOPHIESor CGOVEYtINT

AIOCHIAL GOVIrHRT T

:LITE INTlANS I GENCfOLITICAL REPEtSSION

WAILURE TO ADAPT TO CHMISOURCES OF POiR BNY M*OIrvisG INSTITUTIOS

FAILUtl 10 INCOtPOIATE TlA-DITIONAL GOUPS INTO THEPOLITICAL SECTOR

NtEFECTIVE On ION-XISTENTTENSIOMA tAGtENT SYSTEMS

AlLUEt To CRITICAULL EXIMINUrDORLTING PREMISES OF THEPOLITY

OtCIGN CONTROL O tXPLOi'TATION OF toAllNllT

XCESSIVt. INCON ISTniT.o0 ARITIRAR AUTHORITY

kILURE TO ASSIMILATE ALLINDIVIDUALS INTO THEPOLITICAL CCOPm IT

LILURt TO PEACEFULLY Ptt-VElT INT*IGUE Y ItINCtESPONSIVE TO N(EDS OF

sbl.oDI iAT GCOUPS

AIISON STATESNOUSTRIAL STATES

uELFR STATES

CONIClTnATIl OF WEALTHLACK of PULIC DISCLOSURINFLATIO AlN UND& LOYlMNT

LOSS OF ECOMOHIC INITIATIVST THE COVlNMWNT

FAILURE TO RICOGCIZE CON-STRINTS 0N BSLAICD.ORGANIC GRaOTN

INCFFtCTIVE OR INAPRO-Pl*ATt FISCAL. OSeARY.00 DEVELOPIENT POLICllS

INCOSISTENT. IkCNFFCIEUT.ON INADEtUATE WELFAIRSYSTEM

EXCESSIVE 0a INSUFFICIETROlILITY

FAILURt TO SUPORT AND DE-vELOP THE PUBLIC SECTOR

FAILURE TO DEAL WIT CRIHE.PARTICULARLY WHITE COLLARCRIM

TO RlIOUP PROltit S

STRUCTURAL DlFFERENTIATIONFAILURE TO SUPPOT DEVELOP-

MENT OF A NATIONALLY I-TEaATED INFRASTRUCTUREAND LIGHT MACHIM INDUS-TRY

FAILURE TO IVWR P"ORDUCTIV-ITY In AGRICULTURE

OLT0/OLICOPOLV S I TUA-T0IS. ESPECIALLY IFIOREIUI DOMINATION

FAILUIT TO MAINTATI STAND-AiDS OUUALITY

FAILURE TO SUPtlYVIS ANDCOODINATE THC ACTIVITIES

STATUS DoSCREPANCIEINADIOUATC OPPOTUNITlES

FOi SOCI10-lCOIIC 1OTI-VATION

Y~It

EXCSSlIV ALLOCATION OFRESOURCES TONARUMILI TANT UPEOIlITU

RAPID. UtCOemTMLLUD MaCHARACTERIllDZ b TIMIS-ALLOCATIO OF tr-SOURCES THROUGH MAnlEJIT

"AL DISECO OICESURSTARLE DIXVLOPRIT WITH

DISPANITIIS ETWEElNREVENUE A EtxPEttOlTUlEADVERSITY AFTER PROPER-ITY AFTER AmDVESITY

CONFLICTINM MYTHSIADOUATE SOCIALIZATIONIDOL.61CAL DCATCOlOSIVE SOCIAL PILOSO-

PIES CUHAACTERlIZD BIUWlSOLVED PARADI MATIC ANOMALItS

LOSS Ot AUTMOITY (BtEAi-o aDIW I AS ITS or

FAILURE TO PROVIDE AND TOHOWO NATIONAL MYTH

I I

UMILIATION Of LEADUSLOSS OF CONrFIDENC Ii A

FRUSTRATED POPUIAIION

CmlICISrI OPPORTURISM

COIRPT I O

FAILURE TO DEAL IF'PREJUICE

DSlllTION OF THEINTELLECTUALS

ELITE ADOPTION Of FOlGNHOES AND LIFE STTLES

FAILUE TO DEAL WITN ALIEtATIOM BY rEDUCIIN ANXIEYrM11H CONSISTE1T MOOCEATIOI

FAILUlE TO COUlTER OR AS-SIMILAll FOREIGN IDO-LO6ItS

SIPPSSION OF InTLLUCTUALDISCOURSE

CENSOtSIP OF DAILY HEDIA

