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ACCC/AER Regulatory Conference 2014
Brisbane, 7 August, 2014
Ingo Vogelsang, Boston University
0
I.V. August 7, 2014, Regulating for Efficient Infrastructure Outcomes
International Perspectives
Overview
Hot U.S. topics
Net neutrality
Incentive auctions for spectrum
Mergers
Incentivizing broadband investment and adoption
Electricity regulation, investment and the environment
Conclusions
1
I.V. August 7, 2014, Regulating for Efficient Infrastructure
Outcomes International Perspectives
Hot U.S. topics
Net neutrality:
Over 1 million comments in current proceeding!
Regulations that dictate how content is handled and networks are managed reduce the incentive to invest in next-generation networks and technologies and tie the hands of companies that wish to experiment with innovative offerings. (Rep. Greg Walden (R-OR), chairman of the Energy and Commerce Subcommittee on Communications and Technology, and Rep. Bob Latta (R-OH))
Incentive auctions for spectrum:
The most complicated auctions ever
Mergers:
AT&T – Direct TV
Comcast – Time Warner Cable
2 I.V. August 7, 2014, Regulating for Efficient Infrastructure Outcomes
International Perspectives
Incentivizing broadband investment and adoption
Effect of objective function: Total surplus vs. consumer welfare approach
U.S. deregulatory approach
NGA coverage vs. consumer uptake
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I.V. August 7, 2014, Regulating for Efficient Infrastructure
Outcomes International Perspectives
Effect of regulatory objective on dynamic efficiency High WACC for new investment: Total surplus approach
No doubt that high WACC is beneficial
I.V. August 7, 2014, Regulating for Efficient
Infrastructure Outcomes International Perspectives
High WACC 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑠 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑛𝑒𝑤 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡
𝐷𝑛𝑒𝑤
𝐷𝑜𝑙𝑑
𝑞
4
𝑃𝑛𝑒𝑤
𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑑
DWL
Consumer gain from new product
= 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑙𝑑 = 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑛𝑒𝑤
Effect of regulatory objective on dynamic efficiency High WACC for new investment: Consumer welfare
approach Lots of doubts about high WACC
I.V. August 7, 2014, Regulating for Efficient
Infrastructure Outcomes International Perspectives
𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ 𝑊𝐴𝐶𝐶 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑠 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑛𝑒𝑤 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡
𝐷𝑛𝑒𝑤
𝐷𝑜𝑙𝑑
𝑞
𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑟 𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑠 = 𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚 gain
5
𝑃𝑛𝑒𝑤
𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑑
DWL
= 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑙𝑑 = 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑛𝑒𝑤
Example from New Zealand (Oxera Report):
DWL from ΔWACC = $0.1-1.0 million
Consumer loss from ΔWACC = $105 million
U.S. deregulatory approach
In 2002-2005 the U.S. embarked on deregulation of wholesale broadband access and relied mostly on competition for broadband investment
Today, people on both sides of the Atlantic complain that there is too little broadband expansion,
in U.S. it is claimed to be due to too little regulation monopoly power and collusion,
in EU it is claimed to be due to too much regulation
However, new data by Yoo show the U.S. to be ahead of EU in NGA and LTE in terms of coverage.
6
I.V. August 7, 2014, Regulating for Efficient
Infrastructure Outcomes International Perspectives
U.S. NGA coverage per household as of the end of 2012
Sources: Fetzer and Yoo based on U.S. and European Commission mapping studies
Type of service U.S. Europe
NGA 82% 54%
Rural NGA 48% 12%
DOCSIS 3.0 81% 39%
FTTP 23% 12%
LTE 86% 27%
I.V. August 7, 2014, Regulating for Efficient
Infrastructure Outcomes International Perspectives 7
Explanations for the U.S. success in broadband build-out
U.S. success in NGA mostly due to cable: 81% coverage from cable vs. 82% from all sources
Verizon FIOS (GPON): Stalled after strong build-out
However: FTTH investment race Google vs. AT&T
Success of cable in NGA due to
95% coverage of cable overall: Result of old policies
Cable backbone build-out in the 1990s in order to support “500 channels”: Not related to broadband Internet access
Replacement effect from access deregulation of fixed networks
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I.V. August 7, 2014, Regulating for Efficient
Infrastructure Outcomes International Perspectives
Path dependence of policies
Optimal investment policies depend on (sunk) legacy infrastructures
Duplicate NGA build-out justified (almost) only where duplicate legacy infrastructures: Only incremental investments count
Upgrade to DOCSIS 3.0 was cheap.
Upgrade to VDSL with vectoring is fairly cheap
GPON FTTH is fairly expensive (Verizon FIOS)
P2P FTTH is very expensive: requires high densities
All greenfield NGA networks are very expensive.
→Optimal regulatory policies depend on legacy infrastructures
EU: Monopoly outside areas with cable or outside cities → access regulation?
US: Danger of cable dominance in NGA in most of the country?
EU depends more than U.S. on LTE becoming a meaningful substitute for fixed NGA
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I.V. August 7, 2014, Regulating for Efficient
Infrastructure Outcomes International Perspectives
Focus on the demand-side or the supply-side of the market of tools stimulating broadband-rollout?