FAILUR to PROVIDE ON TOM AITAIN A SUPRA-COMI1UALPARADIGM

FAILURE Of RLIlGIO AS AC0OMrAL SONO

ASSlICt Of SUILIMATINGHS (HAVEN WILL COME

TO THOSt WHO sIFFRl fRRAU TO RICHESI

CULTURL PE-DItSPOSITlOTOUAO VIOLENCE S ANOMATIVE UAV101OPATTIERN

COIrSPICuO CONSUl TIONSOCIAL DISEOUILISInUw

ATOMISM. FAIIArITUFANATICISM

ACOUltSCECt TO MEDIADISTORTIONS

FAILUE TO UTILIZt MASSBDIA EFFECTIVELY

IADEOUATt PUBLIC EDUCA-TION

FAILUL TO tCOGNIZl. MOO-POIZE. OR ASSIMILATEALL SOURCES OF P R ANDTtll ATTErNDAT PERSOMEL

FAILURE TO trOKCE THEPRIORITIES. ALLOWINGA LOSS OF INNOVATIVE

NTIENTUM

FAILURE TO EtCOUMAG IWO-VATlO AND INTRlPIN-EIMSHIP

FAILURE TO EITItU THEFRANCHISE AkD ALL ITSBINrFI TS

FAILURE TC INITIATE NOVELPOGRAMS llNAICIkN tXtrOTENTIAL OF vARIOUSUIMRPLI|«tLCGC GROUPS

FAILURE TO SUPPOT RESLARCAND DVELOPNNMT ItTIDTOlARD NATIoNAL (PLIC,MIDNITIE$

FAILURt TO DEVELOP NATIONALIFIIASTRUCTURt FACILITATINS MOBILITY AND SHADIMAGES

FAILURE TO INTtCGRAT IDI-GtEOUS to PRIMITIVEG SUP INTO COlSMITT

FAILUE TO CONTIOL POLICE.'AN". W0 TERRORISTS

EPIOYlMllT OPPORTUNITIES

FAILURE TO PROVIDE A FtRAt-m FORl PROGRAM AND

TECHNOLOGY ASStSSMENFAILURE TO DAL WITH DISEASE

EXCESSIVC OlR UNREGULATEDDEVELOMIENT OFr UCLAUUCAPACITIESl SUPlPOT FOiCOST INEErrCTIVE PO-GRAMS

EXCESSIVE OR UR uIEGAT[DPOLLUTIOM

lXCtSSIVE OR UwCEGULATEDURIBA IATION

OVE-EIIPESIS ON A SINGLESECTOR Or DUCT

FAILLUE TO EXPLORE NATURALtSOURCE POTENTIAL

OVERLY Fr`A1NMTTD OR CON-CENTRATED LAND OLDINGS

FAILURE TO INCORoORATl OUTlLTING TtlrnITOl11 WITHINNATIONAL JURISDICTIOm

FAILUrE TO PrPAW FOR OCOPE WITu ATIOmADISASTERS (CLIMATICOCHANs. AI-THUA-S)

FAILUR TO PRSU VIE SCARCNATURAL RESOURCES

FAILUtR TO PIROPW LV El-PLOIT INTURA IEUSCKC'

FAILURE :C PlSEtL t it PRO-TtCT ALL SPECIICES OF I',.

FAILURE T' RECOGNIZE THE RICGHAND OCTNTItAL OF ALL rrwsA IC OTll IPCIES

rAILUIl TO ltXLORt THE AA-lTAES o RGIONA0 L INTERA-TION AND INTERl'lTIOA1 AiS-

tllAINTS on AotTH^

*til rcCu ' CAL sFAILUM TO APPO CIAT T

llED FOR ORlAIC GROWTH

FAILURE TO llSTRInuvPOITICAL BiNEFITS BETWoEEUAL AND RURAL AlRt S

FAILUR TO DEAL WITH N Isel-alENTAL TImEATS

RAPID RATE OF ANT Elinor CMHAN

UIAVAILAILITY OF LANDFOR ElPANSIONa lINFFl-tICt LAND TltE, Sn -TER

INCOWATIIILltT ICTWlNRESOURCt LOCATION ANDDEMOGRAPC DISTRIIU-TION

263

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Integrated Information Peacekeeping

INTELLIGENCE

INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY ELECTRONIC("TOOLS FOR TRUTH") HOME DEFENSE

Talking Points:

01 Information Peacekeeping starts and stops with intelligence--accurate andcomprehensive intelligence about all elements of the target's knowledge terrainand psychology, and the insertion of intelligence into the target at multiple precisepoints so as to alter the kiowledge terrain and alter the balance of in formationpower within the target organization or state2

02 Information technology is best used to increase access to information for thosekey individuals and organizations deemed favorable to U.S. policy

03 Traditional manipulation will not work--only truth works--U.S. policy must bereasonable and well-informed, or it will fail. Information peacekeeping willaccelerate the acceptance of good IS. policy; it cannot make a bad UIS. policysuccessfil in spite of itself

04 Information warfare is the in extremis element of information peacekeeping--ingeneral, electronic home defense is the focus of effort.

05 Teaching others how to conduct information warfare on their own people is anextremely hazardous undertaking

06 Offensive information warfare is the 21st century equivalent of chemical andbiological warfare--it is fraught with long-term consequences we do notunderstand

07 If we do not lie to ourselves and do not lie to others, information peacekeepingcould revolutionize the behavior of state and non-state actors, and completelyredefine war and peace as we know it

2 NOTE: "Intelligence" is information that has been tailored to support a specific decision.Information is collated data of generic interest. generally broadcast. Data is the raw image, signal orprint. Nowhere is it written that "intelligence " must he secret!

264

Information Peacekeeping--Application Scenarios

POLITICAL:

Preparation: Net assessment of likely separatist movements--including domestic separatist movements--yields new integrated approach to political liaison and economic trade assistance at the province and statelevel. Emphasis is on properly evaluating cultural imperatives rather than political prerogatives.

Application: Provide open source intelligence support as a good will gesture and to help avoidstereotyping or fear-induced violence. Provide Global Infonnation Infrastructure (GII) grants as part of a"tools for truthl initiative. Help all parties create electronic home defenses against information warfare.

ECONOMIC:

Preparation: Net assessment of poverty-including domestic poverty exacerbated by illegal immigration--yields understanding of threat in terms of crime. civil disobedience and violence, information terrorism(attacks on information infrastructure by dispossessed neo-Luddites). Emphasis on economic self-sustainnent and wealth re-distribution as long-term program for avoidance of xxr and terrorism.

Application: Develop the national defense budget as a whole. with specific attention to education. labor.commerce, and justice equities at home. and with a clear understanding that U.S. expenditures andcapabilities overseas must provide for the avoidance of economic disparities which induce violence.Redefine foreign aid and military assistance in these terms. Dramatically reduce arms sales subsidies infavor of economic subsidies.

CULTURAL:

Preparation: Net assessment of cultural barriers to democracy and capitalism; candidevaluation of aspects of capitalism which foster white collar crime and "cultural imperialism".development of global cultural "rules of engagement" which lessen tensions between traditional andemerging cultures.

Application: Increase funding for U.S. Information Agency. Peace Corps. and civil government and civilengineering elements of DoD. Negotiate cultural treaties which clearly identify and address host countryareas of concern. Focus on host country immigrants to U.S. as a vehicle for bridging cultural gaps.

DEMOGRAPHIC:

Preparation: Net assessment of domestic and international migration. disease. birth rates. and educationallevels, with deliberate policies, including monitoring and financial incentives and assistance, to reducenegative impact of demographic change on U.S. security and prosperity.

Application: Share information and open source intelligence about trends and forecasted economicimplications of trends. Work aggressively, using both ilfonnation and money, to stabilize globalpopulation growth and increase global economic prosperity on a country by country basis.

GEOGRAPHIC:

Preparation: Net assessment of trends toward urbanization. depletion of water and arable land. andgeneral vulnerability of major populations to catastrophic failure of agricultural and transportation "lifesupport" systems-develop clear policies and financial incentives for "organic" self-sustainable growth.