Field of Dreams: If you build it they will come (?)
Striking difference between coverage and penetration: The case of Malta
Almost 100% coverage and almost 0% penetration
However, in U.S. the latest FCC report also found that “consumers are moving to faster speed tiers, continuing the trend we highlighted in the February 2013 Report and the July 2012 Report.” The average subscribed speed is now 21.2 Mbps, an average annualized speed increase of about 36% from the 15.6 Mbps average in 2012.
In the U.S. build-out and take-up seem to be fairly much in sync.
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I.V. August 7, 2014, Regulating for Efficient
Infrastructure Outcomes International Perspectives
Electricity regulation, investment and the environment
Investment vs. usage: Vogelsang, JRE 2001
Investment by transmission company
Independent system operator (ISO) calculates congestions prices.
Explicit use of two-part tariffs in wholesale price caps in order to induce balanced network expansion and network utilization
Renewables and grid investments
Transmission investments required to accommodate renewables are hard to carry through in the U.S. because of environmental concerns.
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I.V. August 7, 2014, Regulating for Efficient Infrastructure
Outcomes International Perspectives
Electricity regulation, investment and the environment
New proposed U.S. CO2 regulation for electric utilities
Envisages net climate and health benefits of $48-82 billion (at 3% discount rate)
Envisaged CO2 reduction of 30% of the power sector
EPA imposes CO2 limits on all states individually but lets them figure out how to meet the limits.
Long time frame until emission reductions start (2020) and until final limits are reached (2030)
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I.V. August 7, 2014, Regulating for Efficient Infrastructure
Outcomes International Perspectives
Conclusions
Regulatory objectives can make a big difference for the optimal policy choice.
Telecommunications
U.S. deregulation policy probably worked
Network investment because of prior infrastructures
Electricity
Climate policy finally on the move
13
I.V. August 7, 2014, Regulating for Efficient Infrastructure
Outcomes International Perspectives
Backup 1: Hot U.S. topics - Net neutrality
How is net neutrality hot?
Current proceeding and discussions are about paid prioritization under tight conditions for “commercial reasonableness”
vs.
re-classifying Internet as telecommunication service vs.
doing nothing
How is net neutrality related to our topic?
Utilization and build-out of networks
Sources of investment financing
14 I.V. August 7, 2014, Regulating for Efficient Infrastructure Outcomes
International Perspectives
Backup 2: Hot U.S. topics - Incentive auctions for spectrum
Additional spectrum is substitute for additional investment in wireless infrastructure (cell sites, fixed backbone networks)
U.S. Incentive auctions
Try to repurpose existing spectrum rights by encouraging existing broadcast television licensees to voluntarily give up spectrum in exchange for a share in the revenues generated from new licenses auctioned off for this spectrum
Value of spectrum per MHz-pop for mobile services: 1.28 $ vs. 0.11-015 $ for broadcasting
Complicated set of two types of auctions, one to relinquish spectrum (“reverse auction”), one to acquire spectrum (“forward auction”).
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I.V. August 7, 2014, Regulating for Efficient
Infrastructure Outcomes International Perspectives
Backup 3: Hot U.S. topics - Incentive auctions for spectrum
16
I.V. August 7, 2014, Regulating for Efficient
Infrastructure Outcomes International Perspectives
U.S. Incentive auctions
Amount to be sold in forward auction depends on result of reverse auction: Flow
diagram from FCC Staff Summary: The Broadcast Television Spectrum Incentive
Auction
Auction design is being created but incentive auctions will be run in 2015
Backup 4: NGA broadband coverage in Europe (from Fetzer and Yoo)
I.V. August 7, 2014, Regulating for Efficient
Infrastructure Outcomes International Perspectives 17 Malta
Backup 5: NGA broadband penetration in Europe (from Fetzer and Yoo)
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
IT EL CY MT SI PL FR ES AT HU EE SK DE EU FI PT IE UK LU CZ DK BG RO SE LV LT NL BE
High-speed (at least 30 Mbps) broadband penetration, January 2012 - January 2013
Jan-12 Jan-13
Source: Digital Agenda Scoreboard 2013
I.V. August 7, 2014, Regulating for Efficient
Infrastructure Outcomes International Perspectives 18
Malta
Backup 6: Focus on the demand-side or the supply-side of the market of tools stimulating broadband-rollout?
Slow take-up could be the Achilles heal of fixed NGA
How much is lost under slow instead of fast NGA build-out?
Do the empirical results about the effects of broadband on economic growth extend to the delta resulting from a move to NGA?
19
I.V. August 7, 2014, Regulating for Efficient
Infrastructure Outcomes International Perspectives
Backup 7: Two Part Tariff for Investment and Capacity Utilization
Vogelsang (2001) proposes the following approach:
1. The transmission company (Transco) should be allowed to price in
a way that capacity is best utilized
2. The Transco should rise enough money to invest
XiNFqp
NFqpwtwt
wtwt
111
p transmission price q transmission output
F fixed fee N number of consumers
i interest rate X regulatory X-factor