Application: As with demographic-use intelligence to educate and influence environmental sustainment.

265

Improving Policy Options Through Applied Intelligence

Seven Steps

01 Work with DIA, ISA, and Net Assessments to formulate a global modelfor developing net assessments for each of the four warrior classes in thelarger knowledge terrain context. Note that it would be useful to establisha SOLIC "Top Ten" Key Intelligence Questions focused on the threeemerging warrior classes.

02 Establish a requirement for an Open Source Intelligence Center locatedin the Pentagon, perhaps as an adjunct to the National Military JointIntelligence Center, and directly responsive to DoD policy-makers.

03 Create inter-agency "tiger teams" to study each of the three emergingwarrior classes, and commission wargames (e.g. through the ArmyWar College Peacekeeping Center, or the Marine Corps WargamingCenter) to consider various policy scenarios using only open sourceintelligence so that international and private sector allies can be included

04 Develop intelligence collection requirements as well as funding proposalsfor establishing global networks of predominantly private sector "sensors"and subject matter experts focused on each policy problem area; managethese as an extension of the Open Source Intelligence Center, but withdirect liaison and oversight from within the policy & operations community.

05 Begin the process of creating an information "order of battle" in whichspecific individuals and organizations are the "targets", and specific kinds ofinformation and intelligence products are the "munitions". Developoperational plans for altering knowledge terrain in specific instances suchas Burundi.

06 Recognize that information peacekeeping abroad will not succeed withoutinformation networking at home, and that there is a "civil defense" aspectto information peacekeeping--a completely accurate and truthful "netassessment" of the situation to be influenced is a pre-requisite to effectiveinformation peacekeeping operations.

07 Practice, practice, practice. Develop three prototype operations--one focused on atribal war, one on a transnational criminal gang, and one on an economic opponentusing illegal industrial espionage or information warfare methods--and run themfor real, with wargaming, collection plans, net assessments, delivery of informationproducts and tools for truth to appropriate parties, and bi-annual evaluations of theimpact of the information peacekeeping operations. Establish a separate fundingline for such operations in the next budget.

266

Preliminary Definition of Information Peacekeeping

Information Peacekeeping is the active exploitation of information andinformation technology in order to modify the balance of power between specificindividuals and groups so as to achieve IS. policy objectives. The three elements ofinformation peacekeeping, in order ofpriority, are intelligence (providing usefilactionable information); information technology (providing "toolsfor truth" whichafford the recipient access to international information and the ability to communicatewith others); and electronic home defense, a strictly defensive aspect of informationwarfare.

What It Is Not

Information Peacekeeping is not the application of information or informationtechnology in support of conventional military peacekeeping operations, or in support ofUnited Nations or coalition military operations.

Information Peacekeeping is not the development and execution of traditionalpsychological operations which focus on manipulating perceptions and imposing strategicdeceptions.

Information Peacekeeping is not covert action media placement operations, covertaction agent of influence operations, or covert action paramilitary operations.

Information Peacekeeping is not clandestine human intelligence (HUMINT)operations.

Gray Areas

Information Peacekeeping may require the clandestine delivery of classified oropen source intelligence, or the covert delivery of"tools for truth", as a means ofnurturing critical nodes of influence in their early days under oppressive regimes.

Information Peacekeeping may require the covert delivery of assistance inelectronic home defense, or selective offensive information warfare operations (eithercovert or overt) in order to "level the playing field" between emerging democratic andcapitalist nodes, and their oppressive opponents.

On Balance

Information Peacekeeping by its nature is most powerful and most effective whenit relies exclusively on open sources of intelligence and overt action, and when it istherefore incontestably legal and ethical under all applicable rules of law including hostcountry and non-Western cultural and religious rules of law.

267

OSS '96: THE CONFERENCE Proceedings, 1996 Volume II, Fifth Internatinal

Symposium Global Security & Global Competitiveess: Open - Link PagePrevious Mr. Robert Ayers, Department of Defense, Vulnerabilities and Opportunities in the Open Source System --

Protecting the Civilian Infrastructure as an Aspect of Information Warfare

Next Co-Keynote Speaker: Mr. Ted Nanz, President, SPOT Image Corporation, Remarks

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